Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

CHAP. XXVII.

Of transfering right; Sinnes independence on Covenants. Which are not voyd by suspiiion. Of propriety and Coercive Power. An arbitration between the Fool and Mr. Hobbes concerning Justice, the feare of God, getting Heaven by violence, &c. Faith not to be violated; Concerning the Law of nature in order to aeternal faelici∣ty. Breach of Covenant. Rebellion.

Sect. 1.

CAp. 15. Pag. 71. In the beginning of this Chap. will appeare the unhappinesse of his former dis∣course, concerning mens natural right, over one another,* 1.1 here, in his first words, he supposeth [That law of nature by which men are obliged to transferre their right one to another] The vanity of which I have discus∣sed before; from this he drawes a third [That men must keep their Covenants made one to another.] The conclusion is good,* 1.2 and of the highest consequence, in all commerce betwixt men that possibly can be; but his Commendation of it is not so commendable as his conclusion, but most dangerous; his words are these [And in this Law of nature consisteth the fountaine and original of justice] This Law is of keeping of Cove∣nants. Let the Reader look back upon Cap. 14. Sect. 4. and he shall find the wicked Sins of the Sodo∣mites,

of Cain, in which no man can say, that there was any Covenant betwixt those parties preceded, concern∣ing such actions; and then, upon that score, they were just, because not unjust; now if the fountaine of Justice were Covenant, then those actions (being where was no Covenant preceding) could not be unjust. His rea∣son, by which he confirm's this,* 1.3 is not so solid asmight be expected from such a learned man, which is this; [for where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred; and every man hath right to every thing; and, consequently, no action can be unjust.] See here, Reader, how necessary it is timely to stop an Errour; it is a Sicknesse in a man's soul, and ought to be nipt in its growth; it is an ill Guest, which is easier kep't out, then thrust out, especially when it come's with force of a Law, or Axiome, as this did. Had he proved before, that every man hath right to every thing, even in the possession of another's person, yea to ano∣ther's person, as he pretended to doe, then this Con∣clusion would have justly been deduced thence: but I think, that being confuted, this Conclusion must like∣wise fall with it.* 1.4 Let us consider two or more men of divers nations met together in some, before not in∣habited, place; were it not unjust, against the law of nature, that one should murther, or maime the other, without any injury from him? were it not just, that they should help one another in distresse, by the Law of hu∣manity? If he say, not, consider his owne saying (for a man so learned, as he is, cannot but, in many things, acknowledge the universall rules which governe the world, although he may misapply them) see therefore pag. 65. Cap. 14. This (saith he) is that law of the Gospell; Whatsoever ye require that others should doe to you,

that doe you to them: and that law of all men; Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne f••ceris] apply this law to these men, without any Covenant, expressed, or imply'd, but onely that; would any of these think it just, that the other should doe him violence or Injury? It is unjust then by this law, that he should doe it to the other.

* 1.5He againe labour's to confirme his Conclusion from the definition of injustice, which, saith he, is [The not performance of Covenant] this definition was never (I think) writ before; although a thousand have treated of injustice, yet never any defined it so; It is true, every breach of Covenant is Injustice: but Injustice is what is not a breach of Covenant, as I have shewed, and therefore will insist no further upon it.

Sect. 2.

He goe's on [But because Covenants of mutual trust where there is a feare on either part (as hath been saide in the former chap.) are invalid] The place he mentioned is pag. 68▪ where he deliver's that [If a Covenant be made wherein neither of the p••••••les performe presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of war of every man against every man) upon any reasonable suspition it is voyd. but if there be a com∣mon power set over them both, with right and force suffici∣ent to compell performance,* 1.6 it is not voyd.]

This proposition, although it make a faire shew, up∣on a superficial view; yet we shall find it, upon diligent examination, to be full of unhappy errours. Had he said, such Covenants are dangerous to be kept: and that men with wicked principles will not keep them, he had said somewhat that might have borne him out in it; but to

say, they are voyd, is to affirme, they have no obliging nature, or Tye with them, which is not to be indured by Iustice.

