An essay concerning humane understanding microform

BOOK II. (Book 2)

CHAP. I. Of Ideas in general, and their Original.

§. 1. EVery Man being conscious to himself, That he thinks, and that which his Mind is employ'd about whilst thinking, being the Ideas, that are there, 'tis past doubt, than Men have in their Minds several Ideas, such as are those ex∣pressed by the words, Whiteness, Hardness, Sweetness, Thinking, Motion, Man, Elephant, Army, Drunkenness, and others: It is in the first place then to be enquired, How he comes by them? I know it is a received Do∣ctrine, That Men have native Ideas, and original Characters stamped upon their Minds, in their very first being. This Opinion I have at large exami∣ned already; and, I suppose, what I have said in the fore-going Book, will be much more easily admitted, when I have shewed, whence the Un∣derstanding may get all the Ideas it has, and by what ways and de∣grees they may come into the Mind; for which I shall appeal to every ones own Observation and Experience.

§. 2. Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas; How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busie and boundless Fan∣cy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From Experience: In that, all our Knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives it self. Our Observation employ'd either about external, sensible Objects; or about the internal Operations of our Minds, perceived and reflected on by our selves, is that, which supplies our Vnderstandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the Foun∣tains of Knowledge, from whence all the Ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

§. 3. First, Our Senses, conversant about particular, sensible Objects, do con∣vey into the Mind, several distinct Perceptions of things, according to those various ways, wherein those Objects do affect them: And thus we come by those Ideas, we have of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities. This great Source, of most of the Ideas we have, depending wholly upon our Senses, and derived by them to our Understanding, I call SENSATION.

§. 4. Secondly, The other Fountain, from which Experience furnisheth the Understanding with Ideas, is the Perception of the Operations of our own Minds within us, as it is employ'd about the Idea's it has got; which Operations, when the Soul comes to reflect on, and consider, do furnish the Understanding with another sett of Ideas, which could not be had from things without; and such are, Perception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Rea∣soning,

Knowing, Willing, and all the different actings of our own Minds; which we being conscious of, and observing in our selves, do from these receive into our Understanding, as distinct Ideas, as we do from Bodies affecting our Senses. This Source of Ideas, every Man has wholly in himself: And though it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with exter∣nal Objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call'd internal Sense. But as I call the other Sensation, so I call this RE∣FLECTION, the Ideas it affords being such only, as the Mind gets by reflecting on its own Operations within it self. By REFLECTION then, in the following part of this Discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof, there come to be Ideas of these Ope∣rations in the Understanding. These two, I say, viz. External, Material things, as the Objects of SENSATION; and the Operations of our own Minds within, as the Objects of REFLECTION, are, to me, the only Originals, from whence all our Idea's take their beginnings. The term Operations here, I use in a large sence, as comprehending not barely the Actions of the Mind about its Ideas, but some sort of Passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

§. 5. The Understanding seems to me, not to have the least glimmering of any Ideas, which it doth not receive from one of these two: Eternal Objects furnish the Mind with the Ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produced in us: And the Mind fur∣nishes the Vnderstanding with Ideas of its own Operations. These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several modes, and the Compositions made out of them, we shall find to contain all our whole stock of Ideas; and that we have nothing in our Minds, which did not come in, one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and throughly search into his Understanding, and then let him tell me, Whether all the original Ideas he has there, are any other than of the Ob∣jects of his Senses, or of the Operations of his Mind, considered as Objects of his Reflection: and how great a mass of Knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any Idea in his Mind, but what one of those two have imprinted; though, per∣haps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged, by the Understan∣ding, as we shall see hereafter.

§. 6. He that attentively considers the state of a Child, at his first co∣ming into the World, will have little reason to think him stored with plenty of Ideas, that are to be the matter of his future Knowledge. 'Tis by degrees he comes to be furnished with them: And though the Ideas of obvious and familiar qualities, imprint themselves, before the Memo∣ry begins to keep a Register of Time and Order, yet 'tis often so late be∣fore some unusual qualities come in the way, that there are few Men that cannot recollect the beginning of their acquaintance with them: And if it were worth while, no doubt a Child might be so ordered, as to have but a very few, even of the ordinary Ideas, till he were grown up to a Man. But being surrounded with Bodies, that perpetually and diversly affect us, variety of Idea's, whether care be taken about it, or no, are imprinted on the Minds of Children. Light, and Colours, are busie and at hand every∣where, when the Eye is but open; Sounds, and some tangible Qualities, fail not to sollicite their proper Senses, and force an entrance to the Mind; but yet, I think, it will be granted easily, That if a Child were kept in a place, where he never saw any other but Black and White, till he were a Man,

he would have no more Ideas of Scarlet or Green, than he that from his Childhood never tasted an Oyster, or a Pine-Apple, has of those particu∣lar Relishes.

§. 7. Men then come to be furnished, with sewer or more simple Ideas from without, according as the Objects, they converse with afford greater or lesser variety; and from the Operation of their Minds within, according as they more or less reflect on them. For, though he that contemplates the O∣perations of his Mind, cannot but have plain and clear Ideas of them; yet unless he turn his Thoughts that way, and considers them attentive∣ly, he will no more have clear and distinct Ideas of all the Operations of his Mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular Ideas of any Landscape, or of the Parts and Motions of a Clock, who will not turn his Eyes to it, and with attention heed all the Parts of it. The Picture, or Clock may be so placed, that they may come in his way every Day; but yet he will have but a confused Idea of all the Parts they are made up of, till he applies himself with attention, to consider them each in particular.

§. 8. And hence we see the Reason, why 'tis pretty late before most Children get Ideas of the Operations of their own Minds; and some have not any very clear, or perfect Ideas of the greatest part of them all their Lives. Because, though they pass there continually; yet like floating Visi∣ons, they make not deep Impressions enough, to leave in the Mind clear and distinct, lasting Ideas, till the Understanding turn inwards upon its self, and reflect on its own Operations, and make them the Object of its own Contemplation. Whereas Children at their first coming into the World, seek particularly after nothing, but what may ease their Hunger, or other Pain: but take all other Objects as they come, are generally pleased with all new ones, that are not painful; and so growing up in a constant attention to outward Sensations, seldom make any considerable Reflection on what passes within them, till they come to be of riper Years; and some scarce ever at all.

§. 9. To ask, at what time a Man has first any Ideas, is to ask, when he begins to perceive, having Ideas and Perception being the same thing. I know it is an Opinion, that the Soul always thinks, and that it has the actual Perception of Ideas in its self constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the Soul, as actual Extension is from the Body; which if true, to enquire after the beginning of a Man's Idea's, is the same, as to enquire after the beginning of his Soul. For by this Account, Soul and Ideas, as Body and Extension, will begin to exist both at the same time.

§. 10. But whether the Soul be supposed to exist antecedent to, or coe∣val with, or some time after the first Rudiments of Organisation, or the beginnings of Life in the Body, I leave to be disputed by those, who have better thought of that matter. I confess my self, to have one of those dull Souls, that doth not perceive it self always to contemplate its Ideas, nor can conceive it any more necessary for the Soul always to think, than for the Body always to move: the perception of Idea's, being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what motion is to the Body, not its Essence, but Operation: And therefore, though thinking be supposed never so much the proper Action of the Soul; yet it is not necessary, to suppose, that it should be always thinking, always in Action. That, perhaps, is the Pri∣vilege of the infinite Author and Preserver of all things, who never slum∣bers nor sleeps; but is not competent to any finite Being, at least not to the Soul of Man. We know certainly by Experience, that we sometimes

think, and thence draw this infallible Consequence, That there is some∣thing in us, that has a Power to think: But whether that Substance per∣petually thinks, or no, we can be no farther assured, than Experience in∣forms us. For to say, that actual thinking is essential to the Soul, and inseparable from it, is, to beg what is in Question, and not to prove it by Reasons; which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident Propo∣sition. But whether this, That the Soul always thinks, be a self-evident Pro∣position, that every Body assents to at first hearing, I appeal to Man∣kind.

§. 11. I grant that the Soul in a waking Man is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake: But whether sleeping with∣out dreaming be not an Affection of the whole Man, Mind as well as Body, may be worth a waking Man's Consideration; it being hard to con∣ceive, that any thing should think, and not be conscious of it. If the Soul doth think in a sleeping Man, without being conscious of it, I ask, whether, during such thinking, it has any Pleasure or Pain, or be capable of Happiness or Misery? I am sure the Man is not, no more than the Bed or Earth he lies on. For to be happy or miserable without being conscious of it, seems to me utterly inconsistent and impossible. Or if it be possible, that the Soul can, whilst the Body is sleeping, have its Thinking, Enjoy∣ments, and Concerns; its Pleasure or Pain apart, which the Man is not conscious of, nor partakes in, It is certain, that Socrates asleep, and So∣crates awake, is not the same Person; but his Soul when he sleeps, and Socrates the Man consisting of Body and Soul when he is waking, are two Persons: Since waking Socrates, has no Knowledge of, or Concernment for that Happiness, or Misery of his Soul, which it enjoys alone by it self whilst he sleeps, without perceiving any thing of it, no more than he has for the Happiness, or Misery of a Man in the Indies, whom he knows not. For if we take wholly away all Consciousness of our Actions and Sensa∣tions, especially of Pleasure and Pain, and the concernment that accompa∣nies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place personal Identity.

§. 12. The Soul, during sound Sleep, thinks, say these Men. Whilst it thinks and perceives, it is capable certainly of those of Delight or Trou∣ble, as well as any other Perceptions; and it must necessarily be conscious of its own Perceptions. But it has all this a part: The sleeping Man, 'tis plain, is conscious of nothing of all this. Let us suppose then the Soul of Castor, whilst he is sleeping, retired from his Body, which is no impossible Sup∣position for the Men I have here to do with, who so liberally allow Life, without a thinking Soul to all other Animals. These Men cannot then judge it is impossible, or a contradiction, That the Body should live without the Soul; nor that the Soul subsists and thinks, or has Perce∣ption, even Perception of Happiness or Misery, without the Body. Let us then, as I say, suppose the Soul of Castor separated, during his Sleep, from his Body, to think apart. Let us suppose too, that it chooses for its Scene of Thinking, the Body of another Man, v. g. Pollux, who is sleeping without a Soul: For if Castor's Soul, can think whilst Castor is asleep, what Castor is never conscious of, 'tis no matter what Place it chooses to think in. We have here then the Bodies of two Men with only one Soul between them, which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns; and the Soul still think∣ing in the waking Man, whereof the sleeping Man is never conscious, has never the least Perception. I ask then, Whether Castor and Pollux, thus, with only one Soul between them, which thinks and perceives in one, what the other is never conscious of, nor is not concerned for, are not two as distinct Persons, as Castor and Hercules; or, as Socrates, and Plato

were? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and the other very miserable? Just by the same reason, they make the Soul and the Man two persons, who make the Soul think apart, what the Man is not con∣scious of. For, I suppose, no body will make Identity of persons, to consist in the Soul's being united to the very same numerical particles of matter: For if that be necessary to Identity, 'twill be impossible, in that constant flux of the particles of our Bodies, that any Man should be the same person, two days, or two moments together.

§. 13. Thus, methinks, every drousie nod shakes their Doctrine, who teach, That the Soul is always thinking. Those, at least, who do at any time sleep without dreaming, can never be convinced, That their Thoughts are sometimes for four hours busie without their knowing of it; and if they are taken in the very act, waked in the middle of that sleeping con∣templation, can give no manner of account of it.

§. 14. 'Twill perhaps be said, That the Soul thinks, even in the soundest Sleep, but the Memory retains it not. That the Soul in a sleeping Man should be this moment busie a thinking, and the next moment in a wak∣ing Man, not remember, nor be able to recollect one jot of all those Thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and would need some better Proof than bare Assertion to make it be believed. For who can without any more ado, but being barely told so, imagine, That the greatest part of Men, do, during all their Lives, for several hours every Day, think of something, which if they were asked, even in the middle of these Thoughts, they could remember nothing at all of? Most Men, I think, pass a great part of their Sleep without dreaming. I once knew a Man, that was bred a Scholar, and had no bad Memory, who told me, he had never dream'd in his Life, till he had that Fever, he was then newly recovered of, which was about the Five or Six and Twentieth Year of his Age. I suppose the World affords more such Instances: At least every ones Ac∣quaintance, will furnish him with Examples enough of such, as pass most of their Nights without dreaming.

§. 15. To think often, and never to retain it so much as one moment, is a very useless sort of thinking: and the Soul in such a state of thinking, does very little, if at all, excel that of a Looking-glass, which constantly receives variety of Images, or Ideas, but retains none; they disappear and vanish, and there remain no footsteps of them; the Looking-glass is ne∣ver the better for such Ideas, nor the Soul for such Thoughts. Perhaps it will be said, that in a waking Man, the materials of the Body are em∣ploy'd, and made use of, in thinking; and that the memory of Thoughts, is retained by the impressions that are made on the Brain, and the traces there left after such thinking; but that in the thinking of the Soul, which is not perceived in a sleeping Man, there the Soul thinks apart, and ma∣king no use of the Organs of the Body, leaves no impressions on it, and con∣sequently no memory of such Thoughts. Not to mention again the absur∣dity of two distinct Persons, which follows from this Supposition, I an∣swer farther, That whatever Ideas the Mind can receive, and contem∣plate without the help of the Body, it is reasonable to conclude, it can re∣tain without the help of the Body too, or else the Soul, or any separate Spi∣rit, will have but little advantage by thinking. If it has no memory of its own Thoughts; if it cannot record them for its use, and be able to re∣call them upon any occasion; if it cannot reflect upon what is past, and make use of its former Experiences, Reasonings, and Contemplations, to what purpose does it think? They who make the Soul a thinking Thing, at this rate will not make it a much more noble Being, than those do, whom they

condemn for allowing it to be nothing but the subtilest parts of Matter. Characters drawn on Dust, that the first breath of wind effaces; or Im∣pressions made on a heap of Atoms, or animal Spirits, are altogether as useful, and render the Subject as noble, as the Thoughts of a Soul that perish in thinking; that once out of sight, are gone for ever, and leave no me∣mory of themselves behind them. Nature never makes excellent things, for mean or no uses: and it is hardly to be conceived, that our infinitely wise Creator, should make so admirable a Faculty, as the power of Thinking, that Faculty which comes nearest the Excellency of his own incompre∣hensible Being, to be so idlely and uselesly employ'd, at least ¼ part of its time here, as to think constantly, without remembring any of those Thoughts, without doing any good to its self or others, or being any way useful to any other part of the Creation. If we will examine it, we shall not find, I suppose, the motion of dull and sensless matter, any where in the Universe, made so little use of, and so wholly thrown away.

§. 16. 'Tis true, we have sometimes instances of Perception, whilst we are asleep, and retain the memory of those Thoughts: but how extrava∣gant and incoherent for the most part they are; how little conformable to the Perfection and Order of a rational Being, those who are acquainted with Dreams, need not be told. This I would willingly be satisfied in, Whether the Soul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were separate from the Body, acts less rationally then, when conjointly with it, or no: If its separate Thoughts be less rational, then these Men must say, That the Soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the Body: If it does not, 'tis a wonder that our Dreams should be, for the most part, so frivolous and irrational; and that the Soul should retain none of its more rational Soliloquies and Meditations.

§. 17. Those who so confidently tell us, That the Soul always actually thinks, I would they would also tell us, what those Ideas are, that are in the Soul of a Child, before, or just at the union with the Body, before it hath received any by Sensation. The Dreams of sleeping Men, are, as I take it, all made up of the waking Man's Ideas, though, for the most part, oddly put together. 'Tis strange, if the Soul has Ideas of its own, that it derived not from Sensation or Reflection, (as it must have, if it thought before it received any impressions from the Body) that it should never, in its private thinking, (so private, that the Man himself perceives it not) re∣tain any of them, the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make the Man glad with new discoveries. Who can find it reason, that the Soul should, in its retirement, during sleep, have so many hours thoughts, and yet never light on any of those Ideas it borrowed not from Sensati∣on or Reflection, or at least preserve the memory of none, but such, which being occasioned from the Body, must needs be less natural to a Spirit? 'Tis strange, the Soul should never once in a Man's whole life, recal over any of its pure, native Thoughts, and those Ideas it had before it borrowed any thing from the Body; never bring into the waking Man's view, any o∣ther Ideas, but what have a tangue of the Cask, manifestly derive their Original from that union. If it always thinks, and so had Ideas before it was united, or before it received any from the Body, 'tis not to be sup∣posed, but that during sleep, it recollects its native Ideas, and during that retirement from communicating with the Body, whilst it thinks by it self, the Ideas it is busied about, should be sometimes, at least those more natural and congenial ones had in it self, underived from the Body, or its own operations about them, which since the waking Man never remem∣bers, we must from this Hypothesis conclude, that Memory belongs

only to Ideas, derived from the Body, and the Operations of the Mind about them, or else that the Soul remembers something that the Man does not.

§. 18. I would be glad also to learn from these men, who so confidently pro∣nounce, that the humane Soul, or, which is all one, that a man always thinks, how they come to know it; nay, how they come to know that they themselves think, when they themselves do not perceive it. This, I am afraid, is to be sure, without proofs; and to know, without perceiving: 'Tis, I suspect, a confused Notion, taken up to serve an Hypothesis; and none of those clear Truths, that either their own Evidence force us to admit, or common Experience makes it impudence to deny. For the most that can be said of it, is, That 'tis possible the Soul may always think, but not always retain it in memory: And, I say, it is as possible, that the Soul may not always think; and much more probable, that it should sometimes not think, than that it should often think, and that a long while together, and not be consci∣ous to it self the next moment after, that it had thought.

§. 19. To suppose the Soul to think, and the Man not perceive it, is, as has been said, to make two persons in one man: And if one consider well these mens way of speaking, one shall be lead into a suspicion, that they do so. For they who tell us, that the Soul always thinks, do never, that I remember, say, That a man always thinks. Can the Soul think, and not the Man? Or a Man think, and not be conscious of it? This, per∣haps, would be suspected of Iargon in others. If they say, The man thinks always, but is not always conscious of it; they may as well say, His Body is extended, without having parts. For 'tis altogether as intelligible to say, that any thing is extended without parts, as that any thing thinks, with∣out being conscious of it; without perceiving, that it does so. They who talk thus, may, with as much reason, if it be necessary to their Hypothesis, say, That a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it: Whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in be∣ing conscious that one thinks. If they say, That a man is always consci∣ous to himself of thinking; I ask, How they know it? Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind. Can another man perceive, that I am conscious of any thing, when I perceive it not my self? No man's Knowledge here, can go beyond his Experience. Wake a man out of a sound sleep, and ask him, What he was that moment thinking on. If he himself be conscious of nothing he then thought on, he must be a notable Diviner of Thoughts, that can assure him, that he was thin∣king: May he not with more reason assure him, he was not asleep? This is something beyond Philosophy; and it cannot be less than Revelation, that discovers to another, Thoughts in my mind, when I can find none there my self: And they must needs have a penetrating sight, who can certainly see, that I think, when I cannot perceive it my self, and declare, That I do not; and yet can see, that a Dog, or an Elephant, do not think, though they give all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us, that they do so. This some may suspect to be a step beyond the Rosecrucians; it seeming easier to make ones self invisible to others, than to make another's thoughts visible to me, which are not visible to himself. But 'tis but defining the Soul to be a substance, that always thinks, and the business is done. If such a definition be of any Authority, I know not what it can serve for, but to make many men suspect, That they have no Souls at all, since they find a good part of their Lives pass away with∣out thinking. For no Definitions, that I know, no Suppositions of any Sect, are of force enough to destroy constant Experience; and, perhaps,

'tis the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive, that makes so much useless dispute, and noise, in the World.

§. 20. I see no Reason therefore to believe, that the Soul thinks before the Senses have furnished it with Ideas to think on; and as those are in∣creased, and retained; so it comes, by Exercise, to improve its Faculty of thinking in the several parts of it, as well as afterwards, by compounding those Ideas, and reflecting on its own Operations, it increases its Stock as well as Facility, in remembring, imagining, reasoning, and other modes of thinking.

§. 21. He that will suffer himself, to be informed by Observation and Experience, and not make his own Hypothesis the Rule of Nature, will find few Signs of a Soul accustomed to much thinking in a new born Child, and much fewer of any Reasoning at all. And yet it is hard to imagine, that the rational Soul should think so much, and not reason at all. And he that will consider, that Infants, newly come into the World, spend the greatest part of their time in Sleep, and are seldom awake, but when either Hunger calls for the Teat, or some Pain, (the most impor∣tunate of all Sensations) or some other violent Idea, forces the mind to perceive, and attend to it, He, I say, who considers this, will, perhaps, find Reason to imagine, That a Foetus in the Mother's Womb, differs not much from the State of a Vegetable; but passes the greatest part of its time without Perception or Thought, doing very little, but sleep in a Place, where it needs not seek for Food, and is surrounded with Li∣quor, always equally soft, and near of the same Temper; where the Eyes have no Light, and the Ears, so shut up, are not very susceptible of Sounds; and where there is little or no variety, or change of Objects to move the Senses.

§. 22. Follow a Child from its Birth, and observe the alterations that time makes; and you shall find, as the mind by the Senses comes more and more to be furnished with Ideas, it comes to be more and more a∣wake; thinks more, the more it has matter to think on. After some time, it begins to know the Objects, which being most familiar with it, have made lasting Impressions. Thus it comes, by degrees, to know the Persons it daily converses with, and distinguish them from Strangers; which are Instances and Effects of its coming to retain and distinguish the Ideas the Senses convey to it: And so we may observe, how the Mind, by degrees, improves in these, and advances to the Exercise of those other Faculties of Enlarging, Compounding, and Abstracting its Ideas, and of reasoning about them, and reflecting upon all these, of which, I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

§. 23. If it shall be demanded then, When a Man begins to have any Ideas? I think, the true Answer is, When he first has any Sensation. For since there appear not to be any Ideas in the Mind, before the Senses have con∣veyed any in, I conceive that Ideas in the Understanding, are coeval with Sensation; which is such an Impression or Motion, made in some part of the Body, as makes it be taken notice of in the Under∣standing.

§. 24. The Impressions then, that are made on our Senses by outward Objects, that are extrinsical to the Mind, and its own Operations, about these Impressions reflected on by its self, as proper Objects to be contem∣plated by it, are, I conceive, the Original of all Knowledge; and the first Capacity of Humane Intellect, is, That the Mind is fitted to receive the Impressions made on it; either, through the Senses, by outward Objects; or by its own Operations, when it reflects on them. This is the first

step a Man makes towards the Discovery of any thing, and the Ground∣work, whereon to build all those Notions, which ever he shall have na∣turally in this World. All those sublime Thoughts, which towre above the Clouds, and reach as high as Heaven its self, take their Rise and Foot∣ing here: In all that great Extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote Speculations, it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those Ideas, which Sense or Reflection, have offered for its Contem∣plation.

§. 25. In this Part, the Vnderstanding is meerly passive; and whether or no, it will have these Beginnings, and as it were materials of Knowledge, is not in its own Power. For the Objects of our Senses, do, many of them, obtrude their particular Ideas upon our minds, whether we will or no: And the Operations of our minds, will not let us be without, at least some obscure Notions of them. No Man, can be wholly ignorant of what he does, when he thinks. These simple Ideas, when offered to the mind, the Vnderstanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones in it self, than a mir∣ror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the Images or Ideas, which the Ob∣jects set before it do therein produce. As the Bodies that surround us, do diversly affect our Organs, the mind is forced to receive the Impres∣sions; and cannot avoid the Perception of those Ideas, that are annexed to them.

CHAP. II. Of simple Idea's.

§. 1. THE better to understand the Nature, Manner, and Extent of our Knowledge, one thing is carefully to be observed, concern∣ing the Ideas we have; and that is, That some of them are simple, and some complex.

Though the Qualities that affect our Senses, are, in the things them∣selves, so united and blended, that there is no separation, no distance be∣tween them; yet 'tis plain, the Ideas they produce in the Mind, enter by the Senses simple and unmixed. For though the Sight and Touch often take in from the same Object, at the same time, different Ideas; as a Man sees at once Motion and Colour; the Hand feels Softness and Warmth in the same piece of Wax: Yet the simple Ideas thus united in the same Subject, are as perfectly distinct, as those that come in by different Sen∣ses. The coldness and hardness, which a Man feels in a piece of Ice, be∣ing as distinct Ideas in the Mind, as the Smell and Whiteness of a Lily; or as the taste of Sugar, and smell of a Rose: And there is nothing can be plainer to a Man, than the clear and distinct Perception he has of those simple Ideas; which being each in it self uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform Appearance, or Conception in the Mind, and is not distinguishable into different Ideas.

§. 2. These simple Ideas, the Materials of all our Knowledge, are suggest∣ed and furnished to the Mind, only by those two ways above mentioned, viz. Sensation and Reflection. When the Understanding is once stored with these simple Ideas, it has the Power to repeat, compare, and unite them even to an almost infinite Variety, and so can make at Pleasure new com∣plex

Ideas. But it is not in the Power of the most exalted Wit, or en∣larged Understanding, by any quickness or variety of Thought, to invent or frame one new simple Idea in the Mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned: nor can any Force of the Understanding, destroy those that are there. The Dominion of Man in this little World of his own Under∣standing, being much what the same, as it is in the great World of visible things; wherein his Power, however managed by Art and Skill, reaches no farther, than to compound and divide the Materials that are made to his Hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least Particle of new Matter, or destroying one Atome of what is already in Being. The same inability, will every one find in himself, who shall go about to fa∣shion in his Understanding any simple Idea, not received in by his Senses, from external Objects, or from the Operations of his own Mind about them. I would have any one try to phansie any Taste, which had ne∣ver affected his Palate; or frame the Idea of a Scent, he had never smelt: And when he can do this, I will also conclude, that a blind Man hath I∣deas of Colours, and a deaf Man true distinct Notions of sounds.

§. 3. This is the Reason why, though we cannot believe it impossible to God, to make a Creature with other Organs, and more ways to convey into the Understanding the notice of Corporeal things, than those five, as they are usually counted, which he has given to Man: Yet I think, it is not pos∣sible, for any one to imagine any other Qualities in Bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides Sounds, Tastes, Smells, visible and tangible Qualities. And had Mankind been made with but four Senses, the Qualities then, which are the Object of the Fifth Sense, had been as far from our notice, Imagination, and Conce∣ption, as now any belonging to a Sixth, Seventh, or Eighth Sense, can possi∣bly be; which, whether yet some other Creatures, in some other Parts of this vast, and stupendious Universe, may not have, will be a great Presumption to deny. He that will not set himself proudly at the top of all things; but will consider the Immensity of this Fabrick, and the great variety, that is to be found in this little and inconsiderable part of it, which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in other Mansions of it, there may be other, and different intelligent Beings, of whose Facul∣ties, he has as little Knowledge or Apprehension, as a worm shut up in one drawer of a Cabinet, hath of the Senses or Understanding of a Man; Such Variety and Excellency, being suitable to the Wisdom and Power of the Maker. I have here followed the common Opinion of Man's hav∣ing but five Senses; though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more; but either Supposition serves equally to my present Purpose.

CHAP. III. Of Ideas of one Sense

§. 1. THE better to conceive the Ideas, we receive from Sensation, it may not be amiss for us to consider them, in reference to the different ways, whereby they make their Approaches to our Minds, and make themselves perceivable by us.

First then, There are some, which come into our Minds by one Sense only.

Secondly, There are others, that convey themselves into the Mind by more Senses than one.

Thirdly, Others that are had from Reflection only.

Fourthly, There are some that make themselves way, and are suggested to the Mind by all the ways of Sensation and Reflection.

We shall consider them apart under these several Heads:

First, There are some Ideas, which have admittance only through one Sense, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus Light and Co∣lours, as white, red, yellow, blue; with their several Degrees or Shades, and Mixtures, as Green, Scarlet, Purple, Sea-green, and the rest, come in only by the Eyes: All kinds of Noises, Sounds, and Tones only by the Ears: The several Tastes and Smells, by the Nose and Palate. And if these Organs, or the Nerves which are the Conduits, to convey them from without to their Audience in the Brain, the Mind's Presence-Room (as I may so call it) are any of them so disordered, as not to perform their Functions, they have no Postern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into view, and be perceived by the Understanding.

The most considerable of those, belonging to the Touch, are Heat and Cold, and Solidity; all the rest, consisting almost wholly in the sensible Configuration, as smooth and rough; or else more, or less firm adhesion of the Parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

§. 2. I think, it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple Ideas, belonging to each Sense: Nor indeed is it possible, if we would, there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the Senses, than we have Names for. The variety of Smells, which are as many al∣most, if not more than Species of Bodies in the World, do most of them want Names. Sweet and Stinking commonly serve our turn for these Ideas, which in effect, is little more than to call them pleasing or displeasing; though the smell of a Rose, and Violet, both sweet, are certainly very di∣stinct Ideas. Nor are the different Tastes that are in Nature, much bet∣ter provided with Names. Sweet, Bitter and Sowre, Harsh and Salt, are almost all we have to denominate all the variety of Relishes, which are to be found distinct, not only in almost every sort of Creatures, but in the different Parts of the same Plant or Animal. The same may be said of Colour and Sound. I shall therefore in the account of simple Ideas, I am here giving, content my self to set down only such, as are most material to our present Purpose, or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of though they are very frequently the Ingredients of our complex Ideas,

amongst which, I think, I may well account Solidity; which therefore I shall treat of in the next Chapter.

CHAP. IV. Of Solidity.

§. 1. THE Idea of Solidity, we receive by our Touch; and it arises from the Resistance we find in Body, to the entrance of any o∣ther Body into the Place it possesses, till it has left it. There is no Idea, which we receive more constantly from Sensation, than Solidity. Whe∣ther we move, or rest, in what Posture soever we are, we always feel some∣thing under us, that supports us, and hinders our farther sinking down∣wards; and the Bodies we daily handle, make us perceive that whilst they remain between them, they do by an insurmountable Force, hinder the approach of the parts of our Hands that press them. That which thus hinders the approach of two Bodies, when they are moving one to∣wards another, I call Solidity. I will not dispute, whether this accepta∣tion of the Word solid be nearer to its Original Signification, than that which Mathematicians use it in: It suffices, that I think, the common Notion of Solidity will allow, if not justifie, this use of it; but if any one think it better to call it Impenetrability, he has my Consent. Only I have thought the Term Solidity, the more proper to express this Idea, not only because of its vulgar use in that Sense; but also, because it car∣ries something more of positive in it, than Impenetrability, which is nega∣tive; and is, perhaps, more a consequence of Solidity, than Solidity it self. This of all other, seems the Idea most intimately connected with, and essential to Body, so as no where else to be found or imagin'd, but only in matter; which though our Senses take no notice of, but in masses of matter of a bulk, sufficient to cause a Sensation in us: Yet the Mind, having once got this Idea from such grosser sensible Bodies, traces it farther, and considers it as well as Figure, in the minutest Particle of matter, that can exist, and finds it inseparably inherent in Body, where-ever, or howe∣ver modified.

§. 2. This is the Idea belongs to Body, whereby we conceive it to fill space. The Idea of which filling of space, is, That where we imagine any space taken up by a solid Substance, we conceive it so to possess it, that it excludes all other solid Substances; and, will for ever hinder any two o∣ther Bodies, that move towards one another in a strait Line, from coming to touch one another, unless it remove from between them in a Line, not parallel to that they move in. This Idea of it, the Bodies we ordi∣narily handle sufficiently furnish us with.

§. 3. This Resistance, whereby it keeps other Bodies out of the space it possesses, is so great, That no force, how great soever, can surmount it. All the Bodies in the World, pressing a drop of Water on all sides, will never be able to overcome the Resistance it will make, as soft as it is, to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their way: whereby our Idea of Solidity is distinguished both from pure space, which is capable neither of Resistance nor Motion, and the ordinary Idea of Hardness. For a Man may conceive two Bodies at a distance, so as they

may approach one another, without touching or displacing any solid thing, till their Superficies come to meet; whereby, I think, we have the clear Idea of Space without Solidity. For (not to go so far as annihila∣tion of any particular Body) I ask, Whether a Man cannot have the Idea of the motion of one single Body alone, without any other other succeeding immediately into its Place? which, I think, 'tis evident he can; the Idea of Motion in one Body, no more including the Idea of Motion in a∣nother, than the Idea of a square Figure in one Body includes the Idea of a square Figure in another. I do not ask, Whether Bodies do so exist, that the motion of one Body cannot really be without the motion of another? To determine this either way, is to beg the Question for or against a Vacuum. But my Question is, Whether one cannot have the Idea of one Body moved, whilst others are at rest? and I think, this no one will deny•• If so, then the Place it deserted, gives us the Idea of pure Space without Solidity, whereinto another Body may enter, without either Resistance or Protrusion of any thing. When the Sucker in a Pump is drawn, the space it filled in the Tube is certain∣ly the same, whether any other body follows the motion of the Sucker or no; nor does it imply a contradiction, That upon the motion of one Bo∣dy, another that is only contiguous to it, should not follow it. The ne∣cessity of such a motion, is built only on the Supposition, That the World is full; but not on the distinct Ideas of Space and Solidity, which are as different, as Resistance and not Resistance, Protrusion and not Protrusion: And that Men have Ideas of Space, without Body, their very Disputes a∣bout a Vacuum plainly demonstrate, as is shewed in another Place.

§. 4. Solidity is hereby also differenced from Hardness, in that Solidi∣ty consists in repletion, and so an utter Exclusion of other Bodies out of the space it possesses: But Hardness, in a firm Cohesion of the parts of Matter, making up masses of a sensible bulk; so that the whole does not easily change its Figure. And indeed, Hard and Soft, are, as apprehended by us, only relative Terms, to the Constitutions of our Bodies; that being generally call'd hard by us, which will put us to Pain, sooner than change Figure by the pressure of any part of our Bodies; and that on the contra∣ry, soft, which changes the Situation of its parts upon an easie and un∣painful touch.

But this Difficulty of changing the Situation of the sensible parts a∣mongst themselves, or of the Figure of the whole, gives no more Solidi∣ty to the hardest Body in the World, than to the softest; nor is an Ada∣mant one jot more solid than Water. For though the two flat sides of two pieces of Marble, will more easily approach each other, between which there is nothing but Water or Air, than if there be an Adamant between them: yet it is not, that the parts of the Adamant are more solid than those of Water, or resist more; but because the parts of Water, being more easily separable from each other, they will by a side motion be more easily removed, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of Mar∣ble: But if they could be kept from making Place, by that side-motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of these two pieces of Marble, as much as the Diamond; and 'twould be as impossible by any force, to surmount their Resistance, as to surmount the Resistance of the parts of a Diamond. The softest Body in the World will as invin••ibly resist the coming together of any two other Bodies, if it be not put out of the way, but remain between them, as the hardest that can be found or imagined. He that shall fill a yielding soft Body well with Air or Water, will quickly find its Resistance: And he that thinks, that nothing but Bodies, that are

hard, can keep his Hands from approaching one another, may be pleased to make an Experiment, with the Air inclosed in a Football.

§. 5. By this Idea of Solidity, is the Extension of Body distinguished from the Extension of Space. The Extension of Body, being nothing but the cohesion or continuity of solid, separable, moveable Parts; and the Ex∣tension of Space, the continuity of unsolid, inseparable, and immoveable Parts. Vpon the Solidity of Bodies also, depends their mutual impulse, Re∣sistance, and Protrusion. Of pure Space then, and Solidity, there are several (amongst which, I confess my self one) who persuade themselves, they have clear and distinct Ideas; and that they can think on Space, without any thing in it, that resists, or is protruded by Body; whereof they think they have as clear an Idea, as of the Extension of Body, the Idea of the distance between the opposite Parts of a concave Superficies, being equally as clear without, as with the Idea of any solid Parts be∣tween; and on the other side, That they have the Idea of something that fills space, that can be protruded by the impulse of other Bodies, or resist their Motion. If there be others, that have not these two Ideas distinct, but confound them, and make but one of them, I know not, how Men, who have the same Idea, under different Names, or different Ideas, under the same Name, can, in that case, talk with one another, any more than a Man, who not being blind, or deaf, has distinct Ideas of the Colour of Scarlet, and the sound of a Trumpet, could discourse concerning Scarlet-Colour with the blind Man, I mention in another Place, who phansied, that the Idea of Scarlet was like the sound of a Trumpet.

§. 6. If any one ask me, What this Solidity is, I send him to his Senses to inform him: Let him put a Flint, or a Foot-ball between his Hands; and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a sufficient Explication of Solidity, what it is, and wherein it consists; I promise to tell him, what it is, and wherein it consists, when he tells me, what thinking is, or wherein it consists; or explain to me, what Ex∣tension or Motion is, which, perhaps seems much easier. The simple Ideas we have such, as experience teaches them us; but if beyond that, we endeavour by Words to make them clearer in the Mind, we shall suc∣ceed no better, than if we went about to clear up the Darkness of a blind Man's mind, by talking; and to discourse into him the Ideas of Light and Colours. The Reason of this, I shall shew in another Place.

CHAP. V. Of simple Ideas of divers Senses.

THe Ideas we get by more than one Sense, are of Space, or Exten∣sion, Figure, Rest, and Motion: For these make perceivable im∣pressions, both on the Eyes and Touch; and we can receive and convey into our Minds, the Ideas of the Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest of Bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak more at large of these, in another place, I here only enumerate them.

CHAP. VI. Of simple Ideas of Reflection.

§. 1. THe Mind receiving the Ideas, mentioned in the foregoing Cha∣pter, from without, when it turns its view inward upon its self, and observes its own Actions about those Ideas it has, takes from thence other Ideas, which are as capable to be the Objects of its Contem∣plation, as of any of those it received from foreign things.

§. 2. The two great and principal Actions of the Mind, which are most frequently considered, and which are so frequent, that every one that pleases, may take notice of in himself, are these two:

• Perception, or Thinking; and
• Volition, or Willing.

The power in the Mind of producing these Actions we denominate Fa∣culties, and are called the Vnderstanding, and the Will. Of some of the modes of these simple Ideas of Reflection, such as are Remembrance, Dis∣cerning, Reasoning, Iudging, Knowledge, Faith, &c. I shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

CHAP. VII. Of simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection.

§. 1. THere be other simple Ideas, which convey themselves into the Mind, by all the ways of Sensation and Reflection, viz.

• Pleasure, or Delight, and its opposite.
• Pain, or Vneasiness.
• ...Power.
• ...Existence.
• ...Vnity.

§. 2. Delight, or Vneasiness, one or other of them join themselves to almost all our Ideas, both of Sensation and Reflection: And there is scarce any affection of our Senses from without, any retired thought of our Mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure, or pain. By Plea∣sure and Pain, I would be understood to signifie, whatsoever delights or molests us; whether it arises from the thoughts of our Minds, or any thing operating on our Bodies. For whether we call it Satisfaction, De∣light, Pleasure, Happiness, &c. on the one side; or Uneasiness, Trouble, Pain, Torment, Anguish, Misery, &c. on the other, they are still but different degrees of the same thing, and belong to the Ideas of Pleasure and Pain, Delight or Uneasiness; which are the names I shall most com∣monly use for those two sorts of Ideas.

§. 3. The infinitely Wise Author of our being, having given us the power over several parts of our Bodies, to move or keep them at rest, as we think fit; and also by the motion of them, to move our selves, and other contiguous Bodies, in which consists all the Actions of our Body: He having also given a power to our Minds, in several instances, to chuse amongst its Ideas which it will think on, and to pursue the enquiry of this or that Subject, with consideration and attention, to excite us to these Actions of thinking and motion that we are capaple of, he has been plea∣sed to join to several Thoughts, and several Sensations, a perception of De∣light. This if it were wholly separated from all our outward Sensations, and inward Thoughts, we should have no reason to preferr one Thought or Action, to another; Negligence, to Attention; or Motion, to Rest. And so we should neither stir our Bodies, nor employ our Minds, but let our Thoughts (if I may so call it) run a drift without any direction or de∣sign, and suffer the Ideas of our Minds, like unregarded shadows, to make their appearances there, as it happen'd, without attending to them. In which state Man, however furnished with the Faculties of Understanding and Will, would be a very idle, unactive Creature, and pass his time only in a lazy lethargick Dream. It has therefore pleased our Wise Crea∣tor, to annex to several Objects, and the Ideas we receive from them, as also to several of our Thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in se∣veral Objects, to several degrees, that those Faculties he had endowed us with, might not remain wholly idle, and unemploy'd by us.

§. 4. Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work, that Pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our Faculties to avoid that, as to pur∣sue the other: Only this is worth our consideration, That it is often pro∣duced

by the same Objects and Ideas, that produce Pleasure in us. This their near Conjunction, which makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure, gives us new occasion of admiring the Wisdom and Goodness of our Maker, who designing the preservation of our Being, has annexed Pain to the application of many things to our Bo∣dies, to warn us of the harm they will do, and as advices to withdraw from them. But he, not designing our preservation barely, but the preservati∣on of every part and organ in its perfection, hath, in many cases, annexed pain to those very Ideas which delight us. Thus Heat, that is very agree∣able to us in one degree, by a little greater increase of it, proves no ordina∣ry torment: and the most pleasant of all sensible Objects, Light it self, if there be too much of it; if increased beyond a due proportion to our Eyes, causes a very painful sensation. Which is wisely and favourably so order∣ed by Nature, that when any Object does, by the vehemence of its opera∣tion, disorder the instruments of sensation, whose Structures cannot but be very nice and delicate, we might by the pain, be warned to withdraw, before the Organ be quite put out of order, and so be unfitted for its pro∣per sunctions for the future. The consideration of those Objects that pro∣duce it, may well perswade us, That this is the end or use of pain. For though great light be insufferable to our Eyes, yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all disease them: because that causing no disorderly motion in it, leaves that curious Organ unharm'd, in its natural state. But yet excess of Cold, as well as Heat, pains us: because it is equally de∣structive to that temper, which is necessary to the preservation of life, and the exercise of the several functions of the Body, which consists in a mo∣derate degree of warmth; or, if you please, a motion of the insensible parts of our Bodies, confined within certain bounds.

§. 5. Beyond all this, we may find another reason why God hath scat∣tered up and down several degrees of pleasure and pain, in all the things that environ and affect us; and blended them together, in almost all that our Thoughts and Senses have to do with; that we finding imperfecti∣on, dissatisfaction, and want of compleat happiness, in all the Enjoyments of the Creatures can afford us, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of him, with whom there is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand are plea∣sures for evermore.

§. 6. Though what I have here said, may not, perhaps, make the Ideas of Pleasure and Pain clearer to us, than our own Experience does, which is the only way that we are capable of having them; yet the consideration of the Reason, why they are annexed to so many other Ideas, serving to give us due sentiments of the Wisdom and Goodness of the Soveraign Dis∣poser of all Things, may not be unsuitable to the main end of these en∣quiries: The knowledge and veneration of Him, being the chief end of all our Thoughts, and the proper business of all Understandings.

§. 7. Existence and Vnity, are two other Ideas, that are suggested to the Understanding, by every Object without, and every Idea within. When Ideas are in our Minds, we consider them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us; which is, that they exist, or have Existence: And whatever we can consider as one thing, whether a real Being, or Idea, suggests to the Understanding, the Idea of Vnity.

§. 8. Power also is another of those simple Ideas, which we receive from Sensation and Reflection. For observing in our selves, that we do, and can think•• and that we can, at pleasure, move several parts of our Bodies which were at rest; the effects also, that natural Bodies are able to pro∣duce

in one another, occuring every moment to our Senses, we both these ways get the Idea of Power.

§. 9. Besides these, there is another Idea, which though suggested by our Senses, yet is more constantly offered us, by what passes in our own Minds; and that is the Idea of Succession. For if we will look immedi∣ately into ourselves, and reflect on what is observable there, we shall find our Ideas always, whilst we are awake, or have any thought passing in train, one going, and another coming, without intermission.

§. 10. These, if they are not all, are at least (as I think) the most consi∣derable of those simple Ideas which the Mind has, and out of which are made all its other knowledge; all which it receives only by the two fore∣mentioned ways of Sensation and Reflection.

