An essay concerning humane understanding microform

BOOK IV. (Book 4)

CHAP. I. Of Knowledge in general.

§. 1. SInce the Mind, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own Ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident, that our Knowledge is only conversant about them.

§. 2. Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this Perception is, there is Know∣ledge; and where it is not, there, though we may fansie, guess, or be∣lieve, yet we always come short of Knowledge. For when we know that White is not Black, what do we else but perceive, that these two Ideas do not agree? When we possess our selves with the utmost security of the Demonstration, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, What do we more but perceive, that Equality to two right ones, does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three Angles of a Triangle?

§. 3. But to understand a little more distinctly, wherein this Agree∣ment of Disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts:

• 1. Identity, or Diversity.
• 2. Relation.
• 3. Co-existence, or necessary Connexion.
• 4. Real Existence.

§. 4. First, As to the first sort of Agreement or Disagreement, viz. Identiy, or Diversity. 'Tis the first Act of the Mind, when it has any Sentiments, or Ideas at all, to perceive its Ideas, and so far as it per∣ceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely neces∣sary, that without it there could be no Knowledge, no Reasoning, no Imagination, no distinct Thoughts at all. By this the Mind clearly and infallibly perceives each Idea to agree with it self, and to be what it is; and all distinct Ideas to disagree, i. e. the one not to be the other: And this it does without any pains, labour, or deduction; but at first view, by its natural power of Perception and Distinction. And though Men of Art have reduced this into those general Rules, What is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, for ready applica∣tion in all cases, wherein there may be occasion to reflect on it; yet it is certain, that the first exercise of this Faculty, is about particular Ideas. A Man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his Mind, that the Ideas he calls White and Round, are the very Ideas they are, and that they are not other Ideas which he calls Red or Square. Nor can any Maxim or Proposition in the World make him know it clearer

or surer than he did before, or without any such general Rule. This then is the first agreement, or disagreement, which the Mind perceives in its Ideas; which it always perceives at first sight: And if there ever happen any doubt about it, 'twill always be found to be about the Names, and not the Ideas themselves, whose Identity and Diversity will always be perceived, as soon and as clearly, as the Ideas themselves are, nor can it possibly be otherwise.

§. 5. Secondly, The next sort of Agreement, or Disagreement, the Mind perceives in any of its Ideas, may, I think, be called Relative, and is nothing but the Perception of the Relation between any two Ideas, of what kind soever, whether Substances, Modes, or any other. For since all distinct Ideas must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universally and constantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any positive Knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any Relation between our Ideas, and find out the Agreement or Dis∣agreement, they have one with another, in several ways the Mind takes of comparing them.

§. 6. Thirdly, The third sort of Agreement, or Disagreement, to be found in our Ideas, which the Perception of the Mind is employ'd a∣bout, is Co-existence, or non-Co-existence in the same Subject; and this belongs particularly to Substances. Thus when we pronounce concer∣ning Gold, that it is fixed, our Knowledge of this Truth amounts to no more but this, that Fixedness, or a power to remain in the Fire unconsu∣med, is an Idea, that always accompanies, and is join'd with that particu∣lar sort of Yellowness, Weight, Fusibility, Malleableness, and Solubility in Aq. Regia, which make our complex Idea, signified by the word Gold.

§. 7. Fourthly, The fourth and last sort is, that of actual real Exi∣stence agreeing to any Idea. Within these four sorts of Agreement or Disagreement, is, I suppose contained all the Knowledge we have, or are capable of: For all the Enquiries that we can make, concerning any of our Ideas, all that we know, or can affirm concerning any of them, is, That it is, or is not, the same with some other; that it does, or does not always co-exist with some other Idea in the same Subject; that it has this or that Relation to some other Idea; or that it has a real Existence without the Mind. Thus Blue is not Yellow, is of Identity. Two Triangles upon equal Basis, between two Parallels, are equal, is of Relation. Iron is susceptible of magnetical Impressions, is of Co-existence. GOD is, is of real Existence. Though Identity and Co-existence are truly nothing but Relations, yet they are so peculiar ways of Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas, that they deserve well to be considered as distinct Heads, and not under Relation in general; since they are so different grounds of Affirmation and Negation, as will easily appear to any one, who will but reflect on what is said in several places of this Essay. I should now proceed to examine the seve∣ral degrees of our Knowledge, but that it is necessary first, to consider the different acceptations of the word Knowledge.

§. 8. There are several ways wherein the Mind is possessed of Truth, each of which is called Knowledge.

• 1. There is actual Knowledge, which is the present view the Mind has of the Agreement, or Disagreement of any of its Ideas, or of the Relation they have one to another.
• 2. A Man is said to know any Proposition, which having been once laid before his Thoughts, he evidently perceived the Agreement, or Disagree∣ment of the Ideas whereof it consists; and so lodg'd it in his Memory, that

• whenever that Proposition comes again to be reflected on, he, without doubt or hesitation, embraces the right side; assents to, and is certain of the Truth of it. This, I think, one may call habitual Knowledge: And thus a Man may be said to know all those Truths, which are lodg'd in, his Memory, by a foregoing clear and full perception, whereof the Mind is assured past doubt, as often as it has occasion to reflect on them. For our finite Understandings being able to think, clearly and distinctly, but on one thing at once, if Men had no Knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant: and he that knew most, would know but one Truth, that being all he was able to think on at one time.

§. 9. Of habitual Knowledge, there are also, vulgarly speaking, two degrees:

First, The one is of such Truths laid up in the Memory, as when∣ever they occur to the Mind, it actually perceives the Relation is be∣tween those Ideas. And this is in all those Truths, whereof we have an intuitive Knowledge, where the Ideas themselves, by an imme∣diate view, discover their Agreement, or Disagreement one with a∣nother.

Secondly, The other is of such Truths, whereof the Mind having been convinced, it retains the memory of the Conviction, without the Proofs. Thus a Man that remembers certainly, that he once perceived the Demonstration, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, is commonly allow'd to know it, because he cannot doubt of the truth of it. But yet having forgot the Demonstration, strictly speaking, he rather believes his Memory, than knows the thing; or rather it is something between Opinion and Knowledge, a sort of assu∣rance that exceeds bare Belief, which relies on the Testimony of ano∣ther, and yet comes short of perfect Knowledge. For Knowledge con∣sisting in a clear Perception of the Relation of any two Ideas, either by an immediate juxta-Position, as in intuitive Knowledge; or by the inter∣vention of other Ideas, which do immediately discover their Relation one to another, as in Demonstration, the Mind cannot, in strictness, be said to have so much as an habitual Knowledge, where it has not an habitual View of the Proofs; where it has not such a Memory of the Demon∣stration, that it can, when that Proposition is again recall'd to the Mind, perceive the connexion of those Ideas, by the intervention of such other Ideas, whose immediate connexion, or relation one to another, shew the relation of the Extremes. And hence it is, that demonstrative Knowledge, is much more imperfect than Intuitive, as we shall see in the following Chapter.

CHAP. II. Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

§. 1. ALL our Knowledge consisting, as I have said, in the view the Mind has of its own Ideas, which is the utmost Light and greatest Certainty, we with our Faculties, and in our way of Knowledge are capable of, it may not be amiss, to consider a little the degrees of its Evidence. The different clearness of our Knowledge seems to me to lie in the diffe∣rent way of Perception, the Mind has of the Agreement, or Disagree∣ment of any of its Ideas. For if we will reflect on our own ways of Thinking, we shall find, that sometimes the Mind perceives the Agree∣ment or Disagreement of two Ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: And this, I think, we may call intuitive Knowledge. For in this, the Mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth Light, only by being directed toward it. Thus the Mind perceives, that White is not Black, That a Circle is not a Triangle, That Three are more than Two, and equal to One and Two. Such kind of Truths, the Mind perceives at the first Sight of the Ideas together, by bare intuition, without the intervention of any other Idea; and this kind of Knowledge is the clearest, and most certain, that humane Frailty is capable of. This part of Knowledge is irresisti∣ble, and like the bright Sun-shine, forces it self immediately to be per∣ceived, as soon as ever the Mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for Hesitation, Doubt, or Examination, but the Mind is presently filled with the clear Light of it. 'Tis on this Intuition, that depends all the Certainty and Evidence of all our Knowledge, which Certainty every one finds to be so great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater: For a Man cannot conceive himself capable of a greater Certain∣ty, than to know that any Idea in his Mind is such, as he perceives it to be; and that two Ideas, wherein he perceives a difference, are different, and not precisely the same. He that demands a greater Certainty than this, demands he knows not what; and shews only that he has a Mind to be a Sceptick, without being able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly on this Intuition, that in the next degree of Knowledge, which I call De∣monstrative, this intuition is necessary in all the Connexions of the inter∣mediate Ideas, without which we cannot attain Knowledge and Certainty.

§. 2. The next degree of Knowledge is, where the Mind perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of any Ideas, but not immediately. Though where-ever the Mind perceives the Agreement or Disagreement of any of its Ideas, there be certain Knowledge: Yet it does not always happen, that the Mind sees that Agreement or Disagreement, which there is between them, even where it is discoverable; and in that case, remains in Ignorance, or at most, gets no farther than a probable conje∣cture. The Reason why the Mind cannot always perceive presently the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas is, because those Ideas, con∣cerning whose Agreement or Disagreement the Enquiry is made, cannot by the Mind be so put together, as to shew it. In this Case then, when the Mind cannot so bring it's Ideas together, as by their immediate Com∣parison, and as it were Juxta-position, or application one to another, to perceive their Agreement or Disagreement, it is fain, by the Intervention of other Ideas (one or more, as it happens) to discover the Agreement or Disagreement, which it searches; and this is that which we call Reaso∣ning.

Thus the Mind being willing to know the Agreement or Disagree∣ment in bigness, between the three Angles of a Triangle, and two right ones, cannot by an immediate view and comparing them, do it: Because the three Angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once, and be com∣pared with any other one, or two Angles; and so of this the Mind has no immediate, no intuitive Knowledge. In this Case the Mind is fain to find out some other Angles, to which the three Angles of a Triangle have an Equality; and finding those equal to two right ones, comes to know their Equality to two right ones.

§. 3. Those intervening Ideas, which serve to shew the Agreement of any two others, are called Proofs; and where the Agreement or Disagree∣ment is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called Demon∣stration, it being shewn to the Understanding, and the Mind made see that it is so. A quickness in the Mind to find out these intermediate Ideas, (that shall discover the Agreement or Disagreement of any other,) and to apply them right, is, I suppose, that which is called Sagacity.

§. 4. This Knowledge by intervening Proofs, though it be certain, yet the Evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the assent so ready, as in intuitive Knowledge. For though in Demonstration, the Mind does at last perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas it considers; yet 'tis not without Pains and Attention: There must be more than one transient view to find it. A steddy application and pur∣suit, is required to this Discovery: And there must be a Progression by steps and degrees, before the Mind can in this way arrive at Certainty, and come to perceive the Agreement or Repugnancy between two Ideas that need Proofs, and the Use of Reason to shew it.

§. 5. Another difference between intuitive and demonstrative Knowledge, is, that though in the latter all doubt be removed, when by the Interven∣tion of the intermediate Ideas, the Agreement or Disagreement is per∣ceived; yet before the Demonstration there was a doubt, which in intui∣tive Knowledge cannot happen to the Mind that has its Faculty of Perce∣ption left to a degree capable of distinct Ideas, no more than it can be a doubt to the Eye, (that can distinctly see White and Black,) Whether this Ink, and this Paper be all of a Colour. If there be Sight in the Eyes, it will at first glimpse, without Hesitation, perceive the Words printed on this Paper, different from the Colour of the Paper: And so if the Mind have the Faculty of distinct Perception, it will perceive the Agreement or Disa∣greement of those Ideas that produce intuitive Knowledge. If the Eyes have lost the Faculty of seeing, or the Mind of perceiving, we in vain en∣quire after the quickness of Sight in one, or clearness of Perception in the other.

§. 6. 'Tis true the Perception, produced by demonstration, is also very clear; but yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident lustre and full assurance that always accompany that which I call intuitive; like a Face reflected by several Mirrors one to another, where as long as it re∣tains the similitude and agreement with the Object, it produces a Know∣ledge; but 'tis still every reflection, with a lessening of that perfect Clear∣ness and Distinctness, which is in the first; till in many removes it has a great mixture of Dimness, and is not at first Sight so knowable, especially to weak Eyes. Thus it is with Knowledge, made out by a long train of Proofs.

§. 7. Now, in every step Reason makes in demonstrative Knowledge, there is an intuitive Knowledge of that Agreement or Disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate Idea, which it uses as a Proof: For if it were not

so, that yet would need a Proof. Since without the Perception of such Agreement or Disagreement, there is no Knowledge produced: If it be perceived by it self, it is intuitive Knowledge: If it cannot be perceived by it self, there is need of some intervening Idea, as a common measure to shew their Agreement or Disagreement, by which it is plain, that e∣very step in Reasoning, that produces Knowledge, has intuitive Certainty; which when the Mind perceives, there is no more required, but to remember it to make the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas, concerning which we enquire visible and certain. So that to make any thing a Demonstration, it is necessary to perceive the immediate A∣greement of the intervening Ideas, whereby the Agreement or Disagree∣ment of the two Ideas under Examination (where the one is always the first, and the other the last in the Account) is found. This intuitive Per∣ception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the intermediate Ideas, in each Step and Progression of the Demonstration, must also be carried exact∣ly in the Mind, and a Man must be sure that no part is left out; which be∣cause in long Deductions, and the use of many Proofs, the Memory does not always so readily and exactly retain: therefore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuitive Knowledge, and Men embrace often Falshoods for Demonstrations.

§. 8. The necessity of this intuitive Knowledge, in each step of scienti∣fical or demonstrative Reasoning, gave occasion, I imagine, to that mista∣ken Axiom, that all Reasoning was ex praecognitis & praeconcessis; which how far it is a mistake, I shall have occasion to shew more at large, where I come to consider Propositions, and particularly those Propositions, which are called Maxims; and to shew that 'tis by a mistake, that they are sup∣posed to be the foundations of all our Knowledge and Reasonings.

§. 9. It is not only Mathematicks, or the Ideas alone of Number, Ex∣tension, and Figure, that are capable of Demonstration, no more than it is these Ideas alone, and their Modes, that are capable of Intuition: For whatever Ideas we have, wherein the Mind can perceive the immediate Agreement or Disagreement that is between them, there the Mind is ca∣pable of intuitive Knowledge; and where it can perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas, by an intuitive Perception of the Agree∣ment or Disagreement they have with any intermediate Ideas, there the Mind is capable of Demonstration, which is not limited to Ideas of Ex∣tension, or Figure, or Number, or their Modes.

§. 10. The Reason why it has been generally sought for, and supposed to be only in those, I imagine, has been not only the general usefulness of those Sciences: But because, in comparing their Equality or Excess, the Modes of Numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceiva∣ble: And though in Extension, every the least Excess is not so perceptible; yet the Mind has found out ways, to examine and discover demonstrative∣ly the just Equality of two Angles, or Extensions, or Figures, and both these, i. e. Numbers and Figures, can be set down, by visible and lasting marks.

§. 11. But in other simple Ideas, whose Modes and differences are made, and counted by degrees, and not quantity, we have not so nice and accu∣rate a distinction of their differences, as to perceive, or find ways to mea∣sure their just Equality, or the least Differences. For those other simple Ideas, being Appearances or Sensations, produced in us by the Size, Fi∣gure, Number, and Motion of minute Corpuscles singly insensible, their different degrees also depend upon the variation of some, or all of those Causes; which since it cannot be observed by us in Particles of Matter,

whereof each is too subtile to be perceived, it is impossible for us to have any exact Measures of the different degrees of these simple Ideas. For supposing the Sensation or Idea we name Whiteness, be produced in us by a certain number of Globules, which having a verticity about their own Centres, strike upon the Retina of the Eye, with a certain degree of Rotation, as well as progressive Swiftness; it will hence easily follow, that the more the superficial parts of any Body are so ordered, as to re∣flect the greater number of Globules of Light, and to give them that pro∣per Rotation, which is fit to produce this Sensation of White in us, the more White will that Body appear, that, from an equal space sends to the Retina the greater number of such Corpuscles, with that peculiar sort of Motion. I do not say, that the nature of Light consists in very small round Globules, nor of Whiteness, in such a texture of parts as gives a certain Rotation to these Globules, when it reflects them; for I am not now treating physically of Light, or Colours: But this, I think, I may say, that I cannot (and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did) conceive how Bodies without us, can any ways affect our Senses, but by the immediate contact of the sensible Bodies themselves, as in Tasting and Feeling, or the impulse of some insensible Particles co∣ming from them, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling; by the different impulse of which Parts, caused by their different Size, Figure, and Mo∣tion, the variety of Sensations is produced in us.

§. 12. Whether then they be Globules, or no; or whether they have a Verticity about their own Centres, that produce the Idea of Whiteness in us, this is certain, that the more Particles of Light are reflected from a Body, fitted to give them that peculiar Motion, which produces the Sen∣sation of Whiteness in us; and possibly too, the quicker the peculiar Mo∣tion is, the whiter does the Body appear, from which the greater num∣ber are reflected, as is evident in the same piece of Paper put in the Sun∣beams, in the Shade, and in a dark Hole; in each of which, it will pro∣duce in us the Idea of Whiteness in far different degrees.

§. 13. Not knowing therefore what number of Particles, nor what Motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of Whiteness, we can∣not demonstrate the certain Equality of any two degrees of Whiteness, because we have no certain Standard to measure them by, nor Means to distinguish every the least real difference, the only help we have being from our Senses, which in this point fail us. But where the difference is so great, as to produce in the Mind clearly distinct Ideas, whose differen∣ces can be perfectly retained, there these Ideas of Colours, as we see in different kinds, as Blue and Red, are as capable of Demonstration, as Ideas of Number and Extension. What I have here said of Whiteness and Colours, I think, holds true in all secundaries Qualities and their Modes.

§. 14. These two, (viz.) Intuition and Demonstration, are the degrees of our Knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these, with what assu∣rance soever embraced, is but Faith, or Opinion, but not Knowledge, at least in all general Truths. There is, indeed, another Perception of the Mind, employ'd about the particular existence of finite Beings without us; which going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the fore-going degrees of Certainty, passes under the name of Knowledge. There can be nothing more certain, than that the Idea we re∣ceive from an external Object is in our Minds; this is intuitive Knowledge. But whether there be any thing more than barely that Idea in our Minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us, which corresponds to that Idea, is that whereof some Men think

there may be a Question made, because Men may have such Ideas in their Minds, when no such Thing exists, no such Object affects their Senses. But yet here, I think, we are provided with an Evidence, that puts us past doubting: For I ask any one, Whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different Perception, when he looks on the Sun by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes Wormwood, or smells a Rose, or only thinks on that Savour, or Odour? We as plain∣ly find the difference there is between any Idea revived in our Minds by our own Memory, and actually coming into our Minds by our Senses, as we do between any two distinct Ideas. If any one say, a Dream may do the same thing, and all these Ideas may be produced in us, without any external Objects, he may please to dream, that I make him this an∣swer, 1. That 'tis no great matter, whether I remove his Scruple, or no: Where all is but dream, Reasoning and Arguments are of no use, Truth and Knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a very mani∣fest difference between dreaming of being in a Fire, and being actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical, as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the Fire, is nothing but a dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such thing as Fire actually exists without us; I answer, That we certainly finding, that Pleasure or Pain follows upon the application of certain Objects to us, whose Exi∣stence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our Senses; this Cer∣tainty is as great as our Happiness, or Misery; beyond which, we have no concernment to know, or to be. So that, I think, we may add to the two former sorts of Knowledge, this also, of the existence of particular external Objects, by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of Ideas from them, and allow these three degrees of Knowledge, viz. Intuitive, Demonstrative, and Sensitive: in each of which, there are different degrees and ways of Evidence and Certainty.

§. 15. But since our Knowledge is founded on, and employ'd about only our Ideas, Will it not follow from thence, that it is conformable to our Ideas; and that where our Ideas are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused, our Knowledge will be so too? To which I answer, No: For our Knowledge consisting in the perception of the Agreement, or Disagree∣ment of any two Ideas, its clearness or obscurity, consists in the clearness or obscurity of that Perception, and not in the clearness or obscurity of the Ideas themselves: v. g. a Man that has as clear Ideas of the Angles of a Triangle, and of Equality to two right ones, as any Mathematician in the World, may yet have but a very obscure Perception of their Agree∣ment, and so have but a very obscure Knowledg of it. But obscure and confused Ideas, can never produce any clear or distinct Knowledge; be∣cause as far as any Ideas are confused, or obscure, so far the Mind can never perceive clearly, whether they agree, or disagree.

CHAP. III. Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge.

§. 1. KNowledge, as has been said, lying in the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement, of any of our Ideas, it follows from hence, That,

First, We can have Knowledge no farther than we have Ideas.

§. 2. Secondly, That we can have no Knowledge farther, than we can have Perception of that Agreement, or Disagreement: Which Perception being, 1. Either by Intuition, or the immediate comparing any two Ideas; or, 2. By Reason, examining the Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas, by the intervention of some others: Or, 3. By Sensation, percei∣ving the Existence of particular Things. Hence it also follows,

§. 3. Thirdly, That we cannot have an intuitive Knowledge, that shall extend it self to all our Ideas, and all that we would know about them; because we cannot examine and perceive all the Relations they have one to ano∣ther, by juxta-position, or an immediate comparison one with another. Thus having the Ideas of an Obtuse, and an acute angled Triangle, both drawn from equal Bases, and between Parallels, I can by intuitive Knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other; but cannot that way know, whether they be equal, or no; because their Agreement, or Dis∣agreement in equality, can never be perceived by an immediate compa∣ring them: The difference of Figure makes their parts uncapable of an exact immediate application; and therefore there is need of some interve∣ning Quantities to measure them by, which is Demonstration, or rational Knowledge.

§. 4 Fourthly, It follows also, from what is above observed, that our rational Knowledge, cannot reach to the whole extent of our Ideas. Be∣cause between two different Ideas we would examine, we cannot always find such Mediums, as we can connect one to another with an intuitive Knowledge, in all the parts of the Deduction; and where-ever that fails, we come short of Knowledge and Demonstration.

§. 5. Fifthly, Sensitive Knowledge reaching no farther than the Existence of Things actually present to our Senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

§. 6. From all which it is evident, that the extent of our Know∣ledge comes not only short of the reality of Things, but even of the extent of our own Ideas. Though our Knowledge be limited to our Ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent, or perfection; and though these be very narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of All-being, and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some, even created Understan∣dings, not tied down to the dull and narrow Information, is to be recei∣ved from some few, and not very acute ways of Perception, such as are our Senses; yet it would be well with us, if our Knowledge were but as large as our Ideas, and there were not many Doubts and Enquiries concerning the Ideas we have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in this World, resolved. Nevertheless, I do not yet Question, but that Humane Knowledge, under the present Circumstances of our Beings and Consti∣tutions, may be carried much farther than it hitherto has been, if Men would sincerely, and with freedom of Mind, employ all that Industry and labour of Thought, in improving the means of discovering Truth, which they do for the colouring or support of Falshood, to maintain a

System, Interest, or Party, they are once engaged in. But yet after all, I think I may, without injury to humane Perfection, be confident, that our Knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know con∣cerning those Ideas we have; nor be able to surmount all the Difficulties, and resolve all the Questions might arise concerning any of them. We have the Ideas of a Square, a Circle, and Equality; and yet, perhaps, shall never be able to find a Circle equal to a Square, and certainly know that it is so. We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether Matter thinks, or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own Ideas, without reve∣lation, to discover, whether Omnipotency has given to Matter fitly dis∣posed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to Matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial Substance: It being equally easie, in respect of our Notions, to conceive, that GOD can, if he pleases, su∣peradd to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking, as that he should superadd to it another Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking; since we know not wherein Thinking consists, nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created Being, but meerly by the good Pleasure and Bounty of the Crea∣tor. For what assurance of Knowledge can any one have, that certain Thoughts, such as, v. g. Pleasure and Pain, should not be in Body it self, after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that it should be in an immaterial Substance, upon the Motion of the parts of Body: Mo∣tion, according to the utmost reach of our Ideas, being able to produce nothing but Motion, so that when we allow it to produce Pleasure or Pain, or the Idea of a Colour, or Sound, we are fain to quit our Rea∣son, go beyond our own Ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good Plea∣sure of our Maker. For since we must allow he has annexed Effects to Motion, which we can no way conceive Motion able to produce, what Reason have we to conclude, that he could not order them as well to be produced in a Subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a Subject we cannot conceive the motion of Matter can any way ope∣rate upon? I say not this, that I would any way lessen the belief of the Soul's Immateriality: I am not here speaking of Probability, but Knowledge; and I think not only, that it becomes the Modesty of Phi∣losophy, not to pronounce Magisterially, where we want that Evidence that can produce Knowledge; but also, that it is of use to us, to discern how far our Knowledge does reach; for the state we are at present in, not being that of Vision, we must, in many Things, content our selves with Faith and Probability: And in the present Question, about the Im∣materiality of the Soul, if our Faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative Certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great Ends of Mora∣lity and Religion, are well enough secured, without philosophical Proofs of the Soul's Immateriality; since it is evident, that he who made us at first begin to subsist here, sensible intelligent Beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to the like state of Sensibility in another World, and make us capable there to receive the Retribution he has designed to Men, according to their doings in this Life. But to return to the Argument in hand, our Knowledge, I say, is not only limited to the Paucity and Imperfections of the Ideas we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes short of that too: But how far it reaches, let us now enquire.

§. 7. The affirmations or negations we make concerning the Ideas we have, may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduced to these four sorts,

viz. Identity, Co-existence, Relation, and real Existence. I shall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of these:

§. 8. First, As to Identity and Diversity in this way, of the Agree∣ment, or Disagreement of our Ideas, our intuitive Knowledge is as far ex∣tended as our Ideas themselves: and there can be no Idea in the Mind, which it does not presently, by an intuitive Knowledge, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

§. 9. Secondly, As to the second sort, which is the Agreement, or Dis∣agreement of our Ideas in Co-existence, in this our Knowledge is very short, though in this consists the greatest and most material part of our Know∣ledge concerning Substances. For our Ideas of the Species of Substan∣ces, being, as I have shewed, nothing but certain Collections of simple Ideas united in one Subject, and so co-existing together: v. g. Our Idea of Flame, is a Body hot, luminous, and moving upward; of Gold, a Body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and susible: for these, or some such complex Ideas as these in Mens Minds, do these two names of different Substances, Flame and Gold, stand for. When we would know any thing farther concerning these, or any other sort of Substances, what do we enquire but what other Qualities, or Powers, these Substances have, or have not; which is nothing else but to know, whether simple Ideas do, or do not co-exist with those that make up that complex Idea.

§. 10. This, how weighty and considerable a part soever of Humane Science, is yet very narrow, and scarce any at all. The reason whereof is, that the simple Ideas whereof our complex Ideas of Substances are made up, are, for the most part, such as carry with them, in their own Nature, no visible necessary connexion, or inconsistency with any other simple Ideas, whose co-existence with them, we would inform our selves about.

§. 11. The Ideas that our complex ones of Substances, are made up of, and about which our Knowledge, concerning Substances, is most em∣ploy'd, are those of their secondary Qualities; which depending all (as has been shewed) upon the primary Qualities of their minute and insensible parts; or if not upon them, upon something yet more remote from our Comprehension 'tis impossible we should know, which have a necessary union or inconsistency one with another: For not knowing the Root they spring from, not knowing what size, figure, and texture of Parts they are, on which depend, and from which result those Qualities which make our complex Idea of Gold, 'tis impossible we should know what other Qua∣lities result from the same Constitution of the insensible parts of Gold; and so consequently must always co-exist with that complex Idea we have of it, or else are inconsistent with it.

§. 12. Besides this Ignorance of the primary Qualities of the insensible Parts of Bodies, on which depend all their secundary Qualities, there is yet another and more incurable part of Ignorance, which sets us more remote from a certain Knowledge of the Co-existence, or Inco-existence (if I may so say) of different Ideas in the same Subject; and that is, that there is no discoverable connexion between any secundary Quality, and those primary Qualities that it depends on.

§. 13. That the size, figure, and motion of one Body, should cause a change in the size, figure, and motion of another Body, is not beyond our Conception; the separation of the parts of one Body, upon the intru∣sion of another; and the change from Rest to Motion upon impulse; these, and the like, seem to us to have some connexion one with another.

And if we knew these primary Qualities of Bodies, we might have reason to hope, we might be able to know a great deal more of these Operations of them one upon another: But our Minds not being able to discover any connexion betwixt these primary qualities of Bodies, and the sensations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted Rules, of the Consequence or Co-existence of any secundary Qulities, though we could discover the size, figure, or motion of those in∣sible Parts, which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing what figure, size, or motion of parts produce a yellow Colour, a sweet Taste, or a sharp Sound, that we can by no means conceive how any size, figure, or motion of any Particles, can possibly produce in us the Idea of any Colour, Taste, or Sound whatsoever, there is no conceivable con∣nexion betwixt the one and the other.

§. 14. In vain therefore shall we endeavour to discover by our Ideas, (the only true way of certain and universal Knowledge,) what other Ideas are to be found constantly joined with that of our com∣plex Idea of any Substance; since we neither know the real Constitution of the minute Parts, on which their Qualities do depend; nor, did we know them, could we discover any necessary connexion between them, and any of the secundary Qualities; which is necessary to be done, before we can certainly know their necessary co-existence. So that let our complex Idea of any Species of Substances, be what it will, we can hardly, from the simple Ideas contained in it, certainly determine the necessary co-existence of any other Quality whatsoever. Our Knowledge in all these Enquiries, reaches very little farther than our Experience. Indeed, some few of the primary Qualities have a necessary dependence, and visible connexion one with another, as Figure necessarily supposes Extension, receiving or communicating Motion by impulse, supposes Solidity. But though these, and perhaps some others of our Ideas have; yet there are some few of them, that have a visible Connexion one with another, that we can by Intuition or Demonstration, discover the co-existence of very few of the Qualities are to be found united in Substances; and we are left only to the assistence of our Senses, to make known to us what Qualities they contain. For all the Qualities that are co-existent in any Subject, without this dependence and evident connexion of their Ideas one with another, we cannot know certainly to co-exist any farther, than Expe∣rience, by our Senses, informs us. Thus though we see the yellow Co∣lour, and upon trial find the Weight, Malleableness, Fusibility, and Fixed∣ness, that are united in a piece of Gold; yet because no one of these Ideas has any evident dependence, or necessary connexion with the other, we cannot certainly know, that where any four of these are, the fifth will be there also, how highly probable soever it may be: Because the highest Probability, amounts not to Certainty; without which, there can be no true Knowledge. For this co-existence can be no farther known, than it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived, but either in particular Subjects, by the observation of our Senses, or in general, by the necessary connexion of the Ideas themselves.

§. 15. As to incompatibility or repugnancy to co-existence, we may know, that any Subject can have of each sort of primary Qualities, but one parti∣cular at once, v. g. each particular Extension, Figure, number of Parts, Moti∣on, excludes all other of each kind. The like also is certain of all sensible Ideas peculiar to each Sense; for whatever of each kind is present in any Subject, excludes all other of that sort; v. g. no one Subject can have two Smells, or two Colours, at the same time. To this, perhaps,

will be said, Has not an Opall, or the infusion of Lignum Nepbriticum, two Colours at the same time? To which, I answer, that these Bodies, to Eyes differently placed, may at the same time afford different Colours: But I take Liberty also to say, that to Eyes differently placed, 'tis different parts of the Object, that reflect the Particles of Light: And therefore 'tis not the same part of the Object, and so not the very same Subject, which at the same time appears both yellow and azure. For 'tis as impossible, that the very same Particle of any Body, should at the same time different∣ly modifie, or reflect the rays of Light, as that it should have two different Figures and Textures at the same time.

§. 16. But as to the Powers of Substances to change the sensible Quali∣ties of other Bodies, which make a great part of our Enquiries about them, and is no inconsiderable branch of our Knowledge; I doubt, as to these, whether our Knowledge reaches much farther than our Experience; or whe∣ther we can come to the discovery of most of these Powers, and be cer∣tain that they are in any Subject by the Connexion with any of those Ideas, which to us make its Essence. Because the Active and Passive Powers of Bodies, and their ways of operating, consisting in a Texture and Motion of Parts, which we cannot by any means come to discover: 'Tis but in very few Cases, we can be able to perceive their dependence on, or repugnance to any of those Ideas, which make our complex one of that sort of Things. I have here instanced in the corpuscularian Hy∣pothesis, as that which is thought to go farthest in an intelligible Expli∣cation of the Qualities of Bodies; and I fear the weakness of humane Un∣derstanding is scarce able to substitute another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary Connexion, and Co-existence, of the Powers, which are to be observed united in several sorts of them. This at least is certain, that which ever Hypothesis be clearest and truest, (for of that it is not my business to determine,) our Knowledge concerning corporeal Substances, will be very little advanced by any of them, till we are made see what Qualities and Powers of Bodies have a necessary Con∣nexion or Repugnancy one with another; which in the present State of Philosophy, I think, we know but to a very small degree; And, I doubt, whe∣ther with those Faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our gene∣ral Knowledge (I say not particular Experience) in this part much farther.

§. 17. If we are at this loss in respect of the Powers, and Operations of Bodies, I think it is easie to conclude, we are much more in the dark in reference to Spirits, whereof we naturally have no Ideas, but what we draw from that of our own; by reflecting on the Operations of our own Souls within us, as far as they can come within our Observation. But how inconsiderable a rank the Spirits that inhabit our Bodies hold amongst those various, and possibly innumerable, kinds of nobler Beings; and how far short they come of the Endowments and Perfections of Cherubims, and Seraphims, and infinite sorts of Spirits above us, we have in another Place made some Reflection upon.

§. 18. As to the third sort of our Knowledge, viz. the Agreement or Disa∣greement of any of our Ideas in any other Relation: This, as it is the largest Field of our Knowledge, so it is hard to determine how far it may extend: Because the Advances that are to be made in this part of Knowledge, de∣pending on our Sagacity, in finding intermediate Ideas, that may shew the Relations and Habitudes of Ideas, whose Co-existence is not conside∣red, 'tis an hard Matter to tell, when we are at an end of such Discoveries; and when Reason has all the helps it is capable of, for the finding of Proofs, and examining the Agreement or Disagreement of remote Ideas. They

that are ignorant of Algebra cannot imagine the Wonders in this kind are to be done by it; and what farther Improvements and Helps, advan∣tageous to other parts of Knowledge, the sagacious Mind of Man may yet find out, 'tis not easie to determine. This at least I believe, that the Ideas of Quantity are not those alone that are capable of Demonstration and Knowledge; and that other, and perhaps more useful parts of Con∣templation, would afford us Certainty, if Vices, Passions, and domi∣neering Interests did not oppose, or menace such Endeavours.

