Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

CHAP. XXVIII.

Concerning the extent of natural knowledge; Our hopes of eternal happinesse; and our advantages in the prosecution of it; Whereof; as to its certainty de futuro, we may be more secure then we can be of any thing, from Tradition and Reason; How unsatisfied mans Understanding and Will is in all things else but it and God. Concerning the last Article of our faith.

Sect. 1.

BUt (saith he) because there is no natural knowledge of mans estate after death; much lesse of the reward that is then to be given to the breach of Faith] Had he stayed there,* 1.1 although this squint's at mischief, yet this might have been sl••pt over, and might have been somewhat excused, and a man might have said, that he only deny∣ed a natural knowledge of this reward, not a divine faith; and we Christians may be content with this, although it is an unkind act to Religion, to hinder it from any as∣sistance, especially in so high a point as this, which move's the first foot towards heaven, He that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them who seeke him; So that these two acts of faith are those which leades a man out of this world towards hea∣ven, to believe there is a God; and that he is a rewarder of them who seeke him; both which the Author hath sl••ighted; Of the first I have spoken: Of the second I shall now treat. But I say, had he given it onely this slurre, I would have passed it over; but as he denye's the assist••nce of Nature to the knowledge of future happi∣nesse; so be most disgracefully adde's [but onely a beliefe ground••d upon ••th••r mens saying, that they know it superna∣turally,

or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally] Could any thing be spoke more sleightingly, or unworthily, of the hope of heaven? of all the expectation of Christianity? I curb in my self, who could be angry in bitter Language, and doe think it would be comely to doe so; but let others doe it that will, I onely meane to discourse soberly a∣gainst it, in no passion.

Sect. 2.

First, then, suppose all, he saith here were true;* 1.2 that our knowledge of heaven were nothing but a belief &c. yet it ought to perswade more then any motive can be brought to regulate our actions with; which will ap∣peare, first, out of the nature of the happinesse compared with others; next out of the evidence it hath from the nature of happinesse; for it is an eternal happin••sse, a spiritual bappin••sse; an eternal happinesse, therefore more to be desired then any temporal felicity whatso∣ever: the content that a man hath in this life is but for this life, and this life is so momentary, that there is no man hath assurance of one daye's delay in it; and let him who hath lead a life in an affluence of all this world's goods, think what he is the better for them on his death-bed; what will it profit a man to gaine the whole world, and lose his own Soul? yea all his felicity past add's but to his misery; he may say, fuimus Troes, &c. but hath with it a miserum fuisse; he cannot choose but sit down by the waters of Babylon, and weep, when he remem∣bers the Sion of happinesse, which he hath lost, but can∣not now enjoy. I will not drench my self in this com∣mon place of the frailnesse, weaknesse, and vanity of this world's pleasure: It is evident, in respect of eternity, it

is as nothing, so that then, upon the proposal of such a question, whether had you rather enjoy this world's felicity, whilst you live, or eternal happinesse hereafter? the an∣swer must needs be, as if it were proposed, whether had you rather have the possession of an estate for a day, or an In∣heritance for ever? and as a man would say to that, I care not for this possession a day, it is of no moment; so must a man's judgement conclude; this life is nothing; it is but a day, not that certaine; I am not made hap∣py by any thing which can be added to me this day, but for hereafter; and the notion of eternity doth so fill the ap∣petite of man, and hath such a conveniency with it, as he cannot choose, if he ponder in his Soul the excel∣lency of it, but desire and embrace it.

Sect. 3.

* 1.3Then let a man goe further, and see, that those thoughts we have of this eternal felicity, do not represent it to us as of a bodily felicity onely, but a spiritual, an intellectual felicity, proper for man, such felicity as only can make man happy, and such as can make man happy alone. Conceive a man with a troubled Spirit, thoughts perplexed, a wounded conscience, to speake in the Scrip∣ture language,* 1.4 bring all the riches of this world's plea∣sure, meats, drinkes, musick, delightfull sights; make up a body composed of sensuall contentments, he ab∣horre's them; they vex him, they rather trouble him, then ease him, or content him; because the intellectu∣all disturbance, which he hath, savour's not those things of these poore bodily delights; they are as much below the contentments of his mind, as childish Toyes to the contemplations of some grave and serious Philosopher. Againe, fill a Soule with those speculations which, at this distance from it, he can have of heaven, and let him

