Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

CHAP. XIV.

What the seed of Religion. Concerning the chaine of causes. What of God to be known. Of finite and infinite. The first mover. The sound doctrine of Eternity, &c.

Sect. 1.

CErtainly the sole immediate seed of Religion, is the assurance that there is a God of an infinite excellency governing all the world; for therefore men perform Religion to him;* 1.1 but that which propagates this natu∣rally, is first without doubt an innate principle, born in, and with a man, which naturally every man hath as soon as he hath reason; and there never was Nation, or so∣ciety of men, found in the world, which denied it. It is true, there may be now and then, by the suggestions of the Devill, a man found, that with malicious reason hath laboured to diswade this Principle; but that is not material; There are Errours and Monsters in the morall part of man, as well as in his natural: This Gentleman, who hath by nature the sight of Colours, and ability to discern them, yet hath studied reasons to make men beleeve he sees none. There is nothing so abhorring to Reason that malicious Reason doth not oppose; but such

a truth as this, Quod ubi{que} semper, et ab omnibus, hath been held, cannot be other then natural; and whereas he can shew one man breaking this rule, I can shew him a hundred that have no use of reason at all, and a thou∣sand that have lost it; so that as such a man, as he, is a rarer sight then those; so he may well be reckoned a∣mongst the worst of fooles and mad-men; and there∣fore the Psalmist, Psal. 14.1. saith, The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God; and he himself in this Chapter, pag. 58. affirmes, That an opinion of a Diety and Powers invisible, and supernatural, can never be abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions may be made to spring out of them: So that this Seed is so naturally and firmly rooted in mans heart, that it cannot be extirpa∣ted by any thing, that doth not likewise with it extirpate reason.

Sect. 2.

* 1.2But because although this is natural, yet some men, by the wickednesse of malicious reason, have endeavou∣red to wither it, therefore other Children of Nature have endeavoured to cherish this root by watering it with the strength of invincible reasons, drawne from the chaine of Causes, which suppose a seed or a tree first, and that first to be created, not generated; for if generated, then it requires a preceding tree, or seed, and then that was not first; and so in all the effects in the world. But these men pretend an Eternity in the world,* 1.3 and so, in the propagation and causation of Natural things, that there may be an infinity of these causations from one to another, which is almost impossible to be conceived; for then there should be an Infinite number of Causes, which cannot be, for then Robert, who is now born, should have no more Paternities or Precedings in causes then Adam

had; for if there should be an infinite Number of Causes preceding Adam, then there can be no addition to it; for what can receive addition, is not Infinite, it hath a bound to it, and then all the Causations from Adam to Robert are nothing; for if you should imagine in these five or six Thousand yeares there may have been so many hundred generations more then were before, I can answer no, the other was infinite; for should you fill this sheet with Ciphers, and head them with the figure of one, I can make all these Ciphers nines, and the fi∣gure of one Nine, and make nine Millions of such sheets; and yet all this, in respect of Eternity, will be not so much as one unite to all this; and six or seaven hundred thousand were nothing being added; because whatso∣ever you adde to Roberts number of Fathers, I can adde a thousand times as many to Adams; and therefore Na∣ture, that abhors impossibilities, abhors likewise infinites of Numbers, and, by consequence, of Causations eternally; for a man to say, this Eternity is à parte ante, and not à parte post, is a contradiction; for although there may be some imagination of a thing, which, having a beginning, may have no end, but exist eternally, because it may be created with eternal Principles, and the Number infinite is not presently existing, nor ever shall be; for whenso∣ever you reckon, you shall have a finite time to reckon from, although it were ten thousand Millions of yeares hence, or whensoever; yet there can be nothing, with∣out a beginning, eternal à parte ante, but must needs have eternal Principles, which no time can corrupt, for if time could corrupt it, as suppose ten thousand yeares, or a thousand times so many, fix any time, it had been cor∣rupted before this, or else it was not eternal à parte ante. And then to the second part, such a person, he hath

actually an Infinite number of Causes, which cannot be; and therefore these things must be created in some cer∣taine time: These, and many more arguments, out of Metaphysiques, as that which the Philosophers call Essen∣tial Subordination of Causes, as likewise many others, are such as of which I may say, that they render the Propo∣sition, There is a God, evidently to be discerned by the Creatures, but, as Aegidius Romanus excellently speaks, Sapientibus, this evidence is perceiveable only by wise men; from the disquisition whereof they are not to be scared by the infinity of Gods essence, because inaccessible to a finite Inquirer,* 1.4 as he plainly asserts it in his Element of Philosophy, &c. whither I will make a transition, to in∣large this discourse, and cleare what I have writ from somewhat I find there opposite to my purpose.

Sect. 3.

