Sect. 5.
Pag. 61. He saith, that [that which may make such e∣quality (that is, of Prudence, concerning which he had spoken before) incredible, is but a vaine conceit of our own wisdome, &c. for such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more El••quent, or more Learned, yet they will hardly beleeve there are many so wise as themselves; for they see their owne wit at hand,* 1.1 and others at a distance.] This is a strange contradictory passage to its self; for first consider that what was conceited by this to be opposed, was the equa∣lity of Prudence; to oppose this he introduceth mens conceits of their own wisdome; he that reflects upon his Exposition of names in Cap. 5. pag. 22. shall find Prudence and Wisdome two things; Therefore a high esteeme of a mans own wisdom may be without the like imagina∣tion of his own Prudence. Then consider, that he saith, Men will allow others more witty, learned, eloquent, but not more wise; he proves this, because men see their own