have to that an assurance, that he is in the way to it; bring fires, fagots, gridirons, pincers, what you will,* 1.5 he will have blessed, and charitable, and comfortable thoughts at that time; so that, with St. Stephen, he can thank them for their tortures, and blesse them, and, like a man that hath received a benefit, pray to God to blesse his benefactors; so can such a man be happy, when he hath spiritual happinesse, in the midst of all worldly miseries. This therefore must be most desira∣ble, without which no man is happy, and with which no man miserable; with all worldly, sensual goods a man may be miserable, who hath them; but not so with those; which fortify a man against all the fiery darts of Satan in this world, and hereafter give him eternal feli∣city, without any disturbance. So that then these world∣ly goods, and this eternal, admit no comparison to him that apprehend's the one and the other; that eternal feli∣city must needs be more desirable then the other. Men may object, had we such assurance of one as the other, this were true;* 1.6 but we have weak assurance of this, and great of worldly; therefore we let this goe, and content our selves with the other.

Sect. 4.

For answer to this, conceive with me, first,* 1.7 that al∣though the assurance of the Testimony which is given to these Divine happinesses were much short of that is given to the other, yet in prudence men ought to pro∣secute it; First because we can be no losers of worldly happinesse by the prosecution of this; there is no action,* 1.8 which a man doth in order to eternal felicity, which hin∣der's, but rather adde's to temporal felicity; the gover∣ning and regulating our passions, without which no man can have any happinesse, faith, hope, and charity, with

all their proper operations; that man is happier here in this world who hath these habits, & operates accordingly, then he who hath the greatest excesse of all worldly things; but, contrarywise, the luxurious enjoying these temporary things rob's a man of those eternall joyes; these actions, in which is most safety, being prejudiciall to no rational felicity; a man acting by the rules of pru∣dence ought rather to doe, such actions then those which are hazardous of his safety, though seemingly more evi∣dent because they appear of no other profit then for tem∣poral, for sensual contents, and may hurt the other; but these will be profitable for eternal, spiritual good, and cannot hurt temporal;* 1.9 We find Merchants venturing their estates, their lives to the East-Indies, per tot discrimina re∣rum, although a Journey full of hazard, rather then pid∣dle at nearer and more secure trades, because the return of the first is of a higher value; If men then reasonably take such paines, with so much hazard of life, for such a little difference of advantage as is betwixt these two, onely because there is a possibility of a better returne here; much rather should men engage in this great ad∣venture for eternity, where upon weaker premises (if they were so) men must expect such an invaluable gaine, and are assured of no possible losse: but I let this passe. Suppose the evidence of it were none but such as Mr. Hobbes report's, A beliefe grounded upon others sayings &c. yet these other men are such, and these from whom they received it, as may give a better assurance then we can have of any worldly things.

Sect. 5.

Let us, to this purpose, consider what assurance Mr. Hobbes hath of his worldly felicity,* 1.10 The felicity he placeth in the enjoyment of this life, and the accommodations of it; the security of this is by a Covenant made by eve∣ry man in a Common-wealth with every man, to submit themselves to a Leviathan, or supreame Governour, and make him their representative in all his actions, as will hereafter more fully be discoursed upon; Now I shall shew, and it is evident, there is no such thing, then no security▪ But suppose there were, he will allow his Le∣viathan to covenant nothing with his subjects, then they have not so much as a promise for their security, not so much as is here spoken by him concerning mans felicity: a belief grounded upon other mens sayings, and here is no manner of promise; but because I labour to advance the security men have of this unicum nec••ssarium, I will not onely compare it with Mr. Hobbes his security, but all that can be had in any politique Society.

Sect. 6.

What security can any man have for the injoying his studyed worldly happinesse? all the security,* 1.11 he can have is from the promises, or oathes of men, that they will do this, or that; this is the greatest safety that any man can have; but, alas, how inconsiderable are promises, yea oathes of men, unlesse honest men, I would our experi∣ence did not teach us; and who can have more then a weak probable assurance of another's integrity, unlesse he have sealed it with his bloud? which cannot be shewed in any politique concernment de futuro, that it shall be, and if any man would doe such an act, as to dye

for confirmation of it, he might be reckoned a mad man. But, contrariwise, let us examine the assurance that we have of this.

Sect. 7.