In his said book of Philosophy de Corpore, Cap. 26. Pag. 236. having proposed divers questions about the World, he concludes at the bottome of that pag. and the beginning of the next, Et haec omnia ab eo qui Philo∣sophiam complecti profiteretur universam determinanda essent,* 1.5 si quantum quaerit, tantum sciri potest, est autem in∣finiti scientia finito quaesitori inaccessibilis. Thus far he; And not without reason, no finite understanding can grasp that which is infinite; yet, although we cannot perfectly know that which is Infinite, we may know many things of it. Mr. Hobbes himself, I dare say, doth not know the essence of the Sun, yet there is not the meanest person, which follows the Plough, but knowes there is a Sun, and many effects of the Sun, that he doth send forth light, and heat, by which the poor man is comforted. Mr. Hobbes his Argument, Therefore, be∣cause

finite things cannot know God as he is, we must know nothing of him, is weake. He proceeds.

Sect. 4.

Whatsoever we men know, we have learned from our Phantasm; but there is no Phantasm of that which is either Infinite in magnitude, or time, Neque enim homo, saith he, neiiher man, nor any thing that is not infinite, can have any conceipt of that which is infinite.) He said true in affirming, that what we know,* 1.6 we have learned from our Phantasm; so although the soul of man have many things in it which have no being in the world, as Chime∣ra's, Utopia's, Leviathans, and our Phantasmes are pro∣perly of things in the world; yet those things which are in the understanding, and not in the world, are learned from those Phantasmes, which are of things in the world; as thus, That man who cannot behold the Sun in his own glory, and lustre, yet seeing him behinde a thin Cloud, can learn from thence, that the Sun, who shines so glorious, vailed, and hid from eyes by such a dark body, would have a strange high degree of resplen∣dent lustre, if we could see him as he is: So we learn from Phantasmes apparent, as the Apostle speaks, from visible things, to collect many apprehensions of that which is of its self invisible, and not to be perceived; and, having reduced one Conclusion, may collect from thence many more; and men desirous to know God (as he, who desires knowledge, doth) will make such collections. The Prophet David there, in a most hea∣venly invective, calls them not onely fools, but beastly people, who do not so collect, Psal. 94.8. Understand ye brutish among the People: and ye fools, when will ye be wise? Mark; they were foolish, and brutish, because

they did not make such Collections. He that planted the Ear, shall he not hear, and he that formed the Eye, shall he not see? Thus from one truth men may, and ought to enlarge their talent to another, and learn, as Mr. Hobbes expresseth, from Phantasmes. But I like not so well what Mr. Hobbes adds; that there is no Phantasme of that whch is Infinite; nor, what he further expresseth; Neither man, nor any thing, that is not Infinite, can have any conceipt of that which is Infinite: To understand which I shall take a little pains to explain the conceipt of Finite and Infinite,

Sect. 5.

Finite is the same to have bounds or limits, beyond which it cannot passe;* 1.7 Infinite is that which hath no bounds nor limits; and although, concerning these terms, in the first sounding, a man would think that Infinite should express a meere negation, as finite an affirmation; yet upon judgment of these things, expressed by these termes, we shall find the cleane contrary; for by finite we understand non ultra, as much as hitherto, and no farther; but by Infinite we apprehend such a vastness, to which we can alwaies say ultra, that there is further, there is somewhat beyond, and there must be something more. And out of this regard, finite things must have a cause of their finite nature, because whatsoever is boun∣ded, is bounded by somewhat, but infinite can have no cause, because unbounded or limited. These bounds or limits we may consider in three things; in the essence of things, in their quantities, and in their qualities: In their Essence, and so we consider all finite things to be this, and no other; as a Tree is a tree, and not a Beast or Bird, nor another tree; the being of it is bounded, and limited by that difference which constituted it either

in its specifical, or particular being; and whatsoever is the Cause of that being, is that which limits that thing, and makes it thus finite in being. But that which is in∣finite in essence hath no bounds, no limits of that being; it is all essence, without limitation, and, in a most emi∣nent manner, comprehends all being, without any ne∣gation. It is true, it is not finite, and therefore it is not a Man, a horse, a dog, a tree, all which names doe import a restraint and confinement; but is the perfe∣ction of all these, so that no perfection of any thing can be denied of that which is infinite essentially, to say that this infinite is not that; Let us conceive a line infinite; imagine such a thing; This line you cannot say it is a span, a foot, a yard, or mile long, yet it contains in it all these measures, without their limitation; so doth an infinite being containe all beings without con∣finement, in a more excellent and eminent manner. What I have spoken concerning that which is infinite in essence, or being, may be applied to all other infinites in immensity, in quantity; what is immense must be be∣yond all bounds of quantity; it must have no limits, but contains eminently all quantities in it: so must number be likewise, if there be any such, which I shall disprove (God willing) hereafter: so must, in respect of duration, Eternity be; It must comprehend all durations, and its self be without beginning and end; so must all Infinites, in respect of quality, be, in regard of wisdome, of mer∣cy, of power, comprehend all those Acts of those qua∣lities, which are in that which is finite, and themselves be without all bounds and limits. H••v••ng thus explained what is meant by infinitie, let us return to that which occasioned this discourse [neither man nor any thing which is not infinite (saith he) can have any conceipt of that which

is infinite] (conceptionem ullam) is his phrase.