The Idea of a supreme Being, infinite in Power and Wisdom, whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the Idea of our selves, as understanding, rational Creatures, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered, and pursued, afford such Founda∣tions of our Duty and Rules of Action, as might place Morality amongst the Sciences capable of Demonstration; wherein I doubt not, but from Principles, as incontestable as those of the Mathematicks, by necessary Consequences, the measures of right and wrong might be made out, to any one that will apply himself with the same Indifferency and Attention to the one, as he does to the other of these Sciences. The Relation of other Modes may certainly be perceived, as well as those of Number and Ex∣tension; and I cannot see why they should not also be capable of Demon∣stration, if due Methods were thought on to examine, or pursue their Agreement or Disagreement. Where there is no Propriety, there is no Injustice, is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in Euclid: For the Idea of Property, being a right to any thing; and the Idea to which the name Injustice is given, being the Invasion or Violation of that right; it is evident, that these Ideas being thus established, and these names an∣nexed to them, I can as certainly know this Proposition to be true, as that a Triangle has three Angles equal to two right ones. Again, No Go∣vernment allows absolute Liberty, the Idea of Government being the esta∣blishment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws, which require Confor∣mity to them; and the Idea of absolute Liberty, being for any one to do whatever he pleases; I am as capable of being certain of the Truth of this Proposition, as of any in Mathematicks.

§. 19. That which in this respect has given the advantage to the Ideas of Quantity, and made them thought more capable of Certainty and De∣monstration, is,

First, That they can be set down, and represented by sensible marks, which have a greater and nearer Correspondence with them than a∣ny Words or Sounds whatsoever. Diagrams drawn on Paper are Copies of the Ideas in the Mind, and not liable to the Uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification. An Angle, Circle, or Square, drawn in Lines, lies open to the view, and cannot be mistaken: it remains un∣changeably, and may at leisure be considered, and examined, and the De∣monstration be revised, and all the parts of it may be gone over more than once, without any danger of the least change in the Ideas. This cannot be thus done in moral Ideas, we have no sensible marks that resemble them, whereby we can set them down; we have nothing but Words to express them by; which though, when written, they remain the same, yet the Ideas they stand for, may change in the same Man; and 'tis very seldom, that they are not different in different Persons.

Secondly, Another thing that makes the greater difficulty in Ethicks, is, That moral Ideas are commonly more complex than those of the Fi∣gures ordinarily considered in Mathematicks: from whence these two In∣conveniences follow: First, That their names are of more uncertain Sig∣nification,

the precise Collection of simple Ideas they stand for not being so easily agreed on, and so the Sign that is used for them in Communi∣cation, always, and in Thinking, often, does not always carry with it the same Idea. Upon which the same Disorder, Confusion, and Error fol∣lows, as would if a Man, going to demonstrate something of an Hepta∣gon, should in the Diagram he took to do it, leave out one of the Angles, and by oversight make the Figure with one Angle less than the name or∣dinarily imported, or he intended it should, when at first he thought of his Demonstration. This often happens, and is hardly avoidable in very complex moral Ideas, where the same name being retained, one Angle, i. e. one simple Idea is left out or put in, in the complex one, (still called by the same name,) more at one time than another. Secondly, From the Complexedness of these moral Ideas there follows another Inconvenience, (viz.) that the Mind cannot easily retain those precise Combinations, so exactly and perfectly, as is necessary in the Examination of the Habitudes and Correspondencies, Agreements or Disagreements, of several of them one with another; especially where it is to be judged of by long Deductions, and the intervention of several other complex Ideas, to shew the Agree∣ment, or Disagreement of two remote ones.

The great help against this, which Mathematicians find in Diagrams and Figures, which remain unalterable in their Draughts, is very apparent, and the memory would often have great difficulty otherwise to retain them so exactly, whilst the Mind went over the parts of them, step by step, to examine their several Correspondencies: And though in casting up a long Summ, either in Addition, Multiplication, or Division, every part be only a Progression of the Mind, taking a view of its own Ideas, and conside∣ring their Agreement or Disagreement, and the Resolution of the Question be nothing but the Result of the whole, made up of such paticulars, whereof the Mind has a clear Perception; yet without setting down the several Parts by marks, whose precise Significations are known, and by marks, that last and remain in view, when the memory had let them go; it would be almost impossible to carry so many different Ideas in Mind, without confounding, or letting slip some parts of the Reckoning, and thereby making all our Reasonings about it useless. In which Case, the Cyphers or Marks help not the Mind at all to perceive the Agreement of any two, or more Numbers, their Equalities or Proportions. That the Mind has only by Intuition of its own Ideas of the Numbers themselves. But the numerical Characters are helps to the memory, to record and re∣tain the several Ideas about which the Demonstration is made, whereby a man may know how far his intuitive Knowledge, in surveying several of the particulars, has proceeded; that so he may without Confusion go on to what is yet unknown; and, at last, have in one view before him the Result of all his Perceptions and Reasonings.

§. 20 One part of these Disadvantages, in moral Ideas, which has made them be thought not capable of Demonstration, may in a good measure be remedied by Definitions, setting down that Collection of simple Ideas, which every Term shall stand for; and then using the Terms stedily and constantly for that precise Collection. And what methods Algebra, or something of that kind, may hereafter suggest, to remove the other diffi∣culties, is not easie to foretell. Confident I am, that if Men would in the same method, and with the same indifferency search after moral as they do mathematical Truths, they would find them to have a stronger Con∣nexion one with another, and a more necessary Consequence from our clear and distinct Ideas, and to come nearer perfect Demonstration, than

is commonly imagined. But much of this is not to be expected, whilst the desire of Esteem, Riches, or Power, makes Men espouse the well en∣dowed Opinions in Fashion, and then seek Arguments, either to make good their Beauty, or varnish over, and cover their Deformity: nothing being so beautiful to the Eye, as Truth is to the Mind; nothing so de∣formed and irreconcileable to the Understanding, as a Lye. For though many a Man can with satisfaction enough own a no very handsome Wife in his Bosom; yet who is bold enough openly to avow that he has espou∣sed a Falshood, and received into his Breast so ugly a thing as a Lye? Whilst the Parties of Men, I say, cram their Tenents down all Men's Throats, whom they can get into their Power, without permitting them to exa∣mine their Truth or Falshood; and will not let Truth have fair Play in the World, nor Men the Liberty to search after it; What Improvements can be expected of this kind? What greater Light can be hoped for in the moral Sciences? The Subject part of Mankind, in most Places, might, in∣stead thereof, with Egyptian Bondage expect Egyptian Darkness, were not the Candle of the Lord set up by himself in Men's Minds, which it is im∣possible for the Breath or Power of Man wholly to extinguish.

§. 21. As to the fourth sort of our Knowledge, viz. of the real, actual Existence of Things without us, we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence; a demonstrative Knowledge of the Existence of a God; of the Existence of any thing else, we have no other but a sensitive Know∣ledge, which extends not beyond the Objects present to our Senses.

§. 22. Our Knowledge being so narrow, as I have shew'd, it will, per∣haps, give us some Light into the present State of our Minds, if we look a little into the dark side, and take a view of our Ignorance; which being infinitely larger than our Knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of Disputes, and improvement of useful Knowledge; if discovering how far we have clear and distinct Ideas, we confine our Thoughts within the Contemplation of those Things that are within the reach of our Under∣standings, and lanch not out into that Abyss of Darkness, (where we have not Eyes to see, nor Faculties to perceive any thing,) out of a Pre∣sumption that nothing is beyond our Comprehension. But to be satisfied of the Folly of such a Conceit, we need not go far. He that knows any thing, knows this in the first place, that he need not seek long for In∣stances of his Ignorance. The meanest, and most obvious Things that come in our way, have dark sides, that the quickest Sight cannot pene∣trate into. The clearest, and most enlarged Understandings of thinking Men, find themselves puzled, and at a loss, in every Particle of Matter: which we shall the less wonder at, when we consider the Causes of our Ignorance; which from what has been said, I suppose, will be found to be chiefly these three:

• First, Want of Ideas.
• Secondly, Want of a discoverable Connexion between the Ideas we have.
• Thirdly, Want of tracing, and examining our Ideas.

§. 23. First, There are some Things, and those not a few, that we are ignorant of for want of Ideas.

First, all the simple Ideas we have are confined (as I have shewn) to the Observation of our Senses, and the Operations of our own Minds, that we are conscious of in our selves. But how much these few and narrow ••nlets are disproportionate to the vast whole Extent of all Beings, will not be hard to persuade those, who are not so foolish, as to think their span the measure of all Things. What other simple Ideas 'tis possible the Creatures in other parts of the Uni∣verse

may have, by the Assistence of Senses and Faculties, more or per∣fecter than we have, or different from ours, 'tis not for us to determine. But to say, or think there are no such, because we conceive nothing of them, is no better an Argument, than if a blind Man should be positive in it, that there was no such thing as Sight and Colours, because he had no manner of Idea of any such thing, nor could by any means frame to himself any Notions about Seeing. The Ignorance, and Darkness that is in us, no more hinders nor confines the Knowledge that is in others, than the Blindness of a Mole is an Argument against the quick sightedness of an Eagle. He that will consider the infinite Power, Wisdom, and Good∣ness of the Creator of all Things, will find Reason to think it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a Creature, as he will find Man to be; who in all probability, is one of the lowest of all intellectual Beings. What Faculties therefore other Species of Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature, and inmost Constitutions of Things; what Ideas they may receive of them, far different from ours, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want several other views of them, besides those we have, to make Discoveries of them more per∣fect. And we may be convinced that the Ideas we can attain to by our Faculties, are very disproportionate to Things themselves, when a positive clear distinct one of Substance it self, which is the Foundation of all the rest, is concealed from us. But want of Ideas of this kind, being a Part, as well as Cause of our Ignorance, cannot be described. Only this, I think, I may confidently say of it, That the intellectual and sensible World, are in this perfectly alike; That that part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we see not; And what∣soever we can reach with our Eyes, or our Thoughts of either of them, is but a point, almost nothing, in comparison of the rest.

§. 24. Secondly, Another great Cause of Ignorance, is the want of Ideas we are capable of. As the want of Ideas, which our Faculties are not able to give us, shuts us wholly from those views of Things, which 'tis reaso∣nable to think, other perfecter Beings than we have, of which we know nothing; so the want of Ideas, I now speak of, keeps us in Ignorance of Things, we conceive capable of being known to us. Bulk, Figure, and Motion, we have Ideas of. But though we are not without Ideas of these primary Qualities of Bodies in general; yet not knowing what is the par∣ticular Bulk, Figure, and Motion, of the greatest part of the Bodies of the Universe, we are ignorant of the several Powers, Efficacies, and Ways of Operation, whereby the Effects we daily see, are produced. These are hid from us in some Things, by being too remote; and in others, by being too minute. When we consider the vast distance of the known and visi∣ble parts of the World, and the Reasons we have to think, that what lies within our Ken, is but a small part of the immense Universe, we shall then discover an huge Abyss of Ignorance. What are the particular Fa∣bricks of the great Masses of Matter, which make up the whole stupendi∣ous frame of corporeal Beings; how far they are extended; what is their Motion, and how continued, or communicated; and what Influence they have one upon another, are Contemplations, that at first glimpse our Thoughts lose themselves in. If we narrow our Contemplation, and confine our Thoughts to this little Canton, I mean this System of our Sun, and the grosser Masses of Matter, that visibly move about it, what several sorts of Vegetables, Animals, and intellectual corporeal Beings, in∣finitely different from those of our little spot of Earth, may probably be in the other Planets; to the Knowledge of which, even of their outward

Figures and Parts, we can no way attain, whilst we are confined to this Earth, there being no natural Means, either by Sensation or Reflection, to convey their certain Ideas into our Minds. They are out of the reach of those Inlets of all our Knowledge; and what sorts of Furniture and Inha∣bitants those Mansions contain in them, we cannot so much as guess, much less have clear, and distinct Ideas of them.

§. 25. If a great, nay for the greatest, part of the several ranks of Bo∣dies in the Universe, scape our notice by their remoteness, there are others that are no less concealed from us by their Minuteness. These insensible Corpuscles, being the active parts of Matter, and the great Instruments of Nature, on which depend not only all their secondary Qualities, but also most of their natural Operations; our want of precise distinct Ideas of their primary Qualities, keeps us in an uncureable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could discover the Figure, Size, Connexion, and Motion of the minute constituent parts of any two Bodies, we should know without Trial several of their Opera∣tions one upon another, as we do now the Properties of a Square, or a Triangle; and we should be able to tell before Hand, that Rubarb would purge, Hemlock kill, and Opium make a Man sleep; as well as a Watch-maker does that a little piece of Paper, laid on the Ballance, will keep the Watch from going till it be removed; or that some small part of it, being rubb'd by a File, the Machin would quite lose its Motion, and the Watch go no more. Did we know the mechanical Affections of the Particles of Rubarb, Hemlock, Opium, and a Man, as a Watch-maker does those of a Watch, whereby it performs all its Operations; and of a File, which by rubbing on them will alter the Figure of any of the Wheels; the dissol∣ving of Silver in aqua fortis, and Gold in aq. regia, and not vice versa, would be then, perhaps, no more difficult to know, than it is to a Smith to understand why the turning of one Key will open a Lock, and not the turning of another. But whilst we are destitute of Senses, acute enough to discover the minute Particles of Bodies, and to give us Ideas of their mechanical Affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their proper∣ties and ways of Operation; nor can we be assured about them any farther, than some few Trials we make, are able to reach. But whether they will succeed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain Knowledge of universal Truths, concerning natural Bodies. And our Reason carries us herein very little beyond particular matter of Fact.

§. 26. And therefore I am apt to doubt that, how far soever humane Industry may advance useful and experimental Philosophy in physical Things, scientifical will still be out of our reach; because we want per∣fect and adequate Ideas of those very Bodies, which are nearest to us, and most under our Command. Those which we have ranked into Classes un∣der names, and we think our selves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect, and incompleat Ideas of. Distinct Ideas of the several sorts of Bodies, that fall under the Examination of our Senses, perhaps, we may have; but adequate Ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And though the former of these will serve us for common Use and Discourse; yet whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of scientifical Knowledge; nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive Truths concerning them. Certainty and Demonstration, are Things we must not, in these Matters, pretend to. By the Colour, Figure, Taste, and Smell, and other sensible Qualities, we have as clear, and distinct Ideas of Sage and Hemlock, as we have of a Circle and a Triangle: But having no Ideas

of the particular primary Qualities of the minute parts of either of these Plants, nor of other Bodies we would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will produce; Nor when we see those Effects, can we so much as guess, much less know, their manner of production. Thus having no Ideas of the particular mechanical Affections of the minute parts of Bodies, that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their Constitutions, Powers, and Operations; and of Bodies more re∣mote, we are ignorant of their very outward Shapes and Beings.

§. 27. This, at first sight, will shew us how disproportionate our Knowledge is to the whole extent even of material Beings; to which, if we add the Consideration of that infinite number of Spirits that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our Knowledge, where∣of we have no cognizance, nor can frame to our selves any distinct Ideas of their several ranks and sorts, we shall find this cause of Ignorance con∣ceal from us, in an impenetrable obscurity, almost the whole intellectual World; a greater, certainly, and more beautiful World than the material. For, bating some very few, and those, if I may so call them, superficial Ideas, which Spirit, we, by reflection, get of our own and of the Father of all Spi∣rits, the eternal, independent Author of them and us, and all Things, we have no certain information, so much as of their Existence, but by revelation. Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery. And all those In∣telligences, whereof 'tis likely there are more Orders than of corporeal Substances, are Things whereof our natural Faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are Minds, and thinking Beings, in other Men as well as himself, every Man has a reason, from their Words and Acti∣ons, to be satisfied. But between us and the Great GOD, we can have no certain knowledge of the Existence of any Spirits, but by revelation; much less have we distinct Ideas of their different Natures, Conditions, States, Powers, and several Constitutions, wherein they agree or differ from one another, and from us. And therefore in what concerns their dif∣ferent Species and Properties, we are under an absolute ignorance.

§. 28. Secondly, What a small part of the substantial Beings that are in the Universe, the want of Ideas leave open to our Knowledge, we have seen. In the next place, another cause of Ignorance, of no less moment, is the want of a discoverable Connexion between those Ideas we have. For where∣ever we want that, we are utterly uncapable of universal and certain Knowledge; and are, as in the former case, left only to Observation and Experiment; which how narrow and confined it is, how far from gene∣ral Knowledge, we need not be told. I shall give some few instances of this cause of our Ignorance, and so leave it. 'Tis evident that the bulk, figure, and motion of several Bodies about us, produce in us several Sen∣sations as of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, or Smells, Pleasure and Pain, &c. those mechanical Affections of Bodies, having no affinity at all with these Ideas they produce in us, there being no conceivable connexion be∣tween any impulse of any sort of Body, and any perception of a Colour, or Smell, we find in our Minds, we can have no distinct knowledge of such Operations beyond our Experience; and can reason no otherwise about them, than as the effects or appointment of an infinitely Wise Agent, which perfectly surpass our Comprehensions. As the Ideas of sensible, secundary Qualities we have in our Minds, can, by us, be no way deduced from bodily Causes, nor any correspondence or connexion be found between them and those primary Qualities which (Expe∣rience shews us) produce them in us; so, on the other side, the Ope∣tions of our Minds upon our Bodies, is as unconceivable. How

any thought should produce a motion in Body is as remote from the na∣ture of our Ideas, as how any Body should produce any Thought in the Mind. That it is so, if Experience did not convince us, the Considerations of the Things themselves would never be able, in the least, to discover to us. These, and the like, though they have a constant and regular connexion, in the ordinary course of Things; yet that connexion being not discoverable in the Ideas themselves, which appearing to have no ne∣cessary dependence one on another, we can attribute their connexion to nothing else but the arbitrary Determination of that All-wise Agent, who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way utterly above our weak Understanding to conceive.

§. 29. In some of our Ideas there are certain Relations, Habitudes, and Connexions, so visibly included in the Nature of the Ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them, by any Power what∣soever. And in these only, we are capable of certain and universal Know∣ledge. Thus the Idea of a right-lined Triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its Angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this Relation, this connexion of these two Ideas, to be possibly mutable, or depend on any arbitrary Power, which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of Matter, the production of Sensation in us of Colours and Sounds, &c. by impulse and motion; nay, the original Rules and Communication of Motion, being such wherein we can discover no natural connexion with any Ideas we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleasure of the Wise Architect. I need not, I think, here men∣tion the Resurrection of our Bodies, the future state of this Globe of Earth, and such other Things, which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the Determination of a free Agent. The Things that, as far as our Observation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude, do act by a Law set them; but yet a Law that we know not; whereby, though Causes work steddily and Effects con∣stantly flow from them, yet their Connexions and Dependencies being not discoverable in our Ideas, we can have but an experimental Know∣ledge of them. From all which, 'tis easie to perceive what a darkness we are involved in, how little 'tis of being, and the things that are, that we are capable to know. And therefore we shall do no injury to our Know∣ledge, when we modestly think with our selves, that we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the Universe, and all the things contained in it, that we are not capable of a philosophical Know∣ledge of the Bodies that are about us, and make a part of us: Concer∣ning their secundary Qualities, Powers, and Operations, we can have no universal certainty. Several Effects come every day within the notice of our Senses, of which we have so far sensitive Knowledge; but the causes, manner, and certainty of their production, for the two foregoing Rea∣sons, we must be content to be ignorant of. In these we can go no farther than particular Experience informs us of matter of fact, and by Analogy to guess what Effects the like Bodies are, upon other tryals, like to pro∣duce. But as to a perfect Science of natural Bodies, (not to mention spi∣ritual Beings,) we are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing, that I conclude it lost labour to seek after it.

§. 30. Thirdly, Where we have adequate Ideas, and where there is a certain and discoverable connexion between them, yet we are often igno∣rant, for want of tracing those Ideas we have, or may have, and finding out those intermediate Ideas, which may shew us what habitude of

agreement or disagreement they have one with another. And thus ma∣ny are ignorant of mathematical Truths, not out of any imperfection of their Faculties, or uncertainty in the Things themselves; but for want of application in acqu••ring, examining, and by due ways comparing those Ideas. That which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our Ideas, and finding out their Relations, and Agreements or Dis∣agreements one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of Words. It is impossible that Men should ever truly seek, or certainly discover the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas themselves, whilst their Thoughts flutter about, or stick only in Sounds of doubtful and uncertain significa∣tions Mathematicians abstracting their Thoughts from Names, and accustoming themselves to set before their Minds the Ideas themselves, that they would consider, and not Sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puddering, and confusion, which has so much hindred Mens progress in other parts of Knowledge; who sticking in Words of undetermined and uncertain signification, were un∣able to distinguish True from False, Certain from Probable, Consistent from Inconsistent, in their own Opinions: Whereby the increase brought into the Stock of real Knowledge has been very little, in proportion to the Schools, Disputes, and Writings, the World has been fill'd with; whilst Men, being lost in the great Wood of Words, knew not whereabout they were, how far their Discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general Stock of Knowledge. Had Men, in their dis∣coveries of the material, done, as they have in those of the intellectual World, involved all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful terms and ways of talking, Volumes writ of Navigation and Voyages, Theories and Stories of Zones and Tydes multiplied and disputed; nay, Ships built, and Fleets set out, would never have taught us the way beyond the Line; and the Antipodes would be still as much unknown, as when it was de∣clared Heresie to hold there were any. But having spoken sufficiently of Words, and the ill or careless use, that is commonly made of them, I shall not say any thing more of it here.

§. 31. Hitherto we have examined the extent of our Knowledge, in re∣spect of the several sorts of Beings that are. There is another extent of it, in respect of Vniversality; which will also deserve to be considered: and in this regard, our Knowledge follows the Nature of our Ideas. If the Ideas are abstract, whose agreement or disagreement we perceive, our Knowledge is universal. For what is known of such general Ideas, will be true of every particular thing, in whom that Essence, i. e. that abstract Idea is to be found; and what is once known of such Ideas, will be perpetually, and for ever true. So that as to all general Knowledge, we must search and find it only in our own Minds, and 'tis only the exa∣mining of our own Ideas, that furnisheth us with that. Truths belonging to Essences of Things, (that is, to abstract Ideas) are eternal, and are to be found out by the contemplation only of those Essences; as the Existence of Things is to be known only from Experience. But having more to of this in the Chapters, where I shall speak of general and real Know∣ledge, this may here suffice as to the Universality of our Knowledge in general.

CHAP. IV. Of the Reality of our Knowledge.

§. 1. I doubt not but my Reader, by this time, may be apt to think, that I have been all this while only building a Castle in the Air; and be ready to say to me, To what purpose all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own Ideas; but who knows what those Ideas may be? Is there any thing so extravagant, as the Imaginations of Men's Brains? Where is the Head that has no Chimeras in it? Or if there be a sober and a wise Man, what difference will there be, by your Rules, between his Knowledge, and that of the most extravagant Fancy in the World? They both have their Ideas, and perceive their agreement and disagreement one with another. If there be any difference between them, the advantage will be on the warm-headed Man's side, as having the more Ideas, and the more lively. And so, by your Rules, he will be the more knowing. If it be true, that all Knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own Ideas, the Visions of an Enthusiast, and the Reasonings of a sober Man, will be equally certain. 'Tis no matter how Things are: so a Man observe but the agreement of his own Imaginations, and talk con∣formably; it is all Truth, all Certainty. Such Castles in the Air, will be as strong Holds of Truth, as the Demonstrations of Euclid. That an Harpy is not a Centaur, is by this way as certain knowledge, and as much a Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle.

But of what use is all this fine Knowledge of Men's own Imaginations, to a Man that enquires after the reality of Things? It matters not what Men's Fancies are, 'tis the Knowledge of Things that is only to be prized: 'tis this alone gives a value to our Reasonings, and preference to one Man's Knowledge over another's, that it is of Things as they really are, and not of Dreams and Fancies.

§. 2. To which I answer, That if our Knowledge of our Ideas termi∣nate in them, and reach no farther, where there is something farther in∣tended, our most serious Thoughts would be of little more use, than the Resveries of a crazie brain; and the Truths built thereon of no more weight, than the Discourses of a Man, who sees Things clearly in a Dream, and with great assurance utters them. But, I hope, before I have done, to make it evident, that this way of certainty, by the knowledge of our own Ideas, goes a little farther than bare Imagination; and, I believe, it will appear, that all the certainty of general Truths a Man has, lies in no∣thing else.

§. 3. 'Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but only by the intervention of the Ideas it has of them. Our Knowledge therefore is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our Ideas and the reality of Things. But what shall be here the Criterion? How shall the Mind, when it perceives nothing but its own Ideas, know that they agree with Things themselves? This, though it seem not to want difficulty, yet, I think, there be two sorts of Ideas that, we may be assured, agree with Things.

§. 4. First, The first are simple Ideas, which since the Mind, as has been shewed, can by no means make to it self, must necessarily be the product of Things operating on the Mind in a natural way, and produ∣cing

therein those Perceptions, which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker, they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple Ideas are not fictions of our Fancies, but the natural and regular productions of Things without us, really operating upon us; and so carry with them all the conformity our state requires, which is to repre∣sent Things under those appearances they are fitted to produce in us; whereby we may distinguish the Substances they are in, and apply them to our Uses. Thus the Idea of Whiteness, or Bitterness, as it is in the Mind, exactly answering that Power which is in any Body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can, or ought to have, with Things without us. And this conformity between our simple Ideas, and the exi∣stence of Things, is sufficient for real Knowledge.

§. 5. Secondly, All our complex Ideas, except those of Substances, being Archetypes of the Mind's own making, not intended to be the Copies of any thing, nor referred to the existence of any thing, as to their Origi∣nals, cannot want any conformity necessary to real Knowledge. For that which is not designed to represent any thing but it self, can never be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true apprehension of any thing, by its dislikeness to it; and such, excepting those of Sub∣stances, are all our complex Ideas; which, as I have shewed in another place, are Combinations of Ideas, which the Mind, by its free choice, puts together, without considering any connexion they have in Nature. And hence it is, that in all these sorts the Ideas themselves are conside∣red as the Archetypes, and Things no otherwise regarded, but as they are conformable to them. So that we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the Knowledge we attain concerning these Ideas is real, and reaches Things themselves: Because in all our Thoughts, Reasonings, and Dis∣courses of this kind, we intend Things no farther than as they are con∣formable to our Ideas; so that in these, we cannot miss of a certain un∣doubted reality.

§. 6. I doubt not but it will be easily granted, that the Knowledge we may have of mathematical Truths, is not only certain, but real Knowledge; not idle Chimeras of Men's Brains: And yet if we will consider, we shall find, that it is only of our own Ideas. The Mathematician considers the Truth and Properties belonging to a Rectangle, or Circle, only as they are in Idea in his own Mind; for 'tis possible he never found either of them existing mathematically, i. e. precisely true, in his Life: But yet the knowledge he has of any Truths or Properties belonging to a Circle, or any other mathematical Figure, are nevertheless true and certain, even of real Things existing: because real Things are no farther concerned, nor intended to be meant by any such Propositions, than as Things really agree to those Archetypes in his Mind. Is it true of the Idea of a Tri∣angle, that its three Angles are equal to two right ones? It is true also of a Triangle, where-ever it really exists. What ever other Figure exists, that is not exactly answerable to that Idea of a Triangle in his Mind, is not at all concerned in that Proposition. And therefore he is certain all his Knowledge concerning such Ideas, is real Knowledge: because intending Things no farther than they agree with those his Ideas, he is sure what he knows concerning those Figures, when they have barely an Ideal existence in his Mind, will hold true of them also, when they have a real existence in Matter; his consideration being barely of those Figures, which are the same where-ever or however they exist.

§. 7. And hence it follows, that moral Knowledge is as capable of real Certainty, as Mathematicks. For Certainty being but the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas; and Demonstration no∣thing but the Perception of such Agreement, by the Intervention of other Ideas, or Mediums, our moral Ideas, as well as mathematical, being Ar∣chetypes themselves, and so adequate, and compleat Ideas, all the Agree∣ment, or Disagreement we shall find in them, will produce real Know∣ledge, as well as in mathematical Figures.

§. 8. That which is requisite to make our Knowledge certain, is the Clearness of our Ideas; and that which is required to make it re••l, is, that they answer their Archetypes. Nor let it be wondred, that I place the Certainty of our Knowledge in the Consideration of our Ideas, with so little Care and Regard (as it may seem) to the real Existence of Things: Since most of those Discourses, which take up the Thoughts, and engage the Disputes of those who pretend to make it their Business to enquire af∣ter Truth and Certainty, will, I presume, upon Examination be found to be general Propositions, and Notions in which Existence is not at all con∣cerned. All the Discourses of the Mathematicians about the squaring of a Circle, conick Sections, or any other part of Mathematicks, concern not the Existence of any of those Figures; but their Demonstrations which depend on their Ideas are the same, whether there be any square or Circle existing in the World, or no. In the same manner, the Truth and Cer∣tainty of moral Discourses abstracts from the Lives of Men, and the E∣xistence of those Vertues in the World, whereof they treat: Nor is Tully's Offices less true, because there is no Body in the World that exactly pra∣ctices his Rules, and lives up to that pattern of a vertuous Man, which he has given us, and which existed no where when he writ but in Idea. If it be true in Speculation, i. e. in Idea, that Murther deserves Death, it will also be true in Reality of any Action that exists comformable to that Idea of Murther. As for other Actions, the Truth of that Proposition concerns them not. And thus it is of all other Species of Things, which have no other Essences but those Ideas which are in the Minds of Men.

§. 9. But it will here be said, that if moral Knowledge be placed in the Contemplation of our own moral Ideas, and those, as other Modes, be of our own making, What strange Notions will there be of Iustice and Tem∣perance? What confusion of Vertues and Vices, if every one may make what Ideas of them he pleases? No confusion nor disorder in the Things themselves, nor the Reasonings about them; no more than (in Mathema∣ticks) there would be a disturbance in the Demonstration, or a change in the Properties of Figures, and their Relations one to another, if a Man should make a Triangle with four Corners, or a Trapezium with four right Angles: that is, in plain English, change the Names of the Figures, and call that by one Name, which Mathematicians call'd ordinarily by ano∣ther. For let a Man make to himself the Idea of a Figure with three Angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, Equilaterum or Trapezium, or any thing else, the Properties of, and Demonstrations about that Idea, will be the same, as if he call'd it a Rectangular-Tri∣angle. I confess, the change of the Name, by the impropriety of Speech, will at first disturb him, who knows not what Idea it stands for; but as soon as the Figure is drawn, the Consequences and Demonstration are plain and clear. And just the same is it in moral Knowledge, let a Man have the Idea of taking from others, without their Consent, what their honest Industry has possessed them of, and call this Iustice, if he please. He that takes the Name here without the Idea put to it, will be mistaken,

by joining another Idea of his own to that Name: But strip the Idea of that Name, or take it such as it is in the Speaker's Mind, and the same Things will agree to it, as if you call'd it Injustice. In∣deed, wrong Names in moral Discourses, breed usually more disorder, because they are not so easily rectified, as in Mathematicks, where the Figure once drawn and seen, makes the Name useless, and of no force: For what need of a Sign, when the Thing signified is present and in view? But in moral Names, that cannot be so easily and shorty done, because of the many decompositions that go to the making up the complex Ideas of those Modes. But yet for all this the miscalling of any of those Ideas, contrary to the usual signification of the Words of that Language, hinders not•• but we may have certain and demonstrative Knowledge of their several Agreements and Disagreements, if we will carefully, as in Mathematicks, keep to the same precise Ideas, and trace them in their several Relations one to another, without being led away by their Names. If we but se∣parate the Idea under consideration, from the Sign that stands for it, our Knowledge goes equally on in the discovery of real Truth and Certainty, whatever Sounds we make use of.

§. 10. One thing more we are to take notice of, That where GOD, or any other Law-maker, hath defined any Moral Names, there they have made the Essence of that Species to which that Name belongs; and there it is not safe to apply or use them otherwise: But in other cases 'tis bare impropriety of Speech to apply them contrary to the common usage of the Country. But yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of that Knowledge, which is still to be had by a due contemplation and compa∣ring of those even nick-nam'd Ideas.

§. 11. Thirdly, There is another sort of complex Ideas, which being referred to Archetypes without us, may differ from them, and so our Knowledge about them, may come short of being real; and these are our Ideas of Substances: which consisting of a Collection of simple Ideas, supposed taken from the Works of Nature, may yet vary from them, by having more or different Ideas united in them, than are to be found uni∣ted in the Things themselves: From whence it comes to pass, ••hat they may, and often do fail of being exactly conformable to Things themselves.

§. 12. I say then, that to have Ideas of Substances, which, by being conformable to Things, may afford us real Knowledge, it is not enough, as in Modes, to put together such Ideas as have no inconsistency, though they did never before so exist. v. g. the Ideas of Sacrilege or Perjury, &c. were as real and true Ideas before, as after the existence of any such fact. But our Ideas of Substances being supposed Copies, and referred to Arche∣types without us, must still be taken from something that does or has exi∣sted; they must not consist of Ideas put together at the pleasure of our Thoughts, without any real pattern they were taken from, though we can perceive no inconsistence in such a Combination. The reason where∣of is, because we knowing not what real Constitution it is of Substances, whereon our simple Ideas depend, and which really is the cause of the strict union of some of them one with another, and the exclusion of others; there are very few of them that we can be sure are or are not inconsistent in Nature, any farther than Experience and sensible Observation reaches. Herein therefore is founded the reality of our Knowledge concerning Sub∣stances, that all our complex Ideas of them must be such, and such only as are made up of such simple ones, as have been discovered to co-exist in Nature. And our Ideas being thus true, though not, perhaps, very exact

Copies, are yet the Subjects of real (as far as we have any) Knowledge of them; which (as has been already shewed) will not be found to reach very far: But so far as it does, it will still be real Knowledge. Whatever Ideas we have, the Agreement we find they have with others, will still be Knowledge. If those Ideas be abstract, it will be general Knowledge. But to make it real concerning Substances, the Ideas must be taken from the real existence of Things; whatever simple Ideas have been found to co-exist in any Substance, these we may with confidence join together again, and so make abstract Ideas of Substances. For whatever have once had an union in Nature, may be united again.

§. 13. This, if we rightly consider, and confine not our Thoughts and ab∣stract Ideas to Names, as if there were, or could be no other Sorts of Things, than what known Names had already determined, and as it were set out, we should think of Things with greater freedom and less confu∣sion, than perhaps we do. 'Twould possibly be thought a bold Paradox, if not a very dangerous Falshood, if I should say, that some Changelings, who have lived forty years together, without any appearance of Reason, are something between a Man and a Beast: Which prejudice is founded upon nothing else but a false Supposition, that these two Names, Man and Beast, stand for distinct Species so set out by real Essences, that there can come no other Species between them: Whereas if we will abstract from those Names, and the Supposition of such specifick Essences made by Nature, wherein all Things of the same Denominations did exactly and equally partake; if we would not fansie, that there were a certain number of these Essences, wherein all Things, as in Molds, were cast and for∣med, we should find that the Idea of the Shape, Motion, and Life of a Man without Reason, is as much as distinct Idea, and makes as much a distinct sort of Things from Man and Beast, as the Idea of the Shape of an Ass with Reason, would be different from either that of Man or Beast, and be a Species of an Animal between, or distinct from both.

