Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

NOTES UPON THE Twelfth Chapter of Leviathan.

CHAP. 12.

Of Religion, the feigned Gods, Ghosts, and the soul of Man.

HAving done with his Two first Chapters, for this present, I will pass over his Third, concer∣ning the consequence and traine of Imaginati∣ons, in which are many things very obnoxious to Cen∣sure; his fourth of Speech likewise I passe over for the present, and his Fifth with his Sixth, which is nothing but an Exposition of easie terms, which have been better discoursed upon by a hundred several persons; and I skip to his Twelfth, —

Which begins Pag, 52. and is entituled, Of Religion, wherein, as in many other places, he is to blame not to expresse what Religion is, that so it might appeare how pertinent and reasonable his D••scourse is, which if he had done, he might have spared much which he hath written, or otherwise disposed it. That I may proceed therefore the more confidently, take the definition of Religion which is most received, which is: —

Sect. 1.

That Religion is a vertue, by which Men give God the worship and honour due to him:* 1.1 And this is the reason why Divines do make Religion a part of Iustice, and handle it as a Species or part of it, though an imperfect one;

because Justice gives to every one as much as is his due exactly;* 1.2 but that cannot be done by man to God; and therefore it is imperfectly a part of Iustice; but yet be∣cause in Religion we, after our weake and imperfect man∣ner, doe it, therefore it is reckoned among the duties of Iustice: we doe by it give God worship and honour; Wor∣ship, as the supream; Honour, as the most excellent; Those, who are over us, we worship as our Governours, al∣though they have not Excellencies to be honoured for; Those which are our Inferiours, or equals, if they have Excellencies in them, and extraordinary parts, we ho∣nour, although not worship them. But these two Excel∣lencies of perfection, and supremacy of Authority over us, being acknowledged by every religious person to be in God, he renders him both those duties in the highest measure, as in Iustice is due to him for them. Thus we briefly discern what is the Subject he writes of; let us now consider what he writes of it.

2. First, he saith rightly, that [there is no cause to doubt that the seed of Religion is onely in man] for cer∣tainly,* 1.3 the Seed of Religion is the assurance that God is infinitely excellent, and hath the highest, and most un∣questionable authority over us by the right of Governing us. This apprehension I conceive to be the seed of Religion, and this can be in no Creature which hath not reason and understanding, as Man hath: for, certainly, if they have not understanding to apprehend those divine excellencies, they cannot have Religion: and unlesse they have liberum arbitrium (which without understand∣ing they cannot have) their actions can be no more pleasing to God then the fire pleaseth him when it bur∣neth.

3. He labours to give reasons for his Conclusion,

others then that I have set down with this Phrase, First,* 1.4 Second; but look upon them, they are so incomposed and disjoynted, that none of them can produce this Conclusion, That only Man hath the Seed of Religion; But in Page 53. in the beginning he urgeth an Argument from the Chaine and Origination of Causes, acknowled∣ged to be of an absolute force for the Causation of a God, and so of the apprehension of the Object to which our Religion is directed. But in all that discourse, let a man consider, whether it be any way pertinent to Religion any otherwise, then to shew, there is a God, and to illu∣strate that saying of his, that fear made the heathen Gods.

Sect. 4.* 1.5

4. He saith [That feare gives occasion to feigne as many Gods, as there are Men that feigne them: And for the matter or substance of the invisible Agents so fancied, they could not, by natural cogitation, fall upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with the Soul of man, and that the soul of man, was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a Dreame to a man that sleepeth, or in a Looking-glasse to one that is awake: which men not knowing that such Apparitions are no∣thing else but Creatures of the fancy, think to be reall, and external substances, and therefore call them Ghosts, as the Latines call them Imagines & umbrae, and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aeriall bodies; and those invi∣sible Agents, which they feare, to be like them, save that they appear, and vanish, when they please. Thus far he. In which Period are many strange and forced Ex∣pressions without any proof, or illustration.* 1.6 I will touch them briefly, but first I must expound that Phrase used twice by him, Invisible Agents; by that he must under∣stand

the false Gods of the Gentiles, for the first Clause, that they conceited those false Gods to be of the same nature with the soul of man, I yeeld, onely more excel∣lent; so was every Daemon esteemed, and so even those Heroes, which were from humanity, in the esteeme of Idolatrous men, exalted to a coelestial excellency, thought of a greater perfection then themselves had in their earthly condition; and that they had influence, and pow∣er over these earthly things, and therefore had Prayers and sacrifice offered to them. But then let us consider his Philosophy concerning mans soul, he saith, That these Idolaters,* 1.7 who thought their Gods like mans soul, thought a mans soul was of the same substance with that which appear∣eth in a Dreame, or in a Looking-glasse] I am perswaded he dreamt when he writ this, he did not so much as see it in any glasse in this world; and although it is too much to say, he never read it in any book, (for his Book will witness, that many unexpected things are in Books) yet I can say, that I never heard or read of any Idolater that ever had that absurd opinion concerning the Soul. These two things are things of a very little Entity, the meanest of Accidents, the one a Dreame, the work of a sleeping fancie; the other the apparition of a Looking-glasse, the weak effect of a poor Accident, Colour, in which it produced it self in a most feeble and weake condition. Contrariwise, the soul of man is the most ex∣cellent and substantial part in the most excellent Crea∣ture man, the Author of all those noble effects which the wit or industry of man can attaine unto; and all this affirmed by these Idolaters in their Philosophical Books.

Sect. 5.

But he seems to give a reason for it thus [which men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but

Creatures of the fancie, think to be reall and external sub∣stances; and therefore call them Ghosts, as the Latines call them Imagines & Umbrae] I cannot conceive to what this Relative (Which) looks,* 1.8 by the preceding words it should be referred to the Dreames or Image in a Looking-glasse, but by the consequent words it seems to look fur∣ther, to the Invisible Agents, for no man was ever so foolish to think that Dreams, or the Image in a Looking-glasse, are real substances; nor yet is it true of one piece of them, which is the Image in the Looking-glasse, to say it is a Creature of the fancy; for the Image is there, whe∣ther the fancy conceit it so, or no. But then to take this word, Which, as it relates to the invisible Agents, which the words following implie [and therefore call them Ghosts] no man ever called the image in a Looking-glasse a Ghost: now then in this Sense, although a strange per∣turbed one, he saith, that men not knowing these Gods of theirs, those invisible Agents to be nothing but Creatures of the fancy called them Ghosts; I beleeve, if they had known them to be Creatures of the fancy, they would not have so called them Ghosts, as the Latines call them Imagines and Umbrae: Certainly I am perswaded, that the Latines did never call their Gods Imagines or Umbrae. This is a most perplexed discourse, I know not how to make sense of it, nor I beleeve he himself, for mark he goes on, [and thought them Spirits; that is, thin aerial bodies.] Con∣sider the relative Them, what doth he meane by it? Their Gods, those Invisible Agents? That cannot be for the following words [and these Invisible Agents, which they feared to be like them.] Now if by them before he meant these Invisible Agents, he could not say that they thought them like themselves; but for the other mention∣ed before, the Dreames or Images in a Glasse, no man

ever thought to be Spirits or aerial bodies. But he puts a difference betwixt Spirits and Ghosts, or Imagines, or Umbrae, or I know not what [how that they apaear and vanish when they please] and it seems the Ghosts did not: this I beleeve is not delivered by any, I am confident by none of his enemies, that are studied in Schoole and Vni∣versity-Learning; but thus he builds Castles in the aire, and I was about to say, fights against them; but he leaves them upon these weak foundations, and never casts a Trench, or plants a Battery against them, with any solid Argument; it may be he throwes a stone, an ill word somtimes, but not the least attempt to prove what he sayes, that ever I read. Hee proceeds with a discourse, from which I withhold my hand till I come to his Treatise of Angels, which will administer occa∣sion of fuller censure, and here I will leap over to Page 52.