Sect. 5.

* 1.8This I disprove; for although a mans understanding is finite, and cannot grasp, or fully comprehend that which is infinite; yet it can lay hold on it, and apprehend, though not comprehend it; although it cannot inclose the whole being of that is infinite; yet he can discover that it is incomprehensible, and that discovery will give him some conceit of that infiniteness; yea the very know∣ledge of finite things will yeeld him some conceit of that is infinite: so he, who travelleth in an enclosed Country, can sever those hedges from his fancy, and can conceit what that Country would be, if those hedges and bounds were removed; although he do not see them so removed; yet he can conceive what manner of Country that would be, if they were removed. Men may con∣ceive that which neither is, nor ever was in the world, as an empty place, against which he hath disputed in his natural Philosophy (although many learned are of opi∣nion against him) and therefore had a conceipt of it. Men may, and learned men have expressed their opini∣ons to be of an infinite thing which is not, that is, of an infinite vacuity beyond the heavens, which give bounds to this visible world, & therefore have a conceipt of that infinite which they dispute for; men have had a conceit, and, methinks, he is not far from it, that this world hath had an eternal being; and therefore they had a conceit of this we call Eternity, which is an infinite duration; men have a conceit of infinity of number; and therefore somewhere, in his Book of Philosophy (I have forgot where) he most ingeniously expresseth it, that if a mans hand were as active as his head (or to this purpose) he

might divide any quantity into infinite parts: his head then is able to doe it, and then he must needs have a conceit of his own work; He spake therefore too much when he said, no finite thing could have any conceit of that is infinite; a conceit it may have, but an imperfect one; and so I goe on with him.

Sect. 6.

[Neque si quis ab effectu quocunque] Neither (saith he) if a man from any effect to its immediate cause, and from thence to his more remote, and so continually, shall ascend by a most right reasoning; yet he cannot proceed to that which is Eternall, but, being tyred, shall flag, at the last, and be ignorant whether he can go further or no] Thus far he, an ingenuous and handsome expression, I confess; but how true, will be examined.

And first, I hope Mr. Hobbes will not say, he is the wisest man that ever was in the world; or that he only found out right reasoning (and yet he speaks somewhat like this now and then) but, howsoever, because I write not onely to him, but to other men, and, I hope, he harh not gained an universal esteem of such with the generality, I thus answer; There was never any sort of reasoning men who denyed an Eternity;* 1.9 for whether they held the world had a beginning, or no beginning, which all did, and must doe; those which held it had no beginning (as Aristotle, in my judgement) held the world eternall; those which held it had a beginning from Water, as Thales; or Ayre, as Anaximenes; or Fire, as Heraclitus; or from Atomes, as Democritus, by chance meeting together in the great and infinite Vacuum; not to lose time in confuting all, or any of these, which are most absurd, (yet all these, that held it was principi∣ated

by these meanes, held likewise that that Principle was eternall; so likewise Plato his Ideas and Chaos were eternall.) Let us from the fact consider the manner in one or two instances. If, with Democritus, we make the world constituted by Atomes, when we resolve these mixed bodies into their principles, we come to their Elements, then, with Democritus, those Elements may be resolved into their Atomes; by Aristotle into their Principles, matter, forme and privation; these Atomes, according to Democritus, are Eternall; that matter, ac∣cording to Aristotle; so here is an eternity found; So likewise may be said of Aire, Water, which are by some imagined to be the Principles; or Chaos, and Ideas; If any man can imagine any thing further, that these had a beginning, and were not eternall, his judgement can fly to none but an eternal God; So that still there is, by the ratiocination of man, found out something that is Eter∣nal. When he said [that by the ascending from the imme∣diate cause to the more remote, a man would lose himself] it was most ingenious, and had a truth with it (which per∣haps will be farther examined hereafter) if it had been applyed to efficient causes; as out of what Egge this Hen was hatched, and what Hen layd this egge, &c. But when we resolve things into their constitutive causes, which make their natures that which they are, then the work will be short as is shewed, and the result easie; man need not lose himself in the inquest. What he saith, [that a man tyred in the search will be ignorant whether he can go further or no] is not so boldly, as finely affirmed by him; for certainly, although a man be weary in his journey; yet he can discern whether he can go further or no.

Sect. 7.

He proceeds, and I [N••que absurdi sequitur quicquam] neither, saith he, would any absurdity follow,* 1.10 whether the world be finite or infinite, since, whatsoever the workman should determine, all those things which we now see, would be seene.] I will not meddle with what concernes not my present business, but remit the madness of the worlds infinity in magnitude, as not pertinent to my purpose, and apply my self to that which is in his following words about Eternity.

