Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

CHAP. IV.

The apparition of colour, its reality, and difference from light.

Sect. 1.

ANd first, that colour or Image is not the Apparition of that Motion, I thus prove;* 1.1 That which is the apparition of any thing, makes it appeare in his own co∣lours, as we speak.

But this image or colour (I take them as he puts them down together) makes not that motion appear in its co∣lours; ergo:* 1.2

The major is evident, for if a thing appeare truly as it is, it appears in its own likenesse, and with such colours as it hath, and unless it be a colour, this Image or colour, he speaks of, makes nothing appear.

The minor I thus prove, If this image or colour make the motion appeare in its colours, then that motion had colour before; but that he denies, for he makes colour to be nothing but the apparition of motion, and if colour or image be the apparition of that motion, that motion must have colour; because it makes the motion appear in no∣thing but colour, either it must have colour, or it cannot appear by colour, or the image of colour.

Again, I can confute this his conclusion, thus;* 1.3 That which is the apparition of any other thing, when that other is the same, then that is the same, and when that other varies or changes, that doth so likewise; but when the stroak or motion from the object is the same, the co∣lour or image varies, and when that is divers, the image is the same, therefore it cannot be the apparition of that motion: The major is evident, for the apparition of any thing, is nothing but the shewing of it as it is: The mi∣nor

will be thus illustrated; Suppose two walls equal∣ly big, the one black, the other greene, these equally strike the brain, the one as the other, but the image or colour represented is black or green, divers; but if any man shall object, that these doe not equally strike the brain, I will let him make them equall in all things but the colour, and then they must equally strike, or if, not, the colour of the wall, not the motion in the braine, is that which onely appeares and makes the difference. Again, when the stroak is divers, sometimes the colour or image is the same; so if we should conceive the strength and difference of motions, we must needs think that solid and strong bodies should move and strike the eye harder then soft and gentle, yet they may easily ap∣pear of one colour; as we may see a Downe-bed, and a stone; either of these instances is enough to shew, that colour or image is not the apparition of that motion, but of the object which makes that motion.

Sect. 2.

* 1.4This I conceive, with what went before, may be a∣bundantly enough for the confutation of his conclusion. And next I come, to my second Proposition, which is, That colour is a reall thing in the object; to prove this, I shall use this medium; That which produceth reall ef∣fects, is a reall thing; but colour in the object produceth reall effects; therefore, &c.

The major hath its evidence from hence, that no∣thing can cause an effect nobler,* 1.5 or more excellent then it self, which if colour, that is in the object, be not a real thing, it should do, when it produceth real effects. The minor may be demonstrated by many experiences, because some colours dissipate the Sun-beams, some con∣gregate

them, which are real effects: As for instance, take one of your ordinary Burning glasses, use all the art you can, it will not burn white paper or linnen, they scatter the beames; but black, or colour the paper or linnen, it will enflame it, and so much the easier, the neerer any colour comes to black, which will collect these beams; this is a sign undeniable, that there is some colour in that linnen or paper which hath these ef∣fects. Again, some colours hurt the sight of the eye, as red, white, and light colours; some are grateful to it, as black or green, these are real effects, and every mans daily experience sheweth them to be so.

Secondly,* 1.6 This may be proved from that operation it hath upon a mans eye; for since the stroak, which he conceives is made upon the eye, must needs be the same made by a white or black wall, as I have shewed, or more close, the same wall now white, and anon souted or blacked, it cannot be that the divers species or Image, which is wrought in the eye, can proceed from any thing but that very Colour which is in the wall, because the diversity of the Image must needs argue some diver∣sity of cause, which can be none but the colour of the object, upon examination of all other pretended causes, for that varying, the image alters; and that remaining the same, the image doth so likewise, and this so con∣stant, that to all eyes, well disposed, it appeares such, whatsoever they are, so the medium be not some way or other clouded; which must needs argue a certainty of causation to him, who in this very Proposition allows the object a causing vertue; because it is a motion from the object, which is by this image made appear; now the motion is the same from black or green, but the colour only differs.

* 1.7Thirdly, let the Gentleman consider what he did mean to do, when he writ this book; did he mean to co∣lour the paper with real letters, or fancy onely? if not with real letters, how could he expect that one word should not be taken for another? he could never think that A. should force the eye or braine, otherwise then B. doth, and so cause another Image, but out of this, that he coloured the paper in another figure, when he made A. then when he made B. Let a man againe conceive, that in the same feather of a Cock, he discernes one speck of white, another of red, another of black, and those are all discerned by another mans eye; let a man think what can so distinguish these colours in this, and not in another feather, but that these colours are there, and not in another. It is a strange thing that his wit should think to perswade a man, not onely against his own eyes, but all the eyes in the world, and all the rea∣son too, but his owne. Well, I conceive this is enough for these two Propositions, That colour is not the Appa∣rition of that motion, and that colour is a reall thing in this object: These two passed Propositions are such, wherein I have disputed with Master Hobbes, no man that I ever read of opposing my conclusions, but himself.

