Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

CHAP. V.

The reality of colour vindicated by intentional colours and species.

Sect. 1.

THe first and chiefest I find is, because colours with∣out light are visible only Potentia,* 1.1 only indeed visi∣ble but reduced into act, and seen by being enlightned; so that then by this light they are reduced into act, and therefore light is their form.* 1.2

For answer to this argument, we must know that the being and nature of things consists not in their second acts as they are called,* 1.3 which are their operations, but in their first acts, which give them their abilities to work, and they are distinguished by their abilities to operate, when time, and other opportunities, and accommoda∣tions are offered; not by their operations themselves. Thus vegetative creatures are distinguished from things inanimate, not by their operations of growth or gene∣ration, for then they should not be vegetable creatures in Winter, but by their abilities to grow or generate when their season is offered; and as their abilities di∣stinguish them from others, so amongst themselves their several species, natures, or kinds are distinguished by their abilities to produce several sorts of things by those operations, not by the operations themselves: so it is in all things, the abilities to sense, not the act of sensation, make an Animal; the abilitie to discourse, not the act, makes the man; for else a beast should not be a beast when he is asleep, nor a man a man, when he is either asleep, or a child. I could instance in all things, quantities, qualities whatsoever: This explains and answers this argument, although colour cannot actu∣ally be seen in the dark, yet that concerns not the na∣ture, but the operation of colours, their second act, not their first; they have in them a power of being seen up∣on occasions and opportunities, even when they are in the dark; darknesse to them is like Winter to vege∣tals, like sleep to beasts, like infancy to man; and as well may they say, that the springing weather, which reduceth the tree to grow, is the tree; that the stroak or blow which wakened the sleepy Lion, is the Lion; that act which inabled the child first to discourse, is the

man, as this light the colour; because of its awaking it to an actual emission of species, or being seen.

Sect. 2.

Another main argument,* 1.4 which is urged against the distinction betwixt light and colour, is thus formed; There is the same reason of all colours, as colours, as of any; but we know that some colours are nothing but light reflected, therefore we may conclude the same of all.

The major it self stands upon its own strength, by that word (as colours) for where there is the same being, there is the same reason or cause of that being. The minor is exemplified in the colours of Pidgeons necks, in those colours made by a glasse of Red-wine, set upon a white cloth, when a great light, or the Sun shines upon the Wine, it will give an eye of red to the white cloth which is under it, as likewise the Sun shining through the coloured glasse; these are real colours, but are no∣thing but light variously reflected; therefore there are colours which are nothing but light.

Sect. 3.

For answer to this, we may say to the major,* 1.5 that there is the same reason of all colours, as colours, which are reall colours and material; but that there should be the same reason and nature with them, and intentionall, apparent or spiritual colours (for by these names they are called) there being but a nominal, and some outward circumstantive convenience only, is very illogically spo∣ken; as if one should say, that a living, and painted, or dead horse were the same, and had the same nature. To shew the convenience and difference of these from

real colours, observe that they both are the object of the sight; that when the eye sees that broken light through the red glasse, it sees a thing, for what is not, cannot be the object of sense, and because it is seen, it is not un∣justly called a colour, for colour is the object of sight, and in that actual relation to the sight, they have both one common nature; but here is the difference, that to the one light gives its being, to the other, onely its being seen, for the light falling thick in with that species and i∣mages sent forth in their first and strongest emission, when they come immediately from the object, it min∣gles with them, and gives them a lustre from it selfe, which is a shining colour; but in all real colours the light adds nothing but a making of them fit to be actually seen; and that they are one real, the other intentional colours, appeares by this, that the real are inherent in the object, which is their subject, and so the white of this paper I write upon is inherent in it, and is moved with the motion of this paper, which is the object of my sight at this time; but red, which falls from the glasse of wine upon a white cloth, or these colours on Pidgeons necks, move not with the cloth or the Pid∣geon, for take the Pidgeon out of the flaring light, and you shall see onely his reall colours; and remove the white cloth, and it retaines onely its whiteness, which is the inherent colour, and the intentionall colour follows the glass and light, not its subject; so that here we find the perfect nature of a reall, absolute, inherent accident in the one, and but of an intentional relative adhe∣rent accident in the other. And here appeares a diverse nature in these two sorts of colours, they differ in their reall nature, although they agree in the relative; and you may see it further illustrated thus: The same

thing cannot at the same time have two real colours, red and white, but the white cloth, though shadowed with red from the wine, is white at that time it is so shadow∣ed, which appears, because remove the shadowing body onely, which is the glasse, and there is the same white∣ness, without any alteration or motion in the cloth; and therefore it was the same before, but onely received an eye of red from the glasse. This may serve for the ma∣jor, that there is the same reason of all colours, I say all reall, not intentionall and reall.

Secondly, to the minor, that must prove that these intentional colours doe not differ from the light,* 1.6 which I deny; for although light is an ingredient in the con∣stitution of them, yet it is not the total, no not refracted light, but as it mixeth with divers colours, so it appears diversly, and then, as you cannot say a book is nothing but paper, or paper inked, but a paper written or prin∣ted; as a medicine cannot be said to be Rubarb, al∣though Rubarb be in it, when there are many other in∣gredients, and perhaps others more predominant. So is it with this matter, although these intentional colours have light in them, yet they are something else besides light. And thus superabundantly; this latter part con∣cerns not his book, nor indeed, had he erred in this con∣clusion onely, that light is colour, would I have censured him, he had learned men in the same cause engaged with him; but when he thought this should countenance these other Propositions, that there was nothing but an apparition of motion: Secondly, that colour was no reall thing in the object, which was abhorring to all sense and teason that was ever bestowed upon these things; find∣ing it in the lump, and thinking it a mistake, have wasted this paper about it.