* 1.12[It is grounded (saith he) upon other mens saying that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that kn••w others, that knew it supernaturally.] This is a most scornefull speech; but had he set downe what men these were who first said they received it supernaturally, the case had been cleare; they were the Apostles, men of a known and assured integrity, men that sealed this Truth with their blood, and dyed in and for the justification of it; this no man would do for that he were not assured of. This, at their deaths, was a comfort in the midst of a thousand agonies. Now, as Aristotle speak's, it is a probable Topicke what a learned and ho∣nest man delivers in matter of opinion; so for matter of fact, without doubt, what vertuous men dare and did die for, is truth. It is the strongest assurance that can be given to man of it. These men therefore, who affir∣med, that they did receive this most divine Truth super∣naturally, ought to have a strong assent given to what they say:* 1.13 I would ask him, what assurance he hath that there was a Julius Caesar; nothing but this, that it was a beliefe grounded upon, &c. (as he speak's of this) yet I dare say, he is more assured that there was a Julius Caesar, then he can be of any future worldly felicity al∣though the evidence which is given for that truth, is not to be compared with the evidence, given for this of our future felicity; for he can never shew me a man who durst dye for the defence of that, as multitudes for the justification of this. This then, although it be handed to us from man to man, as the other, yet it being deli∣vered

by such men must needs have a perswasive force with it, more then other, which have a like Tradi∣tion, but not by such undoubtable meanes.

Sect. 8.

But I will not leave him so; this Truth, that there is an eternal felicity provided for men hereafter,* 1.14 is not onely by Tradition del••vered unto us, from such as had it super∣naturally revealed; bus is also most consonant to reason, and may most reasonably be deduced out of its princi∣ples, and therefore ought most seriously, and most faith∣fully to be confided in; that it is so, I will require but one supposal, which I think I have cleared in my former Treatise, that there is a God; this being granted, we must needs apprehend him provident over those works of his, and, in particular, more eminently over man, which is the most excellent piece of this fabricke, and indeed the onely piece which actively honour's and dishonour's him; here now we find it not alwaies true, that men, who honour him, who forsake all, even their very lives for him here, are blessed by him in this world, I mean with worldly blessings; yea, because they forsake all, and their lives, they cannot be blessed here. Is it possible to think that God will desert those which hold him so dear to them, and value him at so high a rate? It is true, I read of Iob and many others, that have had a restitution of worldly comforts; but that is not so with all; and those that dye for him leave the world, can have no reward in this world; Againe, is it possible that this God of an infinite excellency, wisdome, pow∣er, justice &c. should suffer so many villaines to eat up his Children and Servants, as it were bread? to com∣mit Sacriledge in all kinds? perjury, blasphemy and the

like? persevering in those sins, to passe without any punishment? wh••ch some doe in this world, (although but a few) supposing a God, men cannot think so; and therefore, supposing a God, it is not to be imagined, but that there is an eternall happinesse provided for such as serve God, which is all I contend for.

Sect. 9.

Againe, let us consider man in himself, as he is a fel∣low creature wi••h beasts,* 1.15 plants, stones, &c. we shall, upon consideration of all the Creatures in the world, find that every Creature hath an object fitted to any power it hath, and some matter or other fit to fill every empty roome in it, and satisfie every natural desire in it; to see this cleare, let us first view the lowest sort of things, stones, earth, water, aire, &c. which have no life in them, if they have power to operate by their qualitie, to heat or coole, there are objects in the world fit for such actions; if they have appetites of this place or that, high or low, there are room's in the world to receive them; if the matter (as Aristotle) desire's formes, there are formes to fit it; you may find this truly applyed to any thing, according to that sacred Axiome, so often urged by both Divines and Philoso∣phers, Deus et Natura nihil faciunt frustra; whereas if there were nothing to satisfy those powers and appe∣tites, they were in vaine; if we climb higher to plants and Trees, which have life and no sense, it is evident in them, that their powers and desires of nutrition, gene∣ration, augment••tion, by which they exceed these in∣feriour things, have, whilest they are in this world, enough plentifully in this world to satisfy these appe∣tites, as well as those which they have in common

with those other inferiour things, Then come to that other degree higher, to beasts and such things which do not live only, but have a power of moving themselves, of apprehending by Sense, of delighting themselves in sensual things; these appetites have that which can sa∣tisfie, yea fill their desires, so that more cannot be desi∣red; yea there is to be had in this world not onely a Sa∣tisfaction but a satiety of sensual pleasure; not a belly full onely, but enough to surfeit; so that, for all those things below man, whatsoever they are, there is some∣thing which can sufficiently sat••sfy all the powers and appetites they have. Can we think God is so liberal to these things, and lesse to man? As the Apostle dispute's doth God take care of Oxen? that is, in comparison of us men; As our Saviour, if he so clothe the grasse of the field shall he not much rather take care for us? if he hath so pro∣vided for them, in these mean faculties and appetites, which have here (as the Schoolemen speake) vestigium Dei, onely a footstep of God in them, shall he not much ra••her for these noble powers and appetite of Reason and Will in man, which are made after his image? cer∣tainly it were a high ingratitude to think so; well then, let us inquire what satisfaction there can be found for these humane powers of Reason and Will, by which he excells all other things, that must be it which a man desire's, for every thing endeavour's the perfecting of its powers, and the satisfaction of its appetite, which is truly the good of that thing to which it belong's.