I will first put him the Case betwixt two neighbour∣ing nations; they enter Leagues of Confederacy;* 1.7 they covenant upon Articles; these two are just like such par∣ticular men, unbodied in a common-wealth: can any man think, that when any of these are afrayd of the other's breach of Articles, it shall therefore be fit for him to breake? can his feare dissolve his Covenant? yes, per∣haps, as in his 14. Chap. to which this related [If this suspition be reasonable] A suspicion, though reasonable, is but a suspicion; and it is possible for any man to finde reasons for suspicions; by this all bargains, and Contracts of nations one with another will be made nothing;* 1.8 for no doubt but all nations may, and will suspect one ano∣ther, and yet dare not breake their promises and Cove∣nants which they make; If this doctrine of his were received, it would make all Commerce betwixt nations voyd, yea, I will tell him, betwixt men in private, so that those sacred Sponsalia betwixt man and woman were voyd, if no Witnesses to them; all those promises, yea Oathes (for they are but a stronger bond of the same Covenant) should be voyd, if no Witnesses to testify the Covenant; If mens Covenants cannot bind them, before they make a Leviathan, why should that Covenant binde them? for the Covenant concerning their superi∣our must be before he is who is an effect of it.* 1.9 Plato in his Protagoras tell's a most ingenious fable, the result of which is this, that the world being uninhabited, Iu∣piter appointed Epimetheus to make all sorts of beasts; but Prometheus he appointed to make men, and indued them with Wisdome; these men built Cities; fenced

themselves from beasts, but by their wisdome were more wicked then beasts, and injured one another most impi∣ously; upon that he sent Mercury amongst them; who brought the men two Sisters, Iustice and Modesty, which regulated them in all vertue, and Civility one towards another; These are universally given to men, and are with them, where evill principles, and wicked customes, h••ve not extirpated them; So that that which the School, from the Philosophers, call's Synder••sis, dictate••s to men those great Axiomes of practice: doe to others as ye would be done unto; and keep your faith, and promise, with the like: and no man doth violate these, but with an Injury to the rest and quiet of his mind. I could tell stories of morall men, innumerable, who would keep Covenant, even with their ruine, and death; but they are obvious: It is apparent, that although men may, and doe break Covenants; yet they are not voyd; they have a Tye upon man in his Conscience▪ which makes them affraid to offend in Scandalous and great Injuries.

Sect. 3.

He proceed's, [Though the original of Iustice be the ma∣king of Covenants; yet injustice there can be none, till the cause of such feare be taken away, which, while men are in the condition of warre, cannot be done.] Thus farre he: This phrase, such feare, must be understood of that feare a man hath of another's violation of Covenant; I think all this is satisfied: that there may be injustice before Covenant; injustice against the practicke law of nature; injustice af∣ter Covenant, in the violation of it; and although he imagine's feare to secure a man from violating Covenant, it must certainly be such as the Casuists speak of, metus cadens,* 1.10 such as would shake a valiant or constant man,

as some certaine argument of Death, or ruine, not sus∣picion's, that another will not keep his Covenant which must excuse. Againe, I have already shewed, that men are not naturally in a condition of warre; so that he build's upon very false foundations. I will not trouble the Reader with nine or tenne lines together, which are no∣thing but repetitions of formerly refuted conclusions: but in the next page 72. neare the beginning, he bring's somthing like a new Argument, from the usuall defini∣tion of justice among the Schoolemen, thus:

Sect. 4.

And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary defi∣nition of Iustice in the Schooles; for they say, that Justice is the constant rule of giving to every man his own: And therefore where there is no owne, that is, no propriety, there is no Injustice, and where there is no coercive Power erect∣ed, that is, where there is no Commonwealth, there is no propriety, all men having Right to all things: Therefore where there is no Commonwealth, there nothing is unjust.] I am glad to find him speaking something in the Schooles, although not fully approving it: the definition shall passe without any further trouble; although I thinke it not perfect yet it will prove much better then any thing he hath produced. Let us examine his inference, which is drawne into some Syllogistical form, and therefore will abide a juster answer.