Nor let any one think these too narrow bounds for the capacious Mind of Man to expatiate in, which takes its flight farther than the Stars, and cannot be confined by the limits of the World; that extends its thoughts often even beyond the utmost expansion of Matter, and makes excursions into that incomprehensible Inane. I grant all this, but desire any one to assign any simple Idea, which it received not from one of those Inlets be∣fore-mentioned, or any complex Idea not made out of those simple ones. Nor will it be so strange, to think these few simple Ideas sufficient to employ the quickest Thought, or largest Capacity; and to furnish the Materials of all that various Knowledge, and more various Phansies and Opinions of all Mankind, if we consider how many Words may be made out of the various composition of 24 Letters; or if going one step farther, we will but reflect on the variety of combinations may be made, with barely one of these Ideas, viz. Number, whose stock is inexhaustible, and truly infi∣nite•• And what a large and immense field, doth Excursion alone afford the Mathematicians?

CHAP. VIII. Some farther Considerations concerning our simple Ideas.

§. 1. COncerning the simple Ideas of Sensation 'tis to be considered, That whatsoever is so constituted in Nature, as to be able, by affecting our Senses, to cause any perception in the Mind, doth thereby produce in the Understanding a simple Idea; which, whatever be the ex∣ternal cause of it, when it comes to be taken notice of, by our discerning Faculty, it is by the Mind looked on and considered there, to be a real po∣sitive Idea in the Understanding, as much as any other whatsoever; though, perhaps, the cause of it be but a privation in the subject.

§. 2. Thus the Idea of Heat and Cold, Light and Darkness, White and Black, Motion and Rest, are equally clear and positive Ideas in the Mind; though, perhaps, some of the causes which produce them, are barely pri∣vations in those subjects, from whence our Senses derive those Ideas. These the Understanding, in its view of them, considers all as distinct positive Ideas, without taking notice of the causes that produce them: which is an enquiry not belonging to the Idea, as it is in the Understanding; but to the nature of the things existing without us. These are two very different things, and carefully to be distinguished; it being one thing to

perceive and know the Idea of White or Black, and quite another to exa∣mine what kind of particles they must be, and how ranged in the Super∣ficies to make any Object appear white or black.

§. 3. A Painter, or Dyer, who never enquired into their causes, hath the Ideas of White and Black, and other Colours, as clearly, perfectly, and distinctly, in his Understanding, and perhaps more distinctly than the Phi∣losopher, who hath busied himself in considering their Natures, and thinks he knows how far either of them is in its cause positive or privative; and the Idea of Black is no less positive in his Mind, than that of White, how∣ever the cause of that Colour in the external Object, may be only a priva∣tion.

§. 4. If it were the design of my present Undertaking, to enquire into the natural causes and manner of Perception, I should offer this as a rea∣son, why a privative cause might, in some cases at least, produce a positive Idea, viz. That all Sensation being produced in us, only by different de∣grees and modes of Motion in our animal Spirits, variously agitated by external Objects, the abatement of any former motion, must as necessa∣rily produce a new sensation, as the variation or increase of it; and so in∣troduce a new Idea, which depends only on a different motion of the ani∣mal Spirits in that Organ.

§. 5. But whether this be so, or no, I will not here determine, but ap∣peal to every one's own Experience, whether the shadow of a Man, though it consists of nothing but the absence of Light (and the more the absence of Light is, the more discernible is the shadow) does not, when a Man looks on it, cause as clear and positive an Idea in his mind, as a Man him∣self, though covered over with clear Sunshine? And the picture of a sha∣dow, is a positive thing. Indeed, we have negative Names, to which there be no positive Ideas; but they consist wholly in negation of some cer∣tain Ideas, as Silence, Invisible; but these signifie not any Ideas in the Mind, but their absence.

§. 6. And thus one may truly be said to see Darkness. For supposing a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light is reflected, 'tis certain one may see the figure of it, or it may be painted; and whether the Ink, I write with, make any other Idea, is a question. The privative causes I have here assigned of positive Ideas, are according to the common Opinion; but in truth it will be hard to determine, whether there be really any Ideas from a privative cause, till it be determined, Whether Rest be any more a privation, than Motion.

§. 7. To discover the nature of our Ideas the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish them, as they are Ideas, or Perceptions in our Minds; and as they are in the Bodies, that cause such Perceptions in us; that sowe may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the Images and resemblances of something in∣herent in the subject; most of those of Sensation being in the Mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the Names that stand for them, are the likeness of our Ideas, which yet upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.

§. 8. Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate ob∣ject of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call Idea; and the power to produce any Idea in our mind, I call Quality of the Subject wherein that power is. Thus a Snow-ball having the power to produce in us the Ideas of White, Cold, and Round, the powers to produce those Ideas in us, as they are in the Snow-ball, I call Qualities; and as they are Sensations, or Perceptions, in our Underwandings, I call them Ideas:

which Ideas, if I speak of sometimes, as in the things themselves, I would be understood to mean those Qualities in the Objects which produce them in us.

§. 9. Concerning these Qualities, we may, I think, observe these prima∣ry ones in Bodies, that produce simple Ideas in us, viz. Solidity, Exten∣sion, Motion or Rest, Number and Figure.

§. 10. These, which I call original or primary Qualities of Body, are whol∣ly inseparable from it; and such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as Sense constantly finds in every particle of Matter, which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the Mind finds inseparable from every particle of Matter, though less than to make it self singly be perceived by our Senses. v. g. Take a grain of Wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has still Solidity, Extension, Figure, and Mobility; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all those qualities. For division (which is all that a Mill, or Pestle, or any other Body, does upon another, in re∣ducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either Solidity, Extension, Figure, or Mobility from any Body, but only makes two distinct Bodies, or more, of one, which altogether after division have their certain number.

§. 11. The next thing to be considered, is, how Bodies operate one up∣on another, and that is manifestly by impulse, and nothing else. It being impossible to conceive, that Body should operate on what it does not touch, (which is all one as to imagine it can operate where it is not) or when it does touch, operate any other way than by Motion.

§. 12. If then Bodies cannot operate at a distance; if external Objects be not united to our Minds, when they produce Ideas in it; and yet we per∣ceive these original Qualities in such of them, as singly fall under our Sen∣ses, 'tis evident that some motion must be thence continued by our Nerves, or animal Spirits, by some parts of our Bodies, to the Brains, the seat of Sensation, there to produce in our Minds the particular Ideas we have of them. And since the Extension, Figure, Number, and Motion of Bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight, 'tis evident some singly imperceptible Bodies must come from them to the Eyes, and thereby convey to the Brain some Motion, which produces these Ideas we have of them in us.

§. 13. After the same manner, that the Ideas of these original Quali∣ties are produced in us, we may conceive, that the Ideas of secundary Qua∣lities are also produced, viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our Senses. For it being manifest, that there are Bodies, and good store of Bodies, each whereof is so small, that we cannot, by any of our Sen∣ses, discover either their bulk, figure, or motion, as is evident in the Particles of the Air and Water, and other extreamly smaller than those, perhaps, as much less than the Particles of Air, or Water, as the Particles of Air, or Water, are smaller than Pease or Hail-stones. Let us suppose at present, that the different Motions and Figures, Bulk, and Number of such Particles, affecting the several Organs of our Senses, produce in us those different Sensations, which we have from the Colours and Smells of Bodies, v. g. a Violet, by which impulse of those insensible Particles of Matter of different figures and bulks, and in a different Degree and Modification, we may have the Ideas of the blue Colour, and sweet Scent of a Violet produced in our Minds. It being no more conceived impossible, to conceive, that God should annex such Ide∣as to such Motions, with which they have no similitude; than that he

should annex the Idea of Pain to the motion of a piece of Steel, dividing our Flesh, with which that Idea hath no resemblance.

§. 14. What I have said concerning Colours and Smells, may be under∣stood also of Tastes, and Sounds, and other the like sensible Qualities; which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce various Sensations in us, and depend on those primary Qualities, viz. Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of Parts; and therefore I call them Secundary Qua∣lities.

§. 15. From whence, I think, it is easie to draw this Observation, That the Ideas of primary Qualities of Bodies, are Resemblances of them, and their Patterns do really exist in the Bodies themselves; but the Ideas, produced in us by these Secundary Qualities, have no resemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our Ideas, existing in the Bodies themselves. They are in the Bodies, we denominate from them, only a Power to produce those Sensations in us: And what is Sweet, Blue, or Warm in Idea, is but the certain Bulk, Figure, and Motion of the insensible Parts, in the Bodies themselves we call so.

§. 16. Flame is denominated, Hot and Ligh•••• Snow, White and Cold; and Manna, White, and Sweet, from the Ideas th•••• produce in us. Which Qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those Bodies, that those Ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a Mirror; and it would by most Men be judged very extravagant, if one should say otherwise. And yet he that will consider, that the same Fire, that at one distance produces in us the Sensation of Warmth, does at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different Sensation of Pain, ought to bethink himself, what Reason he has to say, That his Idea of Warmth, which was produced in him by the Fire, is actually in the Fire; and his Idea of Pain, which the same Fire produced in him the same way, is not in the Fire. Why is Whiteness and Coldness in Snow, and pain not when it produces the one and the other Idea in us; and can do neither, but by the Bulk, Figure, Number, and Motion of its solid Parts.

§. 17. The particular Bulk, Number, Figure, and Motion of the parts of Fire, or Snow, are really in them, whether any ones Senses perceive them or no: and therefore they may be called real Qualities, they really exist in those Bodies. But Light, Heat, Whiteness, or Cold∣ness, are no more really in them, than Sickness or Pain is in Manna. Take away the Sensation of them, let not the Eyes see Light, or Colours, nor the Ears hear Sounds; let the Palate not Taste, nor the Nose Smell, and all Colours, Tastes, Odors, and Sounds, as they are such particular Ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their Causes, i. e. Bulk, Figure, and Motion of Parts?

§. 18. A piece of Manna of a sensible Bulk, is able to produce in us the Ideas of a round or square Figure; and by being removed from one place to another, the Idea of Motion. This Idea of Motion represents it, as it really is in the Manna moving: A Circle or Square are the same, whether in Idea or Existence; in the Mind, or in the Manna: And this, both Motion and Figure are really in the Manna, whether we take notice of them or no: This every Body is ready to agree to. Besides, Manna by the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of its Parts, has a Power to pro∣duce the Sensations of Sickness, and sometimes of acute Pains, or Gripings in us. That these Ideas of Sickness and Pain, are not in the Manna, but Effects of its Operations on us, and are no where, when we feel them not: This also every one readily agrees to. And yet Men are hardly to be

brought to think, that Sweetness and Whiteness are not really in Manna; which are but the effects of the operations of Manna, by the motion, size, and figure of its Particles on the Eyes and Palate, as the pain and sickness caused by Manna, are confessedly nothing but the effects of its opera∣tions on the Stomach and Guts, by the size, motion, and figure of its insensible parts; (for by nothing else can a Body operate, as has been proved:) As if it could not operate on the Eyes and Palate, and thereby produce in the Mind particular distinct Ideas, which in it self it has not, as well as we allow it can operate on the Guts and Stomach, and thereby produce distinct Ideas, which in it self it has not. These Ideas being all effects of the operations of Manna, on several parts of our Bodies, by the size, figure, number, and motion of its parts, why those produced by the Eyes and Palate, should rather be thought to be really in the Manna, than those produced by the Stomach and Guts; or why the pain and sickness, Ideas that are the effects of Manna, should be thought to be no-where, when they are not felt; and yet the sweetness and whiteness, effects of the same Manna on other parts of the Body, by ways equal as unknown, should be thought to exist in the Manna, when they are not seen nor tasted, would need some Reason to explain.

§. 19. Let us consider the red and white colours in Porphyre: Hinder light, but from striking on it, and its Colours vanish; it no longer pro∣duces any such Ideas in us: Upon the return of Light, it produces these appearances on us again. Can any one think any real alterations are made in the Porphyre, by the presence or absence of Light; and that those Ideas of whiteness and redness, are really in Porphyre in the light, when 'tis plain it has no colour in the dark? It has, indeed, such a Confi∣guration of Particles, both night and day, as are apt, by the Rays of Light rebounding from some parts of that hard Stone, to produce in us the Idea of redness, and from others the Idea of whiteness: But white∣ness or redness are not in it at any time, but such a texture that hath the power to produce such a sensation in us.

§. 20. Pound an Almond, and the clear white Colour will be altered in to a dirty one, and the sweet Tast into an oily one. What real Alteration can the beating of the Pestle make in any Body, but an Alteration of the Texture of it?

§. 21. Ideas being thus distinguished and understood, we may be able to give an Account, how the same Water, at the same time, may produce the Idea of Cold by one Hand, and of Heat by the other: Whereas it is impossible, that the same Water, if those Ideas were really in it, should at the same time be both Hot and Cold. For if we imagine Warmth, as it is in our Hands, to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of Motion in the minute Particles of our Nerves, or animal Spirits, we may under∣stand, how it is possible, that the same Water may at the same time pro∣duce the Sensation of Heat in one Hand, and Cold in the other; which yet Figure never does, that never producing the Idea of a square by one Hand, which has produced the Idea of a Globe by another. But if the Sensation of Heat and Cold, be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute Parts of our Bodies, caused by the Corpuscles of any other Body, it is easie to be understood, That if that motion be greater in one Hand, than in the other; if a Body be applied to the two Hands, which has in its minute Particles a greater motion, than in those of one of the Hands, and a less, than in those of the other, it will in∣crease the motion of the one Hand, and lessen it in the other, and so cause the different Sensations of Heat and Cold, that depend thereon.

§. 22. I have, in what just goes before, been engaged in Physical Enquiries a little farther than, perhaps, I intended. But it being necessa∣ry, to make the Nature of Sensation a little understood; and to make the difference between the Qualities in Bodies, and the Ideas produced by them in the Mind, to be distinctly conceived, without which it were impossible to discourse intelligibly of them: I hope, I shall be pardoned this little Excursion into Natural Philosophy, it being necessary in our present En∣quiry, to distinguish the primary, and real Qualities of Bodies, which are always in them, (viz. Solidity, Extension, Figure, Number, and Motion, or Rest, and are sometimes perceived by us, viz. when the Bodies they are in, are big enough singly to be discerned) from those secundary and imputed Qualities, which are but the Powers of several Combinations of those primary ones, when they operate, without being distinctly discer∣ned; whereby we also may come to know what Ideas are, and what are not Resemblances of something really existing in the Bodies, we denomi∣nate from them.

§. 23. The Qualities then that are in in Bodies rightly considered, are of Three sorts:

• First, The Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, and Motion, or Rest of their solid Parts; these are in them, whether we perceive them or no; and when they are of that size, that we can discover them, we have by these an Idea of the thing, as it is in it self, as is plain in artificial things. These I call primary Qualities.
• Secondly, The Power that is in any Body, by Reason of its insensible primary Qualities, to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our Senses, and thereby produce in us the different Ideas of several Colours, Sounds, Smells, Tasts, &c. These are usually called sensible Qualities.
• Thirdly, The Power that is in any Body, by Reason of the particular Constitution of its primary Qualities, to make such a change in the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of another Body, as to make it operate on our Senses, differently from what it did before. Thus the Sun has a Pow∣er to make Wax white, and Fire to make Lead fluid.

The First of these, as has been said, I think, may be properly called re∣al, Original, or primary Qualities, because they are in the things them∣selves, whether they are perceived or no: and upon their different Modi∣fications it is, that the secundary Qualities depend.

The other two, are only Powers to act differently upon other things, which Powers result from the different Modifications of those primary Qualities.

§. 24. But though these two later sorts of Qualities, are Powers barely, and nothing but Powers, relating to several other Bodies, and resulting from the different Modifications of the Original Qualities; yet they are generally otherwise thought of. For the Second sort, viz. The Powers to produce several Ideas in us by our Senses, are looked upon as real Quali∣ties, in the things thus affecting us: But the Third sort are call'd, and e∣steemed barely Powers. v. g. the Idea of Heat, or Light, which we receive by our Eyes, or touch from the Sun, are commonly thought real Quali∣ties, existing in the Sun, and something more than barely Powers in it But when we consider the Sun, in reference to Wax, which it melts, or blanches, we look upon the Whiteness and Softness produced in the Wax, not as Qualities in the Sun, but Effects produced by Powers in it: whilst

yet we look on Light and Warmth to be real Qualities, something more than bare Powers in the Sun. Whereas, if rightly considered, these Qua∣lities of Light and Warmth, which are Perceptions in me, when I am warmed, or enlightned by the Sun, are no otherwise in the Sun, than the changes made in the Wax, when it is blanched or melted, are in the Sun. They are all of them equally Powers in the Sun, depending on its primary Qualities; whereby it is able in the one case, so to alter the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of some of the insensible parts of my Eyes, or Hands, as thereby to produce in me the Ideas of Light, or Heat; and in the o∣ther, it is able so to alter the Bulk, Figure, Texture, or Motion of the in∣sensible Parts of the Wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct Ideas of White and Fluid.

§. 25. The Reason, Why the one are ordinarily taken for real Qualities, and the other only for bare Powers, seems to be, because the Ideas we have of distinct Colours, Sounds, &c. containing nothing at all in them, of Bulk, Figure, or Motion, we are not apt to think them the Effect of these primary Qualities, which appear not to our Senses to operate in their Production; and with which, they have not any apparent Congrui∣ty, or conceivable Connexion. Hence it is, that we are so forward to imagine, that those Ideas are the resemblances of something really exist∣ing in the Objects themselves: Since Sensation discovers nothing of Bulk, Figure, or Motion of parts in their Production; nor can Reason shew, how Bodies by their Bulk, Figure, and Motions, should produce in the Mind the Ideas of Blue, or Yellow, &c. But in the other Case, in the Operations of Bodies, changing the Qualities one of another, we plainly discover, that the Quality produced, hath commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it; wherefore we look on it as a bare Effect of Power. For though receiving the Idea of Heat, or Light, from the Sun, we are apt to think, 'tis a Perception and Resemblance of such a Quality in the Sun: yet when we see Wax, or a fair Face, receive change of Colour from the Sun, we cannot imagine that to be the Rece∣ption, or Resemblance of any thing in the Sun, because we find not those different Colours in the Sun it self. For our Senses, being able to observe a likeness, or unlikeness of sensible Qualities in two different external Ob∣jects, we forwardly enough conclude the Production of any sensible Qua∣lity in any Subject, to be an Effect of bare Power, and not the Commu∣nication of any Quality, which was really in the efficient, when we find no such sensible Quality in the thing that produced it. But our Senses, not being able to discover any unlikeness between the Idea produced in us, and the Quality of the Object producing it, we are apt to imagine, that our Ideas are resemblances of something in the Objects, and not the Effects of certain Powers, placed in the Modification of their primary Qua∣lities, with which primary Qualities the Ideas produced in us have no re∣semblance.

§. 26. To conclude, beside those before mentioned primary Qualities in Bodies, viz. Bulk, Figure, Extension, Number, and Motion of their solid Parts, all the rest, whereby we take notice of Bodies, and distinguish them one from another, are nothing else, but several Powers in them, depen∣ding on those primary Qualities; whereby they are fitted, either by immedi∣ately operating on our Bodies, to produce several different Ideas in us; or else by operating on other Bodies, so to change their primary Qualities, as to render them capable of producing Ideas in us, different from what before they did. The former of these, I think, may be called Secundary Qualities, immediately perceivable: The later, Secundary Qualities, me∣diately perceivable.

CHAP. IX. Of Perception.

§. 1. PErception, as it is the first faculty of the Mind, exercised about our Ideas; so it is the first and simplest Idea we have from Re∣flection, and is by some called Thinking in general. Though Thinking, in the propriety of the English Tongue, signifies that sort of operation of the Mind about its Ideas, wherein the Mind is active; where it with some degree of voluntary attention, considers any thing. For in bare naked Perception, the Mind is, for the most part, only passive; and what it perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving.

§. 2. What Perception is, every one will know better, by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, &c. or thinks, than by any discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in himself in his own Mind, cannot miss it: And if he does not reflect, all the words in the World, cannot make him have any notion of it.

§. 3. This is certain, That whatever alterations are made in the Body, if they reach not the Mind; whatever impressions are made on the out∣ward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no Perception. Fire may burn our Bodies, with no other effect than it does a Billet, un∣less the motion be continued to the Brain; and there the sense of Heat, or Idea of Pain, be produced in the Mind, wherein consists actual Per∣ception.

§. 4. How often may a Man observe in himself, that whilst his Mind is intently employ'd in the contemplation of some Objects; and curiously surveying some Ideas that are there, it takes no notice of impressions, of sounding Bodies, which are brought in, though the same alteration be made upon the Organ of Hearing, that uses to be for the producing the Idea of a Sound? A sufficient impulse there may be on the Organ; but it not reaching the observation of the Mind, there follows no perception: And though the motion that uses to produce the Idea of Sound, be made in the Ear, yet no sound is heard. Want of Sensation in this case, is not through any defect in the Organ, or that his Ears are less affected than at other times, when he does hear: but that which uses to produce the Idea, though conveyed in by the usual Organ, not being taken notice of in the Understanding, there follows no Sensation. So that where-ever there is Sense, or Perception, there some Idea is actually produced, and pre∣sent in the Vnderstanding.

§. 5. Therefore I doubt not but Children, by the exercise of their Sen∣ses about Objects, that affect them in the Womb, receive some few Ideas, before they are born, as the unavoidable effects, either of the Bodies that environ them, or else of those Wants or Diseases they suffer; amongst which, (if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable of ex∣amination) I think, the Ideas of Hunger and Warmth are two: which probably are some of the first that Children have, and which they scarce ever part with again.

§. 6. But though it be reasonable to imagine, that Children receive some Ideas before they come into the World, yet these simple Ideas are far from those innate Principles, which some contend for, and we above have rejected. These here mentioned, being the effects of Sensation, are

only from some Affections of the Body, which happen to them there, and so depend on something exterior to the Mind; no otherwise differing in their manner of production from other Ideas derived from Sense, but only in the precedency of Time: Whereas those innate Principles are sup∣posed to be of quite another nature; not coming into the Mind by the ac∣cidental alterations in, or operations on the Body; but, as it were, original Characters impressed upon it, in the very first moment of its Being and Constitution.

§. 7. As there are some Ideas, which we may reasonably suppose may be introduced into the Minds of Children in the Womb, subservient to the necessity of their Life, and being there: So after they are born, those Ideas are the earliest imprinted, which happen to be the sensible Qualities, which first occur to them; amongst which, Light is not the least considerable, nor of the weakest efficacy. And how covetous the Mind is, to be fur∣nished with all such Ideas, as have no pain accompanying them, may be a little guess'd, by what is observable in Children new-born, who always turn their Eyes to that part, from whence the Light comes, lay them how you please. But the Ideas that are most familiar at first, being various, according to the divers circumstances of Childrens first entertainment in the World, the order wherein the several Ideas come at first into the Mind, is very various, and uncertain also; neither is it much material to know it.

§. 8. We are farther to consider concerning Perception, that the Ideas we receive by sensation, are often in grown People alter'd by the Iudg∣ment, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our Eyes a round Globe, of any uniform colour, v. g. Gold, Alabaster, or Jet, 'tis certain, that the Idea thereby imprinted in our Mind, is of a flat Circle variously shadow'd, with several degrees of Light and Brightness coming to our Eyes. But we having by use been accustomed to perceive, what kind of appearance convex Bodies are wont to make in us; what altera∣tions are made in the reflexions of Light, by the difference of the sensible Figures of Bodies, the Judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the Appearances into their Causes: So that from that, which truly is va∣riety of shadow or colour, collecting the Figure, it makes it pass for a mark of Figure, and frames to it self the perception of a convex Figure, and an uniform Colour; when the Idea we receive from thence, is only a Plain variously colour'd, as is evident in Painting.

§. 9. But this is not, I think, usual in any of our Ideas, but those re∣ceived by Sight: Because Sight, the most comprehensive of all our Sen∣ses, conveying to our Minds the far different Ideas of Light and Colours, which are peculiar only to that Sense; and also of Space, Figure, and Mo∣tion, the several varieties whereof, change the appearances of its proper Objects, viz. Light and Colours, it accustoms it self by use, to judge of the one by the other. This in many cases, by a setled habit, in things whereof we have frequent experience, is performed so constantly, and so quick, that we take that for the Perception of our Sensation, which is but an Idea formed by our Judgment; so that one, viz. that of Sen∣sation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of it self; as a Man who reads and hears with attention and understanding, takes little notice of the Characters, or Sounds, but of the Ideas that are excited in him by them.

§. 10. Nor need we wonder, that this is done with so little notice, if we consider, how very quick the actions of the Mind are performed: For as it self takes up no space, has no extension; so its actions seem to require no time, but many of them seem to be crouded into an Instant. I speak this in comparison to the actions of the Body. Any one may easily ob∣serve this in his own Thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an instant, does our Minds, with one glance, see all the parts of a demonstration, which may very well be called along one, if we consider the time it will require to put it into words, and step by step shew it another? Secondly, we shall not be so much surprized, that this is done in us with so little notice, if we consider, how the faci∣lity we get of doing things, by a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us, without our notice•• Habits, especially such as are begun ve∣ry early, come, at last, to produce actions in us, which often scape our obser∣vation. How frequently do we, in a day, cover our Eyes with our Eye∣lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark? Men, that by cu∣stom have got the use of a By-word, do almost in every sentence, pro∣nounce sounds•• which, though taken notice of by others, they them∣selves neither hear, nor observe. And therefore 'tis not so strange, that our Mind should often change the Idea of its Sensation, into that of its Judgment, and make one serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.

§. 11. This faculty of Perception, seems to me to be that, which puts the distinction betwixt the ••nimal Kingdom, and ••he inferior parts of Na∣ture. For however Vegetables have, many of them, some degrees of Motion, and upon the different application of other 〈◊〉〈◊〉 its to them do very briskly alter their Figures and Motions, and so have obtained the name of sensitive Plants, from a motion, which has some resemblance to that, which in Animals follows upon Sensation•• Yet, I suppose, it is all bare Mechanism; and no otherwise produced, than the turning of a wild Oat-beard, by the insinuation of the Particles of Moisture; or the short∣ning of a Rope, by the affusion of Water. All which is done without any sensation in the Subject, or the having or receiving any Ideas.

§. 12. Perception, I believe, is, in some degree, in all sorts of Animals; though in some, possibly, the Avenues provided for the reception of Sen∣sations, are so few by Nature, and the Perception, they are received with, so obscure and dull, that it comes extreamly short of the quickness and va∣riety of Sensations, which is in other Animals; but yet it is sufficient for, and wisely adapted to the state and condition of that sort of Animals, who are thus constituted by Nature: So that the Wisdom and Goodness of the Maker, plainly appears in all the Parts of this stupendious Fabrick, and all the several degrees and ranks of Creatures in it.

§. 13. We may, I think, from the Make of an Oyster, or Cockle, reaso∣nably conclude, that it has not so many, nor so quick Senses, as a Man, or several other Animals; nor if it had, would it in that state and inca∣pacity of transferring it self from one place to another, be better'd by them. What good would Sight and Hearing do to a Creature, that can∣not move it self to or from the Objects, wherein at a distance it perceives Good or Evil? And would not quickness of Sensation, be an Inconveni∣ence to an Animal, that must lie still, where Chance has once placed it; and there receives the afflux of colder or warmer, clean or foul Water, as it happens to come to it?

§. 14. But yet, I cannot but think, there is some small dull Perce∣ption, whereby they are distinguished from perfect Insensibility. And that this may be so, we have plain instances, even in Mankind it self. Take one, in whom decrepid old Age has blotted out the Memory of his past Knowledge, and clearly wiped out the Ideas his Mind was formerly stored with; and has, by destroying his Sight, Hearing, and Smell quite, and his Taste to a great degree, stopp'd up almost all the Passages for new ones to enter: Or if there be some of the inlets yet half open, the Impressions made are scarce perceived, or not at all retained, How far such an one (notwithstanding all that is boasted of innate Principles) is in his Knowledge, and intellectual Faculties, a∣bove the Condition of a Cockle, or an Oyster, I leave to be consi∣dered. And if a Man had passed Sixty Years in such a State, as 'tis possible he might, as well as three Days, I wonder what difference there would have been in any intellectual Perfections, between him and the lowest degrees of Animals.

Perception then being the first step and degree towards Knowledge, and the inlet of all the Materials of it, the fewer Senses any Man, as well as any other Creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the Impressions are that are made by them; and the duller the Faculties are, that are employ∣ed about them, the more remote are they from that Knowledge, which is to be found in some Men. But this being in great variety of Degrees, (as may be perceived amongst Men,) cannot certainly be discovered in the several Species of Animals, much less in their particular Individuals. It suffices me only to have remarked here, that Perception is the first Operation of all our intellectual Faculties, and the inlet of all Knowledge into our Minds. And I am apt too, to imagine, That it is Perception in the lowest degree of it, which puts the Boundaries between Animals, and the inferior ranks of Creatures. But this I mention only as my con∣jecture by the bye, it being indifferent to the Matter in Hand, which way the Learned shall determine of it.

CHAP. X. Of Retention.

§. 1. THE next Faculty of the Mind, whereby it makes a farther Progress towards Knowledge, is that I call Retention; or the keeping of those simple Ideas, which from Sensation or Reflection it hath received, which is done two ways; First, either by keeping the Idea, which is brought into it, for some time actually in view, which is called Contemplation.

§. 2. The other, is the Power to revive again in our Minds those Ideas; which after imprinting have disappeared, or have been as it were laid a∣side out of Sight: And thus we do, when we conceive Heat or Light, Yellow or Sweet, the Object being removed; and this is Memory, which is as it were the Store-house of our Ideas. For the narrow Mind of Man, not being capable of having many Ideas under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary to have a Repository, to lay up those Ideas; which at another time it might have use of. And thus it is, by the As∣sistance of the Memory, that we are said to have all those Ideas in our Understanding; which though we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in sight, and make appear again, and be the Objects of our Thoughts, without the help of those sensible Qualities, which first imprin∣ted them there.

§. 3. Attention and Repetition help much to the fixing any Ideas in our Memory: But those, which naturally at first make the deepest, and most lasting Impression, are those, which are accompanied with Pleasure or Pain. The great Business of the Senses, being to make us take notice of what hurts, or advantages the Body, it is wisely ordered by Nature (as has been shewn) that Pain should accompany the Reception of seve∣ral Ideas; which supplying the Place of Consideration and Reasoning in Children; and acting quicker than Consideration in grown Men, makes both the Young and Old avoid painful Objects, with that haste, which is necessary for their Preservation; and in both settles in the Memory a cau∣tion for the Future.

§. 4. But concerning the several degrees of lasting, wherewith Ideas are imprinted on the Memory, we may observe, First, That some of them being produced in the Understanding, either by the Objects affecting the Senses once barely, and no more, especially if the Mind then otherwise imployed, took but little notice of it, and set not on the stamp deep into it self; or else, when through the Temper of the Body, or otherwise, the Memory is very weak, such Ideas quickly fade, ad vanish quite out of the Understanding, and leave it as clear without any Foot-steps, or re∣maining Characters, as Shadows do flying over Fields of Corn; and the Mind is as void of them, as if they never had been there.

§. 5. Thus many of those Ideas, which were produced in the Minds of Children, in the beginning of their Sensation (some of which, per∣haps, as of some Pleasures and Pains were before they were born, and o∣thers in their Infancy) if in the future Course of their Lives, they are not repeated again, are quite lost, without the least glimpse remaining of them. This may be observed in those, who by some Mischance have lost their

sight, when they were very young; in whom the Ideas of Colours, having been but slightly taken notice of, and ceasing to be repeated, do quite wear out; so that some years after, there is no more Notion, nor Memory of Colours left in their Minds, than in those of People born blind. The Memory in some Men, 'tis true, is very tenacious even, to a Miracle: But yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our Ideas, e∣ven those which are struck deepest, and in the Minds the most retentive; so that if they be not sometimes renewed by repeated Exercise of the Sen∣ses, or Reflection about those kind of Objects, which at first occasioned them, the Print wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen. Thus the Ideas, as well as Children of our Youth, often die before us: And our Minds represent to us those Tombs, to which we are approach∣ing; where though the Brass and Marble remain, yet the Inscriptions are effaced by time, and the Imagery moulders away. The Pictures drawn in our Minds, are laid in fading Colours; and if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear. How much the Constitution of our Bodies are concerned in this; and whether the Temper of the Spirits and Brain make this difference, that some retain the Characters drawn on it like Marble, others like free Stone, and others little better than Sand, I shall not here enquire, though it may seem probable, that the Constitution of the Body, does sometimes influence the Memory; since we oftentimes find a Disease quite strip the Mind of all its Ideas, and the flames of a Fe∣ver in a few days, calcines all those Images to dust and confusion, which seem'd to be as lasting, as if carved in Marble.

§. 6. But concerning the Ideas themselves, it is easie to remark, That those that are oftenest refreshed (amongst which are those that are con∣veyed into the Mind by more ways than one) by a frequent return of the Objects or Actions that produce them, fix themselves best in the Memory, and remain clearest and longest there; and therefore those which are of the original Qualities of Bodies, viz. Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest, and those that almost constantly affect our Bodies, as Heat and Cold; and those which are the Affections of all kind of Beings, as Existence, Duration, and Number, which almost every Object that affects our Senses, every Thought which imploys our Minds, bring along with them: These, I say, and the like Ideas, are seldom quite lost, whilst the Mind retains any Ideas at all.

§. 7. In this secundary Perception, as I may so call it, or viewing again the Ideas, that are lodg'd in the Memory, the Mind is oftentimes more than barely passive, the appearance of those dormant Pictures, depending some∣times on the Will. The Mind very often sets it self on work in search of some hidden Idea, and turns, as it were, the Eye of the Soul upon it; though sometimes too they start up in our Minds of their own accord, and offer themselves to the Understanding; and very often are rouzed and tumbled out of their dark Cells, into open Day-light, by some turbu∣lent and tempestuous Passion, our Affections bringing Ideas to our Me∣mory, which had otherwise lain quiet and unregarded.

§. 8. Memory, in an intellectual Creature, is necessary in the next de∣gree to Perception. It is of so great moment, that where it is wanting, all the rest of our Faculties are in a great measure useless: And we in our Thoughts, Reasonings, and Knowledge, could not proceed beyond pre∣sent Objects, were it not for the assistance of our Memories, wherein there may be two defects:

First, That it loses the Idea quite, and so far it produces perfect Igno∣rance. For since we can know nothing farther, than we have the Ideas of it, when they are gone, we are in perfect ignorance.

Secondly, That it moves slowly, and retrieves not the Ideas, that it has, and are laid up in store, quick enough to serve the Mind upon occasions. This, if it be to a great degree, is Stupidity; and he, who through this de∣fault in his Memory, has not the Ideas, that are really preserved there, ready at hand, when need and occasion calls for them, were almost as good be without them quite, since they serve him to little purpose. The dull Man, who loses the opportunity, whilst he is seeking in his Mind for those Ideas, that should serve his turn, is not much more happy in his Knowledge, than one that is perfectly ignorant. 'Tis the business there∣fore of the Memory, to furnish to the Mind those dormant Ideas, which it has present occasion for, and in the having them ready at hand on all occasions consists, that which we call Invention, Fancy, and quickness of Parts.

§. 9. This faculty of laying up, and retaining the Ideas that are brought into the Mind, several other Animals seem to have, to a great degree, as well as Man. For to pass by other instances, Birds learning of Tunes, and the endeavours one may observe in them to hit the Notes right, put it past doubt with me, that they have Perception, and retain Ideas in their Memories, and use them for Patterns. For it seems to me impossible, that they should endeavour to conform their Voices to Notes (as 'tis plain they do) of which they had no Ideas. For tho' I should grant Sound may mecha∣nically cause a certain motion of the animal Spirits, in the Brains of those Birds, whilst the Tune is actually playing; and that motion may be con∣tinued on to the Muscles of the Wings; and so the Bird mechanically be driven away by certain noises, because this may tend to the Birds preser∣vation: yet that can never be supposed a Reason, why it should cause me∣chanically, either whilst the Tune was playing, much less after it has cea∣sed, such a motion in the Organs of the Bird's voice, as should conform it to the Notes of a foreign Sound, which imitation can be of no use to the Birds preservation. But, which is more, it cannot with any appea∣rance of Reason, be suppos'd (much less proved) that Birds without Sense and Memory, can approach their Notes nearer and nearer, by degrees, to a Tune play'd yesterday; which if they have no Idea of in their Memory, is now no-where, nor can be a Pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated Essays can bring them nearer to. Snce there is no reason why the sound of a Pipe should leave traces in their Brains, which not at first, but by their after-endeavours should produce the like Sounds; and why the Sounds they make themselves, should not make traces which they should follow, as well as those of the Pipe, is impossible to conceive.

CHAP. XI. Of Discerning, and other Operations of the Mind.

§. 1. ANother Faculty we may take notice of in our Minds, is that of Discerning and distinguishing between the several Ideas it has. It is not enough to have a confused perception of something in general. Unless the Mind had a distinct perception of different Ob∣jects, and their Qualities, it would be capable of very little Knowledge, though the Bodies that affect us, were as busie about us, as they are now, and the Mind were continually employ'd in thinking. On this faculty of Distinguishing one thing from another, depends the evidence and cer∣tainty of several, even very general Propositions, which have passed for innate Truths; because Men over-looking the true cause, why those Propositions find universal assent, impute it wholly to native uniform Im∣pressions; whereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning Faculty of the Mind, whereby it perceives two Ideas to be the same, or different: But of this more hereafter.

§. 2. How much the imperfection of accurately discriminating Ideas one from another lies, either in the dulness, or faults of the Organs of Sense; or want of accuteness, exercise, or attention in the Understan∣ding; or hastiness and precipitancy, natural to some Tempers, I will not here examine: It suffices to take notice, that this is one of the Ope∣rations, that the Mind may reflect on, and observe in it self. It is of that consequence to its other Knowledge, that so far as this faculty is in it self dull, or not rightly made use of, for the distinguishing one thing from another; so far our Notions are confused, and our Reason and Judgment disturbed or misled. If in having our Ideas in the Memory ready at hand, consists quickness of parts; in this of having them unconfused, and being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another, where there is but the least difference, consists, in a great measure, the exactness of Judgment, and clearness of Reason, which is to be observed in one Man above another. And hence, perhaps, may be given some Reason of that common Observation, That Men who have a great deal of Wit, and prompt Memories, have not always the clearest Judgment, or deepest Reason. For Wit lying most in the assemblage of Ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resem∣blance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant Pictures, and agree∣able Visions in the Fancy: Iudgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully Ideas one from another, where∣in can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by Similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allusion, where∣in, for the most part, lies that entertainment and pleasantry of Wit, which strikes so lively on the Fancy; and therefore so accepable to all People, because its Beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labour of thought, to examine what Truth or Reason there is in it. The Mind, without looking any farther, rests satisfied with the pleasantness of the Picture, and the gayety of the Fancy: And it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it, by the severe Rules of Truth, and good Rea∣son;

whereby it appears, that it consists in something, that is not per∣fectly conformable to them.

§. 3. To the well distinguishing our Ideas, it chiefly contributes, that they be clear and determinate: And when they are so, it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them, though the Senses should (as some∣times they do) convey them from the same Object differently, on dif∣ferent occasions, and so seem to err. For though a Man in a Fever, should from Sugar have a bitter taste, which at another time would produce a sweet one; yet the Idea of Bitter in that Man's Mind, would be as clear and distinct from the Idea of Sweet, as if he had tasted only Gall. Nor does it make any more confusion between the two Ideas of Sweet and Bitter, that the same sort of Body produces at one time one, and at another time another Idea, by the taste, than it makes a confusion in the two Ideas of White and Sweet, or White and Round, that the same piece of Sugar produces them both in the Mind at the same time. And the Ideas of Orange-colour and Azure, that are produced in the Mind by the same parcel of the infusion of Lignum Nephriticum, are no less distinct Ideas, than those of the same Colours, taken from two very different Bodies.

§. 4. The COMPARING them one with another, in respect of Extent, Degrees, Time, Place, or any other circumstances, is another operation of the Mind about its Ideas, and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of Ideas, comprehended under Relation; which of how vast an extent it is, I shall have occasion to consider hereafter.

§. 5. How far Brutes partake in this faculty, is not easie to determine; I imagine they have it not in any great degree; For though they proba∣bly have several Ideas distinct enough, yet it seems to me to be the Pre∣rogative of Humane Understanding, when it has sufficiently distingui∣shed any Ideas, so as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and so con∣sequently two, to cast about and consider in what circumstances they are capable to be compared. And therefore, I think, Beasts compare not their Ideas, farther than some sensible Circumstances annexed to the Ob∣jects themselves. The other power of Comparing, which may be obser∣ved in Men, belonging to general Ideas, and useful only to abstract Rea∣sonings, we may probably conjecture Beasts have not.

§. 6. The next Operation we may observe in the Mind about its Ideas, is COMPOSITION; whereby it puts together several of those simple ones it has received from Sensation and Reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of Composition, may be reckon'd also that of ENLARGING; wherein though the Composition does not so much appear, as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheless a putting several Ideas together, though of the same kind. Thus by adding several Unites together, we make the Idea of a dozen; and putting together the re∣peated Ideas of several Perches, we frame that of a Furlong.

§. 7. In this also, I suppose, Brutes come far short of Man. For though they take in, and retain together several Combinations of simple Ideas, as possibly the Shape, Smell, and Voice of his Master, make up a com∣plex Idea a Dog has of him, or rather are so many distinct Marks where∣by he knows him; yet, I do not think they do of themselves ever com∣pound them, and make complex Ideas: And perhaps even where we think they have complex Ideas, 'tis only one simple one that directs them in the knowledge of several things, which possibly they distinguish less by their Sight, than we imagine. For I have been credibly infomed, that a Bitch will nurse, play with, and be fond of young Foxes, as much

as, and in place of her Puppies, if you can but get them once to suck her so long, that her Milk may go through them.

§. 8. When Children have, by repeated Sensations, got Ideas fixed in their Memories, they begin, by degrees, to learn the use of Signs: And when they have got the skill to apply the Organs of Speech to the fra∣ming of articulate Sounds, they begin to make use of Words, to signifie their Ideas to others; which words they sometimes borrow from others, and sometimes make themselves, as one may observe among the new and unusual Names Children often give to things in their first use of Lan∣guage.

§. 9. The use of Words then being to stand as outward Marks of our internal Ideas, and those Ideas being taken from particular things, if eve∣ry particular Idea we take in, should have a distinct Name, Names must be endless. To prevent this, the Mind makes the particular Ideas, recei∣ved from particular Objects, to become general; which is done by con∣sidering them as they are in the Mind such Appearances, separate from all other Existencies, and the circumstances of real Existence, as Time, Place, or any other concomitant Ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby Ideas taken from particular Beings, become general Representa∣tives of all of the same kind; and their Names general Names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract Ideas. Such precise, naked Appearances in the Mind, without considering, how, whence, or with what others they came there, the Understanding lays up (with Names commonly annexed to them) as the Standards to rank real Existencies into sorts, as they agree with these Patterns, and to denominate them ac∣cordingly. Thus the same Colour being observed to day in Chalk or Snow, which the Mind yesterday received from Milk, it considers that Appearance alone, makes it a representative of all of that kind; and ha∣ving given in the name Whiteness, it by that found signifies the same quali-wheresoever to be imagin'd or met with; and thus Universals, whether Ideas or Terms, are made.

§. 10. If it may be doubted, Whether Beasts compound and enlarge their Ideas that way, to any degree: This, I think, I may be positive in, That the power of Abstracting, is not at all in them; and that the ha∣ving of general Ideas, is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt Mand and Brutes; and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain to. For it is evident, we observe no foot-steps in them, of making use of general signs for universal Ideas; from which we have reason to imagine, that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or ma∣king general Ideas, since they have no use of Words, or any other gene∣ral Signs.

§. 11. Nor can it be imputed to their want of fit Organs, to frame ar∣ticulate Sounds, that they have no use, or knowledge of general Words; since many of them, we find, can fashion such Sounds, and pronounce Words distinctly enough, but never with any such application. And, on the other side, Men, who through some defect in the Organs, want words, yet fail not to express their universal Ideas by signs, which serve them instead of general words, a faculty which we see Beasts come short in. And therefore I think we may suppose, That 'tis in this, that the Species of Brutes are discriminated from Man; and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so vast a distance. For if they have any Ideas at all, and are not bare Machins (as some would have them) we cannot deny them to have some Reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do reason, as that they have sense;

but it is only in particular Ideas, just as they receiv'd them from their Senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of Abstra∣ction.

§. 12. How far Idiots are concerned in the want or weakness of any, or all of the foregoing Faculties, an exact observation of their several ways of faltering, would no doubt discover. For those who either per∣ceive but dully, or retain the Ideas that come into their Minds, but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little matter to think on. Those who cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to understand, and make use of Language, or judge, or reason to any tolerable degree; but only a little, and imperfectly, about things present, and very familiar to their Senses. And indeed, any of the fore∣mentioned Faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce suitable defects in Mens Understandings and Knowledge.