CHAP. XIII.

The opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second causes, Devotion to what we feare, taking things casual for Prognostiques, mistaken for seeds of Religion. Of the Sybils, and their Oracles.

IN which he sets down foure things, wherein consists the natural seed of Religion, Opinion of Ghosts, Igno∣rance of second Causes, Devotion towards what we feare, and taking things Casual for Prognostiques.] Certainly here is a foundation laid for Atheisme,

Sect. 1.

It is impossible that so goodly a tree, as Religion, should grow out of such rotten and contemptible seeds as these. First, I observe here, that these, he cals seeds,* 1.9 he puts not for the immediate, but remote causes of Re∣ligion: the immediate Cause (to consent what I can with his Phrase) or the body of the tree, which supports these glorious Acts, is the assurance that there is a GOD; these foure Seeds (as he calls them) do but produce that beleefe in us, and that very weakly, not able to make a man forsake all for God, which Religion must do. An∣other observation may be, that he doth not make these conceits of his to be the seeds of false Religion only, but even of true; for so presently he discourseth, that these seeds produced either true or false Religion, according to their culture; so that the culture of Abraham, Moses, our blessed Saviour, was but a husbanding of these seeds; and therefore these words must needs be taken in that Indefinite sense they are exprest, that these are the seeds of all Religion. I will consider them apart, and fi••st the Opinion of Ghosts is a seed of Religion.

Sect. 2.

All the Opinion of Ghosts,* 1.10 which he expresseth in the former part of this Chapter, he makes to be an Error; now for Errour to be a s••ed of Truth, was never heard of before; an ill tree cannot bring forth good fruit, nor ill seed a good tree; Errour the greater growth it hath, the greater is the Errour, but it never growes into Truth. Again, in the seventh Chapter he makes Opinion to be a very weak assurance, as indeed it is, although his descrip∣tion of it is weak in that place, but the assurance that

there is a God, is the greatest that may be; and there∣fore not to grow out of such a seed. Thirdly, consider, that although there can be no assurance of God without an assurance of a Ghost or Spirit, because God is exprest in Scripture to be a Spirit, yet the beliefe and assurance of God cannot grow out of the Opinion of Ghosts; for although the Opinion of Ghosts hath many reasonable and probable arguments in Nature to induce it, which prevailed with many Philosophers to perswade them, that there were such things; yet the Arguments for them are not of like force with those which evince, there is a God; and therefore the assurance of God may introduce and be a seed of the Opinion of Ghosts; but the opinion of Ghosts, which is lesse certain, and lesse evident, cannot introduce it. He brings no manner of proof for what he speakes, and in his Catalogue of those Deities which this opinion should produce, Pag 55. He nameth Chaos, Ocean, Planets, Men, Women, and other things which have no likeness with Ghosts or Spirits, although his Daemons and some others have. Now although the opinion of Spirits may perswade a Religion towards those things which were thought Spirits; yet it could never invite, but would crosse and oppose those, Religions which were paid to corporeall things; for by all men, who have writ of Spirits, both Christian, and others, Spirits are thought to have a more God like power in them then Bodies; and therefore the opinion of them could not introduce the other.

Sect. 3.

* 1.11His second seed is ignorance of second Causes, a most un∣happy and unreasonable speech. Ignorance the Mother of Religion; Ignorance of second Causes cannot make a

man acknowledge the first, Rom. 1.20. S. Paul saith, The Invisible things of Him (that is, of God) from the Creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal Power and God∣head. This understanding of eternal Power and Godhead is the foundation and ground of Religion, and this was visible, although not in its self, yet in the things that are made, the second Causes; so that not the ignorance, but the knowledge of the second Causes, like Iacobs ladder, leads, us from one to another, step by step, until we ascend to the highest and first Cause. This he himself acknowledgeth before; but as he often doth, so he now forgot what he had said. Ignorance of second Causes that they are second, and mistaking them for first may make a man think them Gods, and so turne a Religion to them; but, as may ap∣pear at the bottome of the preceding Page 53. he un∣derstands the Ignorance of the Causation of second Causes, which, without doubt, is so farre from bringing in Reli∣gion, that it is apt to produce Atheism, and an opinion, that the world is governed by chance▪ not by Providence: So that, as for his first, I deny it to be a Seed of Religi∣on, that is, the opinion of Ghosts; so for this Second, the Ignorance of second Causes, I affirm that is an enemy to Religion, stopping the Soul from ascending up to Hea∣ven, by breaking the lowest step of that Ladder which is fixed on Earth.

Sect. 4.

His third Seed is Devotion towards what we fear.* 1.12 That feare, Timor Reverentialis, may be a seed, the fomenter and cherisher of Religion, yea an act of Religion, I do not doubt: but that that ugly sordid feare, which he speaks of, as appeares in the bottom of Page 52. is not to be imagined; for the first feare ariseth out of the know∣ledge

and apprehension we have of the Excellency of God; but this second feare, he speaks of, out of Igno∣rance of Causes. (Because men know there are Causes (saith he) of every thing, but know not those causes, there∣fore they impute their good or evill fortune to some invisible Agent,) This ignorance o•• Causes must needs be under∣stood of second Causes; for ignorance of the first Cause can never make a man worship the first, nor impute the produ∣ction of things to him; It is true, the ignorance of some Attributes, as his goodness, may make a Maniche think there is an ill God; and the same ignorance may pro∣duce almost as ill an opinion in others, that God is the Author of the evil of sin; the one, not apprehending his internal goodness, conceives God evil in himself: the other, not apprehending his Goodness in operation, his Benignity makes him do and produce that is ill; but the ignorance of him, as a first Cause, can never intro∣duce a Religion to him; But then take this ignorance of causes to be the ignorance of the Causation of second Cau∣ses, we cannot conceive how that should breed a fear of an invisible Agent, as he terms it, unless it be that god Fortune, which the Poet derideth:

Te facimus Fortuna Deum; coelo{que} locamus.