Sect. 4.

But I have not yet finished this businesse; in the lat∣ter end of his first chapter of his Leviathan, he saith, (That the Philosophy Schools throughout christendome, grounded upon some Texts of Aristotle, teach another do∣ctrine from him, and say, for the cause of vision, the thing seen sendeth forth a visible species, (in English) a visible shew, apparition, or aspect, the receiving whereof is sight, &c.)

* 1.7This I must censure, and say, that I think that scarce any Philosophie-School teacheth this conclusion, that the receiving the species is sight, but the judgment of the soul upon the receipt, for receipt is a meer passive thing, but all the language in the world makes to see an active verb; if receipt of the species should make sight, then a Looking-glass would see, for that receives the species, and truly the eye is a kind of animate Looking-glass, as a Looking-glass an inanimate eye; but the difference lies in the activity of the soul, which animates the eye, but not the Looking-glasse.

* 1.8But he is angry with the conceit of species, and would have men believe, that that opinion, so universally held, is founded only upon some Texts of Aristotle; but I will tell him, it is not so founded upon Texts, as if his onely authority had gained the general esteem, which that truth hath obtained upon mens judgments, but the reasons of him and his followers, which this Gentleman should have endeavoured to have answered, and not have thought that his bare credit, with scorning it, should prevaile against Christendom. But that a Reader may take notice of some of these reasons, and not trou∣ble himself to peruse other books, I will set down one or two, which may suffice.

Sect. 5.

The first reason of Aristotle is drawn from our expe∣rience thus; We all observe,* 1.9 that when we have discern∣ed things by our senses, and the act of sensing (pardon that word sensing, it is unusuall, yet significant) is done, yet there remains in the sensative memory, that image, which represented the object at the first; now it is im∣possible that that should be any material corporeal thing, for then how could so many huge Towers, Ca∣stles, Towns, Kingdoms, yea heaven it self, if a materi∣al heaven, remaine crowded in so narrow a compass? how could such contraries, as black and white, hot and cold, fire and water, high and low, remaine in that little Ark of mans memory? if they were material and reall things, they could not, but being spiritual, intentional, and things, as Philosophers speak, diminutae entitatis, they make a shift, with their little entities, to creep into such a corner: And this confounds likewise another Proposition of his, that the reception of these species makes sense; for these entities are received and retained, and kept fast in that box which received them, the me∣mory, but are not sense any longer then they are hot, and fresh from the object; well, then there must be such things as these species, or else there could be no memory of the object, which, in a material condition, could not exist in the memory.

A second argument may be drawn from another ex∣periment; suppose Aristotle looks upon Plato,* 1.10 Aristotle cannot see his own face, but in Plato's eyes he can; how can that come about, but that some intentional, species and image of him crept into Plato's eye? a material thing could not, it must be an intentionall, for any ma∣terial

thing would be offensive to Plato's eye, nor could it be that Gamboll he talks of so much, a stroak from the object, for then it must have made Plato see Aristotle, not Aristotle himself, according to his Philo∣sophy.

* 1.11A third argument I can frame thus; Every object, which is distant from the organ, must some way or other make it self reach the organ with its own likeness; but for a reall passage of colours, or such like objects, there can be no imagination, there are but two wayes, either by the propagation of this image, intentionally, through the whole medium, which therefore is not discerned in its passage through the ayr, because the motion is ex∣treamly swift, like the passage of light, instantaneal; and because untill it meets with an eye, or glasse, or some∣thing proper to give it a receipt, it hath no pause for a consideration:* 1.12 This is the most common way of Philo∣sophers; or else it must be by some seminal vertue which it sends abroad, which, when it finds a womb fit to entertain it, there is prolifical, and produceth this image, and therefore in that regard may be called species, because it is such in semine:* 1.13 Now if it should be obje∣cted, that if it were the seed of colours, like the seed of plants, it would produce a thing of the same nature, a reall colour, not an intentionall; It is answered, that se∣cond qualities are like equivocal agents, they cannot produce their own nature, like Mules, and the Monsters of Nile, the furthest they goe is their image; a colour doth not get a colour of its own nature, as heat doth heat; nor can you make one thing white, by putting another white thing to it, unlesse you add some of that white body to the other: This conceit hath much pleased me, and I think would meet with all objections, but I am

not peremptory in it, because I cannot afford my self leasure to spend so much time about such a youthfull study; but, howsoever, one of these wayes, I conjecture, whosoever shall think that the object works upon the sense, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 conceive it, and therefore these species. There are many other arguments used by Philoso∣phers, the least of which he hath not touched, but con∣trouleth them, with only, It is otherwise. I will now leave this, and come to his fourth and last Proposition, in his Humane Nature, where before, numb. 9.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Arguments a∣gainst the re∣ality of colours answered.
• * 1.2

  1 Argument.
• * 1.3

  Wherein the being and na∣ture of things consists, and how they are distinguished.
• * 1.4

  2 Argument.
• * 1.5

  Answ. Colours real and intenti∣onal not the same.
• * 1.6

  Intentional colours not the same with light▪
• * 1.7

  Sight more then a bare re∣ception of spe••••ies.
• * 1.8

  The conceipt of species not founded only upon Aristo∣tles Texts.
• * 1.9

  Aristotles first reason for them.
• * 1.10

  A second ar∣gument from Aristotle's i∣mage in Pla∣to's eye.
• * 1.11

  3 Argument.
• * 1.12

  The species why so called.
• * 1.13

  Obj••ction an∣swered.