Page 160
Sect. 9.
He urgeth further; Iustice and Injustice (saith he) are none of the faculties neither of the body,* 1.1 nor the mind.] I think if he take Faculty, as he seem's to doe, for an in∣nate quality, no man ever said they were; therefore his proof is needlesse, when he come's on [if they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses and Passions] although they are not innate fa∣culties, but acquisite habits, I meane the vertue justice, or the vice injustice; yet the habits may be, when they are acquired with that man who is alone, and when he is alone, though, to act accordingly, require's a present Ob∣ject; now denominations are given from the habits, not the acts. He proceed's [They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude] our dispute is of a third sort of men, neither in such Society as a civill policy, nor a Solitude, but men without all relations, of being under one common sublunary governance, and yet men cohabiting in the same neighbourhood, where may be perpetrated those horrid and unjust actions of Murder and Theevery, &c. And again, although the acts of Justice doe suppose other men to doe justice upon; yet it is other men, not other men in the same City, or po∣lities; and when, by the use of those acts, a habite is got, it remaine's in Solitude.