His Major is undeniable; where is no propriety,* 1.11 there is no injustice; but his minor is mightily to blame, unpro∣ved any where, which is, where is no coercive Power erected, that is, no Common-wealth, there is no propriety; This Proposition I have shewed often to be erroneous; men have right to their own persons, their Wives, their

possessions, without this Power coercive of a Common-wealth; and therefore this Conclusion is not rightly deduced out of the premises.

But now, good Reader, pause with me a while, and consider with me,* 1.12 how contrary these me••nes will work to his intention's; he int••••ds to build •• Common wealth, and the justice of i••, upon ••hese foundations. That there can be no justice or injus••••••e untill then▪ no not in Covenants which ••••l••ven▪ and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Iustice a being; then is the terrour of the coercive powe•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉; if it were true, I am perswaded, there were no suc•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as Iustice or injustice, for then there would n••t be [a constant rule] or, which is a b••tter word, a habit of vertue of giving every one his own; but •• feare of the Magi∣strate, if he do not; and the Supr••••e Magistrate, who principally hath both the sword ••nd purse of Iustice (reward and punishment) in his power, could not do ju∣stice or injustice, because he hath no coercive power above him; and he make's no Covenant (as he discourseth) and I meane to con••ute hereafter: but further, whatsoe∣ver wickednesse, oppression, murder, man can doe se∣cretly, secure from the eye and sword of men, had no in∣justice in it; for if the coercive power of the civill Magi∣strate, operating upon the feare of men, be that which gives the name of justice (as he affirme's) then, with∣out it, no action deserve's that name. What follow's immediately, is but a repetition of what went before.

In the margent of the same page is written, Iustice not contrary to Reason,] what he write's of this head must be next examined.

Sect. 5.

He begin's thus [The foole hath said in his hea••t there is no such thing as Iustice; and sometimes also with his tongue seriously alleaging that every mans conservation and con∣tentment

being committed to his care, there could be no rea∣son why every man might not doe what he thought conduced thereunto; and therefore also to make, or not make, keep, or not keep, Covenants, was not against Reason, when it con∣duced to ones benefit] Thus he make's the fool to con∣firme his wicked Conclusion; and, for my part,* 1.13 I thinke the fools' argument is unanswerable, out of Mr. Hobbes his principles: for if it be true, as he hath supposed, that every man hath a natural right to every thing, and every mans conservation and contentment is committed to his own charge; and that no man can renounce by any Covenant his right to defend himself from death, wounds, impri∣sonment, which he delivered in his 66 page (and, with∣out doubt, much more may be said for other content∣ments, then for some of these) then he can by no Covenant be obliged to forsake any thing, but onely such little things as are scarcely considerable in justice.

He goes on [He does not therein deny that there be Co∣venants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept▪ and that such breach of them may be called Injustice, and the observance of them;* 1.14 Iustice] In this the fool's do∣ctrine, if he understand Covenants of such as are made before there is incorporation in a Common-wealth, is more honest than Mr. Hobbes's: for Mr. Hobbes deliver's, that such Covenants are invalid, because there must be a feare of breach on the other side, and so the Covenant is dull, and a man cannot commit injustice in the breach of them, which this foole acknowledgeth. His next words are [But he questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the feare of God (for the same foole hath said in his heart there is no God) may not sometimes stand with that Reason which dictateth to every man his own good, and par∣ticularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall

