A treatise of the nature of a minister in all its offices to which is annexed an answer to Doctor Forbes concerning the necessity of bishops to ordain, which is an answer to a question, proposed in these late unhappy times, to the author, What is a minister?

CHAP. XIV. Whether the Relict be a reall Relation, or of Reason.

DVr••nd••••, in 4. Dist. 4. Quest. 1. prope finem, stands alone against all the Schools of Thomas and Scotus, and Ocham, and whosoever: his opinion is, that this Character is only Ens Rationis; I cannot approve of his Reasons, nor altogether of his Conclusion, yet do think him unconfuted by all that I have seen, and I have looked over fourty I think at least. The princi∣pall Arguments which are urged against him are Authorities, first, out of the Florentine Councill, in that Decree of union, which indeed might rather be called the Decree of Eugenius the 4th; but howsoever that Decree hath no more, but that these three Sacraments, Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders, imprint an indelible Character, which is a Sign, all which may be allowed Ens Rationis. Secondly, out of the Councill of Trent, Sess. 7. Cap. de Sacr. Ca••. 9. which saith no more than the other, that this Character is a spirituall indelible Sign, so that were I of the Church of Rome, according to their own principles, even in this Age, (for he is excused from heresie by them, writing before these Decrees, but his opinion is condemned by most now after these Canons) yet I say, even now amongst themselves he might be defended by these Canons, much better than they who hold it to be a reall absolute quality; for if it be a Sign, a Sign is a rela∣tion: and that is but a shift to say this word Sign is put for an explicatory term, not as the Genus, since in these two Councills it enjoys the place of a Genus, as is evident in these Canons; and then Signs may be Entia Rationis, as most be which are not na∣tural Signs, but by Institution, of which nature this is. The chief reason that I find may be that of Pitigianus, in Theol. spec. & moral. Dist. 6. Quest. 10. Art. 1. That if the Characters of these Sacraments should be Entia Rationis only, then the Priest∣hood of the new Testament should no othewise impress its Character, than the Priesthood of the old Law. To this I answer, That I

know no need that it should: but yet Vasquez, Quest. 63. Art. 3. Disp. 134. Cap. 2. Num. 34. in 3. saith, That this Character differs from the other, because that was delible, this not; but this is weak, because delibility or indelibility are extrinsecall things to the nature of a Character, and both what is delible and what is indelible may have their beings upon reason, or else be real.

Cabrera, in 3 Quest. 63. Art. 2. Disp. 1. Sec. 2. urgeth Ar∣guments, as before against relation, so here against this, Cha∣racters being Ens Rationis: first, a real action hath a real term; but this Character doth terminate a real action, therefore.

The Major is so extreamly false, that indeed there is no Ens Rationis in the world which doth not terminate a real act: take the most fictitious Chymaera that ever was, which is the most purely the work of humane reason; yet even when I say it is the work of reason, I make it the effect and term of a real act, which is mans reason.

Again, (saith he) If a Character should be Relatio rationis, then the effect of every Sacrament should be a Character, because there are relations of reason in them all.

This hath no consequence at all; for although a Character were a relation of reason, yet it doth not follow that every relati∣on of reason should be a Character.

Thus I conceive the Arguments opposed to Durand, an∣swered, out of their own principles who contend against him.

SECT. II. The constitution of Man, and likeness to God.