§. 14. Here every body will be ready to ask, if Changelings may be supposed something between Man and Beast; 'Pray what are they? I answer, Changelings; which is as good a Word to signifie something different from the signification of MAN or BEAST, as the Names Man and Beast are to have significations different one from the other. This, well considered, would resolve this matter, and shew my meaning without any more ado. But I am not so unacquainted with the Zeal of some Men, which enables them to spin Consequences, and to see Religion threatned whenever any one ventures to quit their forms of Speaking, as not to foresee what Names such a Proposition as this is like to be charged with: And without doubt it will be asked, If Changelings are something between Man and Beast, what will become of them in the other World? To which I answer, 1. It concerns me not to know or enquire. To their own Master they stand or fall: It will make their state neither better nor worse, whether we determine any thing of it, or no: They are in the hands of a faithful Creator and a bountiful Father, who disposes not of his Creatures according to our narrow Thoughts or Opi∣nions, nor distinguishes them according to Names and Species of our Con∣trivance. And we that know so little of this present World we are in, may, I think, content our selves without being peremptory, in defining the different state Creatures shall come into, when they go off this Stage. It may suffice us, that he hath made known to all those, who are capable of Instruction, Discourse, and Reasoning, that they shall come to an ac∣count, and receive according to what they have done in this Body.

§. 15. But, Secondly, I answer, The force of these Men's Question, (viz. will you deprive Changelings of a future state?) is founded on one of two Suppositions, which are both false. The first is, That all Things that have the outward Shape and appearance of a Man, must necessarily be designed to an immortal future Being, after this Life. Or, secondly, that whatever is of humane Birth, must be so. Take away these Imagi∣nations, and such Questions will be groundless and ridiculous. I desire then those who think there is no more but an accidental difference be∣tween themselves and Changelings, the Essence in both being exactly the same, to consider, whether they can imagine Immortality annexed to any outward shape of the Body; the very proposing it, is, I suppose, enough to make them disown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much soever immersed in Matter, allow'd that Excellency to any Figure of the gross sensible outward parts, as to affirm eternal Life due to it, or neces∣sary consequence of it; or that any mass of Matter should, after its disso∣lution here, be again restored hereafter to an everlasting state of Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, only because it was molded into this or that Figure, and had such a particular frame of its visible parts. Such an Opinion as this, placing Immortality in a certain superficial Figure, turns out of doors all consideration of Soul or Spirit; and upon whose account alone, some corporeal Beings have hitherto been concluded immortal, and others not. This is to attribute more to the outside, than inside of Things; to place the Excellency of a Man, more in the external Shape of his Body, than internal Perfections of his Soul; which is but little better than to annex the great and inestimable advantage of Immortality and Life everlasting, which he has above other material Beings: To annex it, I say, to the Cut of his Beard, or the Fashion of his Coat; for this or that outward Make of our Bodies, no more carries with it the hopes of an eternal Duration, than the Fashion of a Man's Suit gives him reasonable grounds to imagine it will never wear out, or that it will make him immortal. 'Twill perhaps be said, that no Body thinks that the Shape makes any thing immortal, but 'tis the Shape is the sign of a rational Soul within which is immortal. I wonder who made it the sign of any such Thing; for barely saying it, will not make it so. It would require some Proofs to persuade one of it. No Figure that I know speaks any such Language. For it may as rational¦ly be concluded, that the dead Body of a Man, wherein there is to be found no more appearance or action of Life, than there is in a Statue, has yet nevertheless a living Soul in it, because of its shape; as that there is a rational Soul in a Changeling, because he has the outside of a rational Creature; when his Actions carry far less marks of Reason with them, in the whole course of his Life, than what are to be found in many a Beast.

§. 16. But 'tis the issue of rational Parents, and must therefore be con∣cluded to have a rational Soul. I know not by what Logick you must conclude so. I am sure this is a Conclusion, That Men no-where allow of: For if they did, they would not make bold, as every-where they do, to destroy ill-formed and mis-shaped Productions. Ay, but these are Monsters. Let them be so; What will your drivling, unintelligent, in∣tractable Changeling be? Shall a defect in the Body make a Monster; a defect in the Mind, (the far more Noble, and, in the common phrase, the far more Essential part, not? Shall the want of a Nose, or a Neck, make a Mon∣ster, and put such Issue out of the rank of Men; the want of Reason and Understanding,) not? This is to bring all back again to what was explo∣ded just now: This is to place all in the Shape, and to take the measure of a Man only by his out-side. To shew that according to the ordinary

way of Reasoning in this Matter, People do lay the whole stress on the Figure, and resolve the whole Essence of the Species of Man, (as they make it,) into the outward Shape, how unreasonable soever it be, and how much soever they disown it, we need but trace their Thoughts and Practice a little farther, and then it will plainly appear. The well-shaped Changeling is a Man, has a rational Soul, though it appear not; this is past doubt, say you. Make the Ears a little longer, and more pointed, and the Nose a little flatter than ordinary, and then you begin to boggle: Make the Face yet narrower, flatter, and longer, and then you begin to doubt: Add still more and more of the likeness of a Brute to it, and let the Head be perfectly that of some other Animal, then presently 'tis a Monster; and 'tis demonstration with you, that it hath no rational Soul, and must be destroy'd. Where now (I ask) shall be the just measure, which the utmost bounds of that Shape, which carries with it a rational Soul? For since there has been humane Foetus's produced, half Beast, and half Man; and others three part one, and one part t'other: And so it is possible they may be in all the variety of approaches to one shape or the other, and may have several degrees of mixture of the likeness of a Man, or a Brute. I would gladly know what are those precise Lineaments, which according to this Hypothesis, are, or are not capable of a rational Soul to be joined to them? What sort of outside is the certain sign, that there is, or is not such an Inhabitant within? For till that be done, we talk at random of Man; and shall always, I fear, do so, as long as we give our selves up to certain Sounds, and the Imaginations of setled and fixed Species in Nature, we know not what. But after all, I desire it may be considered, that those who think they have answered the difficulty, by telling us, that a mis-shaped Foetus is a Monster, run into the same fault they are arguing against, by constituting a Species between Man and Beast: for what else, I pray, is their Monster in the case, (if the word Monster signifie any thing at all,) but something neither Man nor Beast, but partaking somewhat of either; and just so is the Changeling be∣fore mentioned. So necessary is it to quit the common notion of Spe∣cies and Essences, if we will truly look into the Nature of Things, and examine them, by what our Faculties can discover in them as they exist, and not by groundless Fancies have been taken up about them.

§. 17. I have mentioned this here, because I think we cannot be too cautious, that Words and Species, in the ordinary Notions we have been used to of them, impose not on us: For I am apt to think, therein lies one great obstacle to our clear and distinct Knowledge, especially in re∣ference to Substances; and from thence has rose a great part of the Diffi∣culties about Truth and Certainty. Would we accustom our selves to separate our Contemplations and Reasonings from Words, we might, in a great measure, remedy this Inconvenience within our own Thoughts; but yet it would still disturb us in our Discourse with others, as long as we retained the Opinion, that Species and their Essences were any thing else but our abstract Ideas, (such as they are,) with Names annexed to them, to be the signs of them.

§. 18. Where ever we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas, there is certain Knowledge; and where ever we are sure those Ideas agree with the reality of Things, there is certain real Know∣ledge. Of which Agreement of our Ideas with the reality of Things, having here given the marks, I think I have shewn wherein it is that Certainty, real Certainty, consists; which whatever it was to others, was, I confess, to me heretofore, one of those Desiderata which I found great want of.

CHAP. V. Of Truth in general.

§. 1. VVHat is Truth, was an Enquiry many Ages since; and it being that which all Mankind either do, or pretend to search after, it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine where∣in it consists; and so acquaint our selves with the Nature of it, as to ob∣serve how the Mind distinguishes it from Falshood.

§. 2. Truth then seems to me, in the proper import of the Word, to signifie nothing but the joining or separating of Signs, as the Things signi∣fied by them, do agree or disagree one with another; which way of joining or separating of Signs, we call Proposition. So that Truth properly be∣longs only to Propositions: whereof there are two sorts, viz. Mental and Verbal; as there are two sorts of Signs commonly made use of, viz. Ideas and Words.

§. 3. To form a clear Notion of Truth, it is very necessary to consider Truth of Thought, and Truth of Words, distinctly one from another: but yet it is very difficult to treat of them asunder. Because it is un∣avoidable, in treating of mental Propositions, to make use of Words; and then the instances given of Mental Propositions, cease immediately to be barely Mental, and become Verbal. For a mental Proposition being nothing but a bare consideration of the Ideas, as they are in our Minds stripp'd of Names, they lose the Nature of purely mental Propositions, as soon as they are put into Words.

§. 4. And that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal Propositions separately, is, That most Men, if not all, in their Thinking and Reasonings within themselves, make use of Words instead of Ideas; at least when the subject of their Meditation contains in it complex Ideas. Which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our Ideas of that kind, and may, if attentively made use of, serve for a mark to shew us, what are those Things, we have clear and perfect established Ideas of, and what not. For if we will curiously observe the way our Mind takes in Thinking and Reasoning, we shall find, I suppose, that when we make any Propositions within our own Thoughts, about White or Black, Sweet or Bitter, a Triangle or a Circle, we can, and often do frame in our Minds the Ideas themselves, without reflecting on the Names: But when we would consider, or make Propositions about the more complex Ideas, as of a Man, Vitriol, Fortitude, Glory, we usually put the Name for the Idea, because the Ideas these Names stand for, being for the most part im∣perfect, confused, and undetermined, we reflect on the Names themselves, because they are more clear, certain, and distinct, and readier occurr to our Thoughts, than the pure Ideas, and so we make use of these Words instead of the Ideas themselves, even when we would meditate and rea∣son within our selves, and make tacit mental Propositions. In Substances, as has been already noted, this is occasioned by the imperfection of our Ideas, we making the Name stand for the real Essence, of which we have no Idea at all. In Modes, it is occasioned by the great number of simple Ideas, that go to the making them up. For many of them being very much compounded, the Name occurrs much easier, than the complex Idea it self, which requires time and attention to be recollected, and ex∣actly represented to the Mind, even in those Men, who have formerly been at the pains to do it; and is utterly impossible to be done by those, who though they have ready, in their Memory, the greatest part of the

common Words of their Language, yet perhaps never troubled themselves in all their Lives, to consider what precise Ideas the most of them stood for: Some confused or obscure Notions have served their turns; and ma∣ny who talk very much of Religion and Conscience, of Church and Faith, of Power and Right, of Obstructions and Humours, Melancholy and Choler, would, perhaps, have little left in their Thoughts and Medita∣tions, if one should desire them to think only of the Things themselves, and lay by those Words, with which they so often confound others, and not seldom themselves also.

§. 5. But to return to the consideration of Truth. We must, I say, ob∣serve two sorts of Propositions, that we are capable of making.

First, Mental, wherein the Ideas in our Understandings are without the use of Words put together, or separated by the Mind, perceiving, or judging of their Agreement, or Disagreement.

Secondly, Verbal Propositions, which are Words the signs of our Ideas put together or separated in affirmative or negative Sentences. By which way of affirming or denying, these Signs, made by Sounds, are as it were, put together or separated one from another. So that Proposition consists in joining, or separating Signs; and Truth consists in the putting toge∣ther, or separating these Signs, according as the Things they stand for agree or disagree.

§. 6. Every one's Experience will satisfie him, that the Mind, either by perceiving or supposing the Agreement or Disagreement of any of its Ideas, does tacitly within it self put them into a kind of Proposition affirmative or negative, which I have endeavoured to express by the terms Putting together and Separating. But this Action of the Mind, which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning Man, is easier to be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us, when we reason, judge, or sup∣pose, than to be explained by Words. When a Man has in his Mind the Idea of two Lines, viz. the Side and Diagonal of a Square, whereof the Diago∣nal is an Inch long, he may have the Idea also of the division of that Line, into a certain number of equal parts; v. g. into Five, Ten, an Hundred, a Thousand, or any other Number, and may have the Idea of that Inch-Line, being divisible or not divisible, into such equal parts, as a certain number of them will be equal to the Side-line. Now whenever he per∣ceives, believes, or supposes such a kind of Divisibility to agree or dis∣agree to his Idea of that Line, he, as it were, joins or separates those two Ideas, viz. the Idea of that Line, and the Idea of that kind of Di∣visibility, and so makes a mental Proposition, which is true or false, ac∣cording as such a kind of Divisibility, a Divisibility into such ali∣quot parts, does really agree to that Line, or no: And when Ideas are so put together, or separated in the Mind, as they or the Things they stand for do agree, or not, that is, as I may call it, mental Truth. But Truth of Words is something more, and that is the affirming or denying of Words one of another, as the Ideas they stand for agree or disagree: And this again is is twofold, either purely Verbal, and trifling, which I shall speak of, Chap. 10. or Real and instructive; which is the Object of that real Knowledge, which we have spoken of already.

§. 7. But here again will be apt to occurr the same doubt about Truth, that did about Knowledge: And it will be objected, That if Truth be no∣thing but the joining or separating of Words in Propositions, as the Ideas they stand for agree or disagree in Men's Mind, the Knowledge of Truth is not so valuable a Thing, as it is taken to be; nor worth the Pains and Time Men imploy in the search of it: since by this account, it amounts to no

more than the conformity of Words, to the Chimaeras of Men's Brains. Who knows not what odd Notions many Men's Heads are fill'd with, and what strange Ideas all Men's Brains are capable of? But if we rest here, we know the Truth of nothing by this Rule, but of the visionary World in our own Imaginations; nor have other Truth, but what as much concerns Harpies and Centaurs, as Men and Horses. For those, and the like, may be Ideas in our Heads, and have their agreement and disagreement there, as well as the Ideas of real Beings, and so have as true Propositions made about them. And 'twill be altogether as true a Proposition, to say all Centaurs are Animals, as that all Men are Animals; and the certainty of one, as great as the other. For in both the Proposi∣tions, the Words are put together according to the agreement of the Ideas in our Minds: And the agreement of the Idea of Animal, with that of Centaur, is as clear and visible to the Mind, as the agreement of the Idea of Animal, with that of Man; and so these two Propositions are equally true, equally certain. But of what use is all such Truth to us?

§. 8. Though what has been said in the fore-going Chapter, to distin∣guish real from imaginary Knowledge, might suffice here, in answer to this Doubt, to distinguish real Truth from chimerical, or (if you please,) barely nominal, they depending both on the same foundation; yet it may not be amiss here again to consider, that though our Words signifie no∣thing but our Ideas, yet being designed by them to signifie Things, the Truth they contain, when put into Propositions, will be only Verbal, when they stand for Ideas in the Mind, that have not an agreement with the reality of Things. And therefore Truth, as well as Knowledge, may well come under the distinction of Verbal and Real; that being only ver∣bal Truth wherein Terms are joined, according to the agreement or dis∣agreement of the Ideas they stand for, without regarding whether our Ideas are such as really have, or are capable of having an Exstence in Na∣ture. But then it is they contain real Truth, when these signs are joined as our Ideas agree, and when our Ideas are such, as we know are capable of having an Existence in Nature; which in Substances we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed.

§. 9. Truth is the marking down in Words, the agreement or disagree∣ment of Ideas as it is. Falshood is the marking down in Words, the agree∣ment or disagreement of Ideas otherwise than it is. And so far as these Ideas, thus marked by Sounds, agree to their Archetypes, so far only is the Truth real. The knowledge of this Truth, consists in knowing what Ideas the Words stand for, and the perception of the agreement or dis∣agreement of those Ideas, according as it is marked by these Words.

§. 10. But because Words are looked on as the great Conduits of Truth and Knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of Truth, and com∣monly in reasoning about it, we make use of Words and Propositions, I shall more at large enquire, wherein the certainty of real Truths, contai∣ned in Propositions, consists, and where it is to be had; and endeavour to shew in what sort of universal Propositions we are capable of being cer∣tain of their real Truth, or Falshood.

I shall begin with general Propositions, as those which most employ our Thoughts, and exercise our Contemplation. General Truths are most looked after by the Mind, as those that most enlarge our Knowledge; and by their comprehensiveness, satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our way to Knowledge.

§. 11. Besides Truth taken in the strict sense before-mentioned, there are other sorts of Truths; as, 1. Moral Truth, which is speaking Things according to the persuasion of our own Minds, though the Proposition we speak agree not to the reality of Things. 2. Metaphysical Truth, which is nothing but the real Existence of Things, conformable to the Ideas to which we have annexed their Names. This, though it seems to consist in the very Beings of Things, yet when considered a little nearly, will appear to include a tacit Proposition, whereby the Mind joins that parti∣cular Thing, to the Idea it had before setled with a name to it. But these Considerations of Truth, either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here only to have mentioned them.

CHAP. VI. Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

§. 1. THough the examining and judging of Ideas by themselves, their Names being quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinct Knowledge: yet through the prevailing custom of using Sounds for Ideas, I think it is very seldom practised; and every one may observe how common it is for Names to be made use of, instead of the Ideas themselves, even when Men think and reason within their own Breasts; especially if the Ideas be very complex, and made up of a great Collection of simple ones. This makes the consideration of Words and Propositions, so necessary a part of the Treatise of Knowledge, that 'tis very hard to speak intelligibly of the one, without explaining the other.

§. 2. All the Knowledge we have, being only of particular or general Truths, 'tis evident, that whatever may be done in the former of these, the latter, which is that which with Reason is most sought after, can never be well made known, and is very seldom apprehended, but as conceived and expressed in Words. It is not therefore out of our way, in the Exami∣nation of our Knowledge, to enquire into the Truth and Certainty of uni∣versal Propositions.

§. 3. But that we may not be mis-led in this case, by that which is the danger every-where, I mean by the doubtfulness of Terms, 'tis fit to ob∣serve, that Certainty is twofold; Certainty of Truth, and Certainty of Knowledge. Certainty of Truth is, when Words are so put together in Propositions, as exactly to express agreement or disagreement of the Ideas they stand for, as really it is: Certainty of Knowledge, is to per∣ceive the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, as expressed in any Propo∣sition. This we usually call knowing, or being certain of the Truth of any Proposition.

§. 4. Now because we cannot be certain of the Truth of any general Pro∣position, unless we know the precise bounds and extent of the Species its Terms stand for, it is necessary we should know the Essence of each Species, which is that which constitutes and bounds it. This, in all simple Ideas and Modes, is not hard to do: for in these, the real and nominal Essence being the same; or, which is all one, the abstract Idea, the general Term stands for, being the sole Essence and boundary, that is or can be supposed, of the Species, there can be no doubt how far the Species extends, or what Things are comprehended under each Term; which, 'tis evident,

are all that have an exact conformity with the Idea it stands for, and no other. But in Substances, where a real Essence, distinct from the nomi∣nal, is supposed to constitute, determine, and bound the Species, there the extent of the general Word is very uncertain: because not knowing this real Essence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that Species, and con∣sequently what may, or may not with certainty be affirmed of it. And thus speaking of a Man, or Gold, or any other Species of natural Sub∣stances, as supposed made by Nature, and partaking of that real Essence, which is supposed to constitute that Species, we cannot be certain of the truth of any Affirmation or Negation made of it. For Man, or Gold, ta∣ken in this sense, and used for Species of Things, constituted by real Es∣sences, different from the complex Idea in the Mind of the Speaker, stand for we know not what; and the extent of these Species, with such Boun∣daries, are so unknown and undetermined, that it is impossible, with any certainty, to affirm, that all Men are rational, or that all Gold is yel∣low. But where the nominal Essence is kept to, as the boundary of each Species, and Men extend the Application of any general Term no farther than to the particular Things, in which the complex Idea it stands for, is to be found, there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each Species, or be in doubt, on this account, whether any Proposition be true, or no. I have chose to explain this uncertainty of Propositions in this schola∣stick way, and have made use of the Terms of Essences and Species, on purpose to shew the absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them, as of any other sort of Realities, than barely abstract Ideas with Names to them. To suppose, that the Species of Things are any thing but the sorting of them under general Names, according as they agree to several abstract Ideas, of which we make those Names the Signs, is to con∣found Truth, and introduce Uncertainty into all general Propositions, that can be made about them. Though therefore these Things might, to People not possessed with scholastick Learning, be perhaps treated of, in a better and clearer way; yet those wrong Notions of Essences and Species, having got root in most Peoples Minds, who have received any tincture from the Learning, which has prevailed in this part of the World, are to be discovered and removed, to make way for that use of Words, which should convey certainty with it.

§. 5. The Names of Substances then, whe••ever made to stand for Species, which are supposed to be constituted by real Essences, which we know not, are not capable to convey Certainty to the Vnderstanding, Of the Truth of general Propositions made up of such Terms, we cannot be sure.

§. 6. On the other side, the Names of Substances, when made use of, as they should be, for the Ideas Men have in their Minds, though they carry a clear and determinate signification with them, will not yet serve us to make many universal Proposition, of whose Truth we can be certain. Not because in this use of them we are uncertain what Things are signified by them, but because the complex Ideas they stand for, are such Combina∣tions of simple ones, as carry not with them any discoverable connexion or repugnancy, but with a very few other Ideas.

§. 7. The complex Ideas, that our Names of Substances properly stand for, are Collections of such Qualities, as have been observed to co-exist: but what other Qualities necessarily co-exist with such Combinations, we cannot certainly know, unless we can discover their natural dependence; which in their primary Qualities, we can go but a very little way in; and in all their secundary Qualities, we can discover no connexion at all, for the Reasons mentioned, Chap. 3. viz. 1. Because we know not the

real Constitutions of Substances, on which each secundary Quality par∣ticularly depends. 2. Did we know that, it would serve us only for ex∣perimental (not universal) Knowledge; and reach with certainty no far∣ther, than that bare instance: because our Understandings can discover no conceivable connexion between any secundary Quality, and any modi∣fication whatsoever, of any of the primary ones. And therefore there are very few general Propositions to be made concerning Substances, which can carry with them undoubted Certainty.

§. 8. All Gold is fixed, is a Proposition whose Truth we cannot be cer∣tain of, how universally soever it be believed. For if, according to the useless Imagination of the Schools, any one supposes the term Gold to stand for a Species of Things set out by Nature, by a real Essence belong∣ing to it, 'tis evident he knows not what particular Substances are of that Species; and so cannot, with certainty, affirm any thing universally of Gold. But if he make Gold stand for a Species, determined by its nomi∣nal Essence, let the nominal Essence, for example, be the complex Idea of a Body of a certain yellow colour, malleable, susible, and heavier than any other known; in this proper use of the word Gold, there is no diffi∣culty to know what is, or is not Gold: but yet no other Quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of Gold, but what hath a dis∣coverable connexion, or inconsistency with that nominal Essence. Fixed∣ness, for example, having no necessary connexion, that we can discover, with the Colour, Weight, or any other simple Idea of our complex one, or with the whole Combination together; it is impossible that we should certainly know the Truth of this Proposition, That all Gold is fixed.

§. 9. As there is no discoverable connexion between Fixedness, and the Colour, Weight, and other simple Ideas of that nominal Essence of Gold•• so if we make our complex Idea of Gold, a Body yellow, fusible, ductile, weighty, and fixed, we shall be at the same uncertainty concerning So∣lubility in Aq. regia; and for the same reason: since we can never, from consideration of the Ideas themselves, with certainty affirm or deny, of a Body whose complex Idea is made up of yellow, very weighty, ductile, fusible, and fixed, that it is soluble in Aq. regia: and so on of the rest of its Qualities. I would gladly meet with one general Affirmation, concer∣ning any Quality of Gold, that any one can certainly know is true. It will, no doubt, be presently objected, Is not this an universal certain Pro∣position, All Gold is malleable•• To which I answer, It is a very certain Proposition, if Malleableness be a part of the complex Idea the word Gold stands for. But then here is nothing affirmed of Gold, but that that Sound stands for an Idea in which Malleableness is contained: and such a sort of Truth and Certainty as this, it is to say a Centaur is four-footed. But if Malleableness make not a part of the specifick Essence the name Gold stands for, 'tis plain, All Gold is malleable, is not a certain Proposition: be∣cause let the complex Idea of Gold, be made up of whichsoever of its other Qualities you please, Malleableness will not appear to depend on that com∣plex Idea, nor follow from any simple one contained in it. The connexion that Malleableness has (if it has any) with those other Qualities, being only by the intervention of the real Constitution of its insensible parts, which, since we know not, 'tis impossible we should perceive that connexion, unless we could discover that which ties them together.

§. 10. The more, indeed, of these co-existing Qualities we unite into one complex Idea, under one name, the more precise and determinate we make the signification of that Word: but yet never make it more capable of universal Certainty, in respect of other Qualities, not contained in our

complex Idea; since we perceive not their connexion, or dependence one on another, being ignorant both of that real Constitution in which they are all founded; and also how they flow from it. For the chief part of our Know∣ledge concerning Substances, is not as in other Things, barely of the relati∣on of two Ideas that may exist separately; but of the necessary connexion and co-existence of several distinct Ideas in the same Subject, or of their repugnancy so to co-exist. Could we begin at the other end, and disco∣ver what it was wherein that Colour consisted, what made a Body ligh∣ter or heavier, what texture of Parts made it malleable, fusible, and fixed, and fit to be dissolved in this sort of Liquor, and not in another; if (I say) we had such an Idea as this of Bodies, and could perceive wherein all sensible Qualities originally consist, and how they are produced; we might frame such abstract Ideas of them, as would furnish us with mat∣ter of more general Knowledge, and enable us to make universal Propo∣sitions, that should carry general Truth and Certainty with them. But whilst our complex Ideas of the sorts of Substances, are so remote from that internal real Constitution, on which their sensible Qualities depend, and are made up of nothing but an imperfect Collection of those appa∣rent Qualities our Senses can discover, there can be very few general Pro∣positions concerning Substances, of whose real Truth we can be certainly assured; since there are but few simple Ideas, of whose connexion and necessary co-existence, we can have certain and undoubted Knowledge. I imagine, amongst all the secundary Qualities of Substances, and the Powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whose necessa∣ry co-existence, or repugnance to co-exist, can certainly be known, un∣less in those of the same sense, which necessarily exclude one another, as I have elsewhere shewed. No one, I think, by the Colour that is in any Body, can certainly know what Smell, Taste, Sound, or tangible Qualities it has, nor what Alterations it is capable to make, or receive, on, or from other Bodies: the same may be said of the Sound, or Taste, &c. Our spe∣cifick Names of Substances, signifying any Collections of such Ideas, 'tis not to be wondred, that we can, with them, make very few general Pro∣positions of undoubted real certainty: but yet so far as any complex Idea, of any sort of Substances, contains in it any simple Idea, whose necessary co-exi∣stence with any other may be discovered, so far universal Propositions may with certainty be made concerning it: v. g. Could any one discover a necessary con∣nexion between Malleableness, and the Colour or Weight of Gold, or any other part of the complex Idea signified by that Name, he might make a certain universal Proposition concerning Gold in this respect; and the real Truth of this Proposition, That all Gold is malleable, would be as cer∣tain as of this, The three Angles of all right-lined Triangles, are equal to two right ones.

§. 11. Had we such Ideas of Substances, as to know what real Constitutions produce those sensible Qualities we find in them, and how those Qualities flowed from thence, we could, by the specifick Ideas of their real Essences in our own Minds, more certainly find out their Properties, and discover what Qualities they had, or had not, than we can now by our Senses: and to know the Properties of Gold, it would be no more necessary, that Gold should exist, and that we should make Experiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing the Properties of a Triangle, that a Triangle should exist in any Matter, the Idea in our Minds would serve for the one, as well as the other. But we are so far from being admitted into the Secrets of Nature, that we scarce so much as ever approach the first entrance towards them. For we are wont to consider the Substances we meet with, each of them, as an

entire thing by it self, having all its Qualities in it self, and independent of other Things; overlooking, for the most part, the Operations of those invisible Fluids, they are encompassed with; and upon whose Motions and operations depend the greatest part of those qualities which are taken notice of in them, and are made by us the inherent marks of Distinction, where∣by we know and denominate them. Put a piece of Gold any where by it self, let no other Body encompass it, it will immediately lose all its Co∣lour and Weight, and perhaps Malleableness too; which, for ought I know, would be changed into a perfect Friability. Water, in which to us Fluidity is an essential Quality, left to it self, would cease to be fluid. But if inanimate Bodies owe so much of their present state to other Bo∣dies without them, that they would not be what they appear to us, were those Bodies that environ them removed, it is yet more so in Vegetables, which are nourished, grow, and produce Leaves, Flowers, and Seeds, in a constant Succession. And if we look a little nearer into the state of Animals, we shall find, that their Dependence, as to Life, Motion, and the most considerable Qualities to be observed in them, is so wholly on extrinsical Causes and Qualities of other Bodies, that make no part of them, that they cannot subsist a moment without them: though yet those Bodies on which they depend, are little taken notice of, and make no part of the complex Ideas, we frame of those Animals. Take the Air but a minute from the greatest part of living Creatures, and they presently lose Sense, Life, and Motion. This the necessity of breathing has forced into our Knowledge: But how many other extrinsical, and possibly very remote Bodies, do the Springs of those admirable Machines depend on, which are not vulgarly observed, or so much as thought on; and how many are there, which the severest Enquiry can never discover? The Inhabitants of this spot of the Universe, though removed so many millions of Miles from the Sun, yet depend so much on the duly tempered motion of Particles coming from, or agitated by it, that were this Earth removed, but a small part of that distance, out of its present situation, and placed a little farther or nearer that Source of Heat, 'tis more than probable, that the greatest part of the Animals in it, would immediately perish: since we find them so often destroy'd by an excess or defect of the Sun's warmth, which an accidental position, in some parts of this our little Globe, ex∣poses them to. The Qualities observed in a Load-stone, must needs have their Source far beyond the Confines of that Body: and the ravage made often on several sorts of Animals, by invisible Causes, the certain death (as we are told) of some of them, by barely passing the Line, or, as 'tis certain of others, by being removed into a Neighbouring-Country, evident∣ly shew, that the Concurrence and Operation of several Bodies, with which they are seldom thought to have any thing to do, is absolutely necessary to make them be what they appear to us, and to preserve those Qualities we know, and distinguish them by. We are then quite out of the way, when we think, that Things contain within themselves the Qualities, that appear to us in them: And we in vain search for that Constitution within the Body of a Fly, or an Elephant, upon which depend those Qualities and Powers we observe in them; for which, perhaps, to understand them a∣right, we ought to look not only beyond this our Earth and Atmosphere, but even beyond the Sun, or remotest Star our Eyes have yet discovered: For how much the Being and Operation of particular Substances in this our Globe, depend on Causes utterly beyond our view, is impossible for us to determine. We see and perceive some of the Motions and grosser Operations of Things here about us; but whence the Streams come that

keep all these curious Machines in motion and repair, how conveyed and modified, is beyond our notice and apprehension; and the great Parts and Wheels, as I may so say, of this stupendious Structure of the Uni∣verse, may, for ought we know, have such a connexion and dependence in their Influences and Operations one upon another, that, perhaps, Things in this our Mansion, would put on quite another face, and cease to be what they are, if some one of the Stars, or great Bodies incom∣prehensibly remote from us, should cease to be, or move as it does. This is certain, Things, however absolute and entire they seem in themselves, are but Retainers to other parts of Nature, for that which they are most taken notice of by us: Their observable Qualities, Actions, and Powers, are owing to something without them; and there is not so complete and perfect a part, that we know, of Nature, which does not owe the Being it has, and the Excellencies of it, to its Neighbours; and we must look a great deal farther than the Surface of any Body, to comprehend perfectly those Qualities that are in it.

§. 12. If this be so, it is not to be wondred, that we have very imper∣fect Ideas of Substances; and that the real Essences, on which depend their Properties and Operations, are unknown to us. We cannot dis∣cover so much as the size, figure, and texture of their minute and active Parts, which is really in them; much less the different Motions and Im∣pulses made in and upon them by Bodies from without, and the Effects of them, upon which depend, and by which is formed the greatest and most remarkable part of those Qualities we observe in them, and of which our complex Ideas of them are made up. This consideration alone may set us at rest, as to all hopes of our having the Ideas of their real Es∣sences; which, whilst we want the nominal Essences we make use of in∣stead of them, will be able to furnish us but very sparingly with any general Knowledge, or universal Propositions capable of real Certainty.

§. 13. We are not therefore to wonder, if Certainty be to be found in very few general Propositions made concerning Substances: Our Know∣ledge of their Qualities and Properties go very seldom farther than our Senses reach and inform us. Possibly inquisitive and observing Men may, by strength of Iudgment, penetrate farther, and on Probabilities taken from wary Observation, and Hints well laid together, often guess right at what Experience has not yet discovered to them. But this is but guessing still; it amounts only to Opinion, and has not that certainty which is requisite to Knowledge: For all general Knowledge lies only in our own Thoughts, and consists barely in the contemplation of our own ab∣stract Ideas. Wherever we perceive any agreement or disagreement a∣mongst them, there we have general Knowledge; and by putting the Names of those Ideas together accordingly in Propositions, can with certainty pronounce general Truths. But because the abstract Ideas of Substances, for which their specifick Names stand, whenever they have any distinct and determinate signification, have a discoverable connexion or inconsistency with a very few other Ideas, the certainty of universal Propositions con∣cerning Substances, is very narrow and scanty in that part, which is our principal enquiry concerning them: and there is scarce any of the Names of Substances, let the Idea it is applied to be what it will, of which we can generally, and with certainty pronounce, that it has or has not this or that other Quality belonging to it, and constantly co-existing or inconsistent with that Idea, where-ever it is to be found.

§. 14. Before we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind, we must first know what Changes the primary Qualities of one Body, do regularly produce in the primary Qualities of another, and how. Se∣condly, we must know what primary Qualities of any Body, produce certain Sensations or Ideas in us; which, in truth, to know all the Effects of Matter, under its divers modifications of Bulk, Figure, Cohesion of Parts, Motion, and Rest; which is, I think, every body will allow, is utter∣ly impossible to be known by us, without revelation: Nor if it were re∣vealed to us, what sort of Figure, Bulk, and Motion of Corpuscles, would produce in us the Sensation of a yellow Colour, and what sort of Figure, Bulk, and Texture of Parts in the superficies of any Body, were fit to give such Corpuscles their due motion to produce that Colour, Would that be enough to make universal Propositions with certainty, concerning the several sorts of them, unless we had Faculties acute enough to perceive the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of Bodies in those minute Parts by which they operate on our Senses, and so could by those frame our abstract Ideas of them. I have mentioned here only corporeal Substances, whose Operations seem to lie more level to our Understan∣dings: For as to the Operations of Spirits, both their thinking and mo∣ving of Bodies, we at first sight find our selves at a loss; though perhaps, when we have applied our Thoughts a little nearer to the consideration of Bodies, and their Operations, and examined how far our Notions, even in these, reach with any clearness, beyond sensible matter of fact, we shall be bound to confess, that even in these too, our Discoveries amount to very little beyond perfect Ignorance and Incapacity.

