Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

CHAP. XXV.

Concerning nature's right, liberty, power; Of warre and self-preservation by it. For what ends and advantages a man may renounce his right to life liberty, &c.

Sect. 1.

THus having finished my discourse upon this subject, as much as concernes his Corpus Politicum, I returne to examine his handling the same in his Leviathan, to see if the diversity of expression in this from the other doth adde any thing to the confirmation of his designe, Cap. 14. pag. 64. He defines the right of nature to be, the li∣berty every man hath to use his own power, as he will him∣self, for the preservation of his own nature.

* 1.1This definition I except against, as not cut out even to the thing defined. First, it is too narrow, for this right of nature concernes not himself alone, but a man by right of nature hath right to many things which relate not to his owne life: Yea, if it have such a liberty which consisteth in, to do, or, not to doe (as he expound's it pre∣sently after) then it is a right of nature, to forbeare to use his owne power, for the preservation of his life, aswell as to use it; so that out of this regard his definition agree's not to every particular contained in the right of nature. Secondly, like an ill made garment, as it is too streight in one place, so it is too wide in another, the liberty a man hath to use his power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his owne life, is not a right of nature; for the right of nature, as I have shewed, is a result out of the law of Nature, which impower's him for that action; but the law of nature gives not a man leave to do what he will for the preservation, &c. (as I have shewed before) but

only such things as are just, and according to right reason and the most publique and greatest intendments of Na∣ture, to which every particular man's nature and life is ai∣med by that Nature which gives him his nature, are to be preferred before his life.

Sect. 2.

The next thing I blame is his description of Liberty, thus, [By liberty is understood, according to the proper sig∣nification of the word, the absence of externall impediments.] This is a most improper exposition of that liberty he im∣mediately before put in the definition of right,* 1.2 for ex∣ternall impediments have nothing to doe with the liberty of right; nor doth the taking away the ability to recover his estate by strength of opposition, take away the right to have it, especially this natural right; for other rights, by civill institution, and donation, do in some manner, depend upon outward things, because those Nationall lawes, which give them these rights, are outward, although right and title be an inward thing, the issue of that out∣ward law; but in natural right the very law which give's a man this right is an internall law, a law writ in man's heart; and therefore the liberty which attend's this right, and which, he saith, this right is, can in no sense be un∣derstood to be the absence of externall impediments; he adds [Which impediments may oft take away part of a mans power to do what he would.] This is weakly said,* 1.3 or most impertinently, or both; for external impediments can take away no part of natural power (which alone is ne∣cessary to natural right) this may hinder nature in its ope∣rations, but this cannot take away the power of opera∣ting; and in oecconomicks the disobedience of a Son may hinder the acts of a Parents exercising his jus naturale,

his natural right over his son but it cannot take away his natural right over him: These rights are internal things, which are not much concerned in what is outward but re∣maine and keep their being, whatsoever outward things happen.

Sect. 3.

His third thing to be censured in this Chap. and Pag. is his definition of a Law of nature which is this [A law of nature (Lex naturalis) is a precept, or general Rule found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to doe that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the meanes of pre∣serving the same, and to omit that by which it may be best preserved.* 1.4] He is a most unhappie man in his definiti∣ons, which are foundations upon which he build's his discourse, yet are so weake as they cannot themselves withstand the least opposition which many Reasons may assault them with. First for this, we may observe, that if he had said, such a Precept, as he se••s down, had been a law of nature, or a conclusion deduced out of a law of nature, he had spoke truth; but saying, a law of Nature is such a precept, he makes this precepe to be the Predicate, as we University-men, abused with University••learning, terme it, and then it must be as large as the subject. A law of nature is what this is not; for, first, he makes this pre∣cept to be only a prohibition, To a negative law. A precept (saith he) by which a man is forbidden &c. when cer∣tainly, although there are negative precepts; yet they are founded upon affirmative precepts; no negative which is not supported by an affirmative, and this law forbid∣ding, must be founded upon this affirmative duty enjoy∣ned by the law of nature that a man must love his own life. Certainly had not Mr. Hobbes proudly contemned Uni∣versity learning, he would have writ more properly, and

have seduced himself into fewer errors; next,* 1.5 observe with me that generall error which runne's through his whole discourse; that he makes Nature aiming, in all her intendments, at the benefit only of particulars in those provident lawes which she hath made for the uni∣versal, when, indeed, the nature of all lawes is to looke to the publique, and particulars only as they are parts of the publique. The latter part of that Section I have shewed erroneous already, which affirmes law and right inconsistent.