Sect. 10.

It is an undoubted conclusion, a Principle, if not the Principle, which the inbred Law of nature, which go∣verne's man, hath taught every Child of man, and so

powerfully imprinted it in him,* 1.16 th••t no Child, which hath reason, will deny but that he would be happy; and in particular, if he underst••nd the Tearmes, that that is his happinesse, to have all his desires, to have his Will satisfied; for, untill that be, he hath some deficiency; there is something farther to be enquired after; he is not at h••s journey's end; ••hus it is with all things, there is enough for any thing below man to fulfill its appetite to ••urfeit; but not so, for mans appetite; this will ap∣peare ou•• of the consideration of the things in this world which are reputed good,* 1.17 those that are bodily, sensuall, intellectuall; bodily, strength, beauty, health, these can∣not satisfy a man's soule, though altogether; joyn to these all sensuall delights, meates, drinkes, luxurious∣nesse in any kind, for hearing, seeing, smelling; let a man have all, those are but things which beasts may en∣joy as well as he, and in these he cannot excell them; yea they excell him in a fuller fruition of them then he can have; then they are apt to have many casualties to de∣prive us of them, and a certainty that one day they must be lost, which to a man that hath a forecast with him (which other inferiour Creatures have not) must needs disturb the content he might take in enjoying them: consider those humane intellectual things, which have pretended a title to man's felicity either the Stoick's A∣pathy, freedome from passion, or the Aristotelian way of governing Passions by Reason, although those were hand∣some and ingenious, and those men trod some steps to∣wards felicity, yet they were but the first Steps onely, and those the lowest; for if the Subjects be tumultuous, the King cannot be in safety. The Stoicke instead of ruling, would kill his Subjects; take away all Passions, and then the King in man will lack fitting instruments

to effect his businesse; the Aristotelian governed, or at the le••st prescribed rules to governe the Passions, but left the Palace of Reason unrect••fied; and although he freed it from the rebellion of Passions, yet satisfied it no•• with plenty at home; to conclude, that which make's a man happy, and satisfie's his Soule, must be something in him, by which he excell's beasts, that must be his Reason, and reasonable Will; this Will is not satis∣fied but by knowledge; no satisfaction of it, but the enjoying that it love's; no love without knowledge, and therefore though the Will be the seat of happinesse, yet the Understanding is the Conduit by which th••s happinesse is brought to the Will.

Sect. 11.

Now let us then examine what there can be in the Will, brought by the Understanding,* 1.18 which can satisfie it, and make it happy in this life; certainly all the things in the world cannot doe it; for although a man desire's to know any thing, every thing, yet he cannot be happy in knowing all the things in the world. I will not dispute concerning those things which men doe know, for alas it is mighty short of what men may know; the businesse of mens lives take them so up, that he is a wise man who know's any thing in any one Art; many things we know, quòd sunt, yet we know not the things, nor the manner of them; in the Mathematiques there is such a thing as quadratura circuli, but the worke of it is not found out; there is a certaine number of the starres, but men doe not know it: there is a certaine influence, but the most cunning Astrologer is deceived in h••s prog∣nostiques; this might be endlesse; but did any one man know all these; did he know all the contrivance of