Sect. 8.

[Preterea etsi ex eo quod nihil potest movere seipsum. [Moreover (saith he) although out of this, that nothing can move it self, may be right enough inferred, that there is some first moving thing, which shall be Eternall; yet that cannot be inferred thence which men doe use to inferre, to wit, an eternal immoveable, but, contrariwise, an eternall thing moved; for, as it is true, that nothing is moved of its self, so it is true likewise, that nothing is moved but from a thing moved.) He is a most unhappy man in his way of reasoning, this contradicts w••at went before; for,* 1.11 if from that conclusion, which he holds true, nothing can move its self, may be deduced a first mover which is Eter∣nall, it necessarily follows, that men, ascending from effects to immediate causes, thence to others, may ar∣rive at that which is eternall, which was denyed not six lines before, and hath been confuted by me. Againe, observe that that inference, which he censures, must be true, and his inference false; For, if there be a first mo∣ver, and every thing moved is moved by another,* 1.12 then that which moves must it self be unmoved; for if it move, then that was not the first mover, but rather that other thing which moved, that he said was the first

moveable; for a first can have nothing before it; but that moveable, according to his Philosophy, must have another moved thing which moves it; And for the two Propositions, out of which he draws his inference, he saith they are alike true; I, that they are a like false; that which saith, nothing moves its self; For the nature of every thing, as Aristotle defines it, is the Principle of motion and rest of each natural body, that is, the natu∣ral motion and rest, and therefore moves every natural body naturally. And therefore the other Proposition is like false, which saith, that every thing which is moved, is moved by something which is moved it self, which can be affirmed of none but violent motions, they are forced by something without, but neither natural, nor animal motions. And this Philosophy he might have known to have been delivered by many of his friends, the Schoolemen, who disavow Aristotle in that Argument. I will leave his discourse in the middle, which is a proud contempt of such as labour to prove the beginning of the World, and close with him again towards the latter end of 237. Pag. where he endeavours to answer an Ar∣gument somwhat like that which I urge, but how weak∣ly, let the Reader judge. The Argument it self is not so strong as mine, and shall together be both examined.

Sect. 9.

He begins thus, [Quis enim hoc modo demonstrantem laudet.] Who, saith he, will praise a man after this manner demonstrating: if the world be Eternal, then the number of dayes (or any other measure of time) infinite hath prece∣ded the birth of Abraham; but the nativity of Abraham preceded the nativity of Isaac; therefore one infinite, or one eternity, should be greater then another, which is absurd,]

thus farre he.* 1.13 Consider first the affinity this Argument hath with mine in the place to which this should be in∣serted; his Argument is drawne from the number of Dayes, mine of paternity, which overthrows one of his Answers at the first view, as will appear in its place. But that wh••ch he seems to apply his strength against is that Axiom, one Infinite cannot be greater then another; This is used concerning infinite in number; the reason of this is, because whatsoever is infinite, is boundlesse, it cannot be out-gone, but its self out-goes every thing of its kind; now what is greater then another containes that, and exceeds it; so foure exceeds three, and there∣fore gives it bounds; a hundred, and every number is bounded, it is not 100. and one, it is bounded in its self; and therefore every number hath its internal bounds, and, if it be exceeded, it hath external bounds, Minimum quod non, as his friends the Schooles speak, so well as maximum quod sic; it hath the least terme of that it can∣not extend to, as the greatest it can exist in.

Sect. 10.

Well, let us consider his answer [Similis demonstra∣tio est,] It is a like Demonstration (saith he) as if he from thence, that there is an infinite number of equall numbers; therefore he should conclude that that there were so many e∣qual numbers as there are numbers equal and unequal toge∣ther taken.] I find a mighty errour run through his whole work, which doth not become a Mathematician, & is evident in this Answer,* 1.14 that he disputes Ex non conces∣sis, his Answer is drawn from a supposal, that there is an infinite number of equal numbers, which is false; there is no infinite of either equal or unequal numbers; for suppose the world made of Atomes with Democritus

(although they are called Infinite, because mans eye cannot discern them,* 1.15 nor his wit apprehend them) yet they, being bodies that have dimensions, must have a finite nature; and therefore a certain number of them must goe to the constituting another bigger body, sup∣pose a Million to make a barly corne, what num∣ber you will, yet it is a number, and that number may be reckoned by unities, every one for a Million, and so every million of Millions may afterwards be rec∣koned by unities, as one may goe for a Million or Milli∣ons, and a million of sheets, or papers, may be filled by these, or more greater numbers may be united; yet they are, and will be a certain number of them, and the things of this world are made in number by GOD Almighty, aswell as measure and weight, as the Son of Sirak, Wis∣dom, 11.20. Well then: there is no infinite number; he answers from an impossible supposal; but now hence doth he inferre. If I should grant there were an infi∣nite number of equall numbers, then that should be equal to all numbers, even equall and unequall; yes, it must, for there cannot be an infinite number of unities but must be equall to infinite twoes, threes, twenties, hundreds; for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which is infinite hath no bounds, if it had not infinite twenties, infinite Millions, indeed infinite infi∣nites, it had some bounds, it is not infinite, whatsoever by any reckonings, even by myriads, can be boun∣ded, is not infinite, can be exceeded; therefore it is absurd to say, the world was infinite in duration, for if we conceive it infinite,* 1.16 as I argue, there must be as many paternities of Adam, as of Robert, and all that number of paternities betwixt Adam and Robert are no addition. A drop in the Sea is an addition, because the Sea is bounded and finite, but if it were infinite,