Sect. 4.

His next Sect. in the same page and Chap. begins thus [And because the condition of man (as hath been de∣clared in the precedent Chap.) is a condition of war of eve∣ry one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason.] He said somewhat like truth,* 1.6 when he said it was declared in the precedent Chapter; for cer∣tainly there was a bare declaration of such a thing, no m••nner of proof that had shew of reason.

Posito quolibet, sequitur quidlibet; if men suppose im∣possible things, they may from thence-argue impossibi∣lities, Uno absurdo concesso, mille sequuntur, an errour in the foundation, in the first drawing a line, multiplie's its self all the way, thus in this instance he goes on [And there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a helpe unto him in preserving his life against his enemies, it fol∣loweth that in such a condition every man hath right to every thing even to one anothers bodies,] see how many falshoods are supposed to make up this horrid conclusion. First, that unreasonable definition of the right of Nature. Secondly, that, as bad, of the law of Nature. Thirdly, That not to be imagined thesis that every man is at war with every man, without all which this cannot follow,

that every man hath right to one anothers bodies; for cer∣tainly that Nature which gave a right in common to the universal world, besides that, gave every man a proprie∣ty in his owne body, and none had interest in it but by jus naturae, as Parents, or by some concession expressed or implyed, as in polities; yea in warre (saith he) certainly not so, neither; for by the law of Armes men have not right to butcher one another without there be martiall opposition; there are inhumanities in warres, which men have no right to use, as perhaps will be shewed hereaf∣ter; so that then all these Propositions (which are all app••rently false) must be granted, or else the Conclusi∣on which is drawne out of these denied premisses is void and of no cleerness; yet take his Conclusion altogether, it hath some likeness of truth with it, [That in such a Condition every man hath right, &c.] In such a condition, which was never knowne, which is impossible, in such a condition a man may have such a right; he proceeds in the same place [And consequently it is a Precept,* 1.7 or generall rule of reason, that every man ought to endeavour peace as far as he hath hope of obtaining it: and when he cannot ob∣taine it, that he may seeke and use all helpes ••nd advanta∣ges of warre.] This conclusion might have been granted without these unjust meanes of obtaining it, only one terme added to the last clause, which is, when he hath used sufficient meanes to obtaine peace and cannot get it, then he may make use of the advantages of warre; for with∣out this terme sufficient a man may attempt a peace, and upon any deniall or pause, at the first, he might with ju∣stice engage in a war which were most unjust.

Sect. 5.

That which followe's is against his own Principles, the first branch of which rule (saith he) containeth the first and fundamental law of nature (which is to seeke peace, and follow it) this, according to his principles, can be but a deduction out of the law of nature; for if the law of nature be, as he defined it, just before in this page, a Pre∣cept by which a man is forbidden to doe that which is destru∣ctive to his life,* 1.8 this can be no other but a deduction out of that.

[The second (saith he) is the summe of the right of nature, which is, by all meanes we can to defend our selves.* 1.9] The se∣cond branch is not the summe of this right, &c. but a branch of it; for there are many other meanes to pre∣serve our selves besides war, although in a desperate case war may be one. What followe's in that Chap. concer∣ning the second law of nature, deduced out of this, that a man should lay downe his right to all things, &c. I think it needless to speake of; for first there is no man hath,* 1.10 by nature, right to any person but his owne; secondly, a man need's lay down his right to nothing; for his right to any thing returnes to him, if any thing lack an owner, which is not disposed of by such powers, which by de∣duction from the law of nature, are authorised to sett••e them otherwise; and therefore all those needless defi∣nitions and descriptions of what it is to lay down a right, what renouncing, what transferring, what obligation, duty, injustice, are; which are touched in the 65. Page, I let goe at present and for altogether, unlesse some just oc∣casion hereafter may make me look back upon them; only that require's a censure, which he deliver's in the bottome of that Page, and the beginning of the next,

which discourse as I conceive it wicked in its self, so it render's all which he spake before exceeding malicious.

Sect. 6.