Policies; were he expert in all Mechanicks, in naturall knowle••ge, in Morall, in any of which never man was perfect, yet his soule would not be full with all this, nor his appetite of knowledge; for he must needs de∣sire (when he knowe's all these) to know the cause of all, which is God; as in Trismegistus his Poemander, when he asked this Philosophick and knowing man, what he d••sired? he answered, I desire to know things and their causes; the knowledge of any thing without their causes, is not satisfactory to a mans soule; and although men are proud of little Sciences, yet satisfied they can∣not be without the knowledge of God, and his causa∣tion of things; the world cannot fill the vastnesse of man's soule or desire; they can, and doe think of other worlds, and of him who is the cause of all, and desire to know him; I speak not of the baser sort of men, who live little otherwise then beasts; and then whom beasts are more happy; but of them who live like men, excelling beasts by these divine faculties of reason and will; these cannot choose but desire to know God: for knowledge is of Truth, God is the fountaine of all truth, from whence it came, yea Truth its self; and therefore that Understanding,* 1.19 which is carried to Truth; cannot be at rest untill it come to know him againe; God is infi∣nite, nothing can fill the understanding but what is infi∣nite. Let a Mathematician make the greatest number he can, another, yea himself, in his understanding can make a greater; the Understanding of man can grasp and con∣taine any finite thing, and therefore is greater. Let him imagine a world as great, a line as long as he can, yet the understanding of another, yea his own, at a second act, can enlarge that, and make it greater; so that what∣soever is finite cannot fill a man's Soule, but onely what

is infinite; and therefore onely God, who is infinite, can be satisfactory to man's understanding. What I say for the Understanding, I say likewise for the Will; what is lesse then infinite cannot satisfy it; I speak not of these beastly sensual affections, they may be surfeited upon, yea the very enjoying them make's men loath them: but of his humane Will, his intellectual, nothing can sa∣tisfy that but what is infinitely good;* 1.20 let us look upon riches, and things of that nature, although they are thirsted after most eagerly by man's ••easonable Will (no beast covet's Wealth) yet the Soule of man is ne∣ver satisfied with them, but they prove like fuell to the fire, the more a man hath the more he desire's they, who have so much as their riches is a burden to them, are faine to lay the load upon other mens Shoulders, their Servants to manage for them; yet these men de∣sire more; he, who is in meane estate, require's little additions to content him; when he hath gotten that, he hath larger desires; when a Kingdome, another; a world; and then grieve's he can have no more. I ne∣ver read the desi••e of riches satisfied in any man but him in the Parable, who cryed, Soule take thine ease, for thou hast Treasures layd up for many ages; such fl••shes, and little inconsiderable ej••culations of Content, men some∣times have, upon the enjoyment of worldly wealth; but had that man beene asked a little after, would you have another Ba••ne full of Corne? he would have been of another mind, and have said, let me have that, and tha••, and a thousand more; and had he all the wealth in the world, unlesse this should be secured to him, that neither rust nor Moth shall corrupt it, nor Theeves breake through and steale it, yea that that great Thiefe, death, shall not take him from it, his Will cannot be contented; which

yet was never granted to men in this world. I will not stay upon this; riches are not things absolutely good, but relatively onely, as they are referred to other things, they are onely bona vtilia, profitable goods, and that word profit intimate's some other things that they are profitable for; and therefore they who desire riches, desire some other thing for which these riches are desi∣red, and therefore they cannot satisfie that man's desire who covet's them, but he must goe further; in one word, to conclude this discourse, goodnesse, happinesse absolute, is the object of man's will; there is nothing good, but God; all other things are partiall goods, they have some good, but they lacke more then they have; and where there is a deficiency, that is not absolutely good; therefore not any thing, not all things, can sa∣tisfie man's will, but he onely; for still there will be a further desire in the Covetous soule of man, untill they have him who is all good; Now then, if the Understand∣ing can be filled with nothing but God; if the Will can be satisfied with nothing but him; it is most rea∣sonable that there should be some such Condition, where these two highest powers, which are given under the Sunne, should be satisfied.

Sect. 12.

I will next enquire, whether this satisfaction can be in this life; if not, sure there must be such a thing here∣after; and for this, it is fi••st evident that man hath some knowledge of God in this life;* 1.21 he can by examining causes find that there must be a first; yea, he can from thence affirme that he must be free from all imperfecti∣ons, incorporeall, immense, and the like, because Cor∣poriety, Mensurability, finitenesse, argue imperfection.

Thus have men Philosophiz'd by reason: but the under∣standing is not filled with this; as you may observe a Country-man, when he see's another write, walke, speake, and the like, he can tell you, these are the ef∣fects of some excellent principles in that man who doth them; ask him, what it is? he can, with all the world, tell you, it is his Soule; but ask, what that Soule is? he is at a stand, he knowe's nothing of it; such are our thoughts of God, from whose works of his we know there is a cause which bringe's these mighty things to passe, which we call God; but what that God is, who doth them, we are at a losse, by all the reason man can find out; for as a dog can apprehend his master's kind∣nesse to him, or his anger, yet cannot know the excel∣lency of his Master's Wisdome, power, &c. because he is in a lower rank of things then man is; much lesse is man able to reach at that infinite excellency of God, be∣ing many degrees much lower then God, than any Creature is below man. This is the knowledge a man may have of God; if there be any thing else, it must be that other way, in which many Divines have trod, besides these negatives of imperfections, to conceive these things we call perfections to be in a much more in∣finitely excellent manner in him who is God: So a husbandman may know that a learned man exceed's him in knowledge, and that this knowledge is in divine, naturall, and morall things; but what that knowledge of his is, he cannot tell, unlesse that learned man reveale it to him; so it is in respect of God,* 1.22 we know he hath excellencies beyond us, that these consist in these or these eminencies; but what is the nature of these emi∣nencies, no man can know, but he to whom God re∣veale's them; yet he cannot choose but desire to know