§. 13. In fine, The defect in Naturals, seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion, in the intellectual Faculties, whereby they are deprived of Reason: Whereas mad Men, on the other side, seem to suffer by the other Extream. For they do not appear to me to have lost the Faculty of Reasoning: but having joined together some Ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for Truths; and they err as Men do, that argue right from wrong Principles. For by the violence of their Imagi∣nations, having taken their Fansies for Realities, they make right dedu∣ction from them. Thus you shall find a distracted Man phansying him∣self a King, with a right inference, requires suitable Attendance, Respect, and Obedience: Others who have thought themselves made of glass, have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle Bodies. Hence it comes to pass, that a Man, who is very sober, and of a right Understan∣ding in all other things, may in one particular, be as frantick as any in Bedlam; if either by any sudden very strong impression, or long fixing his Fancy upon one sort of Thoughts, incoherent Ideas have been ce∣mented together so powerfully, as to remain united. But there are de∣grees of Madness, as of Folly; the disorderly jumbling Ideas together, is in some more, and some less. In short, herein seems to lie the difference between Idiots and mad Men, That mad Men put wrong Ideas toge∣ther, and so make wrong Propositions, but argue and reason right from them: But Idiots make very few or no Propositions, and reason scarce at all.

§. 14. These, I think, are the first Faculties and Operations of the Mind, which it makes use of in understanding; which though they are exercised about all its Ideas in general; yet the instances, I have hitherto given, have been chiefly in simple Ideas; and I have subjoined the explication of these Faculties of the Mind, to that of simple Ideas, before I come to what I have to say, concerning complex ones, for these following Rea∣sons:

• First, Because several of these Faculties being exercised at first princi∣pally about simple Ideas, we might, by following Nature in its ordina∣ry method, trace and discover them in their rise, progress, and gradual improvements.
• Secondly, Because observing the Faculties of our Mind, how they ope∣rate about simple Ideas, which are usually in most Mens Minds, much more clear, precise, and distinct, than complex ones, we may the better examine and learn how the Mind abstracts, denominates, compares, and exercises its other Operations, about those which are complex, wherein we are much more liable to mistake.
• ...

• Thirdly, Because these very Operations of the Mind about Ideas, receiv'd from Sensation, are themselves, when reflected on, another sett of Ideas, derived from that other source of our Knowledge, which I call Reflecti∣on; and therefore fit to be considered in this place, after the simple Ideas of Sensation. Of Compounding, Comparing, Abstracting, &c. I have but just spoken, having occasion to treat of them more at large in other places.

§. 15. And thus I have given a short, and, I think, true History of the first beginnings of Humane Knowledge; whence the Mind has its first Ob∣jects, and by what steps it makes its progress to the laying in, and sto∣ring up those Ideas, out of which is to be framed all the Knowledge it is capable of; wherein I must appeal to Experience and Observation, whe∣ther I am in the right: The best way to come to Truth, being to exa∣mine Things as really they are, and not to conclude they are as we fan∣sie of our selves, or have been taught to imagine by others.

§. 16. To deal truly, this is the only way that I can discover, whereby the Ideas of things are brought into the Vnderstanding: If other Men have either innate Ideas, or in••used Principles, they have reason to en∣joy them; and if they are sure of it, it is impossible for others to deny them the privilege they have above their Neighbours. I can speak but of what I find in my self, and is agreeable to those Notions; which if we will examine the whole course of Men in their several Ages, Countries, and Educations, seems to depend on these foundations I have laid, and to correspond with this Method in all the parts and degrees thereof.

§. 17. I pretend not to teach, but to enquire; and therefore cannot but confess here again, That external and internal Sensation, are the only passages I can find of knowledge to the Understanding. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the Windows by which light is let into this dark Room. For, methinks, the Vnderstanding is not much unlike a Closet wholly shut from light, with only some little openings left, to let in external visible resemblances, or Ideas of things without; which would they but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the Vnderstanding of a Man, in reference to all Objects of sights, and the Ideas of them.

These are my Guesses concerning the means whereby the Understan∣ding comes to have, and retain simple Ideas, and the modes of them, with some other operations about them. I proceed now to examine some of these simple Ideas, and their Modes a little more particularly.

CHAP. XII. Of Complex Ideas.

§. 1. WE have hitherto considered those Ideas, in the reception whereof, the Mind is only passive, which are those simple ones received from Sensation and Reflection before-mentioned, whereof the Mind cannot make any one to it self, nor have any Idea which does not wholy consist of them. But as these simple Ideas are observed to exist in several Combinations united together; so the Mind has a power to consider several of them united together, as one Idea; and that not only as they are united in external Objects, but as it self has joined them. Ideas thus made up of several simple ones put together, I call Complex; such as are Beauty, Gratitude, a Man, an Army, the Vniverse; which though com∣plicated of various simple Ideas, or complex Ideas, made up of simple ones, yet are, when the Mind pleases, considered each by it self, as one entire thing, and signified by one name.

§. 2. In this faculty of repeating and joining together its Ideas, the Mind has great power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts, infinitely beyond what Sensation or Reflection furnished it with: But all this still confined to those simple Ideas, which it received from those two Sources, and which are the ultimate Materials of all its Compositions. For these, they are all from things themselves; and the Mind can have no more, nor other simple Ideas, than as they are sugge∣sted to it. It can have no other Ideas of sensible Qualities, than what come from without by the Senses; nor any Ideas of other kind of Opera∣tions of a thinking Substance, than what it finds in it self: but when it has once got those simple Ideas, it is not confined barely to Observation, and what offers it self from without, it can, by its own power, put together those Ideas it has, and make new complex ones, which it never received so united.

§. 3. Complex Ideas, however compounded and decompounded, though their number be infinite, and the variety endless, wherewith they fill, and and entertain the Thoughts of Men; yet, I think, they may be all reduced under these three Heads:

• 1. Modes.
• 2. Substances.
• 3. Relations.

§. 4. First, Modes I call such complex Ideas, which however com∣pounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as Dependences on, or Affections of Substances; such are the Ideas signified by the words Triangle, Gratitude, Murther, &c. and if in this I use the word Mode, in somewhat a different sense from its ordinary signification, I beg pardon; it being unavoidable in Discour∣ses, differing from the ordinary received Notions, either to make new Words, or to use old Words in somewhat a new signification; which in our present case, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two.

§. 5. Of these Modes, there are two sorts, which deserve distinct con∣sideration. First, There are some which are only variations, or different combinations of the same simple Idea, without the mixture of any other, as a dozen, or score; which are nothing but the Ideas of so many distinct Unites added together, and these I call simple Modes, as being contained within the bounds of one simple Idea. Secondly, There are others com∣pounded of simple Ideas of several kinds, put together to make one com∣plex one; v. g. Beauty, consisting of a certain composition of Colour and Figure, causing delight in the Beholder; Theft, which being the concea∣led change of the possession of any thing, without the consent of the Pro∣prietor, contains, as is visible, a combination of several Ideas of several kinds; and these I call mixed Modes.

§. 6. Secondly, The Ideas of Substances are such combinations of simple Ideas, as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed, or confused Idea of Substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. Thus if to Substance be joined the simple Idea of a certain dull whitish colour, with certain degrees of Weight, Hardness, Ductility, and Fusibility, we have the Idea of Lead; and a combination of the Ideas of a certain sort of Figure, with the powers of Motion, Thought, and Reasoning, joined to Substance, make the ordinary Idea of a Man. Now of Substances also, there are two sorts of Ideas; one of single Substances, as they exist separately, as of a Man, or a Sheep; the other of several of those put together, as an Army of Men, or Flock of Sheep; which collective Ideas of several Substances thus put together, are as much each of them one single Idea, as that of a Man, or an Unite.

§. 7. Thirdly, The last sort of complex Ideas, is that we call Relation, which consists in the consideration and comparing one Idea with another, of these several kinds, we shall treat in their order.

§. 8. If we will trace the progress of our Minds, and with attention observe how it repeats, adds together, and unites its simple Ideas recei∣ved from Sensation or Reflection, it will lead us farther than at first, per∣haps, we should have imagined. And, I believe, we shall find, if we wa∣rily observe the Originals of our Notions, that even the most abstruse Ideas, how remote soever they may seem from Sense, or any operation of our own Minds, are yet only such as the Understanding frames to it self, by repeating and joining together Ideas, that it had either from Objects of Sense, or its own operations about them: So that those even large and abstract Ideas are derived from Sensation, or Reflection, being no other than what the Mind by the ordinary use of its own Faculties, employ'd about Ideas received from Objects of Sense, or the Operations it observes in it self about them, may, and does attain unto. This I shall endeavour to shew in the Ideas we have of Space, Time, and Infinity, and some few other, that seem the most remote from those Originals.

CHAP. XIII. Of simple Modes; and first, of the simple Modes of Space.

§. 1. THough in the foregoing part, I have often mentioned simple Ideas, which are truly the Materials of all our Knowledge; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come in∣to the Mind, than as distinguished from others more compounded, it will not be, perhaps, amiss to take a view of some of them again under this Consideration, and examine those different Modifications of the same Idea; which the Mind either finds in things existing, or is able to make within it self, without the help of any extrinsical Object, or any foreign Suggestion.

Those Modifications of any one simple Idea (which as has been said, I call simple Modes) are as perfectly different and distinct Ideas in the Mind, as those of the greatest distance or contrariety. For the Idea of Two, is as distinct from Three, as Blueness from Heat, or either of them from any Number; and yet they are made up only of that simple Idea of an Unite repeated; and these Repetitions joined together, make those distinct simple Modes, of a Dozen, a Gross, a Million.

§. 2. I shall begin with the simple Idea of Space. I have shewed above, c. 4. that we get the Idea of Space, both by our Sight, and Touch; which, I think, is so evident, that it would be as needless, to go to prove, that Men perceive by their Sight, a distance between Bodies of different Co∣lours, or between the parts of the same Body; as that they see Colours themselves: Nor is it less obvious, that they can do so in the Dark by Feeling and Touch.

§. 3. This Space considered barely in length between any two Beings, without considering any thing else between them, is called distance: If considered in Length, Breadth, and Thickness, I think, it may be called Capacity: When considered between the extremities of Matter, which fills the Capacity of Space with something solid, tangible, and movable, it is properly called Extension. And so Extension is an Idea belonging to Body only; but Space may, as is evident, be considered without it. At least, I think it most intelligible, and the best way to avoid Confusion, if we use the Word Extension for an Affection of Matter, or the distance of the Extremities of particular solid Bodies; and Space in the more gene∣ral Signification for distance, with or without solid Matter posses∣sing it.

§. 4. Each different distance is a different Modification of Space, and each Idea of any different distance, or Space, is a simple Mode of this Idea. Men having by accustoming themselves to stated lengths of Space, which they use for measuring of other distances, as a Foot, a Yard, or a Fathom, a League, or Diametre of the Earth, made those Ideas familiar to their Thoughts, can in their Minds repeat them as often as they will, with∣out mixing or joining to them the Idea of Body, or any thing else; and frame to themselves the Ideas of long, square, or cubick, Feet, Yards, or Fathoms, here amongst the Bodies of the Universe, or else beyond the utmost Bounds of all Bodies; and by adding these still one to another, enlarge their Idea of Space as much as they please. This Power of re∣peating, or doubling any Idea we have of any distance, and adding it to

the former as often as we will, without being ever able to come to any stop or stint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the Idea of Immensity.

§. 5. There is another Modification of this Idea of Space, which is no∣thing but the Relation of the Parts of the Termination of Capacity, or Extension amongst themselves. This the Touch discovers in sensible Bo∣dies, whose Extremities come within our reach; and the Eye takes both from Bodies and Colours, whose Boundaries are within its view: Where observing how the Extremities terminate, either in streight Lines, which meet at discernible Angles; or in crooked Lines, wherein no Angles can be perceived, by considering these as they relate to one another, in all Parts of the Extremities of any Body or Space, it has that Idea we call Figure, which affords to the Mind infinite Vatiety. For besides the vast Number of different Figures, that do really exist in the coherent masses of Matter, the Stock, that the Mind has in its Power, by varying the Idea of Space; and thereby making still new Compositions, by repeating its own Ideas, and joining them as it pleases, is perfectly inexhaustible: And so it can multiply Figures in infinitum.

§. 6. For the Mind, having a Power to repeat the Idea of any length di∣rectly stretched out, and join it to another in the same Direction, which is to double the length of that streight Line; or else join it to another with what Inclination it thinks fit, and so make what sort of Angle it pleases: And being able also to shorten any Line it imagines, by taking from it ½ or ¼, or what part it pleases, without being able to come to an end of any such Divisions, it can make an Angle of any bigness: So also the Lines that are its sides of what length it pleases, which joining again to other Lines of different lengths, and at different Angles, till it has wholly inclosed a∣ny Space, it is evident that it can multiply Figures both in their Shape, and Capacity, in infinitum, all which are but so many different simple Modes of Space.

The same that it can do with streight Lines, it can do also with crooked, or crooked and streight together; and the same it can do in Lines, it can al∣so in Superficies, by which we may be led into farther Thoughts of the endless Variety of Figures, that the Mind has a Power to make, and there∣by to multiply the simple Modes of Space.

§. 7. Another Idea coming under this Head, and belonging to this Tribe, is that we call Place. As in simple Space, we consider the relation of Di∣stance between any two Bodies, or Points; so in our Idea of Place, we consider the relation of Distance betwixt any thing, and any two or more Points, which are considered, as keeping the same distance one with ano∣ther, and so considered as at rest; for when we find any thing at the same distance now, which it was Yesterday from any two or more Points, which have not since changed their distance one with another, and with which we then compared it, we say it hath kept the same Place: But if it hath sensibly altered its distance with either of those Points, we say it hath changed its Place: Though vulgarly speaking in the common No∣tion of Place, we do not always exactly observe the distance from precise Points; but larger Portions of sensible Objects, to which we consider the thing placed to bear Relation, and its distance, from which we have some Reason to observe.

§. 8. Thus a Company of Chess-men, standing on the same squares of the Chess-board, where we left them, we say they are all in the same Place, or unmoved; though, perhaps, the Chess-board hath been in the mean time carried out of one Room into another, because we compared them on∣ly

to the Parts of the Chess-board, which keep the same distance one with another. The Chess-board, we also say, is in the same Place it was, if it remain in the same part of the Cabin, though, perhaps, the Ship it is in, sails all the while: and the Ship is said to be in the same Place, supposing it kept the same distance with the Parts of the neighbouring Land; though, perhaps, the Earth hath turned round; and so both Chess-men, and Board, and Ship, have every one changed Place in respect of remoter Bodies, which have kept the same distance one with another. But yet the distance from certain Parts of the Board, being that which determines the place of the Chess-men; and the distance from the fixed parts of the Cabin (with which we made the Comparison) being that which determined the Place of the Chess-board; and the fixed parts of the Earth, that by which we determi∣ned the Place of the Ship, these things may be said properly to be in the same Place, in those respects: Though their distance from some other things, which in this matter we did not consider, being varied, they have undoubtedly changed Place in that respect; and we our selves shall think so, when we have occasion to compare them with those other.

§. 9. But this Modification of Distance, we call Place, being made by Men, for their common use, that by it they might be able to design the parti∣cular Position of Things, where they had occasion for such Designation, Men consider and determine of this Place, by reference to those adjacent things, which best served to their present Purpose, without considering other things, which to another Purpose would better determine the Place of the same thing. Thus in the Chess-board, the use of the Designation of the Place of each Chess-men, being determined only within that chequer'd piece of Wood, 'twould cross that Purpose, to measure it by any thing else: But when these very Chess-men are put up in a Bag, if any one should ask, where the black King is, it would be proper to determine the Place by the parts of the Room it was in, and not by the Chess-board; there being a∣nother use of designing the Place it is now in, than when in Play it was on the Chess-board, and so must be determined by other Bodies. So if any one should ask, in what Place are the Verses, which report the Story of Nisus and Eurialus, 'twould be very improper to determine this Place, by saying, they were in such a part of the Earth, or in Bodley's Library: But the right Designation of the place, would be by the parts of Virgil's Works; and the proper Answer would be, That these Verses were about the middle of the Ninth Book of his AEneides; And that they have been always constantly in the same Place ever since Virgil was printed: Which is true, though the Book it self hath moved a Thousand times, the use of the Idea of Place here, being to know only, in what part of the Book that Story is; that so upon occasion, we may know where to find it, and have recourse to it for our use.

§. 10. That our Idea of Place, is nothing else, but such a relative Posi∣tion of any thing, as I have before mentioned, I think, is plain, and will be easily admitted, when we consider, that we can have no Idea of the place of the Universe, though we can of all the parts of it; because beyond that, we have not the Idea of any fixed, distinct, particular Beings, in reference to which, we can imagine it to have any relation of distance; but all be∣yond it is one uniform Space or Expansion, wherein the Mind finds no va∣riety, no marks. For to say that the World is somewhere, means no more, but that it does exist; this though a Phrase, borrowed from Place, signify∣ing only its Existence, not Location; and when one can find out, and frame in his Mind clearly and distinctly the Place of the Universe, he will be able to tell us, whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable

Inane of infinite Space; tho' it be true, that the Word Place, has sometimes a more confused Sense, and stands for that Space, which any Body takes up; and so the Universe is in a Place

§. 11. The Idea therefore of Place, we have by the same means, that we get the Idea of Space, (whereof this is but a particular limited Consi∣deration, viz. by our Sight and Touch; by either of which we receive in∣to our Minds the Ideas of Extension or Distance.

§. 12. There are some that would persuade us, that Body and Extension are the same thing; who either change the Signification of Words, which I would not suspect them of, they having so severely condemned the Phi∣losophy of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning, or deceitful obscurity of doubtful, or insignificant Terms. It therefore they mean by Body and Extension the same, that other People do, viz. by Body something that is solid, and extended, whose parts are sepa∣rable and movable different ways; and by Extension, only the Space that lies between the Extremities of those solid coherent Parts, and which is pos∣sessed by them, they confound very different Ideas one with another. For I appeal to every Man's own Thoughts, whether the Idea of Space be not as distinct from that of Solidity, as it is from th•• Idea of Scarlet-Co∣lour? 'Tis true, Solidity cannot exist without Extension, neither can Scar∣let Colour exist without Extension; but this hinders not, but that they are distinct Ideas. Many Ideas require others, as necessary to their Existence or Conception, which yet are very distinct Ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without Space; and yet Motion is not Space, nor Space Motion; Space can exist without it, and they are very distinct Ideas; and so, I think, are those of Space and Solidity. Solidity is so in∣separable an Idea from Body, that upon that depends its filling of Space, its Contact, Impulse, and Communication of Motion upon Impulse. And if it be a Reason to prove, that Spirit is different from Body, because Think∣ing includes not the Idea of Extension in it; the same Reason will be as valid, I suppose, to prove, that Space is not Body, because it includes not the Idea of Solidity in it; Space and Solidity being as distinct Ideas, as Thinking and Extension, and as wholly separable in the Mind one from another: Body then and Extension, 'tis evident, are two distinct Ideas; for First, Extension includes no Solidity, nor resistence to the Motion of Body, as Body does. Secondly, The Parts of pure Space are inseparable one from the other; so that the Continuity cannot be separated, neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one, to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even so much as in Thought. To divide and separate actually is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two Superficies, where before there was a Conti∣nuity: And to divide mentally, is to make in the Mind two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity, and consider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done in things considered by the Mind, as capable of being separated; and by separation, of acquiring new distinct Superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of: But neither of these ways of Separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, com∣patible to pure Space.

§. 13. 'Tis true, a Man may consider so much of such a Space, as is answerable or commensurate to a Foot, without considering the rest; which is indeed a partial Consideration, but not so much as mental Separation, or Division; since a Man can no more mentally divide, without consi∣dering two Superficies, separate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two Superficies disjoin'd one from the other:

But a partial consideration is not separating. A Man may consider Light in the Sun, without its Heat; or Mobility in Body without its Extension, without thinking of their separation. One is only a partial Consideration, terminating in one alone; and the other is a Consideration of both, as existing separately.

§. 14. Thirdly, The parts of pure Space, are immovable, which fol∣lows from their inseparability; Motion being nothing but change of di∣stance between any two things: But this cannot be between Parts that are inseparable; which therefore must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another.

Thus the clear and distinct Idea of simple Space distinguishes it plain∣ly, and sufficiently from Body; since its Parts are inseparable, immovable, and without resistence to the Motion of Body.

§. 15. If any one ask me, What this Space, I speak of, is? I will tell him, when he tells me what his Extension is. For to say, as is usually done, That Extension is to have partes extra partes, is to say only, That Ex∣tension is Extension: For what am I the better informed in the nature of Extension, when I am told, That Extension is to have parts that are ex∣tended, exterior to parts that are extended, i. e. Extension consists of ex∣tended Parts? As if one asking, What a Fibre was; I should answer him, That it was a thing made up of several Fibres: Would he hereby be ena∣bled to understand what a Fibre was, better than he did before? Or rather, would he not have reason to think, that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him?

§. 16. Those who contend that Space and Body are the same, bring this Dilemma: Either this Space is something or nothing; if nothing be between two Bodies, they must necessarily touch; if it be allowed to be something, they ask, whether it be Body or Spirit? To which I an∣swer by another Question, Who told them, that there was, or could be nothing but solid Beings which could not think, and thinking Beings that were not extended? Which is all they mean by the terms Body and Spirit.

§. 17. If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this Space void of Body, be Substance or Accident, I shall readily answer, I know not; nor shall be ashamed to own my Ignorance, till they that ask, shew me a clear distinct Idea of Substance.

§. 18. I endeavour, as much as I can, to deliver my self from those Fallacies, which we are apt to put upon our selves, by taking Words for Things. It helps not our Ignorance, to feign a Knowledge, where we have none, by making a noise with Sounds, without clear and distinct Significations. Names made at pleasure, neither alter the nature of things, nor make us understand them, but as they are signs of, and stand for clear and distinct Ideas. And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two Syllables, Substance, to consider, whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incomprehensible GOD, to finite Spirits, and to Body, it be in the same sense; and whether it stand for the same Idea, when each of those three so different Beings are called Substances? If so, whether it will not thence follow, That God, Spirits, and Body, agree∣ing in the same common nature of Substance, differ not any otherwise than in a bare different modification of that Substance; as a Tree and a Pebble, being in the same sense bodied, and agreeing in the common nature of Body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter; which will be a very harsh Doctrine. If they say, That they apply it to God, finite Spirits, and Matter, in three different significations, and that it stands for one Idea, when GOD is said to be a Substance; for another,

when the Soul is called Substance; and for a third, when a Body is called so. If the name Substance, stands for three several distinct Ideas, they would do well to make known those distinct Ideas, or at least to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so important a Notion, the Confu∣sion and Errors, that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term; which is so far from being suspected to have three di∣stinct, that it has scarce one clear distinct signification: And if they can thus make three distinct Ideas of Substance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?

§. 19. They who first ran into the Notion of Accidents, as a sort of real Beings, that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word Substance, to support them. Had the poor Indian Philosopher (who imagined that the Earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word Substance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an Elephant to support it, and a Tortoise to support his Elephant: The word Substance would have done it effectually. And he that en∣quired, might have taken it for as good an Answer from an Indian Philo∣sopher, That Substance, without knowing what it is, is that which sup∣ports the Earth, as we take it for a sufficient Answer, and good Doctrine, from our European Philosophers, That Substance without knowing what it is, is that which supports Accidents. So that of Substance, we have no Idea of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.

§. 20. Whatever a learned Man may do here, an intelligent American, who enquired into the Nature of Things, would scarce take it for a satis∣factory Account, if desiring to learn our Architecture, he should be told, That a Pillar was a thing supported by a Basis, and a Basis something that supported a Pillar. Would he not think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as this? And a Stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of Books, and the things they con∣tained, if he should be told, that all learned Books consisted of Paper and Letters, and that Letters were things inhering in Paper, and Paper a thing that held forth Letters; a notable way of having clear Ideas of Letters and Paper. But were the Latin words Inhoerentia and Substantia, put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called Sticking∣on, and Vnder-propping, they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the Doctrine of Substance and Accidents, and shew of what use they are in deciding of Questions in Philosophy.

§. 21. But to return to our Ideas of Space. If Body be not supposed in∣finite, which, I think, no one will affirm, I would ask, Whether if God placed a Man at the extremity of corporeal Beings, he could not stretch his Hand beyond his Body? If he could, then he would put his Arm, where there was before Space without Body; and if there he spread his Fingers, there would still be Space between them without Body: If he could not stretch out his Hand, it must be because of some external hin∣drance; (for we suppose him alive, with such a power of moving the parts of his Body, that he hath now, which is not in it self impossible, if God so pleased to have it;) or at least it is not impossible for God so to move him: And then I ask, Whether that which hinders his Hand from moving outwards, be Substance or Accident, Something or Nothing? And when they have resolved that, they will be able to resolve them∣selves, what that is, which is or may be between two Bodies at a distance, that is not Body, has no Solidity. In the mean time, the Argument is at least as good, That where nothing hinders, (as beyond the utmost bounds of all Bodies,) a Body put into motion may move on, as where there is no∣thing

between, there two Bodies must necessarily touch. For pure Space between, is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual Contact; but bare Space in the way, is not sufficient to stop Motion. The truth is, these Men must either own, that they think Body infinite, though they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm, that Space is not Body. For I would fain meet with that thinking Man, that can, in his Thoughts, set any bounds to Space, more than he can to Duration; or by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of either: And therefore if his Idea of Eternity be infinite, so is his Idea of Immensity; they are both finite or infinite alike.

§. 21. Farther, those who assert the impossibility of Space existing with∣out Matter, must not only make Body infinite, but must also deny a power in God to annihilate any part of Matter. No one, I suppose, will deny, that God can put an end to all motion that is in Matter, and fix all the Bodies of the Universe in a perfect quiet and rest, and continue them so as long as he pleases. Whoever then will allow, that God can, during such a general rest, annihilate either this Book, or the Body of him that reads it, must necessarily admit the possibility of a Vacuum. For it is evi∣dent, that the Space that was filled by the parts of the annihilated Body, will still remain, and be a Space without Body. For the circumambient Bodies being in perfect rest, are a Wall of Adamant, and in that state make it a perfect impossibility for any other Body to get into that Space. And indeed the necessary motion of one Particle of Matter, into the place from whence another Particle of Matter is removed, is but a consequence from the supposition of Plenitude; which will therefore need some bet∣ter proof, than a supposed matter of fact, which Experiment can never make out; our own clear and distinct Ideas plainly satisfying us, that there is no necessary connexion between Space and Solidity, since we can conceive the one without the other. And those who dispute for or against a Vacuum, do thereby confess, they have distinct Ideas of Vacuum and Plenum, i. e. that they have an Idea of Extension void of Solidity, though they deny its existence; or else they dispute about nothing at all. For they who so much alter the signification of Words, as to call Extension Body, and conse∣quently make the whole Essence of Body, to be nothing but pure Exten∣sion without Solidity, must talk absurdly, whenever they speak of Vacuum, since it is impossible for Extension to be without Extension. For Vacuum, whether we affirm or deny its existence, signi••ies Space without Body, whose very existence no one can deny to be possible, who will not make Matter infinite, and take from God a power to annihilate any Particle of it.

§. 22. But not to go so far as beyond the utmost bounds of Body in the Universe, nor appeal to God's Omnipotency to find a Vacuum, the motion of Bodies, that are in our view and neighbourhood, seem to me plain to evince it. For I desire any one so to devide a solid Body of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the solid Parts to move up and down freely every way, within the bounds of that Superficies, if there be not left in it a void space, as big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid Body. And if where the least Particle of the Body divided, is as big as a Mustard-seed, a void Space equal to the bulk of a Mustard-seed, be requisite to make room for the free motion of the Parts of the divided Body, within the bounds of its Superficies, where the Particles of Matter are 100,000,000 less than a Mustard-seed, there must also be a space void of solid Matter, as big as 100,000,000 part of a Mustard-seed; for if it hold in one, it will hold in the other, and so on in infinitum. And let this void Space be as little as it will, it destroys the Hypothesis of Plenitude. For if there can be a

Space void of Body, equal to the smallest separate Particle of Matter now existing in Nature, 'tis still Space without Body; and makes as great a difference between Space and Body, as if it were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a distance as wide as any in Nature. And therefore if we suppose not the void Space necessary to Motion, equal to the least parcel of the divided solid Matter, but to 1/10 or 1/1000 of it, the same consequence will always follow of Space with∣out Matter.

§. 23. But the Question being here, whether the Idea of Space or Ex∣tension, be the same with the Idea of Body, it is not necessary to prove the real existence of a Vacuum, but the Idea of it; which 'tis plain Men have, when they enquire and dispute, whether there be a Vacuum or no? For if they had not the Idea of Space without Body, they could not make a question about its existence: And if their Idea of Body did not include in it something more than the bare Idea of Space, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the World; and 'twould be as absurd to demand, whether there were Space without Body, as whether there were Space without Space, or Body without Body, since these were but different Names of the same Idea.

§. 24. 'Tis true, the Idea of Extension joins it self so inseparably with all visible, and most tangible Qualities, that it suffers us to see no one, or feel very few external Objects, without taking in impressions of Extension too. This readiness of Extension to make it self be taken notice of so constantly with other Ideas, has been the occasion, I guess, that some have made the whole essence of Body, to consist in Extension; which is not much to be wondred at, since some have had their Minds, by their Eyes and Touch, (the busiest of all our Senses,) so filled with the Idea of Exten∣sion, and as it were wholly possessed with it, that they allowed no exi∣stence to any thing, that had not Extension. I shall not now argue with those Men, who take the measure and possibility of all Being, only from their narrow and gross Imaginations: but having here to do only with those, who conclude the essence of Body to be Extension, because, they say, they cannot imagine any sensible Quality of any Body without Ex∣tension, I shall desire them to consider, That had they reflected on their Ideas of Tastes and Smells, as much as on those of Sight and Touch; nay, had they examined their Ideas of Hunger and Thirst, and several other Pains, they would have found, that they included in them no Idea of Extension at all, which is but an affection of Body, as well as the rest dis∣coverable by our Senses, which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure Essence of Things.

§. 25. If those Ideas, which are constantly joined to all others, must therefore be concluded to be the Essence of those Things, which have constantly those Ideas joined to them, and are inseparable from them; then Unity is without doubt the essence of every thing. For there is not any Object of Sensation or Reflection, which does not carry with it the Idea of one: But the weakness of this kind of Argument, we have already shewn sufficiently.

§. 26. To conclude, whatever Men shall think concerning the exi∣stence of a Vacuum, this is plain to me, That we have as clear an Idea of Space distinct from Solidity, as we have of Solidity distinct from Motion, or Motion from Space. We have not any two more distinct Ideas, and we can as easily conceive Space without Solidity, as we can conceive Bo∣dy without Motion, though it be never so certain, that neither Body nor Motion can exist without Space. But whether any one will take Space to be only a relation resulting from the Existence of other Beings at a di∣stance;

or whether they will think the Words of the most knowing King Solomon, The Heaven, and the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain Thee; or those more emphatical ones of the inspired Philosopher St. Paul, In Him we live, move, and have our Being, are to be understood in a literal sense, I leave every one to consider; only our Idea of Space is, I think, such as I have mentioned, and distinct from that of Body. For whether we consider in matter it self, the distance of its coherent solid parts, and call it, in re∣spect of those solid parts, Extension; or whether considering it, as lying between the extremities of any Body in its several dimensions, we call it Length, Breadth, and Thickness; or else considering it as lying between any two Bodies, or positive Beings, without any consideration, whether there be any Matter or no between, we call it Distance. However na∣med or considered, it is always the same uniform simple Idea of Space, taken from Objects, about which our Senses have been conversant, where∣of having setled Ideas in our Minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another as often as we will, and consider the Space or Distance so imagined, either as filled with solid parts, so that another Body cannot come there, without displacing and thrusting out the Body that was there before; or else as void of Solidity, so that a Body of equal dimensions to that empty or pure Space, may be placed in it without the removing or expulsion of any thing that was there.

§. 27. The knowing precisely what our Words stand for, would, I ima∣gine, in this, as well as a great many other cases, quickly end the dispute. For I am apt to think, that Men, when they come to examine them, find their simple Ideas all generally to agree, though in discourse with one a∣nother, they perhaps confound one another with different Names. I¦magine, that Men who abstract their Thoughts, and do well examine the Ideas of their own Minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however, they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several Schools, or Sects they have been bred up in: Though amongst unthinking Men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own Ideas, and strip them not from the marks Men use for them, but con∣found them with words, there must be endless dispute, wrangling, and jargon; especially if they be learned bookish Men, devoted to some Sect, and accustomed to the Language of it, and have learned to talk after others. But if it should happen, that any two thinking Men should really have different Ideas, different Notions, I do not see how they could dis∣course, or argue one with another. Here I must not be mistaken, to think that every floating Imagination in Mens Brains, is presently of that sort of Ideas I speak of. 'Tis not easie for the Mind to put off those confused Notions and Prejudices it has imbibed from Custom, Inadvertency, and common Conversation: it requires pains and assiduity to examine its Ideas, till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones, out of which they are compounded; and to see which, amongst its simple ones, have or have not a necessary connexion and dependence one upon another: Till a Man doth this in the primary and original Notions of Things, he builds upon floating and uncertain Principles, and will often find himself at a loss.

CHAP. XIV. Of Duration, and its simple Modes.

§. 1. THere is another sort of Distance, or Length, the Idea where∣of we get not from the permanent parts of Space, but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of Succession. This we call Duration, the simple Modes whereof are any different lengths of it, whereof we have distinct Ideas, as Hours, Days, Years, &c. Time, and Eternity.

§. 2. The Answer of a great Man, to one who asked what Time was (Si non rogas intelligo, which amounts to this; the more I set my self to think of it, the less I understood it;) might perhaps perswade one, That Time, which reveals all other things, is it self not to be discovered. Du∣ration, Time, and Eternity, are, not without reason, thought to have some∣thing very obstruse in their nature. But however remote this may seem from our Comprehension, yet if we trace them right to their Originals, I doubt not but one of those Sources of all our Knowledge, viz. Sensation and Reflection, will be able to furnish us with those Ideas, as clear and distinct as many others, which are thought much less obscure; and we shall find, that the Idea of Eternity it self, is derived from the same com∣mon Original with the rest of our Ideas.

§. 3. To understand Time and Eternity aright, we ought w••th atten∣tion to consider what Idea it is we have of Duration, and how we came by it. 'Tis evident to any one who will but observe what passes in his own Mind, that there is a train of Ideas, which constantly succeed one another in his Understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several Ideas one after another in our Minds, is that which furnishes us with Idea of Succession: And the distance between any parts of that Suc∣cession, or between the appearance of any two Ideas in our Minds, is that we call Duration. For whilst we are thinking, or whilst we receive successively several Ideas in our Minds, we know that we do exist; and so we call the Existence, or the Continuation of the Existence of our selves, or any thing else, Commensurate to the succession of any Ideas in our Minds, the Duration of our selves, or any such other thing co-existing with our Thinking.

§. 4. That we have our notion of Succession and Duration from this Ori∣ginal, viz. from Reflection on the train of Ideas, which we find to appear one after another in our own Minds, seems plain to me, in that we have no perception of Duration, but by considering the train of Ideas, that take their turns in our Understandings. When that succession of Ideas ceases, our perception of Duration ceases with it; which every one clearly experiments in himself, whilst he sleeps soundly, whether an hour, or a day; a month, or a year; of which Duration of things, whilst he sleeps, or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him; and the moment wherein he leaves off to think, till the moment he begins to think again, seem to him to have no distance. And so I doubt not but it would be to a waking Man, if it were possible for him to keep only one Idea in his Mind, without variation, and the succession of others: And we see, that one who fixes his Thoughts very intently on one thing, so as to take but little notice of the succession of Ideas that pass

in his Mind, whilst he is taken up with that earnest Contemplation, lets slip out of his Account a good part of that Duration, and thinks that time shorter than it is. But if sleep commonly unite the distant parts of Dura∣tion, it is, because during that time we have no Succession of Ideas in our Minds. For if a Man, during his Sleep, dream, and variety of Ideas make themselves perceptible in his Mind one after another, he hath then, during such dreaming, a Sense of Duration, and of the length of it. By which it is to me very clear, that Men derive their Ideas of Duration, from their Reflection on the train of the Ideas, they observe to succeed one another in their own Understandings, without which Observation they can have no Notion of Duration, whatever may happen in the World.

§. 5. Indeed a Man, having from reflecting on the Succession and Num∣ber of his own Thoughts, got the Notion, or Idea of Duration, he can apply that Notion to things, which exist whilst he does not think; as he, that has got the Idea of Extension from Bodies by his Sight or Touch, can apply it to distances, where no Body is seen or felt. And therefore, though a Man have no Perception of the length of Duration, which past whilst he slept, or thought not: Yet having observed the Revolution of Days and Nights, and found the length of their Duration to be in Appearance regular and constant, he can, upon the supposition, that that Revolution has proceeded after the same manner, whilst he was asleep or thought not, as it used to do at other times, he can, I say, imagine and make al∣lowance for the length of Duration, whilst he slept. But if Adam and Eve (when they were alone in the World) instead of their ordinary Nights Sleep, had passed that, and the following 24 hours in one conti∣nued Sleep, the Duration of that 24 hours had been irrecoverably lost to them, and been for ever left out of their Account of time.

§. 6. Thus by reflecting on the appearing of various Ideas, one after ano∣ther in our Vnderstandings, we get the Notion of Succession; which if any one should think, we did rather get from our Observation of Motion by our Senses, he will, perhaps, be of my Mind, when he considers, that even Motion produces in his Mind an Idea of Succession, no other∣wise than as it produces there a continued train of distinguishable Ideas. For a Man looking upon a Body really moving, perceives yet no Motion at all, unless that Motion produces a constant train of successive Ideas. v. g. a Man becalmed at Sea, out of sight of Land, in a fair Day, may look on the Sun, or Sea, or Ship, a whole hour together, and perceive no Motion at all in either; though it be certain, that two, and perhaps all of them, have moved, during that time, a great way: But as soon as he perceives either of them to have changed distance with some other Body, as soon as this Motion produces any new Idea in him, then he perceives, that there has been Motion. But where-ever a Man is, with all things at rest about him, without perceiving any Motion at all; if during this hour of quiet he has been thinking, he will perceive the various Ideas of his own Thoughts in his own Mind, appearing one after another, and there∣by observe, and find Succession, where he could observe no Motion.

§. 7. And this, I think, is the Reason, why Motions very slow, though they are constant, are not perceived by us; because in their remove from one sensible part towards another, their change of distance is so slow, that it causes no new Ideas in us, but a good while one after another: And so not causing a constant train of new Ideas, to follow one another immedi∣ately in our Minds, we have no Perception of Motion; which consisting in a constant Succession, we cannot perceive that Succession, without a constant Succession of varying Ideas arising from it.

§. 8. On the contrary, things that move so swift, as not to affect the Senses distinctly with several distinguishable distances of their Motion, and so cause not any train of Ideas in the Mind, are not also perceived. For any thing, that moves round about in a Circle, in less time than our Ideas are w••nt to succeed one another in our Minds, is not perceived to move; but seems to be a perfect entire Circle of that Matter, or Colour, and not a part of a Circle in Motion.

§. 9. Hence I leave it to others to judge, whether it be not probable that our Ideas do, whilst we are awake, succeed one another in our Minds at certain distances, not much unlike the Images in the inside of a Lan∣thorn, turned round by the Heat of a Candle. This Appearance of theirs in train, though, perhaps, it may be sometimes faster, and some∣times slower; yet, I guess, varies not very much in a waking Man: There seem to be certain Bounds to the quickness and slowness of the Suc∣cession of those Ideas one to another in our Minds, beyond which they can neither delay nor hasten.

§. 10. The Reason I have for this odd conjecture is, from observing that in the Impressions made upon any of our Senses, we can but to a certain degree perceive any Succession; which if exceeding quick, the Sense of Succession is lost, even in Cases where it is evident, that there is a real Succession. Let a Cannon-Bullet pass through a Room, and in its way take with it any Limb, or fleshy Parts of a Man; 'tis as clear as any De∣monstration can be, that it must strike successively the two sides of the Room: 'Tis also evident, that it must touch one part of the Flesh first, and another after; and so in Succession: And yet I believe, no Bo∣dy, who ever felt the pain of such a shot, or heard the blow against the two distant Walls, could perceive any Succession, either in the pain, or sound of so swift a stroke. Such a part of Duration as this, wherein we perceive no Succession, is that which we may call an Instant; and is that which takes up the time of only one Idea in our Minds, without the Succes∣sion of another, wherein therefore we perceive no Succession at all.

§. 11. This also happens, where the Motion is so slow, as not to supply a constant train of fresh Ideas to the Senses, as fast as the Mind is capable of receiving new ones into it; and so other Ideas of our own Thoughts, having room to come into our Minds, between those offered to our Sen∣ses by the moving Body, there the Sense of Motion is lost; and the Body, though it really move, yet not changing perceivable distance with some o∣ther Bodies, as fast as the Ideas of our own Minds do naturally follow one another in train, the thing seems to stand still, as is evident in the Hands of Clocks, and Shadows of Sun-dials, and other constant, but slow Mo∣tions, where though after certain Intervals, we perceive by the change of distance, that it hath moved, yet the Motion it self we perceive not.

§. 12. So that to me it seems, that the constant and regular Succession of Ideas in a waking Man, are, as it were, the Measure and Standard of all other Succession, which if it either exceeds their pace, as where two sounds or pains, &c. take up in their Succession the Duration of but one Idea; or else where any Motion or Succession is so slow, as that it keeps not pac•• with the Ideas in our Minds, or the quickness, in which they take their turns, as when any one, or more Ideas in their ordinary course come in∣to our Mind between those which are offered to the sight, by the different perceptible distances of a Body in Motion, or between Sounds, or Smells, following one another, there also the Sense of a constant continued Suc∣cession is lost, and we perceive it not, but with certain gaps of rest between.

§. 13. If it be so, that the Ideas of our Minds, whilst we have any there, do constantly change, and shift in a continual Succession, it would be impossible, may any one say, for a Man to think long of any one thing: By which if it be meant, that a Man may have one self-same single Idea a long time alone in his Mind, without any variation at all, I think, in Mat∣ter of Fact it is not possible, for which (not knowing how the Ideas of our Minds are framed, of what Materials they are made, whence they have their Light, and how they come to make their Appearances,) I can give no other Reason but Experience: and I would have any one try, whether he can keep one unvaried single Idea in his Mind without any other, for any considerable time together.

§. 14. For Trial, let him take any Figure, any Degree of Light or White∣ness, or what other he pleases; and he will, I suppose, find it difficult to keep all other Ideas out of his Mind: But that some, either of another kind, or various Consideration of that Idea (each of which Consideration is a new Idea) will constantly succeed one another in his Thoughts, let him be as wary as he can.

§. 15 All that is in a Man's Power in this Case, I think, is only to mind and observe what the Ideas are, that take their turns in his Understan∣ding; or else, to direct the sort, and call in such as he hath a desire or use of: but hinder the constant Succession of fresh ones, I think he cannot, though he may commonly chuse, whether he will heedfully observe, and consider them.

§. 16. Whether these several Ideas in a Man's Mind be made by certain Motions, I will not here dispute: But this I am sure, that they include no Idea of Motion in their Appearance; and if a Man had not the Idea of Motion otherwise, I think, he would have none at all, which is enough to my present Purpose; and sufficiently shews, that the notice we take of the Ideas of our own Minds, appearing there one after another, is that which gives us the Idea of Succession and Duration, without which we should have no such Ideas at all. 'Tis not then, Motion, but the constant train of Ideas in our Minds, whilst we are waking, that furnishes us with the Idea of Duration, whereof Motion no otherwise gives us any Perception, than as it causes in our Minds a constant Succession of Ideas, as I have be∣fore shewed: and we have as clear an Idea of Succession, and Duration by the train of Ideas succeeding one another in our Minds, without the Idea of any Motion, as by the train of Ideas of the uninterrupted change of distance between two Bodies, which we have from Motion; and there∣fore we should as well have the Idea of Duration, were there no Sense of Motion at all.