§. 15. This is evident, the abstract complex Ideas of Substances, for which their general Names stand, not comprehending their real Constitu∣tions, can afford us but very little universal Certainty; they not being that on which those Qualities we observe in them, and would inform our selves about, do depend, or with which they have any certain con∣nexion. v. g. Let the Idea to which we give the name Man, be, as it commonly is, a Body of the ordinary shape, with Sense, voluntary Motion, and Reason join'd to it. This being the abstract Idea, and consequently the Essence of our Species Man, we can make but very few general cer∣tain Propositions concerning Man, standing for such an Idea. Because not knowing the real Constitution on which Sensation, power of Motion, and Reasoning, with that peculiar Shape, depend, and whereby they are uni∣ted together in the same Subject, there are very few other Qualities, with which we can perceive them to have a necessary connexion: and therefore we cannot with Certainty affirm, That all Men sleep by inter∣vals; That no Man can be nourished by Wood or Stones; That all Men will be poisoned by Hemlock: because these Ideas have no connexion nor repugnancy with this our nominal Essence of Man, with this abstract Idea that Name stands for. We must in these and the like appeal to trial in particular Subjects, which can reach but a little way. We must content our selves with Probability in the rest: but can have no general Certainty, whilst our specifick Idea of Man, contains not that real Con∣stitution, which is the root, wherein all his inseparable Qualities are uni∣ted, and from whence they flow; whilst our Idea, the word Man stands for, is only an imperfect Collection of some sensible Qualities and Pow∣ers in him, there is no discernible connexion or repugnance between our specifick Idea, and the Operation of either the Parts of Hemlock or Stones, upon his Constitution. There are Animals that safely eat Hemlock, and others that are nourished by Wood and Stones: But

as long as we want Ideas of those real Constitutions of Animals, whereon these, and the like Qualities and Powers depend, we must not hope to reach Certainty in universal Propositions concerning them. Those few Ideas only, which have a discernible connexion with our nomi∣nal Essence, or any part of it, can afford us such Propositions. But these are so few, and of so little moment, that we may justly look on our cer∣tain general Knowledge of Substances, as almost none at all.

§. 16. To conclude, General Propositions, of what kind soever, are then only capable of Certainty, when the Terms used in them, stand for such Ideas, whose agreement or disagreement, as there expressed, is ca∣pable to be discovered by us. And we are then certain of their Truth or Falshood, when we perceive the Ideas they stand for, to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another. Whence we may take notice, that general Certainty is never to be found but in our Ideas. Whenever we go to seek it elsewhere in Experiments, or Obser∣vations without us, our Knowledge goes not beyond particulars. 'Tis the contemplation of our own abstract Ideas, that alone is able to afford us general Knowledge.

CHAP. VII. Of Maxims.

§. 1. THere are a sort of Propositions, which under the name of Maxims and Axioms, have passed for Principles of Science: and because they are self-evident, have been supposed innate, without that any Body (that I know) ever went about to shew the reason and foundation of their clearness or cogency. It may however be worth while, to enquire into the reason of their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone; and also examine how far they influence and govern our other Knowledge.

§. 2. Knowledge, as has been shewn, consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas: Now where that agreement or dis∣agreement is perceived immediately by it self, without the intervention or help of any other, there our Knowledge is self-evident. This will appear to be so to any one, who will but consider any of these Propositions, which, without any proof, he assents to at first sight: for in all these he will find, that the reason of his Assent, is from that agreement or dis∣agreement the Mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those Ideas answering the Affirmation or Negation in the Proposition.

§. 3. This being so, in the next place let us consider, whether this Self-evident be peculiar only to these Propositions, which are received for Maxims, and have the dignity of Axioms allowed them; and here 'tis plain, that several other Truths, not allow'd to be Axioms, partake equally with them in this Self-evidence. This we shall see, if we go over these several sorts of agreement or disagreement of Ideas, which I have above mentioned, viz. Identity, Relation, Co-existence, and real Existence; which will discover to us, that not only those few Propositions, which have had the credit of Maxims, are self-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite number of other Propositions are such.

§. 4. For, First, the immediate perception of the agreement or disagree∣ment of Identity, being founded in the Mind's having distinct Ideas, this affords us as many self-evident Propositions, as we have distinct Ideas.

Every one that has any Knowledge at all, has, as the foundation of it, various and distinct Ideas: And it is the first act of the Mind, (with∣out which, it can never be capable of any Knowledge,) to know every one of its Ideas by it self, and distinguish it from others. This is that which every one finds in himself, that the Ideas he has knows; he knows also when any one is in his Understanding, and what it is: And when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another: Which always being so, (it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives,) he can never be in doubt when any Idea is in his Mind, that it is there, and is that Idea it is; and that two distinct Ideas, when they are in his Mind, are there, and are not one and the same Idea. So that all such Affirmations, and Negations, are made without any possibility of doubt, uncertainty, or hesitation, and must necessarily be assented to, as soon as understood; that is, as soon as we have, in our Minds, the Ideas clear and distinct, which the Terms in the Proposition stand for. It is not therefore alone to these two general Propositions, Whatsoever is, is; and, It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be, that this Self-evidence belongs by any peculiar right. The perception of being, or not being, belongs no more no these vague Ideas, signified by the terms Whatsoever, and Thing, than it does to any other Ideas. The Mind, without the help of any proof, perceives as clearly, and knows as certainly, that the Idea of White, is the Idea of White, and not the Idea of Blue; and that the Idea of White, when it is in the Mind, is there, and is not absent; and so a Triangle, Motion, a Man, or any other Ideas whatsoever. So that in respect of Identity, our intuitive Knowledge reaches as far as our Ideas: And so we are capable of making as many self-evident Propositions, as we have names for di∣stinct Ideas. And I appeal to ever one's own Mind, whether this Pro∣position, A Circle is a Circle, be not as self-evident a Proposition, as that consisting of more general terms, Whatsoever is, is: And again, whether this Proposition, Blue is not Red, be not a Proposition that the Mind can no more doubt of, as soon as it understands the Words, than it does of that Axiom, It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be? and so of all the like.

§. 5. Secondly, As to Co-existence, or such a necessary connexion be∣tween two Ideas, that in the Subject where one of them is supposed, there the other must necessarily be also: Of such agreement, or disagree∣ment as this, the Mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them. And therefore in this sort, we have but very little intuitive Knowledge: nor are there to be found very many Propositions that are self-evident, though some there are; v. g. the Idea of filling of a place equal to the Contents of its superficies, being annexed to our Idea of Body, I think it is a self-evident Proposition, That two Bodies cannot be in the same place.

§. 6. Thirdly, As to the Relations of Modes, Mathematicians have framed many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality. As Equals taken from Equals, the remainder will be Equals; which, with the rest of that kind, however they are received for Maxims by the Ma∣thematicians, and are unquestionable Truths; yet, I think, that any one who considers them, will not find, that they have a clearer self-evidence than these, that one and one, are equal to two; that if you take from the five Fingers of one Hand two, and from the five Fingers of the other Hand two, the remaining number will be equal. These, and a thousand other such Propositions, may be found in Numbers, which, at very first hea∣ring,

force the assent, and carry with them an equal, if not greater clear∣ness, than those mathematical Axioms.

§. 7. Fourthly, As to real Existence, since that has no connexion with any other of our Ideas, but that of our selves, and of a first Being, we have in that, concerning the real existence of all other Beings, not so much as de∣monstrative, much less a self-evident Knowledge: And therefore concer∣ning those there are no Maxims,

§. 8. In the next place let us consider, what influence those received Maxims have, upon the other parts of our Knowledge. The Rules establi∣shed in the Schools, that all Reasonings are ex praecognitis, & prac inces∣sis, seem to lay the foundation of all other Knowledge, in these Maxims, and to suppose them to be praecognita; whereby, I think, is meant these two things: First, That these Axioms, are those Truths that are first known to the Mind; and, secondly, That upon them, the other parts of our Knowledge depend.

§. 9. First, That they are not the Truths first known to the Mind, is evident to Experience. Who perceives not, that a Child certainly knows, that a Stranger is not its Mother; that its Sucking-bottle is not the Rod, long before he knows, that 'tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be•• And how many Truths are there about Numbers, which it is obvious to observe, that the Mind is perfectly acquainted with, and ully convinced of, before it ever thought on these general Maxims, to which Mathema∣ticians, in their Arguings, do sometimes refer them? Whereof the rea∣son is very plain: For that which makes the Mind assent to such Propo∣sitions, being nothing else but the perception it has of the agreement, or disagreement of its Ideas, according as it finds them affirmed or denied one of another, in Words it understands; and every Idea being known to be what it is, and every two distinct Ideas not to be same, it must ne∣cessarily follow, that such self-evident Truths, must be first known, which consist of Ideas that are first in the Mind: and the Ideas first in the Mind, 'tis evident, are those of particuliar Things, from whence, by slow de∣grees, the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones; which be∣ing taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Sense, are setled in the Mind, with general Names to them. Thus particular Ideas are first received and distinguished, and so Knowledge got about them: and next to them, the less general, or specifick, which are next to particular. For abstract Ideas are not so obvious or easie to Children, or the yet unexer∣cised Mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to grown Men, 'tis only because by constant and familiar use they are made so: For when we necely reflect upon them, we shall find, that general Ideas are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves, as we are apt to imagine. For example, Does it not require some pains and skill to form the general Idea of a Triangle, (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult,) for it must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, neither Equila∣teral, Equicrural, nor Scalenon; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an Idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent Ideas are put together. 'Tis true, the Mind in this imperfect state, has need of such Ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of Communication, and Enlargement of Knowledge; to both which, it is naturally very much enclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such Ideas are marks of our Imperfection; at least, this is enough to shew, that the most abstract and general Ideas, are not those that the Mind is first and most easily

acquainted with, nor such as its earliest Knowledge is conversant about.

§. 10. Secondly, From what has been said, it plainly follows, that these magni∣fied Maxims, are not the Principles and Foundations of all our other Know∣ledge. For if there be a great many other Truths, which have as much self-evi∣dence as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impossi∣ble they should be the Principles, from which we deduce all other Truths. Is it impossible to know that One and Two are equal to Three, but by vir∣tue of this, or some such Axiom, viz. the Whole is equal to all its Parts taken together? Many a one knows that One and Two are equal to Three, without having heard, or thought on that, or any other Axiom, by which it might be proved; and knows it as certainly as any other Man knows, that the Whole is equal to all its Parts, or any other Maxim, and all from the same Reason of self-evidence; the Equality of those Ideas, being as vi∣sible and certain to him without that, or any other Axiom, as with it, it needing no proof to make it perceived. Nor after the Knowledge, That the Whole is equal to all its Parts, does he know that one and two are e∣qual to three, better, or more certainly than he did before. For if there be any odds in those Ideas, the Whole and Parts are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be setled in the Mind, than those of One, Two, and Three. And indeed, I think, I may ask these Men, who will needs have all Knowledge besides those general principles themselves, to depend on general, innate, and self-evident Principles, What Principle is requisite to prove, that One and One are Two, that Two and Two are Four, that Three times Two are Six? which being known without any proof, do evince, That either all Knowledge does not depend on certain Praecognita or gene∣ral Maxims, called Principles; or else that these are Principles: and if these are to be counted Principles, a great part of Numeration will be so. To which if we add all the self-evident Propositions, may be made about all our distinct Ideas, Principles will be almost infinite, at least innume∣rable, which Men arrive to the Knowledge of, at different Ages; and a great many of these innate Principles, they never come to know all their Lives. But whether they come in view of the Mind, earlier or later, this is true of them, that they are all known by their native Evidence, are wholly in∣dependent, receive no Light, nor are capable of any proof one from ano∣ther; much less the more particular, from the more general; or the more simple, from the more compounded: the more simple, and less ab∣stract, being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier apprehended. But whichever be the clearest Ideas, the Evidence and Certainty of all such Propositions is in this, That a Man sees the same Idea to be the same Idea, and infallibly perceives two different Ideas to be different Ideas. For when a Man has in his Understanding, the Ideas of one and of two, the Idea of Yellow and the Idea of Blue, he cannot but certainly know, that the Idea of One is the Idea of One, and not the Idea of Two; and that the Idea of Yellow is the Idea of Yellow, and not the Idea of Blue. For a Man cannot confound the Ideas in his Mind, which he has distinct: That would be to have them confused and distinct at the same time, which is a contradiction: And to have none distinct, is to have no use of our Facul∣ties, to have no Knowledge at all. And therefore what Idea soever is af∣firmed of it self; or whatsoever two entire distinct Ideas are denied one of another, the Mind cannot but assent to such a Proposition, as infallibly true, as soon as it understands the Terms, without Hesititation or need of Proof, or regarding those made in more general Terms, and called Maxims.

§. 11. What shall we then say, Are these general Maxims of no use? Yes, they are of great Vse in Disputes, to stop the Mouths of Wranglers; but not of much Use to the discovery of unknown Truths, or to help the Mind forwards, in its search after Knowledge. For whoever began to build his Knowledge on this general Proposition, What is, is: or it is im∣possible for the same thing to be, and not to be; and from either of these, as from a Principle of Science, deduced a System of useful Knowledge? Wrong Opinions, often involving Contradictions, one of these Maxims, as a Touch-stone, may serve well to shew whither they lead: But yet, however fit, to lay open the Absurdity or Mistake of a Man's Reasoning or Opinion, they are of very little Use for enlightning the Understanding: And it will not be found, that the Mind receives much help from them in its Progress in Knowledge; which would be neither less, nor less cer∣tain, were these two general Propositions never thought on. 'Tis true, as I have said, they sometimes serve in Argumentation to stop a Wrang∣ler's Mouth, by shewing the Absurdity of his Opinion. But it is one thing, to shew a Man that he is in an Error; and another, to put him in possession of Truth: and I would fain know what Truths these Proposi∣tions are able to teach; and by their Influence make us know, which we did not know before, or could not know without them. Let us rea∣son from them, as well as we can, they are only about identical Predi∣cations, and influence, if any at all, none but such. Each particular Proposition concerning Identity or Diversity, is as clearly and certainly known in it self, if attended to, as either of these general ones: and there is nothing more certain, than that by these Maxims alone we cannot evi∣dence to our selves the Truth of any one thing really existing. As to other less general Maxims, many of them are no more than bare verbal Propositions, and teach us nothing but the Respect and Import of Names one to another. The Whole is equal to all its Parts, What real Truth I be∣seech you does it teach us? What more is contained in that Maxim, than what the Signification of the Word Totum, or the Whole, does of it self import? And he that knows that the Word Whole, stands for what is made up of all its Parts, knows very little less, than that the Whole is equal to all its Parts. And upon the same ground, I think that this Proposi∣tion, A Hill is higher than a Valley, and several the like, may also pass for Maxims. But yet Mathematicians do not without Reason place this, and some other such, amongst their Maxims, that their Scholars, having in the entrance perfectly acquainted their Thoughts with these Proposi∣tions, made in such general Terms, may have them ready to apply to all particular Cases: not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident than the particular Instances they are brought to confirm; but that being more familiar to the Mind, the very naming them is e∣nough to satisfie the Understanding. But this, I say, is more from our Custom of using them, than the different Evidence of the Things. But be∣fore Custom has setled Methods of Thinking and Reasoning in our Minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwise: and that the Child, when a part of his Apple is taken away, knows it better in that particular Instance, than by that general Proposition, The Whole is equal to all its Parts; and that if one of these have need to be confirmed to him by the other, the general has more need to be let into his Mind by the particular, than the particu∣lar by the general. For in particulars, our Knowledge begins, and so spreads it self, by degrees, to generals. Though afterwards, the Mind takes the quite contrary Course, and having drawn its Knowledge into as general Propositions as it can, makes those familiar to its Thoughts, and

accustoms it self to have recourse to them, as to the Standards of Truth and Falshood: by which familiar use of them, as Rules to measure the Truth of other Propositions, it comes in time to be thought, that more particular Propositions have their Truth and Evidence from their confor∣mity to these more general ones, which in Discourse and Argumentation, are so frequently urged, and constantly admitted. And this I think to be the reason why amongst so many self-evident Propositions, the most ge∣neral only have had the Title of Maxims.

§. 12. One thing farther, I think, it may not be amiss to observe con∣cerning these general Maxims, That they are so far from improving or establishing our Minds in true Knowledge, that if our Notions be wrong, loose, or unsteady, and we resign up our Thoughts rather to the sound of Words, than to setled, clear, distinct Ideas of Things: I say, these general Maxims, will serve to confirm us in Mistakes; and in such a way of use of Words, which is most common, will serve to prove Contradictions: v. g. He that, with Cartes, shall frame in his Mind an Idea of what he calls Body, to be nothing but Extension, may easily demonstrate, that there is no Vacuum; i. e. no Space void of Body, by this Maxim, What is, is. For the Idea to which he annexes the name Body, being bare Extension, his Knowledge, that Space cannot be without Body, is certain. For he knows his own Idea of Extension clearly and distinctly, and knows that it is what it is, and not another Idea, though it be called by these three names, Extension, Body, Space; which three Words standing for one and the same Idea, may, no doubt, with the same evidence and certain∣ty, be affirmed one of another, as each of it self: And it is as certain, that whilst I use them all to stand for one and the same Idea, this predi∣cation is as true and identical in its signification, that Space is Body, as this predication is true and identical, that Body is Body, both in signifi∣cation and sound.

§. 13. But if another shall come and make to himself another Idea dif∣ferent from Cartes, of the thing, which yet, with Cartes, he calls by the same name Body, and make his Idea, which he expresses by the word Body, to consist of Extension and Solidity together, he will as easily de∣monstrate, that there may be a Vacuum, or Space, without a Body, as Cartes demonstrated the contrary, because the Idea to which he gives the name Space, being bare Extension, and the Idea to which he gives the name Body, being the complex Idea of Extension and Resistibility, or Solidity together; these two Ideas are not exactly one and the same, but in the Understanding as distinct as the Ideas of One and Two, White and Black, or as of Corporeity and Humanity, if I may use those barbarous terms: And therefore the predication of them in our Minds, or in Words standing for them is not identical, but the negation of them one of ano∣ther, as certain and evident, as that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be.

§. 14. But yet though both these Propositions (as you see) may be equally demonstrated, viz. That there may be a Vacuum, and that there cannot be a Vacuum, by these two certain Principles, (viz.) What is, is; and the same thing cannot be, and not be; yet neither of these Principles will serve to prove to us that any, or what Bodies do exist; for that we are le••t to our Senses to discover to us as far as they can: Those univer∣sal and self-evident Principles, being only our constant, clear, and distinct Knowledge of our own Ideas more general or comprehensive, can assure us of nothing that passes without the Mind, their certainty is founded only upon the Knowledge we have of each Idea by its self, and of its distinction

from others; about which, we cannot be mistaken whilst they are in our Minds, though we may, and often are mistaken, when we retain the Names without the Ideas; or use them confusedly, sometimes for one, and sometimes for another Idea. In which cases, the sorce of these Axioms reaching only to the Sound, and not the Signfication of the Words, serves only to lead us into Confusion, Mistake, and Errour.

§. 15. But let them be of what use they will in verbal Propositions, they cannot discover or prove to us the least Knowledge of the Nature of Sub∣stances, as they are found and exist without us, any farther than grounded on Experience. And though the consequence of these two Propositions, called Principles, be very clear, and their use not very dangerous, or hurtful, in the probation of such Things, wherein there is no need at all of them for proof, but such as are clear by themselves without them, viz. where our Ideas are clear and distinct, and known by the Names that stand for them; yet when these Principles, viz. What is, is; and, It is im∣possible for the same thing to be, and not to be, are made use of in the pro∣bation of Propositions, wherein are Words standing for complex Ideas; v. g Man, Horse, Gold, Vertue; there they are of infinite danger, and most commonly make Men receive and retain Falshood for manifest Truth, and Uncertainty for Demonstration; upon which follows Errour, Obstinacy, and all the mischiefs that can happen from wrong reasoning. The rea∣son whereof is not, that these Principles are less true in such Propositions, consisting of Words standing for complex Ideas, than in those of simple Ideas. But because Men mistake generally, thinking such Propositions to be about the reality of Things, and not the bare signification of Words, when indeed they are, for the most part, nothing else, as is clear in the demonstration of Vacuum, where the word Body, sometimes stands for one Idea, and sometimes for another: But shall be yet made more ma∣nifest.

§. 16. As for instance: Let Man be that, concerning which you would by these first Principles demonstrate any thing, and we shall see, that so far as demonstration is by these Principles, it is only verbal, and gives us no certain universal true Proposition, or knowledge of any Being existing without us. First, a Child having framed the Idea of a Man, it is pro∣bable, that his Idea is just like that picture, which the Painter makes of the visible appearances joined together; and such a complexion of Ideas together in his Understanding, makes up the single complex Idea which he calls Man, whereof White or Flesh-colour in England being one, the Child can demonstrate to you, that a Negro is not a Man, because White-colour was one of the constant simple Ideas of the complex Idea he calls Man: and therefore he can demonstrate by the Principle, It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be, that a Negro is not a Man; the foundation of his Certainty being not that universal Proposition, which, perhaps, he never heard nor thought of, but the clear distinct perception he hath of his own simple Ideas of Black and White, which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can ever mistake, one for another, whether he knows that Maxim, or no: And to this Child, or any one who hath such an Idea which he calls Man, Can you never demonstrate that a Man hath a Soul, because his Idea of Man includes no such Notion or Idea in it? And therefore to him, the Principle of What is, is, proves not this matter; but it depends upon Collection and Observation, by which he is to make his complex Idea called Man.

§. 17. Secondly, Another that hath gone farther in framing and col∣lecting the Idea he calls Man, and to the outward Shape adds Laughter, and rational Discourse, may demonstrate, that Infants and Changelings are no Men, by this Maxim, It is impossible for the same Thing to be, and not to be: And I have discoursed with very rational Men, who have actually denied that they are Men.

§. 18. Thirdly, Perhaps, another makes us the complex Idea which he calls Man, only out of the Ideas of Body in general, and the Powers of Language and Reason, and leaves out the Shape wholly: This Man is able to demonstrate, that a Man may have no Hands, but be Quadrupes, neither of those being included in his Idea of Man; and in whatever Body or Shape he found Speech and Reason join'd, that was a Man: be∣cause having a clear knowledge of such a complex Idea, it is certain, that What is, is.

§. 19. So that, if rightly considered, I think we may say, that where our Ideas are clear and distinct, and the Names agreed on, that shall stand for each clear and distinct Idea, there is little need, or no use at all of these Ma∣xims, to prove the agreement, or disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the Truth or Falshood of such Propositions, without the help of these, and the like Maxims, will not be helped by these Maxims to do it: since he cannot be supposed to know the Truth of these Ma∣xims themselves without proof, if he cannot know the Truth of others without proof, which are as self-evident as these. And upon the very same grounds, intuitive Knowledge neither requires nor admits any proof, one part of it more than another: He that will suppose it, does take away the foundation of all Knowledge, and Certainty: And he that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his Assent to this Proposition, that Two is equal to Two, will also have need of a proof to make him admit, that What is, is. He that needs a probation to convince him, that Two is not Three, that White is not Black, that a Triangle is not a Circle, &c. or any other two clear distinct Ideas are not one and the same, will need also a demonstration to convince him, that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be.

§. 20. And as these Maxims are of little use, where we have clear and distinct Ideas, so they are, as I have shewed, of dangerous use, where our Ideas are not clear and distinct; and where we use Words that are not annexed to clear and distinct Ideas, but to such as are of a loose and wandering signification, sometimes standing for one, and sometimes for another Idea; from which follows mistake and errour, which these Ma∣xims (brought as proofs to establish Propositions, wherein the terms stand for confused or uncertain Ideas) do by their Authority confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII. Of Trifling Propositions.

§. 1. WHether the Maxims treated of in the fore-going Chapter, be of that use to real Knowledge, as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed, That there are universal Propositions; that though they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our Understandings, bring no increase to our Know∣ledge. Such are,

§. 2. First, All purely identical Propositions. These obviously, and at first blush, appear to contain no Instruction in them. For when we af∣firm the same term of it self, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real Idea, it shews us nothing, but what we must certainly know before, whether such a Proposition be either made by, or proposed to us. Indeed, that most general one, What is, is, may serve sometimes to shew a Man the absurdity he is guilty of, when by circum∣locution, or equivocal terms, he would, in particular instances, deny the same thing of it self; because no body will so openly bid defiance to com∣mon sense, as to affirm visible and direct Contradictions in plain Words: Or if he does, a Man is excused if he break off any farther discourse with him. But yet, I think, I may say, that neither that received Maxim, nor any other identical Proposition, teaches us any thing: And though in such kind of Propositions, this great and magnified Maxim, boasted to be the foundation of Demonstration, may be, and often is made use of to confirm them, yet all it proves, amounts to no more than this, That the same Word may with great certainty be affirmed of it self, without any doubt of the Truth of any such Proposition; and let me add also, without any real Knowledge.

§. 3. For at this rate, any very ignorant person, who can but make a Proposition, and knows what he means when he says Ay, or No, may make a million of Propositions, of whose Truth he may be infallibly cer∣tain, and yet not know one thing in the World thereby; v. g. what is a Soul, is a Soul•• or a Soul, is a Soul; a Spirit, is a Spirit; a Fetiche, is a Fetiche, &c. These all being equivalent to this Proposition, viz. What is, is, i. e. what hath Existence, hath Existence; or who hath a Soul, hath a Soul. What is this more than trifling with Words? It is but like a Monkey shifting his Oyster from one hand to the other; and had he had but Words, might, no doubt, have said, Oyster in right hand is subject, and Oyster in left hand is predicate: and so might have made a self-evident Proposi∣tion of Oyster, i. e. Oyster is Oyster; and yet, with all this, not have been one whit the wiser, or more knowing: and that way of handling the matter, would much at one have satisfied the Monkey's Hunger, or a Man's Understanding; and they would have improved in Knowledge and bulk together.

§. 4. Secondly, Another sort of trifling Propositions is, when a part of the complex Idea is predicated of the Name of the whole; a part of the de∣finition of the Word defined. Such are all Propositions wherein the Genus is predicated of the Species, or more comprehensive of less compre∣hensive terms•• For what Information, what Knowledge carries this Pre∣position

in it, viz. Lead is a Metal, to a Man, who knows the complex Idea the name Lead stands for. All the simple Ideas that go to the com∣plex one, signified by the term Metal, being nothing but what he before comprehended and signified by the name Lead. Indeed, to a Man that knows the signification of the word Metal, and not of the word Lead, it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word Lead, by say∣ing it is a Metal, which at once expresses several of its simple Ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a Body very heavy, fu∣sible, and malleable.

§ 5. Alike trifling it is, to predicate any other part of the Definition of the Term defined, or to affirm any one of the simple Ideas of a complex one, of the name of the whole complex Idea; as all Gold is fusible: For Fu∣sibility being one of the simple Ideas that goes to the making up the com∣plex one the sound Gold stands for, what can it be but playing with Sounds, by affirming that of the name Gold, which is comprehended in its recei∣ved signification. 'Twould be thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely as a Truth of moment, that Gold is yellow; and I see not how it is any jot more material, to say, It is fusible, unless that Quality be left out of the complex Idea, of which the sound Gold is the mark in ordinary speech. What Instruction can it carry with it, to tell one that, which he hath been told already, or he is supposed to know before: For I am supposed to know the signification of the Word another uses to me, or else he is to tell me. And if I know that the name Gold stands for this complex Idea of Body, Yellow, Heavy, Fusible, Malleable, 'twill not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a Proposition, and gravely say, All Gold is fusible. Such Propositions can only serve to shew the disingenuity of one, who will go from the definition of his own Terms, by re-minding him sometimes of it; but carry no Knowledge with them, but of the signification of Words, however certain they be.

§. 6. Every Man is an Animal, or living Body, is as certain a Proposi∣tion as can be; but no more conducing to the Knowledge of Things, than to say a Palfry is an ambling Horse, or a neighing ambling Animal, both being only about the signification of Words, and make me know but this; That Body, Sense, and Motion, or power of Sensation and Mo∣ving, are three of those simple Ideas that I always comprehend and signi∣fie by the word Man; and where they are not to be found together, the name Man belongs not to that Thing: And so of the other, that Body, Sense, and Motion, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of Voice, are some of those simple Ideas which I always comprehend, and signifie by the word Palfry; and when they are not to be found together, the name Palfry belongs not to that thing. 'Tis just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any one or more of the simple Ideas, that altogether make up that complex Idea which is called a Man, is affirmed of the term Man: v. g. suppose a Roman, signified by the word Homo: all these distinct Ideas united in one subject, Corporeitas, Sensibilitas, Potentia se movendi, Rationalitas, Risibilitas, he might, no doubt, with great certainty, universally affirm one more, or all of these together of the word Homo, but did no more than say, that the word Homo, in his Country, comprehended in its signification, all these Ideas. Much like a Romance Knight, who by the word Palfry, signified these Ideas; Body of a certain figure, four-legg'd, with sense, motion, ambling, neigh∣ing, white, used to have a Woman on his back, might, with the same certainty, universally affirm also any or all of these of the word Palfry, but did thereby teach no more, but that the word Palfry, in his, or Ro∣mance-Language,

stood for all these, and was not to be applied to any thing, where any of the••e was wanting. But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing Sense, Motion, Reason, and Laughter, were united, that Thing had actually a notion of GOD, or would be cast into a sleep by Opium, made indeed an instructive Proposition: because neither having the notion of GOD, nor being cast into sleep by Opium, being contai∣ned in the Idea signified by the word Man, we are by such Propositions taught something more than barely what the word Man stands for: And therefore the Knowledge contained in it, is more than verbal

§. 7. Before a Man makes any Proposition, he is supposed to under∣stand the terms he uses in it, or else he talks like a Parrot, only making a noise by imitation, and framing certain Sounds he has learnt of others; but not, as a rational Creature, using them for signs of Ideas he has in his Mind. The Hearer also is supposed to understand the Terms as the Speaker uses them, or else he talks jargon, and makes an untelligible noise. And therefore he tri••les with Words, who makes such a Proposition, which when it is made, contains no more than one of the Terms does, and which a Man was supposed to know before: v. g. a Triangle hath three sides, or Saffron is yellow. And this is no farther tolerable, than where a Man goes to explain his Terms, to one who is supposed or de∣clares himself not to understand him: and then it teaches only the signifi∣cation of that Word, and the use of that Sign.

§. 8. We can know then the Truth of two sorts of Propositions, with perfect certainty; the one is, of those trifling Propositions, which have a certainty in them, but 'tis but a verbal Certainty, but not instructive. And, secondly, we can know the Truth, and so may be certain in Propo∣sitions, which affirm something of another, which is a necessary conse∣quence of its precise complex Idea, but not contained in it. As that the external Angle of all Triangles, is bigger than either of the opposite inter∣nal Angles; which relation of the cutward Angle, to either of the op∣posite internal Angles, making no part of the complex Idea, signified by the name Triangle, this is a real Truth, and conveys with it instructive real Knowledge.

§. 9. We having no knowledge of what Combinations there be of simple Ideas existing together in Substances, but by our Senses, we can∣not make any universal certain Propositions concerning them, any far∣ther than our nominal Essences lead us: which being to a very few and inconsiderable Truths, in respect of those which depend on their real Constitutions, the general Propositions that are made about Substances, if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling; and if they are instru∣ctive, are uncertain, and such as we can have no knowledge of their real Truth, how much soever constant Observation and Analogy may assist our Judgments in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent Discourses, that amount yet to no∣thing. For 'tis plain, that Names of substantial Beings, as well as others, having constant and setled significations affixed to them, may, with great truth, be joined negatively and affirmatively in Propositions, as their Definitions make them fit to be so joined; and Propositions consi∣sting of such Terms•• may, with the same clearness, be deduced one from another, as those that convey the most real Truths; and all this, with∣out any knowledge of the Nature or Reality of Things existing without us. By this method, one may make Demonstrations and undoubted Pro∣positions in Words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the Knowledge of the Truth of Things; v. g. he that having learnt these following

Words, with their ordinary Acceptations annexed to them; v. g. Sub∣stance, Man, Animal, Form, Soul, Vegetative, Sensitive, Rational, may make se∣veral undoubted Propositions about the Soul, without knowing at all what the Soul really is; and of this sort, a Man may find an infinite number of Propositions, Reasonings, and Conclusions, in Books of Metaphysicks, School-Divinity, and some sort of natural Philosophy; and after all, know as little of GOD, Spirits, or Bodies, as he did before he set out.

§. 10. He that hath liberty to define, i. e. determine the signification of his Names of Substances, (as certainly every ones does in effect, who makes them stand for his own Ideas,) and makes their Significations at a venture, taking them from his own or other Men's Fansies, and not from an Examination and Enquiry into the Nature of Things themselves, may, with little trouble, demonstrate them one of another; wherein, however Things agree, or disagree, in their own Nature, he need mind nothing but his own Notions, with the Names he hath bestowed upon them: but thereby no more increases his own Knowledge, than he does his Riches, who taking a Bag of Counters, calls one in a certain place a Pound, another in another place, a Shilling, and a third in a third place, a Penny; and so proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right, and cast up a great summ, according to his Counters so placed, and standing for more or less as he pleases, without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a Pound, Shilling, or Penny is, but only that one is contained in the other twenty times, and contains the other twelve; which a Man may also do in the signification of Words, by making them in respect of one another, more, or less, or equally comprehensive.

§. 11. Though yet concerning most Words used in Discourses, especi∣ally Argumentative and Controversial, there is this more to be complai∣ned of, which is the worst sort of Trifling, and which sets us yet farther from the certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them, viz. that most Writers are so far from instructing us in the Nature and Knowledge of Things, that they use their Words loosly and uncer∣tainly, and do not, by using them constantly and steddily in the same signification, make plain and clear deductions of Words one from ano∣ther, and make their Discourses coherent and clear, (how little soever it were instructive,) which were not difficult to do, did they not find it convenient to shelter their Ignorance or Obstinacy, under the obscurity and perplexedness of their Terms; to which, perhaps, Inadvertency, and ill Custom does in many Men much contribute.

§. 12. To conclude, barely verbal Propositions may be known by these following Marks:

First, All Propositions, wherein two abstract Terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the signification of Sounds. For since no ab∣stract Idea can be the same with any other but its self, when its abstract Name is affirmed of any other Term, it can signifie no more but this, that it may, or ought to be called by that Name; or that these two Names signifie the same Idea. Thus should any one say, that Parsimony is Fru∣gality, that Gratitude is Justice; that this or that Action is, or ••s not Temperance: However specious these and the like Propositions may at first sight seem, yet when we come to press them, and examine nicely what they contain, we shall find, that it all amounts to nothing, but the signfication of those Terms.

§. 13. Secondly, All Propositions, wherein a part of the complex Idea, which any Term stands for, is predicated of that Term, are only verbal, v. g. to say, that Gold is a Metal, or heavy. And thus all Propositions, wherein more comprehensive Words, called Genera, are affirmed of subordinate, or less comprehensive, called Species, or Individuals, are barely verbal.

When by these two Rules, we have examined the Propositions, that make up the Discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of Books, we shall, perhaps, find that a greater part of them, than is usually suspected, are purely about the signification of Words, and contain nothing in them, but the Use and Application of these Signs.

This, I think, I may lay down for an infallible Rule, that where-ever the distinct Idea any Words stand for, is not known and considered, and something not contained in that Idea, is not affirmed, or denied of it, there our Thoughts stick wholly in Sounds, and are able to attain no real Truth or Falshoood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might save us a great deal of useless Amusement and Dispute; and very much shorten our trouble, and wandring in the search of real and true Knowledge.

CHAP. IX. Of our Knowledge of Existence.

§. 1. HItherto we have only considered the Essences of Things, which being only abstract Ideas, and thereby removed in our Thoughts from particular Existence, (that being the proper Operation of the Mind, in Abstraction, to consider an Idea under no other Existence, but what it has in the Understanding,) gives us no Knowledge of real Existence at all. Where by the way we take notice, that universal Propositions, of whose Truth or Falshood we can have certain Knowledge, concern not Exi∣stence; and farther, that all particular Affirmations or Negations, that would not be certain if they were made general, are only concerning Existence; they declaring only the accidental Union or Separation of Ideas in Things existing, which in their abstract Natures, have no known ne∣cessary Union or Repugnancy.