And worthily; for there can be nothing more contra∣dictory then the Providence of God, and the Blindness of Fortune: Now when men cannot find the Chain of Causes, which produce the effects they discerned, and cannot perceive how they depend upon the first Cause, as they cannot who discern not the second, they must needs have that doubt or fear, that they are acted by Fortune, and all things fall alike to all, without either being rewards or punishments, Rods or Scourges, &c. And therefore is so far from introducing of Religion, as

it leads to Atheisme. But it is not said, that this fear, but the Devotion to what we feare, is the Seed of Religion; I could have wished that among other his expositions of words, he had put down what he means by Devotion, but he hath not: Consider then, the sense of it is, Voto decernere, to decree a thing to another, by a vow; so that when one devotes a thing to another, he then decrees it in a sacred manner to be his. Now then Devotion to what we feare, is decreeing some thing to it by way of Vow; Devotion then to what we feare, if that we feare be God, is not a seed, but a fruit and act of Religion; for Re∣ligion is not only, as he, not vainly onely, but wickedly, and prophanely, defines Chap. 6. page 26. (Feare of Power invisible feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publikely allowed,) but it is the worship due to God, and this worship is, when it is, as it ought to be, accompanied and attended with reverential feare and awe of that Infi∣nite Excellency; and this makes us devote our selves in all holy waies to his service; but if these things, we feare, be lesse then God, although we may devote our selves, or any thing is ours, to them, it is not Religion, nor in any way doth it introduce Religion. So that if the thing, we feare, have in it the estimation of Divine Excellency, Devotion to it is an Act of Religion, not a Seed; if it have not that estimation, it is an act of some Reverence, or other habit, but no way a Seed of Religion, for a Seed precedes the fruit, and introduceth it, which this doth not.

Sect. 5.

His fourth and last Seed is taking things casual for Prognostiques. In all these,* 1.13 according to his scornfull derision, rather then definition of Religion, he makes ••he Seeds of it nothing but Errour and Folly; no wonder that

the Tree should be so weak and rotten, when the very Seeds are corrupted.

This Seed he applies Page 56. only to the Religion of the Gentiles, although in general, with the rest, it was uttered of all Religion, and so exprest as I have shewed: Indeed if he should speak it of the true Religion, it were most impiously wicked, and would imply, that the very Prophecies in the old and new Testament (which were a true and reall Seed of Religion) were but casual things, and not fore-seen by God, and revealed to his Prophets; But I wil take him in the best sense that he can be taken, that the taking things casual for Prognostiques, were a seed of those false Religions, and then I say first for the Ora∣cles, men did not therefore beleeve that there were Gods, and so worship them, because of their oracu∣lous sentences; but because of their beliefe, that these were Gods, they were confident that they spake truth, and so expounded them according to the event, what∣soever it was.* 1.14 For the Sibyls I might say the like (if they were such as the other) and although he imagined these but feigned, whose Copies we have, yet, that there were such, is evident in Story, and that they prophecied such things as could be applyed to none but our Saviour, which were not to be interpreted Casual events, but Prognostiques real; and although the beliefe in them, for a great while, was a fruit of Religion, for because men believed they were Prophetesses, and in∣spired by God, therefore they beleeved what they said; yet afterwards, as it haps in Trees, so did it with their Prophesies, that, which was the fruit of one, was the seed of another; so these Prophesies, which were a fruit of Re∣ligion, before were a seed of Religion in planting the Christian Church, and often made use of by the Fathers

an Argument against the Idolatrous world, to perswade them to Christianity; but it was not, as he speakes, a taking Casual things for Prognostiques. For the other things, he there reckons up, I guess them, for the most part, unhappy illusions, and the fruit of Superstition, not the seeds of Religion; or else mistakes of second Causes, which in no sense conduce to Religion, as Horoscopy, Pre∣sages, and the like.

CHAP. XIV.

What the seed of Religion. Concerning the chaine of causes. What of God to be known. Of finite and infinite. The first mover. The sound doctrine of Eternity, &c.

Sect. 1.

CErtainly the sole immediate seed of Religion, is the assurance that there is a God of an infinite excellency governing all the world; for therefore men perform Religion to him;* 1.15 but that which propagates this natu∣rally, is first without doubt an innate principle, born in, and with a man, which naturally every man hath as soon as he hath reason; and there never was Nation, or so∣ciety of men, found in the world, which denied it. It is true, there may be now and then, by the suggestions of the Devill, a man found, that with malicious reason hath laboured to diswade this Principle; but that is not material; There are Errours and Monsters in the morall part of man, as well as in his natural: This Gentleman, who hath by nature the sight of Colours, and ability to discern them, yet hath studied reasons to make men beleeve he sees none. There is nothing so abhorring to Reason that malicious Reason doth not oppose; but such

a truth as this, Quod ubi{que} semper, et ab omnibus, hath been held, cannot be other then natural; and whereas he can shew one man breaking this rule, I can shew him a hundred that have no use of reason at all, and a thou∣sand that have lost it; so that as such a man, as he, is a rarer sight then those; so he may well be reckoned a∣mongst the worst of fooles and mad-men; and there∣fore the Psalmist, Psal. 14.1. saith, The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God; and he himself in this Chapter, pag. 58. affirmes, That an opinion of a Diety and Powers invisible, and supernatural, can never be abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions may be made to spring out of them: So that this Seed is so naturally and firmly rooted in mans heart, that it cannot be extirpa∣ted by any thing, that doth not likewise with it extirpate reason.

Sect. 2.

* 1.16But because although this is natural, yet some men, by the wickednesse of malicious reason, have endeavou∣red to wither it, therefore other Children of Nature have endeavoured to cherish this root by watering it with the strength of invincible reasons, drawne from the chaine of Causes, which suppose a seed or a tree first, and that first to be created, not generated; for if generated, then it requires a preceding tree, or seed, and then that was not first; and so in all the effects in the world. But these men pretend an Eternity in the world,* 1.17 and so, in the propagation and causation of Natural things, that there may be an infinity of these causations from one to another, which is almost impossible to be conceived; for then there should be an Infinite number of Causes, which cannot be, for then Robert, who is now born, should have no more Paternities or Precedings in causes then Adam

had; for if there should be an infinite Number of Causes preceding Adam, then there can be no addition to it; for what can receive addition, is not Infinite, it hath a bound to it, and then all the Causations from Adam to Robert are nothing; for if you should imagine in these five or six Thousand yeares there may have been so many hundred generations more then were before, I can answer no, the other was infinite; for should you fill this sheet with Ciphers, and head them with the figure of one, I can make all these Ciphers nines, and the fi∣gure of one Nine, and make nine Millions of such sheets; and yet all this, in respect of Eternity, will be not so much as one unite to all this; and six or seaven hundred thousand were nothing being added; because whatso∣ever you adde to Roberts number of Fathers, I can adde a thousand times as many to Adams; and therefore Na∣ture, that abhors impossibilities, abhors likewise infinites of Numbers, and, by consequence, of Causations eternally; for a man to say, this Eternity is à parte ante, and not à parte post, is a contradiction; for although there may be some imagination of a thing, which, having a beginning, may have no end, but exist eternally, because it may be created with eternal Principles, and the Number infinite is not presently existing, nor ever shall be; for whenso∣ever you reckon, you shall have a finite time to reckon from, although it were ten thousand Millions of yeares hence, or whensoever; yet there can be nothing, with∣out a beginning, eternal à parte ante, but must needs have eternal Principles, which no time can corrupt, for if time could corrupt it, as suppose ten thousand yeares, or a thousand times so many, fix any time, it had been cor∣rupted before this, or else it was not eternal à parte ante. And then to the second part, such a person, he hath

actually an Infinite number of Causes, which cannot be; and therefore these things must be created in some cer∣taine time: These, and many more arguments, out of Metaphysiques, as that which the Philosophers call Essen∣tial Subordination of Causes, as likewise many others, are such as of which I may say, that they render the Propo∣sition, There is a God, evidently to be discerned by the Creatures, but, as Aegidius Romanus excellently speaks, Sapientibus, this evidence is perceiveable only by wise men; from the disquisition whereof they are not to be scared by the infinity of Gods essence, because inaccessible to a finite Inquirer,* 1.18 as he plainly asserts it in his Element of Philosophy, &c. whither I will make a transition, to in∣large this discourse, and cleare what I have writ from somewhat I find there opposite to my purpose.