put a man in a condition to neglect not onely the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of other men] taking away the feare of God) It a man take from any act, or habit, those circums••••nces which make it evill,* 1.15 it will be good; but I am perswaded that a feare of God is so rooted in the hearts of men, that although men may darken the light, and cleare sight of it, with wicked reasoning; although men may hinder the vivacity in the opposition of it, by customary inhabiting, reigning sins: yet it cannot be so extirpated, but that it will appeare, and breake out sometimes into action: and although a foole, or wicked man may sometimes say so; yet other times he will not beleeve his own words, and must oft feare he is in the wrong.* 1.16 This kind of reasoning either Mr Hobbes taught, or learned from him; for I am perswaded never man disputed so high Conclusions out of such impossible supposalls, as he hath; such is this, if there were no feare of God. Let us see the force of the fool's Argument; he seem's to affirme, that Injustice, taking away the fear of God, will stand with that Reason which dictateth to every man his own good; I am perswaded it is good when In∣justice may be committed where is no Common wealth, when men commit injustice so secretly that no Magi∣strate may take notice of it; for if no God, no heaven, or hell, praemium or poena, for good or ill actions; and then a man's considerations are chiefly about his owne ease, pleasure, and contentment in his bodily and sensi∣tive life; but yet I must adde one restraint to the fool's proposition: Injustice may stand with that Reason which prescribe's his own good, that is, his pleasure, or content∣ment; but not with right Reason, for right Reason preferrs the publicke good before the private, which cannot subsist without Iustice.

Sect. 6.

He goes on with the fools argument most unhappily; he was a witty foole, who disputed so [The Kingdome of God is gotten by violence; but what if it could be gotten by un∣just violence? were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not against Iustice, or else Iustice is not to be approved for good] what another horrid impossible sup∣posall is here brought to confirme the precedent?* 1.17 that heaven should be got by unjust violence; the Kingdome of God, which is Gods gift only, should be forced out of his hands, by wicked actions, against his will; but yet there is a different condition in this with the other, because the Kingdome of God comprehend's in it all happinesse which belong's to any, and without which, at the last de∣parture of his Soul, a man must be miserable; and therefore it is that the Philosophers call that summum bo∣num, which, when revealed, men cannot choose but de∣sire: and therefore if a man could either by fraud, or force, get it, God, who hath so framed a man's desires, that there is a necessity for him to desire it, could never be offended at such endeavours; nor can it be unjust for men so to doe.

Sect. 7.

He proceed's, [From such reasoning as this, Successeful wickedn••ss hath obtained the name of vertue].* 1.18 Here begin's to confute that conclusion of the foole; that there is no such thing as Iustice: this sentence is his foundation, and he thus argue's; If there be no injustice, but all men are to doe what is most reasonable, that is, most conducing to their owne good, that is, worldly pleasure, or profit, then succesfull wickednesse may be called Vertue, which is

abominable, and most odious; for certainly vertue is not measured by the event, but the nature of the act, and the naturall tendence of it to that is good.

* 1.19This argument of his, against the foole, is strong, but let us examine it; doth not this, and all he speaks against the foole, fight against himself in the 13. Chap. of his Leviathan? concerning which I have discoursed be∣fore. He deliver's that [men naturally have a right to all things; and any one may rightly doe any thing to any man for the securing of his life or contentment; and that men are in a state of war (before they are incorporated into a Com∣mon-wealth) with all the world; that in that state, fraud and force are the Cardinall vertues]; so then, in this state, any successefull wickednesse must needs be called Vertue because a man, in such meanes (according to his doctrine) act's nothing but what he hath right to do, and there∣fore was just, and acted according to reason, and by such meanes obtain's his end's which are his own preservation and contentment.

Againe, he hath delivered Chap. 14. [that no man can renounce his right of delivering himself from wounds, and chaines, and imprisonment, or indeed of any such thing as may make his life wearisome to him]; well then: let it be considered, if a man have naturally right to all those things which may secure and preserve them; then let his Compacts, or Covenants, be whatsoever, yet they are invalid, which infringe this right which a man hath no power to alien from himself; then, in order to these, whatsoever a man act's after he hath covenanted▪ himself into a common-wealth, be it never so wicked, must be cloathed with the specious name of vertue; because according to reason and right; so that (let him say what he will) this unlucky foole disputed most unanswerably

against his principles, and the main hinges upon which his policy move's, though nothing against mine.

Sest. 8.

