Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

CHAP. XXVI.

Of merit by contrast and otherwise. The distinction ex congruo & condigno expounded according to the schools.

Sect. 1.

HE that performeth first (saith the Author) in the case of Contract, is said to merit that which he is to receive by the performance of the other, and he hath it as due.] This is true which he writes, this is Merit, but this ex∣pression comprehend's not all merit, this is a legal merit; a man in this case may implead the party he conracted with, and gain his reward by right of law; but there may be merit without a legall title, as thus; A souldier takes

a Prisoner, useth him civilly, dismisseth him, afterwards that souldier,* 1.1 who was so treated, takes his taker priso∣ner, he, without question, deserved to be civilly used againe by him; Titius finds Sempronius a poor necessi∣tou•• Child, takes him into his house, breeds him up carefully; without question Titius deserves from Sempro∣nius all dutifull observances, but he cannot implead him for it, but in humanity it is due to both these from whom they have received these obliging kindnesses, al∣though there was no Contract preceding.* 1.2 What he addes presently after, of a man who scatter's money, to be his who catcheth it, is no differing case from the other, for it is by way of Contract, and the title to that money is as legall in him who first snatcheth up the mony, as in him who should get that money by any other Contract. In the bottome of that page he addes [But there is between those two sorts of merit this difference, that in Contract I merit by vertue of mine own power and the Contractors need but in this case of free guift (so he call's that scattering of Money) I am enabled to merit only by the benignity of the giver.]

Sect. 2.

This distinction I conceive manifestly weak; for first, what he saith of that he call's Contract is as true of the other, that in contract I merit by vertue of my power and the Contractors need; so is it in that contract, as I call it, where mony is scatter'd for him who can first catch it; he who catcheth it first hath it by his own power of catching, and the Contractors need of that pleasure to see men, scramble for the Money; and he deserves it, as well as a Musician doth his hire, or any other of these men which are contracted with for any of our pleasures or recreati∣ons So likewise in the second part of his distinction

what he ••ffi••mes of this other, which he calls Free guift may as truly be spoken of the first which he cals Con∣tract, thus [but in this of Free guift I am enabled to merit onely by the benignity of the giver.] What is it,* 1.3 I would aske, that enables •• Musician to merit that angell, or what else the liberal Gentleman gives him for his houre's delight he had from him, but the benignity of the donor; if he play a day together to a man who hath a clunched hand or no affection to the musick (as it often happen's) they spend their time in vaine at an unwel∣come window, they then merit no more then such boyes that should catch up loose Monies without the right owners disposing of it to them by some Contract prece∣ding; but that which he speake's of the benignity of the giver, that, that enabled the receiver to merit; that hath nothing to doe in the varying the nature of a contract; for in Contracts not the affection of the Contractor, which is not possible to be t••uly known, but the words or signes by which the Contract is made, are able to make a difference in it, for else contracts might be differenced according to all humane affections or vices, hopefull, fearefull, voluptuous, covetous, ambitious, &c. but these doe not vary the natures of Contracts, no more then should the benignity of the donor.

Sect. 3.

But he proceeds with another difference [In Contracts (saith he) I merit at the Contractors hand that he should depart with his right; in this case of guift I merit not that the giver should part with his right, but that then when he hath pasted with it, it should be mine.* 1.4] Here is a shew of something, but indeed it is exceeding vaine and emp∣ty; for if that mony be cast about for such as take it by

scrambling, or the like, if no body come to scramble, the right owner keepeth his property, and doth not out himself of that property untill a scrambler come and get it; I have seene money taken up againe, so the case is evident. A piece of Plate is provided as the reward of him who hath the swiftest horse to runne, at such a time, or such a place; if any horses come and runne, the swift∣est horse gets the Plate; but if there come none, the Plate is where it was, and the other part of runners be∣ing not performed, neither doth the contractor lose his first interest; but if it shall happen that the right owner throw away his interest, and forsake it, without a Con∣dition of any other side, those goods taken up will be like a thing found, and perhaps fall into the hand of the Lord, not the taker; all thi•• shewes, that, in these in∣stances of his, the giver doth not depart with his Right, untill the Condition of his guift be performed, and by the performance of that condition a man merits his deserting his right.

Sect. 4.