This discourse begin's thus [Whensoever a man trans∣ferreth his right, or renounceth it, it is either in considerati∣on of some right reciprocally transferred to himself, or for some other good he hopeth for thereby.] This I grant so far as the words expresse it;* 1.11 but there is something he im∣plies which will render it fit for censure anon; his reason likewise I allow, which followe's [for it is a voluntary act, and of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to himself] as for his deduct on which is layd therefore there be some rights which no man can be under∣stood, by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned or transferred] this in generall hath some truth; for since the end of man is his happiness, which he must needs love, happiness and goodness being as proper an object of the will, as colours to the sight, or any other, yet this applyed to any particular thing will be found erroneous; for although good and happiness must needs, by the law of nature, be desired; yet because what is that good and happiness is not so universally apparent, when that good and happinesse shall be instanced in any particular, it will not be universally received; Now I will consider his examples [As first (saith he) a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life] This is a mistake in him, a man can, and many men have done it; a man can, for a man can preferre other things before his life, and therefore can exchange h••s life for that; men ought to preferre their Countries good before their owne, both being in its self a greater good, and of greater durance; men may preferre their

souls eternall good beyond this life, the hope of which give's the greatest comfort this life is capable of;* 1.12 one may and ought to preferre the glory of God before his own life; by which that eternal good of his own soul shall be assured to him; these men may, and ought to preferre, who are Christians; and as Reason guide's to these actions, so Experience of them who have done it, for these ends, shewe's it may be done; but there are a hundred little by-ends for which men have done it; those of honour in severall kinds, for riches, for present pleasures; and there is almost no worldly contentment, for which some men have not adventured, and lost their lives; but it may justly be objected,* 1.13 that those did not vertuously do it. I answer; that is not materiall to his proposition, wh••ch useth not the word, ought not, but cannot lay downe, &c. yet in the first conditions, before named, which are vertuous, take one eminent Story, be∣sides a multitude, told by Tertullian in his Apologeticus adversus Gentes, Cap. 37. the story is thus; Tertullian lived in the time of Severus, who persecuted the Chri∣stians most barbarously: Tertullian, being converted to Christianity, takes courage, and writes this Book in de∣fence of them, against that cruell manner of persecu∣ting, which was to destroy them unheard, only upon confessing Christianity, like Wolves or beasts odious to the Common-wealth; amongst other slanders, by which this Injustice was coloured to the world, this was one, which they were accused of, that they were ill af∣fected to the Imperiall government,* 1.14 and were enemies to it. Tertullian, in answer to this, saith in 37. Cap. If we were maliciously affected to revenge the injuries done us; Vel una nox pauculis faculis largitatem ultionis possit oper∣ari si malum malo dispungi penes nos liceret. The mean∣ing

of which is, that they were strong enough to set the City on fire, in one night, when they would. Now saith he, if we would declare our selves enemies, we are strong enough to make it good, the Mauri, or Marcomauri, or Parthi are not so numerous, they inhabit one Country, we the world; what war are we not fit for, even with unequall forces, who can suffer our selves tam libenter trucidari, so willingly to be slaine? but, saith he, in this discipline we have learned to be killed, rather then kill; yea, if we would not fight against you, we could, without rebellion, by a meere desertion, de∣stroy you, by the losse ef so many Citizens, this very divorse would astonish you, you would lack men whom to governe. Let him that will, reade that Chap. and the rest about it, he shall find the Christians killed, tortured, yea persecu∣ted, dead, so that the sanctuary of the grave, as he speaketh was not a refuge for them; he shall find that they could ea∣sily vindicate themselves from these evils; yet they chose to suffer them, rather then doe the least evill, ha∣ving implicitely covenanted with that government, by being born under it, to obey it; nay this shewe's, that they, and such a world of men, were of this opinion; and it was apparently knowne, or else he durst not have published this discourse to be read by the Emperour, and to disswade him from his persecution by such an Argument, which, for matter of fact, might so easily have been confuted. Had these men been of Mr. Hobbes his mind, they would have said, what doe you talk of Obedience, give us life, in defence of which a man may kill any man, or men? yea all the world rightfully; nor can any Covenant, by words, or otherwise, divest us of this right; but they were not of his opinion, and their practise is e∣nough to confute Mr. Hobbes, that a man can lay down that right, &c. and it was vertuous so to doe.

Sect. 7.