He goe's on [And some that in all other things have dis∣allowed the violation of faith, yet have allowed it when it is for the getting of a Kingdome.* 1.20] I doe not remember that I have read the violation of faith for the getting a Kingdome justified by any man but Machiavell, who in∣deed approve's any means to bring a man to what he aime's at; but, certainly, no man esteemed for Christi∣anity, or morality: It is said of Julius Caesar, that he would often repeat out of Euripides that Sentence, which he rendred,

Quod si violandum est jus, regnandi gratiâ Violandum est, aliis rebus pietatem colas.

But let the Reader consider, that it is here with (if) if right be to be violated; and what Tully saye's of him, that he was captus Imperii consuetudine, ensnared with the cu∣stome or habit of commanding, which in his infancy he had coveted, and from thence would use that speech, and did practise it as unluckily as other usurpers; but, sure, eve∣ry man, who is mastered with any habit of wicked••••sse the fruition of which he viciously covet's, will say as much for that, as Caesar for governing; but none, as I know of, hath delivered it for a practique conclusion but onely Machiavel; therefore that word [some] might have been spared by Mr. Hobbes,

Sect. 9.

Page 73. He comes to make particular answers, which are not satisfactory to the foole's argument,* 1.21 and therefore must be examined; in the second line he state's

the question, certainly, not punctually to the purpose; for whereas the fool's conclusion was, that there was no such thing as injustice, he saith lin. 2. (that [The Question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no security of performance on the other side; as when there is no civill pow∣er erected over the parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants.] This is a most hatefull parenthesis, (as I have shewed) he goe's on [but either where one of the par∣tyes hath performed already; or where there is a power to make him performe] so that here is a great restraint to the fool's conclusion, and a limitation of the fool's argu∣ment, which I am perswaded, if he had disputed with Mr. Hobbes, he would not have allowed, for he was bred up in Mr. Hobbes his principles, and dispute's shrewdly out of them; but although this be not pertinent to the foole, yet let the fool grant that this shall be the question as Mr. Hobbes put's it Wh••ther it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other, to performe, or not] Here the poore foole is abused mightily, for the fool's conclu∣sion was about justice; Mr. Hobbes put's the question concerning benefit onely: certainly many high Injustices have been beneficial, as he call's benefit, that is, profitable for this life's advantages; but yet see by what fraudu∣lent steps he steale's into the change of these Tearmes: first he hath said, that Iustice is not against Reason; Reason is not against the Law,* 1.22 which looketh onely at the happinesse of this life to that particular man; there∣fore justice is whatsoever any man act's for his own good; all which expressions have beene before shewed not to be depending one upon the other; but let us examine his argument [I say (saith he) it is not against reason] from Iustice he went to reason; from reason to benefit; and now from benefit to reason againe, for the manife∣station

of which he hath a long discourse to shew, that the wisdome of actions is not to be measured by the events, but the for••sight and d••sign (which shall be granted him,) Secondly▪ in that refuted imagination of [every man's being at war with every man for want of a common power to keep them in awe, no man can hope to defend himself by his own power, strength, and wit &c. Therefore he who declare's he think's it reason to deceive those that h••lp him, can in rea∣son expect no other meanes of safety then what can be had from his own single power] This is the force of what he there write's: But consider, Reader, with me, that this is not to the purpose; for the foole's Conclusion was concerning the justice and honesty of a thing; he onely out-wit's the foole, and discourseth of cunning, or craft, or worldly profit of those actions, what is most profitable for the advance of the Agent'•• ease and pleasure: but then consider further, and see if this answear of his satisfy that doubt; The Question, according to his own fra∣ming, is, whether it be profitable to deceive or not; his an∣swer is drawn from a declaration that that man should make, that he think's i•• fit to deceive, which no man but a verier foole then he, who objected it, did ever doe;* 1.23 there is no power to act any great wickedness, but under the shew of Piety, not by professing to deceive, but by pro∣fessing not to deceive; oathes, covenants, protestations, cursings of themselves, are the horrid maskes of Im∣piety, which wicked men use to deceive with, the Devill can no way so efficaciously deceive, as by putting on the shape or likeness of an Angel, sometimes by putting a false glosse upon the Text, as with Adam; sometimes urging the Scripture its self, as with our Saviour. That child of the Devil's, who will prosper in this world, must not protest and declare that he will deceive, but protest