§. 17. Having thus got the Idea of Duration, the next thing natural for the Mind to do, is to get some measure of this common Duration, where∣by it might judge of its different lengths, and consider the distinct Order, wherein several things exist, without which a great part of our Knowledge would be confused, and a great part of History be rendered very useless. This Consideration of Duration••, as set out by certain Periods, and marked by certain Measures or Epochs, is that, I think, which most pro∣perly we call Time.

§. 18. In the measuring of Extension, there is nothing more required, but the Application of the Standard or Measure we make use of, to the thing of whose Extension we would be informed. But in the measuring of Duration, this cannot be done, because no two different parts of Succession can be put together to measure one another: And nothing being a measure of Dura∣tion, but Duration; as nothing is of Extension, but Extension, we can∣not

keep by us any standing unvarying measure of Duration, which con∣sists in a constant fleeting Succession, as we can of certain lengths of Ex∣tension, as Inches, Feet, Yards, &c. marked out in permanent parts of Matter. Nothing then could serve well for a convenient measure of Time, but what has divided the whole length of its Duration into apparently equal Portions, by constantly repeated Periods: What Portions of Dura∣tion are not distinguished, or considered as distinguished and measured by such Periods, come not so properly under the Notion of Time, as appears by such Phrases as these, viz. before all time, and when time shall be no more.

§. 19. The diurnal, and annual Revolutions of the Sun, as having been from the beginning of Nature, constant, regular, and universally observable by all Mankind, and supposed equal to one another, have been with Reason made use of for the measure of Duration. But the distinction of Days and Years, having depended on the motion of the Sun, it has brought this mistake with it, that it has been thought, that Motion and Duration were the measure one of another. For Men in the measuring of the length of time, having been accustomed to the Ideas of Minutes, Hours, Days, Months, Years, &c. which they found themselves upon any mention of Time or Duration presently to think on, all which Portions of Time, were measured out by the motion of the Heavens, they were apt to con∣found time and motion; or at least to think, that they had a necessary Connexion one with another: whereas any constant periodical Appea∣rance, or Alteration of Ideas in seemingly equidistant Spaces of Duration, if constant and universally observable, would have as well distinguished the intervals of Time, as those that have been made use of. For supposing the Sun, which some have taken to be a Fire, had been lighted up at the same distance of time that it now every Day comes about to the same Meridian, and then gone out again about twelve hours after, and that in the Space of an annual Revolution, it had sensibly increased in Brightness and Heat, and so decreased again; would not such regular Appearances serve to measure out the distances of Duration to all that could observe it, as well without as with Motion. For if the Appearances were constant, universally observable, and in equidistant Periods, they would serve Man∣kind for measure of time as well, were the Motion away.

§. 20. For the freezing of Water, or the blowing of a Plant, returning at equidistant Periods in all parts of the Earth, would as well serve Men to reckon their Years by, as the Motions of the Sun; and in effect, we see that some People in America counted their Years by the coming of certain Birds amongst them at their certain Seasons, and leaving them at others. For any Idea returning constantly at equidistant Periods, as a Fit of an A∣gue; the Sense of Hunger, or Thirst; a Smell, or a Taste; and making it self universally be taken notice of, would not fail to measure out the course of Succession, and distinguish the distances of Time. And we see that Men born blind, count Time well enough by Years, whose Revolutions yet they cannot distinguish by Motions, that they perceive not. And I ask, whether a blind Man, who distinguished his Years, either by heat of Sum∣mer, and cold of Winter; by the smell of any Flower of the Spring, or taste of any Fruit of the Autumn, would not have a better measure of Time, than the Romans had before the Reformation of their Calendar by Iulius Caesar, or many other People, whose Years, notwithstanding the motion of the Sun, which they pretend to make use of, are very irregular; and it adds no small difficulty to Chronology, that the exact lengths of the Years that several Nations counted by, are hard to be known, they differing very

much one from another, and, I think, I may say all of them, from the precise motion of the Sun; and if the Sun moved from the Creation to the Flood constantly in the Equator, and so equally dispersed his light and heat to all the habitable Parts of the Earth, in Days all of the same length, without its annual variations to the Tropicks, as a late ingenious Author supposes, I do not think it very easie to imagine, that (notwithstanding the motion of the Sun) Men should in the Antediluvian World, from the beginning count by years, or measure their time by Periods that had no sensible marks very obvious to distinguish them by.

§. 21. But, perhaps, it will be said without a regular Motion, such as of the Sun, or some other, how could it ever be known that such Periods were equal? To which I answer, the Equality of any other returning ap∣pearances might be known by the same way that that of Days was known, or presumed to be so at first, which was only by judging of them by the train of Ideas had passed in Men's Minds in the Intervals, whereby they guessed them to be equal, which was sufficient to make them serve for a measure; though since exacter search has discovered inequality in the di∣urnal Revolutions of the Sun, and we know not whether the Annual also be not unequal. Those yet by their presum'd and apparent Equality, serve as well to reckon time by, though not to measure the parts of Duration exactly, as if they could be proved to be exactly equal; we must there∣fore carefully distinguish betwixt Duration it self, and the measures we make use of to judge of its length. Duration in it self is to be considered, as going on in one constant equal uniform Course; but none of the mea∣sures of it we make use of can be known to do so, nor can we be assured that their assigned Parts or Periods are equal in Duration one to another: for two successive lengths of Duration however measured, can never be demonstrated to be equal. That which the World used so long, and so confidently for an exact measure of Duration, the motion of the Sun has, as I said, been found in its several parts unequal: and though Men have of late made use of a Pendulum, as a more steady and regular Motion, than that of the Sun or (to speak more truly) of the Earth; yet if any one should be asked, how he certainly knows that the two successive swings of a Pendulum are equal, it would be very hard to satisfie himself, that they are infallibly so: since we cannot be sure, that the Cause of that Mo∣tion which is unknown to us, shall always operate equally; and we are sure, that the Medium in which the Pendulum moves, is not constantly the same; either of which varying, may alter the Equality of such Peri∣ods, and thereby destroy the certainty and exactness of the measure by Motion, as well as any other Periods of other Appearances, the Notion of Duration still remaining clear, though our measures of it cannot any of them be demonstrated to be exact. Since then no two Portions of Succes∣sion can be brought together, it is impossible ever certainly to know their Equality. All that we can do for a measure of Time, is to take such as have continual successive Appearances at seemingly equidistant Periods; of which seeming Equality, we have no other measure, but such as the train of our own Ideas have lodged in our Memories, with the concurrence of other probable Reasons, to perswade us of their Equality.

§. 22. One thing seems strange to me, that whilst all Men manifestly measured Time by the motion of the great and visible Bodies of the World, Time yet should be defined to be the measure of Motion; whereas 'tis ob∣vious to every one that reflects ever so little on it, that to measure Mo∣tion, Space is as necessary to be considered as Time; and those who look a little farther, will find also the bulk of the thing moved necessary to be

taken into the Computation, by any one who will estimate or measure Motion, so as to judge right of it. Nor, indeed, does Motion any other∣wise conduce to the measuring of Duration, than as it constantly brings about the return of certain sensible Ideas, in seeming equidistant Periods. For if the Motion of the Sun, were as unequal as of a Ship driven by un∣steady Winds, sometimes very slow, and at others, irregularly very swift; or if being constantly equally swift, it yet was not circular, and produced not the same Appearances, it would not at all help us to measure time, any more than the seeming unequal motion of a Comet does.

§. 23. Minutes, Hours, Days, and Years, are then no more necessary to Time or Duration, than Inches, Feet, Yards, and Miles, marked out in any Matter, are to Extension. For though we in this part of the Uni∣verse, by the constant use of them, as Periods set out by the Revolutions of the Sun, or known parts of them, have fixed the Ideas of such Lengths of Duration in our Minds, which we apply to all parts of Time, whose Lengths we would consider; yet there may be other parts of the Uni∣verse, where they no more use those measures of ours, than in Iapan they do our Inches, Feet, or Miles: but yet something Analagous to them, there must be. For without some regular periodical returns, we could not measure our selves, or signifie to others the length of any Duration, though at the same time the World were as full of Motion, as it is now; but no part of it disposed into regular and apparent equidistant Revolutions. But the different measures that may be made use of for the account of Time, do not at all alter the notion of Duration, which is the thing to be measu∣red, no more than the different standards of a Foot and a Cubit alter the notion of Extension, to those, who make use of those different Measures.

§. 25. The Mind having once got such a measure of Time, as the an∣nual Revolution of the Sun, can apply that measure to Duration, where∣in that measure it self did not exist, and with which in the reality of its being, it had nothing to do: For should one say, That Abraham was born in the 2712 year of the Iulian period, it is altogether as intelligible as reckoning from the beginning of the World, though there were so far back no motion of the Sun, nor any other motion at all. For though the Iulian Period be supposed to begin several hundred years before there were really either Days, Nights, or Years, marked out by any Revolu∣tions of the Sun, yet we reckon as right, and thereby measure Durations as well, as if really at that time the Sun had existed, and kept the same ordinary motion it doth now. The Idea of Duration equal to an an∣nual Revolution of the Sun, is as easily applicable in our Thoughts to Dura∣tion, where no Sun nor Motion was, as the Idea of a Foot or Yard taken from Bodies here, can be applied in our Thoughts to Distances, beyond the Confines of the World, where are no Bodies at all.

§. 26. For supposing it were 5639 miles, or millions of Miles, from this place to the remotest Body of the Universe, (for being finite, it must be at a certain distance,) as we suppose it to be 5639 years, from this time to the first existence of any Body in the beginning of the World, we can, in our Thoughts, apply this measure of a Year to Duration before the Crea∣tion, or beyond the Duration of Bodies or Motion, as we can this mea∣sure of a Mile to Space beyond the utmost Bodies; and by the one mea∣sure Duration, where there was no Motion, as well as by the other mea∣sure Space in our Thoughts, where there is no Body.

§. 27. If it be objected to me here, That in this way of explaining of Time, I have beg'd what I should not, viz. That the World is neither eternal, nor infinite; I answer, That to my present purpose, it is not

needful, in this place, to make use of Arguments, to evince the World to be finite, both in Duration and Extension: But it being at least as con∣ceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the liberty to suppose it, as well as any one hath to suppose the contrary; and I doubt not but that every one that will go about it•• may easily conceive in his Mind the beginning of Motion, though not of all Duration; and so may come to a stop, and non ultra in his Consideration of Motion: so also in his Thoughts he may set limits to Body, and the Extension belonging to it, but not to Space where no Body is, the utmost bounds of Space and Duration being beyond the reach of Thoughts, as well as the utmost bounds of Number are beyond the largest comprehension of the Mind, and all for the same reason, as we shall see in another place.

§. 28. By the same means therefore, and from the same Original that we come to have the Idea of Time, we have also that Idea which we call Eternity, viz. having got the Idea of Succession and Duration, by re∣flecting on the Train of our own Ideas, caused in us either by the natural appearances of those Ideas, coming constantly of themselves into our wa∣king Thoughts, or else caused by external Objects successively affecting our Senses; and having from the Revolutions of the Sun got the Ideas of certain lengths of Duration, we can, in our Thoughts, add such lengths of Duration to one another, as often as we please, and apply them, so ad∣ded, to Durations past or to come: And this we can continue to do on, without bounds or limits, and proceed in infinitum, and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the Sun to Duration, supposed before the Sun's, or any other Motion had its being; which is no more difficult or absurd, than to apply the Notion I have of the moving of a Shadow, one Hour to day upon the Sun-dial, to the duration of something last night; v. g. The burning of a Candle, which is now absolutely separate from all actual motion, and it is impossible for the duration of that Flame for an hour last night, to co-exist with any Motion that now is, or for ever shall be, as for any part of Duration, that was before the beginning of the World to co-exist with the motion of the Sun now. But yet this hinders not, but that having the Idea of the length of the Motion of the Shadow on a Dial, between the Marks of two Hours, I can as distinctly measure in my Thoughts the Duration of that Candle last night, as I can any thing that does now exist: And it is no more than to think, that had the Sun shone then on the Dial, and moved after the same rate it doth now, the shadow on the Dial would have passed from one Hour-line to another, whilst that Flame of the Candle lasted.

§. 29. The notion of an Hour, Day, or Year, being only the Idea I have of the length of certain periodical regular Motions, neither of which Motions do ever all at once exist, but only in the Ideas I have of them in my Memory derived from my Senses or Reflection, I can with the same ease, and for the same reason, apply in my Thoughts to Duration, ante∣cedent to all manner of Motion, as well as to any thing that is but a Minute, or a Day, antecedent to this present Motion that at this very moment the Sun is in. All things past are equally and perfectly at rest; and to this way of consideration of them, are all one, whether they were before the beginning of the World, or but yesterday; the measuring of any Duration, by some motion, depending not at all on the real co-exi∣stence of that thing to that motion, or any other Periods of Revolution, but the having a clear Idea of the length of some periodical known Mo∣tion, or other intervals of Duration in my Mind, and applying that to the Duration of the thing I would measure.

§. 30. Hence we see, that some Men imagine the Duration of the World from its first existence, to this present year 1689. to have been 5639 years, or equal to 5639 annual Revolutions of the Sun, and others a great deal more; as the AEgyptians of old, who in the time of Alexander counted 23000 years, from the Reign of the Sun; and the Chineses now, who account the World 3,269,000 years old, or more; which longer dura∣tion of the World, according to their Computation, though I should not believe to be true, yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as tru∣ly understand, and say one is longer than the other, as I understand that Methusalem's life was longer than Enoch's: And if the common reckoning of 5639 should be true, (as it may be, as well as any other assigned,) it hin∣ders not at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the World a 1000 years older, since every one may with the same Facility imagine (I do not say believe) the World to be 50000 years old, as 5639; and may as well conceive the duration of 50000 years, as 5639. Whereby it appears, that to the measuring the duration of any thing by Time, it is not requisite, that that thing should be co-existent to the Motion we mea∣sure by, or any other periodical Revolution; but it suffices to this purpose, that we have the Idea of the length of any regular periodical appearances, which we can in our Minds apply to Duration, with which the Motion or Appearance never co-existed.

31. For as in the History of the Creation delivered by Moses, I can imagine that Light existed three days before the Sun was, or had any mo∣tion, barely by thinking, that the duration of Light before the Sun was created, was so long as (if the Sun had moved then, as it doth now,) would have been equal to three of his diurnal Revolutions; so by the same way I can have an Idea of the Chaos, or Angels, being created before there was either Light, or any continued motion, a Minute, an Hour, a Day, a Year, or 1000 Years. For if I can but consider Duration equal to one Minute, before either the Being or Motion of any Body, I can add one more Mi∣nute till I come to 60. And by the same way of adding Minutes, Hours, or Years, (i. e. such or such parts of the Sun's revolution, or any other pe∣riod whereof I have the Idea,) proceed in infinitum. And suppose a du∣ration exceeding as many such periods as I can reckon, let me add whilst I will, which I think is the notion we have of Eternity, of whose infinity we have no other notion, than we have of the infinity of Number, to which we can add for ever without end.

§. 32. And thus I think it is plain, that from those two Fountains of all Knowledge before mentioned, (viz.) Reflection and Sensation, we get the Ideas of Duration, and the measures of it.

For First, By observing what passes in our Minds, how our Ideas there in train constantly some vanish, and others begin to appear, we come by the Idea of Succession.

Secondly, By observing a distance in the parts of this Succession, we get the Idea of Duration.

Thirdly, By Sensation observing certain appearances, at certain regular and seeming equidistant periods, we get the Ideas of certain Lengths or Measures of Duration, as Minutes, Hours, Days, Years, &c.

Fourthly, By being able to repeat those Measures of Time, or Ideas of stated length of Duration in our Minds, as o••ten as we will, we can come to imagine Duration, where nothing does really endure or exist; and thus we imagine to morrow, next year, or seven years hence.

Fifthly, By being able to repeat any such Idea of any length of Time, as of a Minute, a Year, or an Age, as often as we will in our own Thoughts, and add them one to another, without ever coming to the end of such addition, any nearer than we can to the end of Number, to which we can always add, we come by the Idea of Eternity, as the future eternal Dura∣tion of our Souls, as well as the Eternity of that infinite Being, which must necessarily have always existed.

Sixthly, By considering any part of infinite Duration, as set out by periodical Measures, we come by the Idea of what we call Time in ge∣neral.

CHAP. XV. Of Duration and Expansion, considered together.

§. 1. THough we have in the precedent Chapters dwelt pretty long on the Considerations of Space and Duration; yet they being Ideas of general concernment, that have something very obstruse and peculiar in their Nature, the comparing them one with another may, perhaps, be of use for their illustration; and we may have the more clear and distinct con∣ception of them, by taking a view of them together. Distance or Space, in its simple abstract conception, to avoid confusion, I call Expansion, to distinguish it from Extension, which by some is used to express this di∣stance only as it is in the solid parts of Matter, and so includes, or at least intimates the Idea of Body: Whereas the Idea of pure Distance includes no such thing. I preferr also the Word Expansion to Space, because Space is often applied to Distance of fleeting successive parts, which never exist together, as well as to those which are permanent. In both these (viz.) Expansion and Duration, the Mind has this common Idea of continued Lengths, capable of greater, or less quantities: For a Man has as clear an Idea of the difference of the length of an Hour, and a Day, as of an Inch and a Foot.

§. 2. The Mind, having got the Idea of the length of any part of Ex∣pansion, let it be a Span, or a Pace, or what length you will, can, as has been said, repeat that Idea; and so adding it to the former, enlarge its Idea of Length, and make it equal to two Spans, or two Paces, and so as often as it will, till it equals the distance of any parts of the Earth one from another, and increase thus, till it amounts to the distance of the Sun, or remotest Star. By such a progression as this, setting out from the place where it is, or any other place, it can proceed and pass beyond all those lengths, and find nothing to stop its going on, either in, or without Body. 'Tis true, we can easily in our Thoughts come to the end of solid Extension; the ex∣tremity and bounds of all Body, we have no difficulty to arrive at: But when the Mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless Expansion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end. Nor let any one say, That beyond the bounds of Body, there is nothing at all, unless he will confine GOD within the limits of Matter. Solomon, whose Understanding was filled and enlarged with Wisdom, seems to have other Thoughts, when he says, Heaven, and the Heaven of Heavens, cannot contain Thee: And he, I think, very much magnifies to himself the Capacity of his own Understanding, who persuades himself, that he can extend his

Thoughts farther than GOD exists, or imagine any Expansion where he is not.

§. 3. Just so is it in Duration. The Mind having got the Idea of any length of Duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it, not only beyond its own, but beyond the existence of all corporeal Beings, and all the measures of Time, taken from the great Bodies of the World, and their Motions. But yet every one easily admits, That though we make Dura∣tion boundless, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. GOD, every one easily allows, fills Eternity; and 'tis hard to find a Rea∣son, why any one should doubt, that he likewise fills Immensity: His infinite Being is certainly as boundless one way as another; and methinks it ascribes a little too much to Matter, to say, Where there is no Body, there is nothing.

§. 4. Hence, I think, we may learn the Reason, why every one famili∣arly, and without the least hesitation, speaks of, and supposes Eternity, and sticks not to ascribe Infinity to Duration; but 'tis with more doubting and reserve, that many admit, or suppose the Infinity of Space. The rea∣son whereof seems to me to be this, That Duration and Extension being used as names of affections belonging to other Beings, we easily conceive in GOD infinite Duration, and we cannot avoid doing so; but not at∣tributing to him Extension, but only to Matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the existence of Expansion without Matter; of which alone we commonly suppose it an Attribute: And therefore when Men pursue their Thoughts of Space, they are apt to stop at the confines of Body; as if Space were there at an end too, and reached no farther: Or if their Ideas upon consideration carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the Universe, imaginary Space; as if it were no∣thing, because there is no Body existing in it. Whereas Duration, antece∣dent to all Body, and the motions it is measured by, they never term imaginary, because it is never supposed void of some other real existence. And if the names of things may at all direct our Thoughts towards the Originals of Mens Ideas, (as I am apt to think they may very much,) one may have occasion to think by the name Duration, that the conti∣nuation of Existence, with a kind of Resistence to any destructive force, and the continuation of Solidity, (which is apt to be confounded with, and if we will look into the minute atomical parts of Matter, is little dif∣ferent from Hardness,) were thought to have some Analogy, and gave oc∣casion to Words, so near of kin as Durare and Durum esse. But be that as it will, this is certain, That whoever pursues his own Thoughts, will find them sometimes lanch out beyond the extent of Body, into the In∣finity of Space or Expansion: the Idea whereof is distinct and separate from Body, and all other things; which may (to those who please) be a subject of farther meditation.

§. 5. Time in general is to Duration, as Place to Expansion. They are so much of those boundless Oceans of Eternity and Immensi∣ty, as is set out and distinguished from the rest, as it were by Land∣marks; and so are made use of, to denote the Position of ••inite real Beings, in respect one to another, in those uniform infinite Oceans of Duration and Space. These rightly considered, are nothing but Ideas of determinate Distances, from certain known points fixed in distinguishable sensible things, and supposed to keep the same distance one from ano∣ther. From such points fixed in sensible Beings we reckon, and from them we measure out Portions of those infinite Quantities; which so considered, are that which we call Time and Place. For Duration and

Space being in themselves uniform and boundless, the Order and Position of things, without such known setled Points, would be lost in them; and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable Conf••••sion.

§. 6. Time and Place taken thus, for determinate distinguishable Portions of those infinite Abysses of Space and Duration, set out, or supposed to be distinguished from the rest, by marks, and known Boundaries, have each of them a two-fold Acceptation.

First, Time in general is commonly taken for so much of infinite Du∣ration, as it measured out by, and co-exhistent with the Existence, and Motions of the great Bodies of the Universe, as far as we know any thing of them; and in this Sense, Time begins and ends with the frame of this sensible World, as in these Phrases before mentioned, before all time, or when time shall be no more. Place likewise is taken sometimes for that Portion of infinite Space, which is possessed by, and comprehended with∣in the Material World; and is thereby distinguished from the rest of Ex∣pansion; though this may more properly be called Extension, than Place. Within, these two are confined, and by the observable Parts of them are measured and determined the particular Time or Duration, and the parti∣cular Extension, and Place of all corporeal Beings.

§. 7. Secondly, Sometimes the word Time is used in a larger sense, and is ap∣plied to Parts of that infinite Duration, not that were really distinguished and measured out by this real Existence, and periodical Motions of Bodies, that were appointed from the Beginning to be for Signs, and for Seasons, and for Days, and Years, and are accordingly our measures of time; but such other portions too of that infinite uniform Duration, which we upon any occasion do suppose equal to certain lengths of measured Time; and so consider them as bounded and determined. For if we should suppose the Creation, or Fall of the Angels, was at the Beginning of the Iulian Period, we should speak properly enough, and should be understood, if we said, 'tis a longer time since the Creation of Angels, than the Creation of the World, by 764 years: Whereby we would mark out so much of that undistinguished Duration, as we suppose equal to, and would have ad∣mitted, 764 annual Revolutions of the Sun, moving at the rate it now does. And thus likewise, we sometimes speak of Place, Distance, or Bulk in the great Inane, beyond the Confines the World, when we consi∣der so much of that Space, as is equal to, or capable to receive a Body of any assigned Dimensions, as a Cubick••foot; or do suppose a Point in it, at such a certain distance from any part of the Universe.

§. 8. Where and when are Questions belonging to all finite Existences, and are by us always reckoned from some known Parts of this sensible World, and from some certain Epochs marked out to us by the Motions observable in it. Without some such fixed Parts or Periods, the Order of things would be lost, to our finite Understandings, in the boundless in∣variable Oceans of Duration and Expansion; which comprehend in them all finite Beings, and in their full Extent, belong only to the Deity. And therefore we are not to wonder, that we comprehend them not, and do so often find our Thoughts at a loss, when we would consider them, ei∣ther abstractly in themselves, or as any way attributed to the first incom∣prehensible Being. But when applied to any particular finite Beings, the Extension of any Body is so much of that infinite Space, as the bulk of that Body takes up. And Place is the Position of any Body, when considered at a certain distance from some other. As the Idea of the particular Duration of any thing, is an Idea of that Portion of infinite Duration, which passes during the Existence of that thing, so

the time when the thing existed, is the Idea of that Space of Duration, which passed between some known and fixed Period of Duration, and the Being of that thing. One shews the distance of the Extremities of the Bulk, or Existence of the same thing, as that it is a Foot Square, or lasted two Years; the other shews the distance of it in Place, or Existence from other fixed points of Duration or Space; as that it was in the mid∣dle of Lincolns-Inn-Fields, or the first degree of Taurus, and in the year of our Lord, 1671. or the 1000 year of the Iulian Period: All which distances, we measure by preconceived Ideas of certain lengths of Space and Duration, as Inches, Feet, Miles, and Degrees, and in the other Mi∣nutes, days and years, &c.

§. 9. There is one thing more, wherein Space and Duration have a great Conformity, and that is, though they are justly reckoned amongst our simple Ideas: Yet none of the distinct Ideas we have of either is with∣out all manner of Composition, it is the very Nature of both of them to con∣sist of Parts: But their Parts being all of the same kind, and without the mixture of any other Idea, hinder them not from having a Place amongst simple Ideas. Could the Mind, as in Number, come to so small a part of Extension or Duration, as excluded Divisibility, that would be, as it were, the indivisible Unite, or Idea; by repetition of which, it would make its more inlarged Ideas of Extension and Duration. But since the Mind is not able to frame an Idea of any Space, without Parts; instead thereof it makes use of the common Measures, which by familiar use, in each Coun∣try, have imprinted themselves on the Memory (as Inches, and Feet; or Cubits, and Parasangs; and so Seconds, Minutes, Hours, Days, and Years in Duration:) The Mind makes use, I say, of such Ideas as these, as sim∣ple ones; and these are the component Parts of larger Ideas, which the Mind, upon Occasion, makes by the addition of such known Lengths, which it is acquainted with: On the other side, the ordinary smallest measure we have of either, look'd on as an Unite in Number, when the Mind by division would reduce them into less Fractions. Though on both sides, both in addition and division, either of Space or Duration, when the Idea under Consideration becomes very big, or very small, the Idea of its precise Bulk becomes very obscure and confused; and it is the Number of its repeated additions, or divisions, that alone remains clear and distinct, as will easily appear to any one, who will let his Thoughts loose in the vast Expansion of Space, or Divisibility of Matter. Every part of Du∣ration is Duration too; and every part of Extension is Extension, both of them capable of addition or division in infinitum. But the least Por∣tions of either of them, whereof we have clear and distinct Ideas, may, perhaps, be fittest to be considered by us, as the simple Ideas of that kind, out of which our complex modes of Space, Extension, and Duration, are made up, and into which they can again be distinctly resolved. Such a small part in Duration, may be called a Moment, and is the time of one Idea in our Minds, in the train of their ordinary Succession there. The other, wanting a proper Name, I know not whether I may be allowed to call a sensible Point, meaning thereby the least Particle of Matter or Space we can discern, which is ordinarily about a Second of a Circle, whereof the Eye is the Centre.

§. 10. Expansion, and Duration have this farther Agreement, that though they are both considered by us as having Parts; yet their Parts are not separable one from another, no not even in Thought: Though the parts of Bodies, from whence we take our measure of the one; and the parts of Motion, or rather the succession of Ideas in our Minds, from

whence we take the measure of the other, may be interrupted and sepe∣rated; as the one is often by Rest, and the other is by Sleep, which we call rest too.

§. 11. But yet there is this manifest difference between them, That the Ideas of Length, we have of Expansion, are turned every way, and so make Figure, and Breadth, and Thickness; but Duration is but as it were the length of one streight Line, extended in infinitum, not capable of Multiplici∣ty, Variation, or Figure; but is one common measure of all Existence whatsoever, wherein all things whilst they exist, equally partake. For this present moment is common to all things, that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their Existence, as much as if they were all but one single Being; and we may truly say, they all exist in the same moment of Time. Whether Angels and Spirits have any Analogy to this, in respect of Expansion, is beyond my Comprehension: and, per∣haps, for us, who have Understandings and Comprehensions, suited to our own Preservation, and the ends of our own Being, but not to the reality and extent of all other Beings, 'tis near as hard to conceive any Existence, or to have an Idea of any real Being, with a perfect Negation of all manner of Expansion; as it is, to have the Idea of any real Existence, with a perfect Negation of all manner of Duration: And therefore what Spirits have to do with Space, or how they communicate in it, we know not. All that we know is, that Bodies do each singly possess its proper Portion of it, according to the extent of its solid Parts; and thereby ex∣clude all other Bodies from having any share in that particular portion of Space, whilst it remains there.

§. 12. Duration and Time, which is a part of it, is the Idea we have of perishing distance, of which no two parts exist together, but follow each other in Succession; as Expansion is the Idea of lasting distance, all whose parts exist together, and are not capable of Succession. And therefore though we cannot conceive any Duration without Succession, nor can put it together in our Thoughts, that any Being does now exist to Mor∣row, or possess at once more than the present moment of Duration; yet we can conceive the eternal Duration of the Almighty far different from that of Man, or any other finite Being. Because Man comprehends not in his Knowledge, or Power, all past and future things: His Thoughts are but of yesterday, and he knows not what to morrow will bring forth. What is once passed, he can never recal; and what is yet to come, he cannot make present. What I say of Man, I say of all finite Beings, who though they may far exceed Man in Knowledge and Power, yet are no more than the meanest Creature, in comparison with God himself. Fi∣nite of any Magnitude, holds not any proportion to infinite. God's infi∣nite Duration being accompanied with infinite Knowledge, and infinite Power, he sees all things past and to come; and they are no more distant from his Knowledge, no farther removed from his sight, than the present: They all lie under the same view: And there is nothing, which he can∣not make exist each moment he pleases. For the Existence of all things, depending upon his good Pleasure; all things exist every moment, that he thinks fit to have them exist. To conclude, Expansion and Duration do mutually imbrace, and comprehend each other; every part of Space, being in every part of Duration; and every part of Duration, in every part of Expansion. Such a Combination of two distinct Ideas, is, I sup∣pose, scarce to be found in all that great Variety, we do or can can con∣ceive, and may afford Matter to farther Speculation.

CHAP. XVI. Of Number.

§. 1. AMongst all the Ideas we have, as there is none suggested to the Mind by more ways, so there is none more simple than that of Vnity, or One, it has no shadow of Variety nor Composition in it: every Object our Senses are employed about; every Idea in our Under∣standings; every Thought of our Minds brings this Idea along with it: And therefore it is the most intimate to our Thoughts, as well as it is in its Agreement to all other things, the most universal Idea we have: For Number applies it self to Men, Angels, Actions, Thoughts, every thing, that either doth exist, or can be imagined.

§. 2. By repeating this Idea in our Minds, and adding the Repetitions together, we come by the complex Ideas of the Modes of it. Thus by ad∣ding one to one, we have the complex Idea of two; by putting twelve Unites together, we have the complex Idea of a dozen; and so of a Score, or a Milion, or any other Number.

§. 3. The simples modes of Number are of all other the most distinct; every the least Variation, which is an unite, making each Combination, as clear∣ly different from that which approacheth nearest to it, as the most re∣mote; two being as distinct from one, as Two hundred; and the Ideas of Two, as distinct from the Idea of Three, as the Magnitude of the whole Earth, is from that of a Mite. This is not so in other simple Modes, in which it is not so easie, nor, perhaps, possible for us to distinguish betwixt two approaching Ideas, which yet are really different. For who will undertake to find a difference between the white of this Paper, and that of the next degree to it? Or can form distinct Ideas of every the least excess in Extension?

§. 4. The Clearness and Distinctness of each mode of Number from all o∣thers, even those that approach nearest, makes me apt to think, that De∣monstrations in Numbers, if they are not more evident and exact than in Extension, yet they are more general in their use, and more determinate in their Application. Because the Ideas of Numbers are more precise, and distinguishable than in Extension; where every Equality and Excess are not so easie to be observed, or measured, because our Thoughts cannot in Space arrive at any determined smallness beyond which it cannot go, as in an Unite; and therefore the quantity or proportion of any the least Ex∣cess cannot be discovered, which is clear otherwise in Number, where, as has been said, 91 is as distinguishable from 90, as from 9000, though 91 be the next immediate Excess to 90. But it is not so in Extension, where whatsoever is more than just a Foot, or an Inch, is not distinguishable from the Standard of a Foot, or an Inch; and in Lines which appear of an e∣qual length, one may be longer than the other by innumerable Parts: Nor can any one assign an Angle, which shall be the next biggest to a right one.

§. 5. By the repeating, as has been said, of the Idea of an Unite, and joining it to another Unite, we make thereof one collective Idea, mar∣ked by the Name Two. And whosoever can do this, and proceed on, still adding one more to the last collective Idea he had of any Number, and give a Name to it, may count, or have Ideas for several Collections of

Unites distinguished one from another, as far as he hath a Series of Names for following Numbers, and a Memory to retain that Series, with their several Names: All Numeration being but still the adding of one Unite more, and giving to the whole together, as comprehended in one Idea, a new or distinct Name or Sign, whereby to know it from those be∣fore and after, and distinguish it from every smaller or greater multitude of Unites: So that he that can add one to one, and so to two, and so go on with his Tale, taking still with him the distinct Names belonging to every Progression; and so again by subtracting an Unite from each Col∣lection retreat and lessen them, is capable of all the Ideas of Numbers, within the compass of his Language, or for which he hath names, though not, perhaps, of more. For the several simple Modes of Numbers being in our Minds but so many Combinations of Unites, which have no varie∣ty, nor are capable of any other difference, but more or less, Names or Marks for each distinct Combination, seem more necessary than in any other sort of Ideas. For without such Names or Marks, we can hardly well make use of Numbers in reckoning, especially where the Combina∣tion is made up of any great multitude of Unites, which put together without a Name or Mark, to distinguish that precise Collection, will hard∣ly be kept from being a heap in Confusion.

§. 6. This, I think, to be the reason why some Americans I have spoken with, (who were otherwise of quick and rational Parts enough,) could not, as we do, by any means count to 1000; nor had any distinct Idea of that Number, though they could reckon very well to 20. Because their Language being scanty, and accommodated only to the few necessaries of a needy simple Life, unacquainted either with Trade or Mathema∣ticks, had no Words in it to stand for 1000; so that when they were dis∣coursed with of those greater Numbers, they would shew the Hairs of their Head, to express a great multitude which they could not number; which inability, I suppose, proceeded from their want of Names. The Tououpinambos had no Names for Numbers above 5; any Number beyond that, they made out by shewing their Fingers, and the Fingers of others who were present: Histoire d'un Voiage fait en la Terre du Brasil, par Iean de Lery, c. 20. 107/382. And I doubt not but we our selves might di∣stinctly number in Words, a great deal farther than we usually do, would we find out but some fit denominations to signifie them by; whereas in the way we take now to name them by Millions of Millions of Millions, it is hard to go beyond eighteen, or at most four and twenty decimal Pro∣gressions, without confusion. But to shew how much distinct Names con∣duce to our well reckoning, or having useful Ideas of Numbers, let us set all these following Figures in one continued Line, as the Marks of one Number: v. g.

Nevilions.	Octilions.	Septilions.	Sextilions.	Quintilions.	Quatrilions.	Trilions.	Bilions.	Milions.	Vnites.
857324.	162486.	345896.	437916.	423147.	248106.	235421.	261734.	368149.	623137.

The ordinary way of naming this Number in English, will be the often repeating of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, of Millions, (which is the denomination of six second Figures.) In which way, it will be very hard to have any distin∣guishing Notions of this Number: But whether, by giving every six Fi∣gures a new and orderly denomination, these, and perhaps a great many more Figures, in progression, might not easily be counted distinctly, and Ideas of them both got more easily to our selves, and more plainly signified to others, I leave it to be considered. This I mention only to shew how ne∣cessary

distinct Names are to Numbering, without pretending to intro∣duce new ones of my invention.

§. 7. Thus Children, either for want of Names to mark the several Progressions of Numbers, or not having yet the faculty to collect scatte∣red Ideas into complex ones, and range them to a regular Order, and so retain them in their Memories, as is necessary to reckoning, do not begin to number very early, nor proceed in it very far or steadily, till a good while after they are well furnished with good store of other Ideas; and one may often observe them in discourse and reason pretty well, and have very clear conceptions of several other things, before they can tell 20. And some, through the default of their Memories, who cannot retain the several Combinations of Numbers, with their Names annexed in their distinct orders, and the dependence of so long a train of numeral Progres∣sions, and their relation one to another, are not able all their life-time, to reckon or regularly go over any moderate Series of Numbers. For he that will count Twenty, or have any Idea of that Number, must know that Nineteen went before, with the distinct Name or Sign of every one of them, as they stand marked in their order; for where-ever this fails, a gap is made, the Chain breaks, and the Progress in numbering can go no farther. So that to reckon right, it is required, 1. That the Mind di∣stinguish carefully two Ideas, which are different one from another only by the addition or subtraction of one Unite. 2. That it retain in me∣mory the Names, or Marks, of the several Combinations from an Unite to that Number; and that not confusedly, and at random, but in that exact order, that the Numbers follow one another; in either of which if it trips, the whole business of Numbring will be disturbed, and there will remain only the confused Idea of multitude, but the Ideas necessary to distinct numeration, will not be attained to.

§. 8. This farther is observable in Number, That it is that which the Mind makes use of, in measuring all things that by us are measurable, which principally are Expansion and Duration; and our Idea of Infinity, even when applied to those, seems to be nothing but the Infinity of Num∣ber. For what else are our Ideas of Eternity and Immensity, but the re∣peated additions of certain Ideas of imagined parts of Space and Expan∣sion, or Duration, with the Infinity of Number, in which we can come to no end of Addition? For such an inexhaustible stock, Number, of all other our Ideas, most clearly furnishes us with, as is obvious to every one: For let a Man collect into one Sum, as great a Number as he pleases, this Multitude, how great soever, lessens not one jot the power of adding to it, or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock of Number, where still there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And this endless addition of Numbers, so apparent to the Mind, is that, I think, which gives us the clearest and most distinct Idea of Infinity; of which more in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XVII. Of Infinity.

§. 1. HE that would know what kind of Idea it is to which we give the name of Infinity, cannot do it better than by conside∣ring to what Infinity is by the Mind more immediately attributed, and then how the Mind comes to frame it.

Finite, and Infinite, seem to me to be looked upon by the Mind, as the Modes of Quantity, and to be attributed primarily in their first de∣signation only to those things which have parts, and are capable of in∣crease or diminution, by the addition or subtraction of any the least part; and such are the Ideas of Space, Duration, and Number, which we have considered in the foregoing Chapters. 'Tis true, that we cannot but be assured, That the Great GOD, of whom, and from whom are all things, is incomprehensibly Infinite; but yet, when we apply to that first and supream Being, our Idea of Infinite in our weak and narrow Thoughts, we do it primarily in respect of his Duration and Ubiquity; and, I think, more figuratively to his Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, and other At∣tributes, which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, &c. For when we call them Infinite, we have no other Idea of this Infinity, but what carries with it some reflection on, and imitation of that Num∣ber or Extent of the Acts or Objects of God's Power, Wisdom, and Good∣ness, which can never be supposed so great, or so many, which these At∣tributes will not always surmount and exceed, let us multiply them in our Thoughts with all the infinity of endless number. I do not pretend to say how these Attributes are in GOD, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow Capacities: They do without doubt contain in them all possible perfection; but this, I say, is our way of conceiving them, and these our Ideas of their Infinity.

§. 2. Finite then, and Infinite, being by the Mind looked on as modi∣fications of Expansion and Duration, the next thing to be considered is, How the Mind comes by them. As for the Idea of Finite, there is no great difficulty; the obvious portions of Extension, that affect our Senses, carry with them into the Mind the Idea of Finite, and the ordinary periods of Succession, whereby we measure Time and Duration; as Hours, Days, and Years, are bounded Lengths: the difficulty is, how we come by those boundless Ideas of Eternity and Immensity, since the Objects we converse with, come so much short of any approach or proportion to that Large∣ness.

§. 3. Every one that has any Idea of any stated lengths of Space, as a Foot, finds that he can repeat that Idea; and joining it to the former, make the Idea of two Foot; and by the addition of a third, three Foot; and so on without ever coming to an end of his additions, whether of the same Idea of a Foot, or if he please of doubling it, or any other Idea he has of any length, as a Mile, or Diametre of the Earth, or of the Orbis Magnus; for which-ever of these he takes, and how often soever he doubles, or any otherwise multiplies it, he finds that after he has continued this doubling in his Thoughts, and enlarged his Idea as much as he pleases, he has no more reason to stop, nor is one jot nearer the end of such Ad∣dition, than he was at first setting out; the power of enlarging his Idea of

Space by farther Additions, remaining still the same, he hence takes the Idea of infinite Space.

§. 4. This, I think, is the way whereby the Mind gets the Idea of infinite Space. 'Tis a quite different Consideration to examine, whether the Mind has the Idea of such a boundless Space actually existing, since our Ideas are not always Proofs of the Existence of Things; but yet since this comes here in our way, I suppose I may say, that we are apt to think, that Space in it self is actually boundless, to which Imagination, the Idea of Space or Expansion of its self naturally leads us. For it being conside∣red by us, either as the Extension of Body, or as existing by it self, with∣out any solid Matter taking it up, (for of such a void Space, we have not only the Idea, but I have proved, as I think, from the Motion of Body, its necessary existence,) it is impossible the Mind should be ever able to find or suppose any end of it, or be stopp'd any where, in its progress in this Space, how far soever it extends its Thoughts. Any Bounds made with Body, even Adamantine Walls, are so far from putting a stop to the Mind in its farther progress in Space and Extension, that it rather facilitates and enlarges it: For so far as that Body reaches, so far no one can doubt of Extension; and when we are come to the utmost extremity of Body, what is there that can there put a stop and satisfie the Mind, that it is at the end of Space, when it perceive it is not; nay, when it is satisfied that Bo∣dy it self can move into it? For if it be necessary for the motion of Body, that there should be an empty Space, though never so little here amongst Bodies, and it be possible for Body to move in or through that empty Space; nay, it is impossible for any particle of Matter to move but into an empty Space, the same possibility of a Bodies moving into a void Space, beyond the utmost Bounds of Body, as well as into a void Space interspersed amongst Bodies, will always remain clear and evident, the Idea of empty pure Space, whether within or beyond the confines of all Bodies, being exactly the same, differing not in Nature, though in Bulk; and there being nothing to hinder Body from moving into it: So that wherever the Mind places it self by any thought, either amongst or re∣mote from all Bodies, it can in this uniform Idea of Space no-where find any bounds, any end; and so must necessarily conclude it by the very Na∣ture and Idea of each part of it to be actually infinite.

§. 5. As by the power we find in our selves of repeating, as often as we will, any Idea of Space, we get the Idea of Immensity; so by being able to repeat the Idea of any length of Duration we have in our Minds, with all the endless addition of Number, we come by the Idea of Eternity. For we find in our selves we can no more come to an end of such repeated Ideas, than we can come to the end of Number, which every one per∣ceives he cannot. But here again 'tis another question, quite different from our having an Idea of Eternity, to know whether there were any real Being, whose Duration has been eternal. He that considers something now existing, must necessarily come to something eternal, but having spoke of this in another place, I shall say here no more of it, but proceed on to some other Considerations of our Idea of Infinity.

§. 6. If it be so, that our Idea of Infinity be got from the Power we ob∣serve in our selves, of repeating without end our own Ideas; It may be demanded, Why we do not attribute Infinity to other Ideas, as well as those of Space and Duration; since they may be as easily, and as often repeated in our Minds as the other; and yet no body ever thinks of in∣finite sweetness, or infinite whiteness, though he can repeat the Idea of Sweet or White, as frequently as those of a Yard, or a Day? To which

I answer, All the Ideas that are considered as having parts, and are ca∣pable of increase by the addition of any equal or less parts, afford us by their repetition the Idea of Infinity; because with this endless repetition, there is continued an enlargement, of which there can be no end. But in other Ideas it is not so; for to the largest Idea of Extension or Dura∣tion that I at present have, the addition of any the least part makes an in∣crease; but to the perfectest Idea I have of the whitest Whiteness, if I add another of a less or equal whiteness, (and of a whiter than I have, I can∣not add the Idea,) it makes no increase, and enlarges not my Idea at all; and therefore the different Ideas of Whiteness, &c. are called Degrees. For those Ideas that consist of Parts, are capable of being augmented by every addition of the least part; but if you take the Idea of White, which one parcel of Snow yielded yesterday to our Sight, and another Idea of White from another parcel of Snow you see to day, and put them toge∣ther in your Mind, they embody, as it were, and run into one, and the Idea of Whiteness is not at all increased; and if we add a less degree of Whiteness to a greater, we are so far from increasing, that we diminish it. Those Ideas that consist not of Parts, cannot be augmented to what pro∣portion Men please, or be stretched beyond what they have received by their Senses; but Space, Duration, and Number, being capable of increase by repetition, leave in the Mind an Idea of an endless room for more; nor can we conceive any where a stop to a farther Addition or Progres∣sion, and so those Ideas alone lead our Minds towards the Thought of Infinity.