§. 2. But leaving the Nature of Propositions, and different ways of Pre∣dication to be considered more at large in another place, Let us proceed now to enquire concerning our Knowledge of the Existence of Things, and how we come by it. I say then, that we have the Knowledge of our own Existence by Intuition; of the Existence of God by Demonstration•• and of other Things by Sensation.

§. 3. As for our own Existence, we perceive it so plainly, and so certain∣ly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us, than our own Existence. I think, I reason, I feel Pleasure and Pain; Can any of these be more evident to me, than my own Existence? If I doubt of all other Things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own Existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel Pain, it is evident, I have as certain a Perception of my own Existence, as of the Existence of the Pain I feel: Or if I know I doubt, I have as certain a Perception of the Existence of the thing doubting, as of that Thought, which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence, and an inter∣nal

infallible Perception that we are. In every Act of Sensation, Reaso∣ning or Thinking, we are conscious to our selves of our own Being; and in this Matter, come not short of the highest degree of Certainty.

CHAP. X. Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a GOD.

§. 1. THough God has given us no innate Ideas of himself; though he has stamped no original Characters in our Minds, wherein we may read his Being: yet having furnished us with those Faculties, our Minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness: since we have Sense, Perception, and Reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry our selves about us. Nor can we justly com∣plain of our Ignorance in this great Point, since he has so plentifully pro∣vided us with the means to discover, and know him, so far as is necessary to the end of our Being, and the great concernment of our Happiness. But though this be the most obvious Truth that Reason discovers; and though its Evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical Certainty: yet it requires Thought and Attention; and the Mind must apply its self to a regular deduction of it from some unquestionable parts of our Knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain, and ignorant of this, as of other Proposi∣tions, which are in themselves capable of clear Demonstration. To shew therefore, that we are capable of knowing, certainly knowing that there is a God, and how we come by it, I think we need look no farther than our selves, and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own Existence.

§. 2. I think it is beyond Question, that Man has a clear Perception of his own Being; he knows certainly, that he exists, and that he is some∣thing. He that can doubt, whether he be any thing, or no, I speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure nothing; or endeavour to con∣vince Non-entity, that it were something. If any one pretend to be so sceptical, as to deny his own Existence, (for really to doubt of it, is ma∣nifes••ly impossible,) let him for me enjoy his beloved Happiness of being nothing, until Hunger, or some other Pain convince him of the contra∣ry. This then, I think, I may take for a Truth, which every ones cer∣tain Knowledge assures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. that he is something that actually exists.

§. 3. In the next place, Man knows by an intuitive Certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real Being, than it can be equal to two right Angles. If a Man knows not that Non-entity, or the Absence of all Being cannot be equal to two right Angles, it is impossible he should know any demonstration in Euclid. If therefore we know there is some real Being, and that Non-entity cannot produce any real Being, it is an evident de∣monstration, that from Eternity there has been something. Since what was not from Eternity, had a Beginning; and what had a Beginning, must be produced by something else.

§. 4. Next, it is evident, that what had its Being and Beginning from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being from another too. All the Powers it has, must be owing to, and received from the same Source. This eternal Source then of all being must also be the Source and Original of all Power; and so this eternal Being must be also the most powerful.

§. 5. Again, a Man finds in himself Perception, and Knowledge. We have then got one step farther; and we are certain now, that there is not only some Being, but some knowing intelligent Being in the World.

There was a time then, when there was no knowing Being, and when Knowledge began to be; or else, there has been also a knowing Being from Eternity. If it be said, there was a time when no Being had any Know∣ledge, when that eternal Being was void of all Understanding. I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have been any Knowledge. It being as impossible, that Things wholly void of Knowledge, and ope∣rating blindly, and without any Perception, should produce a knowing Being, as it is impossile, that a Triangle should make it self three Angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the Idea of sensless Matter, that it should put into it self Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, as it is repugnant to the Idea of a Triangle, that it should put into it self greater Angles than two right ones.

§. 6. Thus from the Consideration of our selves, and what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, That there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being; which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident, and from this Idea duly conside∣red, will easily be deduced all those other Attributes, we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being.

From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more cer∣tain Knowledge of the Existence of a GOD, than of any thing our Senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certanly know that there is a GOD, than that there is any thing else without us When I say we know, I mean there is such a Knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our Minds to that, as we do to several other Enquiries.

§. 7. How far the Ideas of a most perfect Being, which a Man may frame in his Mind, does, or does not prove the Existence of a God, I will not here examine. For in the different Make of Men's Tempers, and Application of their Thoughts, some Arguments prevail more on one, and some on another, for the Confirmation of the same Truth. But yet, I think, this I may say, that it is an ill way of establishing this Truth, and silencing Atheists, to lay the whole stress of so important a Point, as this, upon that sole Foundation: and take some Men's having that Idea of God in their Minds, (for 'tis evident, some Men have none, and some worse than none, and the most very different,) for the only proof of a Deity; and out of an over fondness of that Darling Invention, cashier, or at least endeavour to invalidate all other Arguments, and forbid us to hearken to those proofs, as being weak, or fallacious, which our own Exi∣stence, and the sensible parts of the Universe, offer so clearly, and cogent∣ly to our Thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering Man to withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a Truth, as can any where be delivered, That the invisible Things of God, are clearly seen from the Creation of the World, being understood by the Things that are made, even his Eternal Power, and God-head. Though our own Being furnishes us, as I have shewn, with an evident, and incontestable proof of a Deity. And I beleive no Body can avoid the Cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it, as to any other Demonstration of so many parts: yet this being so fundamental a Truth, and of that Consequence, that all Religion and genuine Morality depend thereon, I doubt not but

I shall be forgiven by my Reader, if I go over some parts of this Argu∣ment again, and enlarge a little more upon them.

§. 8. There is no Truth more evident, than that something must be from Eternity. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a Contradiction, as a Time, wherein there was perfectly nothing. This being of all Absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect Negation and Absence of all Beings, should ever produce any real Existence.

It being then unavoidable for all rational Creatures, to conclude, that something has existed from Eternity. Let us next see what kind of thing that must be.

§. 9. There are but two sorts of Beings in the World, that Man knows or conceives.

First, Such as are purely material, without Sense, Perception, or Thought, as the clippings of our Beards, and paring of our Nails.

Secondly, Sensible, thinking, perceiving Beings, such as we find our selves to be, which if you please, we will hereafter call cogitative and in∣cogitative Beings; which to our present purpose, if for nothing else, are, perhaps, better Terms, than material and immaterial.

§. 10. If then there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of Being it must be. And to that, it is very obvious to Reason, that it must necessarily be a cogitative Being. For it is as impossible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative Matter should produce a thinking intelligent Being, as that nothing should of it self produce Matter. Let us suppose any part of Matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in it self, able to produce nothing. For Example; let us suppose the Matter of the next Peble, we meet with, eternal, closely united, and the parts firmly at rest together, if there were no other Being in the World, Must it not eternally remain so, a dead inactive Lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add Motion to it self, being purely Matter, or produce any thing? Matter then, by its own Strength, cannot produce in it self so much as Motion: the Motion it has, must also be from Eternity, or else be produced, and added to Matter by some other Being more powerful than Matter; Matter, as is evi∣dent, having no•• Power to produce Motion in it self. But let us suppose Motion eternal too; yet Matter, incogitative Matter and Motion, whate∣ver changes it might produce of Figure and Bulk, could never produce Thought: Knowledge will still be as far beyond the Power of Motion and Matter to produce, as Matter is beyond the Power of nothing to produce. And I appeal to every one's own Thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive Matter produced by nothing, as Thought to be produced by pure Matter, when before there was no such thing as Thought, or an intel∣ligent Being existing. Divide Matter into as minute parts as you will, (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it,) vary the Figure and Motion of it, as much as you please, a Globe, Cube, Cone, Prism, Cylinder, &c. whose Diametres are but 1000000th part of a Gry(α) 1.1 will operate no otherwise upon other Bodies of proportionable Bulk, than those of an inch or foot Diametre; and you may as ra∣tionally expect to produce Sense, Thought, and Knowledge, by putting together in a certain Figure and Motion gross Particles of Matter, as by those that are the very minutest, that do any where exist. They knock, impell, and resist one another, just as the greater do, and that is all they can do. So that

if we will suppose nothing first, or eternal, Matter can never begin to be: If we suppose bare Matter, without Motion, eternal, Motion can never begin to be: If we suppose only Matter and Motion first, or eternal, Thought can never begin to be. Whatsoever therefore is eternal, must be a cogitative Being, a Spirit: Whatsoever is first of all Things, must ne∣cessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the Perfections that can ever after exist: nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not, either actually in it self, or at least in a higher degree.

§. 11. If therefore it be evident, that something necessarily must exist from Eternity, 'tis also as evident, that that Something must necessarily be a cogitative Being: For it is as impossible, that incogitative Matter should produce a cogitative Being, as that nothing, or the negation of all Being, should produce a positive Being, or Matter.

§. 12. Though this discovery of the necessary Existence of an eternal Mind, do sufficiently lead us into the Knowledge of a GOD; since it will hence follow, that all other knowing Beings that have a beginning, must depend on him, and have no other ways of Knowledge, or extent of Power, than what he gives them: and therefore if he made those, he made also the less-excellent pieces of this Universe, all inanimate Beings, whereby his Omniscience, Power, and Providence, will be established, and all his other Attributes necessarily follow: yet to clear up this a little farther, we will see what Doubts can be raised against it.

§. 13. First, Perhaps it will be said, that though it be as clear as de∣monstration can make it, that there must be an eternal Being, and that Being must also be knowing: Yet i•• does not follow, but that thinking Being may also be material. Let it be so; it equally still follows, that there is a GOD. For if there be an Eternal, Omniscient, Omnipotent Being, it is certain, that there is a GOD, whether you imagine that Being to be material, or no. But herein, I suppose, lies the danger and de∣ceit of that Supposition: There being no way to avoid the demonstra∣tion, that there is an eternal knowing Being, Men, devoted to Matter, would willingly have it granted, that this knowing Being is material; and then letting slide out of their Minds, or the Discourse, the demonstration whereby an eternal knowing Being was proved necessarily to exist, would argue all to be Matter, and so deny a GOD, that is, an eternal cogitative Being: whereby they are so far from establishing, that they destroy their own Hypothesis. For if there can be, in their Opinion, eternal Matter, without an eternal cogitative Being, they manifestly separate Matter and Thinking, and suppose no necessary connexion of the one with the other, and so establish the necessity of an eternal Spirit, but not of Matter; since it has been proved already, that an eternal cogitative Being, is unavoidably to be granted. Now if Thinking and Matter may be sepa∣rated, the eternal Existence of Matter, will not follow from the eternal Exi∣stence of a cogitative Being, and they suppose it to no purpose.

§. 14. But now let us see how they can satisfie themselves, or others, that this eternal thinking Being is material.

First, I would ask them, Whether they imagine, that all Matter, every particle of Matter, thinks? This, I suppose, they will scarce say; since then there would be as many eternal thinking Beings, as there are Par∣ticles of Matter, and so an infinity of Gods. And yet if they will not allow Matter as Matter; that is, every Particle of Matter to be as well cogitative, as extended, they will have as hard a task to make out to their own Reason, cogitative Being out of incogitative Particles, as an extended Being, out of unextended Parts, if I may so speak.

§. 15. Secondly, If all Matter do not think, I next ask, Whether it be only one Atom that does so? This has as many Absurdities as the other; for then this Atom of Matter, must be alone eternal, or not. If this alone be eternal, then this alone, by its powerful Thought, or Will, made all the rest of Matter. And so we have the creation of Matter by a power∣ful Thought, which is that the Materialists stick at. For if they suppose one single thinking Atom, to have produced all the rest of Matter, they cannot ascribe that Pre-eminency to it upon any other account, than that of its Thinking, the only supposed difference. But allow it to be by some other way, which is above our conception, it must be still Crea∣tion; and these Men must give up their great Maxim, Ex nihilo nil fit. If it be said, that all the rest of Matter is equally eternal, as that thinking Atom, it will be to say any thing at pleasure, though never so absurd: For to suppose all Matter eternal, and yet one small particle in Knowledge and Power infinitely above all the rest, is without any the least appearance of Reason to frame any Hypothesis: Every particle of Matter, as Matter, is capable of all the same Figures and Motions of any other; and I challenge any one in his Thoughts, to add any Thing else to one above another.

§. 16. Thirdly, If then neither one peculiar Atom alone, can be this eternal thinking Being; nor all Matter, as Matter; i. e. every particle of Matter can be it, it only remains, that it is some certain System of Matter duly put together, that is this thinking eternal Being. This is that which, I imagine, is that Notion which Men are aptest to have of GOD, who would have him a material Being, as most readily suggested to them, by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves, and other Men, which they take to be material thinking Beings. But this Imagination, however more natural, is no less absurd than the other: For to suppose the eternal thinking Being, to be nothing else but a composition of Particles of Matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to ascribe all the Wisdom and Knowledge of that eternal Being, only to the juxta-position of parts; than which, no∣thing can be more absurd. For unthinking Particles of Matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new relation of Position, which 'tis impossible should give thought and knowledge to them.

§. 17. But farther, this corporeal System either has all its parts at rest, or it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its Thinking consists. If it be perfectly at rest, it is but one lump, and so can have no privileges above one Atom.

If it be the motion of its parts, on which its Thinking depends, all the Thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental, and limitted; since all the Particles that by Motion cause Thought, being each of them in it self without any Thought, cannot regulate its own Motions, much less be regulated by the Thought of the whole; since that Thought is not the cause of Motion, (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without it,) but the consequence of it, whereby Freedom, Power, Choice, and all rational and wise thinking or acting, will be quite taken away: So that such a thinking Being, will be no better nor wiser, than pure blind Mat∣ter; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind Matter, or into Thought depending on unguided motions of blind Mat∣ter, is the same thing; not to mention the narrowness of such Thoughts and Knowledge, that must depend on the motion of such parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more Absurdities and Impossibili∣ties in this Hypothesis, (however full of them it be,) than that before-mentioned; since let this thinking System be all, or a part of the Mat∣ter of the Universe, it is impossible that any one Particle, should either

know its own, or the motion of any other Particle, or the Whole know the motion of every Particular; and so regulate its own Thoughts or Mo∣tions, or indeed have any Thought resulting from such Motion.

§. 18. Others would have Matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This, tho' it take not away the Being of a God, yet since it denies one and the first great piece of his Work∣manship, the Creation, let us consider it a little. Matter must be allow'd eter∣nal: Why? Because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing, why do you not also think your self eternal? You will answer, perhaps, Because about twenty or forty years since, you began to be. But if I ask you, what that You is, which began to be, you can scarce tell me. The Matter whereof you are made, began not then to be: for if it did, then it is not eternal: But it began to be put together in such a fashion and frame, as makes up your Body; but yet that frame of Particles, is not You, it makes not that thinking Thing You are; (for I have now to do with one, who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking Being, but would have unthinking Matter eternal too;) therefore when did that thinking Thing begin to be? If it did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking Thing from Eternity; the absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one who is so void of Understanding, as to own it. If therefore you can allow a thinking Thing, to be made out of no∣thing, (as all Things that are not eternal must be,) why also can you not allow it possible, for a material Being to be made out of nothing, by an equal Power, but that you have the experience of the one in view, and not of the other? Though, when well considered, Creation of one, as well as t'other, requires an equal Power: And we have no more reason to boggle at the effect of that Power in one, than in the other; because the manner of it in both, is equally beyond our comprehension. For the Creation, or beginning of any one thing out of nothing, being once ad∣mitted, the Creation of every thing else, but the CREATOR Himself, may, with the same ease, be supposed.

§. 19. But you will say, Is it not impossible to admit of the making any thing out of nothing, since we cannot possibly conceive it? I answer, No: 1. Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite Being, be∣cause we cannot comprehend its Operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive their Pro∣duction, we cannot conceive how Thought (or any thing but motion in Body) can move Body: and yet that is not a Reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constant Experience we have of it in our selves, in all our voluntary Motions which are produced in us, only by the free Thoughts of our own Minds; and are not, nor cannot be the effects of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind Matter, in or upon our Bodies; for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter it. For example: My right Hand writes, whilst my left Hand is still: What causes rest in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my Will, a Thought of my Mind; my Thought only changing, the right Hand rests and the left Hand moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied: Explain this, and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to understand Creation. In the mean time, 'tis an overvaluing our selves, to reduce all to the narrow measure of our Capacities; and to con∣clude, all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds our Comprehension. This is to make our Comprehension infinite, or GOD finite, when what he can do, is limitted to what we can con∣ceive of it. If you do not understand the Operations of your own finite

Mind, that thinking Thing within you, do not deem it strange, that you cannot comprehend the Operations of that eternal infinite Mind, who made and governs all Things, and whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain.

CHAP. XI. Of our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.

§. 1. THe Knowledge of our own Being, we have by intuition. The Existence of a GOD, Reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shewn.

The Knowledge of the Existence of any other thing, we can have only by Sensation: For there being no necessary connexion of real Existence, with any Idea a Man hath in his Memory, nor of any other Existence but that of GOD, with the Existence of any particular Man; no parti∣cular Man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only when by actual operating upon him, it makes it self perceived by him. For the having the Idea of any thing in our Mind, no more proves the Existence of that Thing, than the picture of a Man evidences his being in the World, or the Visions of a Dream make thereby a true History.

§. 2. 'Tis therefore the actual receiving of Ideas from without, that gives us notice of the Existence of other Things, and makes us know, that something doth exist at that time without us, which causes that Idea in us, though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it: For it takes not from the certainty of our Senses, and the Ideas we re∣ceive by them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produ∣ced: v. g. whilst I write this, I have, by the Paper affecting my Eyes, that Idea produced in my Mind; which whatever Object causes, I call White; by which I know, that that Quality or Accident (i. e. whose appearance before my Eyes, always causes that Idea) doth really exist, and hath a Being without me. And of this, the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which my Faculties, can attain, is the Testimony of my Eyes, which are the proper and sole Judges of this thing, and whose Te∣stimony I have reason to rely on, as so certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I see White and Black, and that something really exists, that causes that Sensation in me, than that I write or move my Hand; which is a Certainty as great, as humane Nature is capable of, concerning the Existence of any Thing, but a Man's self alone, and of GOD.

§. 3. The notice we have by our Senses, of the existing of Things without us, though it be not altogether so certain, as our intuitive Knowledge, or the Deductions of our Reason, employ'd about the clear abstract Ideas of our own Minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of Know∣ledge, if we persuade our selves, that our Faculties act and inform us right, concerning the existence of those Objests that affect them, it can∣not pass for an ill-grounded confidence. For I think no body can, in ear∣nest, be so sceptical, as to be uncertain of the Existence of those Things he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far, (whatever he may have with his own Thoughts) will never have any Controversies with me; since he can never be sure I say any thing contrary to his Opinion.

As to my self, I think GOD has given me assurance enough of th•• ••••i∣stence of Things without me: since by their different application, I ••an produce in my self both Pleasure and Pain, which is one great Concern∣ment of my present state. This is certain, the confidence that our Fa∣culties do not herein deceive us, is the greatest assurance we are capable of, concerning the Existence of material Beings. For we cannot act any thing, but by our Faculties; nor talk of Knowledge it self, but by the help of those Faculties which are fitted to apprehend even what Know∣ledge is. But besides the assurance our Senses themselves give us, that they do not err in the Information they give us, of the Existence of Things without us, when they are affected by them, we are farther confirmed in this assurance, by other concurrent Reasons.

§ 4. First, 'Tis plain, those Perceptions are produced in us, by exte∣riour Causes affecting our Senses: Because those that want the Organs of any Sense, never can have the Ideas belonging to that Sense produced in their Minds. This is too evident to be doubted: and therefore we cannot but be assured, that they come in by the Organs of that Sense, and no other way. The Organs themselves, 'tis plain, do not produce them: for then the Eyes of a Man in the dark, would produce Colours, and his Nose smell Roses in the Winter: but we see no body gets the relish of a Pine-apple, till he goes to the Indies where it is, and tastes it.

§. 5. Secondly, Because sometimes I find, that I cannot avoid the having those Ideas produced in my Mind. For though when my Eyes are shut, or Windows fast, I can at Pleasure re-call to my Mind the Ideas of Light, or the Sun, which former Experience had lodg'd in my Memory; so I can at pleasure lay by that Idea, and take into my view that of the smell of a Rose, or taste of Sugar. But if I turn my Eyes at noon towards the Sun, I cannot avoid the Ideas, which the Light, or Sun, then produces in me. So that there is a manifest difference, between the Ideas laid up in my Memory; (over which, if they were there only, I should have constantly the same power to dispose of them, and lay them by at plea∣sure) and those which force themselves upon me, and I cannot avoid ha∣ving. And therefore it must needs be some exteriour cause, and the brisk acting of some Objects without me, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those Ideas in my Mind, whether I will, or no. Besides, there is no body who doth not perceive the difference in himself, between con∣templating the Sun, as he hath the Idea of it in his Memory. And actually looking upon it: Of which two, his perception is so distinct, that sew of his Ideas are more distinguishable one from another. And therefore he hath certain knowledge, that they are not both Memory, or the Actions of his Mind, and Fancies only within him; but that actual seeing hath a Cause without.

§. 6. Thirdly, Add to this, that many of those Ideas are produced in us with pain, which afterwards we remember without the least offence. Thus the pain of Heat or Cold, when the Idea of it is revived in our Minds, gives us no disturbance; which, when felt, was very troublesome, and is again, when actually repeated•• which is occasioned by the disorder the ex∣ternal Object causes in our Bodies, when applied to it: And we remem∣ber the pain of Hunger, Thirst, or the Head-ach, without any pain at all; which would either never disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but Ideas floating in our Minds, and Appearances entertaining our Fancies, without the real Existence of Things affecting us from abroad. And though mathemati∣cal

demonstrations depend not upon sense, yet the examining them by Diagrams, gives great credit to the Evidence of our Sight, and seems to give it a Certainty approaching to that to the Demonstration it self. For it would be very strange, that a Man should allow it for an undeniable Truth, that two Angles of a Figure, which he measures by Lines and Angles of a Diagram, should be bigger one than the other; and yet doubt of the Existence of those Lines and Angles, which by looking on, he makes use of to measure that by.

§. 7. Fourthly, Our Senses, in many cases, bear witness to the Truth of each other's report, concerning the Existence of sensible Things without us. He that sees a Fire, may, if he doubt whether it be any thing more than a bare Fancy, feel it too; and be convinced, by putting his Hand in it. Which certainly could never be put into such exquisite pain, by a bare Idea or Phantom, unless that the pain be a fancy too: Which yet he cannot, when the Burn is well, by raising the Idea of it, bring upon himself again.

Thus I see, whilst I write this, I can change the Appearance of the Paper; and by designing the Letters, tell before-hand what new Idea it shall exhibit the very next moment, barely by my drawing the Pen over it: which will neither appear (let me fansie as much as I will) if my Hand stand still; or though I move my Pen, if my Eyes be shut: Nor when those Characters are once made on the Paper, can I chuse after∣wards but see them as they are; that is, have the Ideas of such Letters as I have made. Whence it is manifest, that they are not barely the Sport and Play of my own Imagination, when I find, that the Characters that were made at the pleasure of my own Thoughts, do not obey them; nor yet cease to be, whenever I shall fansie it, but continue to affect my Sen∣ses constantly and regularly, according to the Figures I made them. To which if we will add, that the sight of those shall, from another Man, draw such Sounds, as I before-hand design they shall stand for, there will be little reason left to doubt, that those Words, I write, do really exist without me, when they cause a long series of regular Sounds to affect my Ears, which could not be the effect of my Imagination, nor could my Memory retain them in that order.

§. 8. But yet if after all this, any one will be so sceptical as to distrust his Senses, and to affirm, that all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole Being, is but the series and deluding appea∣rances of a long Dream, whereof there is no reality; and therefore will question the Existence of all Things, or our Knowledge of any thing: I must desire him to consider, that if all be a Dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the Question; and so it is not much matter that a Man should answer. But yet, if he please, he may dream that I make this answer, That the certainty of Things existing in rerum Naturâ, when we have the testimony of our Senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our Condition needs. For our Faculties being suited not to the full extent of Being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive Knowledge of things, free from all doubt and scruple; but to the preservation of us in, whom they are; and accommodated to the use of Life: they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of those Things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a Candle burning, and hath experimented the force of its Flame, by putting his Finger in it, will little doubt, that this is something existing without him, which does him harm, and puts him to great pain; which is assurance enough, when no Man requires greater certainty to govern his Actions

by, than what is as certain as his Actions themselves. And if our Dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass Fornace, be barely a wandring Imagination in a drowsie Man's F••ncy, by putting his Hand into it, he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish, that it is something more than bare Imagination•• So that this evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us, as our Pleasure or Pain; i. e. Happiness or Misery; beyond which, we have no concernment, either of Knowing or Being. Such an assurance of the Exi∣stence of Things without us, is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the Good, and avoiding the Evil which is caused by them, which is the im∣portant concernment we have of being made acquainted with them.

§. 9. In fine then, when our Senses do actually convey into our Under∣standings any Idea, we are well assured that there doth something at that time really exist without us, which doth affect our Senses, and by them give notice of its self to our apprehensive Faculties, and actually pro∣duce that Idea which we then perceive; and we cannot so far distrust their Testimony, as to doubt that such Collections of simple Ideas, as we have observed by our Senses to be united together, do really exist together. But this Knowledge extends as far as the present Testimony of our Senses, employ'd about particular Objects that do then affect them, and no farther. For if I saw such a Collection of simple Ideas, as is wont to be called Man, existing together one minute since, and am now alone, I cannot be sure that the same Man exists now, since there is no necessary connexion of his Existence a minute since, with his Existence now: by a thousand ways he may cease to be, since I had the Testimony of my Sen∣••es for his Existence. And if I cannot be sure, that the Man I saw last to day, is now in being, I can be less sure that he is so, who hath been lon∣ger removed from my Senses, and I have not seen since yesterday, or since the last year, and much less can I be certain of the Existence of Men that I never saw. And therefore though it be highly probable, that Millions of Men do now exist, yet whilst I am alone writing of this, I have no un∣questionable Knowledge of it; though the great likelihood of it puts me past doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon the con∣fidence that there are Men (and Men also of my acquaintance, with whom I have to do) now in the World: But this is but Probability, not Knowledge.

§. 10. Whereby yet we may observe, how foolish and vain a thing it is, for a Man of narrow Knowledge, who having Reason given him to judge of the different evidence and probability of Things, and to be sway'd ac∣cordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect Demonstration and Certainty in things not capable of it; and refuse Assent to very rational Propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear Truths, because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the least (I will not say Rea∣son, but) pretence of doubting. He that in ordinary Affairs of Life, would admit of nothing but direct plain Demonstration, would be sure of no∣thing in this World, but perishing quickly. The wholesomness of his Meat or Drink, would be scarce capable of certainty enough to give him reason to venture on it: And I would fain know what 'tis he could do up∣on such grounds as were capable of no doubt, no Objections.

§. 11. As when our Senses are actually employ'd about any Object, we do know that it does exist; so by our Memory we may be assured, that heretofore Things that affected our Senses, have existed. And thus we have knowledge of the past Existence of several Things, whereof our Senses having informed us, our Memories still retain the Ideas; and of this, we

are past all doubt, so long as we remember well. But this Knowledge also reaches no farther than our Senses have formerly assured us. Thus seeing Water at this instant, 'tis an unquestionable Truth to me that Water doth exist: and remembring that I saw it yesterday, it will also be always true; and as long as my Memory retains it, always an undoubted Propo∣sition to me, that Water did exist 10th. Iuly, 1688. as it will also be equally true, that a certain number of very fine Colours did exist, which at the same time I saw upon a bubble of that Water: But being now quite out of the sight both of the Water and Bubles too, it is no more certainly known to me that the Water doth exist, than that the Bubbles or Colours therein; it being no more necessary that Water should exist to day, be∣cause it existed yesterday, than that the Colours or Bubbles exist to day, because they existed yesterday, though it be exceedingly much more pro∣bable, because Water hath been observed to continue long in Existence, but Bubbles, and the Colours on them quickly cease to be.

§. 12. What Ideas we have of Spirits, and how we come by them, I have already shewn: But though we have those Ideas in our Minds, and know we have them there, the having the Ideas of Spirits, does not make us know that any such Things do exist without us, or that there are any finite Spirits, or any other spiritual Beings, but the eternal GOD. We have ground from revelation, and several other Reasons, to believe with assurance, that there are such Creatures; but our Senses not being able to discover them, we want the means of knowing their particular Existen∣ces. For we can no more know that there are finite Spirits really exi∣sting, by the Idea we have of such Beings in our Minds, than by the Ideas any one has of Fairies, or Centaurs, he can come to know, that Things answering those Ideas, do really exist.

And therefore concerning the Existence of finite Spirits, as well as se∣veral other Things, we must content our selves with the Evidence of Faith, but universal certain Propositions concerning this matter, are be∣yond our reach. For however true it may be, v. g. that all the intelligent Spirits that GOD ever created, do still exist; yet it can never make a part of our certain Knowledge. These, and the like Propositions, we may assent to, as highly probable, but are not, I fear, in this s••ate, capable of knowing. We are not then to put others upon demonstrating, nor our selves upon search of universal Certainty in all those matters, wherein we are not capable of any other Knowledge, but what our Senses give us in this or that particular.

§. 13. By which it appears, that there are two sorts of Propositions; one concerning the Existence of any thing answerable to such an Idea: as having the Idea of an Elephant, Phoenix, Motion, or an Angel, in my Mind, the first and natural enquiry is, Whether such a thing does any where exist? And this Knowledge is only of Particulars. No existence of any thing without us, but only of GOD, can certainly be known farther than our Senses inform us. There is another fort of Propositions, wherein is expressed the Agreement, or Disagreement of our abstract Ideas, and their dependence one on another; and such Propositions may be universal and certain: So having the Idea of GOD and my self, of Fear and Obedience, I cannot but be sure that GOD is to be feared and obeyed by me: and this Proposition will be certain, concerning Man in general, if I have made an abstract Idea of such a Species, whereof I am one particular. But yet this Proposition, how certain soever, that Men ought to fear and obey, GOD proves not to me the Existence of Men in the World, but will be true of all such Creatures, whenever they do

exist: Which certainty of such general Propositions, depends on the Agreement or Disagreement is to be discovered in those abstract Ideas.

§. 14. In the former case, our Knowledge is the consequence of the Existence of Things producing Ideas in our Minds by our Senses•• in the latter, Knowledge is the consequence of the Ideas that are in our Minds whatsoever they are, and produce general certain Propositions, many whereof are called aeter••ae Veritates; and are indeed so, not from being written in the Minds of all Men, or that they were before the World: But wheresoever we can suppose such a Creature as Man is en∣dowed with such Faculties, and thereby furnished with such Ideas as we have, we must conclude he must needs, when he applies his Thoughts to the consideration of his Ideas, know the Truth of certain Propositions that will arise from the Agreement, or Disagreement, he will perceive amongst them. For Names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same Ideas; and the same Ideas having immutably the same Habitudes one to another, Propositions, concerning any abstract Ideas that are on••e true, must needs be eternal Verities.

CHAP. XII. Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

§. 1. IT having been the common received Opinion amongst Men of Letters, that Maxims were the foundations of all Knowledge; and that the Sciences were each of them built upon certain praecognita, from whence the Understanding was to take its rise, and by which it was to conduct it self, in its enquiries into the matters belonging to that Science, the beaten road of the Schools, has been to lay down in the begin∣ning, one or more general Propositions, as Foundations whereon to build the Knowledge was to be had of that Subject. These Doctrines thus laid down for Foundations of any Science, were called Principles, as the be∣ginnings from which we must set out, and look no farther backwards in our Enquiries, but take these for certain and unquestionable Truths, and established Principles.

§. 2. That which gave occasion to this way of proceeding in other Sciences, was (as I suppose) the good success it seemed to have in Mathe∣maticks, wherein Men, being observed to attain a great certainty of Knowledge, these Sciences came by pre-eminence to be called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Learning, or things learn'd, throughly learn'd, as having of all other the greatest certainty, clearness, and evidence in them.

§. 3. But if any one will consider, he will (I guess) find, that the great advancement and certainty of real Knowledge Men arrived to in these Sciences, was not owing to the influence of their Principles, nor derived from any peculiar advantage they received from two or three general Maxims laid down in the beginning; but from the clear, distinct, compleat Ideas their Thoughts were employ'd about, and the relation of Equality and Excess so clear between some of them, that they had an intuitive Knowledge, and by that a way to discover it in others, and this without the help of those Maxims. For I ask, Is it not possible for a young Lad to know, that his whole Body is bigger than his little Finger, but by virtue of this Axiom, that the whole is bigger than a part; nor be assured of it,

till he has learned that Maxim? Or cannot a Country-Wench know, that having received a Shilling from one that owes her three, and a Shilling also from another that owes her three, that the remaining Debts in each of their hands are equal; cannot she know this, I say, without she fetch the certainty of it from this Maxim, That if you take Equals from Equals, the remainder will be Equals; a Maxim which possibly the never heard or thought of? I desire any one to consider which is known first and clearest by most People; the particular Instance, or the general Rule; and which it is that gives Life and Birth to the other. These general Rules are but the comparing our more general and abstract Ideas, which are the Work∣manship of the Mind, made, and Names given to them for the easier dis∣patch in its Reasonings, and drawing into comprehensive Terms, and short Rules, its various and multiplied Observations: But Knowledge be∣gan in the Mind, and was founded on Particulars; though afterwards, perhaps, no notice be taken thereof; it being natural for the Mind (for∣ward still to enlarge its Knowledge) most attentively to lay up those ge∣neral Notions, and make the proper use of them, which is to disburthen the Memory of the cumbersome load of Particulars.

§. 4. But be it in the Mathematicks as it will, whether it be clearer, that taking an Inch from a black Line of two Inches, and an Inch from a red Line of two Inches, the remaining parts of the two Lines will be equal, or that if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be equals: Which, I say, of these two is the clearer and first known, I leave to any one to determine, it not being material to my present occasion. That which I have here to do, is to enquire, whether if it be the readiest way to Know∣ledge•• to begin with general Maxims, and build upon them, it be yet a safe way to take the Principles, which are laid down in any other Sci∣ence, as unquestionable Truths; and so receive them without examina∣tion, and adhere to them, without suffering them to be doubted of, be∣cause Mathematicians have been so happy, or so fair, to use none but self-evident and undeniable. If this be so, I know not what may not pass for Truth in Morality, what may not be introduced and improved in Na∣tural Philosophy.

