Page 67
Sect. 5.
After this weak Discourse he draws a conclusion thus: [From whence it follows, that the longer the time is, after the sight or sense of any object, the weaker is the ima∣gination.] This hath some Truth in it, but is not abso∣lutely true; for many instantly upon sight,* 1.1 or hearing of a thing, have no apprehension of it, as we say, it comes in at one eare, and goes out at another; men carelesly ta∣king notice of it, like a thing not heeded, or cared for, lose it presently; we conceiving the memory, like a Box which keeps these Images, may apprehend attention like a Key to it, which locks them up in that Box. Or, apprehending the memory like wax, we may imagine attention like that force which presseth these Images in∣to it; but, without attention, any sensitive object, though discerned, is lost immediately, and doth not stay for time to weaken or wear it out; when, contrariwise, it often happens, that a thing long time forgot, and not thought on, may be reviv'd and quickned again, and remain more lively in the fancy then things of a much later birth: as I remember Seneca speaks of himself, and I think most men may find in themselves to be true; that the things, which he learned when he was a child, did stick faster and fresher in his memory then those things which he learn∣ed but a little before; so that although there may be some truth in this; that often it happens out, that time wears out the sense or conceit of a thing; yet, because there are many other things conducing to the preserva∣tion and destruction of conceptions besides time, there∣fore this is not universally true, as he proposeth it, yet should not have been censured by me, but because it seems to conduce to the illustration of what went before, which was an Errour not to be swallowed down.