§. 7. Though our Idea of Infinity arise from the contemplation of Quan∣tity, and the endless increase the Mind is able to make in Quantity, by the repeated additions of what Portions thereof it pleases; yet I guess we cause great confusion in our Thoughts, when we join Infinity to any sup∣posed Idea of Quantity the Mind can be thought to have, and so discourse or reason about an infinite quantity as an infinite Space, or an infinite Duration: For our Idea of Infinity being, as I think, an endless growing Idea, but the Idea of any Quantity the Mind has, being at that time terminated in that Idea, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is,) to join Infinity to it, is to adjust a standing measure to a grow∣ing bulk; and therefore I think it is not an insignificant subtilty if I say, that we are carefully to distinguish between the Idea of the Infinity of Space, and the Idea of a Space infinite: The first is nothing but a supposed endless Progression of the Mind, over what repeated Ideas of Space it pleases; but to have actually in the Mind the Idea of a Space infinite, is to suppose the Mind already passed over, and actually to have a view of all those repeated Ideas of Space, which an endless repetition can never totally represent to it, which carries in it a plain contradiction.

§. 8. This, perhaps, will be a little plainer, if we consider it in Num∣bers. The infinity of Numbers, to the end of whose addition every one perceives there is no approach, easily appears to any one that reflects on it: But how clear soever this Idea of the Infinity of Number be, there is nothing yet more evident than the absurdity of the actual Idea of an Infi∣nite Number, whatsoever positive Ideas we have in our Minds of any Space, Duration, or Number, let them be never so great, they are still finite; but when we suppose an inexhaustible remainder, from which we remove all bounds, and wherein we allow the Mind an endless progres∣sion of Thought, without ever compleating the Idea, there we have our Idea of Infinity; which though it seem to be pretty clear, when we con∣sider nothing else in it, but the Negation of an end, yet when we would

frame in our Minds the Idea of an infinite Space or Duration, that Idea is very obscure, and confused, because it is made up of two Parts, very dif∣ferent, if not inconsistent. For let a Man frame in his Mind an Idea of any Space or Number, as great as he will; 'tis plain, the Mind rests and terminates in that Idea, which is contrary to the Idea of Infinity, which consists in a supposed endless Progression. And therefore, I think, it is, that we are so easily confounded, when we come to argue, and reason about infinite Space or Duration, &c. Because the parts of such an Idea, not be∣ing perceived to be, as they are, inconsistent, the one side or other always perplexes, whatever Consequences we draw from the other, as an Idea of Motion not passing on, would perplex any one, who should argue from such an Idea, which is not better than an Idea of motion at rest; and such another seems to me to be the Idea of a Space, or (which is the same thing) a Number infinite, i. e. of a Space or Number, which the Mind actually has, and so views, and terminates in; and of a Space or Number, which in a constant and endless Progression, and enlarging it, can in Thought ne∣ver attain to. For how large soever an Idea of Space I have in my Mind, it is no larger than it is that instant that I have it, though I be capable the next instant to double it; and so on in infinitum: For that alone is infi∣nite, which has no Bounds, and that the Idea of Infinity; in which our Thoughts can find none.

§. 9. But of all other Ideas, it is, Number, as I have said, which, I think, furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct Idea of Infinity we are ca∣pable of. For even in Space and Duration, when the Mind pursues the Idea of Infinity, it there makes uses of the Ideas and Repetitions of Num∣bers, as of millions of millions of Miles, or Years, which are as so many distinct Ideas, kept best by Number from running into a confused heap, wherein the Mind loses it self; and when it has added together as many millions, &c. as it pleases, of known lengths of Space or Duration, the clea∣rest Idea it can get of Infinity, is the confused incomprehensible remain∣der of endless addible Numbers, which affords no prospect of Stop or Boundary.

§. 10. It will, perhaps, give us a little farther light into the Idea we have of Infinity, and discover to us, that it is nothing but the Infinity of Number applied to determinate par••s, of which we have in our Minds the distinct Ideas, if we consider that Number is not generally thought by us infinite, whereas Duration and Extension is apt to be so; which arises from hence, That in Number we are at one end, as it were: for there be∣ing in Number nothing less than an Unite, we there stop, and are at an end; but in addition, or increase of Number, we can set no Bounds: and so it is like a Line, whereof one end terminating with us, the other is ex∣tended still forwards beyond all that we can conceive; but in Space and Duration it is otherwise. For in Duration, we consider it, as if this Line of Number were extended both ways to an unconceivable, undeter∣minate, and infinite length; which is evident to any one, that will but reflect on what Consideration he hath of Eternity; which, I suppose, he will find to be nothing else, but the turning this Infinity of Number both ways, à parte ante, and à parte post, as they speak. For when we would consider Eternity, à parte ante, what do we but beginning from our selves, and the present time we are in, we repeat in our Minds the Ideas of Years or Ages, or any other assignable Portion of Duration past, with a prospect of proceeding in such Addition, with all the Infinity of Num∣ber; and when we would consider Eternity, à parte post, we just after the same rate begin from our selves, and reckon by multiplied Periods yet to

come still, extending that Line of Number, as before; and these two be∣ing put together, are that infinite Duration we call Eternity; which eve∣ry way we consider, appears infinite, because we still turn that way the infinite end of Number, i. e. the Power still of adding more.

§. 11. The same happens also in Space, wherein conceiving our selves to be as it were in the Centre, we do on all sides pursue those indetermi∣nable Lines of Number; and reckoning any way from our selves, a Yard, Mile, Diameter of the Earth, or Orbis magnus, by the infinity of Number, we add others to them as often as we will; and having no more Reason to set Bounds to those repeated Ideas, than we have to set Bounds to Num∣ber, we have that indeterminable Idea of Immensity.

§. 12. And since in any bulk of Matter, our Thoughts can never arrive at the utmost Divisibility, therefore there is an apparent Infinity to us also in that, which has the Infinity also of Number, but with this difference, That in the former Considerations of the Infinity of Space and Duration, we only use Addition of Numbers; whereas this is like the division of an Unite into its Fractions, wherein the Mind also can proceed in infinitum, as well as in the former Additions, it being indeed but the Addition still of new Numbers: though in the Addition of the one, we can have no more the positive Idea of a Space infinitely great, than in the Division of the other, we can have the Idea of a Body infinitely little; our Idea of Infinity being, as I may so say, a growing and fugitive Idea, still in a boundless Progression that can step no where.

§. 13. Though it be hard, I think, to find any one so absurd, as to say he has the positive Idea of an actual infinite Number; the Infinity whereof lies only in a Power still of adding any Combination of Unites to any for∣mer Number, and that as long, and as much as one will; the like also being in the Infinity of Space and Duration, which Power leaves always to the Mind room for endless Additions; yet there be those, who imagine they have positive Ideas of infinite Duration and Space. It would, I think, be enough to destroy any such positive Idea of infinite, to ask him that has it, whether he could add to it or no; which would easily shew the mi∣stake of such a positive Idea. We can, I think, have no positive Idea of any Space or Duration, which is not made up of, and commensurate to repeated Numbers of Feet or Yards, or Days and Years, which are the common measures whereof we have the Ideas in our Minds, and where∣by we judge of the greatness of these sort of quantities. And therefore, since an Idea of infinite Space or Duration must needs be made up of in∣finite Parts, it can have no other Infinity, than that of Number capable still of farther Addition; but not an actual positive Idea of a Number in∣finite. For, I think, it is evident, that the Addition of finite things toge∣ther (as are all lengths, whereof we have the positive Ideas) can never otherwise produce the Idea of infinite, than as Number does; which con∣sisting of Additions of finite Unites one to another, suggests the Idea of Infinite, only by a Power we find we have, of still increasing the Sum, and adding more of the same kind, without coming one jot nearer the end of such Progression.

§. 14. They who would prove their Idea of Infinite to be positive, seem to me to do it by a pleasant Argument, taken from the Negation of an end; which being negative, the Negation of it is positive. He that considers that the end is in Body, but the extremity or superficies of that Body will not, perhaps, be forward to grant, that the end is a bare ne∣gative: And he that perceives the end of his Pen is black or white, will be apt to think, that the end is something more than a pure Negation;

nor is it, when applied to Duration, the bare Negation of Existence, but more properly the last moment of it. But if they will have the end to be nothing but the bare Negation of Existence, I am sure they cannot de∣ny, but that the beginning is the first instant of Being, and is not by any Body conceived to be a bare Negation; and therefore by their own Argument, the Idea of Eternal, à parte ante, or of a Duration without a beginning, is but a negative Idea.

§. 15. The Idea of Infinite, has, I confess, something of positive in all those things we apply to it. When we would think of infinite Space or Duration, we at first step usually make some very large Idea, as, per∣haps, of Millions of Ages, or Miles, which possibly we double and mul∣tiply several times. All that we thus amass together in our Thoughts, is positive, and the assemblage of a great number of positive Ideas of Space or Duration: But what still remains beyond this, we have no more a po∣sitive distinct notion of, than a Mariner has of the depth of the Sea; where having let down a large portion of his Sounding-line, he reaches no bot∣tom, whereby he knows the depth to be so many fathoms, and more; but how much that more is, he hath no distinct notion at all: And could he always supply new Line, and find the Plummet always sink without e∣ver stopping, he would be something in the posture of the Mind reaching after a compleat and positive Idea of Infinity; in which case, let this Line be 10, or 10000 fathoms long, it equally discovers what is beyond it, and gives only this confused and comparative Idea, That this is not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the Mind comprehends of any Space, it has a positive Idea of; but in this thought of Infinity, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the Idea is still imperfect and incom∣pleat. So much Space as the Mind takes a view of, in its contemplation of Greatness, is a clear Picture, and positive in the Understanding; but Infinite is still greater. 1. Then the Idea of so much is positive and clear. 2. The Idea of Greater is also clear, but it is but a comparative Idea. 3. The Idea of so much greater, as cannot be comprehended, and this is plain Ne∣gative: Not Positive; for he has no positive clear Idea of the largeness of any Extension, (which is that sought for in the Idea of Infinite,) that has not a comprehensive Idea of the Dimensions of it; and such, no bo∣dy, I think, pretends to, in what is infinte. For to say a Man has a po∣sitive clear Idea of any Quantity, without knowing how great it is, is as reasonable as to say, He has the positive clear Idea of the number of the Sands on the Sea-shoar, who knows not how many they be; but on∣ly that they are more than Twenty: For just such a perfect and positive Idea has he of Infinity, when he applies it to Space or Duration, who says it is larger than the Extent or Duration of 10, 100, 1000, or any other number of Miles, or Years, whereof he has, or can have, a positive Idea; which is all the Idea, I think, we have of Infinite. So that what lies be∣yond our positive Idea towards Infinity, lies in Obscurity, and has the in∣determinate confusion of a Negative Idea, wherein I know, I neither do nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow Capa∣city: And that cannot but be very far from a positive compleat Idea, where∣in the greatest part of what I would comprehend, is left out, under the un∣determinate intimation of being still greater. For to say, that having in any quantity measured so much, or gone so far, you are not yet at the end, is only to say, that that Quantity is greater, so that the Negation of an end in any Quantity, is in other words only to say, That it is bigger; and a total negation of an end, is but the carrying this Bigger still with you, in all the Progressions your Thoughts shall make in Quantity; and adding

this Idea of still greater, to all the Ideas you have, or can be supposed to have of Quantity; and whether such an Idea as that, be positive, I leave any one to consider.

§. 16. I ask those who say they have a positive Idea of Eternity, whether their Idea of Duration includes in it Succession, or not? If it do not, they ought to shew the difference of their Notion of Duration, when applied to an eternal Being, and to a finite; since, perhaps, there may be others, as well as I, who will own to them their Weakness of Understanding in this point, and acknowledge, That the Notions they have of Duration, force them to conceive, That whatever has Duration, is of a longer conti∣nuance to day, than it was yesterday. If to avoid Succession in eternal Existence, they recur to the Punctum Stans of the Schools, I suppose they will thereby very little mend the matter, or help us to a more clear and positive Idea of infinite Duration, there being nothing more inconceivable to me, than Duration without Succession. Besides, that Punctum Stans, if it signifie any thing, being not Quantum, finite or infinite, cannot belong to it. But if our weak Apprehensions cannot separate Succession from any Duration whatsoever, our Idea of Eternity can be nothing but of infi∣nite Succession of Moments of Duration, wherein any thing does exist; and whether any one has, or can have, a positive Idea of an actual infinite Number, I leave him to consider, till his infinite Number be so great, that he himself can add no more to it; and as long as he can increase it, I doubt he himself will think the Idea he hath of it, a little too scanty for positive Infinity.

§. 17. I think it unavoidable for every considering rational Creature, that will but examine his own, or any other Existence, to have the No∣tion of an eternal wise Being, who had no beginning: And such an Idea of infinite Duration, I am sure I have; but this Negation of a Beginning, being but the Negation of a positive thing, scarce gives me a positive Idea of Infinity; which whenever I endeavour to extend my Thoughts to, I confess my self at a loss, and find I cannot attain any clear comprehension of it.

§. 18. He that thinks he has a positive Idea of infinite Space, will when he considers it, find that he can no more have a positive Idea of the greatest, than he has of the least Space: For in this latter, which seems the easier of the two, and more within our comprehension, we are ca∣pable only of a comparative Idea of Smalness, which will always be less than any one whereof we have the positive Idea; for all our positive Ideas of any Quantity, whether great or little, have always bounds, though our comparative Idea, whereby we can always add to the one, and take from the other, hath no bounds: For that which remains either great or little, not being comprehended in that positive Idea we have, lies in obscurity; and we have no other Idea of it, but of the power of enlarging the one, and diminishing the other without ceasing. For a Pestle and Mortar will as soon bring any Particle of Matter to Indi∣visibility, as the accutest Thought of a Mathematician: And a Surveyor may as soon with his Chain, measure out infinite Space, as a Philosopher by the quickest flight of Mind reach it, or by thinking comprehend it, which is to have a positive Idea of it. He that thinks on a Cube of an Inch diametre, has a clear and positive Idea of it in his Mind, and so can frame one of ½ a ¼ ⅛, and so on till he has the Idea in his Thoughts of something very very little, but yet reaches not the Idea of that incomprehensible littleness, which Division can produce. What remains of Smalness, is as far from his Thoughts, as when he first began;

and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and positive Idea of that Smalness, which is consequent to infinite Divisibility.

§. 19. Every one that looks towards Infinity, does, as I have said, at first glance make some very large Idea of that he applies it to, let it be Space, or Duration; and possibly wearies his Thoughts, by multiplying in his Mind that first large Idea: But yet by that he comes no nearer, having a positive clear Idea of what remains, to make up a positive Infinite, than the Coun∣try-fellow had of the Water which was yet to come, and pass the Channel of the River where he stood:

Rusticus expectat dum transeat amnis, at ille Labitur, & Labetur per omne volubilis aevum.

§. 20. There are some I have met with, that put so much difference be∣tween infinite Duration, and infinite Space, that they persuade themselves, that they have a positive Idea of Eternity; but that they have not, nor can have any Idea of infinite Space. The reason of which mistake, I suppose to be this, That finding by a due Contemplation of Causes and Effects, that it is necessary to admit some Eternal Being, and so to consider the real existence of that Being, as taking up, and commensurate to their Idea of Eternity. But on the other side, not finding it necessary, but on the contrary apparently absurd, that Body should be infinite, they forwardly conclude they can have no Idea of infinite Space, because they can have no Idea of infinite Matter: Which Consequence, I conceive, is very ill col∣lected, the Existence of Matter being no ways necessary to the Existence of Space, no more than the Existence of Motion, or the Sun, is necessary to Duration, though Duration uses to be measured by it: And I doubt not but a Man may have the Idea of 10000 Miles square, without any Body so big, as well as the Idea of 10000 Years, without any Body so old. It seems as easie to me to have the Idea of Space empty of Body, as to think of the Capacity of his Bushel without Corn, or the hollow of a Nut∣shell without a Kernel in it; it being no more necessary that there should be existing a solid Body infinitely extended, because we have any Idea of the Infinity of Space, than it is necessary that the World should be eternal, because we have an Idea of infinite Duration: And why should we think our Idea of infinite Space, requires the real existence of Matter to support it, when we find we have as clear an Idea of infinite Duration to come, as we have of infinite Duration past? Though, I suppose, no body thinks it conceivable, that any thing does or has existed in that future Duration. Nor is it possible to join our Idea of future Duration, with present or past Existence, any more than it is possible to make the Ideas of yesterday, to day, and to morrow to be the same; or bring Ages past and future toge∣ther, and make them contemporary. But if these men are of the Mind, That they have clearer Ideas of infinite Duration, than of infinite Space, because it is past doubt, that GOD has existed from all Eternity, but there is no real Matter co-extended with infinite Space; yet those Philo∣sophers who are of Opinion, That infinite Space is possessed by GOD's infinite Omnipresence, as well as infinite Duration by his eternal Exi∣stence, must be allowed to have as clear Idea of infinite Space, as of infi∣nite Duration; though neither of them, I think, has any positive Idea of Infinity in either case. For whatsoever positive Ideas a Man has in his Mind of any Quantity, he can repeat it, and add it to the former, as easie as he can add together the Ideas of two Days, or two Paces, which are positive Ideas of Lengths he has in his Mind, and so on as long as he

please; whereby if a Man had a positive Idea of Infinite, either Dura∣tion or Space, he could add two Infinites together; nay, make one Infi∣nite infinitely bigger than another, Absurdities too gross to be con••uted.

§. 21. But yet if after all this, there be Men who persuade themselves, that they have clear positive comprehensive Ideas of Infinity, 'tis fit they enjoy their privilege: And I should be very glad (with some others that I know, who acknowledge they have none such,) to be better informed by their Communication; for I have been hitherto apt to think, that the great and inextricable Difficulties, which perpetually involve all Dis∣courses concerning Infinity, whether of Space, Duration, or Divisibility, have been the certain marks of a defect in our Ideas of Infinity, and the disproportion the Nature thereof has to the Comprehension of our nar∣row Capacities. For whilst Men talk and dispute of infinite Space or Duration, as if they had as compleat and positive Ideas of it, as they have of the Name they use for it, or of a Yard, or of an Hour, or any other determinate Quantity, it is no wonder if the incomprehensible Nature of the thing they discourse of, or reason about, lead them into Per∣plexities and Contradictions, and their Minds be overlaid by an Object too large and mighty, to be surveyed and managed by them.

§. 22. If I have dwelt pretty long on the Considerations of Duration, Space, and Number; and what arises from the Contemplation of them, Infinity, 'tis possibly no more than the matter requires, there being few simple Ideas, whose Modes give more exercise to the Thoughts of Men, than these do. I pretend not to treat of them in their full Latitude, it suffices to my Design, to shew how the Mind receives them, such as they are, from Sensation and Reflection: And how even the Idea we have of Infi∣nity, how remote soever it may seem to be from any Object of Sense, or Operation of our Mind, has nevertheless, as all our other Ideas, its Ori∣ginal there. Some Mathematicians, perhaps, of advanced Speculations, may have other ways to introduce into their Minds Ideas of Infinity: But this hinders not but that they themselves, as well as all other Men, got the first Ideas they had of Infinity, from Sensation and Reflection, in the me∣thod we have here set down.

CHAP. XVIII. Of other simple Modes.

§. 1. THough I have in the foregoing Chapters, shewn how from simple Ideas taken in by Sensation, the Mind comes to extend its self even to Infinity; which however it may of all others seem most remote from any sensible Perception, yet at last hath nothing in it, but what is made out of simple Ideas, received into the Mind by the Senses, and afterwards there put together, by the Faculty the Mind has to repeat its own Ideas. Though, I say, these might be instances of enough simple Modes of the simple Ideas of Sensation, and suffice to shew, how the Mind comes by them; yet I shall for Methods sake, though briefly, give an account of ••ome few more, and then proceed to more complex Ideas.

§. 2. To slide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, leap, skip, and abundance other that might be named, are Words which are no sooner heard, but every one who understands English, has presently in his Mind

distinct Ideas, which are all but the different modifications of Motion. Modes of Motion answer those of Extension; Swift and Slow are two dif∣ferent Ideas of Motion, the measures whereof are made of the distances of Time and Space put together, so they are complex Ideas comprehending Time and Space with Motion.

§. 3. The like variety have we in Sounds. Every articulate word is a different modification of Sound; by which we see, that from the sense of Hearing by such modifications, the Mind may be furnished with distinct Ideas, to almost an infinite Number. Sounds also, besides the distinct cries of Birds and Beasts, are modified by diversity of Notes of different length put together, which make that complex Idea call'd a Tune, which a Musician may have in his Mind, when he hears or makes no Sound at all, by reflecting on the Ideas of those Sounds, so put together silently in his own Fancy.

§. 4. Those of Colours might also be very various; some we take no∣tice of as the different degrees, or as they are termed, Shades of the same Colour: But since we very seldom make assemblages of Colours, either for Use or Delight, but Figure is taken in also, and has its part in it, as in Painting, Weaving, Needle-works, &c. Those which are taken notice of, do most commonly belong to mixed Modes, as being made up of Ideas of divers kinds, viz. Figure and Colour, such as Beauty, Rain bow, &c.

§. 5. All compounded Tastes and Smells, are also Modes made up of these simple Ideas of those Senses; but they being such as generally we have no names for, are less taken notice of, and cannot be set down in writing; and therefore must be left without enumeration, to the Thoughts and Ex∣perience of my Reader.

§. 6. In general it may be observed, that those simple Modes which are considered but as different degrees of the same simple Idea; though they are in themselves many of them very distinct Ideas; yet have ordinarily no distinct Names, nor are much taken notice of as distinct Ideas, where the difference is but very small between them. Whether Men have ne∣glected these Modes, and given no Names to them, as wanting measures nicely to distinguish them, or because when they were so distinguished, that Knowledge would not be of general or necessary use, I leave it to the Thoughts of others; it is sufficient to my purpose to shew, that all these simple Ideas, come to our Minds only by Sensation and Reflection; and that when the Mind has them, it can variously repeat and compound them, and so make new complex Ideas. But though White, Red, or Sweet, &c. have not been modified or made into complex Ideas, by several Com∣binations, so as to be named, and thereby ranked into Species; yet some others of the simple Ideas, viz. those of Unity, Duration, Motion, &c. above instanced in, as also Power and Thinking have been thus modified to a great variety of complex Ideas, with Names belonging to them.

§. 7. The Reason whereof, I suppose, has been this, That the great Con∣cernment of Men being with Men one amongst another, the Knowledge of Men, and their Actions, and the signifying of them to one another, was most necessary; and therefore they made Ideas of Actions very nicely modified, and gave those complex Ideas names, that they might the more easily record and discourse of those things they were daily conversant in, without long Ambages and Circumlocutions; and that the things they were continually to give and receive information about, might be the easier and quicker understood. That this is so and that Men in framing different complex Ideas, and giving them Names, have been much go∣verned

by the end of Speech in general (which is a very short and expe∣dite way of conveying their Thoughts one to another) is evident in the Names, which in several Arts have been found out, and applied to several complex Ideas of modified Actions, belonging to their several Trades, for dispatch sake, in their Direction or Discourses about them: Which Ideas are not generally framed in the Minds of Men not conversant about these Operations; and thence the words that stand for them, by the greatest part of Men of the same Language, are not understood; v. g. Coltsher, Drilling, Filtration, Cohobation, are words standing for certain complex Ideas; which being not in the Minds of every body, they having no use of them, those names of them are not generally understood but by Smiths, and Chimists; who having framed the complex Ideas which these words stand for, and having given names to them, or received them from others upon hearing of these names in communication, readily conceive those Ideas in their Minds; as by Cohobation all the simple Ideas of Distilling, and the pouring the Liquor, distilled from any thing, back upon the re∣maining Matter, and distilling it again. Thus we see, that there are great varieties of simple Ideas, as of Tastes and Smells, which have no Names, and of Modes many more; which either not having been generally e∣nough observed, or else not being of any great use to be taken notice of in the Affairs and Converse of Men, they have not had names given to them, and so pass not for Species, which we shall have occasion hereafter to consider more at large, when we come to speak of Words.

CHAP. XIX. Of the Modes of Thinking.

§. 1. WHen the Mind turns its view inwards upon its self, and contemplates its own Actions, Thinking is the first that occurrs; wherein it observes a great variety of Modifications, and there∣of frames to it self distinct Ideas. Thus the Perception, or Thought, which actually accompany, and is annexed to any impression on the Bo∣dy, made by an external Object, it frames a distinct Idea of, which we call Sensation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any Idea into the Understanding by the Senses. The same Idea, when it again recurrs without the operation of the like Object on the eternal Sensory, is Remem∣brance. If it be sought after by the Mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, 'tis Recollection: If it be held there long under attentive Consideration, 'tis Contemplation. When Ideas float in our Mind, without any reflection or regard of the Understanding, it is that which the French call Resvery; our Language has scarce a name for it. When the Ideas that offer themselves, (for as I have observed in ano∣ther place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of Ideas succeeding one another in our Minds,) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registred in the Memory, it is Attention. When the Mind with great earnestness, and of a choice, fixes its view on any Idea, considers it on all sides, and will not be called off by the ordinary sollicitation of other Ideas, it is that we call Intention, or Study. Sleep, without dreaming, is rest from all these; and Dreaming it self, is the perception of Ideas (whilst the outward Senses are stopp'd, so that they receive not outward Objects

with their usual quickness,) in the Mind, not suggested by any external Objects, or known occasion; nor under any Choice or Conduct of the Understanding at all; and whether that which we call Extasie, be not dreaming with the Eyes open, I leave to be examined.

§. 2. These are some few instances of those various Modes of thinking, which the Mind may observe in it self, and so frame as distinct Ideas of, as it does of White and Red, a Square or a Circle. I do not pretend to enume∣rate them all, nor to treat at large of this set of Ideas, which are got from Reflection, that would be to make a Volume. It suffices to my pre∣sent purpose, to have shewn here, by some few Examples, of what sort those Ideas are, and how the Mind comes by them; especially since I shall have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of Reasoning, Iudging, Volition, and Knowledge, which are some of the most considerable Opera∣tions of the Mind, and Modes of thinking.

§. 3. But, perhaps, it may not be an unpardonable Digression, nor wholly impertinent to our present Design, if we reflect here upon the dif∣ferent State of the Mind in thinking; which those instances of Attention, Resvery, and Dreaming, &c. before mentioned naturally enough suggest. That there are Ideas, some or other, always present in the Mind of a wa∣king Man, every ones Experience convinces him; though the Mind em∣ploys it self about them with several degrees of Attention. Sometimes the Mind fixes it self with so much earnestness on the Contemplation of some Objects, that it turns their Ideas on all sides; remarks their Rela∣tions and Circumstances; and views every part so nicely, and with such in∣tention, that it shuts out all other Thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary Impressions made then on the Senses, which at another Season would produce very sensible Perceptions: At other times, it barely ob∣serves the train of Ideas that succeed in the Understanding, without di∣recting and pursuing any of them: And at other times, it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadows that make no Impression.

§. 4. This difference of Intention, and Remission of the Mind in thinking, with a great variety of Degrees, between earnest Study, and very near minding nothing at all, Every one, I think, has experimented in him∣self. Trace it a litte farther, and you find the Mind in Sleep, retired as it were from the Senses, and out of the reach of those Motions made on the Organs of Sense, which at other times produce very vivid and sensible Ideas. I need not, for this, instance in those, who sleep out whole stormy Nights, without hearing the Thunder, or seeing the Lightning, or feel∣ing the shaking of the House, which are sensible enough to those who are waking. But in this retirement of the Mind from the Senses, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call Drea∣ming, and last of all sound Sleep closes the Scene quite, and puts an end to all Appearances. This I think almost every one has Experience of in him∣self, and his own Observation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence is, That since the Mind can sensibly put on, at several times, several degrees of Thinking; and be some∣times even in a waking Man so remiss, as to have Thoughts dim and ob∣scure to that degree, that they are very little removed from none at all; and at last in the dark retirements of sound Sleep, loses the sight perfect∣ly of all Ideas whatsoever: Since, I say, this is evidently so in Matter of Fact, and constant Experience, I ask whether it be not probable, that think∣ing is the Action, and not the Essence of the Soul? Since the Operations of Agents will easily admit of intention and remission; but the Essences of things, are not conceived capable of any such variation. But this by the bye.

CHAP. XX. Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain.

§. 1. Amongst the simple Ideas, which we receive both from Sensation and Reflection, Pain and Pleasure are two very considerable ones. For as in the Body, there is Sensation barely in its self, or accom∣panied with Pain or Pleasure: so the Thought, or Perception of the Mind is simply so, or else accompanied also with Pleasure or Pain, Delight or Trouble, call it how you please. These like other simple Ideas cannot be described, nor their Names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the simple Ideas of the Senses, only by Experience: For to define them by the Presence of Good or Evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us, than by making us reflect on what we feel in our selves, upon the se∣veral and various Operations of Good and Evil upon our Minds, as they are differently applied to, or considered by us.

2. Things then are good or evil, only in reference to Pleasure or Pain; That we call Good, which is apt to cause or increase Pleasure, or diminish Pain in us; or else to procure, or preserve us the possession of any other Good, or absence of any Evil. And on the contrary we name that Evil, which is apt to produce or increase any Pain, or diminish any Pleasure in us; or else to procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good. By Pleasure and Pain, I must be understood to mean of Body or Mind, as they are commonly distinguished; though in truth, they be only different Constitutions of the Mind, sometimes occasioned by disorder in the Body, sometimes by Thoughts of the Mind.

§. 3. Pleasure and Pain, and that which causes them, Good and Evil, are the hinges on which our Passions turn: and if we reflect on our selves, how these under various Considerations operate in us, what Modifications or Tempers of Mind, what internal Sensations, (if I may so call them,) they produce in us, we may thence form to our selves the Ideas of our Passions.

§. 4. Thus any one reflecting upon the Thought he has of the Delight, which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the Idea we call Love. For when a Man declares in Autumn, when he is eating them; or in Spring, when there are none, that he loves Grapes, it is no more, but that the taste of Grapes delights him; let an alteration of Health or Constitution destroy the delight of their Taste, and he then can be said to love Grapes no longer.

§. 5. On the contrary, the Thought of the Pain which any thing pre∣sent or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call Hatred. Were it my business here to enquire any farther, than into the bare Ideas of our Passions, as they depend on different Modifications of Pleasure and Pain, I should remark that our Love and Hatred of inanimate insensible Beings, is commonly founded on that Pleasure and Pain we receive from their use and application any way to our Senses, though with their Destruction; but Love and Hatred to Beings capable of Happiness or Misery, is often the Pain or Delight we have in their very Being or Happiness. Thus the Being and Welfare of a Man's Children or Friends, producing constant Delight in him, he is said constantly to love them. But it suffices to note that our Ideas of Love and Hatred, are but the Dispositions of the Mind, in re∣spect of Pleasure and Pain in general however caused in us.

§. 6. The uneasiness a Man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing, whose present enjoyment carries the Idea of Delight with it, is that we call Desire, which is greater or less, as that uneasiness is more or less vehement.

§. 7. Ioy is a delight of the Mind, from the consideration of the pre∣sent or assured approaching possession of a Good; and we are then pos∣sessed of any Good, when we have it so in our power, that we can use it when we please. Thus a Man almost starved, has Ioy at the arrival of Relief, even before he has the pleasure of using it; and a Father, in whom the very well-being of his Children causes delight, is always, as long as his Children are in such an estate, in the possession of that Good; for he needs but to reflect on it to have that pleasure.

§. 8. Sorrow is uneasiness in the Mind, upon the thought of a Good lost, which might have been enjoy'd longer, or the sense of a present Evil.

§. 9. Hope is that pleasure in the Mind, which every one finds in him∣self, upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight him.

§. 10. Fear is an uneasiness of the Mind, upon the thought of future Evil likely to befall us.

§. 11. Despair is the thought of the unattainableness of any Good, which works differently in Mens Minds, sometimes producing uneasiness or pain, sometimes rest and indolency.

§. 12. Anger, is uneasiness or discomposure of the Mind, upon the receit of any Injury, with a present purpose of Revenge.

§. 13. Envy is an uneasiness of Mind, caused by the consideration of a Good we desire, obtained by one we think should not have had it be∣fore us.

§. 14. These two last, Envy and Anger, not being caused by Pain and Pleasure simply in themselves, but having in them some mixed Conside∣rations of our selves and others, are not therefore to be found in all Men, because those other parts of valuing their Merits, or intending Revenge, is wanting in them; but all the rest terminating purely in Pain and Plea∣sure, are, I think, to be found in all Men: For we love, desire, rejoice, and hope only in respect of Pleasure; we hate and fear, and are sad only in respect of Pain ultimately; and these Passions are moved by things only, as they appear to be the Causes of Pleasure and Pain, and to have Plea∣sure or Pain some way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our Hatred usually to the subject, (at least if a sensible or voluntary Agent,) which has produced Pain in us, because the fear it leaves is a constant pain: But we do not so constantly love what has done us good; because Pleasure operates not so strongly on us, as Pain; and because we are not so ready to have hope it will do so again; but this by the bye.

§. 15. By Pleasure and Pain, Delight and Uneasiness, I must all along be understood, as I have above intimated, to mean not only bodily Pain and Pleasure, but whatsoever Delight or Uneasiness is felt by us, whe∣ther arising from any grateful or unacceptable Sensation or Refle∣ction.

§. 16. 'Tis farther to be considered, That in reference to the Passions, the removal or lessening of a Pain is considered, and operates as a Plea∣sure, and the loss or diminishing of a Pleasure, as a Pain.

§. 17. The Passions too have most of them in most Persons opera∣tions on the Body, and cause various changes in it; which not being al∣ways sensible, do not make a necessary part of the Idea of each Passion: For

Shame, which is an uneasiness of the Mind, upon the thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the Esteem we value, has not always blushing accompanying it.

§. 18. I would not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a Discourse of the Passions; they are many more than those I have here named: And those I have taken notice of, would each of them require a much larger and more accurate Discourse. I have only mentioned these here, as so many instances of Modes of Pleasure and Pain resulting in our Minds, from va∣rious Considerations of Good and Evil; I might, perhaps, have instanced in other Modes of Pleasure and Pain more simple than these, as the Pain of Hunger and Thirst, and the Pleasure of Eating and Drinking, when one is so: The pain of the Head-ach, or pleasure of rational Conversation with one's Friend, or discovering of a speculative Truth upon study. But the Passions being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to instance in them, and shew how the Ideas we have of them, are derived from Sensation and Reflection.

CHAP. XXI. Of Power.

§. 1. THe Mind being every day informed by the Senses, of the alte∣ration of those simple Ideas it observes in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another be∣gins to exist which was not before; reflecting also on what passes within it self, and observing a constant change of its Ideas, sometimes by the im∣pression of outward Objects on the Senses, and sometimes by the determi∣nation of its own choice, and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like Changes will for the future be made in the same things, by like Agents, and by the like ways, considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple Ideas changed, and in another the possibility of making that change; and so comes by that Idea which we call Power. Thus we say, Fire has a power to melt Gold, i. e. to destroy the consistency of its insensible parts, and consequently its hard∣ness, and make it fluid; and Gold has a power to be melted; That the Sun has a power to blanch Wax, and Wax a power to be blanched by the Sun, whereby the Yellowness is destroy'd, and Whiteness made to exist in its room: in which, and the like Cases, the Power we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable Ideas. For we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon any thing, but by the observable change of its sensible Ideas; nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a Change of some of its Ideas.

§. 2. Power thus considered is twofold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive any change: The one may be called Active, and the other Pas∣sive Power. Whether matter be not wholly destitute of active Power, as its Author GOD is truly above all passive power; and whether the intermediate state of created Spirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and passive Power, may be worth consideration: I shall not now enter into that enquiry, my present business being not to search into the original of Power, but how we come by the Idea of it. But since active Powers make so great a part of our complex Ideas of na∣tural

Substances, (as we shall see hereafter,) and I mention them as such according to common apprehension; yet they being not, perhaps, so truly active Powers, as our hasty Thoughts are apt to represent them, I judge it not amiss, by this intimation, to direct our Minds to the con∣sideration of GOD and Spirits, for the clearest Idea of active Power.

§. 3. I confess Power includes in it some kind of relation, (a relation to Action or Change,) as indeed which of our Ideas, of what kind soever, when attentively considered, does not? For our Ideas of Extension, Dura∣tion, and Number, do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the Parts? Figure and Motion have something relative in them much more vi∣sibly; and sensible Qualities, as Colours and Smells, &c. what are they but the Powers of different Bodies, in relation to our Perception, &c. And if considered in the things themselves, do they not depend on the Bulk, Fi∣gure, Texture, and Motion of the Parts? All which include some kind of relation in them. Our Idea therefore of Power, I think, may well have a place amongst other simple Ideas, and be considered as one of them, being one of those that makes a principle Ingredient in our complex Ideas of Substances, as we shall here after have occasion to shew.

§. 4. Of passive Power, all sensible things abundantly furnish us with Ideas; whose sensible Qualities and Beings we find to be in a continual flux, and therefore with reason we look on them as liable still to the same Change. Nor have we of active Power (which is the more proper signi∣fication of the word Power) fewer instances: since whatever Change is observed, the Mind must collect a Power somewhere, able to make that Change, as well as a possibility in the thing it self to receive it. But yet if we will consider it attentively, Bodies by our Senses do not afford us so clear and distinct an Idea of active Power, as we have from reflection on the Operations of our Minds. For all Power relating to Action, and there being but two sorts of Action whereof we have any Idea, viz. Thinking and Motion, let us consider whence we have the clearest Ideas of the Powers which produce these Actions. 1. Of Thinking, Body affords us no Idea at all, it is only from Reflection that we have that; neither have we from Body any Idea of the beginning of Motion. A Body at rest af∣fords us no Idea of any active Power to move; and when it is set in mo∣tion its self, that Motion is rather a Passion, than an Action in it: For when the Ball obeys the stroke of a Billiard-stick•• it is not any action of the Ball, but bare passion; also when by impulse it sets another Ball in mo∣tion that lay in its way, it only communicates the Motion it had received from another, and loses in it self so much as the other received; which gives us but a very obscure Idea of an active Power of Moving in Body, whilst we observe it only to transferr, but not produce any motion. For it is but a very obscure Idea of Power, which reaches not the Production of the Action, but the Continuation of the Passion: For so is Motion in a Body impelled by another; the continuation of the Alteration made in it from Rest to Motion, being little more an Action, than the continuation of the Alteration of its Figure by the same blow is an Action. The Idea of the beginning of Motion, we have only from reflection on what passes in our selves, where we find by Experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the Mind, we can move the parts of our Bodies, which were before at rest: So that it seems to me, we have from the observation of the operation of Bodies by our Senses, but a very imperfect obscure Idea of active Power, since they afford us not any Idea in themselves of the Power to begin any Action, either Motion or Thought. But if from the Impulse Bodies are observed to make one upon another, any one thinks he

has a clear Idea of Power, it serves as well to my purpose, Sensation being one of those ways, whereby the Mind comes by its Ideas; only I thought it worth while to consider here by the way, whether the Mind doth not receive its Idea of active Power clearer from reflection on its own Opera∣tions, than it doth from any external Sensation.

§. 5. This at least I think evident, That we find in our selves a Power to begin or forbear, continue or end several, Thoughts of our Minds, and Motions of our Bodies, barely by the choice or preference of our Minds. This Power the Mind has to prefer the Consideration of any Idea, to the not considering it; or to prefer the Motion of any part of the Body, to its Rest, is that, I think, we call the Will; and the actual preferring one to another, is that we call Volition, or Willing. The power of Perception, is that we call the Vnderstanding: Perception, which we make the act of the Understanding, is of three sorts: 1. The Perception of Ideas in our Minds. 2. The Perception of the signification of Signs. 3. The Perce∣ception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any distinct Ideas. All these are attributed to the Understanding, or perceptive Power, though it be to the two latter, that in strictness of Speech, the act of Understan∣ding is usually applied.

§. 6. These Powers of the Mind, viz. of Perceiving, and of Preferring, are usually call'd by another name; and the ordinary way of Speaking is, That the Understanding and Will, are two Faculties of the Mind; a word proper enough, if it be used as all Words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in Mens Thoughts, by being supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real Beings in the Soul, that performed those Actions of Understanding and Volition. For when we say the Will is the comman∣ding and superiour Faculty of the Soul; that it is, or is not free; that it de∣termines the inferiour Faculties; that it follows the Dictates of the Under∣standing, &c. though these and the like Expressions, by those that care∣fully attend to their own Ideas, and conduct their Thoughts more by the evidence of Things, than the sound of Words, may be understood in a clear and distinct sense; yet I suspect, I say, that this way of speaking of Fa∣culties, has misled many into a confused Notion of so many distinct Agents in us, which had their several Provinces and Authorities, and did command, obey, and perform several Actions, as so many distinct Beings; which has been no small occasion of wrangling, obscurity, and uncertainty in Que∣stions relating to them.

§. 7. Every one, I think, finds in himself a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several Actions in himself. The power the Mind has at any time to prefer any particular one of those Actions to its for∣bearance, or Vice versa, is that Faculty which, as I have said, we call the Will; the actual exercise of that Power we call Volition; and the for∣bearance or performance of that Action, consequent to such a preference of the Mind, is call'd Voluntary. Hence we have the Ideas of Liberty and Necessity, which arise from the consideration of the extent of this Power of the Mind over the Actions, not only of the Mind, but the whole Agent, the whole Man.

§. 8. All the Actions that we have any Idea of reducing themselves, as has been said, to these two, viz. Thinking and Motion, so far as a Man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference of his own choice, so far is a Man Free. Where-ever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a Man's power; where∣ver doing or not doing, will not equally follow upon the preference o•• his Mind, there he is not Free, though perhaps the Action may be voluntary.

So that the Idea of Liberty, is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any Action, according to the determination or thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is preferr'd to the other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be produced by him according to his preference, there is not Liberty, That Agent is under Necessity. So that Liberty cannot be, where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Will; but there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Voli∣tion, where there is no Liberty. A little Consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear.

§. 9. A Tennis-ball, whether in Motion by the stroke of a Racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a free Agent. If we en∣quire into the Reason, we shall find it is, because we conceive not a Ten∣nis-ball to think, and consequently not to have any Volition, or preference of Motion to rest, or vice versâ; and therefore has not Liberty, is not a free Agent; but all its both Motion and Rest, come under our Idea of Necessary, and are so call'd. Likewise a Man falling into the Water, (a Bridge breaking under him,) has not herein liberty, is not a free Agent. For though he has Volition, though he preferrs his not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that Motion not being in his Power, the stop or Cessation of that Motion follows not upon his Volition; and therefore therein he is not free. So a Man striking himself, or his Friend, by a Con∣vulsive motion of his Arm, which is not in his Power upon his Preference or Volition to forbear; no Body thinks he has in this Liberty; every one pities him, as acting by Necessity and Constraint.

§. 10. Again, suppose a Man be carried, whilst fast asleep, into a Room, where is a Person he longs to see and speak with; and be there locked fast in, beyond his Power to get out: he awakes, and is glad to find himself in so desirable Company, which he stays willingly in, i. e. preferrs his stay to going away; I ask, Is not this stay voluntary? I think, no Bo∣dy will doubt it; and yet being locked fast in, 'tis evident he is not at li∣berty not to stay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that Liberty is not an Idea belonging to Volition, or preferring; but to the Person having the Power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the Mind shall chuse. Our Idea of Liberty reaches as far as that Power, and no farther. For whereever restraint comes to check that Power, or compulsion, takes away that Indifferency to act, or not to act; there liberty, and our Notion of it, presently ceases.