there could be no addition to it. The greatest number, that is, may have addition, because it is finite, but what is infinite can have none. Nature therefore, which ab∣horres these impossibilities, allows no infinite being in the world, or to this world; But now consider his an∣swer once againe, you shall find the similitude, he an∣swers, cleane contrary to my Argument, and the Argu∣ment opposed by himself. He sayes, because there is an infinite number of even numbers, therefore that should be equal. I dispute cleane contrary, because an infinite number of even numbers cannot be equall to even and odde, which it must if it be infinite; therefore there is no infinite number of even numbers, twen∣ty must be more then three, and infinite threes, if there were any such, must be infinite twenties. Like∣wise, I think I have said enough to this answer, I will now examine his other.

Sect. 11.

He proceeds in the last line of that page, and the be∣ginning of Page 288. [Nonne qui Eternitatem mundi sic tollant. Doe not (saith he) Who so take away the Eternity of the world, with ••he same work, take eternity from the buil∣der of this World.] No, say I, by my Argument drawn from the certaine number of paternities,* 1.17 there is no colour for that mistake; for I, with St. Luke, 3. and the last, fix all paternities in God, and make him the father of Adam, beyond which there is no reckoning. But howsoever my Argument is quit of his Answer, yet he, although he argue weakly against himself, answers as weakly, for the Argument no way can be applyed to God the maker of the world, not his own Argument. I will therefore, as neare as I can, draw out the force of

his Argument; for at the first blush it appeares not. The maker of the world is Eternal, that is, infinite in duration, and therefore infinite of dayes may be attribu∣ted to him; therefore he cannot have more dayes ad∣ded to him, for if no infinite can be longer then another, then he, that had an infinite duration in the dayes of Abraham, could have no addition in the life of Isaac; so that the denyal of an imparity of infinite numbers, de∣nyes likewise, by consequence, the infinite of God. For satisfaction to this, Conceive that God is Eternal, which is to be without beginning or end,* 1.18 the beginning and end of all Creatures, but he is without either; that in Eternity there is neither Prius nor Posterius, before or after; for where there is no alteration, but the thing exists the same for ever, there can be nothing before or after, for these termes require two things to be applyed to, either this and another, or this differing from its self; but in that Eternity, before the making of the world, there was nothing besides God, and he without change, so that there could be no use of those relatives before or after; And this Philosophy must be true of whatsoever is eternally existing alone. So Plato concerning his eter∣nal Ideas, before they were incorporated with Chaos; So Democritus must think of his eternal Atomes, before that good luck, which brought them together had, com∣pacted them into those bodies which they made. Now although this, which is eternal, have no before, or after appliable to him existing in himself; yet when he hath made Creatures, then coexisting with them, and in re∣lation to them, these phrases may be applyed, as before this man, this thing; before a day, a yeare, or the like; for such relations may then be had to other things, though none in himself, or to himself; Now, because

of this, no duration of time, no Aera, no computation can be applyed to God, before the world, to say he was a day or yeare, or so, by such time as we make our Com∣putations, or can tell how to make any; but it is true to say, he was before the world, which signifies no more but to say, he was, and the world was not; but to say, he was a Day, a moneth, or yeare, or the like, is not true, nor to be imagined; for time its self (and therefore the parts of it) is the measure of duration, in regard of its priority or posteriority; so a year hath divers moneths, weeks; those, dayes; and they, houres, distinguished by the first, second, &c. Now where is not this priority or posteriority, there can be no imagination of time; so that, for my part, I am of opinion that these, who hold the whole world to be Eternal, must not, cannot reckon the duration of the world (because the whole being must be altogether) to say that it lasts yeares, dayes, or so forth, for it must be immutable in its self, although the parts of it are mutable and subject to change, and they may be reckoned by these times, or part of them, ac∣cording to which they exist; and this world, in the bulk coexisting with its mutable parts, may, in relation to them, be said to be before or after them; But now the case is otherwise with God, who was when there was no world, nor any mutable thing, and then could have none of those relations, which concerne them, attributed to him; for when there is no yeare, day, houre, how can he be said, to endure and last those times? nay, although we should fancy such a thing which is not, as a day, or houre, before this mutable world, yet we cannot apply it to him who hath no succession in him, when he hath no successive thing coexisting with him; as concerning his immensity, he having no quantity, we can say he

coexists with these quantitative things that are in the world; but he being such that neither the Heaven, nor heaven of heavens can contain, he must exist without them, and there he cannot be said to exist with any quantity or measure; and to say, Gods being was a day a year, &c. before the world, when there was no time, were as improper as to say, he were a yard long, or a mile, where there was no continued quantity, or body for him to subsist with.