What he farther instances in, concerning Wounds, Chaines, and Imprisonment,* 1.15 how th••t the same may be said of them as of a mans life; that no covenant can passe away a man's right of rescuing himself from them, may seeme answered in what was applyed to those of Life; because if we may passe away our right to our own life, much ra∣ther to these lesser things; but I will examine his rea∣son [both (saith he) because there is no benefit consequent to such patience, as there is to the patience of suffering another to be Wounded or Imprisoned] no benefit? Yes surely, great every way, when these afflictions are laid upon us by lawfull Magistrates,* 1.16 then there is the benefit of obedience then which no sacrifice is more gratefull to Almighty God; it is that which is the foundation of politie, and without which no Common-wealth can subsist; for if men should not subject for Conscience, and think that obe∣dience to punishments a vertuous duty, which carrie's its reward in its self, no man would ever submit, so long as he could find any meanes to struggle; the innumerable instances might be made of this, might of themselves fill a volumne; take but that one of Marcus Regulus, how he rather then he would violate a little promise, and that with an Enemy, did expose and thrust himself ••nto such vengeance, and tortures, as the greatest malice could impose upon him; how much rather upon those weigh∣ty, though implicite Covenants, which every man make's with that Common-wealth wherein he live's, to obey the Lawes made for the good of it, how much ra∣ther may they exact a submission to them, though with our owne losse and injurie?

Sect. 8.

He goes on [And lastly, the motive and end, for which this renouncing and transferring of Rights is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a mans person in his life, and in the meanes ••f so preserving life as not to be weary of it.]

I will not discourse over again these termes, renoun∣cing and transferring of right, the nature of which I have before debated,* 1.17 but here onely touch upon what the end of mens submission to the lawes of Politique society is, and wherein it consists, which is that he meanes by th••se phrases Renouncing, &c. and, surely, to say, it is nothing else but the security, &c. is much too bold an as∣sertion; for certainly Pro aris & focis, was wont to be the Argument why men did engage themselves in any dangerous or hard adventure, and Pro aris first. I may say the same for the good of their Posterity,* 1.18 for which we have read the famous story of the Children of Israel, drawing our that painfull and laborious jour∣ney through so many hazards and perils, forty yeares together, that their Posterity might live contentedly and blessedly in Canaan; and we daily find multitudes of men amongst us who spend as long time without any comfort in their owne lives. (I speake of these sensual comforts and eases which he intimate's▪) onely out of this regard, that they have an expectati∣on, that their Posterity after them may live plenti∣fully.

Againe, as I instanced before, the good of the Com∣mon-wealth in which they live hath not onely here a sufficient Argument to perswade a hard, but even to cast off all life for their Countries good; I need not speake

of the monastick retreats, which in God's cause many yea multitudes of men, make,* 1.19 and no doubt many ho∣nestly and piously, in truth and reality, even to be An∣chorites, and renounce all contentment in this world; all which makes it apparent, that this life, and the content∣ments of it, are not the sole and onely end for which men renounce their rights and interests; and therefore men may enter into such Covenants, where even the subje∣ction of their lifes, and all the accommodation of it may justly be engaged, without any misconstruction or fraud, as he seemes to imply immediately after, and therfore that must fall of it selfe, and I need speak no more to it. What follows in the same Page; concerning Contracts, Covenants, &c. I let passe, unlesse, by misapplication of them, I find hereafter that they are abused to the preju∣dice of some cause, which will deserve vindication, and I will now come to what he speakes of Merit, at the bot∣tome of page 67. and the beginning of 68.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The right of nature not such as Mr. Hobbs defines it.
• * 1.2

  Nor liberty, as he describe's it.
• * 1.3

  External im∣pediments may hinder, but not take a∣way naturall power.
• * 1.4

  Exceptions a∣gainst Mr. Hobbes defi∣nition of the law of nature.
• * 1.5

  A veine of e¦rours that run through his book.
• * 1.6

  Mr. Hobbes may be allowd to say, he de∣clares, when he proves no∣thing.

  But not to sup∣pose a multi∣tude of fals∣hoods to make up the horrid∣ness of one conclusion.
• * 1.7

  A terme wan∣ting to Mr. Hobbes's just engagement in a war.
• * 1.8

  And to him a remembrance of his owne principles.
• * 1.9

  War not the onely preser∣vative of mans right or Na∣ture's.
• * 1.10

  The discourse of mans laying downe his right to all things, &c. unnecessary.
• * 1.11

  That is not al∣wayes really good for which a man pa••ts with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 right.
• * 1.12

  A man may lay down his right to resi∣stance, and preservation of his life for a greater good.
• * 1.13

  Obj. Ans.
• * 1.14

  Tertullian's signal instance in the Christi∣ans of his time.
• * 1.15

  He may suffer imprisonment &c. without reluctance for the same reason..
• * 1.16

  Obedience be∣ing better then sacrifice.
• * 1.17

  A man may re∣nounce h••s right pro ••ris et foci••.
• * 1.18

  For the good of his posteri∣ty.
• * 1.19

  Monastick re∣treats.