NOw to understand the truth of this Question; Paulo Ma∣jora Canamus, conceive, as it is described in the first of Genesis, that God made all the world, and the things that are in it; when he had done, he made man after his own image, as it is described there; a little God to govern the world which he had made, under God; and not so only, but this image did glorious∣ly appear in the soul of man, not only that as God made the crea∣tures, so he gave man the authority to give them their names, but likewise that he gave his soul a power to make another world as he had done this: so that as God hath made one world, so man, in the power of his imagination, of his reasonable imaginati∣on, hath made a thousand more; and can imagine that the infi∣nite power may, and hath made so many worlds, that this to that number should be but as a mote to this. He can make a world in the Moon; and as wise men do concerning this, so such men can and have philosophized what men do and ought to do in that: he can make nations of Pigmies, Silves, Nymphs, and philoso∣phize what their natures are, and what their manners; yea some have told what their religion and duty to God is: he can go fur∣ther, and take in pieces this world, and joyn a man, an horse, and a bird together; and his busie fancie can bring forth births monstrous, to all the effects of God in nature; yea you may ob∣serve these expressions wonderfull in the Prophets. Now as the works of God which he made are such as we call reall things, both those absolute entities, and those which are relations, for those relations which God hath made by the hand of nature, (as smoak and fire, father and son, and the like, are reall relations; so those works which are wrought by mens reason alone, those are Entia rationis, the things of reason, all Chimaera's, all men in the Moon, all imagined things, which have no existence in the world, out of mans head and intellect; these are things of mans

making, and attain not that excellency of Gods works to be reall things, but barely things of reason. Yet besides this, God hath not only given man power to make these strange beings, existing in mans own intellect, but likewise to mix them, and joyn them with his own reall things. So we may see amongst men which are Gods creatures, and reall things; men make by the power of their intellect this man a master, that a servant: this humane power gives the particular interests which severall men have in these reall estates; for although the right of dominion which one hath over another, or over any of the creatures, is confirmed by God, and the duties belonging to those relations, the reall du∣ties exacted by him, yet the particular way of interest is allowed to humane institution. Thus have men power to adde to divine works and beings, their relations, which so far as they are of hu∣mane making, are things of reason, nor reall; and these are the works, Rationis ratiocinatae, which reason finds some foundation in the things for, but not ratiocinantis only, which have not be∣ing out of mans soul which made them. Now then to apply this to our purpose; this relict of Baptism is a relation of Gods constituting barely, where man hath nothing to do, but meerly as a morall instrument, to administer, of himself giving no influ∣ence, making no constitution concerning it, and therefore can∣not be Ens rationis; all such things as exist without humane pow∣er, without humane invention, are reall, such is this: did no man in the world contribute any thing to it, but only that instru∣mentall application; did no man think upon it, yet God had a near particular interest in that baptized person, and would exact his proper duties from him, which were not in a man unbapti∣zed: So then this being a work of Gods, must be a reall relati∣on, not only of reason.

SECT. III. Baptism hath all things necessary to a real Relation.

AGain, observe that it hath all things requisite to a real re∣lation: The ••irst requisite is, that it have Subjectum ca∣pax, a Subject capable of it; this I mean to be man, as I intend to demonstrate anon. Secondly, That it have a fit foundation, that is, the Will or Law of God. Thirdly, That it have its Ter∣minus, or Correlate co-existing, which is Christ as his head, and the rest of the Church as his fellow members, both which are and shall be alwayes co-existing; and therefore this must be a real relation; and therefore now to come to answer Durands Rea∣sons, why it is Relatio rationis: The first of which is,

As (saith he) money receives its value and price from humane institution, so (saith he) do natural things receive the nature of a Sacrament from divine institution: but money receives its price and value from a relation of humane reason so appointing it; therefore, (saith he) these things receive the nature of a Sacra∣ment from a relation of divine reason so appointing it: therefore again (saith he) since a Character is that by which in orders one man is capable of giving the Sacraments, and another in Baptism to receive them, it is nothing but a relation of reason by divine in∣stitution.

I consent so far as he saith it is a relation, without any dispute; but it is a relation of divine making and confirming, and therefore not barely a relation of reason, which in its use of speaking is re∣ferred to the constitution of mans soul, but it is a real relation, such as God makes; for if those are real relations which naturally result out of the principles of nature, because that is Gods Ordi∣nance, much rather are those real which by the immediate hand and power of God are ordained, as this: and therefore although I think he hath better explained the nature of this Character than others, yet he spake too diminishingly of such a most heavenly and divine work, to call it a relation of reason; and therefore