them; But it may here be said, that God hath revealed these excellencies of his in his holy book; he hath revea∣led something of himself in Scripture, enough for a viaticum, for a rep••st by the way, in a Riddle, darkely, behind a Cloud; by which he believe's there are such things; yet faith cannot make men absolutely perfect; it is the support,* 1.23 the foundation of things hoped for; but Peregrinamur fide, we must be strangers from happiness, whilst we live in faith; it is of things absent; happinesse consists in the fruition, the possession of what is present, which cannot be so long as we are believing; Faith give's a man a nearer approach to happinesse, then any thing else in this world; and therefore a faithfull man can passe better through all the affronts of this world, then any other; because he knowe's there is a happiness for him elswhere; that he is approaching to it; his con∣versation is in heaven, as S. Paul speaketh; his thoughts are there, his businesse and negotiation; this world be∣long's not to him; but yet he is going to his happinesse; onely, he is not there, untill he put off his flesh and blood. There are other revelations to prophetique persons,* 1.24 by dreames, visions, and other apparitions, by which God is pleased to reveale himself to some espe∣ciall Servants of his; but these are of some particular things, which cannot fill the vast understanding of man; there are likewise extasies in some men, which (I guess) have had by them fuller and greater manifestations of God; of that kind was that Saint Paul speake's of, in which were unutterable mysteries; but these are very short, enough to give a man a taste of heaven, not satisfie him; enough to make him long for more of the same, and desire to be dissolved, and be with Christ; enough to give him an eagernesse of desire, mixed with the Com∣fort

of assurance. He who hath happinesse, as it must be full, so it must be ••onstant, without losse, or feare of losing: for although beasts are happy in the present en∣joyment of their happy objects, because they have no forecast of any future evill, unlesse such little Sagacities, and instincts of nature as dispose them to these, or these provisions for the future; yet man, having foreseeing eyes, alwayes looking at what will become of him here∣after, cannot be happy in the present without forecast of the future, what he shall be; and therefore these tem∣porary felicities cannot make him blessed.

Sect. 13.

What I have said of the Understanding,* 1.25 may be ap∣plyed to the Will; for the Understanding give's light to all the Will's actions; and the reasonable Will cannot pos∣sibly enjoy any thing without it: Therefore as the Understanding cannot in this world fully apprehend the infinite good, neither can the Will enjoy it; the Will joye's in nothing which is not present; and the Vnder∣standing is that onely arme which embraceth this infi∣nite good, and the onely hand which layeth hold of it to convey it to the Will; and therefore, because the Understanding cannot fully, and clearely, receive this infinite Goodnesse, neither Understanding, nor Will, neither of these most excellent faculties, can be per∣fected in this World.

Sect. 14.

And now after this tedious discourse,* 1.26 from which I can yet hardly withdraw my Pen, consider my Argu∣ment, and see if in reason it may not yield a man as strong assurance as almost any natural Truth, that there

is a felicity after death: Consider the most apparent truths which thy Reason can perswad•• thee to of things unseen; thou art ••ssured that all men in all the world are mortal, and must dye: ask the reason; thou seest, or ••earest, that all here doe so where thou livest, and from thence canst collect that death belong's to all mankind: thou knowest that the fire burn's in the In∣dies, because it hath a power of burning, and an appe∣tite to it wheresoever it is: so I w••ll argue not from one Species, or sort of things, but from all the things in this world: there is nothing in the world which hath an appetite not satisfiable, a power without an ade∣quate subject, as Logicians speak, therefore it must be in man, in whom certainly there can be nothing in vain or imperfect; so that the certainty of this is drawn from the most universal Principle that is in Nature, and such a Principle which is as universally touched upon by Philosophers and School-men, as any one whatso∣ever, that Deus & natura nihil faciunt frustra; that frustra est potentia quae nunquam reducitur in actum; which these powers should be, if there were no felicity after this life, because there can be none absolutely here.

