in the same dignity which God would have me sustain (is his word) he ought to enjoy the same privilege which I do, therefore to him should belong a like and equal right ••ver all creatures, neither out of the respect of the crea∣tures is one part allotted to him, another to me.
This seem's by him to be an introduction to what follow's, but indeed contain's a main Argument against him; for two, much less two millions of men, particu∣lar men, cannot have a right to the same thing. There∣fore, saith he, we must seek somewhere else to find what por∣tion is allotted to him, what to me, and then, saith he, let the adversaries turn which way they will, they must confess that the distinction of these creatures ariseth onely out of Covenant; this pag. 101. and this, saith he, they do suf∣ficiently declare, who teach, that in extreme necessity the an∣cient right doth revive, and the use of those things is made lawful which they by Covenant had disposed away before. Thus far he.
The case, which he speak's of, may be thus put; A man ready to starve, for want of food or clothes, take's a piece of bread, or meat, or a warm garment, which be∣long's to another man, to supply his extremity; here, say his Authors, in this extremity his right to these things revived: therefore, saith this Writer, he had right to all creatures before, or else his instance is weak: I an∣swer, the consequence is very infirm; he may have right to such parcels of the world, yet not to all; he, who hath right to little pieces in a field, hath not right to the whole; I have sh••wed in my former piece, which I now defend, that no right, but by some Law; the Law of hu∣manity, give's him right to this; by which we may, and ought to suppose, that men should do as they would be done unto; and, when necessity compell's a man to such