§. 11. We have instances enough, and often more than enough in our own Bodies. A Man's Heart beats, and the Blood circulates, which 'tis not in his Power by any Thought or Volition to stop; and therefore in respect of these Motions, where rest depends not on his choice, nor would follow the determination of his Mind, if it should prefer it, he is not a free Agent. Convulsive Motions agitate his Legs; so that though he wills it never so much, he cannot by any power of his Mind stop their Motion, (as in that odd Disease called Chorea Sancti Viti,) but he is perpe∣tually dancing: He is not at Liberty in this Action, but under as much Necessity of moving, as a Stone that falls, or a Tennis-ball struck with a Racket. On the other side, a Palsie or Stocks hinder his Legs from obey∣ing the determination of his Mind, if it would thereby transferr his Body to another Place. In all these there is want of Freedom, though the sitting still even of a Paralitick, whilst he preferrs it to removal, is truly voluntary: Voluntary then is not opposed to Necessary; but to Involuntary. For a Man may prefer what he can do, to what he cannot do; the State he is in, to its absence or change, though Necessity has made it in it self unalterable.

§. 12. As it is in the Motions of the Body, so it is in the Thoughts of our Minds; where any one is such, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the Mind, there we are at liberty. A waking Man being under the necessity of having some Ideas con∣stantly in his Mind, is not at liberty to think, or not to think; no more than he is at liberty, whether his Body shall touch any other, or no: But whether he will remove his Contemplation from one Idea to another, is many times in his choice; and then he is in respect of his Ideas, as much at liberty, as he is in respect of Bodies he rests on: He can at pleasure re∣move himself from one to another. But yet some Ideas to the Mind, like some Motions to the Body, are such, as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use. A Man on the Rack, is not at liberty to lay by the Idea of pain, and entertain other Contemplations; and sometimes a boisterous Passion hurries our Thoughts, as a Hurricane does our Bodies, without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather chuse: But as soon as the Mind regains the power to stop or continue, begin or forbear any of these Motions of the Body without, or Thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, then we consider the Man as a free Agent again.

§. 13. Where-ever Thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear, there Necessity takes place. This in an Agent capable of Voli∣tion, when the beginning or continuation of any Action is contrary to that preference of his Mind, is called Compulsion; when the hindring or stopping any Action is contrary to his Volition, it is called Restraint. Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing ne∣cessary Agents.

§. 14. If this be so, (as I imagine it is,) I leave it to be considered, whe∣ther it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and, I think, un∣reasonable, because unintelligible, Question, viz. Whether Man's Will be free, or no. For if I mistake not, it follows from what I have said, that the Question it self is altogether improper: And it is as insignificant to ask, whether Man's Will be free, as to ask, whether his Sleep be Swift, or his Vertue square; Liberty being as little applicable to the Will, as swiftness of Motion is to Sleep, or squareness to Vertue. Every one would laugh at the absurdity of such a Question as either of these, because it is obvious, that the modifications of Motion being not to sleep, nor the difference of Figure to Vertue; and when any one well considers it, I think he will as plainly perceive, that Liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to A∣gents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the Will, which is also but a Power.

§. 15. Volition, 'tis plain, is nothing but the actual choosing or prefer∣ing forbearance to the doing, or doing to the forbearance, of any parti∣cular Action in our power, that we think on. And what is the Will, but the Faculty to do this? And is that Faculty any thing more in effect, than a Power, the power of preferring any Action to its Forbearance, or vice versâ, as far as it appears to depend on us? For can it be denied, that whatever Agent has a power to think on its own Actions, and to preferr their doing or omission either to other, has that Facul∣ty call'd Will. Will then is nothing, but such a power; Liberty, on the other side, is the power a Man has to do or forbear doing any particular Action, according as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference in the Mind, which is the same thing as to say, according as he himself wills it.

§. 16. 'Tis plain then, That the Will is nothing but one Power or Ability, and Freedom another Power or Ability: So that to ask, whether the Will has Freedom, is to ask, whether one Power has another Power, one Ability another Ability; a Question at first sight too grosly absurd to make a Dispute, or need an Answer. For who is it that sees not, that Powers belong only to Agents, and are Attributes only of Substances, and not of Powers themselves? So that this way of putting the question, viz. whether the Will be free, is in effect to ask, whether the Will be a Sub∣stance, an Agent, or at least to suppose it, since Freedom can properly be attributed to nothing else. If Freedom can with any propriety of Speech be applied to Power, it may be attributed to the Power, is in a Man, to produce, or forbear producing Motion in parts of his Body, by choice or preference; which is that which denominates him free, and is Freedom it self. But if any one should ask, whether Freedom were free, he would be suspected not to understand well what he said; and he would be thought to deserve Midas's Ears, who knowing that Rich was a denomi∣nation from the possession of Riches, should demand whether Riches themselves were rich.

§. 17. However the name Faculty, which Men have given to this Power call'd the Will, and so talked of it as acting, may by this appropri∣ated term, seem a little to palliate the absurdity, yet the Will in truth, signifies nothing but a Power, or Ability, to preferr or choose; and when considered, as it is, barely as an Ability to do something, it will easily dis∣cover the absurdity, in saying it is free, or not free. For if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of Faculties, as distinct Beings, that can act, (as we do, when we say the Will orders, and the Will is free,) 'tis fit that we should make a speaking Faculty, and a walking Faculty, and a dancing Faculty, by which those Actions are produced, which are but several Modes of Mo∣tion; as well as we do the Will and Understanding to be Faculties, by which the Actions of Choosing and Perceiving are produced, which are but several Modes of Thinking; and we may as properly say, that 'tis the singing Faculty sings, and the dancing Faculty dances, as that the Will chooses, or that the Understanding conceives; or, as is usual, that the Will directs the Understanding, or the Understanding obeys, or obeys not the Will. It being altogether as proper and intelligible to say, that the power of Speaking directs the power of Singing, or the power of Singing obeys or disobeys the power of Speaking.

§. 18. This way of talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and, as I guess, produced great confusion; for these being all different Powers in the Mind, or in the Man, to do several Actions, he exerts them as he thinks fit; but the power to do one Action, is not operated on by the power of doing another Action. For the power of Thinking operates not on the power of Choosing; nor the power of Choosing on the power of Thin∣king, no more than the power of Dancing operates on the power of Sing∣ing, or the power of Singing on the power of Dancing, as any one may easily perceive, who will but consider; and yet that is it which we say, when we thus speak, that the Will operates on the Vnderstanding, or the Vnderstanding on the Will.

§. 19. I grant, that this or that actual Thought, may be the occasion of Volition, or exercising the power a Man has to choose; or the actual choice of the Mind, the cause of actual thinking on this or that thing: As the actual singing of such a Tune, may be the occasion of dancing such a Dance, and the actual dancing of such a Dance, the occasion of singing such a Tune: But in all these, it is not one power that operates on another;

for Powers are Relations, not Agents: but it is the Mind, or the Man, that operates, and exerts these Powers; that does the Action, he has power, or is able to do. That which has the power, or not the power to operate, is that alone, which is, or is not free; and not the Power it self: for Free∣dom, or not Freedom, can belong to nothing, but what has, or has not a power to act.

§. 20. The attributing to Faculties, that which belonged not to them, has given occasion to this way of talking: but the introducing into Dis∣courses concerning the Mind, with the name of Faculties, a Notion of their operating, has, I suppose, as little advanced our Knowledge in that part of our selves; as the great use and mention of the like invention of Faculties, in the operations of the Body, has helped us in the knowledge of Physick. Not that I deny there are Faculties both in the Body and Mind: they both of them have their powers of Operating, else neither the one nor the other could operate: For nothing can operate, that is not able to ope∣rate; and that is not able to operate, that has no power to operate. Nor do I deny, that those Words, and the like, are to have their place in the common use of Languages, that have made them currant. It looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by: and Philosophy it self, though it likes not a gaudy dress, yet when it appears in publick, must have so much Complacency, as to be cloathed in the ordinary Fashion and Language of the Country, so far as it can consist with Truth and Per∣spicuity. But the fault has been, that Faculties have been spoken of, and represented, as so many distinct Agents: For it being asked, what it was that digested the Meat in our Stomachs? it was a ready, and very satisfacto∣ry Answer, to say, That it was the digestive Faculty. What was it that made any thing come out of the Body? The expulsive Faculty. What moved? The Motive Faculty: And so in the Mind the intellectual Faculty, or the Understanding, understood; and the elective Faculty, or the Will, willed or commanded: which is in short to say, That the ability to digest, digested; and the ability to move, moved; and the ability to understand, understood. For Faculty, Ability, and Power, I think, are but diffe∣rent names of the same things: Which ways of speaking, when put into more intelligible Words, will, I think, amount to thus much; That Di∣gestion is performed by something that is able to digest; Motion by some∣thing able to move; and Understanding by something able to under∣stand. And in truth it would be very strange if it should be otherwise; as strange as it would be for a Man to be free without being able to be free.

§. 21. To return then to the Enquiry about Liberty, I think the Que∣stion is not proper, whether the Will be free, but whether a Man be free. Thus, I think,

1. That so far as any one can, by choice, or preference of the existence of any Action, to the non-existence of that Action, and, vice versâ, make it to exist, or not exist; so far he is free: For if I can, by the preference of the motion of my Finger to its rest, make it move, or vice versâ, 'tis evi∣dent, that in respect of that, I am free: and if I can, by a like thought of my Mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words, or silence, I am at liberty to speak, or hold my peace; and as far as this Power reaches, of acting, or not acting, by the determination of his own Thought preferring either, so far is a Man free. For how can we think any one freer than to have the power to do what he will? And so far as any one can (by pre∣ferring any Action to its not being; or Rest to any Action) produce that Action or Rest, so far can he do, what he will: For such a preferring of

Action to its absence, is the willing of it: and we can scarce tell how to imagine any Being freer, than to be able to do what he will: So that in respect of Actions, within the reach of such a power in him, a Man seems as free, as 'tis possible for Freedom to make him.

§. 22. But the inquisitive Mind of Man, willing to shift off from him∣self, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be by putting him∣self into a worse state than that of fatal Necessity, is not content with this; will have this to be no freedom, unless it reaches farther: but is ready to say, a Man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will, as he is to act, what he wills. Concerning a Man's Liberty there yet therefore is raised this far∣ther Question, Whether a Man be free to will; which, I think, is that meant, when it is disputed, Whether the will be free: And as to that, I imagine,

§. 23. 2. That Willing, or Choosing being an Action, and Freedom consisting in a power of acting, or not acting, a Man in respect of willing any Action in his power once proposed to his Thoughts, cannot be free. The reason whereof is very manifest: for it being unavoidable that the Action depending on his Will, should exist, or not exist; and its existence, or not existence, following perfectly the determination, and preference of his Will, he cannot avoid willing the existence, or not existence, of that Action; it is absolutely necessary that he will the one, or the other, i. e. prefer the one to the other: since one of them must necessarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the choice and determinati••n of his Mind; that is, by his willing it: for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in respect of the act of willing, a Man is not free: Liberty consisting in a power to act, or not to act, which, in regard of Volition, a Man has not: it being necessary, and unavoidable (any Action in his power being once thought on) to prefer either its doing, or forbearance, upon which pre∣ference, the Action, or its forbearance certainly follows, and is truly volun∣tary. So that to make a Man free in this sense, there must be another an∣tecedent Will, to determine the Acts of this Will, and another to deter∣mine that, and so in infinitum: for where-ever one stops, the Actions of the last Will cannot be free: Nor is any Being, as far as I can compre∣hend Beings above me, capable of such a freedom of Will, that it can for∣bear to Will, i. e. to preferr the being, or not being of any thing in its power, which it has one considered as such.

§. 24. This then is evident, A Man is not at liberty to will, or not to will any thing in his power, that he once considers of: Liberty consisting in a power to act, or not to act, and in that only. For a Man that sits still, is said yet to be at liberty, because he can walk if he wills it. A Man that walks is at liberty in that respect: not because he walks, or moves; but because he can stand still if he wills it. But if a Man sitting still has not a power to remove himself, he is not at liberty: nor a Man falling down a precipice, though in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion if he would: But a Man that is walking, to whom it is proposed to give off walking, is not at liberty, whether he will will, or no: he must necessarily prefer one, or t'other of them; walking or not walking: and so it is in re∣gard of all other Actions in our power; they being once proposed, the Mind has not a power to act, or not to act, wherein consists Liberty: It has not a power to forbear willing, it cannot avoid some determination concer∣ning them, let the Consideration be as short, the Thought as quick as it will, it either leaves the Man in the state he was before thinking, or changes it: whereby it is manifest it prefers one to the other, and there∣by either the continuation, or change becomes unavoidably voluntary.

§. 25. Since then it is plain, a Man is not at liberty, whether he will Will, or no; (for when a thing in his power is proposed to his Thoughts, he cannot forbear Volition, he must determine one way or other;) the next thing to be demanded is, Whether a Man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, Motion or Rest. This Question carries the absurdi∣ty of it so manifestly in it self, that one might thereby sufficiently be con∣vinced, that Liberty concerns not the Will in any case. For to ask, whe∣ther a man be at liberty to will either Motion, or Rest; Speaking, or Silence; which he pleases, is to ask, whether a Man can will, what he wills; or be pleased with what he is pleased with. A Question which, I think, needs no answer: and they, who can make a Question of it, must suppose one Will to determine the Acts of another, and another to determinate that; and so on in infinitum, an absurdity before taken notice of.

§. 26. To avoid these, and the like absurdities, nothing can be of greater use, than to establish in our Minds clear and steady Notions of the things under Consideration: if the Ideas of Liberty, and Volition, were well fixed in our Understandings, and carried along with us in our Minds, as they ought, through all the Questions are raised about them, I suppose, a great part of the Difficulties, that perplex Mens Thoughts, and entangle their Understandings, would be much easier resolved; and we should perceive where the confused signification of terms, or where the nature of the thing caused the obscurity.

§. 27. First then, it is carefully to be remembred, That Freedom con∣sists in the dependence of the Existence, or not Existence of any Action, up∣on our Volition of it, and not in the dependence of any Action, or its contra∣ry, on our preference. A Man standing on a cliff, is at liberty to leap twenty Yards downwards into the Sea; not because he has a power to do the contrary Action, which is to leap twenty Yards upwards, for that he cannot do: but he is therefore free, because he has a power to leap, or not to leap. But if a greater force than his, either hold him fast, or tumble him down, he is no longer free in that case: because the doing, or for∣bearance, of that particular Action, is no longer in his power. He that is a close Prisoner, in a Room twenty foot square, being at the North-side of his Chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty foot Southward, because he can walk, or not walk it: but is not, at the same time, at liberty, to do the con∣trary; i. e. to walk twenty foot Northward.

In this then consists Freedom (viz.) in our being able to act, or not to act, according as we shall choose, or will.

§. 28. Secondly, In the next place we must remember, that Volition or Willing, regarding only what is in our power, is nothing but the prefer∣ring the doing of any thing, to the not doing of it; Action to Rest, & con∣tra. Well, but what is this Preferring? It is nothing but the being plea∣sed more with the one, than the other. Is then a Man indifferent to be pleased, or not pleased, more with one thing than another? Is it in his choice, whether he will, or will not be better pleased with one thing than another? And to this, I think, every one's Experience is ready to make answer, No. From whence it follows,

§. 29. Thirdly, That the Will, or Preference, is determined by something without it self: Let us see then what it is determined by. If willing be but the being better pleased, as has been shewn, it is easie to know what 'tis de∣termines the Will, what 'tis pleases best: every one knows 'tis Happiness, or that which makes any part of Happiness, or contributes to it; and that is it we call Good. Happiness and Misery are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not: 'tis what Eye hath not seen,

Ear hath not heard, nor hath entred into the Heart of Man to conceive. But of some degrees of both, we have very lively impressions made by several instances of Delight and Joy on the one side, and Torment and Sorrow on the other: which, for shortness sake, I shall comprehend under the names of Pleasure and Pain, there being pleasure and pain of the Mind, as well as the Body: With Him is fulness of Ioy, and Pleasures for evermore: Or to speak truly, they are all of the Mind; though some have their rise in the Mind from Thought, others in the Body from Motion. Happiness then is the utmost Pleasure we are capable of, and Misery the utmost Pain. Now because Pleasure and Pain are produced in us, by the operation of certain Objects, either on our Minds, or our Bodies; and in different degrees: therefore what has an aptness to produce pleasure in us, is that we labour for, and is that we call Good; and what is apt to produce pain in us, we avoid and call Evil, for no other reason, but for its aptness to produce Pleasure and Pain in us, wherein consists our happiness or misery. Farther, because the degrees of Pleasure and Pain have also justly a prefe∣rence; though what is apt to produce any degree of Pleasure, be in it self good; and what is apt to produce any degree of Pain, be evil; yet it of∣ten happens, that we do not call it so, when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort. So that if we will rightly estimate what we call Good and Evil, we shall find it lies much in comparison: For the cause of every less degree of Pain, as well as every greater degree of Pleasure, has the nature of Good, and vice versâ, and is that which determines our Choice, and challenges our Preference. Good then, the greater Good is that alone which determines the Will.

§. 30. This is not an imperfection in Man, it is the highest perfection of intellectual Natures: it is so far from being a restraint or diminution of Freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: 'tis not an Abrigdment, 'tis the end and use of our Liberty: and the farther we are removed from such a determination to Good, the nearer we are to Misery and Slavery. A perfect Indifferency in the Will, or Power of Preferring, not determinable by the Good or Evil, that is thought to attend its Choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual Nature, that it would be as great an im∣perfection, as the want of Indifferency to act, or not to act, till determi∣ned by the Will, would be an imperfection on the other side. A Man is at liberty to lift up his Hand to his Head, or let it rest quiet: He is perfectly indifferent to either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that Power, if he were deprived of that Indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection, if he had the same Indifferency, whe∣ther he would prefer the li••ting up his Hand, or its remaining in rest, when it would ••ave his Head or Eyes from a blow he sees coming: 'tis as much a perfection, that the power of Preferring should be determined by Good, as that the power of Acting should be determined by the Will; and the certainer such determination is, the greater is the perfection.

§. 31. If we look upon those superiour Beings above us, who enjoy per∣fect Happiness, we shall have reason to judge they are more steadily deter∣mined in their choice of Good than we: and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite Creatures as we are, to pronounce what infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, That God himself cannot choose what is not good; the Fredom of the Almighty hinders not his be∣ing determined by what is best.

§. 32. But to consider this mistaken part of Liberty right, Would any one be a Changeling, because he is less determined, by wise Considerations, than a wise Man? Is it worth the Name of Freedom to be at liberty to play the Fool, and draw Shame and Misery upon a Man's self? If want of restraint to chuse, or to do the worse, be Liberty, true Liberty, mad Men and Fools are the only Free-men: but yet, I think, no Body would chuse to be mad for the sake of such Liberty, but he that is mad already.

§. 33. But though the preference of the Mind be always determined by the appearance of Good, greater Good; yet the Person who has the Pow∣er, in which alone consists liberty to act, or not to act according to such preference, is nevertheless free, such determination abridges not that Pow∣er. He that has his Chains knocked off, and the Prison-doors set open to him, is perfectly at liberty, because he may either go or stay, as he best likes; though his preference be determined to stay by the darkness of the Night, or illness of the Weather, or want of other Lodging. He ceases not to be free; though that which at that time appears to him the grea∣ter Good absolutely determines his preference, and makes him stay in his Prison. I have rather made use of the Word Preference than Choice, to express the act of Volition, because choice is of a more doubtful significa∣tion, and bordering more upon Desire, and so is referred to things re∣mote; whereas Volition, or the Act of Willing, signifies nothing properly, but the actual producing of something that is voluntary.

§. 34. The next thing to be considered is, If our Wills be determined by Good, How it comes to pass that Men's Wills carry them so contrarily, and consequently some of them to what is Evil? And to this I say, that the various and contrary choices, that Men make in the World, doe not argue, that they do not all chuse Good; but that the same thing is not good to every Man. Were all the Concerns of Man terminated in this Life; why one pursued Study and Knowledge, and another Hawking and Hunting; why one chose Luxury and Debauchery, and another So∣briety and Riches, would not be, because every one of these did not pur∣sue his own Happiness; but because their Happiness lay in different things; And therefore 'twas a right Answer of the Physician to his Patient, that had sore Eyes. If you have more Pleasure in the Taste of Wine, than in the use of your Sight, Wine is good for you: but if the Pleasure of Seeing be greater to you, than that of Drinking, Wine is naught.

§. 35. The Mind has a different relish, as well as the Palate; and you will as fruitlesly endeavour to delight all Men with Riches or Glory, (which yet some Men place their Happiness in,) as you would to satisfie all Men's Hunger with Cheese or Lobsters; which, though very agreeable and delicious fare to some, are to others extremely nauseous and offensive: And many People would with Reason prefer the griping of an hungry Belly, to those Dishes, which are a Feast to others. Hence it was, I think, that the Philosophers of old did in vain enquire, whether Summum bonum consisted in Riches, or bodily Delights, or Virtue, or Contemplation: And they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the best Relish were to be found in Apples, Plumbs, or Nuts; and have divided themselves into Sects upon it. For as pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves, but their agreea∣bleness to this or that particular Palate, wherein there is great variety: So the greatest Happiness consists, in the having those things which pro∣duce the greatest Pleasure, and the absence of those which cause any di∣sturbance, any pain, which to different Men are very different things.

If therefore Men in this Life only have hope; if in this Life they can on∣ly enjoy, 'tis not strange, nor unreasonable, they should seek their Happi∣ness by avoiding all things that disease them here, and by preferring all that delight them; wherein it will be no wonder to find variety and dif∣ference. For if there be no Prospect beyond the Grave, the inference is certainly right, Let us eat and drink, let us enjoy what we delight in, for to morrow we shall die. This, I think, may serve to shew us the Reason, why, though all Men's Wills are determined by Good, yet they are not determined by the same Object. Men may chuse different things, and yet all chuse right, supposing them only like a Company of poor Insects, whereof some are Bees, delighted with Flowers, and their sweetness; others Scarabes, delighted with other kind of Viands; which having enjoyed for a Season, they should cease to be, and exist no more for ever.

§. 36. This sufficiently discovers to us, why Men in this World prefer diffe∣rent things, and pursue Happiness by contrary Courses: But yet since Men are always determined by Good, the greater Good; and are constant, and in earnest, in matter of Happiness and Misery, the Question still remains, How Men come often to prefer the worse to the better; and to chuse that, which by their own Confession has made them miserable?

§. 37. To this I answer, That as to present Happiness, or Misery; pre∣sent Pleasure or Pain, when that alone comes in Consideration, a Man never chuses amiss: he knows what best pleases him, and that, he actually pre∣fers. Things in their present enjoyment, are what they seem: the apparent and real good, are, in this case, always the same. For the Pain or Pleasure being just so great, and no greater, than it is felt, the present Good or Evil is really so much as it appears. And therefore were every Action of ours concluded within it self, and drew no Consequences after it, we should undoubtedly always will nothing but Good; always infallibly pre∣fer the best. Were the pains of honest Industry, and of starving with Hunger and Cold set together before us, no Body would be in doubt which to chuse: were the satisfaction of a Lust, and the Joys of Heaven offered at once to any one's present Possession, he would not balance, or err in the choice, and determination of his Will. But since our voluntary Actions carry not all the Happiness, and Misery, that depend on them, along with them in their present performance; but are the precedent Causes of Good and Evil, which they draw after them, and bring upon us, when they themselves are passed, and cease to be; that which has the Preference, and makes us will the doing or omitting any Action in our Power, is the greater Good, appearing to result from that choice in all its Consequences, as far as at present they are represented to our view.

§. 38. So that, that which determines the choice of the Will, and obtains the preference, is still Good, the greater Good: But it is also only Good that appears; that which carries with it the Expectation of Addition to our Happiness, by the increase of our Pleasures, either in Degrees, Sorts, or Duration, or by the preventing, lessening, or shortning of pain. Thus the Temptation of a pleasant Taste, brings a Surfeit, a Disease, and, per∣haps, Death too, on one, who looks no farther than that apparent Good, than the present Pleasure; who sees not the remote and concealed Evil: and the hopes of easing or preventing some greater pain, sweetens another Man's Draught, and makes that willingly be swallowed, which in it self is nauseous and unpleasant. Both these Men were moved to what they did by the appearance of Good, though the one found Ease and Health, and the other a Disease and Destruction: and therefore to him that looks beyond this World, and is fully persuaded, that God the righteous Judge,

will render to every Man according to his Deeds; To them who by pa∣tient continuance in well doing, seek for Glory, and Honour, and Immor∣tality, Eternal Life; but unto every Soul that doth Evil, Indignation and Wrath, Tribulation and Anguish: To him, I say, who hath a prospect of the different State of perfect Happiness, or Misery that attends all Men after this Life, depending on their Behaviour here, the measures of Good and Evil, that govern his choice, are mightily changed. For since no∣thing of Pleasure and Pain in this Life, can bear any proportion to endless Happiness, or exquisite Misery of an immortal Soul hereafter, Actions in his Power will have their preference, not according to the transient Plea∣sure, or Pain that accompanies, or follows them here; but as they serve to secure that perfect durable Happiness hereafter.

§. 36. He then that will account for the Misery, that Men often bring on themselves, notwithstanding that they do all in earnest pursue Happiness, and always prefer the greater apparent Good, must consider, how Things come to be represented to our choice, under deceitful appearances: and that is, by the Iudgment pronouncing wrongly concerning them. To see how far this reaches, and what are the Causes of wrong Judgment, we must remember, that things are judged good or bad in a double Sense.

First, That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely Pleasure or Pain.

Secondly, But because not only present Pleasure and Pain, but that also which is apt by its efficacy, or consequences, to bring it upon us at a distance, cannot but move the Will, and determine the choice of a Creature, that has soresight; therefore things also that draw after them Pleasure and Pain, are considered as Good and Evil.

§. 40. The wrong Iudgment that misleads us, and makes the Will often fasten on the worse side, lies in misreporting upon the various Compari∣sons of these. The wrong Judgment I am here speaking of, is not what one Man may think, of the determination of another; but what every Man himself must confess to be wrong. For since I lay it for a certain ground, that every intelligent Being really seeks Happiness, and would enjoy all the pleasures he could, and suffer no pain; 'tis impossible any one should willingly put into his own draught any bitter Ingredient, or leave out any thing in his Power, that could add to its sweetness, but on∣ly by a wrong Judgment. I shall not here speak of that mistake, which is the consequence of invincible Error, which scarce deserves the Name of wrong Judgment; but of that wrong Judgment, which every Man him∣self must confess to be so.

§. 41. I. Therefore, as to present Pleasure and Pain, the Mind as has been said, never mistakes that which is really good or evil: that which is the greater Pleasure, or the greater Pain, is really just, as it appears. But though present Pleasure and Pain, shew their difference and degrees so plainly, as not to leave room for mistake: yet when we compare present Pleasure or Pain with future, we often make wrong Iudgments of them, ta∣king our measures of them in different positions of distance. Objects near our view, are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger size, that are more remote: and so it is with Pleasures and Pains, the present is apt to carry it, and those at a distance have the disadvantage in the Comparison. Thus most Men, like spend-thrift Heirs, are apt to judge a little in Hand better than a great deal to come; and so for small Mat∣ters in Possession, part with great ones in Reversion: but that this is a wrong Judgment every one must allow, let his pleasure consist in whatever it

will: since that which is future, will certainly come to be present; and then having the same advantage of nearness, will shew its self in its full dimen∣sions, and discover his wilful mistake, who judged of it by unequal mea∣sures. Were the Pleasure of Drinking accompanied, the very moment a Man takes off his Glass, with that sick Stomach, and akeing Head, which in some Men are sure to follow not many hours after, I think no body, whatever Pleasure he had in his Cups, would, on these Conditions, ever let Wine touch his Lips; which yet he gaily swallows, and the evil side comes to be chosen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time. But if Pleasure or Pain can be so lessened only by a few hours removal, how much more will it be so, by a farther distance, to a Man, that will not (by a due consideration, do, what time will, i. e. bring it home upon himself) con∣sider it as present, and there take its true dimensions? This is the way we usually impose on our selves, in respect of bare Pleasure and Pain, or the true degrees of Happiness or Misery: The future loses its just proportion, and what is present, obtains the preference as the greater. I mention not here the wrong Judgment, whereby the absent are not only lessened, but reduced to perfect nothing; when Men enjoy what they can in present, and make sure of that, concluding amiss, That no evil will thence follow: For that lies not in comparing the greatness of future Good and Evil, which is that we are here speaking of: But in another sort of wrong Judg∣ment, which is concerning Good or Evil, as it is considered, to be the cause and procurement of Pleasure or Pain, that will follow from it.

§. 42. The cause of our judging amiss, when we compare our pre∣sent Pleasure or Pain with future, seems to me to be the weak and narrow Constitutions of our Minds. We cannot well enjoy two Pleasures at once, much less any Pleasure almost, whilst Pain possesses us. The present Plea∣sure, if it be not very languid, and almost none at all, fills our narrow Souls, and so takes up all our Minds, that it scarce leaves any thought of things absent: Or if many of our Pleasures are not strong enough to ex∣clude the consideration of things at a distance; yet we have so great an abhorrence of Pain, that a little of it extinguishes all our Pleasures. A little bitter mingled in our Cup, leaves no relish of the sweet: and hence it comes, that at any rate we desire to be rid of the present Evil, which we are apt to think nothing absent can equal; since while the Pain remains, we find not our selves capable of any the least degree of Happiness. Hence we see the present Pain, any one suffers, is always the worst; and 'tis with anguish they cry out, Any other rather than this; nothing can be so into∣lerable as what I now suffer. And therefore our whole Endeavours and Thoughts are intent to get rid of the present Evil before all things, as the first necessary step towards Happiness, let what will follow. Nothing, as we passionately think, can exceed, or almost equal the Pain we feel: and because the abstinence from a present Pleasure that offers it self, is a sort of Pain; nay, oftentimes a very great one, 'tis no wonder, that that ope∣rates after the same manner Pain does, and lessens in our Thoughts what is future, and so forces us, as it were, blindfold into its embraces. Thus much of the wrong Judgment we make of present and future Pleasure and Pain, when they are compared together; and so the absent conside∣red as future.

§. 43. II. As to things good or bad in their Consequences, and by the apt∣ness is in them to procure us good or Evil in the future, we judge amiss several ways.

1. When we judge that so much Evil does not really depend on them, as in truth there does.

2. When we judge, that though the Consequence be of that moment, yet it is not of that certainty, but that it may otherwise fall out; or else by some means be avoided, as by industry, address, change, repentance, &c. But that these are wrong ways of judging, were easie to shew in every particular, if I would examine them at large singly; but I shall on∣ly mention this in general, viz. That it is a very wrong, and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater Good and Evil, for a less, upon uncer∣tain guesses, and before due, and through examination, as far as a Man's knowledge can, by any endeavours or assistance, attain. This, I think, every one must confess, especially if he considers the usual Causes of this wrong Iudgment, whereof these following are some.

§. 44. I. Ignorance: He that judges without informing himself to the utmost that he is capable, cannot acquit himself of judging amiss.

II. Inadvertency: When a Man overlooks even that which he does know. This is an affected and present Ignorance, which misleads our Judgments, as much as the other. Judging is, as it were, balancing an account, and determining on which side the odds lies. If therefore either side be hud∣led up in haste, and several of the Summs, that should have gone into the reckoning, be overlook'd and left out, this Precipitancy causes as wrong a Judgment, as if it were a perfect Ignorance. That which most com∣monly causes this, is the prevalency of some present Pleasure, heightned by our feeble passionate Nature, most strongly wrought on by what is present. To check this Precipitancy, our Understanding and Reason was given us, if we will make a right use of it, to search, and see, and then judge thereupon. How much sloth and negligence, heat and pas∣sion, the prevalency of fashion, or acquired indispositions, do severally contribute, on occasion to these wrong Judgments, I shall not here far∣ther enquire.

§. 45. This, I think, is certain, That the choice of the Will is every-where determined by the greater apparent Good, however it may be wrong repre∣sented by the Understanding; and it would be impossible Men should pursue so different Courses as they do in the World, had they not diffe∣rent Measures of Good and Evil. But yet Morality, established upon its true Foundations, cannot but determine the Choice in any one that will but consider: and he that will not be so far a rational Creature, as to reflect seriously upon infinite Happiness and Misery, must needs con∣demn himself, as not making that use of his Understanding he should. The Rewards and Punishments of another Life, which the Almighty has established as the Enforcements of his Law, are of weight enough to de∣termine the Choice, against whatever Pleasure or Pain this Life can shew, when the eternal State is considered in its bare possibility, which no Body can deny. He that will allow exquisite and endless Happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good Life here, or the contrary state the possible Reward of a bad one, must own himself to judge very much a∣miss, if he does not conclude, That a vertuous Life, with the certain ex∣pectation of everlasting Bliss, which may come, is to be preferred to a vi∣cious one, with the fear of that dreadful state of Misery, which 'tis very possible may overtake the guilty; or at best the terrible uncertain hope of Annihilation. This is evidently so, though the vertuous Life here had nothing but Pain, and the vicious continual pleasure; which yet is for the most part quite otherwise, and wicked Men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their present possession; nay, all things rightly consi∣dered, have, I think even the worse part here. But when infinite Hap∣piness is put in one Scale, against infinite Misery in the other; if the

worst, that comes to the pious Man, if he mistake, be the best that the wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, Who can without madness run the venture? Who in his Wits would chuse to come within a possibi∣lity of infinite Misery, which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas on the other side, the sober Man ventures nothing against infinite Happiness to be got, if his Expectation comes to pass. If the good Man be in the right, he is eternally happy: if he mistake, he is not miserable, he feels nothing. On the other side, if the wicked be in the right, he is not happy: if he mistake, he is infinitely miserable. Must it not be a most manifest wrong Judgment, that does not presently see, to which side, in this case, the preference is to be given. I have forborn to mention any thing of the certainty, or probability of a ••uture State, de∣signing here to shew the wrong Judgment, that any one must allow, he makes, upon his own Principles laid how he pleases, who prefers the short pleasures of a vicious Life upon any consideration, whilst he knows, and cannot but be certain, that a future Life is at least possible.

§. 46. Under this simple Idea of Power, I have taken occasion to ex∣plain our Ideas of Will, Volition, Liberty, and Necessity; which having a greater mixture in them, than belongs barely to simple Modes, might perhaps, be better placed amongst the more complex. For Will, for ex∣ample, contains in it the Idea of a Power to prefer the doing, to the not doing any particular Action (& vice versa) which it has thought on; which preference is truly a Mode of Thinking, and so the Idea which the word Will stands for, is a complex and mixed one, made up of the simple Ideas of Power, and a certain Mode of Thinking: and the Idea of Li∣berty is yet more complex, being made up of the Idea of a Power to act, or not to act, in conformity to Volition. But I hoped this transgression, against the method I have proposed to my self, will be forgiven me, if I have quitted it a little, to explain some Ideas of great importance; such as are those of the Will, Liberty, and Necessity, in this place, where they, as it were, offered themselves, and sprang up from their proper roots. Be∣sides, having before largely enough instanced in several simple Modes, to shew what I meant by them, and how the Mind got them, (for I in∣tend not to enumerate all the particular Ideas of each sort,) those of Will, Liberty, and Necessity, may serve as instances of mixed Modes, which are that sort of Ideas I purpose next to treat of.

§. 47. And thus I have, in a short draught, given a view of our ori∣ginal Ideas, from whence all the rest are derived, and of which they are made up; which if I would consider, as a Philosopher, and exa∣mine on what Causes they depend, and of what they are made, I be∣lieve they all might be reduced to these very few primary, and original ones, viz.

• ...Extension,
• ...Solidity,
• ...Mobility;

which by our Senses we receive from Body:

• Thinking, and the
• Power of Moving;

which by reflection we receive from our Minds; to which if we add

• ...Existence,
• ...Duration,
• ...Number;

which belong both to the one, and the other, we have, perhaps, all the ori∣ginal

Ideas on which the rest depend. For by these, I imagine, might be explained the nature of Colours, Sounds, Tastes, Smells, and all other Ideas we have, if we had but Faculties acute enough to perceive the severally modified Extensions, and Motions, of these minute Bodies, which produce those several Sensations in us. But my present purpose be∣ing to enquire only into the Knowledge the Mind has of Things, by those Ideas, and Appearances God has fitted it to receive from them, and how the Mind comes by that Knowledge; rather than into their Causes, or manner of Production, I shall not, contrary to the Design of this Essay, set my self to enquire philosophically into the peculiar Constitution of Bodies, and the Configuration of Parts, whereby they have the power to pro∣duce in us the Ideas of their sensible Qualities: I shall not enter any farther into that Disquisition; it sufficing to my purpose to observe, That Gold, or Saffron, has a power to produce in us the Idea of Yellow; and Snow, or Milk, the Idea of White; which we can have only by our Sight, without examining the Texture of the Parts of those Bodies, or the particular Figures, or Motion of the Particles, which rebound from them, to cause in us that particular Sensation: Though when we go beyond the bare Ideas in our Minds, and would enquire into their Causes, we cannot conceive any thing else, to be in any sensible Object, whereby it produces different Ideas in us, but the different Bulk, Figure, Number, Texture, and Motion of its insensible Parts.

CHAP. XXII. Of Mixed Modes.

§. 1. HAving treated of Simple Modes in the foregoing Chapters, and given several instances of some of the most considerable of them, to shew what they are, and how we come by them; we are now in the next place to consider those we call Mixed Modes, such are the Com∣plex Ideas, we make by the names Obligation, Drunkenness, a Lie, &c. which consisting of several Combinations of simple Ideas of different kinds, I have called Mixed Modes, to distinguish them from the more simple Modes, which consists only of simple Ideas of the same kind. These mixed Modes being also such Combinations of simple Ideas, as are not looked upon to be the characteristical Marks of any real Beings that have a steady existence, but scattered and independent Ideas, put together by the Mind, are thereby distinguished from the complex Ideas of Substances.

§. 2. That the Mind, in respect of its simple Ideas, is wholly passive, and receives them all from the Existence and Operations of Things, such as Sensation or Reflection offers them, without being able to make any one Idea Experience shews us. But if we attentively consider these Ideas I call mixed Modes, we are now speaking of, we shall find their Original quite different. The Mind here often exercises an active Power in the ma∣king these several Combinations: for it being once furnished with simple Ideas, it can put them together in several Compositions, and so make variety of complex Ideas, without examining whether they exist so toge∣ther in Nature. And hence, I think, it is, that these sort of Ideas are called Notions; as if they had their Original, and constant Existence more

in the Thoughts of Men, than in the reality of things; and to form such Ideas, it sufficed, that the Mind put the parts of them together, and that they were consistent in the Understanding, without considering whether they had any real Being. Though I do not deny, but several of them might be taken from Observation, and the Existence of several simple Ideas so combined, as they are put together in the Understanding: For the Man who first framed the Idea of Hypocrisie, might have either taken it at first from the observation of one, who made shew of good Qualities which he had not; or else have framed that Idea in his Mind, without having any such pattern to fashion it by. For it is evident, that in the beginning of Languages, and Societies of Men, several of those complex Ideas, which were consequent to the Constitutions established amongst them, must needs have been in the Minds of Men, before they existed any where else; and that many names, that stood for such complex Ideas, were in use, and so those Ideas framed, before the Combinations they stood for, ever existed.

§. 3. Indeed, now that Languages are made, and abound with words standing for them, an usual way of getting these complex Ideas, is by the explication of those terms that stand for them. For consisting of a com∣pany of simple Ideas combined, they may by words, standing for those simple Ideas, be represented to the Mind of one who understands those words, though that complex Combination of simple Ideas were never offered to his Mind by the real existence of things. Thus a Man may come to have the Idea of Sacrilege, or Murther, by enumerating to him the simple Ideas these words stand for, without ever seeing either of them committed.

§. 4. Every mixed Mode consisting of many distinct simple Ideas, it may be well enquired, whence it has its Vnity; and how such a precise multitude comes to make but one Idea, since that Combination does not always exist together in Nature: And this, it is plain, it has from an Act of the Mind combining those several simple Ideas together, and conside∣ring them as one complex one, consisting of those parts; and the mark of this Union, or that which is looked on generally to compleat it, is one name given to that Combination. For 'tis by their names, that Men com∣monly regulate their account of their distinct Species of mixed Modes, seldom allowing or considering any number of simple Ideas, to make one complex one, but such Collections as there be names for. Thus, though the killing of an old Man be as fit in Nature to be united into one com∣plex Idea, as the killing a Man's Father; yet there being no name stan∣ding precisely for the one, as there is the name of Parricide to mark the other, it is not taken for a particular complex Idea, nor a distinct Species of Actions, from that of killing a young Man, or any other Man.

§. 5. If we should enquire a little farther, to see what it is, that occasions Men to make several Combinations of simple Ideas into distinct, and, as it were, setled Modes, and neglect others, which in the Nature of Things themselves, have as much an aptness to be combined, and make distinct Ideas, we shall find the reason of it to be the end of Language; which be∣ing to mark, or communicate Mens Thoughts to one another, with all the dispatch that may be, they usually make such Collections of Ideas into complex Modes, and affix names to them, as they have frequent use of in their way of Living and Conversation, leaving others, which they have but seldom an occasion to mention, loose and without names, that tye them together: they rather chusing to enumerate (when they have need) such Ideas as make them up, by the particular names, that stand for them,

than to trouble their Memories by multiplying of complex Ideas with names to them, which they shall seldom or never have any occasion to make use of.

§. 6. This gives us the Reason how it comes to pass, that there are in every Language words which cannot be rendred by any words of another. For the several Fashions, Customs, and Manners of one Nation, making seve∣ral Combinations of Ideas familiar and necessary in one, which another People had never any occasion to make, or, perhaps, so much as take no∣tice of, Names come of course to be annexed to them, to avoid long Peri∣phrases in things of daily Conversation; and so they become so many di∣stinct complex Ideas in their Minds. Thus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 amongst the Greeks, and Proscripto amongst the Romans, stood for complex Ideas, which were not in the Minds of other People, nor had therefore any names in other Languages that answered them. Where there was no such Custom, there was no notion of any such Actions, no use of such Combinations of Ideas as were united, and, as it were, tied together by those terms; and therefore in other Countries there were no names for them.

§. 7. Hence also we may see the Reason, Why Languages constantly change, take up new, and lay by old terms. Because change of Customs and Opinions bringing with them new Combinations of Ideas, which it is necessary frequently to think on, and talk about, new names to avoid long descriptions are annexed to them; and so they become new Species of complex Modes. What a number of different Ideas are by this means wrapped up in one short sound, and how much of our Time and Breath is thereby saved, any one will see, who will but take the pains to enu∣merate all the Ideas, that either Reprieve or Appeal stand for; and in∣stead of either of those Names, use a Periphrasis to make any one under∣stand their meaning.

§. 8. Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at large, when I come to treat of Words, and their Use; yet I could not avoid to take thus much notice here of the names of mixed Modes, which being flee∣ting, and transient Combinations of simple Ideas, which have but a short existence any where, but in the Minds of Men; and there too have no longer any existence, than whilst they are thought on, have not so much any where the appearance of a constant and lasting existence, as in their Names; which are therefore, in these sort of Ideas, very apt to be taken for the Ideas themselves. For if we should enquire where the Idea of a Tri∣umph, or Apetheosis exists, it is evident, they could neither of them exist al∣together any where in the things themselves, being Actions that required time to their performance, and so could never all exist together: And as to the Minds of Men, where the Ideas of these Actions are supposed to be lodged, they have there too a very uncertain existence; and therefore we are apt to annex them to the Names that excite them in us.

§. 9. There are therefore three ways whereby we get these complex Ideas of mixed Modes. 1. By Experience and Observation of things themselves. Thus by seeing two Men wrastle, or fence, we get the Idea of wrastling or fencing 2. By Invention, or voluntary putting together of several simple Ideas in our own Minds: So he that first invented Printing, or Etching, had an Idea of it in his Mind, before it ever existed. 3. Which is the most usual way, by explaining the names of Actions we never saw, or Notions we cannot see; and by enumerating, and thereby, as it were, setting be∣fore our Imaginations all those Ideas which go to the making them up, and are the constituent parts of them. For having by Sensation and Re∣flection stored our Minds with simple Ideas, and by use got the Names,

that stand for them, we can by those Names represent to another any complex Idea, we could have him conceive: so that it has in it no simple Idea, but what he knows, and has, with us, the same name for. For all our complex Ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple Ideas, of which they are compounded, and originally made up, though perhaps their immedi∣ate Ingredients, as I may so say, are also complex Ideas. Thus the mix∣ed Mode, which the word Lye stands for, is made of these simple Ideas: 1. Articulate Sounds. 2. Certain Ideas in the Mind of the Speaker. 3. Those words the signs of those Ideas. 4. Those signs put together by affirmation or negation, otherwise than the Ideas they stand for, are in the Mind of the Speaker. I think I need not go any farther in the Analy∣sis of that complex Idea, we call a Lye: what I have said is enough to shew, that it is made up of simple Ideas: And it could not but be an of∣fensive tediousness to my Reader, to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple Idea, that goes to this complex one; which, from what has been said, he cannot but be able to make out to himself. The same may be done in all our complex Ideas whatso∣ever; which however compounded, and decompounded, may at last be resolved into simple Ideas, which are all the Materials of Knowledge or Thought we have or can have. Nor shall we have reason to fear, that the Mind is hereby stinted to too scanty a number of Ideas, if we consider, what an inexhaustible stock of simple Modes, Number, and Figure alone affords us. How far then mixed Modes, which admit of the various Com∣binations of different simple Ideas, and their infinite Modes, are from be∣ing few and scanty, we may easily imagine. So that before we have done, we shall see, that, no Body need be afraid, he shall have scope, and compass enough for his Thoughs to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confi∣ned only to simple Ideas received from Sensation or Reflection, and their several combinations.