Sect. 12.

* 1.19By Eternity we conceive either the internal duration of God, or an external measure of that duration, as time is to the duration of successive things; In the first, he being subject to no change nor alteration, no composi∣tion or commixtion, we can make no division in it of houres, or dayes, in his Eternity, because there is no parts of it subject to any change; For the second, if you conceive Eternity to be an outward measure, a real measure you cannot, (for there was no real thing with∣out him) you must make it then only imaginary, in the apprehension of men, what can that be! First then, there was no man to imagine it; secondly, if a mans present imagination work upon it, it must make the measure even to the thing measured, without begin∣ning, without end, altogether without succession, and then th••nk if there can be day, yeare, Olympiad, Eclipse, Aera, Epocha, any thing that is used for Computation of time, found in it; certainly no mans imagination, I think, can apply any such thing to an eternall being, and therefore not dayes.

Sect. 13.

This doctrine is most agreeing to the Scriptures (which teacheth the truest Philosophy) for the Scrip∣ture makes him to be the Creatour of the world; if so,* 1.20 then before the world; then Eternall; then these dura∣tions, which are measures of our worldly things, can∣not be affirmed of him, nor time, nor parts of it, which are onely measures proportioned to those things of this world, which are successive. I need not name the pla∣ces, but there are many of Scripture which expresse this eternal being of God, so Psal. 90.2. Before the moun∣tains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the Earth and the World, even from everlasting to everlasting thou art GOD; Here, in this one place, is all the Philo∣sophy I have delivered of Gods eternity; here is contain∣ed his Eternal being, when the world was not, in that is said before. &c. when they were not, he was. Secondly, here is expressed the totall being of the Eternal toge∣ther, in that is said, Thou art God from everlasting to everlasting, not thou wert, or wilt be, only, but before them thou art; and here is expressed likewise, that, in respect of other things, the Creatures, he may be said to have these relations before and after, though not in relation to himself; but yet no set terme, as to say, a day, or two dayes, or years, before. I am confident there is no one place of Scripture which expresseth any certaine mea∣sures of duration belonging to him. I know it may be objected to this, that in the Epistle to the Hebrews, Chap. 1. vers. 10, 11, 12. The Apostle, speaking of the Eternity of our Saviour, according to his Divinity, saith; Thou Lord in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the Earth, and the Heavens are the works of thy hands.

Verse. 11. They shall perish, but thou remainest, and they all shall wax old as doth a garment. Verse 12. And like a vesture shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be changed; but thou art the same, and thy yeares shall not faile. In this place the eternity of Christs divinity is called yeares; and therefore those measures of our times must be ap∣plied to that Eternity, and then dayes may, of which years are composed. To this we may most reasonably answer, that the Apostle accommodates his manner of language to the capacity of the vulgar, and the language of men, concerning durations, so well as actions; so be∣fore he said, the Heavens were the works of Gods hands, as if he had said, because all great works are wrought by hands amongst men, God had hands, by which he wrought those heavens, So, thy yeares shall not faile; that is, thou art Eternal, because men reckon their duration by yeares; and yet observe the language, it is said, they are indeficient yeares, yeares which faile not, all our yeares, faile, the last yeare is gone, this farre in going, and untill the end of the world, mans yeares, the worlds yeares, and their durations will faile; but Gods yeares, no part of his duration, reckon it what you will, shall faile. This is the sense of the Scriptures, and men can∣not, without a contradiction, expound it of our time, every part of which is deficient; Thus the Philosophy I have delivered being framed according to Scripture, I shall answer his Argument. The dayes, which may be attributed to God, and the measures of our time, can onely be in regard of his coexisting with time in this world, and therefore he doth not, nor can be said to be of more dayes, then the world hath; for he, who affirms he hath more dayes, or any such Computation, affirmes a falshood; there were not more dayes, therefore not a

coexisting with them; and therefore he had more dayes when Isaac was born, then when Abraham; but in neither of them had he an infinite number, but finite numbers of dayes; nor doth the world yeeld more; his durance is without number of weeks, or dayes, what successive thing soever we accompt by; and therefore that Argument, against the worlds eternity, hath no force, applied to God.

Sect. 14.