against it, and utterly defy it; so excellently the Poet makes Sinon, in that high fraud of his, Cozen by the denying of Cozenage, nec si miserum fortuna Sinonem Finxit, vanum etiam mendacemque improba finget· Mr. Hobbes, I am confident, well knowe's, that he, who is premonished of his danger, will avoyd it; even birds do avoyd the net openly layd before them; so that cer∣tainly this come's not close to Mr. Hobbes his purpose which should prove, that it were not wisely done accor∣ding to his wisdome, to deceive, when he speak's onely of such who manifest and declare they will deceive; and it is a maine fault which runne's throughout his whole book, that he attempt's one proposition, and, by shuf∣fling and changing the Tearmes, prove's another.

* 1.24Now my conclusion is, that all deceit is injustice, all in∣justice unprofitable, because against the most sacred Law-maker, who will avenge it here, or hereafter, whether men take notice of it, or no; evil and injustice will hunt the wicked person; onely honesty and justice will bring a man peace and prosperity at the last.

Sect. 10.

Afterwards he bring's another Answer, concerning the getting of heaven by violence,* 1.25 which is not logical; for although he sayes truth, that there is but one way of getting heaven, which is, not breaking, but keeping of Co∣venant; yet, the Fool supposing the impossibility that men might get heaven by unjust violence, he was to an∣swer logically out of the premisses, and not to deny the supposition.

Then he comes to answer that argument which amu∣sed me,* 1.26 concerning the getting sovereignty by rebellion: for let a man read his manner of writing and judge whe∣ther

in that he did not seem to make this an argument against the fool (as indeed it was) when, sayes he, from such reasoning as this succes••ful wickedness is called Vertue: now from the hatefulness of this Conclusion he over∣throw's the fools Conclusion. I allow his answer, but think he had had more reason to have confirmed the ar∣gument then overthrown it, because, as I have shewed, it was a doctrine corroborated by the main principles of his book; then he raiseth a new discourse about ano∣ther opinion [There be some (saith he) that proceed far∣ther, and will not have the Law of Nature to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life upon earth, but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death.] I am of that mind,* 1.27 that the Law of Nature doth give rules for the attaining eternal felicity after death; for it is a most undoubted rule of the Law of Nature, as to the general, that bonum est appetibile, so to the particular, that accor∣ding to the degrees of goodnesse, that which is majus bonum, is magis appetibile, and ought to be more desired then what is minus; and this is so universally delivered by Nature, that no reasonable man heare's the tearme's, and understand's them, but he assent's to them; here is a major, one rule delivered concerning eternal life here∣after; if we can find a Minor corresponding, it will be (I think) one of the clearest delivered truths that can re∣sult out of that habit called by Philosophers intellectus or habitus principiorum; but here, in these Tearmes he puts it, there can be no doubt of it: for if it be an eter∣nall felicity (as he call's it) and all Christians believe, the very Tearmes render it cleare, that an Eternall is more to be desired then a Temporary, and therefore more to be endeavoured for. I insist no further upon this at this instant; I come to that he applye's this to.

Sect. 11.

[To which (saith he) they think the breach of Covenant may conduce, and consequently to be just and reasonable] I think he never read in any Author this Conclusion de∣livered,* 1.28 that the breach of Covenant doth conduce to eter∣nal felicity; for he put's it in unlimited Terms: It is true, if any man, or men, make a Covenant to do any wicked thing, although they bind it by an oath, they are bound, and, in order to heaven, they ought, to re∣pent of that Covenant, and not keep it; but it is not the breach of Covenant, as a Covenant, which disposeth them to heaven, but the acting of that holy thing which that wicked Covenant forbid's them to do:* 1.29 Suppose a Com∣bination of Thieves should covenant with each other to act whatsoever such a person, whom they make their supreme, should command; one of this College should have a sense of that wicked life he live's in, knowing that it lead's to hell and perdition, can any man think he is not bound to leave that Society, and disobey what∣soever command is imposed upon him of Robbery or Murther? Suppose an Adulteress married woman should, by her oath,* 1.30 covenant with her Adulterer to appropriate her body to him, do not you think she was bound, in order to heaven, to break that wicked Covenant? So is it with all Covenants to do evil, they ought to violate them; but it is not the violation of Covenant, but the doing of righteousness, which is acceptably pleasing to God; but he instance's in his following words:

Sect. 12.