Sect. 3.

In his said book of Philosophy de Corpore, Cap. 26. Pag. 236. having proposed divers questions about the World, he concludes at the bottome of that pag. and the beginning of the next, Et haec omnia ab eo qui Philo∣sophiam complecti profiteretur universam determinanda essent,* 1.19 si quantum quaerit, tantum sciri potest, est autem in∣finiti scientia finito quaesitori inaccessibilis. Thus far he; And not without reason, no finite understanding can grasp that which is infinite; yet, although we cannot perfectly know that which is Infinite, we may know many things of it. Mr. Hobbes himself, I dare say, doth not know the essence of the Sun, yet there is not the meanest person, which follows the Plough, but knowes there is a Sun, and many effects of the Sun, that he doth send forth light, and heat, by which the poor man is comforted. Mr. Hobbes his Argument, Therefore, be∣cause

finite things cannot know God as he is, we must know nothing of him, is weake. He proceeds.

Sect. 4.

Whatsoever we men know, we have learned from our Phantasm; but there is no Phantasm of that which is either Infinite in magnitude, or time, Neque enim homo, saith he, neiiher man, nor any thing that is not infinite, can have any conceipt of that which is infinite.) He said true in affirming, that what we know,* 1.20 we have learned from our Phantasm; so although the soul of man have many things in it which have no being in the world, as Chime∣ra's, Utopia's, Leviathans, and our Phantasmes are pro∣perly of things in the world; yet those things which are in the understanding, and not in the world, are learned from those Phantasmes, which are of things in the world; as thus, That man who cannot behold the Sun in his own glory, and lustre, yet seeing him behinde a thin Cloud, can learn from thence, that the Sun, who shines so glorious, vailed, and hid from eyes by such a dark body, would have a strange high degree of resplen∣dent lustre, if we could see him as he is: So we learn from Phantasmes apparent, as the Apostle speaks, from visible things, to collect many apprehensions of that which is of its self invisible, and not to be perceived; and, having reduced one Conclusion, may collect from thence many more; and men desirous to know God (as he, who desires knowledge, doth) will make such collections. The Prophet David there, in a most hea∣venly invective, calls them not onely fools, but beastly people, who do not so collect, Psal. 94.8. Understand ye brutish among the People: and ye fools, when will ye be wise? Mark; they were foolish, and brutish, because

they did not make such Collections. He that planted the Ear, shall he not hear, and he that formed the Eye, shall he not see? Thus from one truth men may, and ought to enlarge their talent to another, and learn, as Mr. Hobbes expresseth, from Phantasmes. But I like not so well what Mr. Hobbes adds; that there is no Phantasme of that whch is Infinite; nor, what he further expresseth; Neither man, nor any thing, that is not Infinite, can have any conceipt of that which is Infinite: To understand which I shall take a little pains to explain the conceipt of Finite and Infinite,

Sect. 5.

Finite is the same to have bounds or limits, beyond which it cannot passe;* 1.21 Infinite is that which hath no bounds nor limits; and although, concerning these terms, in the first sounding, a man would think that Infinite should express a meere negation, as finite an affirmation; yet upon judgment of these things, expressed by these termes, we shall find the cleane contrary; for by finite we understand non ultra, as much as hitherto, and no farther; but by Infinite we apprehend such a vastness, to which we can alwaies say ultra, that there is further, there is somewhat beyond, and there must be something more. And out of this regard, finite things must have a cause of their finite nature, because whatsoever is boun∣ded, is bounded by somewhat, but infinite can have no cause, because unbounded or limited. These bounds or limits we may consider in three things; in the essence of things, in their quantities, and in their qualities: In their Essence, and so we consider all finite things to be this, and no other; as a Tree is a tree, and not a Beast or Bird, nor another tree; the being of it is bounded, and limited by that difference which constituted it either

in its specifical, or particular being; and whatsoever is the Cause of that being, is that which limits that thing, and makes it thus finite in being. But that which is in∣finite in essence hath no bounds, no limits of that being; it is all essence, without limitation, and, in a most emi∣nent manner, comprehends all being, without any ne∣gation. It is true, it is not finite, and therefore it is not a Man, a horse, a dog, a tree, all which names doe import a restraint and confinement; but is the perfe∣ction of all these, so that no perfection of any thing can be denied of that which is infinite essentially, to say that this infinite is not that; Let us conceive a line infinite; imagine such a thing; This line you cannot say it is a span, a foot, a yard, or mile long, yet it contains in it all these measures, without their limitation; so doth an infinite being containe all beings without con∣finement, in a more excellent and eminent manner. What I have spoken concerning that which is infinite in essence, or being, may be applied to all other infinites in immensity, in quantity; what is immense must be be∣yond all bounds of quantity; it must have no limits, but contains eminently all quantities in it: so must number be likewise, if there be any such, which I shall disprove (God willing) hereafter: so must, in respect of duration, Eternity be; It must comprehend all durations, and its self be without beginning and end; so must all Infinites, in respect of quality, be, in regard of wisdome, of mer∣cy, of power, comprehend all those Acts of those qua∣lities, which are in that which is finite, and themselves be without all bounds and limits. H••v••ng thus explained what is meant by infinitie, let us return to that which occasioned this discourse [neither man nor any thing which is not infinite (saith he) can have any conceipt of that which

is infinite] (conceptionem ullam) is his phrase.

Sect. 5.

* 1.22This I disprove; for although a mans understanding is finite, and cannot grasp, or fully comprehend that which is infinite; yet it can lay hold on it, and apprehend, though not comprehend it; although it cannot inclose the whole being of that is infinite; yet he can discover that it is incomprehensible, and that discovery will give him some conceit of that infiniteness; yea the very know∣ledge of finite things will yeeld him some conceit of that is infinite: so he, who travelleth in an enclosed Country, can sever those hedges from his fancy, and can conceit what that Country would be, if those hedges and bounds were removed; although he do not see them so removed; yet he can conceive what manner of Country that would be, if they were removed. Men may con∣ceive that which neither is, nor ever was in the world, as an empty place, against which he hath disputed in his natural Philosophy (although many learned are of opi∣nion against him) and therefore had a conceipt of it. Men may, and learned men have expressed their opini∣ons to be of an infinite thing which is not, that is, of an infinite vacuity beyond the heavens, which give bounds to this visible world, & therefore have a conceipt of that infinite which they dispute for; men have had a conceit, and, methinks, he is not far from it, that this world hath had an eternal being; and therefore they had a conceit of this we call Eternity, which is an infinite duration; men have a conceit of infinity of number; and therefore somewhere, in his Book of Philosophy (I have forgot where) he most ingeniously expresseth it, that if a mans hand were as active as his head (or to this purpose) he

might divide any quantity into infinite parts: his head then is able to doe it, and then he must needs have a conceit of his own work; He spake therefore too much when he said, no finite thing could have any conceit of that is infinite; a conceit it may have, but an imperfect one; and so I goe on with him.