§. 10. It is worth our observing which of all our simple Ideas have been most modified, and had most mixed Modes made out of them, with names given to them: And those have been these three; Thinking, and Motion, (which are the two Ideas which comprehend in them all Action,) and Power, from whence these Actions are conceived to flow. These simple Ideas, I say, of Thinking, Motion, and Power, have been those, which have been most modified; and out of whose Modifications have been made most complex Modes, with names to them. For Action being the great busi∣ness of Mankind, and the whole matter about which all Laws are con∣versant, it is no wonder, that the several Modes of Thinking and Motion, should be taken notice of, the Ideas of them observed and laid up in the Memory, and have Names assigned to them; without which, Laws could be but ill made, or Vice and Disorders repressed. Nor could any Com∣munication be well had amongst Men, without such complex Ideas, with Names to them; and therefore Men have setled Names, and suppo∣sed setled Ideas in their Minds, of modes of Actions distinguished by their Causes, Means, Objects, Ends, Instruments, Time, Place, and other cir∣cumstances; and also of their Powers fitted for those Actions; v. g. Bold∣ness is the Power to speak or do before others, without fear or disorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: Which power or ability in Man, of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the same thing, is, that the Idea we name Habit; when it is forward, and ready upon every occasion, to break into Action, we call it Disposition: Thus Testiness is a disposition or aptness to be angry.

To conclude, Let us examine any Modes of Action, v. g. Considera∣tion and Assent, which are Actions of the Mind; Running and Speaking, which are Actions of the Body; Revenge and Murther, which are Acti∣ons of both together, and we shall find them but so many Collections of simple Ideas, which together make up the complex ones signified by those Names.

§. 11. Power being the Source from whence all Action proceeds. The Substances wherein these Powers are, when they exert this Power into Act, are called Causes; and the Substances which thereupon are produ∣ced, or the simple Ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exerting of that Power, are called Effects. The efficacy whereby the new Substance or Idea is produced, is called, in the subject, exerting that Power, Action; but in the subject, wherein any simple Idea is changed on pro∣duced, it is called Passion: which efficacy however various, and the effects almost infinite; yet we can, I think, conceive it in intellectual Agents, to be nothing else but Modes of Thinking, and Willing, in corpo∣real Agents, nothing else but Modifications of Motion. I say, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but these two: For whatever sort of Action, besides these, produces any effects, I confess my self to have no Notion, nor Idea of; and so they are quite remote from my Thoughts, Apprehensions, and Knowledge; and are as much in the dark to me, as five other Senses, or the Ideas of Colours to a blind Man: And there∣fore many words, which seem to express some Action, signifie nothing of the Action, or Modus Operandi at all, but barely the effect, with some circum∣stances of the Subject wrought on, or Cause operating; v. g. Creation, Annihilation, contain in them no Idea of the Action or Manner, whereby they are produced, but barely of the Cause, and the thing done. And when a Country man says, the Cold freezes Water, though the word Free∣zing seem to import some Action, yet truly it signifies nothing, but the effect, viz. that Water, that was before fluid, is become hard and consi∣stent, without containing any Idea of the Action whereby it is done.

§. 12. I think I shall not need to remark here, that though Power and Action make the greatest part of mixed Modes, marked by Names, and familiar in the Minds and Mouths of Men; yet other simple Ideas, and their several Combinations, are not excluded; much less, I think, will it be necessary for me to enumerate all the mixed Modes, which have been setled, with Names to them: that would be to make a Dictionary of the greatest part of the Words made use of in Divinity, Ethicks, Law, and Po∣liticks, and several other Sciences. All that is requisite to my present de∣sign, is to shew, what sort of Ideas those are, I call Mixed Modes; how the Mind comes by them; and that they are Compositions, made up of sim∣ple Ideas got from Sensation and Reflection, which, I suppose, I have done.

CHAP. XXIII. Of our Complex Ideas of Substances.

§. 1. THe Mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great num∣ber of the simple Ideas, conveyed in by the Senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by Reflection on its own Operations, takes no∣tice also, that a certain number of these simple Ideas go constantly toge∣ther; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and, Words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called so united in one subject, by one name; which by inadvertency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one single Idea, which in∣deed is a complication of many Ideas together: Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple Ideas can subsist by themselves, we accu∣stom our selves, to suppose some Substratum, wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call Substance.

§. 2. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his Notion of pure Substance in general, he will find he has no other Idea of it at all, but only a Supposition of he knows not what support of such Qualities, which are capable of producing simple Ideas in us; which Qualities are com∣monly called Accidents: And if any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein Colour or Weight inheres, he would have nothing to say, but the solid extended parts: And if he were demanded, what is it, that that Solidity and Extension inhere in, he would not be in a much better case, than the Indian before mentioned; who saying that the World was sup∣ported by a great Elephant, was asked, what the Elephant rested on; to which his answer was, A great Tortoise: But being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-back'd Tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases, where we use Words without having clear and distinct Ideas, we talk like Children; who be∣ing questioned, what such a thing is, which they know not; readily give this satisfactory answer, That is something; which in truth signifies no more when so used, either by Children or Men, but that they knew not what; and that the thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no distinct Idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it and in the dark. The Idea then we have, to which we give the gene∣ral name Substance, being nothing, but the supposed, but unknown sup∣port of those Qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, sine re substante, without something to support them, we call that Sup∣port Substantia; which according to the true import of the Word is, in plain English, standing under, or upholding.

§. 3. An obscure and relative Idea of Substance in general being thus made, we come to have the Ideas of particular sorts of Substances, by collecting such Combinations of simple Ideas, as are by Experience and Observation of Mens Senses taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal Constitution, or unknown Essence of that Substance. Thus we come to have the Ideas of a Man, Horse, Gold, Water, &c. of which Substances, whether any one has any other clear Idea, farther than of certain simple Ideas coexisting to∣gether, I appeal to every one's own Experience. 'Tis the ordinary Qua∣lities, observable in Iron, or a Diamond, put together, that make the true

complex Idea of those Substances, which a Smith, or a Jeweller, common∣ly knows better than a Philosopher; who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other Idea of those Substances, than what is framed by a collection of those simple Ideas are to be found in them; only we must take notice, that our complex Ideas of Substances, besides all these simple Ideas they are made up of, have always the confused Idea of some∣thing to which they belong, and in which they subsist: and therefore when we speak of any sort of Substance, we say it is a thing having such or such Qualities, as Body is a thing that is extended, figured, and ca∣pable of Motion; a Spirit a thing capable of thinking: and so Hardness, Friability, and Power to draw Iron, we say, are Qualities to be found in a Loadstone. These and, the like fashions of speaking intimate, that the Substance is supposed always something besides the Extension, Figure, So∣lidity, Motion, Thinking, or other observable Ideas, though we know not what it is.

§. 4. Hence when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal Substances, as Horse, Stone, &c. though the Idea, we have of either of them, be put the Complication, or Collection, of those several simple Ideas of sensible Qualities, which we use to find united in the thing called Horse, or Stone, yet because we cannot conceive, how they should subsist alone, nor one in another, we suppose them to exist in, and supported by some common subject; which Support we denote by the name Substance, though it be certain, we have no clear, or distinct Idea of that thing, we suppose a Support.

§. 5. The same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, viz. Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, &c. which we concluding not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be pro∣duced by it, we are apt to think these the Actions of some other Sub∣stance, which we call Spirit; whereby yet it is evident, that having no other Idea or Notion, of Matter, but something wherein those many sensible Qualities, which affect our Senses, do subsist; by supposing a Substance, wherein Thinking, Knowing, Doubting, and a power of Moving, &c. do subsist, We have as clear a Notion of the Nature, or Substance of Spirit, as we have of Body; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the Substratum to those simple Ideas we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the Substra∣tum to those Operations, which we experiment in our selves within. 'Tis plain then, that the Idea of corporeal Substance in Matter is as remote from our Conceptions, and Apprehensions, as that of Spiritual Substance, or Spirit: and therefore from our not having any notion of the Substance of Spirit, we can no more conclude its non-Existence, than we can, for the same reason, deny the Existence of Body: It being as rational to affirm, there is no Body, because we cannot know its Essence, as 'tis called, or have no Idea of the Substance of Matter; as to say, there is no Spirit, because we know not its Essence, or have no Idea of a Spiritual Sub∣stance.

§. 6. Whatever therefore be the secret and abstract Nature of Substance in general, all the Ideas we have of particular distinct Substances, are nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas, coexhisting in such, though un∣known, Cause of their Union, as makes the whole subsist of it self. 'Tis by such Combinations of simple Ideas, and nothing else, that we represent particular Substances to our selves; such are the Ideas we have of their several sorts in our Minds; and such only do we by their specifick Names, signifie to others, v. g. Man, Horse, Sun, Water, Iron, upon hearing

which Words, every one who understands the Language, frames in his Mind a Combination of those several simple Ideas, which he has usually observed, or fancied to exist together under that denomination; all which he supposes to rest in, and be, as it were, adherent to that unknown com∣mon Subject, which inheres not in any thing else: Though in the mean time it be manifest, and every one, upon Enquiry into his own thoughts, will find, that he has no other Idea of any Substance, v. g. let it be Gold, Horse, Iron, Man, Vitriol, Bread, but what he has barely of those sen∣sible Qualities, which he supposes to inhere with a supposition of such a Substratum, as gives as it were a support to those Qualities, or simple I∣deas, which he has observed to exist united together. Thus the Idea of Sun, What is it, but an aggregate of these several simple Ideas, Bright, Hot, Roundish, having a constant regular motion, at a certain distance from us, and, perhaps, some other? As he who thinks and discourses of the Sun, has been more or less accurate, in observing those sensible Qualities, Ideas, or Properties, which are in that thing, which he calls the Sun.

§. 7. For he has the perfectest Idea of any particular Substance, who has gathered, and put together, most of those simple Ideas, which do exist in it, among which are to be reckoned its active Powers, and passive Ca∣pacities; which though not strictly simple Ideas, yet, in this respect, for brevities sake, may conveniently enough be reckoned amongst them. Thus the power of drawing Iron, is one of the Ideas of the Complex one of that substance we call a Load-stone, and a Power to be so drawn is a part of the Complex one we call Iron; which Powers pass for inherent Quali∣ties in those Subjects. Because every Substance, being as apt by the Pow∣ers we observe in it, to change some sensible Qualities in other Subjects, as it is to produce in us those simple Ideas, we receive immediately from it, does by those new sensible Qualities, introduced into other Subjects, discover to us those Powers, which do thereby mediately affect our Sen∣ses, as regularly as its sensible Qualities do it immediately, v. g. we imme∣diately by our Senses perceive in Fire its Heat and Colour; which are, if rightly considered, nothing but Powers in it, to produce those Ideas in us: We also by our Senses perceive the colour and brittleness of Charcoal; whereby we come by the Knowledge of another Power in Fire, which it has to change the colour and consistency of Wood: By the former Fire immediately, by the later it mediately discovers to us these several Powers; which therefore we look upon to be a part of the Qualities of Fire, and so make them a part of the complex Ideas of it. For all those Powers that we take Cognizance of, terminating only in the alteration of some sensible Qualities, in those Subjects, on which they operate, and so making them exhibit to us new sensible Ideas, therefore it is, that I have reckoned these Powers amongst the simple Ideas, which make the com∣plex ones of the sorts of Substances; though these Powers considered in themselves, are truly complex Ideas. And in this looser sense, I crave leave to be understood, when I name any of these Potentialities amongst the simple Ideas, which we recollect in our Minds, when we think of par∣ticular Substances. For the Powers that are severally in them, are necessa∣ry to be considered, if we will have true distinct Notions of Substances.

§. 8. Nor are we to wonder, that Powers make a great part of our com∣plex Ideas of Substances; since their secondary Qualities are those, which in most of them serve principally to distinguish Substances one from ano∣ther, and commonly make a considerable part of the complex Idea of the several sorts of them. For our Senses failing us, in the discovery of the Bulk, Texture, and Figure of the minute parts of Bodies, on which their

real Constitutions and Differences depend, we are fain to make use of their secondary Qualities, as the characteristical Notes and Marks, whereby to frame Ideas of them in our Minds, and distinguish them one from another. All which secondary Qualities, as has been shewn, are nothing but bare Powers. For the Colour and Taste of Opium, are, as well as its foporifick or anodyn Virtues, meer Powers depending on its primary Qualities, whereby it is sitted to produce different Operations, on different parts of our Bodies.

The Ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal Substances, are of these three sorts. First, The Ideas of the primary Qualities of things, which are discovered by our Senses, and are in them even when we perceive them not, such are the Bulk, Figure, Number, Situation, and Motion of the Parts of Bodies, which are really in them, whether we perceive them or no. Secondly, The sensible secondary Qualities, which depend∣ing on these, are nothing but the Powers, those Substances have to produce several Ideas in us by our Senses; which Ideas are not in the things them∣selves, otherwise than as any thing is in its Cause. Thirdly, The aptness we consider in any Substance, to give or receive such alterations of primary Qualities, as that the Substance so altered, should produce in us different Ideas from what it did before, these are called active and passive Powers: all which Powers, as far as we have any Notice or Notion of them, terminate only in sensible simple Ideas; for whatever alteration a Load-stone has the Power to make in the minute Particles of Iron, we should have no Notion of any Power it had at all to operate on Iron, did not its sensible Motion discover it; and I doubt not but there are a thousand Changes, that Bodies we daily handle, have a Power to cause in one another, which we never su∣spect, because they never appear in sensible effects.

§. 10. Powers therefore, justly make a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances. He, that will examine his complex Idea of Gold, will find seve∣ral of its Ideas, that make it up, to be only Powers, as the Power of being melted, but of keeping its weight in the Fire, of being dissolved in Aq. Regia, are Ideas, as necessary to make up our complex Idea of Gold, as its Colour and Weight; which if duly considered, are also nothing but different Powers. For to speak truly, Yellowness is not actually in Gold; but is a Power in Gold, to produce that Idea in us by our Eyes, when pla∣ced in a due Light; and the Heat, which we cannot leave out of our Idea of the Sun, is no more really in the Sun, than the white Colour it intro∣duces in Wax. These are both equally Powers in the Sun, operating by the Motion, and Figure of its insensible Parts; so on a Man, as to make him have the Idea of Heat; and so on Wax, as to make it capable to produce in a Man the Idea of White.

§. 11. Had we Senses acute enough to discern the minute particles of Bodies, and the real Constitution on which their sensible Qualities depend, I doubt not but they would produce quite different Ideas in us; and that which is now the yellow Colour of Gold, would then disappear, and in∣stead of it we should see an admirable Texture of parts of a certain Size and Figure. This Microscopes plainly discover to us; for what to our naked Eyes produces a certain Colour, is by thus augmenting the acute∣ness of our Senses, discovered to be quite a different thing; and the thus altering, as it were, the proportion of the Bulk of the minute parts of a co∣loured Object to our usual Sight, produces different Ideas from what it did before. Thus Sand, or pounded Glass, which is opaque, and white to the naked Eye, is pellucid in a Microscope; and a Hair seen this way, looses its former Colour, and is in a great measure pellucid, with a mixture of some bright sparkling Colours, such as appear from the refraction of

Diamonds, and other pellucid Bodies. Blood to the naked Eye appears all red; but by a good Microscope, wherein its lesser parts appear, shews only some few Globules of Red, swimming in a pellucid Liquor; and how these red Globules would appear, if Glasses could be found, that yet could magnifie them 1000, or 10000 times more, is uncertain.

§. 12. The infinitely wise contriver of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our Senses, Faculties, and Organs, to the conveniences of Life, and the Business we have to do here We are able by our Senses, to know, and distinguish things; and to examine them so far, as to apply them to our Uses, and several ways accommodate the Exigences of this Life. We have insight enough into their admirable Contrivances, and wonderful Effects, to admire, and magnifie the Wisdom, Power, and Goodness of their Author. Such a Knowledge as this, which is suited to our present Condition, we want not Faculties to attain. But it appears not, that God intended, we should have a perfect, clear, and adequate Knowledge of them: that perhaps is not in the Comprehension of any finite Being. We are furnished with Faculties (dull and weak as they are) to discover enough in the Creatures, to lead us to the Knowledge of the Creator, and the Knowledge of our Duty; and we are fitted well enough with Abilities, to provide for the Conveniences of living. These are our Business in this World: But were our Senses altered, and made much quicker and acuter, the appearance and outward Scheme of things would have quite another Face to us; and I am apt to think, would be inconsistent with our Being, or at least well-being in this part of the Universe we inhabit. He that considers, how little our Constitution is able to bear a remove into parts of this Air, not much higher than that we commonly breath in, will have rea∣son to be satisfied, that in this Globe of Earth alotted for our Mansion, the all∣wise Architect has suited our Organs, and the Bodies, that are to affect them one to another. If our Sense of Hearing were but 1000 times quick∣er than it is, how would a perpetual noise distract us? And we should in the quietest Retirement, be less able to sleep or meditate, than in the mid∣dle of a Sea-fight. Nay, if that most instructive of our Senses, Seeing, were in any Man 1000, or 100000 more acute than it is now by the best Micro∣scope, he would see things 1000 or 100000 less than he does now, and so come nearer the Discovery of the Texture and Motion of the minute Parts of corporeal things; and in many of them, probably get Ideas of their internal Constitutions: But then he would be in a quite different World from other People: Nothing would appear the same to him, and o∣thers: the visible Ideas of every thing would be different. So that I doubt, Whether he, and the rest of Men, could discourse concerning the Objects of Sight; or have any Communication about Colours, their ap∣pearances being so wholly different. And, perhaps, such a quickness and tenderness of Sight could not endure bright Sun-shine, or so much as open Day-light; nor take in but a very small part of any Object at once, and that too only at a very near distance. And if by the help of such Micro∣scopical Eyes, (if I may so call them,) a Man could penetrate farther than ordinary into the secret Composition, and radical Texture of Bodies, he would not make any great advantage by the change, if such an acute Sight would not serve to conduct him to the Market and Exchange; If he could not see things, he was to avoid at a convenient distance; nor distinguish things he had to do with, by those sensible Qualities others do. He that was sharp-sighted enough to see the Configuration of the minute Particles of the Spring of a Clock, and observe upon what peculiar Structure and Im∣pulse, its elastick Motion depends, would no doubt discover something

very admirable: But if Eyes so framed, could not view at once the Hand, and the Characters of the Hour-plate, and thereby at a distance see what a-Clock it was, their Owner could not be much benefited by that acute∣ness; which whilst, it discovered the secret contrivance of the Parts of the Machin, made him loose its use.

§. 13. And here give me leave to propose an extravagant conjecture of mine, viz. That since we have some Reason, (if there be any Credit to be given to the report of things, that our Philosophy cannot account for,) to imagine, that Spirits can assume to themselves Bodies of different Bulk, Figure, and Conformation of Parts, Whether one great advantage some of them have over us, may not lie in this, that they can so frame, and shape to themselves Organs of Sensation or Perception, as to suit them to their present Design, and the Circumstances of the Object they would consi∣der. For how much would that Man exceed all others in Knowledge, who had but the Faculty so to alter the Structure of his Eyes, that one Sense, as to make it capable of all the several degrees of Vision, which the as∣sistence of Glasses (casually at at first light on) has taught us to conceive? What wonders would he discover, who could so fit his Eye to all sorts of Objects, as to see when he pleased the Figure and Motion of the minute Particles in the Blood, and other juices of Animals, as distinctly as he does at other times the shape and motion of the Animals themselves. But to us in our present State, unalterable Organs, so contrived, as to discover the Figure and Motion of the minute parts of Bodies, whereon depend those sensible Qualities, we now observe in them, would, perhaps, be of no ad∣vantage. God has no doubt made us so, as is best for us in our present Condition. He hath fitted us for the Neighbourhood of the Bodies, that surround us, and we have to do with: And though we cannot by the Fa∣culties we have, attain to a perfect Knowledge of Things; yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above mentioned, which are our great Concernment. I beg my Reader's Pardon, for laying before him so wild a Phansie, concerning the ways of Conception in Beings above us: But how extravagant soever it be, I doubt whether we can imagine any thing about the Knowledge of Angels, but after this manner, some way or o∣ther, in proportion to what we find and observe in our selves. And tho' we cannot but allow, that the infinite Power and Wisdom of God, may frame Creatures with a thousand other Faculties, and ways of perceiving things without them, than what we have: Yet our Thoughts can go no farther than our own, so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very Guesses beyond the Ideas received from our own Sensation and Reflection. The Supposition at least, that Angels do sometimes assume Bodies, need not startle us, since some of the most ancient, and most learned Fathers of the Church, seemed to believe, that they had Bodies: And this is certain, that their state and way of Existence is unknown to us.

§. 14. But to return to the Matter in Hand, the Ideas we have of Sub∣stances; and the ways we come by them, I say our Ideas of Substances are nothing else but a Collection of a certain number of simple Ideas, consi∣dered as united in one thing. These Ideas of Substances, though they are commonly called simple Apprehensions, and the Names of them simple Terms; yet in effect, are complex and compounded. Thus the Idea which an English-man signified by the Name Swan, is white Colour, long Neck, red beak, black Legs, and whole Feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the Water, and making a certain kind of Noise, and, perhaps, to a Man, who has long observed those kind of Birds, some other Properties, which all terminate in sensible simple Ideas.

§. 15. Besides the complex Ideas we have of material sensible Substan∣ces, of which I have last spoken, by the simple Ideas we have taken from those Operations of our own Minds, we experiment daily in our selves, as Thinking, Understanding, Willing, Knowing, and power of beginning Motion, &c. coexisting in some Substance, we are able to frame the com∣plex Idea of a Spirit. And thus by putting together the Ideas of Think∣ing, Perceiving, Liberty, and power of moving themselves and other things, we have as clear a perception, and notion, of immaterial Substan∣ces, as we have of material. For putting together the Ideas of Thinking and Willing, or the power of moving or quieting corporeal Motion, joined to Substance, of which we have no distinct Idea, we have the Idea of Spi∣rit; and by putting together the Ideas of coherent solid parts, and a power of being moved, joined with Substance, of which likewise we have no positive Idea, we have the Idea of Matter. The one is as clear and di∣stinct an Idea, as the other: The Idea of Thinking, and moving a Body, being as clear and distinct Ideas, as the Ideas of Extension, Solidity, and being moved. For our Idea of Substance, is equally obscure, or none at all, in both; it is but a supposed, I know not what, to support those Ideas, we call Accidents.

§. 16. By the complex Idea of extended, figured, coloured, and all other sensible Qualities, which is all that we know of it, we are as far from the Idea of the Substance of Body, as if we knew nothing at all: Nor after all the acquaintance and familiarity, which we imagine we have with Matter, and the many Qualities Men assure themselves they per∣ceive and know in Bodies, will it, perhaps, upon examination be found, that they have any more, or clearer, primary Ideas belonging to Body, than they have belonging to Spirit.

§. 17. The primary Ideas we have peculiar to Body, as contradistingui∣shed to Spirit, are the cohesion of solid, and consequently separable parts, and a power of communicating Motion by impulse. These, I think, are the original Ideas proper and peculiar to Body: for Figure is but the conse∣quence of finite Extension.

§. 18. The Ideas we have belonging, and peculiar to Spirit, are Think∣ing, and Will, or a power of putting Body into motion by Thought, and, which is consequent to it, Liberty. For as Body cannot but communi∣cate its Motion by impulse, to another Body, which it meets with at rest; so the Mind can put Bodies into Motion, or forbear to do so, as it pleases. The Ideas of Existence, Duration, and Mobility, are common to them both.

§. 19. There is no reason why it should be thought strange, that I make Mobility belong to Spirit: For having no other Idea of Motion, but change of distance, with other Beings, that are considered as at rest; and finding that Spirits, as well as Bodies, cannot operate, but where they are; and that Spirits do operate at several times, at several places, I can∣not but attribute change of place to all finite Spirits: (for of the infinite Spirit, I speak not here.) For my Soul being a real Being, as well as my Body, is certainly as capable of changing of distance with any other Bo∣dy, or Being, as Body it self; and so is capable of Motion. And if a Mathematician can consider a certain distance, or a change of that di∣stance between two Points; one may certainly conceive a distance, and a change of distance between two Spirits; and so conceive their Motion, their approach, or removal, one from another.

§. 20. Every one finds in himself, that his Soul can think, will, and operate on his Body, in the place where that is; but cannot operate on a Body, or in place, an hundred Miles distant from it. No body can

imagine, that his Soul can think, or move a Body at Oxford, whilst he is at London; and cannot but know, that being united to his Body, it con∣stantly changes place all the whole Journey, between Oxford and London, as the Coach, or Horse, does that carries him; and, I think, may be said to be truly all that while in motion: Or if that will not be allowed to afford us a clear Idea enough of its motion, its being separated from the Body in death, I think, will: For to consider it, to go out of the Body, or leave it, and yet to have no Idea of its motion, seems to me impos∣sible.

§. 21. If it be said by any one, that it cannot change place, because it hath none, for Spirits are not in Loco, but Vbi; I suppose that way of tal∣king, will not now be of much weight to many, in an Age that is not much disposed to admire, or suffer themselves to be deceived, by such un∣intelligible ways of speaking. But if any one thinks there is any sense in that distinction, and applicable to our present purpose, I desire him to put it into intelligible English; and then from thence draw a reason to shew, that Spirits are not capable of Motion. Indeed, Motion cannot be attri∣buted to GOD, not because he is a Spirit, but because he is an Infinite Spirit.

§. 22. Let us compare then our complex Idea of Spirit, with our com∣plex Idea of Body, and see whether there be any more obscurity in one, than in the other, and in which most. Our Idea of Body, as I think, is an extended solid Substance, capable of communicating Motion by im∣pulse: And our Idea of our Souls, is of a Substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting Motion in Body, by Will, or Thought. These, I think, are our complex Ideas of Soul and Body, as contradistinguished: and now let us examine which has most obscurity in it, and difficulty to be apprehen∣ded. I know that People, whose Thoughts are immersed in Matter, and have so subjected their Minds to their Senses, that they seldom reflect on any thing beyond them, are apt to say, they cannot comprehend a thin∣king thing, which, perhaps, is true: But I affirm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended thing.

§. 23. If any one says, he knows not what 'tis thinks in him; he means, he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing: No more, say I, knows he what the substance is of that solid thing. Farther, if he says he knows not how he thinks; I answer, Neither knows he how he is ex∣tended; how the solid parts of Body are united, or cohere together to make Extension. For though the pressure of the Particles of Air, may ac∣count for the cohesion of several parts of Matter, that are grosser than the Particles of Air, and have Pores less than the Corpuscles of Air; yet the weight, or pressure, of the Air, will not explain, nor can be a cause of the coherence of the Particles of Air themselves. And if the pressure of the AEther, or any subtiler Matter than the Air, may unite, and hold fast together, the parts of a Particle of Air, as well as other Bodies; yet it cannot make Bonds for it self, and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that materia subtilis. So that that Hypo∣thesis, how ingeniously soever explained, by shewing, that the parts of sensible Bodies are held together, by the pressure of other external insen∣sible Bodies, reaches not the parts of the AEther it self; and by how much the more evident it proves, that the parts of other Bodies are held toge∣ther, by the external pressure of the AEther; and can have no other con∣ceivable cause of their cohesion and union, by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the Corpuscles of the AEther it self: which we can neither conceive without parts, they being

Bodies and divisible, nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cause of cohesion, which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other Bodies.

§. 24. But in truth, the pressure of any ambient Fluid, how great soever, can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of Matter. For though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished Super∣ficies, one from another in a Line perpendicular to them, as in the Expe∣riment of two polished Marbles: Yet it can never, in the least, hinder the separation by a Motion, in a Line parallel to these Superficies. Because the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to succeed in each point of Space, diserted by a lateral motion, resists such a motion of Bodies so joined, no more, than it would resist the motion of that Body, were it on all sides environed by that Fluid, and touched no other Body: And therefore, if there were no other cause of cohesion, all parts of Bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion. For if the pressure of the AEther be the adequate cause of cohesion, where-ever that cause operates not, there can be no cohesion. And since it cannot operate against such a la∣teral separation, (as has been shewed,) therefore in every imaginary plain, intersecting any mass of Matter, there could be no more cohesion, than of two polished Superficies; which will always, notwithstanding any ima∣ginable pressure of a Fluid, easily slide one from another: so that, per∣haps, how clear an Idea soever we think we have of the Extension of Body, which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider it in his Mind, may have reason to conclude, That 'tis as easie for him to have a clear Idea, how the Soul thinks, as how Body is ex∣tended. For since Body is no farther, nor otherwise extended, than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts, we shall very ill comprehend the extension of Body, without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts; which seems to me as incomprehensible, as the manner of Thinking, and how it is performed.

§. 25. I allow, it is usual for most People to wonder, how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe. Do we not see, will they be ready to say, the parts of Bodies stick firmly toge∣ther? Is there any thing more common? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like, I say, concerning Thinking, and voluntary Motion: Do we not every moment experiment it in our selves; and there∣fore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear, I confess; but when we would a little nearer look into it, and consider how it is done, there, I think, we are at a loss, both in the one, and the other; and can as little understand how the parts of Body cohere, as how we our selves perceive, or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of Gold, or Brass, (that but now in fusion were as loose from one ano∣ther, as the Particles of Water, or the Sands of an Hour-glass,) come in a few moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another, that the utmost force of Mens arms cannot separate them: A considering Man will, I suppose, be here at a loss, to satisfie his own, or another Man's Understanding.

§. 26. The little Bodies that compose that Fluid, we call Water, are so extreamly small, that I have never heard of any one, who by a Micro∣scope, (and yet I have heard of some, that have magnified to 10000; nay, to much above 100,000 times,) pretended to perceive their di∣stinct Bulk, Figure, or Motion: And the Particles of Water, are also so per∣fectly loose one from another, that the least force sensibly separates them. Nay, if we consider their perpetual motion, we must allow them to have

no cohesion, one with another: and y••t let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate, these little Atoms cohere, and are not, with∣out great force, separable. He that could find the Bonds, that tie these heaps of loose little Bodies together so firmly; he that could make known the Cement, that makes them stick so fast one to another, would disco∣ver a great, and yet unknown Secret: And yet when that was done, would he be far enough from making the extension of Body (which is the cohesion of its solid parts) intelligible, till he could shew wherein consi∣sted the union, or consolidation of the parts of those Bonds, or of that Ce∣ment, or of the least Particle of Matter that exists. Whereby it appears that this primary and supposed obvious Quality of Body, will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehensible, as any thing belonging to our Minds; and a solid extended Substance, as hard to be conceived, as a thining one, whatever difficulties some would raise against it.

§. 27. For to extend our Thoughts a little farther, that pressure, which is brought to explain the cohesion of Bodies, is as unintelligible, as the co∣hesion it self. For if Matter be considered, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one send his Contemplation to the Extremities of Universe, and there see what conceivable Hoops, what Bond he can imagine to hold this mass of Matter, in so close a pressure together; from whence Steel has its firm∣ness, and the parts of a Diamond their hardness and indissolubility. If Matter be finite, it must have its Extreams; and there must be something to hinder it from scattering asunder. If to avoid this difficulty, any one will throw himself into the Supposition and Abyss of infinite Matter, let him consider what light he thereby brings to the cohesion of Body; and whether he be ever the nearer making it intelligible, by resolving it into a Supposition, the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all other: So far is our Extension of Body, (which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts,) from being clearer, or more distinct, when we would en∣quire into the Nature, Cause, or Manner of it, than the Idea of Think∣ing.

§. 28. Another Idea we have of Body, is the power of communication of Motion by impulse; and of our Souls, the power of exciting of Motion by Thought. These Ideas, the one of Body, the other of our Minds, every days experience clearly furnishes us with: But if here again we enquire how this is done, we are equally in the dark. For in the communication of Motion by impulse, wherein as much Motion is lost to one Body, as is got to the other; which is the ordinariest case, we can have no other conception, but of the passing of Motion out of one Body into another; which, I think, is as obscure and unconceivable, as how our Minds move or stop our Bodies by Thought; which we every moment find they do. The increase of Motion by impulse, which is observed or believed some∣times to happen, is yet harder to be understood. We have by daily experi∣ence clear evience of Motion produced both by impulse, and by thought; but the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehension; we are qual∣ly at a loss in both. So that however we consider Motion, and its communi∣cation either in Body or Spirit, the Idea which belongs to Spirit, is at least as clear, as that, that belongs to Body. And if we consider the active power of Moving, or, as I may call it, Motivity, it is much clearer in Spirit than Body: since two Bodies, placed by one another at rest, will never afford us the Idea of a power in the one to move the other, but by a borrow∣ed motion: whereas the Mind, every day, affords us Ideas of an active power of moving of Bodies; and therefore it is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of Spirits, and passive

power of Matter. But be that as it will, I think, we have as many, and as clear Ideas belonging to Spirit, as we have belonging to Body, the Sub∣stance of each being equally unknown to us; and the Idea of Thinking in Spirit, as clear as of Extension in Body; and the communication of Motion by Thought, which we attribute to Spirit, is as evident, as that by impulse, which we ascribe to Body. Constant Experience makes us sensible of both of these, though our narrow Understandings can compre∣hend neither. For when the Mind would look beyond these original Ideas, we have from Sensation, or Reflection; and penetrate into their Causes, and manner of production, we find still, it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness.

§. 29. To conclude, Sensation convinces us, that there are solid exten∣ded Substances; and Reflection, that there are thinking ones: Experience assures us of the Existence of such Beings; and that the one hath a power to move Body by impulse, the other by thought; this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes us with the clear Ideas, both of the one, and the other. But beyond these Ideas, as received from their proper Sources, our Faculties will not reach. If we would en∣quire farther into their Nature, Causes, and Manner, we perceive not the Nature of Extension, clearer than we do of Thinking. If we would explain them any farther, one is as easie as the other: and there is no more difficulty, to conceive how a Substance we know not, should by thought set Body into motion, than how a Substance we know not, should by impulse set Body into motion. So that we are no more able to disco∣ver, wherein the Ideas belonging to Body consist, than those belonging to Spirit, From whence it seems probable to me, that the simple Ideas, we receive from Sensation and Reflection, are the Boundaries of our Thoughts: beyond which, the Mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot: nor can it make any discoveries, when it would prie into the Nature, and hidden Causes of those Ideas.

§. 30. So that, in short, the Idea we have of Spirit, compared with the Idea we have of Body, stands thus: The substance of Spirit is unknown to us; and so is the substance of Body, equally unknown to us: Two pri∣mary Qualities, or Properties of Body, viz. solid coherent parts, and impulse, we have distinct clear Ideas of: So likewise we know, and have distinct clear Ideas of two primary Qualities, or Properties of Spirit, viz. Thinking, and a power•• Action; i. e. a power of beginning, or stopping several Thoughts, or Motions. We have also the Ideas of several Quali∣ties inherent in Bodies, and have the clear distinct Ideas of them: which Qualities, are but the various modifications of the Extension of cohering solid Parts, and their motion. We have likewise the Ideas of the several modes of Thinking, viz. Believing, Doubting, Intending, Fearing, Ho∣ping; all which, are but the several modes of Thinking. We have also the Ideas of Willing, and Moving the Body consequent to it, and with the Body it self too; for, as has been shewed, Spirit is capable of Mo∣tion.

§. 31. Lastly, if this Notion of Spirit, may have, perhaps, some diffi∣culties in it, not easie to be explained, we have thereby no more reason to deny, or doubt the existence of Spirits, than we have to deny, or doubt the existence of Body: because the notion of Body is cumbred with some difficulties very hard, and, perhaps, impossible to be explained, or understood by us. For I would fain have instanced any thing in our no∣tion of Spirit more perplexed, or nearer a Contradiction, than the very notion of Body includes in it; the divisibility in infinitum of any finite

Extension, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated, or made consistent; Consequences that carry greater difficulty, and more apparent absurdity, than any thing can fol∣low from the Notion of an immaterial knowing substance.

§. 32. Which we are not at all to wonder at, since we having but some few superficial Ideas of things, discovered to us only by the Senses from without, or by the Mind, reflecting on what it experiments in it self within, have no Knowledge beyond that, much less of the internal Con∣stitution, and true Nature of things, being destitute of Faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and discovering in our selves Knowledge, and the power of voluntary Motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without us, the cohesion and separation of solid Parts, which is the Extension and Motion of Bodies; we have as much Reason to be satisfied with our Notion of Spirit, as with our Notion of Body; and the Existence of the one, as well as the other. For it being no more a contradi∣ction, that Thinking should exist, separate, and independent from Solidi∣ty; than it is a contradiction, that Solidity should exist separate, and in∣dependent from Thinking, they being both but simple Ideas, independent one from another; and having as clear and distinct Ideas in us of Thinking, as of Solidity, I know not, why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without Solidity, i. e. Imma••erial, to exist; as a solid thing without Thinking, i. e. Matter, to exist; especially since it is no harder to conceive, how Thinking should exist without Matter, than how Matter should think. For whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple Ideas, we have from Sensation and Reflection, and dive farther into the Nature of Things, we fall presently into Darkness and Obscurity, Perplexedness and Difficulties; and can discover nothing farther, but our own Blindness and Ignorance. But which ever of these complex Ideas be clearest, that of Body, or Spirit, this is evident, that the simple Ideas that make them up, are no other than what we have received from Sensation or Reflection; and so is it of all our other Ideas of Substances, even of God himself.

§. 33. For if we examine the Idea we have of the incomprehensible su∣preme Being, we shall find, that we come by it the same way; and that the complex Ideas we have both of God, and separate Spirits, are made up of the simple Ideas, we receive from Reflection; v. g. having from what we experiment in our selves, got the Ideas of Existence and Duration; of Knowledge, and Power; of Pleasure, and Happiness; and of several o∣ther Qualities and Powers, which it is better to have, than to be without, when we would frame an Idea the most suitable we can to the supreme Be∣ing, we enlarge every one of these with our Idea of Infinity; and so put∣ting them together, make our complex Idea of God. For that the Mind has such a power of enlarging some of its Ideas, received from Sensation and Reflection, has been already shewed.

§. 34. If I find, that I know some few things; and some of them, or all, perhaps, imperfectly, I can frame an Idea of knowing twice as many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to number, and thus en∣large my Idea of Knowledge, by extending its Comprehension to all things existing or possible: The same also I can do of knowing them more perfectly; i. e. all their Qualities, Powers, Causes, Consequences, and Relations, &c. till all be perfectly known, that is in them, or can any way relate to them, and thus frame the Idea of infinite or boundless Know∣ledge: The same may also be done of Power, till we come to that we call infinite; and also of the Duration of Existence, without beginning or end; and so frame the Idea of an eternal Being: The Degrees or Extent, where∣in

we ascribe Existence, Power, Wisdom, and all other Perfection, (which we can have any Ideas of) to that Sovereign Being, which we call God, being all boundless and infinite, we frame the best Idea of him our Minds are capable of; all which is done, I say, by enlarging those simple Ideas, we have taken from the Operations of our own Minds, by reflection; or by our Senses, from exterior things, to that vastness, to which Infinity can extend them.

§. 35. For it is Infinity, which, joined to our Ideas of Existence, Power, Knowledge, &c. makes that complex Idea, whereby we represent to our selves the best we can, the supreme Being. For though in his own Essence, (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real Essence of a Pe∣ble, or a Fly, or of our own selves,) God be simple and uncompounded; yet, I think, I may say we have no other Idea of him, but a complex one of Existence, Knowledge, Power, Happiness, &c. infinite, and eternal: which are all distinct Ideas, and some of them being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been shewn, originally got from Sensation and Reflection, go to make up the Idea or Notion we have of God.

§. 36. This farther is to be observed, that there is no Idea we attribute to God, bating Infinity, which is not also a part of our complex Idea of other Spirits. Because being capable of no other simple Ideas, belonging to any thing but Body, but those which by reflection we receive from the Operation of our own Minds, we can attribute to Spirits no other, but what we receive from thence: And all the difference we can put be∣tween them in our Contemplation of Spirits, is only in the several Extents and Degrees of their Knowledge, Power, Duration, Happiness, &c. For that in our Ideas, as well of Spirits, as of other things, we are restrained to those we receive from Sensation and Reflection, is evident from hence, that in our Ideas of Spirits, how much soever advanced in Perfection, be∣yond those of Bodies, even to that of Infinite, we cannot yet have any Idea of the manner, wherein they discover their Thoughts one to another: Though we must necessarily conclude, that Spirits, which are Beings, that have perfecter Knowledge, and greater Happiness than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their Thoughts, than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal Signs, and particularly Sounds, which are therefore of most general use, as being the best, and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate Communication, having no Expe∣riment in our selves, and consequently, no Notion of it at all, we have no Idea, how Spirits, which use not Words, can with quickness, or much less, how Spirits that have no Bodies, can be Masters of their own Thoughts, and communicate, or conceal them at Pleasure, though we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such a Power.

§. 37. And thus we have seen, what kind of Ideas we have of Substances of all kinds, wherein they consist, and how we come by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,

• First, That all our Ideas of the several sorts of Substances, are nothing but Collections of simple Ideas, with a Supposition of something, to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though of this supposed some∣thing, we have no clear distinct Idea at all.
• Secondly, That all the complex Ideas we have of Substances, are made up of no other simple Ideas, but such, as we have received from Sensation or Reflection. So that even in those, which we think, we are most inti∣mately acquainted with, and come nearest the Comprehension of, our most enlarged Conceptions, cannot reach beyond those simple Ideas. And

• even in those, which seem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely surpass any thing, we can perceive in our selves by Reflection, or discover by Sensation in other things, we can attain to nothing, but these simple Ideas, which we originally received from Sensation, or Refle∣ction, as is evident in the complex Ideas we have of Angels, and particu∣larly of God himself.
• Thirdly, That most of the simple Ideas, that make up our complex Ideas of Substances, when truly considered, are only Powers, however we are apt to take them for positive Qualities; v. g. the greatest part of the Ideas, that make our complex Idea of Gold, are Yellowness, great Weight, Du∣ctility, Fusibility, and Solubility, in Aq. Regia, &c. all united together in an unknown Substratum; all which Ideas, are nothing else, but so ma∣ny relations to other Substances; and are not really in the Gold it self, though they depend on those real, and primary Qualities of its internal constitution, whereby it has a fitness, differently to operate, and be operated on by several other Substances.

CHAP. XXIV. Of Collective Ideas of Substances.

§. 1. BEsides these complex Ideas of several single Substances, as of Man, Horse, Gold, Violet, Apple, &c. the Mind hath also com∣plex collective Ideas of Substances; which I so call, because such Ideas are made up of many particular Substances considered together, as united in∣to one Idea, and which so joined, are looked on as one; v. g. the Idea of such a collection of Men as make an Army, though consisting of a great number of distinct Substances, is as much one Idea, as the Idea of a Man: And the great collective Idea of all Bodies whatsoever signified by the name World, is as much one Idea, as the Idea of any the least Particle of Matter in it; it sufficing, to the unity of any Idea, that it be considered as one Representation, or Picture, though made up of never so many Particulars.