I proceed with him, Ita ab hoc absurdo, &c. [There∣fore (saith he) from this absurd thing they fall into another, being constrained to say, that Eternity is a standing instant and an infinite number of numbers is an Unity, which is much more absurd.] There are two parts in this Objecti∣on, the first concernes the nunc stans, or permanent in∣stant; the second of innumerable numbers, &c. for per∣spicuity I take them apart, and handle them distinctly. And first for his absurdity that he conceives to be in a standing instant; if it doe not stand still,* 1.21 and when it doth not, it is no longer nunc, or an instant, but time, or at the least two parts of time, but instant it is not; now, certainly, that which hath no mutation cannot choose but perpetually, eternally, stand still; and that, which to mutable things would be time, to him must be instant. I can shew him one instant that stood still neare two thou∣sand yeares of time; and therefore, if time could be infinite, would last eternally, which is Iohn 8.58. When the Iewes wondred that our Saviour should have seen Abraham, he answered, before Abraham was (not I was, but) I am. There is a difference in exposition, some say that this speech is understood of his Humanity, that his humanity was in the thoughts of God, and his Decree, before Abraham; but this cannot be the sense;

for Christ being the son and posterity of Abraham, even in the knowledge and decree of God, as well as in his birth in the world, therefore it could not be spoke of his humanity, that it was in the Decree of God before A∣braham, for Abraham, in the same Decree, must be be∣fore Christs humanity, as the father of him: But suppose it were, let me enquire, was that being, which Christ had then in the knowledge or being of God before A∣braham, was that being existing when he spake these words, or no? If no, then he could not say I am, but I was; if so, it proves my Conclusion, that there was a nunc stans, a standing instant neare two thousand years. But I am well satisfied, that that speech, of his, was meant of his Divinity which is eternally the same, and was before Abraham, when Abraham was; and after him, he being that which is, which was, and is to come, Revelation 1.4. And certainly there must needs be the same reason, that that instant must be Eternall, as that it should stand still so long as before Abraham to our Saviour. But his words, presently after, seeme to make another reason of the absurdity in nunc stans, thus.

Sect. 15.

[Cur enim Eternitas] Why (saith he) should Eternity be called nunc stans, now standing, rather then tunc, then standing; there must therefore be either many Eternities, or now and then must signifie the same) Thus he for answer; this terme stans or standing, is indifferent to time passed or to come, when applyed to either positively; but if either doth imply a Negative of that is present, in that second consideration it no way agrees to eternity which is alwaies present; but in the first sense, because eternity comprehends all time, when it is spoke of any thing

done or being in time, as that Isaac was borne, or Anti∣christ shall be, this was, or shall be done, may be in Eter∣nity, which coexists with these times; so, before Abraham was, I am; and who is, was, and shall be, are spoke of him; and then, when Abraham was, he was, without the Ne∣gative of was, that is, denying it to be now; then when Antichrist will be, he will be, without any implyed Neg. that he is not now; And so comes in the second part of this Objection, that now and then are all one; For an∣swer; although now standing and then standing,* 1.22 if apply∣ed to Eternity, signifie the same thing, and we conceive, by both of them, an eternal immutable being; yet now, and then, alone do signifie divers things; old Abraham, and young Abraham, signifie the same person, but old and young are divers. Or thus, Socrates laughing, and Socrates discoursing, are the same, this is false Logick, and he either considered not what he writ, or did it with an intention to deceive; this same terme [standing] makes them both be applied to Eternity, for no durati∣on is standing, or lasting, but that which is eternal; all others are successive; that eternal thing, which stands now, without succession, stands then, in passed and future times, whensoever they exist, they changed, but he remaining the same. Expect not a simile to agree in all things, then it must be that very thing which it assi∣mulates: but thus: As you may conceive a firme and strong rock made of some Adamantine, or heavenly, immutable substance; this rocke stands still, without change of the least particle; cut a sluce of the Sea into it, whose waves dash upon it, so long as these waves batter upon it, that rock is before one, and behind another, none of which relations it had before; they are in a perpetu∣all flux and change, the rock stands, as it were, u••con∣cern'd

in them; return that Sea into its own Channel, it hath no respect to any wave againe, no more then it had before the coming in of those waters: so that e∣ternal, immutable, unwashable rock of beings, exists of its self, untill these turbulent waves of unconstant time are let into it, then, all that while, it hath these relati∣ons to it, of past, present, and to come; but when things are retreated againe, when time ceaseth, there is no more any of these differences of past, or present, which are ap∣plied to time, and it had in relation only to time and temporary things, but is purely nunc stans, or tunc stans, I care not which, if it be stans, if it be standing and per∣manent, it expresseth the notion of eternity. Well, and yet nunc and tunc, now and then differ in themselves, and are united only in this which we call Eternity. Revel. 1.8. I am Alpha and Omega, there the time that was pas∣sed, and the time that was to come, every kind of them was applied to this nunc; the present being, I am, in it comprehended the beginning and the end of others: it might be said of others, they were the beginning, and should be the end; but of him, he is the beginning, and the end, the first and the last, as it is added in the 22. of the same Revelations the 13. He is this in himself; but then take him coexisting with time, he is he who is, who was, and who shall be; so that it is evident his duration taken in its self, is the same time and nunc, now and then; so either of them be considered standing, or permanent; but, in respect of the Creature, he may be said that was or shall be. Thus I hope that Argument is answered; nunc and tunc stans, now and then, so they have that ad∣dition of permanent, are the same, which differ with∣out that addition. Now to the second Argument

Sect. 16.