Sect. 6.

[Neque si quis ab effectu quocunque] Neither (saith he) if a man from any effect to its immediate cause, and from thence to his more remote, and so continually, shall ascend by a most right reasoning; yet he cannot proceed to that which is Eternall, but, being tyred, shall flag, at the last, and be ignorant whether he can go further or no] Thus far he, an ingenuous and handsome expression, I confess; but how true, will be examined.

And first, I hope Mr. Hobbes will not say, he is the wisest man that ever was in the world; or that he only found out right reasoning (and yet he speaks somewhat like this now and then) but, howsoever, because I write not onely to him, but to other men, and, I hope, he harh not gained an universal esteem of such with the generality, I thus answer; There was never any sort of reasoning men who denyed an Eternity;* 1.23 for whether they held the world had a beginning, or no beginning, which all did, and must doe; those which held it had no beginning (as Aristotle, in my judgement) held the world eternall; those which held it had a beginning from Water, as Thales; or Ayre, as Anaximenes; or Fire, as Heraclitus; or from Atomes, as Democritus, by chance meeting together in the great and infinite Vacuum; not to lose time in confuting all, or any of these, which are most absurd, (yet all these, that held it was principi∣ated

by these meanes, held likewise that that Principle was eternall; so likewise Plato his Ideas and Chaos were eternall.) Let us from the fact consider the manner in one or two instances. If, with Democritus, we make the world constituted by Atomes, when we resolve these mixed bodies into their principles, we come to their Elements, then, with Democritus, those Elements may be resolved into their Atomes; by Aristotle into their Principles, matter, forme and privation; these Atomes, according to Democritus, are Eternall; that matter, ac∣cording to Aristotle; so here is an eternity found; So likewise may be said of Aire, Water, which are by some imagined to be the Principles; or Chaos, and Ideas; If any man can imagine any thing further, that these had a beginning, and were not eternall, his judgement can fly to none but an eternal God; So that still there is, by the ratiocination of man, found out something that is Eter∣nal. When he said [that by the ascending from the imme∣diate cause to the more remote, a man would lose himself] it was most ingenious, and had a truth with it (which per∣haps will be farther examined hereafter) if it had been applyed to efficient causes; as out of what Egge this Hen was hatched, and what Hen layd this egge, &c. But when we resolve things into their constitutive causes, which make their natures that which they are, then the work will be short as is shewed, and the result easie; man need not lose himself in the inquest. What he saith, [that a man tyred in the search will be ignorant whether he can go further or no] is not so boldly, as finely affirmed by him; for certainly, although a man be weary in his journey; yet he can discern whether he can go further or no.

Sect. 7.

He proceeds, and I [N••que absurdi sequitur quicquam] neither, saith he, would any absurdity follow,* 1.24 whether the world be finite or infinite, since, whatsoever the workman should determine, all those things which we now see, would be seene.] I will not meddle with what concernes not my present business, but remit the madness of the worlds infinity in magnitude, as not pertinent to my purpose, and apply my self to that which is in his following words about Eternity.

Sect. 8.

[Preterea etsi ex eo quod nihil potest movere seipsum. [Moreover (saith he) although out of this, that nothing can move it self, may be right enough inferred, that there is some first moving thing, which shall be Eternall; yet that cannot be inferred thence which men doe use to inferre, to wit, an eternal immoveable, but, contrariwise, an eternall thing moved; for, as it is true, that nothing is moved of its self, so it is true likewise, that nothing is moved but from a thing moved.) He is a most unhappy man in his way of reasoning, this contradicts w••at went before; for,* 1.25 if from that conclusion, which he holds true, nothing can move its self, may be deduced a first mover which is Eter∣nall, it necessarily follows, that men, ascending from effects to immediate causes, thence to others, may ar∣rive at that which is eternall, which was denyed not six lines before, and hath been confuted by me. Againe, observe that that inference, which he censures, must be true, and his inference false; For, if there be a first mo∣ver, and every thing moved is moved by another,* 1.26 then that which moves must it self be unmoved; for if it move, then that was not the first mover, but rather that other thing which moved, that he said was the first

moveable; for a first can have nothing before it; but that moveable, according to his Philosophy, must have another moved thing which moves it; And for the two Propositions, out of which he draws his inference, he saith they are alike true; I, that they are a like false; that which saith, nothing moves its self; For the nature of every thing, as Aristotle defines it, is the Principle of motion and rest of each natural body, that is, the natu∣ral motion and rest, and therefore moves every natural body naturally. And therefore the other Proposition is like false, which saith, that every thing which is moved, is moved by something which is moved it self, which can be affirmed of none but violent motions, they are forced by something without, but neither natural, nor animal motions. And this Philosophy he might have known to have been delivered by many of his friends, the Schoolemen, who disavow Aristotle in that Argument. I will leave his discourse in the middle, which is a proud contempt of such as labour to prove the beginning of the World, and close with him again towards the latter end of 237. Pag. where he endeavours to answer an Ar∣gument somwhat like that which I urge, but how weak∣ly, let the Reader judge. The Argument it self is not so strong as mine, and shall together be both examined.

Sect. 9.

He begins thus, [Quis enim hoc modo demonstrantem laudet.] Who, saith he, will praise a man after this manner demonstrating: if the world be Eternal, then the number of dayes (or any other measure of time) infinite hath prece∣ded the birth of Abraham; but the nativity of Abraham preceded the nativity of Isaac; therefore one infinite, or one eternity, should be greater then another, which is absurd,]

thus farre he.* 1.27 Consider first the affinity this Argument hath with mine in the place to which this should be in∣serted; his Argument is drawne from the number of Dayes, mine of paternity, which overthrows one of his Answers at the first view, as will appear in its place. But that wh••ch he seems to apply his strength against is that Axiom, one Infinite cannot be greater then another; This is used concerning infinite in number; the reason of this is, because whatsoever is infinite, is boundlesse, it cannot be out-gone, but its self out-goes every thing of its kind; now what is greater then another containes that, and exceeds it; so foure exceeds three, and there∣fore gives it bounds; a hundred, and every number is bounded, it is not 100. and one, it is bounded in its self; and therefore every number hath its internal bounds, and, if it be exceeded, it hath external bounds, Minimum quod non, as his friends the Schooles speak, so well as maximum quod sic; it hath the least terme of that it can∣not extend to, as the greatest it can exist in.

Sect. 10.