Sect. 15.

I know of but two things which can be objected here against this Conclusion, and I will endeavour to satisfie them in order, severally.

* 1.27The first is, that although man cannot enjoy the compleat full satisfaction of these powers in this life, yet he may be happy in those little parcels of know∣ledge of God, and his delight in that, by confining his desire and curbing it in, sapere ad sobrietatem, as S. Paul speaketh: and thus he will be happy here in this life.

I answer, this may breed a moderate content,* 1.28 but not a happiness: Happiness is, th••n which no more can be desired; but there is no man know's so much of God in this life, that he ought not to desire more, because more is knowable; for although in the fulness of hap∣piness the whole blessed Vision is manifest in a glorious manner, at one act, and that enjoyed; yet here we get it by piece-meal, now one, then another apprehension, by parts, and pieces; and the Infiniteness of Divine perfections is such, that no man's life, applyed to no∣thing else, can compass a full apprehension of it; yea, the further he goe's in this Journey, the further he finde's himself at a loss, and behind with knowledge; therefore a man must not be content, but strive for more knowledge; or if he have some content, yet this cannot be satisfaction of the powers, but a curbing them, which yield's but a half enjoyment, such as may be proper for a Viator, a Traveller to it, not a possessor of happiness in hope, as the Prophet David say'th; but God is our portion in the land of the living: we are here in the land of the dying, where others and we die dayly, and our happiness here is God, but God in hope; when we come to the land of the living, God will be our portion and possession: to conclude, men may have a begun happiness here, but no•• perfect untill hereafter: man perhaps may have content here, but felicity onely in heaven after life. A Traveller joye's his heart to see at a distance that happy Palace where he hope's for comfort, but he is not satisfied untill he come there: so it is with us in our Journey to heaven; the happiness we have here is our hope of it, but hereafter our pos∣session.

The next Objection may be,* 1.29 That this future Feli∣city

is an Article of our Faith, the Conclusion of all the Twelve, The resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting: Now if it were demonstrable thus by rea∣son, an act of Faith is not necessary to it.

* 1.30I can here bring the first and last Articles of our Faith together, that which concern's God's creation, and this which concern's man's salvation, man's beginning and end, which are both from God, and say, That for both of them there is abundance of reason, but those Rea∣sons cannot be easily argued by every man; and yet though every man cannot Philosophize in high points of learning, every man can believe these Conclusions which are proved by learned men, and that belief is re∣qu••red of every man; and surely belief hath great force to fasten men to that which they, upon good grounds, believe; no man know's who is his Mother, but by his belief of very easie people to deceive, and to be deceived; and yet this belief is constantly adhered unto by all sorts of men, so that men dare depose, that such a one was this man's Mother, and such this man's; none of us, that are not travelled in those parts, know that there is a Constantinople, yet we are assured by hear-say, and are most confident there is such a City: and stronger than all these may our Faith be of this T••uth, as I have shewed; Faith and Reason doe not destroy, but help, one the other; for it is with our way to heaven, as to other places; when a man hath shewed us one way, we can by that guess at another, which hath proportion and convenience to that; like lights, when you have kindled one Candle, you may easily light others at that: when the Soul of man is enlighte∣ned by Faith, it can with much more ease afterwards inlighten Reason, which perhaps else it would never

have thought upon, and Reason sometimes assist's Faith; for when the persons, we believe, deliver to be believed nothing but that is reasonable, it is with comfort swal∣lowed down and entertained, and the work of Faith hath less labour when it imposeth no unreasonable thing. Thus you see the same Conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason,* 1.31 and therefore although proved in one, yet exalted as an Article in the other.

I could now insist upon the Article of Faith, how confirmed by Scripture, but that is done by an hun∣dred men before, and is evident too to every one that looke's upon the New Testament: I could further en∣large upon that I have already touched, concerning the Credibility and Fitness to believe those men which de∣livered it to us, that certainly, as Festus said to S. Paul,* 1.32 not he onely, but all the rest were mad with learning, or something else, who did endure so many afflictions, yea death, for Religion, if there were no reward here∣after; and the Story of their sufferings was sealed to us by the blood of thousands in divers immediate Cen∣turyes, and continued by the most universally consen∣ted Story in the world: so that, for certainty we, have not so much reason to believe any Article of the Faith (I speak of reason) nor any Conclusion delivered by relation, as this one, That there is a Blessedness hereafter for God's servants▪ because this is the reason, and chief reason, why these men durst dye for Religion; this made Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego, Dan. 3. de∣spise the fire for Gods cause; the Heroick Sons, 2 Mac. 7. contemn Tortures with a most noble Constancy, be∣cause they looked for a better and happier life; so, as it is phrased Hebr. 12.1. We are compassed about with a mighty cloud of Witnesses, or indeed a cloud of mighty

