Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

Sect. 4.

His next Sect. in the same page and Chap. begins thus [And because the condition of man (as hath been de∣clared in the precedent Chap.) is a condition of war of eve∣ry one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason.] He said somewhat like truth,* 1.1 when he said it was declared in the precedent Chapter; for cer∣tainly there was a bare declaration of such a thing, no m••nner of proof that had shew of reason.

Posito quolibet, sequitur quidlibet; if men suppose im∣possible things, they may from thence-argue impossibi∣lities, Uno absurdo concesso, mille sequuntur, an errour in the foundation, in the first drawing a line, multiplie's its self all the way, thus in this instance he goes on [And there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a helpe unto him in preserving his life against his enemies, it fol∣loweth that in such a condition every man hath right to every thing even to one anothers bodies,] see how many falshoods are supposed to make up this horrid conclusion. First, that unreasonable definition of the right of Nature. Secondly, that, as bad, of the law of Nature. Thirdly, That not to be imagined thesis that every man is at war with every man, without all which this cannot follow,

that every man hath right to one anothers bodies; for cer∣tainly that Nature which gave a right in common to the universal world, besides that, gave every man a proprie∣ty in his owne body, and none had interest in it but by jus naturae, as Parents, or by some concession expressed or implyed, as in polities; yea in warre (saith he) certainly not so, neither; for by the law of Armes men have not right to butcher one another without there be martiall opposition; there are inhumanities in warres, which men have no right to use, as perhaps will be shewed hereaf∣ter; so that then all these Propositions (which are all app••rently false) must be granted, or else the Conclusi∣on which is drawne out of these denied premisses is void and of no cleerness; yet take his Conclusion altogether, it hath some likeness of truth with it, [That in such a Condition every man hath right, &c.] In such a condition, which was never knowne, which is impossible, in such a condition a man may have such a right; he proceeds in the same place [And consequently it is a Precept,* 1.2 or generall rule of reason, that every man ought to endeavour peace as far as he hath hope of obtaining it: and when he cannot ob∣taine it, that he may seeke and use all helpes ••nd advanta∣ges of warre.] This conclusion might have been granted without these unjust meanes of obtaining it, only one terme added to the last clause, which is, when he hath used sufficient meanes to obtaine peace and cannot get it, then he may make use of the advantages of warre; for with∣out this terme sufficient a man may attempt a peace, and upon any deniall or pause, at the first, he might with ju∣stice engage in a war which were most unjust.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Mr. Hobbes may be allowd to say, he de∣clares, when he proves no∣thing.

  But not to sup∣pose a multi∣tude of fals∣hoods to make up the horrid∣ness of one conclusion.
• * 1.2

  A terme wan∣ting to Mr. Hobbes's just engagement in a war.