Well, let us consider his answer [Similis demonstra∣tio est,] It is a like Demonstration (saith he) as if he from thence, that there is an infinite number of equall numbers; therefore he should conclude that that there were so many e∣qual numbers as there are numbers equal and unequal toge∣ther taken.] I find a mighty errour run through his whole work, which doth not become a Mathematician, & is evident in this Answer,* 1.28 that he disputes Ex non conces∣sis, his Answer is drawn from a supposal, that there is an infinite number of equal numbers, which is false; there is no infinite of either equal or unequal numbers; for suppose the world made of Atomes with Democritus

(although they are called Infinite, because mans eye cannot discern them,* 1.29 nor his wit apprehend them) yet they, being bodies that have dimensions, must have a finite nature; and therefore a certain number of them must goe to the constituting another bigger body, sup∣pose a Million to make a barly corne, what num∣ber you will, yet it is a number, and that number may be reckoned by unities, every one for a Million, and so every million of Millions may afterwards be rec∣koned by unities, as one may goe for a Million or Milli∣ons, and a million of sheets, or papers, may be filled by these, or more greater numbers may be united; yet they are, and will be a certain number of them, and the things of this world are made in number by GOD Almighty, aswell as measure and weight, as the Son of Sirak, Wis∣dom, 11.20. Well then: there is no infinite number; he answers from an impossible supposal; but now hence doth he inferre. If I should grant there were an infi∣nite number of equall numbers, then that should be equal to all numbers, even equall and unequall; yes, it must, for there cannot be an infinite number of unities but must be equall to infinite twoes, threes, twenties, hundreds; for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which is infinite hath no bounds, if it had not infinite twenties, infinite Millions, indeed infinite infi∣nites, it had some bounds, it is not infinite, whatsoever by any reckonings, even by myriads, can be boun∣ded, is not infinite, can be exceeded; therefore it is absurd to say, the world was infinite in duration, for if we conceive it infinite,* 1.30 as I argue, there must be as many paternities of Adam, as of Robert, and all that number of paternities betwixt Adam and Robert are no addition. A drop in the Sea is an addition, because the Sea is bounded and finite, but if it were infinite,

there could be no addition to it. The greatest number, that is, may have addition, because it is finite, but what is infinite can have none. Nature therefore, which ab∣horres these impossibilities, allows no infinite being in the world, or to this world; But now consider his an∣swer once againe, you shall find the similitude, he an∣swers, cleane contrary to my Argument, and the Argu∣ment opposed by himself. He sayes, because there is an infinite number of even numbers, therefore that should be equal. I dispute cleane contrary, because an infinite number of even numbers cannot be equall to even and odde, which it must if it be infinite; therefore there is no infinite number of even numbers, twen∣ty must be more then three, and infinite threes, if there were any such, must be infinite twenties. Like∣wise, I think I have said enough to this answer, I will now examine his other.

Sect. 11.

He proceeds in the last line of that page, and the be∣ginning of Page 288. [Nonne qui Eternitatem mundi sic tollant. Doe not (saith he) Who so take away the Eternity of the world, with ••he same work, take eternity from the buil∣der of this World.] No, say I, by my Argument drawn from the certaine number of paternities,* 1.31 there is no colour for that mistake; for I, with St. Luke, 3. and the last, fix all paternities in God, and make him the father of Adam, beyond which there is no reckoning. But howsoever my Argument is quit of his Answer, yet he, although he argue weakly against himself, answers as weakly, for the Argument no way can be applyed to God the maker of the world, not his own Argument. I will therefore, as neare as I can, draw out the force of

his Argument; for at the first blush it appeares not. The maker of the world is Eternal, that is, infinite in duration, and therefore infinite of dayes may be attribu∣ted to him; therefore he cannot have more dayes ad∣ded to him, for if no infinite can be longer then another, then he, that had an infinite duration in the dayes of Abraham, could have no addition in the life of Isaac; so that the denyal of an imparity of infinite numbers, de∣nyes likewise, by consequence, the infinite of God. For satisfaction to this, Conceive that God is Eternal, which is to be without beginning or end,* 1.32 the beginning and end of all Creatures, but he is without either; that in Eternity there is neither Prius nor Posterius, before or after; for where there is no alteration, but the thing exists the same for ever, there can be nothing before or after, for these termes require two things to be applyed to, either this and another, or this differing from its self; but in that Eternity, before the making of the world, there was nothing besides God, and he without change, so that there could be no use of those relatives before or after; And this Philosophy must be true of whatsoever is eternally existing alone. So Plato concerning his eter∣nal Ideas, before they were incorporated with Chaos; So Democritus must think of his eternal Atomes, before that good luck, which brought them together had, com∣pacted them into those bodies which they made. Now although this, which is eternal, have no before, or after appliable to him existing in himself; yet when he hath made Creatures, then coexisting with them, and in re∣lation to them, these phrases may be applyed, as before this man, this thing; before a day, a yeare, or the like; for such relations may then be had to other things, though none in himself, or to himself; Now, because

of this, no duration of time, no Aera, no computation can be applyed to God, before the world, to say he was a day or yeare, or so, by such time as we make our Com∣putations, or can tell how to make any; but it is true to say, he was before the world, which signifies no more but to say, he was, and the world was not; but to say, he was a Day, a moneth, or yeare, or the like, is not true, nor to be imagined; for time its self (and therefore the parts of it) is the measure of duration, in regard of its priority or posteriority; so a year hath divers moneths, weeks; those, dayes; and they, houres, distinguished by the first, second, &c. Now where is not this priority or posteriority, there can be no imagination of time; so that, for my part, I am of opinion that these, who hold the whole world to be Eternal, must not, cannot reckon the duration of the world (because the whole being must be altogether) to say that it lasts yeares, dayes, or so forth, for it must be immutable in its self, although the parts of it are mutable and subject to change, and they may be reckoned by these times, or part of them, ac∣cording to which they exist; and this world, in the bulk coexisting with its mutable parts, may, in relation to them, be said to be before or after them; But now the case is otherwise with God, who was when there was no world, nor any mutable thing, and then could have none of those relations, which concerne them, attributed to him; for when there is no yeare, day, houre, how can he be said, to endure and last those times? nay, although we should fancy such a thing which is not, as a day, or houre, before this mutable world, yet we cannot apply it to him who hath no succession in him, when he hath no successive thing coexisting with him; as concerning his immensity, he having no quantity, we can say he

coexists with these quantitative things that are in the world; but he being such that neither the Heaven, nor heaven of heavens can contain, he must exist without them, and there he cannot be said to exist with any quantity or measure; and to say, Gods being was a day a year, &c. before the world, when there was no time, were as improper as to say, he were a yard long, or a mile, where there was no continued quantity, or body for him to subsist with.

Sect. 12.

* 1.33By Eternity we conceive either the internal duration of God, or an external measure of that duration, as time is to the duration of successive things; In the first, he being subject to no change nor alteration, no composi∣tion or commixtion, we can make no division in it of houres, or dayes, in his Eternity, because there is no parts of it subject to any change; For the second, if you conceive Eternity to be an outward measure, a real measure you cannot, (for there was no real thing with∣out him) you must make it then only imaginary, in the apprehension of men, what can that be! First then, there was no man to imagine it; secondly, if a mans present imagination work upon it, it must make the measure even to the thing measured, without begin∣ning, without end, altogether without succession, and then th••nk if there can be day, yeare, Olympiad, Eclipse, Aera, Epocha, any thing that is used for Computation of time, found in it; certainly no mans imagination, I think, can apply any such thing to an eternall being, and therefore not dayes.

Sect. 13.