Let that Principle of some of the old Philosophers, That all is Matter, and that there is nothing else, be received for certain and indubitable, and it will be easie to be seen by the Writings of some that have revived it again in our days, what consequences it will lead us into. Let any one, with Polemo, take the World; or, with the Stoicks, the AEther, or the Sun; or, with Aneximenes, the Air, to be God; and what a Divinity, Religion, and Worship must we needs have! Nothing can be so dangerous, as Principles thus taken up without questioning or examination; especially if they be such as concern Morality, which influence Men's Lives, and give a biass to all their Actions. Who might not justly expect another kind of Life in Aristippus, who placed Happiness in bodily Pleasure; and in Antisthenes, who made Vertue sufficient to Felicity? And he who, with Plato, shall place Beatitude in the Knowledge of GOD, will have his Thoughts raised to other Contemplations, than those who look not beyond this spot of Earth, and those perishing Things are to be had in it. He that, with Archelaus, shall lay it down as a Principle, That Right and Wrong, Honest and Dishonest, are defined only by Laws, and not by Na∣ture, will have other measures of moral Rectitude and Pravity, than those who take it for granted, that we are under Obligations antecedent to all humane Constitutions.

§. 5. If therefore those that pass for Principles, are not certain, (which we must have some way to know, that we may be able to distinguish them from those that are doubtful,) but are only made so to us by our blind assent we are liable to be misled by them; and instead of being gui∣ded into Truth, we shall, by Principles, be only confirmed in Mistake and Errour.

§. 6. But since the Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles, as well as of all other Truths, depends only upon the perception we have of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our Ideas, the way to improve our Know∣ledge, is not, I am sure, blindly, and with an implicit Faith to receive and swallow Principles; but is, I think, to get and fix in our Minds clear, di∣stinct, and compleat Ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them proper and constant Names. And thus, perhaps, without any other Prin∣ciples, but barely considering those perfect Ideas, and by comparing them one with another, finding their Agreement, and Disagreement, and their several Relations and Habitudes; we shall get more true and clear Know∣ledge, by the conduct of this one Rule, than by taking up Principles, and thereby putting our Minds into the disposal of others.

§. 7. We must therefore, if we will proceed as Reason advises, adapt our me∣thods of Enquiry to the nature of the Ideas we examine, and the Truth we search after. General and certain Truths, are only founded in the Habi∣tudes and Relations of abstract Ideas. A sagacious and methodical ap∣plication of our Thoughts, for the finding out these Relations, is the on∣ly way to discover all that can be put, with Truth and Certainty con∣cerning them, into general Propositions. By what steps we are to pro∣ceed, is to be learned in the Schools of the Mathematicians, who from very plain and easie beginnings, by gentle degrees, and a continued Chain of Reasonings, proceed to the discovery and demonstration of Truths, that appear at first sight beyond humane Capacity. The Art of finding Proofs, and the Ideas that demonstratively shew the equality or inequa∣lity of unapplicable Quantities, is, I confess, of great help to them: But whether something like this, in respect of other Ideas, as well as those of magnitude, may not in time be found out, I will not determine. This, I think, I may say, that if other Ideas, that are the real as well as nominal Essences of their Species, were pursued in the way familiar to Mathema∣ticians, they would carry our Thoughts farther, and with greater evidence and clearness, than possibly we are apt to imagine.

§. 8. This gave me the confidence to advance that Conjecture, which I suggest, Chap. 3. viz. That Morality is capable of Demonstration, as well as Mathematicks. For the Ideas that Ethicks are conversant about, being all real Essences, and such as I imagine have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another; so far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and general Truths: and I doubt not, but if a right method were taken, a great part of Morality might be made out with that clearness, that could leave, to a considering Man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the Truth of Propositions in Mathematicks which have been demonstrated to him.

§. 9. In our search after the Knowledge of Substances, our want of Ideas, that are suitable to such a way of proceeding, obliges us to a quite different method. We advance not here, as in the other, where our abstract Ideas are real, as well as nominal Essences, by contemplating our Ideas, and considering their Relations and Correspondencies, that helps us very little, for the Reasons that in another place we have at large shewed. By

which, I think, it is evident, that Substances afford Matter of very little general Knowledge; and the bare Contemplation of their abstract Ideas, will carry us but a very little way in the search of Truth and Certainty. What then are we to do for the improvement of our Knowledge in substan∣tial Beings? Here we are to take a quite contrary Course, the want of Ideas of their real Essences sends us from our own Thoughts, from con∣templating, and drawing Consequences from our own Ideas, to the Things themselves as they exist: Experience must teach me what Reason cannot: and by trying, 'tis alone that I can certainly know what other Qualities co-exist with those of my complex Idea, v. g. whether that yellow, hea∣vy, fusible Body, I call Gold, be malleable, or no; which Experience (which way ever it prove in that particular Body I examine) makes me not certain, that it is so, in all or any other yellow, heavy, fusible Body, but that which I have tried. Because it is no Consequence one way or t' other from my complex Idea, the Necessity or Inconsistence of Mallea∣bility, hath no visible connection with the Combination of that Colour, Weight, and Fusibility in any body. What I have said here of the nomi∣nal Essence of Gold, supposed to consist of a Body of such a determinate Colour, Weight, and Fusibility, will hold true, if Malleableness, Fixed∣ness, and Solubility in Aqua Regia be added to it, our Reasonings from these Ideas will carry us but a little way in the certain discovery of the other Properties in those Masses of Matter, wherein all these are to be found. Because the other Properties of such Bodies, depending not on these, but on that unknown real Essence, on which these also depend, we cannot by them discover the rest; we can go no farther than the simple Ideas of our nominal Essence will carry us, which is very little beyond themselves; and so afford us but very sparingly any certain, universal, and useful Truths. For upon Trial, having found that particular piece (and all others of that Colour, Weight, and Fusibility, that I ever tried) mal∣leable, that also makes now, perhaps, a part of my complex Idea, part of my nominal Essence of Gold; whereby though I make my complex Idea, to which I affix the Name Gold, to consist to more simple Ideas than be∣fore: yet still, it not containing the real. Essence of any Species of Bodies, it helps me not certainly to know (I say to know, perhaps, it may to conjecture) the other remaining Properties of that Body, farther than they have a visible connection, with some or all of the simple Ideas, that make up my nominal Essence. For Example, I cannot be certain from this complex Idea, whether Gold be fixed, or no: Because as before, there is no necessary connection, or inconsistence to be discovered betwixt a complex Idea of a Body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable, betwixt these, I say, and Fixedness, so that I may certainly know, that in whatsoever Body those are found, there Fixedness is sure to be: Here again for assu∣rance, I must apply my self to Experience, as far as that reaches, I may have certain Knowledge, but no farther.

§. 10. I deny not, but a Man accustomed to rational and regular Ex∣periments, shall be able to see farther into the Nature of Bodies, and guess righter at their yet unknown Properties, than one that is a Stranger to them: But yet, as I have said, this is but Judgment and Opinion, not Knowledge and Certainty. This way of attaining, and improving our Knowledge in Substances, only by Experience and History, to which the weakness of our Faculties in this State of Mediocrity we are in, in this World, makes me suspect, that natural Philosophy is not capable of being made a Science. We are able, I imagine, to reach very little general Knowledge concerning the Species of Bodies, and their several Properties,

Experiments and Historical Observations, we may have, from which we may draw Advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase our stock of Conveniences for this Life; but beyond this, our Talents reach not, our Faculties cannot attain.

§. 11. From whence it is obvious to conclude, that since our Faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal Fabrick and real Essences of Bo∣dies; but yet plainly discover to us the Being of a God, and the Know∣ledge of our selves, enough to lead us into a full and clear discovery of our Duty, and great Concernment, it will become us, as rational Crea∣tures, to employ our Faculties about what they are most adopted to, and follow the direction of Nature, where it seems to point us out the way. For 'tis rational to conclude, that our proper Imployment lies in those Enquiries, and in that sort of Knowledge, which is most suited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it our greatest interest, i. e. the Condition of our eternal Estate: and therefore it is, I think, that Morality is the pro∣per Science, and Business of Mankind in general, (who are both concer∣ned, and fitted to search out their Summum Bonum,) as several Arts con∣versant about several parts of Nature, are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men, for the common Convenience of humane Life, and their own particular Subsistence in this World. Of what Consequence the dis∣covery of one natural Body, and its Properties may be to humane Life, the whole great Continent of America is a convincing instance; whose Ignorance in useful Arts, and want of the greatest part of the Convenien∣cies of Life, in a Country that abounded with all sorts of natural Plenty, I think, may be attributed to their Ignorance, of what was to be found in a very ordinary despicable Stone, I mean the Mineral of Iron. And whatever we think of our Parts or Improvements in this part of the World, where Knowledge and Plenty seem to vie each with other; yet to any one that will seriously reflect on it, I suppose, it will appear past doubt, that were the use of Iron lost among us, we should in a few Ages be unavoi∣dably reduced to the Wants and Ignorance of the ancient savage Ameri∣cans, whose natural Endowments and Provisions, come no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite Notions. So that he who first made known the use of that one contemptible Mineral, may be truly styled the Father of Arts, and Author of Plenty.

§. 12. I would not therefore be thought to dis-esteem, or dissuade the Study of Nature. I readily agree the Contemplation of his Works gives us occasion to admire, revere, and glorifie their Author: and if rightly directed, may be of greater benefit to Mankind, than the Monuments of exemplary Charity, that have at so great Charge been raised, by the Foun∣ders of Hospitals and Alms-houses. He that first invented Printing; dis∣covered the Use of the Compass; or made publick the Virtue and right Use of Kin Kina; did more for the propagation of Knowledge, for the acquisition of Conveniencies of Life; and saved more from the Grave, than those who built Colleges, Work-houses, and Hospitals. All that I would say, is, that we should not be too forwardly possessed with the Opinion, or Expectation of Knowledge, where it is not to be had; or by Ways, that will not attain it: That we should not take doubtful Systems, for compleat Sciences; nor unintelligible Notions, for scientifical Demon∣strations. In the Knowledge of Bodies, we must be content to glean what we can from particular Experiments, since we cannot from a Discovery of their real Essences, grasp at a time whole Sheaves; and in bundles, com∣prehend the Nature and Properties of whole Species together. Where our Enquiry is concerning Co-existence, or Repugnancy to co-exist; which

by Contemplation of our Ideas, we cannot discover, there Experience Observation, and natural History, must give us by our Senses, and by retail, an insight into corporeal Substances. The Knowledge of Bodies we must get by our Senses, warily employed in taking notice of their Qualities, and Operations on one another; and what we hope to know of separated Spirits in this World, we must, I think, expect only from Revelation. He that shall consider, how little general Maxims, precarious Principles, and Hypotheses laid down at Pleasure, have promoted true Knowledge, or helped to satisfie the Enquiries of rational Men after real Improvements. How little, I say, the setting out at the end, has for ma∣ny Ages together advanced Men's Progress towards the Knowledge of na∣tural Philosophy, will think, we have Reason to thank those Men, who in this latter Age have taken another Course, and have trod out to us, though not an easier way to learned Ignorance, yet a surer way to profitable Knowledge.

§. 13. Not that we may not, to explain any Phoenomena of Nature, make use of any probable Hypothesis whatsoever: Hypotheses, if they are well made, are at least great helps to the Memory, and often direct us to new Discoveries. But my Meaning is, that we should not take up any one too hastily, (which the Mind, that would always penetrate into the Causes of Things, and have Principles to rest on, is very apt to do,) till we have very well examined Particulars, and made several Experiments, in that thing we would explain by our Hypothesis, and see whether it will agree to them all; whether our Principles will carry us quite through, and not be as inconsistent with one Phaenomenon of Nature, as they seem to accommodate, and explain another. And at least, that we take care, that the Name of Principles deceive us not, nor impose on us, by making us receive that for an unquestionable Truth, which is really, at best, but a very doubtful conjecture, such as are most (I had almost said all) of the Hypotheses in natural Philosophy.

§. 14. But whether natural Philosophy be capable of Certainty, or no, the ways to enlarge our Knowledge, as far as we are capable, seem to me, in short, to be these two:

• First, The First is to get, and settle in our Minds, as far as we can, clear, distinct, and constant Ideas of those Things we would consider and know. For it being evident, that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas, where they are either imperfect, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, and perfect Knowledge.
• Secondly, The other is the Art of finding out those intermediate Ideas, which may shew us the Agreement, or Repugnancy of other Ideas, which cannot be immediately compared.

§. 15. That these two (and not the relying on Maxims, and drawing Consequences from some general Propositions) are the right Method of im∣proving our Knowledge in other Ideas of Modes, the Consideration of Mathematical Knowledge will easily inform us. Where first we shall find, that he that has not a perfect, and clear Idea of those Angles, or Fi∣gures of which he desires to know any thing, is utterly thereby uncapa∣ble of any Knowledge about them. Suppose but a Man, not to have a perfect exact Idea of a right Angle, a Scalenum, or Trapezium; and there is nothing more clear, that he will in vain seek any Demonstration about them. And farther it is evident, that it was not the influence of those Maxims, which are taken for Principles in Mathematicks, that hath led the Masters of that Science into those wonderful Discoveries they have made. Let a Man of good Parts know all the Maxims generally made use of in Mathematicks never so perfectly, and contemplate their Extent and

and Consequences, as much as he pleases, he will by their Assistence, I suppose, scarce ever come to know that the square of the Hypotieneuson in a right angled Triangle, is equal to the squares of the two other sides. The Knowledge, that the Whole is equal to all its Parts, and if you take Equal from Equal, the remainder will be Equal, &c. helped him not, I presume, to this Demonstration: And a Man may, I think, pore long enough on those Axioms, without ever seeing one jot the more of mathe∣matical Truths. They have been discovered by the Thoughts otherways applied: The Mind had other Objects, other Views before it, far diffe∣rent from those Maxims, when it first got the Knowledge of such kind of Truths in Mathematicks, which Men well enough acquainted with those received Axioms, but ignorant of their Method, who first made these De∣monstrations, can never sufficiently admire. And who knows what Me∣thods may hereafter be found out to enlarge our Knowledge in other Things, as well as that of Algebra in Mathematicks, which so readily finds out Ideas of Quantities to measure others by, whose Equality or Pro∣portion we could otherwise very hardly, or, perhaps, never come to know?

CHAP. XIII. Some farther Considerations concerning our Knowledge.

§. 1. OVr Knowledge, as in other Things, so in this, has a great Con∣formity with our Sight, that it is neither wholly necessary, nor wholly voluntary. If our Knowledge were altogether necessary, all Men's Knowledge would not only be alike, but every Man would know all that is knowable; and if it were wholly voluntary, some Men so little regard or value it, that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men that have Senses, cannot chuse but receive some Ideas by them; and if they have Memory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they have any distinguishing Faculty, cannot but perceive the Agreement, or Disagreement of some of them one with another: As he that has Eyes, if he will open them by day, cannot but see some Objects, and perceive a difference in them. But though a Man with his Eyes open in the Light, cannot but see: yet there be certain Objects, which he may chuse whe∣ther he will turn his Eyes to; there may be in his reach a Book contai∣ning Pictures, and Discourses, capable to delight, or instruct him, which yet he may never have the Will to open, never take the Pains to look into.

§. 2. There is also another thing in a Man's Power, and that is, though he turn his Eyes sometimes towards an Object, yet he may chuse whether he will intently survey it, and with an accurate search, endeavour to ob∣serve all that is visible in it. But yet what he does see, he cannot see otherwise than he does: It depends not on his Will to see that Black, which appears Yellow; nor to persuade himself, that what actually scalds him, feels cold: The Earth will not appear painted with Flowers, nor the Fields covered with Verdure, whenever he has a Mind to it; in the cold Winter, he cannot help seeing it white and hoary, if he will look abroad. Just thus is it with our Understanding, all that is voluntary in our Knowledge, is the employing, or with-holding any of our Faculties from this or that sort of Objects, and a more, or less accurate survey of

them: But they being employed, our Will hath no Power to determine the Knowledge of the Mind one way or other; that is done only by the Objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered. And therefore, as far as Men's Senses are conversant about external Objects, the Mind can∣not but receive those Ideas, which are presented by them, and be informed of the Existence of Things without: and so far as Men's Thoughts converse with their own clear and distinct Ideas, they cannot but, in some mea∣sure, observe the Agreement, and Disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them, which is so far Knowledge: and if they have Names for those Ideas, they have thus considered, they must needs be assured of the Truth of those Propositions, which express that Agreement, or Disagreement they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinced of those Truths. For what a Man sees, he cannot but see; and what he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.

§. 3. Thus he that has got the Ideas of Numbers, and hath taken the Pains to compare One, Two, and Three, to Six, cannot chuse but know that they are equal: He that hath got the Idea of a Triangle, and found the ways to measure its Angles, and their Magnitudes, is as certain that its three Angles are equal to two right ones, as that it is impossible for the same to be, and not to be.

He also that hath the Idea of an intelligent, but frail and weak Being, made by and depending on another, who is eternal, omnipotent, per∣fectly wise and good, will as certainly know that Man is to honour, fear, and obey God, as that the Sun shines when he sees it. For if he hath but the Ideas of two such Beings in his Mind, and will turn his Thoughts that way, and consider them, he will as certainly find that the Inferior, Finite, and Dependent, is under an Obligation to obey the Supreme and Infinite, as he is certain to find, that Three, Five, and Seven, are less than Fifteen, if he will consider, and compute those Numbers; nor can he be surer in a clear Morning that the Sun is risen, if he will but open his Eyes, and turn them that way. But yet these Truths, being never so certain, never so clear, he may be ignorant of either, or all of them, who will never take the Pains to employ his Faculties, as he should, to in∣form himself about them.

CHAP. XIV. Of Iudgment.

§. 1. THE Understanding Faculties being given to Man, not barely for Speculation, but also for the Conduct of his Life, Man would be at a great loss, if he had nothing to direct him, but what has the Certainty of true Knowledge: for that being very short and scanty, as we have seen, he would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the Actions of his Life, perfectly at a stand, had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain Knowledge. For he that will not eat, till he has Demonstration that it will nourish him; he that will not stir, till he infallibly knows the Business he goes about will succeed, will have little else to do, but sit still and perish.

§. 2. Therefore as God has set some Things in broad day-light; as he has given us some certain Knowledge, though limited to a few Things

in comparison, probably, as a Taste of what intellectual Creatures are ca∣pable of, to excite in us a Desire and Endeavour after a better State: So in the greatest part of our Concernment, he has afforded us only the twi∣light, as I may so say, of Probability, suitable, I presume, to that State of Mediocrity and Probationership, he has been pleased to place in us here; wherein we might not be over confident, and presume; but might by e∣very day's Experience be made sensible of our short-sightedness and liable∣ness to Error; which might be a constant Admonition to us, to spend the days of this our Pilgrimage with Industry and Care, in the search, and fol∣lowing of that way, which might lead us to a State of greater Perfection. It being highly rational to think, even where Revelation is silent in the Case, That as Men employ those Talents, God has given them, here, they shall accordingly receive their Rewards at the close of the day, when their Sun shall set, and Night shall put an end to their Labours.

§. 3. The Faculty, which God has given Man to enlighten him, next to clear and certain Knowledge, is Iudgment: whereby the Mind takes its Ideas to agree, or disagree; or which is the same, any Proposition to be true, or false, without perceiving a demonstrative Evidence in the Proofs. The Mind sometimes exercises this Judgment out of necessity, where de∣monstrative Proofs, and certain Knowledge are not to be had; and some∣times out of Laziness, Unskilfulness, or Haste, even where demonstrative and certain Proofs are to be had. Men often stay not warily to examine the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas, which they are desirous, or concerned to know; but either incapable of such Attention, as is re∣quisite in a long Train of Gradations, or impatient of delay, lightly sur∣vey, or wholly pass over the Proofs; and so without making out the Demonstration, determine of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas, as it were by a view of them, as they are at a distance, and take it to be the one or the other, as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey. This Faculty of the Mind, when it is exercised immediately about Things, is called Iudgment; when about Truths delivered in Words, is most com∣monly called Assent or Dissent: which being the most usual way, where∣in the Mind has occasion to employ this Faculty, I shall under these Terms treat of it, as least liable in our Language to Equivocation

§. 4. Thus the Mind has two Faculties, conversant about Truth and Falshood.

• First, Knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of the Agreement or Disagreement of any Ideas.
• Secondly, Judgment, which is the putting Ideas together, or separa∣ting them from one another in the Mind, when their certain Agreement, or Disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the Word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears. And if it so unites, or separates them, as in Reality Things are, it is right Iudgment.

CHAP. XV. Of Probability.

§. 1. AS Demonstration is the shewing the Agreement, or Disagree∣ment of two Ideas, by the intervention of one or more Proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with another: so Probability is nothing but the appearance of such an Agreement, or Disagreement, by the intervention of Proofs, whose con∣nexion is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is, or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition to be true, or false, rather than the contrary. For example: In the demonstration of it, a Man perceives the certain immutable connexion there is of Equality, between the three Angles of a Triangle, and those intermediate ones, which are made use of to shew their Equality to two right ones; and so by an intuitive Know∣ledge of the Agreement, or Disagreement of the intermediate Ideas in each step of the progress, the whole Series is continued with an evidence, which clearly shews the Agreement, or Disagreement, of those three Angles, in equality to two right ones: And thus he has certain Know∣ledge that it is so. But another Man who never took the pains to observe the Demonstration, hearing a Mathematician, a Man of credit, affirm the three Angles of a Triangle, to be equal to two right ones, assents to it; i. e. receives it for true: In which case, the foundation of his Assent, is the Probability of the thing, the Proof being such as, for the most part, carries Truth with it: The Man on whose Testimony he receives it, not being wont to affirm any thing contrary to, or besides his Knowledge, especially in matters of this kind. So that that which cau∣ses his Assent to this Proposition, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes him take these Ideas to agree, without knowing them to do so, is the wonted Veracity of the Speaker in other cases, or his supposed Veracity in this.

§. 2. Our Knowledge, as has been shewn, being very narrow, and we not happy enough to find certain Truth in every thing, we have occasion to consider, most of the Propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay act upon, are such, as we cannot have undoubted Knowledge of their Truth: yet some of them border so near upon Certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them; but assent to them as firmly, and act accor∣ding to that Assent as vigorously, as if they were infallibly demonstra∣ted, and that our Knowledge of them was perfect and certain. But there being degrees herein, from the very neighbourhood of Certainty and Evi∣dence, quite down to Improbability and Unlikeliness, even to the Con∣fines of Impossibility; and also degrees of Assent from certain Know∣ledge, and what is next it, full Assurance and Confidence, quite down to Conjecture, Doubt, Distrust, and Disbelief. I shall come now, as having (as I think) found out the bounds of humane Knowledge and Certainty, in the next place to consider the several degrees and grounds of Probabi∣lity, and Assent or Faith.

§. 3. Probability then is likeliness to be true, the very notation of the Word signifying such a Proposition, for which there be Arguments or Proofs, to make it pass or be received for true. The entertainment the Mind gives this sort of Propositions, is called Belief, Assent, or Opi∣nion, which is the admitting or receiving any Proposition for true, upon Arguments or Proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true,

without certain Knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the difference between Probability and Certainty, Faith and Knowledge, that in all the parts of Knowledge, there is intuition; each immediate Idea, each step has its visible and certain connexion; in Belief not so. That which makes me believe, is something extraneous to the thing I believe; some∣thing not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly shewing the Agreement, or Disagreement of those Ideas that are under consideration.

§. 4. Probability then being to supply the defect of our Knowledge, and to guide us where that fails, it is always conversant about things, whereof we have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive it for true. The grounds of it are, in short, these two following:

• First, The conformity of any thing with our own Knowledge, Ob∣servation, and Experience.
• Secondly, The Testimony of others, vouching their Observation and Experience. In the Testimony of others, is to be considered, 1. The Number. 2. The Integrity. 3. The Skill of the Witnesses. 4. The Design of the Author, where it is a Testimony out of a Book cited. 5. The Consistency of the Parts, and Circumstances of the Relation. 6. Con∣trary Testimonies.

§. 5. Now Probability wanting that intuitive Evidence, which infal∣libly determines the Understanding, and produces certain Knowledge, the Mind, before it rationally assents or dissents to any probable Proposi∣tion, ought to examine all the grounds of Probability, and see how they make more or less for or against it, and upon a due balancing the whole, reject, or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of Probabily on one side or the other. For example:

If I my self see a Man walk on the Ice, it is past Probability, 'tis Know∣ledge: but if another tells me he saw a Man in England in the midst of a sharp Winter, walk upon Water harden'd with cold; this has so great conformity with what is usually observed to happen, that I am disposed by the nature of the thing it self to assent to it, unless some manifest suspicion attend the Relation of that matter of fact. But if the same thing be told to one born between the Tropicks, who never saw nor heard of any such thing before, there the whole Probability relies on Testimony: And as the Relators are more in number, and of more Credit, and have no Interest to speak contrary to the Truth; so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief. Though to a Man, whose Experience has been always quite contrary, and has never heard of any thing like it, the most untainted Credit of a Witness will scarce be able to find belief. As it hap∣pened to a Dutch Ambassadour, who entertaining the King of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he was inquisitive after, amongst other things told him, that the Water in his Country, would sometimes, in cold weather, be so hard that Men walked upon it, and that it would bear an Elephant, if he were there. To which the King replied, Hitherto I have believed the strange Things you have told me, because I look upon you as a sober fair Man, but now I am sure you lye.

§. 6. Upon these grounds depends the Probability of any Proposition: And as the conformity of our Knowledge, as the certainty of Observa∣tions, as the frequency and constancy of Experience, and the number and credibility of Testimonies, do more or less agree, or disagree with it, so is any Proposition in it self, more or less probable. There is another, I confess, which though by it self it be no true ground of Probability, yet is often made use of for one, by which Men most commonly regulate

their Assent, and upon which they pin their Faith more than any thing else; any, that is, the Opinion of others; though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one; since there is much more Falshood and Errour amongst Men, than Truth and Know∣ledge. And if the Opinions and Persuasions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a ground of Assent, Men have Reason to be Hea∣thens in Iapan, Mahumetans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and Lutherans in Sueden. But of this wrong ground of As∣sent, I shall have occasion to speak more at large in another place.

CHAP. XVI. Of the Degrees of Assent.

§. 1. THe grounds of Probability, we have laid down in the fore∣going Chapter, as they are the foundations on which our Assent is built; so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are, or ought to be regulated: only we are to take notice, that whatever grounds of Probability there may be, they yet operate no farther on the Mind, which searches after Truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear; at least in the first Judgment or Search that the Mind makes. I confess, in the Opinions Men have, and firmly stick to, in the World, their Assent is not always from an actual view of the Reasons that at first prevailed with them: It being in many cases almost impossible, and in most very hard, even for those who have very admirable Memories, to retain all the Proofs, which, upon a due examination, made them em∣brace that side of the Question. It suffices, that they have once with care and fairness, examined the matter as far as they could; and that they have searched into all the Particulars, that they could imagine to give any light to the Question; and with the best of their Skill, cast up the account upon the whole Evidence: and thus having once found on which side the Probability appeared to them, after as full and exact an en∣quiry as they can make, they lay up the conclusion in their Memories, as a Truth they have discovered; and for the future, they remain satisfied with the Testimony of their Memories, that this is the Opinion, that by the Proofs they have once seen of it, deserves such a degree of their Assent as they afford it.

§. 2. This is all that the greatest part of Men are capable of doing, in regulating their Opinions and Judgments; unless a Man will exact of them, either to retain distinctly in their Memories all the Proofs concer∣ning any probable Truth, and that too in the same order, and regular deduction of Consequences, in which they have formerly placed or seen them; which sometimes is enough to fill a large Volume upon one single Question: Or else they must require a Man, for every Opinion that he embraces, every day to examine the Proofs: both which, are impossible. It is unavoidable therefore, that the Memory be relied on in the case, and that Men be persuaded of several Opinions, whereof the Proofs are not actually in their Thoughts; nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to re-call. Without this, the greatest part of Men must be either very Scepticks, or change every moment, and yield themselves up to who∣ever,

having lately studied the Question, offers them Arguments; which for want of Memory, they are not able presently to answer.

§. 3. I cannot but own, that Men's sticking to their past Iudgment, and adhering firmly to Conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of great obstinacy in Errour and Mistake. But the fault is not that they rely on their Memories, for what they have before well judged; but because they judged before they had well examined. May we not find a great number (not to say the greatest part) of Men, that think they have for∣med right Judgments of several matters; and that for no other reason, but because they never thought otherwise? That imagine themselves to have judged right, only because they never questioned, never examined their own Opinions? Which is indeed to think they judged right, because they never judged at all: And yet these of all Men hold their Opinions with the greatest stiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their Tenets, who have least examined them. What we once know, we are certain is so: and we may be secure, that there are no latent Proofs undiscovered, which may overturn our Knowledge, or bring it in doubt. But in matters of Probability, 'tis not in every case that we can be sure that we have all the Particulars before us, that any way concern the Que∣stion; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, which may cast the Probability on the other side, and out-weigh all that at present seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there, that hath the lei∣sure, patience, and means, to collect together all the Proofs concerning most of the Opinions he has, so as safely to conclude, that he hath a clear and full view, and that there is no more to be alledged for his better in∣formation? And yet we are forced to determine our selves on the one side or other. The conduct of our Lives, and the management of our great Concerns, will not bear delay: for those depend, for the most part, on the determination of our Judgment in points, wherein we are not ca∣pable of certain and demonstrative Knowledge, and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the one side, or the other.

§. 4. Since therefore it is unavoidable to the greatest part of Men, if not all, to have several Opinions, without certain and indubitable Proofs of their Truths; and it carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly, for Men to quit and renounce their former Tenets, presently upon the offer of an Argument, which they cannot immediately answer, and shew the insufficiency of: It would, methinks, become all Men to maintain Peace, and the common Offices of Humanity, and Friendship, in the diversity of Opinions: since we cannot reasonably ex∣pect, that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his own Opinion, and embrace ours, with a blind resignation to an Authority, which the Understanding of Man acknowledges not. For however it may often mi∣stake, it can own no other Guide but Reason, nor blindly submit to the Will and Dictates of another. If he you would bring over to your Sentiments be one that examines before he assents, you must give him leave, at his leisure, to go over the account again, and re-calling what is out of his Mind, examine all the Particulars, to see on which side the advantage lies: And if he will not think our Arguments of weight enough to engage him anew in so much pains, 'tis but what we do often our selves in the like case; and we should take it amiss, if others should prescribe to us what points we should study. And if he be one who takes his Opinions upon trust, How can we imagine that he should renounce those Tenets, which Time and Custom have so setled in his Mind, that he thinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionable Certainty; or which he takes to

be impressions he has received from GOD Himself, or from Men sent by Him? How can we expect, I say, that Opinions thus setled, should be given up to the Arguments or Authority of a Stranger, or Adversary; especially if there be any suspicion of Interest, or Design, as there never fails to be, where Men find themselves ill treated? We should do well to commiserate our mutual Ignorance, and endeavour to remove it in all the gentle and fair ways of Information; and not instantly treat others ill, as obstinate and perverse, because they will not renounce their own, and receive our Opinions, or at least those we would force upon them, when 'tis more than probable that we are no less obstinate in not embracing theirs. For where is the Man that has uncontestible Evidence of the Truth of all that he holds, or of the Falshood of all he condemns; or can say, that he has examined, to the bottom, all his own or other Men's Opinions? The necessity of believing, without knowledge, nay, often upon very slight grounds, in this fleeting slate of Action and Blindness we are in, should make us more busie and careful to inform our selves than constrain others. At least, those who have not throughly examined to the bottom all their own Tenets, must confess they are unfit to pre∣scribe to others; and are unreasonable in imposing that as a Truth on other Men's Belief, which they themselves have not searched into, nor weighed the Arguments of Probability, on which they should receive or reject it. Those who have fairly and truly examined, and are thereby got past doubt in all the Doctrines they profess, and govern themselves by, would have a juster pretence to require others to follow them: But these are so few in number, and find so little reason to be magisterial in their Opinions, that nothing insolent and imperious is to be expected from them: And there is reason to think, that if Men were better in∣structed themselves, they would be less imposing on others.

§. 5. But to return to the grounds of Assent, and the several degrees of it, we are to take notice, that the Propositions we receive upon In∣ducements of Probability, are of two sorts; either concerning some par∣ticular Existence, or, as it is usually termed, matter of fact, which fal∣ling under our Observation, is capable of humane Testimony; or else concerning Things, which being beyond the discovery of our Senses, are not capable of any such Testimony.

§. 6. Concerning the first of these, viz. particular matter of fact,

First, Where any particular thing, consonant to the constant Obser∣vation of our selves and others, in the like case, comes attested with the concurrent Reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain knowledge; and we reason and act thereupon with as little doubt, as if it were perfect demonstra∣tion. Thus if all English-men, who have occasion to mention it, should affirm, that it froze in England the last Winter, or that there were Swal∣lows seen there in the Summer, I think a Man could almost as little doubt of it, as that Seven and Four are Eleven. The first therefore, and highest degree of Probability, is, when the general consent of all Men, in all Ages, as far as it can be known, concurrs with a Man's constant and never-failing Experience in like cases, to confirm the Truth of any par∣ticular matter of fact attested by fair Witnesses: such are all the stated Constitutions and Properties of Bodies, and the regular proceedings of Causes and Effects in the ordinary course of Nature. This we call an Argument from the nature of Things themselves. For what our own and other Men's constant Observation, has found always to be after the same

manner, that we with reason conclude to be the Effects of steddy and regular Causes, though they come not within the reach of our Know∣ledge. Thus, That Fire warmed a Man, made Lead fluid, and changed the colour or consistency in Wood or Charcoal: that Iron sunk in Water, and swam in Quicksilver: These and the like Propositions about par∣ticular facts, being agreeable to our constant Experience, as often as we have to do with these matters; and being generally spoke of, (when mentioned by others,) as things found constantly to be so, and therefore not so much as controverted by any body, we are put past doubt, that a relation affirming any such thing to have been, or any predication that it will happen again in the same manner, is very true. These Probabili∣ties rise so near to Certainty, that they govern our Thoughts as absolutely, and influence all our Actions as fully, as the most evident demonstration; and in what concerns us, we make little or no difference between them and certain Knowledge. And our Belief thus grounded, rises to As∣surance.

§. 7. Secondly, The next degree of Probability is, when I find by my own Experience, and the Agreement of all others that mention it, a thing to be, for the most part, so; and that the particular instance of it is atte∣sted by many and undoubted Witnesses: v. g. History giving us such an ac∣count of Men in all Ages; and my own Experience, as far as I had an op∣portunity to observe, confirming it, that most Men prefer their private Advantage, to the publick. If all Historians that write of Tiberius, say that Tiberius did so, it is extreamly probable. And in this case, our Assent has a sufficient foundation to raise it self to a degree, which we may call Confidence.

§. 8. Thirdly, In matters that happen indifferently, as that a Bird should fly this or that way; that it should thunder on a Man's right or left Hand, &c. when any particular matter of fact comes attested by the con∣current Testimony of unsuspected Witnesses, there our Assent is also un∣avoidable. Thus: That there is such a City in Italy, as Rome: That about 1700 years ago, there lived in it a Man, called Iulius Caesar; that he was a General, and that he won a Battel again another called Pompey. This, though in the nature of the thing, there be nothing for, nor against it; yet, being related by Historians of credit, and contradicted by no one Writer, a Man cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it, as he does of the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance, whereof he himself is a Witness.

