A treatise of the nature of a minister in all its offices to which is annexed an answer to Doctor Forbes concerning the necessity of bishops to ordain, which is an answer to a question, proposed in these late unhappy times, to the author, What is a minister?

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Title
A treatise of the nature of a minister in all its offices to which is annexed an answer to Doctor Forbes concerning the necessity of bishops to ordain, which is an answer to a question, proposed in these late unhappy times, to the author, What is a minister?
Author
Lucy, William, 1594-1677.
Publication
London :: Printed by Thomas Ratcliffe for the author, and are to be sold by Edward Man ...,
1670.
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Subject terms
Hooker, Thomas, 1586-1647. -- Survey of the summe of church-discipline.
Forbes, John, 1593-1648. -- Irenicum.
Church of England -- Clergy.
Clergy -- Office.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A49441.0001.001
Cite this Item
"A treatise of the nature of a minister in all its offices to which is annexed an answer to Doctor Forbes concerning the necessity of bishops to ordain, which is an answer to a question, proposed in these late unhappy times, to the author, What is a minister?." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A49441.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 13, 2024.

Pages

SECT. III. Motion is to Relation.

I Answer to this, that motion is to relation, and that relations may be the effects of motions, that language which Scotus and his followers use in the explication of this Conclusion, is not amiss; that it is true, such relations which arise ab intrinseco, from some inward principle, cannot be produced without a change in the subject, or fundamentum, or the object to which it is referred; but such relations which arise ab extrinsco, from abroad, are terms and proper effects of motions. His followers, Franciscus de Pitigianis, Ruiz, Faber Faventinus, in Q. 4. Dist. 6. Quest. 10. amongst the later: as likewise the more ancient touching upon it, explain this distinction thus, These relations arise from within, out of the very nature of both the relates, which putting both the relates in actuall being, that respect must needs arise out of them, (and this indeed must shew such relati∣on to arise from an inward principle, because it results from their being, like heat from ire, as soon as it is. For instance, a son and a father are no sooner in the world both at the same time,

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but there ariseth out of them that mutuall relation of fatherhood and filiation; so likewise no sooner is one paper dyed black, but there ariseth that mutuall similitude and likeness it hath with ano∣ther paper which was black before: that relation comes from abroad, which doth not naturally arise out of the being of the re∣lates, but requires something else to give it a proper being. They illustrate it thus; an agent and patient have relation one to the other, but the agent, as fire, and the patient, as wood, may both he in being, yet not have their relation one to ano∣ther: they may be at such a distance, as the fire cannot work upon the wood; yea in a sit distance, and all things else dispo∣sed, there may be some medium interposed, and the fire not be agent, nor the wood patient, and without any new change in either of them, but the removing the interposed body, they shall have instantly the relation of agent and patient; and the mo∣tion only of the interposed body, without any new absolute qua∣lity introduced into either, the fire or the wood, shall cause that relation: thus they; but see it clearer in those morall relations which have a nearer affinity with this of my business in hand; a man is chosen Mayor of a Town, Judge in a Circuit, he is the same in all absolute things he was before, can do no physicall or naturall act which he could not before, he was as wise before, could before give sentence as well as after, but his sentence was not definitive before this, only that relation which the power of the Magistrate gave him of being a Judge or Mayor, enabled him with, and this was extrinsecall, from abroad; for he was be∣fore, the Town or parties to be judged were before, but only this outward investiture in his Office, (outward in respect of both the relates) gave him this being. So it is with the busi∣ness in hand; the baptized man had all the absolute qualities be∣fore that he hath afterwards; he could receive the Communion, he could pray with the Congregation, he could be absolved, the same things he could do or suffer, but he had right to none, he could not do or receive these blessings effectively before he was baptized: he was before, Christ was before, the Church was before, but his relations to neither were before, but this act of Baptism introduced them. And thus relation we see may be the term and effect of such motion, for mutation or change is what∣soever hath novum, else a new thing is something which it was

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not before, now that which hath a new relation, is something that it was not before: the Mayor is the Governor of his Town, the Judge of his Circuit; so a baptized man, a Christian, which he was not before. I think there needs no more be spoken to the first Argument; for the place in Aristotle, the Scotists say, it is only to be understood of those relations which have their be∣ing from an inward principle, not such as are from abroad, that it is true of those which are in the predicament of relation, not of all respects which are transcendent, or of which the six last pre∣dicaments are constituted; for Suarez makes Angelicall motion to be to the predicament of ubi, which is one of those respects which constitute a Predicament of themselves, but are not in the predicament of relation: And we may observe, that our tran∣sposition of our body in our place to a new situs, is a motion to a relation, which is another Predicament of the same nature. But Cabrera, where before, saith, that Dominicus Soto despi∣seth this Answer, in 4. Dist. 1. Quest. 4. Art. 2. You may read it towards the later end of that Article; His Answer is, That there is no such thing as a relation arising out of any outward cause, for every relation ariseth immediately out of its foundation: The instances of Scotus he seems to overthrow. First, That of fire, (saith he) the foundation of the relation, to the patient the wood, is the action of warming, not the heat; but let that warm∣ing act to the wood have its being, presently the relation re∣sults: and for the action to Vbi, he denies Vbi to be a relation, but the esse in loco, to be in a place, which is a reall thing. I will not dispute these instances, although they are the only in∣stances given by the Scotists, and they do not observe this reply in this place; but my instances of a Mayor or Judge can in no man∣ner be excepted against, for there is the Mayor absolutely the same way endowed with all qualities and defects as before, who is the foundation of this relation, and he living in the same Town, conversing with the same men, and yet hath this new relation of being Mayor, arising from the constitution of an outward pow∣er, and that motion from an outward cause works no change in him to any reall and absolute quality. But perhaps he will say, that this Mayoralty is the foundation of that relation, and so the relation immediately results out of it: Let him tell me then what that Mayoralty is, but that relation he hath to that Society of

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which he is Mayor; for certainly he can make it nothing else, but that very Mayoralty must be that relation.

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