This doctrine is most agreeing to the Scriptures (which teacheth the truest Philosophy) for the Scrip∣ture makes him to be the Creatour of the world; if so,* 1.34 then before the world; then Eternall; then these dura∣tions, which are measures of our worldly things, can∣not be affirmed of him, nor time, nor parts of it, which are onely measures proportioned to those things of this world, which are successive. I need not name the pla∣ces, but there are many of Scripture which expresse this eternal being of God, so Psal. 90.2. Before the moun∣tains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the Earth and the World, even from everlasting to everlasting thou art GOD; Here, in this one place, is all the Philo∣sophy I have delivered of Gods eternity; here is contain∣ed his Eternal being, when the world was not, in that is said before. &c. when they were not, he was. Secondly, here is expressed the totall being of the Eternal toge∣ther, in that is said, Thou art God from everlasting to everlasting, not thou wert, or wilt be, only, but before them thou art; and here is expressed likewise, that, in respect of other things, the Creatures, he may be said to have these relations before and after, though not in relation to himself; but yet no set terme, as to say, a day, or two dayes, or years, before. I am confident there is no one place of Scripture which expresseth any certaine mea∣sures of duration belonging to him. I know it may be objected to this, that in the Epistle to the Hebrews, Chap. 1. vers. 10, 11, 12. The Apostle, speaking of the Eternity of our Saviour, according to his Divinity, saith; Thou Lord in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the Earth, and the Heavens are the works of thy hands.

Verse. 11. They shall perish, but thou remainest, and they all shall wax old as doth a garment. Verse 12. And like a vesture shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be changed; but thou art the same, and thy yeares shall not faile. In this place the eternity of Christs divinity is called yeares; and therefore those measures of our times must be ap∣plied to that Eternity, and then dayes may, of which years are composed. To this we may most reasonably answer, that the Apostle accommodates his manner of language to the capacity of the vulgar, and the language of men, concerning durations, so well as actions; so be∣fore he said, the Heavens were the works of Gods hands, as if he had said, because all great works are wrought by hands amongst men, God had hands, by which he wrought those heavens, So, thy yeares shall not faile; that is, thou art Eternal, because men reckon their duration by yeares; and yet observe the language, it is said, they are indeficient yeares, yeares which faile not, all our yeares, faile, the last yeare is gone, this farre in going, and untill the end of the world, mans yeares, the worlds yeares, and their durations will faile; but Gods yeares, no part of his duration, reckon it what you will, shall faile. This is the sense of the Scriptures, and men can∣not, without a contradiction, expound it of our time, every part of which is deficient; Thus the Philosophy I have delivered being framed according to Scripture, I shall answer his Argument. The dayes, which may be attributed to God, and the measures of our time, can onely be in regard of his coexisting with time in this world, and therefore he doth not, nor can be said to be of more dayes, then the world hath; for he, who affirms he hath more dayes, or any such Computation, affirmes a falshood; there were not more dayes, therefore not a

coexisting with them; and therefore he had more dayes when Isaac was born, then when Abraham; but in neither of them had he an infinite number, but finite numbers of dayes; nor doth the world yeeld more; his durance is without number of weeks, or dayes, what successive thing soever we accompt by; and therefore that Argument, against the worlds eternity, hath no force, applied to God.

Sect. 14.

I proceed with him, Ita ab hoc absurdo, &c. [There∣fore (saith he) from this absurd thing they fall into another, being constrained to say, that Eternity is a standing instant and an infinite number of numbers is an Unity, which is much more absurd.] There are two parts in this Objecti∣on, the first concernes the nunc stans, or permanent in∣stant; the second of innumerable numbers, &c. for per∣spicuity I take them apart, and handle them distinctly. And first for his absurdity that he conceives to be in a standing instant; if it doe not stand still,* 1.35 and when it doth not, it is no longer nunc, or an instant, but time, or at the least two parts of time, but instant it is not; now, certainly, that which hath no mutation cannot choose but perpetually, eternally, stand still; and that, which to mutable things would be time, to him must be instant. I can shew him one instant that stood still neare two thou∣sand yeares of time; and therefore, if time could be infinite, would last eternally, which is Iohn 8.58. When the Iewes wondred that our Saviour should have seen Abraham, he answered, before Abraham was (not I was, but) I am. There is a difference in exposition, some say that this speech is understood of his Humanity, that his humanity was in the thoughts of God, and his Decree, before Abraham; but this cannot be the sense;

for Christ being the son and posterity of Abraham, even in the knowledge and decree of God, as well as in his birth in the world, therefore it could not be spoke of his humanity, that it was in the Decree of God before A∣braham, for Abraham, in the same Decree, must be be∣fore Christs humanity, as the father of him: But suppose it were, let me enquire, was that being, which Christ had then in the knowledge or being of God before A∣braham, was that being existing when he spake these words, or no? If no, then he could not say I am, but I was; if so, it proves my Conclusion, that there was a nunc stans, a standing instant neare two thousand years. But I am well satisfied, that that speech, of his, was meant of his Divinity which is eternally the same, and was before Abraham, when Abraham was; and after him, he being that which is, which was, and is to come, Revelation 1.4. And certainly there must needs be the same reason, that that instant must be Eternall, as that it should stand still so long as before Abraham to our Saviour. But his words, presently after, seeme to make another reason of the absurdity in nunc stans, thus.

Sect. 15.

[Cur enim Eternitas] Why (saith he) should Eternity be called nunc stans, now standing, rather then tunc, then standing; there must therefore be either many Eternities, or now and then must signifie the same) Thus he for answer; this terme stans or standing, is indifferent to time passed or to come, when applyed to either positively; but if either doth imply a Negative of that is present, in that second consideration it no way agrees to eternity which is alwaies present; but in the first sense, because eternity comprehends all time, when it is spoke of any thing

done or being in time, as that Isaac was borne, or Anti∣christ shall be, this was, or shall be done, may be in Eter∣nity, which coexists with these times; so, before Abraham was, I am; and who is, was, and shall be, are spoke of him; and then, when Abraham was, he was, without the Ne∣gative of was, that is, denying it to be now; then when Antichrist will be, he will be, without any implyed Neg. that he is not now; And so comes in the second part of this Objection, that now and then are all one; For an∣swer; although now standing and then standing,* 1.36 if apply∣ed to Eternity, signifie the same thing, and we conceive, by both of them, an eternal immutable being; yet now, and then, alone do signifie divers things; old Abraham, and young Abraham, signifie the same person, but old and young are divers. Or thus, Socrates laughing, and Socrates discoursing, are the same, this is false Logick, and he either considered not what he writ, or did it with an intention to deceive; this same terme [standing] makes them both be applied to Eternity, for no durati∣on is standing, or lasting, but that which is eternal; all others are successive; that eternal thing, which stands now, without succession, stands then, in passed and future times, whensoever they exist, they changed, but he remaining the same. Expect not a simile to agree in all things, then it must be that very thing which it assi∣mulates: but thus: As you may conceive a firme and strong rock made of some Adamantine, or heavenly, immutable substance; this rocke stands still, without change of the least particle; cut a sluce of the Sea into it, whose waves dash upon it, so long as these waves batter upon it, that rock is before one, and behind another, none of which relations it had before; they are in a perpetu∣all flux and change, the rock stands, as it were, u••con∣cern'd