§. 9. Thus far the matter goes easie enough. Probability upon such grounds carries so much evidence with it, that it naturally determines the Judgment, and leaves us as little at liberty to believe, or disbelieve, as a Demonstration does, whether we will know, or be ignorant. The difficulty is, when Testimonies contradict common Experience, and the report of History and Witnesses clashes with the ordinary course of Nature, or with one another; there it is, where Diligence, Attention, and Exactness is required, to form a right Judgment, and to proportion the Assent to the different Evidence and Probability of the thing; which rises and falls, according as those two foundations of Credibility, viz. Com∣mon Observation in like cases, and particular Testimonies in that parti∣cular instance, favours or contradicts it. These are liable to so great va∣riety of contrary Observations, Circumstances, Reports, different Qualifi∣cations, Tempers, Designs, Over-sights, &c. of the Reporters, that 'tis impossible to reduce to precise Rules, the various degrees wherein Men give their Assent. This only may be said in general, That as the Argu∣ments

and Proofs, pro and con, upon due examination, nicely weighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear, upon the whole matter, in a greater or less degree, to preponderate on either side, so they are fitted to produce in the Mind such different entertainment, as we call Belief, Conjecture, Guess, Doubt, Wavering, Distrust, Disbelief, &c.

§. 10. This is what concerns Assent in matters wherein Testimony is made use of; concerning which, I think, it may not be amiss to take notice of a Rule observed in the Law of England; which is, That though the attested Copy of a Record be good proof, yet the Copy of a Copy never so well attested, and by never so credible Witnesses, will not be admitted as a proof in Judicature. This is so generally approved as reasonable, and sui∣ted to the Wisdom and Caution to be used in our Enquiry after material Truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This practice, if it be allowable in the Decisions of Right and Wrong, carries this Obser∣vation along with it, viz. That any Testimony, the farther off it is from the original Truth, the less force and proof it has. The Being and Exi∣stence of the thing it self, is what I call the original Truth. A cre∣dible Man vouching his Knowledge of it, is a good proof: But if another equally credible, do witness it from his Report, the Testimony is weaker; and a third that attests the Hearsay of an Hearsay, is yet less considerable. So that in traditional Truths, each remove weakens the force of the proof; And the more hands the Tradition has successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does it receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of: Because I find amongst some Men, the quite contrary commonly practised, who look on Opinions to gain force by growing older; and what a thousand year since would not, to a rational Man, contemporary with the first Voucher, have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain beyond all question, only because several have since, from him, said it one after another. Upon this ground Propositions, evidently false or doubtful enough in their first beginning, come by an inverted Rule of Probability, to pass for authentick Truths: and those which found or deserved little credit from the mouths of their first Authors, are thought to grow venerable by Age, and are urged as undeniable.

§. 11. I would not be thought here to lessen the Credit and use of Hi∣story: 'tis all the light we have in many cases; and we receive from it a great part of the useful Truths we have, with a convincing evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the Records of Antiquity: I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But this, Truth it self forces me to say, That no Probability can arise higher than its first Original. What has no other Evidence than the single Testimony of one onely Witness, must stand or fall by his onely Testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; and though cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is so far from receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the Weaker. Passion, Interest, Inadvertency, Mistake of his Meaning, and a thousand odd Reasons, or Caprichios, Men's Minds are acted by, (impossible to be discovered,) may make one Man quote another Man's Words or Meaning wrong. He that has but ever so little examined the Citations of Writers, cannot doubt how little Credit the Quotations de∣serve, where the Originals are wanting; and consequently how much less Quotations of Quotations can be relied on. This is certain, that what in one Age was affirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future Ages, by being often repeated. But the far∣ther still it is from the Original, the less valid it is, and has always less

force in the mouth, or writing of him that last made use of it, than in his from whom he received it.

§. 12. The Probabilities we have hitherto mentioned, are only such as concern matter of fact, and such Things as are capable of Observation and Testimony: there remains that other sort, concerning which, Men en∣tertain Opinions with variety of Assent, though the Things be such, that falling not under the reach of our Senses, are not capable of Testimony; and such are, 1. The Existence, Nature, and Operations of finite immaterial Be∣ings without us; as Spirits, Angels, Devils, &c. or the Existence of mate∣rial Beings; which either for their smalness in themselves, or remoteness from us, our Senses cannot take notice of, as whether there be any Plants Animals, and intelligent Inhabitants of the Planets, and other Mansions of the vast Universe. 2. Concerning the manner of Operation in most parts of the Works of Nature; wherein though we see the sensible effects, yet their causes are unknown, and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced. We see Animals are generated, nourished, and move; the Load-stone draws Iron; and the parts of a Candle successively melting, turn into flame, and give us both light and heat. These and the like Effects we see and know: but the causes that operate, and the manner they are produced in, we can only guess, and probably conjecture. For these and the like coming not within the scrutiny of humane Senses, cannot be examined by them, or be attested by any body, and therefore can appear more or less probable, only as they more or less agree to Truths that are established in our Minds, and as they hold proportion to other parts of our Knowledge and Observation. Analogy in these matters is the only help we have, and 'tis from that alone we draw all our grounds of Pro∣bability. Thus observing that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently one upon another, produces heat, and very often fire it self, we have reason to think, that what we call Heat and Fire, consists in a certain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning matter•• observing likewise, that the different refractions of pellucid Bodies produce in our Eyes the different appearances of several Colours; and also that the different ran∣ging and laying the superficial parts of several Bodies, as of Velvet, wate∣red Silk, &c. does the like, we think it probable that the Colour and shining of Bodies, is in them nothing but the different Arangement and Refraction of their minute and insensible parts. Thus finding in all the parts of the Creation, that fall under humane Observation, that there is a gradual connexion of one with another, without any great or discer∣nable gaps between, in all that great variety of Things we see in the World, which are so closely linked together, that, in the several ranks of Beings, it is not easie to discover the bounds betwixt them, we have Rea∣son to be persuaded, that in such gentle steps Things in Perfection ascend upwards. 'Tis an hard Matter to say where Sensible and Rational begin, and where Insensible and Irrational end; and who is there quick-sighted enough to determine precisely which is the lowest Species of living Things, and which the first of those which have no Life? Things, as far as we can observe lessen and augment, as the quantity does in a regular Cone, where though there be a manifest odds betwixt the bigness of the Diametre at re∣mote distances: yet the difference between the upper and under, where they touch one another, is hardly discernable. The difference is excee∣ding great between some Men, and some Animals: But if we will compare the Understanding and Abilities of some Men, and some Brutes, we shall find so little difference, that 'twill be hard to say, that that of the Man is ei∣ther clearer or larger: Observing, I say, such gradual and gentle descents

downwards in those parts of the Creation, that are beneath Man, the Rule of Analogy may make it probable, that it is so also in Things above us, and our Observation; and that there are several ranks of intelligent Beings, excelling us in several degrees of Perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite Perfection of the Creator, by gentle steps and differences, that are every one at no great distance from the next to it. This sort of Probabi∣lity, which is the best conduct of rational Experiments, and the rise of Hy∣pothesis has also its Use and Influence: and a wary Reasoning from Analo∣gy leads us often into the discovery of Truths, and useful Productions, which would otherwise lie concealed.

§. 13. Though the common Experience, and the ordinary Course of Things have justly a mighty Influence on the Minds of Men, to make them give or refuse Credit to any thing proposed to their Belief; yet there is one Case, wherein the strangeness of the Fact lessens not the Assent to a fair Testimony given of it. For where such supernatural Events are suitable to ends aim'd at by him, who has the Power to change the course of Nature, there, under such Circumstances, they may be the fitter to pro∣cure. Belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordi∣nary Observation. This is the proper Case of Miracles, which well at∣tested, do not only find Credit themselves; but give it also to other Truths, which need such Confirmation.

§. 14. Besides those we have hitherto mentioned, there is one sort of Propositions that challenge the highest degree of our Assent, upon bare Testimony, whether the thing proposed, agree or disagree with common Experience, and the ordinary course of Things, or no. The Reason whereof is, because the Testimony is of such an one, as cannot deceive, nor be deceived, and that is of God himself. This carries with it Certain∣ty beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond Exception. This is called by a pe∣culiar Name, Revelation, and our Assent to it, Faith: which has as much Certainty as our Knowledge it self; and we may as well doubt of our own Being, as we can, whether any Revelation from GOD be true. So that Faith is a setled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance, and leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Hesitation: Only we must be sure, that it be a divine Revelation, and that we understand it right; else we shall expose our selves to all the Extravagancy of Enthusiasm, and all the Error of wrong Principles, if we have Faith and Assurance in what is not divine Revelation. And therefore in those Cases, our Assent can be rationally no higher than the Evidence of its being a Revelation, and that this is the meaning of the Expressions it is delivered in. If the Evidence of its being a Revelation, or that this its true Sense be only on probable Proofs, our Assent can reach no higher than an Assurance or Diffidence, arising from the more, or less apparent Probability of the Proofs. But of Faith, and the Precedency it ought to have before other Arguments of Persua∣sion, I shall speak more hereafter, where I treat of it, as it is ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to Reason: though in Truth, it be nothing else but an Assent founded on the highest Reason.

CHAP. XVII. Of Reason.

§. 1. THE Word Reason in the English Language has different Signi∣fications: sometimes it is taken for true, and clear Principles: Sometimes for clear, and fair deductions from those Principles: and some∣times for the Cause, and particularly the final Cause: but the Considera∣tion I shall have of it here, is in a Signification different from all these; and that is, as it stands for a Faculty in Man, That Faculty, whereby Man is supposed to be distinguished from Beasts, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them.

§. 2. If general Knowledge, as has been shewn, consists in a Perce∣ption of the Agreement, or Disagreement of our own Ideas; and the Knowledge of the Existence of all Things without us (except only of GOD) be had only by our Senses; What room then is there for the Exercise of any other Faculty, but outward Sense and inward Perception? What need is there of Reason? Very much; both for the Enlargement of our Knowledge, and regulating our Assent: For it hath to do, both in Knowledge and Opinion, and is necessary, and assisting to all our other intellectual Faculties, and indeed contains two of them, viz. Sagacity and Illation: By the one, it finds out, and by the other, it so orders the in∣termediate Ideas, as to discover what connexion there is in each link of the Chain, whereby the Extremes are held together; and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the Truth sought for, which is that we call Illation or Inference, and consists in nothing but the Perception of the connexion there is between the Ideas, in each step of the deduction, whereby the Mind comes to see, either the certain Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas, as in Demonstration, in which it arrives at Knowledge; or their probable connexion, on which it gives or with-holds its Assent, as in Opinion. Sense and Intuition reach but a very little way; the grea∣test part of our Knowledge depends upon Deductions and intermediate Ideas: And in those Cases, where we are fain to substitute Assent instead of Knowledge, and take Propositions for true, without being certain they are so, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the grounds of their Probability. In both these Cases, the Faculty which finds out the Means, and rightly applies them to discover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the other, is that which we call Reason. For as Reason perceives the necessary, and indubitable connexion of all the Ideas or Proofs one to another, in each step of any Demonstration that produces Knowledge: so it likewise perceives the probable connexion of all the Ideas or Proofs one to another, in every step of a Discourse, to which it will think Assent due. This is the lowest degree of that, which can be truly called Reason: For where the Mind does not perceive this probable connexion; where it does not discern, whether there be any such con∣nexion, or no, there Men's Opinions are not the product of Judgment, or the Consequence of Reason; but the effects of Chance and Hazard, of a Mind floating at all Adventures, without choice, and without direction.

§. 3. So that we may in Reason consider these four degrees; the first and highest, is the discovering, and finding out of Proofs; the second, the regular and methodical Disposition of them, and laying them in a clear

and fit Order, to make their Connexion and Force be plainly and easily perceived; the third is the perceiving their connexion; and the fourth, the making a right conclusion. These several degrees may be observed in any mathematical Demonstration: it being one thing to perceive the connexion of each part, as the Demonstration is made by another; another to perceive the dependence of the conclusion on all the parts; a third to make out a Demonstration clearly and neatly ones self, and something different from all these, to have first found out those intermediate Ideas or Proofs by which it is made.

§. 4. There is one thing more, which I shall desire to be considered concerning Reason; and that is, whether Syllogism, as is generally thought, be the proper instrument of it, and the usefullest way of exercising this Faculty. The Causes I have to doubt, are these:

First, Because Syllogism serves our Reason, but in one only of the fore∣mentioned parts of it; and that is, to shew the connexion of the Proofs in any one instance, and no more: but in this, it is of no great use, since the Mind can perceive such connexion where it really is, as easily, nay, perhaps, better without it.

If we will observe the Actings of our own Minds, we shall find, that we reason best and clearest, when we only observe the connexion of the Proofs, without reducing it to any Rule of Syllogism: and therefore we may take notice, that there are many Men that reason exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a Syllogism. He that will look into many parts of Asia and America, will find Men reason there, perhaps, as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a Syllogism, nor can reduce any one Argument to those Forms. Indeed sometimes it may serve to discover a Fallacy hid in a rhetorical Flourish, or cunningly wrapp'd up in a smooth Period; and stripping an Absurdity of the Cover of Wit, and good Language, shew it in its naked Deformity: But the Mind is not taught to reason by these Rules, it has a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence, or Incoherence of its Ideas, and can range them right, without any such perplexing Repetitions. Tell a Country Gentlewoman, that the Wind is South-West, and the Weather louring, and like to rain, and she will easily understand, 'tis not safe for her to go abroad thin clad, in such a day, after a Fever: she clearly sees the probable connexion of all these, viz. South-West-Wind, and Clouds, Rain, wetting, taking Cold, Relapse, and Danger of Death, without tying them together in those ar∣tificial and cumbersome Fetters of several Syllogisms, that clog and hinder the Mind, which proceeds from one part to another quicker and clearer without them; and the Probability which she easily perceives in Things thus in their native State, would be quite lost, if this Argument were managed learnedly, and proposed in Mode and Figure. For it very often confounds the connexion: and, I think, every one will perceive in mathe∣matical Demonstrations, that the Knowledge gain'd thereby, comes shor∣test and clearest without Syllogism.

Secondly, Because though Syllogism serves to shew the Force or Fallacy of an Argument, made use of in the usual way of discoursing, by supply∣ing the absent Proposition, and so setting it before the view in a clear Light; yet it no less engages the Mind in the perplexity of obscure, equi∣vocal, and fallacious Terms, wherewith this artificial way of Reasoning always abounds: it being adapted more to the attaining of Victory in Dispute, than the discovery or confirmation of Truth in fair Enquiries.

§. 5. But however it be in Knowledge, I think, I may truly say, it is of far less, or no use at all in Probabilities: for the Assent there, being to be determined by the preponderancy, after a due weighing of all the Proofs, with all Circumstances on both sides, nothing is so unfit to assist the Mind in that, as Syllogism; which running away with one assumed Probability, or one topical Argument, pursues that till it has led the Mind quite out of sight of the thing under Consideration; and forcing it upon some remote Difficulty, holds it fast there, intangled perhaps, and as it were, mana∣cled in the Chain of Syllogisms, without allowing it the liberty, much less affording it the helps requisite to shew on which side, all Things consi∣dered, is the greater Probability.

§. 6. But let it help us (as, perhaps, may be said) in convincing Men of their Errors or Mistakes; (and yet I would fain see the Man, that was for∣ced out of his Opinions by dint of Syllogism;) yet still it fails our Reason in that part, which if not its highest Perfection, is yet certainly its hardest Task, and that which we most need its help in; and that is the finding out of Proofs, and making new Discoveries. The Rules of Syllogism serve not to furnish the Mind with those intermediate Ideas, that may shew the connexion of remote ones. This way of reasoning discovers no new Proofs, but is the Art of marshalling, and ranging the old ones we have already. The 47th Proposition of the First Book of Euclid is very true; but the discovery of it, I think, not owing to any Rules of common Logick. A Man knows first, and then he is able to prove syllogistically. So that Syllogism comes after Knowledge, and then a Man has little or no need of it. But 'tis chiefly by the finding out those Ideas that shew the con∣nexion of distant ones, that our stock of Knowledge is increased, and that useful Arts and Sciences are advanced. Syllogism, at best, is but the Art of fencing with the little Knowledge we have, without making any Addition to it: And if a Man should employ his Reason all this way, he will not doe much otherwise than he, who having got some Iron out of the Bowels of the Earth, should have it beaten up all into Swords, and put it into his Servants Hands to fence with, and bang one another. Had the King of Spain imploy'd the Hands of his People, and his Spanish Iron so, he had brought to Light but little of that Treasure, that lay so long hid in the dark Entrails of America. And I am apt to think, that he who shall employ all the force of his Reason only in brandishing of Syllogisms, will discover very little of that Mass of Knowledge, which lies yet concea∣led in the secret recesses of Nature; and which I am apt to think, native rustick Reason (as it formerly has done) is likelier to open a way to, and add to the common stock of Mankind, rather than any scholastick Pro∣ceeding by the strict Rules of Mode and Figure.

§. 7. I doubt not nevertheless, but there are ways to be found to assist our Reason in this most useful part; and this the judicious Hooker en∣courages me to say, who in his Eccl. Pol. l. 1. §. 6. speaks thus: If there might be added the right helps of true Art and Learning, (which helps I must plainly confess, this Age of the World carrying the Name of a learned Age, doth neither much know, nor generally regard,) there would undoubted∣ly be almost as much difference in Maturity of Iudgment between Men there∣with inured, and that which now Men are, as between Men that are now, and Innocents. I do not pretend to have found, or discovered here any of those right helps of Art, this great Man of deep Thoughts mentions; but this is plain, that Syllogism, and the Logick now in Use, which were as well known in his days, can be none of those he means. It is sufficient for me, if by a Discourse, perhaps, something out of the way, I am sure as to me

wholly new, and unborrowed, I shall have given Occasion to others, to cast about for new Discoveries, and to seek in their own Thoughts, for those right Helps of Art, which will scarce be found, I fear, by those who servilely confine themselves to the Rules and Dictates of others; for beaten Tracts lead these sort of Cattel, (as an observing Roman calls them,) whose Thoughts reach only to Imitation, Non quo eundum est, sed quo itur. But I can be bold to say, that this Age is adorned with some Men of that Strength of Judgment, and Largeness of Comprehension, that if they would employ their Thoughts on this Subject, could open new and undiscovered Ways, to the Advancement of Knowledge.

§. 8. Having here had Occasion to speak of Syllogism in general, and the Use of it, in Reasoning, and the Improvement of our Knowledge, 'tis fit, before I leave this Subject, to take notice of one manifest Mistake in the Rules of Syllogism; viz. That no Syllogistical Reasoning can be right, and conclusive, but what has, at least, one general Proposition in it. As if we could not reason, and have Knowledge about Particulars; whereas, in truth, the Matter rightly considered, the immediate Object of all our Rea∣soning and Knowledge, is nothing but Particulars. Every Man's Reasoning and Knowledge, is only about the Ideas existing in his own Mind, which are truly, every one of them, particular Existences; and our Knowledge and Reasoning about other Things, is only as they correspond with those our particular Ideas. So that the Perception of the Agreement, or Dis∣agreement of our particular Ideas, is the whole and utmost of all our Knowledge; Universality is but accidental to it, and consists only in this, That the particular Ideas, about which it is, are such, as more than one particular Thing can correspond with, and be represented by. But the Perception of the Agreement, or Disagreement of any two Ideas, and consequently, our Knowledge, is equally clear and certain, whether either, or both, or neither of those Ideas be capable of representing more real Beings than one, or no.

§. 9. Reason, Though it penetrates into the Depths of the Sea and Earth, elevates our Thoughts as high as the Stars, and leads us through the vast Spaces, and large Rooms of this mighty Fabrick, yet it comes far short of the real Extent of even corporeal Being; and there are many Instances wherein it fails us: As,

First, It perfectly fails us, where our Ideas fail. It neither does, nor can extend it self farther than they do: and therefore, where-ever we have no Ideas, our Reasoning stops, and we are at an End of our Reckoning: And if at any time we reason about Words, which do not stand for any Ideas, 'tis only about those Sounds, and nothing else.

§. 10. Secondly, Our Reason is often puzled, and at a loss, because of the scurity, Confusion, or Imperfection of the Ideas it is employed about; and there we are involved in Difficulties and Contradictions. Thus, not ha∣ving any perfect Idea of the least Extension of Matter, nor of Infinity, we are at a loss about the Divisibility of Matter; but having perfect, clear, and distinct Ideas of Number, our Reason meets with none of those inex∣tricable Difficulties in Numbers, nor finds it self involved in any Contra∣dictions about them. Thus, we having but imperfect Ideas, of the Opera∣tions of our Minds upon our Bodies or Thoughts; and of the Beginning of either Motion or Thought in us; and much imperfecter yet, of the Ope∣ration of GOD, run into great Difficulties about free, created Agents, which Reason cannot well extricate it self out of.

§. 11. Thirdly, Our Reason is often at a stand, because it perceives not those Ideas, which could serve to shew the certain or probable Agreement, or Dis∣agreement

of any two other Ideas; and in this, some Men's Faculties far out-go others. Till Algebra, that great Instrument and Instance of Hu∣mane Sagacity, was discovered, Men, with Amazement, looked on seve∣ral of the Demonstrations of ancient Mathematicians, and could scarce for∣bear to think the finding some of those Proofs, more than humane.

§. 12. Fourthly, Reason is often engaged in Absurdities and Difficulties, brought into Straits and Contradictions, without knowing how to free it self, by proceeding upon false Principles; which, being followed, lead Men in∣to Contradictions to themselves, and Inconsistency in their own Thoughts; which their Reason is so far from clearing, that if they will pursue it, it entangles them the more, and engages them deeper in Perplexities.

§. 13. Fifthly, As obscure and imperfect Ideas often involve our Reason, so, upon the same Ground, do dubious Words, and uncertain Signs, often, in Discourses and Arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle Men's Rea∣son, and bring them to a Nonplus. But these two latter are our Fault, and not the Fault of Reason: But yet, the Consequences of them are ne∣vertheless obvious; and the Perplexities, or Errors, they fill Men's Minds with, is every where observable.

§. 14. Some of the Ideas that are in the Mind, are so there, that they can be, by themselves, immediately compared, one with another: And in these, the Mind is able to perceive, that they agree, or disagree, as clear∣ly, as that it has them. Thus the Mind perceives, that an Arch of a Circle is less than the whole Circle, as clearly as it does the Idea of a Circle: And this, therefore, as has been said, I call Intuitive Knowledge; which is certain, beyond all Doubt, and needs no Probation, nor can have any; this being the highest of all Humane Certainty. In this consists the Evi∣dence of all those AEternae Veritates, which no Body has any Doubt about, but every Man (does not, as is said, only assent to, but) knows to be true, as soon as ever they are proposed to his Understanding. In the Discovery of, and Assent to these Truths, there is no Use of the dis∣cursive Faculty, no need of Reason; but they are known by a superior, and higher Degree of Evidence: And such, if I may guess at Things un∣known, I am apt to think, that Angels have now, and the Spirits of just Men made perfect, shall have, in a future State, of Thousands of Things, which now, either wholly escape our Apprehensions, or which, our short-sighted Reason having got some faint Glimpse of, we, in the Dark, grope after.

§. 15. But though we have, here and there, a little of this clear Light, some Sparks of bright Knowledge; yet the greatest part of our Ideas are such, that we cannot discern their Agreement, or Disagreement, by an immediate Comparing them: And in all these, we have Need of our Rea∣son; and must, by Discourse and Inference, make our Discoveries. Now of these, there are two sorts, which I shall take the liberty to mention here again.

First, Those whose Agreement, or Disagreement, though it cannot be seen by an immediate Putting them together, yet may be examined by the Intervention of other Ideas, which can be compared with them; where∣in, if the Agreement, or Disagreement, be plainly discerned, of the inter∣mediate Ideas on both sides, with those we would compare, there it is Demonstration; and it produces certain Knowledge, though not altoge∣ther so evident as the former: Because there is in the former, bare Intui∣tion, but in these there is Intuition indeed, but not altogether at once; for there must be a Remembrance of the Intuition of the Agreement of the Medium, with that we compared it with before, when we compare

it with the other: and where there be many Mediums, there the danger of the Mistake is the greater, and consequently it may be liable to the greater uncertainty. But yet where the Mind clearly retains the Intui∣tion it had of the Agreement of any Idea with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, &c. there the Agreement of the first and the fourth is a Demonstration, and produces certain Knowledge, which may be called Rational Knowledge, as the other is Intuitive.

§. 16. Secondly, There are other Ideas, whose Agreement, or Disagree∣ment, can no otherwise be judged of, but by the intervention of others, which have not a certain Agreement with the Extremes, but an usual or likely one: and in these it is, that the Iudgment is properly exercised, which is the acquiescing of the Mind, that any Ideas do agree, by com∣paring them with such probable Mediums. And this, though it never a∣mounts to Knowledge, no not to that which is the lowest degree of it; yet sometimes the intermediate Ideas tie the Extremes so firmly toge∣ther; and the Probability is so clear and strong, that Assent as necessa∣rily follows it, as Knowledge does Demonstration. The great Excellen∣cy and Use of the Judgment, is to observe Right, and take a true esti∣mate of the force and weight of each Probability; and then casting them up all right together, chuse that side which has the over-balance.

§. 17. Intuitive Knowledge, is the perception of the certain Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas immediately compared together.

Rational Knowledge, is the perception of the certain Agreement, or Dis∣agreement of any two Ideas, by the intervention of one or more other Ideas.

Iudgment, is the thinking or taking two Ideas to agree, or disagree, by the intervention of one or more Ideas, whose certain agreement, or disagreement with them, it does not perceive, but hath observed to be fre∣quent and usual.

§. 18. Though the deducing one Proposition from another, or making Inferences in Words, be a great part of Reason, and that which it is usual∣ly employ'd about: yet the principal Act of Ratiocination is the finding the Agreement, or Disagreement of two Ideas one with another, by the intervention of a third. As a Man, by a Yard, finds two Houses to be of the same length, which could not be brought together to measure their Equality by juxta-position. Words have their Consequences, as the signs of such Ideas: and Things, agree or disagree, as really they are; but we observe it only by our Ideas.

§. 19. Before we quit this Subject, it may be worth our while a little to reflect on four sorts of Arguments, that Men in their Reasonings with others do ordinarily make use of, to prevail on their Assent; or at least so to awe them, as to silence their Opposition.

First, The first is, to alledge the Opinions of Men, whose Parts, Lear∣ning, Eminency, Power, or some other cause, has gained a Reputation to, and setled in the common esteem with some kind of Authority. When Men are established in any kind of Dignity, 'tis thought a breach of Modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the Authority of Men who are in possession of it. This is apt to be censured, as carrying with it too much of Pride, when a Man does not readily vail to the Opinions of approved Authors, which have been received with respect and submission by others; and 'tis looked upon as insolence, for a Man to set up, and adhere to his own Opinion, against the current stream of Antiquity, or to put it in the balance against that of some learned Doctor, or otherwise approved Writer. Whoever backs his Tenets with

such Authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the Cause, and is ready to style it Impudence in any one who shall stand out against them. This, I think, may be called Argumentum ad Verecundiam.

Secondly, §. 20. Another way that Men ordinarily use to drive others, and force them to submit their Judgments, and receive the Opinion in debate, is to require the Adversary to admit what they alledge as a Proof, or to assign a better. And this I call Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.

§. 21. Thirdly, A third way is, to press a Man with Consequences drawn from his own Principles, or Concessions. This is already known un∣der the Name of Argumentum ad Hominem.

§. 22. Fourthly, The fourth is, the using of Proofs drawn from any of the Foundations of Knowledge, or Probability This I call Argumentum ad Iudicium, This alone of all the four, brings true Instruction with it, and advances us in our way to Knowledge. For, 1. It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right, because I out of respect, or any other consi∣deration, but that of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another Man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow, that another Man is in the right way, because he has shewn me, that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose another Man's Persuasion: I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an Errour, and another may shew me that I am so. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the reception of Truth, but helps me not to it: That must come from Proofs and Arguments, and light arising from the nature of Things themselves, and not from my Shamefacedness, Ignorance, or Errour.

§. 23. By what has been before said of Reason, we may be able to make some guess at th•• distinction of Things, into those that are according to, above, and contrary to Reason. 1. According to Reason are such Propo∣sitions, whose Truth we can discover, by examining and tracing those Ideas we have from Sensation and Reflexion; and by natural deduction, find to be true, or probable. 2. Above Reason are such Propositions, whose Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles. 3. Contrary to Reason are such Propositions, as are inconsistent with, or irreconcileable to our clear and distinct Ideas. Thus the Existence of one GOD is according to Reason; the Existence of more than one GOD, contrary to Reason; the Resurrection of the Body after death, above Reason. Above Reason also may be taken in a double sense, viz. Above Probability, or above Certainty; and in that large sense also, Con∣trary to Reason, is, I suppose, sometimes taken.

§. 24. There is another use of the word Reason, wherein it is opposed to Faith: which though it be in it self a very improper way of speaking, yet common Use has so authorized it, that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it: Only I think it may not be amiss to take notice, that however Faith be opposed to Reason, Faith is nothing but a firm Assent of the Mind; which if it be regulated, as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good Reason; and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes, without having any Reason for believing, may be in love with his own Fansies; but neither seeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning Faculties he has given him, to keep him out of Mistake and Errour. He that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on Truth, is in the right but by chance: and I know not whether the luckiness of the Accident, will excuse the irregularity of

his proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever Mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the Light and Faculties GOD has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover Truth, by those Helps and Abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his Duty as a rational Creature, that though he should miss Truth, he will not miss the Reward of it. For he governs his Assent right, and places it as he should, who in any case or matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves, according as Reason directs him. He that does otherwise, transgresses against his own Light, and misuses the Faculties which were given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer Evidence, and greater Probability. But since Reason and Faith are by some Men opposed, we will so consider them in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVIII. Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces.

§. 1. IT has been above shewn, 1. That we are of necessity ignorant; and want Knowledge of all sorts, where we want Ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational Knowledge, where we want Proofs. 3. That we want general Knowledge and Certainty, as far as we want clear and determined specifick Ideas. 4. That we want Probability to direct our Assent in matters where we have neither Knowledge of our own, nor Testimony of other Men to bottom our Reason upon.

From these things thus premised, I think we may come to lay down the measures and boundaries between Faith and Reason; the want whereof, may possibly have been the cause, if not of great Disorders, yet at least of great Disputes, and perhaps Mistakes in the World. For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by Reason, and how far by Faith, we shall in vain dispute, and endeavour to convince one another in Mat∣ters of Religion.

§. 2. I find every Sect, as far as Reason will help them, make use of it gladly; and where it fails them, they cry out, 'Tis matter of Faith, and above Reason. And I do not see how they can ever be convinced by any, who makes use of the same plea, without setting down strict boundaries between Faith and Reason; which ought to be the first point established in all Questions, where Faith has any thing to do.

Reason therefore here, as contradistinguished to Faith, I take to be the discovery of the Certainty or Probability of such Propositions or Truths, which the Mind arrives at by Deductions made from such Ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties, viz. by Sensation or Re∣flexion.

Faith, on the other side, is the Assent to any Proposition, not thus made out by the Deductions of Reason, but upon the Credit of the Pro∣poser, as coming immediately from GOD; which we call Revelation.

§. 3. First, Then, I say, That no Man inspired by GOD, can by any Revelation communicate to others any new simple Ideas which they had not before from Sensation or Reflexion. For whatsoever impressions he him∣self may have from the immediate hand of GOD, this Revelation, if it be of new simple Ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by Words, or any other signs: because Words, by their immediate Operation on us,

cause no other Ideas, but of their natural Sounds; and 'tis by the Custom of using them for Signs, that they excite, and revive in our Minds latent Ideas; but yet only such Ideas, as were there before. For Words seen or heard, recall to our Thoughts those Ideas only, which to us they have been wont to be Signs of: but cannot introduce any perfectly new simple Ideas, which were never there before. The same holds in all other Signs, which cannot signifie to us Things, of which we have before never had any Ideas at all.

Thus whatever Things were discovered to St. Paul, when he was rapp'd up into the Third Heaven; whatever new Ideas his Mind there received, all the description he can make to others of that Place, is only this, That there are such Things, as Eye hath not seen, nor Ear heard, nor hath it entred into the Heart of Man to conceive. And, supposing God should discover to any one, supernaturally, a Species of Creatures inhabiting: For Example, Iupiter, or Saturn (for that it is possible there may be such, no body can deny) which had six Senses; and imprint on his Mind the Ideas convey'd to theirs by that sixth Sense, he could no more, by Words, produce in the Minds of other Men those Ideas, imprinted by that sixth Sense; than one of us could convey the Idea of any Colour, by the sound of Words into a Man, who having the other four Senses perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth of Seeing. For our simple Ideas then, which are the Foundation, and sole Matter of all our Notions, and Knowledge, we must depend wholly on our Reason, I mean, our natural Faculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them from Traditional Revela∣tion, I say, Traditional Revelation, in distinction to Original Revelation. By the one, I mean that first Impression, which is made immediately by GOD, on the Mind of any Man, to which, I pretend not to set any Bounds; and by the other, those Impressions delivered over to others in Words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another.

§. 4. Secondly, I say, that the same Truths may be discovered, and conveyed down from Revelation, which are discoverable to us by Reason, and those clear Ideas we have. So God might, by Revelation, discover the Truth of any Proposition in Euclid, as well as Men, by the natural use of their Faculties, come to make the discovery themselves. In all Things of this Nature, there is little need or use of Revelation, GOD having furnished us with natural, and surer means to arrive at the Knowledge of them. For whatsoever Truth we come to the discovery of, from the Knowledge and Contemplation of our own clear Ideas, will always be certainer to us, than those which are conveyed to us by Traditional Revelation: for the Knowledge we have, that this Revelation came at first from GOD, can never be so sure, as the Knowledge we have from our own clear and distinct Ideas. As if it were revealed some Ages since, That the three An∣gles of a Triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the Truth of that Proposition, upon the Credit of the Tradition, that it was revealed: but that would never amount to so great a Certainty, as the Knowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my own clear Ideas of two right Angles, and the three Angles of a Triangle. The like holds in Matter of Fact, knowable by our Senses; v. g. the History of the De∣luge is conveyed to us by Writings, which had their Original from Reve∣lation: and yet no body, I think, will say, he has as certain and clear a Knowledge of the Flood, as Noah that saw it; or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive, and seen it. For he has no greater an assurance than that of his Senses, that it is writ in the Book supposed writ

by Moses: but he has not so great an assurance, that Moses writ that Book, as if he had seen Moses write it; so that the assurance of its being a Reve∣lation, is less still than the assurance of his Senses.

