An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.

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Title
An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome.
Author
Le Grand, Antoine, d. 1699.
Publication
London :: Printed by Samuel Roycroft, and sold by the undertaker Richard Blome [and 10 others],
1694.
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Subject terms
Descartes, René, 1596-1650.
Philosophy -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A50014.0001.001
Cite this Item
"An entire body of philosophy according to the principles of the famous Renate Des Cartes in three books, (I) the institution ... (II) the history of nature ... (III) a dissertation of the want of sense and knowledge in brute animals ... / written originally in Latin by the learned Anthony Le Grand ; now carefully translated from the last corrections, alterations, and large additions of the author, never yet published ... by Richard Blome." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A50014.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 15, 2024.

Pages

CHAP. IV. Of the Five Ʋniversals, or Predicables.

I. There is a twofold Genus of Beings or Entities. WE are to suppose in the first Place, that there are Beings that have some reality in the Nature of things; and whose Attributes belong to them, whether the Understanding think so or not. Such are all Substances, and all Attributes or Modes, which denominate or vary them. Others again derive all the Being they have from the In∣tellect, on the operation whereof they so depend, as to vanish away upon its Cessation; as are all those which are called Entia Rationis (Entities of Reason) in the Schools.

II. Universals are only Modes of Thinking. In the Second place we are to suppose, that no∣thing else is to be understood by the word Uni∣versal, than that which agrees or is attributable to many things; as the word Substance, which agrees to Body and Spirit. Wherefore all Universals are in our Understanding, and to speak properly, are only Modes of Thinking. For seeing all Na∣tural things are Singular and distinct from each other, these Universals can have no Unity, but what our Understanding gives them. By Example, Two Lines if separately consider'd, cannot be said to agree in the Notion of a Line; because in the Conception of the one, is included the Negation of the other; wherefore to the end they may agree, we must first frame an Idea, which may serve us for the conceiving of all Lines that are like one another. Thus we put some Common Name upon all those things which are represented by an Idea, which Name is commonly called an Universal. And thus that famous Number of Universals, which hath rack'd so many Brains, may easily be salved.

III. How Uni∣versals are formed. For Example, When we consider Substance extended in Length, Breadth and Depth, we frame an Idea of it, and call it the Idea of a Body, which afterwards is of use to us for the representing of all Bodies to our Mind. But seeing that many of them are distinguish'd by Species, as into Living Bodies

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Booke 1. Part 1. Chap 2 Rule

To the Right Worshipfull S.r Thomas Mompesson of Bathampton in Wilt-shire Knight

This Plate is humbly Dedicated by Rich: Blome

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and Inanimate, the Universal Name with relation to them is called GENUS. And since many of them differ only in Number; as two Lines of the same Magnitude, or two Spherical Bodies, we con∣ceive an Universal Idea, which may represent all Lines that are measur'd by the same length, and all round Bodies contain'd within the same Surface; which Idea, with reference to them, as Numeri∣cally distinct, is called SPECIES, which is the Second Universal.

IV. An Univer∣sal as con∣sidered as a Whole, or as a Part. Whence it follows, that one and the same Uni∣versal, with respect to the self-same Inferiour, may be considered either as a Part; or a Whole: For both the Genus in respect of the Species, and the Species in respect of the Individuals, is called a WHOLE: Thus Animal contains a Man and Beast. Universals also may be look'd upon as Parts of their Inferiours; so a Man is conceived as consisting of his Genus and Difference, that is, of an Animal and Rationality.

V. The Origi∣nal of Dif∣ference and Proprium. Neither hath the Universal, called Difference, any other Original; for when we consider that there is some difference between those things which we understand to be under the same Genus, or Species; we apprehend this variety under some common Notion, which we afterwards attribute to every Difference: As Streightness or Rectitude, whereby a Line is distinguish'd from one that is of another Figure. Roundess, whereby a Globe is di∣stinguish'd from an Angular Body, &c. The Pre∣dicable Proprium is made, when we abstract one Notion from those that are peculiar to Things, and to which alone it agrees, and to no other: As Partition or Divisibility, and Mobility to a Body.

〈…〉〈…〉 called Ac∣cident is framed. Accident is framed by us, when after we have considered that many things may happen to, or be taken from Things, without the destruction of their Nature, we conceive the Idea of an Entity separable from them, which we call Accident: Which Name we make use of for the conceiving of all those things, which fortuitously happen to Things. And this is sufficient for the Explication of the Nature of Universals, especially to those who do not love to spend their time in vain Que∣stions, or to confound the Notions of Things with fruitless Disputations.

VII. The Parti∣tion of an Universal into five Species is a compleat Division. Now that this Division of an Universal, is Adaequate; that is, that there are neither more nor less Members of them than these Five, appears thus: The Idea which we frame in our Mind, and make use of to conceive many Things, either represents many Things distinguish'd by Species, and then it is Genus; or only Numerically distinct, and then it is Species; or it represents the Diversity, whereby many Singulars differ amongst themselves, and from other things, and then it is Difference; or the Pro∣perty which belongs to them alone, and then it is Proprium; or some Contingency separable from their Essence, and this makes Accident, or the first and last Predicable.

VIII. What Pre∣dicables are. These Five Universals are otherwise called Praedicabilia, Predicables, because they are Modes of conceiving Universal Notions, which are af∣firmed of many things Truly, Properly, Naturally and Immediately. They are said to be Modes of Conceiving, to intimate to us, that Predicables are Second Notions. For Genus is nothing in it self, but only with respect to those things with which it is compared; neither is there any Species, but with respect to the Genus to which it is subjected: neither can Difference, Property or Accident be conceived, but with relation to the Subjects they belong to.

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