[Such are they (saith he) who think it a work of merit, to kill, or depose, or rebell against the soveraign power con∣stituted

over them by their own consent] This instance he give's because he hoped that writing against such a hor∣rid diabolical doctrine would usher in the rest of his wic∣ked opinions plausibly;* 1.31 I am not intended to defend their opinions who think so; but yet I will say this for them, that I think they that write for killing of kings, which are the Papists, and some others, as destructive of civill Society as they, will pretend that those Sovereignes are not constituted over them by their own consent: they will say, they never consented to his Coronation; to his acception; never took the Oath of Alleageance and Supremacy: And I will say, that if this be all the ground of this sinne in rebellion,* 1.32 there is no such thing as rebellion by Mr. Hobbes his doctrine; for Mr. Hobbes (as will be seen hereafter) make's no Sovereign, or Leviathan, but such as is consented unto by every particular, of which kind there is none in the world: and therefore, where men have not made such a consent, and are bound by that Covenant which is not to be seen in the whole world, there can be no sin in rebellion; but this was onely an instance to lead on his future scorne of religion, being in it's self impertinent

Notes

• * 1.1

  Mr. Hobbes's vaine supposi∣tion of trans∣ferring right, &c.
• * 1.2

  His justiying most horrid sins, where no Covenant had been made a∣gainst them.
• * 1.3

  His reason frustrate.
• * 1.4

  An instance of two persons meeting in some place not before inhabi∣ted.
• * 1.5

  His imperfect definition of injustice.
• * 1.6

  Suspition makes not Co∣venants voyd.
• * 1.7

  The case put between two nations en∣tring League of Confedera∣cy.
• * 1.8

  The evil con∣sequences of his opinion.
• * 1.9

  Plato's inge∣nious Fable.
• * 1.10

  The Casuists metus ••adens.
• * 1.11

  A propriety, where is no Coercive Pow∣er.
• * 1.12

  The foundati∣ons wherein Mr. Hobbes builds a Com∣mon wealth and the justice of it.
• * 1.13

  The Foole's argument un∣answerable out of Mr. Hobbes's prin∣ciples.
• * 1.14

  His doctrine more honest then Mr. Hobbes
• * 1.15

  Taking away the feare of God, an unre∣asonable sup∣position.
• * 1.16

  U••certain whether taugh or learned of the other the Foole or Mr. Hobbes.
• * 1.17

  Mr. Hobbes's horrid suppo∣sal, of getting Heaven by un∣just violence.
• * 1.18

  He pretends to confute the Foole.
• * 1.19

  But by inad∣vertense fights against him∣self.
• * 1.20

  The violation of faith not ••llowed, for a Kingdome.
• * 1.21

  Mr. Hobbes mistake's the question.
• * 1.22

  And changeth 〈◊〉〈◊〉 termes fraudulently h••re and o∣therwhere.
• * 1.23

  He that means to deceive will not declare his intent.
• * 1.24

  The Bishops Conclusion.
• * 1.25

  Mr. Hobbes's illogical An∣••wer.
• * 1.26

  Another like it
• * 1.27

  The Law of Nature give's rules for the attaining eter∣nal felicity af∣rte death.
• * 1.28

  The breach of Covenant though a wic∣ked one con∣duceth not to eternal felicity yet such Cove∣nants ought to be broken.
• * 1.29

  As that enterd into by Theeves.
• * 1.30

  The other by an Adulteress.
• * 1.31

  Mr Hobbes's subtilty in wri∣ting against Rebelion.
• * 1.32

  which cannot be by his do∣ctrine.