§. 5. In Propositions then, whose Certainty is built upon clear, and perfect Ideas, and evident Deductions of Reason, we need not the assistence of Revelation, as necessary to gain our Assent, and introduce them into our Minds. Because the natural ways of Knowledge could settle them there, or had done it already, which is the greatest assurance we can possi∣bly have of any thing, unless where God immediately reveals it to us: and there too our Assurance can be no greater than our Knowledge is, that it is a Revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can under that Title, shake or over-rule plain Knowledge, nor rationally prevail with any Man, to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear Evi∣dence of his own Understanding. For since no Evidence of our Faculties, by which we receive such Revelations, can exceed, if equal, the Certainty of our intuitive Knowledge, we can never receive for a Truth, any thing that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge; v. g. The Idea of one Body, and one Place, does so clearly agree; and the Mind has so evident a Perception of it, that we can never assent to a Proposition, that affirms the same Body to be in two distant Places at once, however it should pretend to the Authority of a divine Revelation, since the Evi∣dence; First, That we deceive not our selves in ascribing it to GOD, Secondly, That we understand it right, can never be so great, as the Evi∣dence of our own intuitive Knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible, for the same Body to be in two Places at once. And therefore, no Proposi∣tion can be received for divine Revelation, or obtain the Assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive Knowledge. Since this would be to subvert the Principles, and Foundations of all Knowledge, Evi∣dence, and Assent whatsoever; and leave no difference between Truth and Falshood; no measures of Credible and Incredible in the World, if doubt∣ful Propositions shall take place before self-evident; and what we certain∣ly know, give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In Propo∣sitions therefore contrary to our distinct and clear Ideas, 'twill be in vain to urge them as Matters of Faith. They cannot move our Assent under that, or any other Title whatsoever. For Faith can never convince us of any thing, that contradicts our Knowledge. Because though Faith be founded on the Testimony of God, (revealing any Proposition to us,) who cannot lie; yet we cannot have an assurance of the Truth of its being a divine Revelation, greater than our own Knowledge: since the whole strength of the Certainty depends upon our Knowledge, that God re∣vealed it, which in this Case, where the Proposition suppos'd reveal'd, contradicts our Knowledge or Reason, will always have this Objection hanging to it, (viz.) that we cannot tell how to conceive, that to come from GOD, the bountiful Author of our Being, which if received for true, must overturn all our Principles and Foundations of Knowledge; render all our Faculties useless; wholly destroy the most excellent part of his Workmanship, our Understandings; and put a Man in a Condition, wherein he will have less Light, less Conduct than the Beast that perisheth. For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer (and, per∣haps, not so clear) an Evidence of any thing to be a divine Revelation, as it has of the Principles of its own Reason, it can never have a ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reason, to give place to a Proposition, whose Revelation has not a greater Evidence.

§. 6. Thus far a Man has use of Reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original Revelation, where it is supposedly made to himself: But to all those who pretend not to immediate Revelation but are required to pay Obedience, and to receive the Truths revealed to others, which, by the Tradition of Writings, or Word of Mouth, are conveyed down to them, Reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For Matter of Faith being only Divine Revelation, and nothing else, Faith, as we use the Word, (called commonly, Divine Faith) has to do with no Propositions, but those which are supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those, who make Revelation alone the sole Object of Faith, can say, that it is a Matter of Faith, and not of Reason, to believe, that such or such a Proposition, to be found in such or such a Book, is of Divine Inspira∣tion; unless it be revealed, that that Proposition, or all in that Book, was communicated by Divine Inspiration. Without such a Revelation, the believing, or not believing that Proposition, or Book, to be of Divine Autho∣rity, can never be Matter of Faith, but Matter of Reason; and such as I must come to an Assent to, only by the use of my Reason, which can never require or enable me to believe that, which is contrary to it self: it being impossible for Reason, ever to procure any Assent to that, which to it self appears unreasonable.

In all Things therefore, where we have clear Evidence from our Ideas, and those Principles of Knowledge, I have above mentioned, Reason is the proper Judge; and Revelation, though it may in consenting with it, con∣firm its Dictates, yet cannot, in such Cases, invalidate its Decrees: Nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Rea∣son, to quit it, for the contrary Opinion, under a Pretence that it is Mat∣ter of Faith.

§. 7. But Thirdly, There being many Things, wherein we have very imperfect Notions, or none at all; and other Things, of whose past, pre∣sent, or future Existence, by the natural Use of our Faculties, we can have no Knowledge at all; these, as being beyond the Discovery of our natu∣ral Faculties, and above Reason, are, when revealed, the proper Matter of Faith. Thus that part of the Angels rebelled against GOD, and there∣by lost their first happy State: And that the Bodies of Men shall rise, and live again: These, and the like, being beyond the Discovery of Reason, are purely Matters of Faith; with which, Reason has, directly, nothing to do.

§. 8. But since all Things that are under the Character of Divine Revela∣tion, are esteemed Matter of Faith; and there are amongst them, several Things, that fall under the Examen of Reason; and are such as we could judge of by our natural Faculties, without a Supernatural Revelation. In these, Revelation must carry it, against the probable Conjectures of Rea∣son: because the Mind, not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know, but is only probably convinced of, is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony, which, it is satisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet, it still belongs to Reason, to judge of the Truth of its being a Revelation, and of the signification of the Words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if any thing shall be thought Revelation, which is contrary to the plain Principles of Reason, and the evident Knowledge the Mind has of its own clear and distinct Ideas; there Reason must be hearkned to, as to a Matter within its Province: since a Man can never have so certain a Knowledge, that a Proposition which contradicts the clear Principles and Evidence of his own Knowledge, was

divinely revealed, or that he understands the Words rightly, wherein it is delivered, as he has, that the Contrary is true, and so is bound to consi∣der and judge of it as a Matter of Reason, and not swallow it, without Examination, as a Matter of Faith.

§. 9. The Summ of all is,

• First, Whatever Proposition is revealed, of whose Truth, our Mind, by its natural Faculties and Notions, cannot judge, that is purely Matter of Faith, and above Reason.
• Secondly, All Propositions, whereof the Mind, by the use of its natural Faculties, can come to determine and judge, from natural acquired Ideas, are Matter of Reason; with this difference still, that in those, concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence, and so is persuaded of their Truth, only upon probable Grounds, which still admit a Possibility of the Contrary to be true, without doing Violence to the certain Evidence of its own Knowledge, and overturning the Principles of all Reason: In such probable Propositions, I say, an evident Revelation ought to deter∣mine our Assent even against Probability. For where the Principles of Rea∣son have not determined a Proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear Revelation, as another Principle of Truth, and Ground of Assent, may determine; and so it may be Matter of Faith, and be also above Reason. Because Reason, in that particular Matter, being able to reach no higher than Probability, Faith gave the Determination, where Rea∣son came short; and Revelation discovered on which side the Truth lay.

§. 10. Thus far the Dominion of Faith reaches, and that without any violence, or hindrance to Reason; which is not injured, or disturbed, but assisted and improved, by new Discoveries of Truth, coming from the Eternal Fountain of all Knowledge. Whatever GOD hath revealed, is certainly true; no Doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of Faith: But whether it be a divine Revelation, or no, Reason must judge; which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor prefer less Certainty to the greater. There can be no Evidence, that any traditional Revelation is of divine Original, in the Words we receive it, and in the Sense we understand it, so clear, and so certain as those of the Principles of Reason: And therefore, Nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with the clear and self-evident Dictates of Reason, has a Right to be urged, or assented to, as a Matter of Faith, wherein Reason hath nothing to do. Whatsoever is divine Revelation, ought to over-rule all our Opinions, Prejudices, and Interests, and hath a Right to be received with a full Assent: Such a Submission as this of our Reason to Faith, takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge: This shakes not the Foundations of Reason, but leaves us that Use of our Fa∣culties, for which they were given us.

§. 11. If the Provinces of Faith and Reason are not kept distinct by these Boundaries, there will, in matter of Religion, be no more for Reason at all; and those extravagant Opinions and Ceremonies, that are to be found in the several Religions of the World, will not deserve to be blamed: For, to this crying up of Faith, in opposition to Reason, we may, I think, in good measure, ascribe those Absurdities, that fill almost all the Reli∣gions which possess and divide Mankind. For Men having been princi∣pled with an Opinion, that they must not consult Reason in the Things of Religion, however apparently contradictory to common Sense, and the very Principles of all their Knowledge, have let loose their Fansies, and natural Superstition, and have been, by them, lead into so strange Opinions, and extravagant Practices in Religion, that a considerate Man

cannot but stand amazed at their Follies, and judge them so far from be∣ing acceptable to the great and wise GOD, that he cannot avoid thin∣king them ridiculous, and offensive to a sober, good Man. So that, in ef∣fect, that which most properly ought to distinguish us from Beasts, that wherein we are elevated, as rational Creatures, above Brutes; in that we appear most irrational, and more senseless than Beasts themselves. Credo, quia impossibile est: I believe, because it is impossible, might, in a good Man, pass for a Sally of Zeal; but would prove a very ill Rule for Men to chuse their Opinions, or Religion by.

CHAP. XIX. Of Wrong Assent, or Errour.

§. 1. KNowledge being to be had only of visible certain Truth, Er∣rour is not a Fault of our Knowledge, but a Mistake of our Judgment giving Assent to that, which is not true.

But if Assent be grounded on Likelihood, if the proper Object and Motive of our Assent be Probability, and that Probability consist in what is laid down in the foregoing Chapters, it will be demanded, how Men come to give their Assents contrary to Probability: For there is nothing more common, than Contrariety of Opinions; nothing more obvious, than that one Man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third stedfastly believes, and firmly adheres to. The Reasons whereof, though they may be very various, yet, I suppose, may all be reduced to these four.

• 1. Want of Proofs.
• 2. Want of Ability to use them.
• 3. Want of Will to use them.
• 4. Wrong Measures of Probability.

§. 2. First, By Want of Proofs: I do not mean, only the Want of those Proofs which are no where extant, which are no where to be had; but the Want even of those Proofs which are in Being, or might be procured. And thus Men want Proofs, who have not the Convenience, or Oppor∣tunity to make Experiments and Observations themselves, tending to the Proof of any Proposition; nor likewise the Convenience to enquire into, and collect the Testimonies of others: And in this State are the greatest part of Mankind, who are given up to Labour, and enslaved to the Ne∣cessity of their mean Condition; whose Lives are worn out, only in the Provisions for Living. These Men's Opportunity of Knowledge and En∣quiry, are commonly as narrow as their Fortunes; and their Understan∣dings are but little instructed, when all their whole Time and Pains is laid out, to still the Croaking of their own Bellies, or the Cries of their Chil∣dren 'Tis not to be expected, that a Man, who drudges on, all his Life, in a laborious Trade, should be more knowing in the Variety of Things done in the World, than a Pack-horse, who is driven constantly forwards and backwards, in a narrow Lane, and dirty Road, only to Market, should be skilled in the Geography of the Country. Nor is it at all more pos∣sible, that he who wants Leisure, Books, and Languages, and the Oppor∣tunity of Conversing with Variety of Men, should be in a Condition to collect those Testimonies and Observations which are in Being, and are

necessary to make out many, nay, most of the Propositions, that in the Societies of Man, are judged of the greatest Moment; or to find out Grounds of Assurance so great, as the Belief of the Points he would build on them, is thought necessary. So that a great part of Mankind are, by the natural and unalterable State of Things in this World, and the Con∣stitution of humane Affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible Igno∣rance of those Prooss, on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those Opinions: The greatest part of Men, having much to do to get the Means of Living, are not in a Condition to look after those of learned and laborious Enquiries.

§. 3. What shall we say then? Are the greatest part of Mankind, by the necessity of their Condition, subjected to unavoidable Ignorance in those Things, which are of greatest Importance to them? (for of those, 'tis obvious to enquire?) Have the Bulk of Mankind no other Guide, but Accident, and blind Chance, to conduct them to their Happiness, or Misery? Are the current Opinions, and licensed Guides of every Coun∣try sufficient Evidence and Security to every Man, to venture his grea∣test Concernments on; nay, his everlasting Happiness, or Misery? Or can those be the certain and infallible Oracles and Standards of Truth, which teach one Thing in Christendom, and another in Turkey? Or shall a poor Country-man be eternally happy, for having the Chance to be born in Italy; or a Day-Labourer be unavoidably lost, because he had the ill Luck to be born in England? How ready some Men may be to say some of these Things, I will not here examine; but this I am sure, that Men must allow one or other of these to be true, (let them chuse which they please;) or else grant, that GOD has furnished Men with Facul∣ties sufficient to direct them in the Way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that Way, when their ordinary Vocations allow them the Leisure. No Man is so wholly taken up with the Attendence on the Means of Living, as to have no spare Time at all to think on his Soul, and inform himself in Matters of Religion. Were Men as intent upon this, as they are on Things of lower Concernment, there are none so en∣slaved to the Necessity of Life, who might not find many Vacancies, that might be husbanded to this Advantage of their Knowledge.

§. 4. Besides thos••, whose Improvements and Informations are strait∣ned by the narrowness of their Fortunes, there are others, whose largeness of Fortune would plentifully enough supply Books, and other Opportu∣nities of clearing of Doubts, and discovering of Truth: But they are coo∣ped in close, by the Laws of their Countries, and the strict Guards of those, whose Interest it is to keep them ignorant, lest, knowing more, they should believe the less in them, that they are as far, nay farther, from the Liber∣ties and Opportunities of a fair Enquiry, than those poor and wretched La∣bourers we before spoke of. These Men, however they may seem high and great, are confined to narrowness of Thought, and enslaved in that which should be the freest part of Man, their Understandings. This is generally the Case of all those, who live in Places where Care is taken to propagate Truth, without Knowledge; where Men are forced, at a ven∣ture, to be of the Religion of the Country; and must therefore swallow down Opinions, as silly People do Empiricks Pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do, but believe that they will do the Cure; but in this, are much more miserable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refuse swallowing what, per∣haps, they had rather let alone; or to chuse the Physician, to whose Con∣duct they would trust themselves.

§. 5. Secondly, Those that want skill to use those Evidences they have of Probabilities, that cannot carry a train of Consequences in their Heads, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary Proofs and Testimonies, making every Circumstance its due allowance, may be easily misled to assent to Positions that are not probable. There are some Men of one, some but of two Syllogisms, and no more; and others that can but ad∣vance one step farther. These cannot always discern that side on which the strongest Proofs lie, cannot constantly follow that which in its self is the more probable Opinion. Now that there is such a difference between Men, in respect of their Understandings, I think no body will question, who has had any Conversation with his Neighbours, though he never was at Westminster-Hall or the Exchange on the one hand, nor at Alms-Houses or Bedlam on the other; which great difference in Men's Intel∣lectuals, whether it rises from any defect in the Organs of the Body, par∣ticularly adapted to Thinking, or in the dulness or untractableness of those Faculties, for want of use; or, as some think, in the natural differences of Men's Souls themselves, or some or all of these together, it matters not here to examine: Only this is evident, that there is a difference of de∣grees in Men's Understandings, Apprehensions, and Reasonings, to so great a latitude, that one may, without doing injury to Mankind, affirm, that there is a greater distance between some Men and others in this re∣spect, than between some Men and some Beasts. But how this comes about, is a Speculation, though of great consequence, yet not necessary to our present purpose.

§. 6. Thirdly, There are another sort of People that want Proofs, not because they are out of their reach, but because they will not use them: Who though they have Riches and leisure enough, and want neither Parts nor Learning, may, yet through their hot pursuit of Pleasure, or Business, or else out of laziness or fear, that the Doctrines, whose Truth they should enquire into, would not suit well with their Opinions, Lives, or Designs, may never come to the knowledge of, nor give their Assent to those Pro∣babilities which lie so much within their view, that to be convinced of them, they need but turn their Eyes that way: But we know some Men will not read a Letter, which is supposed to bring ill news; and many Men forbear to cast up their Accompts, or so much as think upon their Estates, who have reason to fear their Affairs are not in a very good po∣sture. How Men, whose plentiful Fortunes allow them leisure to im∣prove their Understandings, can satisfie themselves with a lazy ignorance, I cannot tell: But methinks they have a low Opinion of their Souls, who lay out all their Incomes in Provisions for the Body, and employ none of it to procure the Means and Helps of Knowledge; who take great care to appear always in a neat and splendid outside, and would think themselves miserable in course Cloaths, or a patched Coat, and yet con∣tentedly suffer their Minds to appear abroad in a pie-bald Livery of course Patches, and borrowed Shreds, such as it has pleased Chance, or their Country-Tailor, I mean the common Opinion of those they have conver∣sed with, to cloath them. I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for Men that ever think of a future state, and their concernment in it, which no rational Man can avoid to do sometimes: nor shall I take notice what a shame and confusion it is, to the greatest Contemners of Know∣ledge, to be found ignorant in Things they are concerned to know. But this, at least, is worth the consideration of those who call themselves Gentlemen, That however they may think Credit, Respect, Power, and Authority the Concomitants of their Birth and Fortune, yet they will

find all these still carried away from them, by Men of lower Condition, who surpass them in Knowledge. They who are blind, will always be led by those that see, or else fall into the Ditch; and he is certainly the most subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in his Understanding. In the foregoing instances, some of the Causes have been shewn of wrong Assent, and how it comes to pass, that probable Doctrines are not always received with an Assent proportionable to the Reasons, which are to be had for their Probability; but hitherto it has been only of such Probabili∣ties, whose Proofs do only exist, but do not appear to him that embraces the Errour.

§. 7. Fourthly, There remains yet the last sort, who even where the real Probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, yet do not admit of the conviction, nor yield unto manifest Reasons, but do either 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, suspend their Assent, or give it to the less probable Opinion. And to this danger are those exposed, who have taken up wrong measures of Pro∣bability, which are,

• 1. Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubt∣ful and false, taken up for Principles.
• 2. Received Hypotheses.
• 3. Predominant Passions or Inclinations.
• 4. Authority.

§. 8. First, The first and firmest ground of Probability, is the con∣formity any thing has to our own Knowledge; especially that part of our Knowledge which we have embraced, and continue to look on as Principles. These have so great an influence upon our Opinions, that 'tis usually by them we judge of Truth; and measure Probability to that de∣gree, that what is inconsistent with our Principles, is so far from passing for probable with us, that it will not be allowed possible. The reverence is born to these Principles is so great, and their Authority so paramount to all other, that the Testimony not only of other Men, but the Evidence of our own Senses are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these established Rules. How much the Doctrine of innate Principles, and that Principles are not to be proved or questioned, has contributed to this, I will not here examine: This I readily grant, that one Truth cannot contradict another; but withal I take leave also to say, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a Prin∣ciple; to examine it strictly, and see whether he certainly knows it to be true of it self by its own evidence, or whether he does only with assu∣rance believe it to be so, upon the Authority of others, For he hath a strong biass put into his Understanding, which will unavoidably misguide his Assent, who hath imbibed wrong Principles, and has blindly given him∣self up to the Authority of any Opinion in it self not evidently true.

§. 9. There is nothing more ordinary, than that Children should re∣ceive into their Minds Propositions (especially about Matters of Religion) from their Parents, Nurses, or those about them; which being insinuated into their unwary, as well as unbiass'd Understandings, and fastened by degrees, are at last (equally, whether true or false) rivited there by long Custom and Education, beyond all possibility of being pull'd out again. For Men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their Opinions, and finding those of this sort to be as ancient in their Minds as their very Memories, not having observed their early insinuation, nor by what means they got them, they are apt to reverence them as sacred Things, not to suffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned, but look on them as the Vrim and Thummim set up in their Minds immediately by

GOD Himself, to be the great and unerring Deciders of Truth and Falshood, and the Judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of Controversies.

§. 10. This Opinion of his Principles (let them be what they will) being once established in any one's Mind, it is easie to be imagined what reception any Proposition shall find, how clearly soever proved, that shall invalidate their Authority, or at all thwart with these internal Oracles; whereas the grossest Absurdities and Improbabilities, being but agreeable to such Principles, go down glibly, and are easily digested. The great obstinacy, that is to be found in Men firmly believing quite contrary Opi∣nions, though many times equally absurd, in the various Religions of Mankind, are as evident a Proof, as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of Reasoning from received traditional Principles: So that Men will disbelieve their own Eyes, renounce the Evidence of their Sen∣ses, and give their own Experience the lye, rather than admit of any thing disagreeing with these sacred Tenets. Take an intelligent Romanist, that from the very first dawnings of any Notions in his Understanding, hath had this Principle constantly inculcated, viz. That he must believe as the Church believes, or that the Pope is Infallible: and this he never so much as heard questioned, till at forty or fifty years old he met with one of other Principles: How is he prepared easily to swallow, not only against all Probability, but even the clear Evidence of his Senses, the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, and will believe that to be Flesh, which he sees to be Bread? And what way will you take to convince a Man of any improbable Opinion he holds, who, with some Philosophers, hath laid down this as a foundation of Reasoning, That he must believe his Rea∣son (for so Men improperly call Arguments drawn from their Prin∣ciples) against their Senses? Let an Enthusiast be principled, that he or his Teacher is inspired, and acted by an immediate Communication of the Divine Spirit; and you in vain bring the Evidence of clear Reasons against his Doctrines. Whoever therefore have imbibed wrong Princi∣ples, are not, in Things inconsistent with these Principles, to be moved by the most apparent and convincing Probabilities, till they are so can∣did and ingenuous to themselves, as to be persuaded to examine even those very Principles, which many never suffer themselves to do.

§. 11. Secondly, Next to these, are Men whose Understandings are cast into a Mold, and fashioned just to the size of a received Hypothesis. The difference between these and the former, is, that they will admit of mat∣ter of Fact, and agree with Dissenters in that; but differ only in assigning of Reasons, and explaining the manner of Operation. These are not at that o∣pen defiance with their Senses, as the former; they can endure to hearken to their Intelligence a little more patiently: but will by no means admit of their Reports, in the Explanation of Things, nor be prevailed on by Pro∣babilities which would convince them that Things are not brought about just after the same manner, that they have decreed within themselves that they are. Would it not be an insufferable a thing for a learned Professor, and that which his Scarlet would blush for, to have his Authority of forty years standing wrought out of hard Rock Greek and Latin, with no small expence of Time and Candle, and confirmed by general Tradi∣tion, and a reverend Beard, in an instant overturned by an upstart Nove∣list; and he made to confess, That what he taught his Scholars thirty years ago, was all Errour and Mistake; and that he sold them hard Words and Ignorance at a very dear rate? What Probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such a case? And who ever by the most cogent Arguments

will be prevailed with, to disrobe himself at once of all his old Opinions, and Pretences to Knowledge and Learning, which with hard Study, he hath all his Time been labouring for, and turn himself out stark naked, in quest a-fresh of new Notions? All the Arguments can be used, will be as little able to prevail, as the Wind did with the Traveller, to part with his Cloak, which he held only the faster. To this of wrong Hypothesis, may be reduced the Errors, that may be occasioned by a true Hypothesis, or right Principles, but not rightly understood. There is nothing more familiar than this, The Instances of Men, contending for different Opi∣nions, which they all derive from the infallible Truth of the Scripture, are an undeniable Proof of it. All that call themselves Christians, allow the Text, that says, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to carry in it the Obligation to a very weighty Duty. But yet how erroneous will one of their Practices be, who under∣standing nothing but the French, take this Rule with one Translation to be repentez vous, repent; or with the other, faitez Penitence, do Penance.

§. 12. Thirdly, Probabilities, which cross Men's Appetites, and pre∣vailing Passions, run the same Fate. Let never so much Probability hang on one side of a covetous Man's Reasoning, and money on the other; and it is easie to foresee which will out-weigh. Earthly Minds, like Mud-Walls, resist the strongest Batteries: and though, perhaps, sometimes the force of a clear Argument may make some Impression, yet they never∣theless stand firm, keep out the Enemy Truth, that would captivate, or disturb them. Tell a Man, passionately in Love, that he is gilted; bring a score of Witnesses of the Falshood of his Mistress, 'tis ten to one but three kind Words of hers, shall invalidate all their Testimonies. Quod volumus, facilè credimus; what suits our Wishes, is forwardly believed, is, I suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented: and though Men cannot always openly gain-say, or resist the force of manifest Proba∣bilities, that make against them; yet yield they not to the Argument. Not but that it is the Nature of the Understanding constantly to close with the more probable side, but yet a Man hath a Power to suspend and restrain its Enquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory Examination, as far as the Matter in Question is capable, and will bear it to be made. Until that be done, there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent Probabilities.

§. 13. First, That the Arguments being (as for the most part they are) brought in Words, there may be a Fallacy latent in them: and the Consequen∣ces being, perhaps, many in Train, they may be some of them incoherent. There be very few Discourses, are so short, clear and consistent, to which most Men may not, with satisfaction enough to themselves, raise this doubt; and from whose conviction they may not, without reproach of Disingenuity or Unreasonableness, set themselves free with the old Reply, Non persuadebis, etiam si persuaseris; though I cannot answer, I will not yield.

§. 14. Secondly, Manifest Probabilities may be evaded, and the Assent with∣held upon this Suggestion, That I know not yet all that may be said on the contrary side; and therefore though he be beaten, 'tis not necessary he should yield, not knowing what Forces there are in reserve behind. This is a refuge against Conviction so open and so wide, that it is hard to de∣termine, when a Man is quite out of the Verge of it.

§. 15. But yet there is some end of it, and a Man having carefully en∣quired into all the grounds of Probability and Unlikeliness; done his ut∣most to inform himself in all Particulars fairly; and cast up the whole

Summ on both sides, may in most Cases come to acknowledge, upon the whole Matter, on which side the Probability rests: wherein some Proofs in Matters of Reason, which are suppositious upon universal Expe∣rience, are so cogent and clear; and some Testimonies in Matters of Fact so universal, that he cannot refuse his Assent. So that, I think, we may conclude, that in Propositions, where though the Proofs in view are of most Moment, yet there are sufficient grounds, to suspect that there is either Fallacy in Words, or certain Proofs, as considerable, to be produ∣ced on the contrary side, there Assent, Suspense, or Dissent, are often voluntary Actions: But where the Proofs are such, as make it highly probable, and there is not sufficient ground to suspect, that there is either Fallacy of Words, (which sober and serious Consideration may discover,) nor equally valid Proofs yet undiscovered latent on the other side, (which also the Nature of the thing, may, in some Cases, make plain to a consi∣derate Man,) there, I think, a Man, who has weighed them, can scarce refuse his Assent to the side, on which the greater Probability appears. Whether it be probable, that a promiscuous jumble of printing Letters should often fall into a Method and Order, which should stamp in Paper a coherent Discourse; or that a blind fortuitous concourse of Atoms, not guided by an understanding Agent, should frequently constitute the Bo∣dies of any Species of Animals; in these and the like Cases, I think, no Body that considers them, can be one jot at a stand which side to take, nor at all waver in his Assent. Lastly, when there can be no Supposition, (the thing in its own Nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the Testimony of Witnesses,) that there is as fair Testimony against, as for the Matter of Fact attested; which by Enquiry, is to be learned, v. g. whe∣ther there was 1700 years agone such a Man at Rome as Iulius Caesar: In all such Cases, I say, I think it is not in any rational Man's Power to refuse his Assent; but that it necessarily follows, and closes with such Probabili∣ties. In other less clear Cases, I think, it is in a Man's Power to suspend his Assent; and, perhaps, content himself with the Proofs he has, if they favour the Opinion that suits with his Inclination, or Interest, and so stop from farther search. But that a Man should afford his Assent to that side, on which the less Probability appears to him, seems to me utterly impra∣cticable, and as impossible, as it is to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the same time.

§. 16. As Knowledge, is no more arbitrary than Perception; so, I think, Assent is no more in our Power than Knowledge. When the Agree∣ment of any two Ideas appear to our Minds, whether immediately, or by the Assistence of Reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid seeing those Objects, which I turn my Eyes to, and look on in day-light: And what upon full Examina∣tion I find the most probable, I cannot deny my Assent to. But though we cannot hinder our Knowledge, where the Agreement is once percei∣ved by our Minds; nor our Assent, where the Probability manifestly ap∣pears upon due Consideration of all the Measures of it: Yet we can hin∣der both Knowledge and Assent, by stopping our Enquiry, and not imploy∣ing our Faculties in the search of any Truth: if it were not so, Ignorance, Error, or Infidelity could not in any Case be a Fault. Thus in some Cases, we can prevent or suspend our Assent: But can a Man, versed in modern or ancient History, doubt whether there be such a Place as Rome, or whe∣ther there was such a Man as Iulius Caesar? Indeed there are millions of Truths, that a Man is not, or may not think himself concerned to know; as whether Richard the Third was crook-back'd, or no; or whether Roger

Bacon was a Mathematician, or a Magician: In these and such like Cases, where the Assent one way or other, is of no Importance to the Interest of any one, no Action, no Concernment of his following, or depending thereon, there 'tis not strange, that the Mind should give it self up to the common Opinion, or render it self to the first Comer. These and the like Opinions, are of so little weight and moment, that like Motes in the Sun, their Tendencies are very rarely taken notice of. They are there, as it were, by Chance, and the Mind lets them float at liberty. But where the Mind judges, the Proposition has Concernment in it, where the As∣sent, or not Assenting, is thought to draw Consequences after it of mo∣ment, and Good or Evil to depend on chusing, or refusing the right side, and the Mind sets it self seriously to enquire, and examine the Pro∣bability; there, I think, it is not in our Choice, to take which side we please, if manifest odds appears on either: The greater Probability, I think, in that Case, will determine the Assent; and a Man can no more avoid as∣senting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives the greater Probabili∣ty, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he perceives the A∣greement or Disagreement of any two Ideas.

If this be so, the Foundation of Errour will lie in wrong Measures of Probability; as the Foundation of Vice, in wrong Measures of Good.

§. 17. Fourthly, The fourth and last wrong Measure of Probability I shall take notice of, and which keeps in Ignorance, or Error, more Peo∣ple than all the other together, is that which I have mentioned in the fore-going Chapter, I mean, the giving up our Assent to the common recei∣ved Opinions, either of our Friends, or Party; Neighbourhood, or Country. How many Men have no other ground for their Tenets, than the supposed Honesty, or Learning, or Number of those of the same Pro∣fession? As if honest, or bookish Men could not err, or Truth were to be established by the Vote of the Multitude; yet this with most Men serves the Turn. The Tenet has had the attestation of reverend Antiquity; it comes to me with the Pass-port of former Ages, and therefore I am secure in the Reception I give it: other Men have been, and are of the same Opinion, (for that is all is said,) and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A Man may more justifiably throw up Cross and Pile for his Opinions, than take them up by such Measures. All Men are liable to Error, and most Men are in many Points, by Passion or Interest, under Temptation to it. If we could but see the secret motives, that influenced the Men of Name and Learning in the World, and the Leaders of Parties, we should not always find, that it was the embracing of Truth for its own sake, that made them espouse the Doctrines, they owned and maintained. This at least is certain, there is not an Opinion so absurd, which a Man may not receive upon this ground. There is no Error to be named, which has not had its Professors: And a Man shall never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks he is in the right way, where-ever he has the Foot-steps of others to follow.

§. 18. But notwithstanding the great Noise is made in the World about Errors and Opinions, I must do Mankind that Right, as to say, There are not so many Men in Errors, and wrong Opinions, as is commonly supposed. Not that I think they embrace the Truth; but indeed, because concer∣ning those Doctrines they keep such a stir about, they have no Thought, no Opinion at all. For if any one should a little catechise the greatest part of the Partisans of most of the Sects in the World, he would not find, con∣cerning those Matters they are so zealous for, that they have any Opi∣nions of their own: much less would he have Reason to think, that they

took them upon the Examination of Arguments, and Appearance of Pro∣bability. They are resolved to stick to a Party, that Education or Inte∣rest has engaged them in; and there, like the common Soldiers of an Ar∣my, shew their Courage and Warmth, as their Leaders direct, without ever examining, or so much as knowing the Cause they contend for. If a Man's Life shews, that he has no serious Regard to Religion; for what Reason should we think, that he beats his Head about the Opinions of his Church, and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or that Do∣ctrine? 'Tis enough for him to obey his Leaders, to have his Hand, and his Tongue ready for the support of the common Cause, and thereby approve himself to those, who can give him Credit, Preferment, or Protection in that Society. Thus Men become Professors of and Combatants for those Opinions, they were never convinced of, nor Proselites to; no, nor ever had so much as floating in their Heads: And though one cannot say, there are fewer improbable Opinions in the World than there are; yet this is certain, there are fewer that actually assent to them than is imagined.

CHAP. XX. Of the Division of the Sciences.

§. 1. ALL that can fall within the compass of humane Understan∣ding, being either, First, The Nature of Things, as they are in themselves, their Relations, and their manner of Operation: Or, Secondly, that which Man himself ought to do, as a rational and volunta∣ry Agent, for the Attainment of any Ends, especially Happiness: Or, Thirdly, The ways and means, whereby the Knowledge of both the one and the other of these, are attained and communicated; I think, Science may be divided properly into these Three sorts.

§. 2. First, The Knowledge of Things, as they are in their own proper Beings, their Constitutions, Properties, and Operations, whereby I mean not only Matter, and Body, but Spirits also, which have their proper Na∣tures, Constitutions, and Operations as well as Bodies. This in a little more enlarged Sense of the Word, I call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or natural Philosophy. The end of this, is bare speculative Truth, and whatsoever can afford the Mind of Man any such, falls under this branch, whether it be God him∣self, Angels, Spirits, Bodies, or any other of their Affections, as Number, and Figure, &c.

§. 3. Secondly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The Skill of Right applying our own Powers and Actions, for the Attainment of Things good and useful. The most consi∣derable under this Head, is Ethicks, which is the seeking out those Rules, and Measures of humane Actions, which lead to Happiness, and the Means to practise them. The end of this is not bare Speculation, and the Knowledge of Truth; but Right, and a Conduct suitable to it.

§. 4. Thirdly, The third Branch may be called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or the Doctrine of Signs, the most usual whereof being Words, it is aptly enough termed also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Logick; the business whereof, is to consider the Nature of Signs, the Mind makes use of for the understanding of Things, or conveying its Knowledge to others. For since the Things, the Mind contemplates, are

none of them, besides it self, present to the Understanding, 'tis necessary that something else, as a Sign or Representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: And these are Ideas. And because the Ideas of one Man's Mind cannot immediately be laid open to the view of another; nor be themselves laid up any where, but in the Memory, which is apt to let them go and lose them: Therefore to communicate our Ideas one to another, as well as record them for our own use, Signs of our Ideas are also necessary. Those which Men have found most convenient, and therefore generally make use of, are articulate Sounds. The Considera∣tion then of Ideas and Words, as the great Instruments of Knowledge, make no despicable part of their Contemplation, who would take a view of humane Knowledge in the whole Extent of it. And, perhaps, if they were distinctly weighed, and duly considered, they would afford us ano∣ther sort of Logick and Critick, than what we have been hitherto ac∣quainted with.

§. 5. This seems to me the first and most general, as well as natural divi∣sion of the Objects of our Understanding. For since a Man can employ his Thoughts about nothing, but either the Contemplation of Things themselves for the discovery of Truth; Or about the Things in his own Power, which are his own Actions, for the Attainment of his own Ends; Or the Signs the Mind makes use of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them for its clearer Information. All which three, viz. Things as they are in themselves knowable; Actions as they depend on us, in order to Happiness; and the right use of Signs in order to Know∣ledge, being toto caelo different, they seemed to me to be the three great Provinces of the intellectual World, wholly separate and distinct one from another.

FINIS.

Notes

• (α) 1.1

  A Gry is 1/•••• of a line, a line 1/10 of an inch, an inch 1/1•• of a philosophical foot, a philosophical foot 1/•• of a pendulum, whose Diadroms•• in the latitude of 45 degrees, are each equal to one Second of time, or 1/6•• of a minute. I have affected∣ly made use of this measure here, and the parts of it, under a decimal division with names to the•••• because, I think, it would be of general convenience, that this should be the common measure in the Commonwealth of Letters.