of Cain, in which no man can say, that there was any Covenant betwixt those parties preceded, concern∣ing such actions; and then, upon that score, they were just, because not unjust; now if the fountaine of Justice were Covenant, then those actions (being where was no Covenant preceding) could not be unjust. His rea∣son, by which he confirm's this, is not so solid asmight be expected from such a learned man, which is this; [for where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred; and every man hath right to every thing; and, consequently, no action can be unjust.] See here, Reader, how necessary it is timely to stop an Errour; it is a Sicknesse in a man's soul, and ought to be nipt in its growth; it is an ill Guest, which is easier kep't out, then thrust out, especially when it come's with force of a Law, or Axiome, as this did. Had he proved before, that every man hath right to every thing, even in the possession of another's person, yea to ano∣ther's person, as he pretended to doe, then this Con∣clusion would have justly been deduced thence: but I think, that being confuted, this Conclusion must like∣wise fall with it. Let us consider two or more men of divers nations met together in some, before not in∣habited, place; were it not unjust, against the law of nature, that one should murther, or maime the other, without any injury from him? were it not just, that they should help one another in distresse, by the Law of hu∣manity? If he say, not, consider his owne saying (for a man so learned, as he is, cannot but, in many things, acknowledge the universall rules which governe the world, although he may misapply them) see therefore pag. 65. Cap. 14. This (saith he) is that law of the Gospell; Whatsoever ye require that others should doe to you,