in them; return that Sea into its own Channel, it hath no respect to any wave againe, no more then it had before the coming in of those waters: so that e∣ternal, immutable, unwashable rock of beings, exists of its self, untill these turbulent waves of unconstant time are let into it, then, all that while, it hath these relati∣ons to it, of past, present, and to come; but when things are retreated againe, when time ceaseth, there is no more any of these differences of past, or present, which are ap∣plied to time, and it had in relation only to time and temporary things, but is purely nunc stans, or tunc stans, I care not which, if it be stans, if it be standing and per∣manent, it expresseth the notion of eternity. Well, and yet nunc and tunc, now and then differ in themselves, and are united only in this which we call Eternity. Revel. 1.8. I am Alpha and Omega, there the time that was pas∣sed, and the time that was to come, every kind of them was applied to this nunc; the present being, I am, in it comprehended the beginning and the end of others: it might be said of others, they were the beginning, and should be the end; but of him, he is the beginning, and the end, the first and the last, as it is added in the 22. of the same Revelations the 13. He is this in himself; but then take him coexisting with time, he is he who is, who was, and who shall be; so that it is evident his duration taken in its self, is the same time and nunc, now and then; so either of them be considered standing, or permanent; but, in respect of the Creature, he may be said that was or shall be. Thus I hope that Argument is answered; nunc and tunc stans, now and then, so they have that ad∣dition of permanent, are the same, which differ with∣out that addition. Now to the second Argument

Sect. 16.

[And (saith he) they make an infinite number of numbers an unitie.] I deny this Consequence,* 1.37 it can be inforced no otherwise then that eternal exists an infinite num∣ber of dayes, which I deny; Eternity doth not exist an infinite number of any measures of time, nor any time, when time doth not exist, as is before expressed: but, if there should be an infinite time lasting, it would exist with it; but, the first failing, coexisting with it can∣not be.

Thus the Reader may, in a weak manner, conceive this Eternal Now, how it may be the same with Eternal Then, and how there are not contained an infinite num∣ber of numbers in it.

Sect. 17.

As to those other Arguments drawn from the govern∣ment of the Creatures, to prove the main proposition,* 1.38 that there is a God; I could delight to spend whole sheets in discourse upon them, but that I must not lose my self in this intendment I am about; they are so e∣vident, that, as St. Paul, where before cited, Rom. 1.20. it renders men without excuse; For the Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament sheweth his handy work, Psal. 19.1. There is no speech nor language where their voyce is not heard, Vers. 3. So that the manifestation is universal, no man can be excused from the observation of these things, verse 4. Their line, or direction, is gone throughout all the earth, and their words to the end of the world: I must not be long in this Theame; As when a man sees a brave house gloriously built, he cannot chuse but think him an excellent workman that wrought it: so doth the beauty of this great building of the

World make us admire the workman; As he, who should heare excellent Musique, must needs think it the work of some eminent Musician; As a man, when he sees a Great man's house governed with regularity, and order∣ed in an exact discipline, must needs think there is a dis∣creet Steward or Master, who disposeth and orders that family: so when the Method, in which the world is con∣trived, and disciplin'd, is considered, a man must needs think that there is an infinite wisdom which governs all: And therefore the sonne of Sirach, Wisd. 13.5. By the greatnesse and beauty of Creatures, proportionably, the Ma∣ker of them is seene; that is, the maker of this house, the Artist, who composed the Harmony, the Contriver of this discipline is discerned by the effects of it, which, be∣cause they require a vast and immense power and wis∣dom, we must attribute to God; for if a man would think with himself how innumerable accidents, that is, external things, conduce to the producing of the least effect, a man cannot conceive how lesse then an Infinite wisdom and power could, in such a Method, concenter them to the least business. But I lose my self with delight in this admiration of my God, and I desist. These, and the like reasons doe cherish that innate Axi∣ome, That there is a God, even in natural Man; And this leaves all the world without excuse, for not knowing, there is a God, or knowing there is one, but not worship∣ing him as God, or, knowing him thus, as Nature teacheth him, for worshiping Idols, or Images, which they must needs know not to be the Author of these great effects.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Religion defi∣ned.
• * 1.2

  Why reckon∣ed among the duties of ju∣stice.
• * 1.3

  The seed of Re••igion in man onely, be∣cause rational.
• * 1.4

  Mr. Hobbes's reasons invalid and his dis∣course imper∣tinent.
• * 1.5

  His opinion of the feigned God, invisible Agents, Ghosts &c.
• * 1.6

  Invisible A∣gents what.
• * 1.7

  Mr. Hobbes sticks an absurd opinion of mans soul un∣deservedly up∣on Idolaters.
• * 1.8

  His discourse of Spirits and Ghosts &c. too perplexed.
• * 1.9

  Mr. Hobbes sowes ambigu∣ous seeds to produce false and true Re∣ligion.
• * 1.10

  The opinion of Ghosts could not in∣troduce the as∣surance that there is a God.
• * 1.11

  Ignorance of second causes apter to pro∣duce Atheisme then Religion.
• * 1.12

  Devotion to what we fear rather a fruit, then seed, of Religion.
• * 1.13

  A taking things casual for Prognosti∣qu••s, no seed of the ta••••e Religions.
• * 1.14

  There have been Sibyls that prophe∣sied of our Saviour.
• * 1.15

  The sole im∣mediate seed of Religion an innate principle.
• * 1.16

  To be prov'd from the chain of causes.
• * 1.17

  An eternity of the world, with an infinity of causations, why not to be admitted.
• * 1.18

  A transition to Mr. Hobbes's Element of Philosophy, &c.
• * 1.19

  Somewhat of God, though infinite, may be known.
• * 1.20

  And that from Phantasms.
• * 1.21

  The conceit of fi••ite and infi∣nite explain'd.
• * 1.22

  What conceit may be had of infinite.
• * 1.23

  An Eternity acknowledged by all of diffe∣rent opinions.
• * 1.24

  Mr. Hobbes's indiff••rence, be the world finite or infi∣nite.
• * 1.25

  His contrad••∣ction of him∣self by inad∣vertence.
• * 1.26

  The first mo∣ver prov'd im∣moveable.
• * 1.27

  Mr Hobb••s's paralogisme.
• * 1.28

  His disputing ex non con∣cessis.
• * 1.29

  No infinity at all of numbers
• * 1.30

  Why the world cannot be conceived infinite in du∣ration.
• * 1.31

  And yet God the Creatour, may, and must.
• * 1.32

  No before or after in Eter∣nity; and yet how these terms are ap∣plicable to Gods duration or coexistenc••, not to his sim∣ple or absolute existence.
• * 1.33

  Our double conceipt of Gods eternity, to which no computation of time is ap∣plicable
• * 1.34

  The doctrine of eternity most agreeable to H. Scrip∣ture.
• * 1.35

  No absurdity in asserting Eternity to be a standing in∣stant.
• * 1.36

  The difference of nunc stans and tunc stans as applied to Eternity.
• * 1.37

  Eternity coex∣••sts, with no infinite num∣ber of dayes.
• * 1.38

  God so mani∣fest in the Creatures, as all ignorance is inexcusable.