4. But at the last, in the beginning of Page 68. he un∣dertakes to expound by this (which he hath delivered) a Schoole distinction, thus; [This is the meaning of that Distinction of the schooles between Meritum congrui and Meritum condigni; for, God Almighty having promised Paradise to those men (hood winkt with carnall desires) that can walk through the world according to the Precepts and limits prescribed by him, they say, he that shall so walke shall merit Paradise ex Congruo; but because no man can de∣mand a right to it by his own righteousness or any other power within himself but by the grace of God onely,* 1.5 they say no man merits Paradise ex Condigno] thus far he.

I cannot blame this Gentleman to be offended with

the Schoolemen, since it seeme's to be a learning strange to him, and in apparence is the fate of it, as well as other Learning, to be scorned by them who understands it not, which this gentleman doth not, or else he malici∣ously write's, and offer's to expound this easie distincti∣on. First, the Conclusion (as he expresseth it,) is no where delivered in the Schooles; for with one consent, unlesse some passages in Gregorius Ariminensis, and Du∣rand, expounded otherwise, The Schooles, both old and later agree to deliver, that Heaven or Glory (which he calls Paradise) is merited ex Condigno; because that righteous men, acting such things by the assistance of God's grace, in the mystical union with Christ their head, to which God hath promised heaven, heaven is due to them, as a reward of such actions, not for their owne' excellency in an Arithmeticall proportion, as some;* 1.6 but a Geometrieal; or as others, by their Arithmetical proportion taken vertually, as a seed is vertually a Tree, and hath abilities vertually, as a tree hath actually; so these gracious acts have glory vertually in them, as be∣ing the seed of glory; and then, although God can be no debtor to any mans Merits; yet, he having put such a prise upon them in his Gospell, these have such a bles∣sing due to them, not out of Congruity onely, but Con∣dignity, at which rate God doth value them, by his stan∣dard; but then as they say; Heaven is merited by the righ∣teous ex Condigno, so they say that these Graces, which e∣nable a man to merit heaven ex Condigno, by Gods Cove∣nant those graces are merited, ex Congruo, by that man be∣fore he is justified or righteous; so that then to understand the distinction better, lest a Reader should be misguided by him who is no way acquainted with School-Divinity, know that Merit ex Condigno necessarily requires a Cove∣nant

but ex Congruo none. The first can never faile, because founded upon justice and title; the other may, because built onely upon Grace, as thus; a man promiseth that he who fights this day well shall be made a Captaine; or a King promiseth that he who plead's such a cause ably shall be made a Judge; these places are due to him who doth it; there is another, who by industry in the Law hath greater abilities then he, and hath pleaded a hun∣dred causes better; another man who hath fought in twenty battailes better, yet not being imployed in these services to which the promise was made, they deserve those places ex Congruo, but the other ex Condigno; the one is truly, and as truly merit as the other, but he de∣serves it not legally out of a law or Covenant, but his owne vertue, and the gallantry of his Commander in chiefe who rewards vertue; or thus, he who meeting a poore man in necessity shall bargaine with him to pay him doubly for those Clothes he supplies him with when he comes to a better fortune, which he then adventures upon: when he doth come to such a Condition the other merits that ex Condigno, he must & ought to have it payd, it is his due; the who seeing that or such another in that sad case should, without any compact, supply him, when he came to a happier estate, ex Congruo merits a returne from him; although he cannot claime any thing upon debt or due, yet out of Congruity it is fit he should be sa∣tisfied. I do not here justifie the distinction in its ap∣plication by the Schoole-men, but onely set downe my observation of his unjust dealing with them, and how unlike their meaning is to his; for the Prise he speaks of, which is proposed to him who winneth it out of Cove∣nant, that man who gaineth it hath it out of right of Condignity, not out of the equality his worke hath to the

reward in its self intrinsecally, but out of that extrinse∣call value which is added to it by the owners Covenant; and therefore what he adds may have some truth, that [Because writers are not agreed upon the signification of the termes of Art, he will determine nothing in it.] I beleeve all circumstances will hardly be agreed upon; yet thus much as I have delivered, which is contrary to what he writes, is universally consented unto by them; and there is none of them but sayes, that what God hath Cove∣nanted for, is merited ex Condigno by them who act their part.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Diversity of Merit.
• * 1.2

  The Catchers title so sca••∣terd mony.
• * 1.3

  Benignity to a Musician va∣rieth not the, nature of this or that Donors contract.
• * 1.4

  How the own∣er keeps his ptoderty, who intended to re∣nounce it.
• * 1.5

  The distincti∣on ex congruo & ex condigno misund••••stood by Mr. Hobbes.
• * 1.6

  How other∣wise expoun∣ded by the Schooles.