that learned man had very ill luck to boast of that place, Eccle∣siastic. 24. 31. as in the vulgar, Qui elucidant me vitam aeter∣nam habebunt, They who manifest, or make me (that is, wisd••me) clear and easie, shall have everlasting life. This, as if he had done, he modestly glories in, but, as I said, most unhappily, for this Text is only in the vulgar, not in the most original Copy, which is the Greek, which is the most original language that Book is delivered to us in. I must confess the sentence is heaven∣ly; it is a noble work to clear an obscure piece of wisdome, and free it from the incumbrances of Scholastick discourses; and I am perswaded, as he was of himself, he did it, only he gives it too poor a name, for by this way all the great effects of Baptism are justified, of making us the Sons of God, members of his body, the Church; and yet men need be troubled with none of these nicityes which the School is perplexed with: as when a Cove∣nant is made with men, and their Seal set to it, they will be forced to make it good, though their will be wicked, by the Justice of the Land; so God who is Justice it self, will make good whatsoever promise he hath made, and set his Seal to. We need not seek for new entities in the soul, whether powers or habits; here is this real relation stampt, which is most invisible, but yet most sure, and therefore the safest way for any man to speak in this case.

SECT. IV. What is the Subject of this Relict.

IF any man shall enquire, in what Subject this relation is placed, I must oppose all in that, as well as the former. Some put it in the soul immediately; some in the understanding, which hath most prevailed; some in the will; I in neither, but the whole man, who is made a member of God; the very body is a member of God; Shall I take the members of God, and make them the members of an harlot? and therefore the whole man is the Subject of this relation, or rather the relate, for relations whose nature is ad aliud, their beings do not so properly exist In, as Ad: and because the man is the Subject of this blessed Cove∣nant, therefore this indelibility of the Covenant consists only in this life, where the soul of man and his body are united; not with the soul in heaven or hell, as is imagined in generall by the School, for which I see no Argument of strength objected: That which is said, That if a man baptized, after his death with Lazarus should be raised again, or a Priest who had received Or∣ders; should that man be consecrated or baptized again? •• answer, no; for although there was a suspension of the personality of that man, yet he is the same individuall person he was, and hath the same relations he had: If he arise in the same flesh, he hath the same fatherhood, and filiation to the same persons; he hath the same similitudes and dissimilitudes, the same equalities and ine∣qualities; and therefore likewise as in these, so in this, he is the same. Thus the nature of this relict being explained, as I hope, so far as is usefull to the understanding of any man, we see which way to expound that place before touched, Gal. 3. 27. As many as are baptized into Christ have put on Christ. What, have they in the preterperfect Tense? have they renewed themselves ac∣cording to righteousness and true holiness? have they cast off the polluted raggs of their corrupted nature, and cloathed themselves with the glorious robe of Christs righteousness? no, not in act, but in obligation, like him who is admitted into any Corpora∣tion,

or Office of Government, he presently is a Governor, and we may say, hath taken upon him, and put on the Govern∣ment of that place, when perhaps he never did, nor perhaps ever will do act of justice, yet he hath the bond and obligation to do it immediately, he is responsible for his neglect; so is it with men baptized; when they are baptized into Christ, they have taken this duty upon them, and they are by a new bond, which is the relict of this Baptism, made debtors to Christian duties, whether they pay them or no.

SECT. V. My Definition reconciled with this Discourse.

THere is yet one Objection left which I think my self bound to satisfie, which is, That I defined this relict of Baptism by the Genus of a power; but in all my Discourse I have made it a relation: for answer to this, I say, I defined it by that which delivered the nature of it most clearly to our capacity, the essence of powers being more easily discerned than that of relations. But farther conceive, that these moral relations either are powers, or the immediate foundations of them, as we may discern in those which are instanced in before, as a King, a Judge, a Mayor, and the like: These either are those powers, or have those pow∣ers most naturally flowing out of them; about which if any will contend, I am weary of Dispute: Let him correct the Definiti∣on, and say, It is a relation by which a man hath a spiritual pow∣er, and it will come all to the same effect.

I have done now with Mr. Hooker his third Argument, from page 69. to 75. of the second Part; as also that which for con∣firmation of it was in many Arguments produced, Part 1. Chap. 5. Pag. 55. to overthrow my Conclusion, That Baptism doth make a member of a visible Church.