Witnesses, to evidence the Truth: Mr. Hobbes there∣fore did not doe this noble heavenly Conclusion right,* 1.33 when he say'd, [It is received onely upon a belief, groun∣ded upon other mens saying, that know it supernaturally, or that they know those that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally] which was a disgracefull ex∣pression, and, I can justly fear, intended to that pur∣pose, to disparage this Article; for let a man consider his Conclusion which follows, [Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason, or Nature▪] This, he saith, was opposed by some who held killing of Sovereigns law∣full: this seemed out of his premisses to be argued; for thus, That which conduceth to future felicity ought to be done; but the breach of faith in killing of Sovereigns conduceth to future felicity, therefore &c. what need had he any way to have disgraced our hope of heaven; it might have served his turn much better to have shewed how the God of Truth love's Truth, and hate's Fals∣hood; how unpossible it is that Error and Falshood should be the way to Truth, how inconsistent they are: these things would abundantly have served his turn, and have contented the Reader; but to leave that, and fall foule, without occasion, upon our hope of heaven, was very ill done of him.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Mr. Hobbes unkind to Re∣ligion in the disparagement he puts upon natural know∣ledge.
• * 1.2

  What a per∣swasive the na∣tural know∣ledge, or be∣liefe we have of eternal hap∣pinesse, is to withdraw us from our opi∣nion of tempo∣ral felicity.
• * 1.3

  The transcen∣dent delight here in our hopes of eter∣nal happinesse.
• * 1.4

  For which we loth worldly pleasures.
• * 1.5

  And welcome tortures.
• * 1.6

  Obj.
• * 1.7

  Ans.
• * 1.8

  The worldly advantages in prosecuting divine happi∣n••sse.
• * 1.9

  Merchant ad∣venturer.
• * 1.10

  Mr. Hobbes can render himself more s••cure of temporal then he seemes to be (with little satisfaction) of eternal felicity
• * 1.11

  The promises, and oathes of men, which he make's his greatest assu∣rance being very fallible.
• * 1.12

  His scornful scale of know∣ledge.
• * 1.13

  Our evidence greater of fu∣ture felicity then that ever there was such a man as Jul∣us Caesar.
• * 1.14

  Being not on∣ly deliver'd to us by Traditi∣on, but most consonant ••o Reason,
• * 1.15

  In Mans fel∣l••wship with other Crea∣tures, and his excellency a∣bove them.
• * 1.16

  A very chi••d requires he satisfaction of his Will.
• * 1.17

  A man's Will satisfied wi••h no wo••ldly goods, whe∣ther b••d••ly, sensual, or in∣tellectual.
• * 1.18

  H••s knowledge ••s defective, and cannot doe it.
• * 1.19

  Nor ought else which is not infinite, and that infi∣nite is God.
• * 1.20

  Riches doe it not, wh••ch bring with them an im∣patient covet∣ousness of get∣ting more, when men have most.
• * 1.21

  Man hath some imperfect knowledge of God in this life.
• * 1.22

  None positive∣ly of his emi∣nencies, but by revelation.
• * 1.23

  What Faith do••'s towa••d it.
• * 1.24

  What dreams, visions, ecsta∣sies &c.
• * 1.25

  The severall parts acted by the Under∣standing and the Will, both which facul∣ties are im∣perfect in this world.
• * 1.26

  The certainty of felicity af∣ter death re∣sum'd and proved.
• * 1.27

  Object. 1.
• * 1.28

  Ans. The Objecti∣on answer'd, to••ching man's felic••ty in the knowledge &c. he hath, though ••m∣perfect.
• * 1.29

  Objection 2.
• * 1.30

  Answer. A second Ob∣j••ction an∣swer'd, about Eternal feli∣city, being the last Article of our Faith.
• * 1.31

  The same Conclusion may be the result of Faith and Reason.
• * 1.32

  An Argument to confirme this, drawn from the H. Martyrs con∣stancy in their sufferings.
• * 1.33

  Mr. Hobbes su∣spected of a design, to dis∣parage the foresaid Ar∣ticle of our ••aith.