[And (saith he) they make an infinite number of numbers an unitie.] I deny this Consequence,* 1.23 it can be inforced no otherwise then that eternal exists an infinite num∣ber of dayes, which I deny; Eternity doth not exist an infinite number of any measures of time, nor any time, when time doth not exist, as is before expressed: but, if there should be an infinite time lasting, it would exist with it; but, the first failing, coexisting with it can∣not be.

Thus the Reader may, in a weak manner, conceive this Eternal Now, how it may be the same with Eternal Then, and how there are not contained an infinite num∣ber of numbers in it.

Sect. 17.

As to those other Arguments drawn from the govern∣ment of the Creatures, to prove the main proposition,* 1.24 that there is a God; I could delight to spend whole sheets in discourse upon them, but that I must not lose my self in this intendment I am about; they are so e∣vident, that, as St. Paul, where before cited, Rom. 1.20. it renders men without excuse; For the Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament sheweth his handy work, Psal. 19.1. There is no speech nor language where their voyce is not heard, Vers. 3. So that the manifestation is universal, no man can be excused from the observation of these things, verse 4. Their line, or direction, is gone throughout all the earth, and their words to the end of the world: I must not be long in this Theame; As when a man sees a brave house gloriously built, he cannot chuse but think him an excellent workman that wrought it: so doth the beauty of this great building of the

World make us admire the workman; As he, who should heare excellent Musique, must needs think it the work of some eminent Musician; As a man, when he sees a Great man's house governed with regularity, and order∣ed in an exact discipline, must needs think there is a dis∣creet Steward or Master, who disposeth and orders that family: so when the Method, in which the world is con∣trived, and disciplin'd, is considered, a man must needs think that there is an infinite wisdom which governs all: And therefore the sonne of Sirach, Wisd. 13.5. By the greatnesse and beauty of Creatures, proportionably, the Ma∣ker of them is seene; that is, the maker of this house, the Artist, who composed the Harmony, the Contriver of this discipline is discerned by the effects of it, which, be∣cause they require a vast and immense power and wis∣dom, we must attribute to God; for if a man would think with himself how innumerable accidents, that is, external things, conduce to the producing of the least effect, a man cannot conceive how lesse then an Infinite wisdom and power could, in such a Method, concenter them to the least business. But I lose my self with delight in this admiration of my God, and I desist. These, and the like reasons doe cherish that innate Axi∣ome, That there is a God, even in natural Man; And this leaves all the world without excuse, for not knowing, there is a God, or knowing there is one, but not worship∣ing him as God, or, knowing him thus, as Nature teacheth him, for worshiping Idols, or Images, which they must needs know not to be the Author of these great effects.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The sole im∣mediate seed of Religion an innate principle.
• * 1.2

  To be prov'd from the chain of causes.
• * 1.3

  An eternity of the world, with an infinity of causations, why not to be admitted.
• * 1.4

  A transition to Mr. Hobbes's Element of Philosophy, &c.
• * 1.5

  Somewhat of God, though infinite, may be known.
• * 1.6

  And that from Phantasms.
• * 1.7

  The conceit of fi••ite and infi∣nite explain'd.
• * 1.8

  What conceit may be had of infinite.
• * 1.9

  An Eternity acknowledged by all of diffe∣rent opinions.
• * 1.10

  Mr. Hobbes's indiff••rence, be the world finite or infi∣nite.
• * 1.11

  His contrad••∣ction of him∣self by inad∣vertence.
• * 1.12

  The first mo∣ver prov'd im∣moveable.
• * 1.13

  Mr Hobb••s's paralogisme.
• * 1.14

  His disputing ex non con∣cessis.
• * 1.15

  No infinity at all of numbers
• * 1.16

  Why the world cannot be conceived infinite in du∣ration.
• * 1.17

  And yet God the Creatour, may, and must.
• * 1.18

  No before or after in Eter∣nity; and yet how these terms are ap∣plicable to Gods duration or coexistenc••, not to his sim∣ple or absolute existence.
• * 1.19

  Our double conceipt of Gods eternity, to which no computation of time is ap∣plicable
• * 1.20

  The doctrine of eternity most agreeable to H. Scrip∣ture.
• * 1.21

  No absurdity in asserting Eternity to be a standing in∣stant.
• * 1.22

  The difference of nunc stans and tunc stans as applied to Eternity.
• * 1.23

  Eternity coex∣••sts, with no infinite num∣ber of dayes.
• * 1.24

  God so mani∣fest in the Creatures, as all ignorance is inexcusable.