Sect. 3.

In the next I find various opinions among Scholars, which if he would have studied,* 1.8 although not for truth, but to maintain his own opinion onely, although against truth (which I doubt he unluckily affects) he might have found much more probable reasons for what he af∣firms, then any produced by him. The conclusion de∣fended by him, and denyed by me, is, That colour and light are the same thing; this he demonstrates thus, to∣wards

the later end of the 8. num. where before [Their difference being onely this, that when the light cometh di∣rectly from the fountain to the eye, or indirectly by reflection from clean and polite bodies, and such as have not inward particular motion internal to alter it, we call it light; but when it cometh to the eye by refl••ction, from uneven, rough, and course bodies, or such as are affected with internal mo∣tion of their own to alter it, then we call it colour, colour and light differing onely in this, that the one is pure, the other perturbed light] Although to deny is answer suffi∣cient enough for all is said, there being no proof, but as if he were another Moses, he delivers his Philosophy as authentique, coming from his mouth without any argu∣ments, although against the opinions of the whole world; yet I will in little lay open some weaknesses in these expressions: First, think what he meanes by in∣ward particular motion internal to alter light; certainly unlesse he meanes the causes of colour, which must be against himself, I know not what it can be; and then inward motion internall, which should have power to al∣ter light which is external, to that body, was an uneven and course kind of expression, if it express any thing; but the weaknesse of the whole appeares to any man that hath eyes; for whereas he saith, when it cometh to the eye by reflection, from uneven, rough, and course bodies, or such, &c. there we call it colour (speaking of light) I say let it come from the most even, most clean and po∣lite bodies that can be imagined, that Nature or Art have made, as Brasse, Silver, Gold, yea, heaven it self, we call it colour, as one Star is red, another more white; and therefore this Gentleman is either mistaken, or would deceive in the usage of speech.

His conclusion it self may be thus overthrown.

Sect. 4.

* 1.9That which exists when there is no light, that can∣not be the same thing with light: But colour exists where there is no light, ergo, colour is not the same with light.

The major is evident, because the same cannot be, and not be, at the same time, which would be true, if at the same time colour and light being the same, colour should be, and light not.

The minor will be proved thus; Colours are in the dark where light is not, that will be proved, because at night, when light leaves our Horizon, yet the colours remaine the same they were before; and that is proved, because when light (although another light) is brought to them, yet they are, and they apppear the same they were be∣fore: Now we have an Axiom in nature, and to be over-master'd and check'd by nothing but divine power, à privatione ad habitum non datur regressus, there is no re∣calling a word that is spoke, no making that not done, which is once done; not making that up individually and compleatly the same which is destroyed; no restoring a forme, and being once lost; now this being the same it was, and appearing so at the coming of the second light, which it was at the manifestation of the first, it is evident that the light did not give this colour its being, but onely the manifestation of its being, and this colour was something besides light, which was made appear by light; I know not what can be answered to this any further.

* 1.10Again, I can dispute thus, That which opposeth light cannot be the same with light; but some colours oppose light; Ergo:

The major appeares, because nothing opposeth it self; the minor is thus illustrated, because black oppo∣seth light, for light hath an affinity with white, and black with darknesse, so that such Stars, which have not something to vary their representation, to us appear white, and so do candles, and these white things, amongst us, have something of light in them, and great affinity to it, and therefore are better discerned with a weak and evening light, then darker Clouds are. So likewise black hath an affinity with darknesse, which is the total privation of light, insomuch as a shadow, which is a par∣tiall privation of light in a particular place, is black, in∣tentionally black, as I shall discourse hereafter: It is true, that neither black, nor any colour, can be seen without light, no more can a shadow; but dark, and black colours and shadowes, do oppose light, which is a kind of white, when in reality it is in its own subject, as the Sun, or Star, or Candle. This certainly, joyned to what went before, may serve for my last Proposition. But because there are other Opposers of this conclusion besides him∣self, now I am in, I will speak something to their ar∣guments.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Colour, or I∣mage, not the apparition of motion, but of the object.
• * 1.2

  2 Argument.
• * 1.3

  2 Argument.
• * 1.4

  Colour a real thing in the object.
• * 1.5

  1 Argument.
• * 1.6

  2 Argument.
• * 1.7

  3 Argument, or instance of A. B. in the book.
• * 1.8

  Colour and light not the same thing.
• * 1.9

  1 A••gument.
• * 1.10

  2 Argument.