Sect. 2.
His 8. Numb. must be likewise examined which saith [Also every man by right of nature is judge himself of the necessity of the meanes, and of the greatness of the danger.
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His 8. Numb. must be likewise examined which saith [Also every man by right of nature is judge himself of the necessity of the meanes, and of the greatness of the danger.
This hath some truth in it, and yet not to be so under∣stood,* 1.1 that by right of nature a man may judge what he will, and accordingly act, and what he acts is right, as he seems to imply here, & from hence enforces afterwards; for as in our judicatures there must use be made of Jud∣ges, and the decrees of those Judges will regulate and govern our possessions; yet those Judges have rules by which their judicatures should be regulated, and what they act contrary to those rules, or Lawes, although it may be effected, yet it is wicked; so it is in those, no doubt; but every man will (in such an impossible state as he supposeth man) judge of the meanes and necessity, but yet there is a law of nature in every man, by which his judgement should be guided, and what he judgeth, though never so congruent to his will, contrary to this law, is not right; so that, as a Judge, though what he jud∣geth must be performed, and he hath power to judge what he thinkes fit; yet he hath right to judge only ac∣cording to the law of that Nation which gave him the power of being a Judge, all other judgement is by power, but not by right; so is it with this man, he may act against the law of nature for the preservation of his life or Limbe, but if not right, it is wicked to doe so. The Argument he brings for proofe of this Conclusion con∣vinceth not me. [For, saith he, if it be against reason that I be Judge of mine own danger my self,* 1.2 then it is reason that another may be Judge, &c.] It is reason, say I, that in such a Case I am Judge, but it is reason likewise, that I judge according to Law, and make my will be guided by reason, not my reason regulated by my will; because it is mine, it is not therefore right; but because mine ac∣cording to the law of nature and right reason; of which he himself afterwards grants, there are divers lawes both
of men in society, to men single, and to men that live to∣gether, although not united in a policy.
He that jud∣geth by the right of Na∣ture hath a law of Nature to limit and regulate him in that judg∣ment.
To which he is oblig'd by Reason.