§. 2. These collective Ideas of Substances, the Mind makes by its power of Composition, and uniting severally either simple or complex Ideas into one, as it does, by the same Faculty, make the complex Ideas of particular Substances, consisting of an aggregate of divers simple Ideas, united in one Substance: And as the Mind by putting together the re∣peated Ideas of Unity, makes the collective Mode, or complex Idea of any number, as a Score, or a Gross, &c. So by putting together seve∣ral particular Substances, it makes collective Ideas of Substances, as a Troop, an Army, a Swarm, a City, a Fleet; each of which, every one finds, that he represents to his own Mind, by one Idea, in one view; and so under that Notion, considers the Things themselves as perfectly one, as one Ship, or one Atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an Army of ten Thousand Men, should make one Idea, than how a Man should make one Idea; it being as easie to the Mind, to unite into one, the Idea of a great number of Men, and consider it as one; as it is to unite into one particular, all the distinct Ideas, that make up the composition of a Man, and consider them altogether as one

§. 3. Amongst such kind of collective Ideas, are to be counted most part of artificial Things, at least such of them as are made up of distinct Substan∣ces: And, in truth, if we consider all these collective Ideas aright, as ARMY, Constellation, Vniverse, as they are united into so many single Ideas, they are but the artificial Draughts of the Mind, bringing things very remote, and independent one from another, into one view, the better to contemplate, and discourse of them, united into one conce∣ption, and signified by one name. For there are no Things so remote, nor so contrary, which the Mind cannot, by this art of Composition, bring into one Idea, as is visible in that signified by the name Vniverse.

CHAP. XXV. Of Relation.

§. 1. BEsides the Ideas, whether simple or complex, that the Mind has of Things, as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another. The Understanding, in the consideration of any thing, is not confined to that precise Object: It can carry any Ideas, as it were, beyond it self, or, at least, look be∣yond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other. When the Mind so considers one thing, that it does, as it were, bring it to, and set it by another, and carry its view from one to t'other: This is, as the Words import, Relation and R••spect; and the Denominations given to positive Things, ••ntimating that Respect, and serving as Marks to lead the Thoughts beyond the Subject it self denominated, to something di∣stinct from it, are what we call Relatives; and the Things so brought together, Related•• Thus when the Mind considers Cajus, as such a po∣sitive Being, it takes nothing into that Idea, but what really exists in Cajus; v. g. when I consider him, as a Man, I have nothing in my Mind, but the complex Idea of the Species, Man: So likewise, when I say•• Cajus is a white Man, I have nothing but the bare consideration of Man, who hath that white colour. But when I give Cajus the name Husband, I in∣timate some other person; and when I give him the name Whiter, I in∣timate some other thing in both cases: my Thought is led to something beyond Cajus, and there are two things brought into consideration. And since any Idea, whether simple, or complex, may be the occasion, why the Mind thus brings two things together, and, as it were, takes a view of them at once, though still considered as distinct: therefore any of our Ideas, may be the foundation of Relation, as in the above-mentioned in∣stance, the Contract, and Ceremony of Marriage with Sempronia, is the occasion of the Denomination, or Relation of Husband; and the colour White, the occasion why he is said whiter than Free-stone.

§. 2. These, and the like Relations, expressed by relative terms, that have others answering them, with a reciprocal intimation, as Father, and Son•• Bigger, and Less; Cause, and Effect, are very obvious to every one, and every Body at first sight perceives the Relation. For Father, and Son•• Husband, and Wife, and such other correlative terms, seem so near∣ly to belong one to another, and, through Custom, do so readily chime, and answer one another in Peoples Memories, that upon the naming of either of them, the Thoughts are presently carried beyond the Thing so

named; and no body over-looks, or doubts of a Relation, where it is so plainly intimated. But where Languages have failed to give correlative Names, there the Relation is not always so easily taken notice of. Con∣cubine is, no doubt, a relative Name, as well as Wife; but in Languages where this, and the like Words, have not a correlative term, there People are not so apt to take them to be so, as wanting that evident Mark of Relation, which is between Correlatives, which seem to explain one ano∣ther, and not to be able to exist but together. Hence it is, that many of those Names, which duly considered, do include evident Relations, have been called External Denominations: But all Names, that are more than empty sounds, must signifie some Idea, which is either in the thing to which the name is applied; and then it is positive, and is looked on as united to, and existing in the Thing to which the Denomination is given•• or else it arises from the respect the Mind finds in it, to something di∣stinct from it, with which it considers it; and then it includes a Re∣lation.

§. 3. Another sort of relative terms there is, which are not looked on to be either relative, or so much as external Denominations; which yet, under the form and appearance of signifying something absolute in the Subject, do conceal a tacit, though less observable, Relation; such are the seemingly positive terms of Old, Great, Imperfect, &c. whereof I shall have occasion to speak more at large in the following Chapters.

§. 4. This farther may be observed, That the Ideas of Relation, may be the same in Men, who have far different Ideas of the Things that are related, or that are thus compared; v. g. those who have far different Ideas of a Man, may yet agree in the notion of a Father; which is a notion superinduced to the Substance, or Man, and refers only to an act of that thing called Man; whereby it contributed to the Generation of one of his own kind, let Man be what it will.

§. 5. The nature therefore of Relation, consists in the referring, or com∣paring two things, one to another; from which comparison, one or both comes to be denominated: And if either of those things be removed, or cease to be, the Relation ceases, and the Denomination consequent to it, though the other receive in it self no alteration at all; v. g. Cajus, whom I consider to day as a Father, ceases to be so to morrow, only by the death of his Son, without any alteration made in himself; nay, barely by the Mind's changing the Object, to which it compares any thing, the same thing is capable of having contrary Denominations at the same time; v. g. Cajus, compared to several Persons, may truly be said to be Older, and Younger; Stronger, and Weaker, &c.

§. 6. Whatsoever doth, or can exist, or be considered as one thing, is positive; and so not only simple Ideas and Substances, but Modes also are positive Beings; though the parts, of which they consist, are very often relative one to another: but the whole together considered as one thing, and producing in us the complex Idea of one thing; which Idea is in our Minds, as one Picture, though an aggregate of divers parts; and un∣der one name, it is a positive or absolute Thing, or Idea. Thus a Triangle, though the parts thereof, compared one to another, be relative, yet the Idea of the whole, is a positive absolute Idea. The same may be said of a Family, a Tune, &c. for there can be no Relation, but betwixt two Things, considered as two Things. There must always be in relation two Ideas, or Things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, and then ground or occasion for their comparison.

§. 7. Concerning Relation in general, these things may be consi∣dered:

First, That there is no one thing, whether simple Idea, Substance, Mode, or Relation, or Name of either of them, which is not capable of almost an infinite number of Considerations, in reference to other things; and there∣fore this makes no small part of Mens Thoughts and Words; v. g. one single Man may at once be concerned in, and sustain all these following Relations, and many more, viz. Father, Brother, Son, Grandfather, Grandson, Father-in-Law, Son-in-Law, Husband, Friend, Enemy, Sub∣ject, General, Judge, Patron, Client, Professor, European, English-man, Islanders, Servant, Master, Possessor, Captain, Superiour, Inferiour, Bigger, Less, Older, Younger, Contemporary, Like, Unlike, &c. to an almost in∣finite number, he being capable of as many Relations, as there can be oc∣casions of comparing him to other things, with which he may agree, or disagree, or have any respect: For, as I said, Relation is a way of compa∣ring, or considering two things together; and giving one, or both of them, some appellation from that Comparison, and sometimes giving even the Relation it self a Name.

§. 8. Secondly, This farther may be considered concerning Relation, That though it be not contained in the real existence of Things, but some∣thing extraneous, and superinduced; yet the Ideas which relative Words stand for, are often clearer, and more distinct, than of those Substances to which they do belong. The Notion we have of a Father, or Brother, is a great deal clearer, and more distinct, than that we have of a Man: Or, if you will, Paternity is a thing whereof 'tis easier to have a clear Idea, than of Humanity: And I can much easier conceive what a Friend is, than what GOD. Because the knowledge of one Action, or one simple Idea, is oftentimes sufficient to give me the Notion of a Relation: but to the knowing of any substantial Being, an accurate collection of sundry Ideas is necessary. A Man, if he compare two things together, can hardly be supposed not to know what it is, wherein he compares them: So that when he compares any Things together, he cannot but have a very clear Idea of that Relation. The Ideas then of Relations are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct in our Minds, than those of Sub∣stances: Because it is commonly hard to know all the simple Ideas, which are really in any Substance, but for the most part easie enough to know the simple Ideas that make up any Relation I think on, or have a Name for; v. g. comparing two Men, in reference to one common Parent, it is very easie to frame the Ideas of Brothers, without having yet the perfect Idea of a Man. For significant relative Words, as well as others, standing only for Ideas; and those being all either simple, or made up of simple ones, it suffices for the knowing the precise Idea the relative term stands for, to have a clear conception of that, which is the foundation of the Re∣lation; which may be done without having a perfect and clear Idea of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the Notion, that one laid the Egg, out of which the other was hatched, I have a clear Idea of the Re∣lation of Dam and Chick, between the two Cassiowaries in St. Iames's Park; though, perhaps, I have but a very obscure and imperfect Idea of those Birds themselves.

§. 9. Thirdly, Though there be a great number of Considerations, wherein Things may be compared one with another, and so a multitude of Relations, yet they all terminate in, and are concerned about tho•••• simple Ideas, either of Sensation or Reflection; which I think to be the whole Materials of all our Knowledge. To clear this, I shall shew it in the

most considerable Relations that we have any notion of, and some that seem to be the most remote from Sense or Reflection; which yet will ap∣pear to have their Ideas from thence, and that the Notions we have of them, are but certain simple Ideas, and so originally derived from Sense or Reflection.

§. 10. Fourthly, That Relation being the considering of one thing with another, which is extrinsical to it, it is evident, that all Words, that ne∣cessarily infer, and lead the Mind to any other Ideas, than are supposed really to exist in that thing, to which the Word is applied, are relative Words; v. g. A Man Black, Merry, Thoughtful, Thirsty, Angry, Ex∣tended; these, and the like, are all absolute, because they neither signifie nor intimate any thing, but what does, or is supposed really to exist in the Man thus denominated: But Father, Brother, King, Husband, Blac∣ker, Merrier, &c. are Words, which, together with the thing they deno∣minate, imply also something else separate and exterior to the existence of that thing.

§. 11. Having laid down these Premises concerning Relation in general, I shall now proceed to shew, in some instances, how all the Ideas we have of Relation are made up, as the others are, only of simple Ideas; and that they all, how refined, or remote from Sense soever they seem, terminate at last in simple Ideas. I shall begin with the most comprehensive Relation, wherein all things that do, or can exist, are concerned; and that is the Relation of Cause and Effect. The Idea whereof, how derived from the two Fountains of all our Knowledge, Sensation and Reflection, I shall in the next place consider.

CHAP. XXVI. Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations.

§. 1. IN the notice, that our Senses take of the constant Vicissitude of Things, we cannot but observe, that several particular, both Qualities, and Substances begin to exist; and that they receive this their Existence, from the due Application and Operation of some other Being. From this Ob∣servation, we get our Ideas of Cause and Effect. That which produces any simple or complex Idea, we denote by the general Name Cause; and that which is produced, Effect. Thus finding, that in that Substance which we call Wax, Fluidity, which is a simple Idea, that was not in it before, is constantly produced by the Application of a certain degree of Heat, we call the simple Idea of Heat, in relation to Fluidity in Wax, the Cause of it; and Fluidity the Effect. So also finding that the Substance, Wood, which is a certain Collection of simple Ideas, so called, will by the Appli∣cation of Fire, be turned into another Substance, called Ashes; i. e. another complex Idea, consisting of a Collection of simple Ideas, quite different from that complex Idea, which we call Wood; we consider Fire, in re∣lation to Ashes, as Cause, and the Ashes, as Effect. So that whatever is considered by us, to conduce or operate, to the producing any parti∣cular simple Idea, or Collection of simple Ideas, whether Substance, or Mode, which did not before exist, hath thereby in our Minds the relation of a Cause, and so is denominated by us.

§. 2. Having thus, from what our Senses are able to discover, in the Opera∣tions of Bodies on one another, got the Notion of Cause and Effect; viz. That a Cause is that which makes any other thing, either simple Idea, Substance, or Mode, begin to be; and an Effect is that, which had its Beginning from some other thing, The Mind finds no great difficulty, to distinguish the several Originals of things into two sorts:

• First, When the thing is wholly made new, so that no part thereof did ever exist before; as when a new Particle of Matter doth begin to exist, in rerum natura, which had before no Being; and this we call Creation.
• Secondly, When a thing is made up of Particles, which did all of them before exist, but that very thing, so constituted of pre-existing Particles, which considered altogether make up such a Collection of simple Ideas, had not any Existence before, as this Man, this Egg, Rose, or Cherry, &c. And this, when referred to a Substance, produced in the ordinary course of Nature, by an internal Principle, but set on work by, and received from some external Agent, or Cause, and working by insensible ways, which we perceive not, we call Generation; when the Cause is extrinsical, and the Effect produced by a sensible Separation, or juxta Position of di∣scernable Parts, we call it Making; and such are all artificial things. When any simple Idea is produced, which was not in that Subject before, we call it Alteration. Thus a Man is generated, a Picture made, and either of them altered, when any new sensible Quality, or simple Idea, is produ∣ced in either of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exist, which were not there before, are Effects; and those things, which operated to the Existence, Causes. In which, and all other Cases, we may observe, that the Notion of Cause and Effect, has its rise from Ideas, received by Sensation or Reflection; and that this Relation, how comprehensive soever, terminates at last in them. For to have the Idea of Cause and Effect, it suffices to consider any simple Idea, or Substance, as beginning to exist, by the Operation of some other, without knowing the manner of that Operation.

§. 3. Time and Place, are also the Foundations of very large Relations, and all finite Beings, at least are concerned in them. But having already shewn in another Place, how we got these Ideas, it may suffice here to intimate, that most of the Denominations of things, received from time, are only Relations; thus, when any one says, that Queen Elizabeth lived sixty nine, and reigned forty five years; these Words import only the Relation of that Duration to some other, and means no more but this, that the Duration of her Existence was equal to sixty nine, and the Dura∣tion of her Government to forty five Annual Revolutions of the Sun; and so are all Words, answering, how long. Again, William the Conqueror inva∣ded England about the year 1070. which means this; that taking the Duration from our Saviour's Time, till now, for one entire great length of time, it shews at what distance this Invasion was from the two Ex∣tremes: and so do all Words of time, answering to the Question when, which shew only the distance of any point of time, from the Period of a longer Duration, from which we measure, and to which we thereby con∣sider it, as related.

§. 4 There are yet besides those, other Words of time, that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive Ideas, which yet will, when considered, be found to be relative, such as are Young, Old, &c. which include, and intimate the Relation any things has, to a certain length of Duration, whereof we have the Idea in our Minds. Thus having setled in our

Thoughts the Idea of the ordinary Duration of a Man to be seventy years, when we say a Man is Young, we mean, that his Age is yet but a small part of that which usually Men attain to: And when we denominate him Old, we mean, that his Duration is run out almost to the end of that which Men do not usually exceed. And so 'tis but comparing the particu∣lar Age, or Duration of this or that Man, to the Idea of that Duration which we have in our Minds, as ordinarily belonging to that sort of Ani∣mals: Which is plain, in the application of these Names to other Things; for a Man is called young at twenty years, and very young at seven years old: But yet a Horse we call old at twenty, and a Dog at seven years; because in each of these, we compare their Age to different Ideas of Duration which are setled in our Minds, as belonging to these several sorts of Animals, in the ordinary course of Nature. But the Sun, and Stars, though they have outlasted several Generations of Men, we call not old, because we do not know what period GOD hath set to that ••ort of Beings. This Term belonging properly to those Things, which we can observe in the ordinary course of Things, by a natural decay to come to an end, in a certain period of time; and so have in our Minds, as it were, a Standard, to which we can compare the several parts of their Du∣ration; and by the relation they bear thereunto, call them young, or old; which we cannot therefore do to a Ruby, or a Diamond, things whose usual periods we know not.

§. 5. The Relation also that things have to one another, in their Places and Distances, is very obvious to observe; as Above, Below, a Mile di∣stant from Charing-Cross, in England, and in London. But as in Duration, so in Extension and Bulk, there are some Ideas that are relative, which we signifie by Names, that are thought positive; as Great, and Little, are truly Relations. For here also having, by observation, setled in our Minds the Ideas of the Bigness of several Species of Things, from those we have been most accustomed to, we make them, as it were, the Standards where∣by to denominate the Bulk of others. Thus we call a great Apple, such an one as is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to; and a little Horse, such an one as comes not up to the size of that Idea, which we have in our Minds, to belong ordinarily to Hor∣ses: And that will be a great Horse to a Welsh-man, which is but a little one to a Fleming; they two having from the different Breed of their Countries, taken several siz'd Ideas to which they compare, and in rela∣tion to which they denominate their Great, and their Little.

§. 6. So likewise Weak and Strong, are but relative Denominations of Power, compared to some Idea we have, at that time, of greater or less Power. Thus when we say a Weak Man, we mean one that has not so much Strength, or Power to move, as usually Men have, or usually those of his size have; which is a comparing his Strength, to the Idea we have of the usual Strength of Men, or Men of such a size. The like when we say the Creatures are all weak Things; Weak, there, is but a re∣lative term, signifying the disproportion there is in the Power of GOD, and the Creatures. And so abundance of Words, in ordinary Speech, stand only for Relations, (and, perhaps, the greatest part,) which at first sight, seem to have no such signification: v. g. The Ship has neces∣sary Stores: Necessary, and Stores, are both relative Words; one having a relation to the accomplishing the thing intended, and the other to future use. All which Relations, how they are confined to, and terminate in Ideas derived from Sensation, or Reflection, is too obvious to need any Explication.

CHAP. XXVII. Of other Relations.

§. 1. BEsides the before-mentioned occasions of Time, Place, and Causality of comparing, or referring Things one to another, there are, as I have said, infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.

First, The first I shall name, is some one simple Idea; which being ca∣pable of Parts or Degrees, affords an occasion of comparing the Sub∣jects wherein it is to one another, in respect of that simple Idea, v. g. Whiter, Sweeter, Bigger, Equal, More, &c. These Relations depen∣ding on the Equality and Excess of the same simple Idea, in several Sub∣jects, may be called, if one will, Proportional; and that these are on∣ly conversant about those simple Ideas received from Sensation or Refle∣ction, is so evident, that nothing need be said to evince it.

§. 2. Secondly, Another occasion of comparing Things together, or con∣sidering one thing, so as to include in that Consideration some other thing, is the circumstances of their origine or beginning; which being not afterwards to be altered, make the Relations, depending thereon, as lasting as the Subjects to which they belong; v. g. Father and Son, Bro∣thers, Cousin-Germanes, &c. which have their Relations by one Communi∣ty of Bloud, wherein they partake in several degrees; Country-men, i. e. those who were born in the same Country, or Tract of Ground; and these I call natural Relations: Wherein me may observe, that Mankind have fitted their Notions and Words to the use of common Life, and not to the truth and extent of Things. For 'tis certain, that in reality, the Relation is the same, betwixt the Begetter, and the Begotten, in the several Races of other Animals, as well as Men: But yet 'tis seldom said, This Bull is the Grandfather of such a Calf; or that two Pigeons are Counsin-Germanes. It is very convenient, that by distinct Names, these Relations should be observed, and marked out in Mankind, there being occasion, both in Laws and other Communications one with another, to mention and take no∣tice of Men, under these Relations: From whence also arise the Obligati∣ons of several Duties amongst Men: Whereas in Brutes, Men having ve∣ry little or no cause to mind those Relations, they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar Names. This, by the way, may give us some light into the different state and growth of Languages, which being suited only to the convenience of Communication, are proportio∣ned to the Notions Men have, and the commerce of Thoughts familiar amongst them; and not to the reality or extent of Things, nor to the va∣rious Respects might be found among them; or the different abstract Considerations might be framed about them. Where they had no philo∣sophical Notions, there they had no Terms to express them: And 'tis no wonder Men should have framed no Names for those Things they found no occasion to discourse of. From whence it is easie to imagine, why, as in some Countries, they may not have so much as the Name for an Horse; and in others, where they are more careful of the Pedigrees of their Horses, than of their own, that there they may have not only Names for particular Horses, but also of their several Relations of Kindred one to another.

§. 3. Thirdly, Sometimes the foundation of considering Things, with reference to one another, is some act whereby any one comes by a Moral,

Right, Power, or Obligation to do something. Thus a General is one that hath power to command an Army; and an Army under a General, is a Collection of armed Men, obliged to obey one Man. A Citizen, or a Burgher, is one who has a Right to certain Privileges in this or that place. All this sort depending upon Mens Wills, or Agreement in Socie∣ty, I call Instituted, or Voluntary; and may be distinguished from the natural, in that they are most, if not all of them, some way or other alte∣rable, and separable from the Persons to whom they have sometimes be∣longed, though neither of the Substances, so related, be destroy'd. Now though these are all reciprocal, as well as the rest; and contain in them a reference of two things, one to the other: yet because one of the two things often wants a relative Name, importing that reference, Men usual∣ly take no notice of it, and the Relation is commonly over-look'd, v. g. A Patron and Client, are easily allow'd to be Relations: but a Constable, or Dictator, are not so readily, at first hearing, considered as such. Be∣cause there is no peculiar Name for those who are under the Command of a Dictator, or Constable, expressing a Relation to either of them; though it be certain, that either of them hath a certain Power over some others; and so is so far related to them, as well as a Patron is to his Client, or Ge∣neral to his Army.

§. 4. Fourthly, There is another fort of Relation, which is the Confor∣mity, or Disagreement, Mens voluntary Actions have to a Rule, to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of; which, I think, may be called Moral Relation; as being that which denominates our Moral Actions, and deserves well to be examined, there being no part of Know∣ledge wherein we should be more careful to get clear and distinct Ideas, and avoid, as much as may be, Obscurity and Confusion. Humane Acti∣ons, when with their various Ends, Objects, Manners, and Circumstan∣ces, they are framed into distinct complex Ideas, they are, as has been shewed, so many mixed Modes, a great part whereof have Names annexed to them. Thus supposing Gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return Kindness received; Polygamy to be the having more Wives than one at once: when we frame these Notions thus in our Minds, we have there so many clear and distinct Ideas of mixed Modes. But this is not all concerning our Actions; it is not enough to have clear and distinct Ideas of them, and to know what Names belong to such and such Combinations of Ideas, as make up the complex Idea belonging to such a Name. We have a farther and greater Concernment, and that is, to know whether such Actions so made up, are morally good, or bad.

§. 5. Good and Evil, as has been shewed in another place, are nothing but Pleasure or Pain, or that which occasions or procures Pleasure or Pain to us. Morally Good and Evil then, is only the Conformity or Dis∣agreement of our voluntary Actions to some Law, whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us, from the Will and Power of the Law-maker; which Good and Evil, Pleasure or Pain, attending our observance, or breach of the Law, by the Decree of the Law-maker, is that we call Reward and Pu∣nishment.

§. 6. Of these Moral Rules, or Laws, to which Men generally refer, and by which they judge of the Rectitude or Pravity of their Actions, there seem to me to be three sorts, with their three different Enforcements, or Rewards and Punishments. For since it would be utterly in vain, to sup∣pose a Rule set to the free Actions of Man, without annexing to it some Enforcement of Good and Evil, to determine his Will, we must, where∣ever we suppose a Law, suppose also some Reward or Punishment annexed

to that Rule. It would be in vain for one intelligent Being, to set a Rule to the Actions of another, if he had it not in his Power, to reward and punish the compliance with, or deviation from his Rule, by some Good and Evil, that is not the natural product and consequence of the Action it self. For that being a natural Convenience, or Inconve∣nience, would operate of it self without a Law. This, if I mistake not, is the true nature of all Law, properly so called.

§. 7. The Laws that Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their Rectitude, or Obliquity, seem to me to be these three. 1. The Divine Law. 2. The Civil Law. 3. The philosophical Law, if I may so call it. By the Relation they bear to the first of these, we judge whether our Actions are Sins, or Duties; by the second, whether they be Criminal, or Innocent; and by the third, whether they by Virtues or Vices.

§. 8. First, That GOD has given a Law to Mankind, I think, there is no body so brutish as to deny. He has a Right to do it, we are his Creatures: He has Goodness and Wisdom to direct our Actions to that which is best: and he has Power to enforce by Reward and Punishments, of infinite weight and duration, in another Life: for no body can take us out of his hands. By comparing them to this Law, it is, that Men judge of the most considerable Moral Good or Evil of their Actions; that is, whether as Duties, or Sins, they are like to procure them happiness, or mi∣sery, from the hands of the ALMIGHTY.

§. 9. The Civil Law, the Rule set by the Commonwealth, to the Acti∣ons of those who belong to it, is another Rule, to which Men refer their Actions, to judge whether they be criminal, or no. This Law no body over-looks: the Rewards and Punishments that enforce it, being ready at hand, and suitable to the Power that makes it, which is the force of the Commonwealth, which is engaged to protect the Lives, Liberties, and Possessions, of those who live according to its Laws, and has power to take away Life, Liberty, or Goods, from him who disobeys; which is the punishment of Offences committed against this Law.

§. 10. Thirdly, The third, which I call the philosophical Law, not because Philosophers make it, but because they have most busied themselves to en∣quire after it, and talk about it, is the Law of Vertue, and Vice; which though it be more talked of, possibly, than either of the other, yet how it comes to be established with such Authority as it has, to distinguish and denominate the Actions of Men; and what are the true measures of it, perhaps, is not so generally taken notice of. To comprehend this aright, we must consi∣der, that Men uniting into Politick Societies, though they have resigned up to the Publick the disposing of all their force; so that they cannot em∣ploy it against any fellow-Citizen, any farther than the Law of their Coun∣try directs: yet they retain still the Power of Thinking well or ill; appro∣ving or disapproving the Actions of those they live amongst, and converse with. If therefore we examine it right, we shall find, that the measure of what is every-where called and esteemed Vertue and Vice, is this appro∣bation or dislike, praise or blame, which, by a secret and tacit Consent, establishes it self in the several Societies, Tribes, and Clubs of Men in the World: whereby several Actions come to find Credit or Disgrace a∣mongst them, according to the Judgment, Maxims, or Fashions of that Place.

§. 11. That this is the common measure of Vertue and Vice, will appear to any one, who considers, that though that passes for Vice in one Coun∣try, which is counted a Vertue in another, yet every-where Vertue and Praise, Vice and Blame, go together. Vertue is every-where that which

is thought Praise-worthy; and nothing else but that which has the allow∣ance of publick Esteem, is Vertue. Vertue and Praise are so united, that they are called often by the same Name. Sunt sua proemia Laudi, says Virgil; and so Cicero, nihil habet natura praestantius, quam Honestatem, quam Laudem, quam Dignitatem, quam Decus, which he tells you, are all Names for the same thing, Tusc. l. 2. This is the Language of the Heathen Philoso∣phers, who well understood wherein their Notions of Vertue and Vice consisted. And though, perhaps, by the different Temper, Education, Fashion, Maxims, or Interest of different sorts of Men it fell out, that what was thought Praise-worthy in one Place, escaped not censure in another; and so in different Societies, Vertues and Vices were changed: Yet as to the Main, they for the most part kept the same every where. For since nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with Esteem and Repu∣tation, that wherein every one finds his Advantage; and to blame and discountenance the contrary: 'tis no Wonder, that Esteem and Discredit; Vertue and Vice, should in a great measure everywhere correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, which the Law of God hath established; there being nothing•• that so directly, and visibly secures, and advances the general Good of Mankind in this World, as Obedience to the Laws he has set them, and nothing that breeds such Mischiefs and Confusion, as the neglect of them. And therefore Men, without renouncing all Sense and Reason, and their own Interest, which they are so constantly true to, could not generally mistake, in placing their Commendation and Blame on that side, that really deserved it not. Nay, even those Men, whose Practice was otherwise, failed not to give their Approbation right, few being depraved to that Degree, as not to condemn, at least in others, the Faults they themselves were guilty of: whereby even in the Corruption of Manners, the true Boundaries of the the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preserved. So that even the Exhortations of inspired Tea∣chers, have not feared to appeal to common Repute. Whatsoever is love∣ly, whatsoever is of good report, if there be any Vertue, if there be any praise, &c. Phil. 4.8.

§. 12. If any one shall imagine, that I have forgot my own Notion of a Law, when I make the Law, whereby Men judge of Vertue and Vice, to be nothing else, but the Consent of private Men, who have not Autho∣rity enough to make a Law: Especially wanting that, which is so necessary, and essential to a Law, a Power to inforce it: I think, I may say, that he, who imagines Commendation and Disgrace, not to be strong Motives on Men, to accommodate themselves to the Opinions and Rules of those with whom they converse, seems little skill'd in the Nature, or History of Mankind, the greatest part whereof, he shall find to govern themselves chiefly, if not solely, by this Law of Fashion; and so they do that, which keeps them in Reputation with their Company, little regard the Laws of God, or the Magistrate. The Penalties, that attend the breach of God's Laws, some, nay, perhaps, most Men seldom seriously reflect on: and a∣mongst those that do, many whilst they break the Law, entertain Thoughts of future reconciliation, and making their Peace for such Breaches: And as to the Punishments, due from the Laws of the Common-Wealth, they fre∣quently flatter themselves with the hopes of Impunity. But no Man scapes the Punishment of their Censure and Dislike, who offends against the Fa∣shion and Opinion of the Company he keeps, and would recommend himself to. Nor is there one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible enough, to hear up under the constant Dislike, and Condemnation of his

own Club. He must be of a strange, and unusual Constitution, who can content himself, to live in constant Disgrace and Disrepute with his own particular Society. Solitude many Men have sought, and been reconciled to: But no Body, that has the least Thoughts, or Sense of a Man about him, can live in Society, under the constant Dislike, and ill Opinion of his Familiars, and those he converses with. This is a Burthen too heavy for humane Sufferance: And he must be made up of irreconcileable Contradictions, who can take Pleasure in Company, and yet be insensible of Contempt and Disgrace from his Companions.

§. 13. These Three then, First, The Law of God. Secondly, the Law of politick Societies. Thirdly, the Law of Fashion, or private Censure, are those, to which Men variously compare their Actions: And 'tis by their Conformity to one of these Laws, that they take their measures, when they would judge of their Moral Rectitude, and denominate their Actions good or bad.

§. 14. Whether the Rule, to which, as to a Touch-stone, we bring our voluntary Actions, to examine them by, and try their Goodness, and accor∣dingly to name them; which is, as it were, the Mark of the value we set upon them. Whether, I say, we take that Rule from the Fashion of the Country, or the Will of a Law-maker, the Mind is easily able to observe the Relation any Action hath to it; and to judge, whether the Action agrees, or disagrees with the Rule; and so hath a Notion of Moral Goodness or Evil, which is either Conformity, or not Conformity of any Action to that Rule: And therefore, is often called Moral Rectitude. This Rule being nothing but a Collection of several simple Ideas, the Conformity thereto is but so ordering the Action, that the simple Ideas, belonging to it, may correspond to those, which the Law requires. And thus we see, how Moral Beings and Notions, are founded on, and terminated in these simple Ideas, we have received from Sensation or Reflection, besides which, we have nothing at all in our Understandings, to employ our Thoughts about. For Example, let us consider the complex Idea, we signifie by the Word Murther; and when we have taken it asunder, and examined all the Particulars, we shall find them to amount to a Collection of simple Ideas, derived from Reflection or Sensation, viz. First, From Reflection on the Operations of our own Minds, we have the Ideas of Willing, Considering, Purposing before hand, Malice, or wishing Ill to another; and also of Life, or Perception, and Self-motion. Secondly, From Sensation, we have the Collection of the simple sensible Ideas of a Man, and of some Action, whereby we put an end to that Perception, and Motion in the Man; all which simple Ideas, are comprehended in the Word Murther. This Collection of simple Ideas, being found by me to agree or disagree, with the Esteem of the Country I have been bred in; and to be held by most Men there, worthy Praise, or Blame, I call the Action vertuous or vitious: If I have the Will of a supreme, invisible Law-maker for my Rule; then, as I supposed the Action commanded, or forbidden by God, I call it Good or Evil, Sin or Duty: and if I compare it to civil Law, the Rule made by the Legislative of the Country, I call it lawful, or unlawful, a Crime, or no Crime. So that whencesoever, we take the Rule of Moral Actions; or by what Standard soever, we frame in our Minds the Ideas of Vertues or Vices, they consist only, and are made up of Collections of simple Ideas, which we originally received from Sense or Reflection; and their Recti∣tude or Obliquity, consists in the Agreement or Disagreement, with those Patterns prescribed by some Law.

§. 15. To conceive a Right of Moral Actions, we must take notice of

them, under this two-fold Consideration. First, As they are in them∣selves each made up of such a Collection of simple Ideas. Thus Drunkenness, or Lying, signifie such or such a Collection of simple Ideas, which I call mixed Modes; and in this Sense, they are as much positive absolute Ideas, as the drinking of a Horse, or speaking of a Parrot. Secondly, Our Actions are considered, as Good, Bad, or indifferent: and in this respect, they are Relative, it being their Conformity to, or Disagreement with some Rule, that makes them to be regular or irregular, Good or Bad; and so, as far as they are compared with a Rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under Relation. Thus the challenging, and fighting with a Man, as it is a certain positive Mode, or particular sort of Action, by particular Ideas, distinguished from all others, is called Duelling; which, when considered, in relation to the Law of God, will deserve the Name Sin; to the Law of Fashion, in some Countries, Valour and Vertue; and to the municipal Laws of some Governments, a capital Crime. In this Case, when the positive Mode has one Name, and another Name as it stands in relation to the Law, the distinction may as easily be observed, as it is in Substances, where one Name, v. g. Man, is used to signifie the thing, another, v. g. Father, to signifie the Relation.

§. 16. But because, very frequently the positive Idea of the Action, and its Moral Relation are comprehended together under one Name, and the same Word made use of, to express both the Mode or Action, and its Moral Rectitude or Obliquity: therefore the Relation it self is less taken notice of; and there is often no distinction made between the positive Idea of the Action, and the reference it has to rule. By which confusion, of these two distinct Considerations, under one Term, those who yield too easily to the Impressions of Sounds, and are forward to take Names for Things, are often mis••ed in their Judgment of Actions. Thus the taking from a∣nother what is his, without his Knowledge or Allowance, is properly cal∣led Stealing: but that Name, being commonly understood to signifie also the Moral pravity of the Action, and to denote its contrariety to the Law, Men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called Stealing, as an ill Action, disagreeing with the Rule of Right. And yet the private ta∣king away his Sword from a Mad-man, to prevent his doing Mischief, though it be properly denominated Stealing, as the Name of such a mix∣ed Mode: yet when compared to the Law of God; when considered in its relation to that supreme Rule, it is no Sin, or Transgression, though the Name Stealing ordinarily carries such an intimation with it.

§. 17. And thus much for the Relation of humane Actions to a Law, which therefore I call Moral Relations.

'Twould make a Volume, to go over all sorts of Relations: 'tis not therefore to be expected, that I should here mention them all. It suf∣fices to our present purpose, to shew by these, what the Ideas are, we have of this comprehensive Consideration, call'd Relation, which is so va∣rious, and the Occasions of it so many, (as many as there can be of com∣paring things one to another,) that it is not very easie to reduce it to Rules, or under just Heads. Those I have mentioned, I think, are some of the most considerable, and such, as may serve to let us see, from whence we get our Ideas of Relations, and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this Argument, from what has been said, give me Leave to observe,

§. 18. First, That It is evident, That all Relation terminates in, and is ultimately founded on those simple Ideas, we have got from Sensation or Reflection: So that all that we have in our Thoughts our selves, (if we think of any thing, or have any meaning,) or would signifie to others, when we

use Words, standing for Relations, is nothing but some simple Ideas, or Collections of simple Ideas, compared one with another. This is so mani∣fest in that sort called proportional, that nothing can be more. For when a Man says, Honey is sweeter than Wax, it is plain, that his Thoughts in this Relation, terminate in this simple Idea, Sweetness, which is equally true of all the rest; though, where they are compounded, or decom∣pounded, the simple Ideas they are made up of, are, perhaps, seldom ta∣ken notice of. v. g. when the Word Father is mentioned: First, There is meant that particular of Species or collective Idea, signified by the Word Man; Secondly, Those sensible simple Ideas, signified by the Word Generation; And, Thirdly, The Effects of it, and all the simple Ideas, signified by the Word Child. So the Word Friend, being taken for a Man, who loves, and is ready to do good to another, has all those following Ideas to the making of it up. First, all the sim∣ple Ideas, comprehended in the Word Man, or intelligent Being. Se∣condly, the Idea of Love. Thirdly, The Idea of Readiness, or Disposition. Fourthly, The Idea of Action, which is any kind of Thought, or Motion. Fifthly, The Idea of Good, which signifies any thing that may advance his Happiness; and terminates at last, if examined, in particular sim∣ple Ideas, of which the Word Good in general, signifies any one; but if removed from all simple Ideas quite, it signifies nothing at all: And thus also, all Moral Words terminate at last, though, perhaps, more remotely in a Collection of simple Ideas: the immediate signification of Relative Words, being very often other supposed known Relations; which, if tra∣ced one to another, still end in simple Ideas.

§. 19. Secondly, That in Relations, we have for the most part, if not always, as clear a Notion of the Relation, as we have of those simple Ideas, wherein it is founded: Agreement or Disagreement, whereon Relation depends, being Things, whereof we have commonly as clear Ideas, as of any other whatsoever: it being but the distinguishing simple Ideas, or their Degrees one from another, without which, we could have no di∣stinct Knowledge at all. For if I have a clear Idea of Sweetness, Light, or Extension, I have too, of equal or more, or less, of each of these: If I know what it is for one Man to be born of a Woman, viz. Sempronia, I know what it is for another Man to be born of the same Woman, Sempro∣nia; and so have as clear a Notion of Brothers, as of Births, and, perhaps, clearer. For if I believed, that Sempronia digged Titus out of the Parsley-Bed, (as they use to tell Children,) and thereby became his Mother; and that afterwards in the same manner, she digged Cajus out of the Parsley-Bed, I had as clear a Notion of the Relation of Brothers between them, as if I had all the Skill of a Midwife; the Notion that the same Woman con∣tributed, as Mother, equally to their Births, (though I were ignorant, or mistaken in the manner of it,) being that on which I grounded the Rela∣tion; and that they agreed in that Circumstance of Birth, let it be what it will. The comparing them then in their descent from the same Person, without knowing the particular Circumstances of that descent, is enough to found my Notion of their having, or not having the Relation of Bro∣thers. But though the Ideas of particular Relations, are capable of being as clear and distinct in the Minds of those, who will duly consider them, as those of mixed Modes, and more determinate than those of Substances; yet the Names belonging to Relation, are often of as doubtful, and in∣certain Signification, as those of Substances, or mixed Modes; and much more than those of simple Ideas. Because Relative Words, being the Marks of this Comparison, which is made only by Men's Thoughts, and is an

Idea only in Men's Minds, Men frequently apply them to different Com∣parisons of Things, according to their own Imaginations, which do not always correspond with those of others using the same Names.

§. 20. Thirdly, That in these I call Moral Relations, I have a true No∣tion of Relation, by comparing the Action with the Rule, whether the Rule be true, or false. For if I measure any thing by a Yard, I know, whether the thing I measure be longer, or shorter, than that supposed Yard, though, perhaps, the Yard I measure by; be not exactly the Stan∣dard: Which, indeed, is another Enquiry. For though the Rule be erro∣neous, and I mistake in it: yet the agreement, or disagreement of that which I compare with it, is evidently known by me; wherein consists my knowledge of Relation. Though measuring by a wrong Rule, I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its moral Rectitude; because I have tried it by that which is not the true Rule: but am not mistaken in the relation that Action bears to that Rule I compare it to, which is agree∣ment, or disagreement.

CHAP. XXVIII. Of Clear and Obscure, Distinct and Confused Ideas.

§. 1. HAving shewed the Original of our Ideas, and considered the several sorts of them, as Simple and Complex; and shewed the difference in Complex ones, betwixt those of Modes, Relations, and Substances, all which, I think, is necessary to be done by any one, who would acquaint himself throughly with the progress of the Mind, in its Apprehension and Knowledge of Things, it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the Examination of Ideas. I must, never∣theless, crave leave to offer some few other Considerations concerning them. The first is, That some are clear, and others obscure; some distinct, and others confused.

§. 2. Perception of the Mind, being most aptly explained by Words re∣lating to the Sight, we shall best understand what is meant by Clear, and Obscure in our Ideas, by reflecting on what we call Clear and Obscure in the Objects of Sight. Light being that which discovers to us visible Objects, we give the name of Obscure, to that, which is not placed in a Light, sufficient to discover minutely to us the Figure and Colours, which are observable in it, and which, in a better Light, would be discernable. Thus our simple Ideas are clear, when they are such as the Objects them∣selves, from whence they were taken, did, in a well-ordered Sensation or Perception, present them. Whilst the Memory retains them thus, and can produce them so, to the Mind, when-ever it has occasion to consider them, they are clear Ideas. So far as they either want any thing of that original Exactness, or have lost any of their first Freshness, and are, as it were, faded or tarnished by Time, so far are they obscure. Complex Ideas, as they are made up of Simple ones: so they are clear, when the Ideas, that go to their Composition, are clear; and the Number and Order of those Simple Ideas, that are the Ingredients of any Complex one, is deter∣minate and certain.

§. 3. The cause of Obscurity in simple Ideas, seems to be either dull Organs; or very slight and transient Impressions made by the Objects;

or else a weakness in the Memory, not able to retain them as received. For to return again to visible Objects, to help us to apprehend this mat∣ter. If the Organs, or Faculties of Perception, like Wax over-hardned with Cold, will not receive the Impression of the Seal, from the usual impulse wont to imprint it; or, like Wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it well, when well imprinted; or else supposing the Wax of a temper fit, but the Seal not applied with a sufficient force, to make a clear Impression: In any of these cases, the print left by the Seal, will be obscure. This I sup∣pose, needs no application to make it plainer.

§. 4. As a clear Idea is that whereof the Mind has a full and evident perception, so a distinct Idea is that wherein the Mind perceives a diffe∣rence from all other; and a confused Idea is such an one, as is not suf∣ficiently distinguishable from another, from which it ought to be dif∣ferent.

§. 5. If no Idea be confused, but such as is not sufficiently distinguish∣able from another, from which it should be different, it will be hard, may any one say, to find anywhere a confused Idea. For let any Idea be as it will, it can be no other but such as the Mind perceives it to be; and that very perception, sufficiently distinguishes it from all other Ideas, which cannot be other, i. e. different, without being perceived to be so. No Idea therefore can be undistinguishable from another, from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from it self: for from all other, it is evidently different.

§. 6. To remove this difficulty, and to help us to conceive aright, what it is, that makes the confusion, Ideas are at any time chargeable with, we must consider, that Things are supposed different enough to have different Names, whereby to be marked, and discoursed of apart, upon any occa∣sion: And there is nothing more evident, than that the greatest part of different Names, are supposed to stand for different Things. Now every Idea a Man has, being visibly what it is, and distinct from all other Ideas, but it self, that which makes it confused is, when it is such, that it may as well be called by another Name, as that which it is expressed by: the dif∣ference which keep the Things (to be ranked under those two diffe∣rent Names) distinct, and makes them belong rather to the one, than the other of them, being left out; and so the distinction, which was in∣tended to be kept up by those different Names, is quite lost.

§. 7. The Defaults which usually occasion this Confusion, I think, are chiefly these following:

First, When any complex Idea (for 'tis complex Ideas that are most liable to confusion) is made up of 100 small a number of simple Ideas, and such only as are common to other Things, whereby the differences, that make it deserve a different Name, are left out. Thus he, that has an Idea made up of barely the simple ones of a Beast with Spots, has but a confused Idea of a Leopard, it not being thereby sufficiently distingui∣shed from a Lynx, and several other sorts of Beasts that are spotted. So that such an Idea, though it hath the peculiar Name Leopard, is not di∣stinguishable from those designed by the Names Lynx, or Panther, and may as well come under the Name Lynx, as Leopard. How much the custom of defining of Words by general terms, contributes to make the Ideas we would express by them, confused and undetermined, I leave o∣thers to consider. This is evident, that confused Ideas are such as render the Use of Words uncertain, and take away the benefit of distinct Names. When the Ideas, for which we used different terms, have not a difference answerable to their distinct Names, and so cannot be distinguished by them, there it is that they are truly confused.

§.8. Secondly, Another default, which makes our Ideas confused, is, when though the particulars that make up any Idea, are in number enough; yet they are so jumbled together, that it is not easily discernable, whether it more belongs to the Name that is given it, than to any other. There is nothing properer to make us conceive this Confusion, than a sort of Pictures usually shewn, as surprizing Pieces of Art, wherein the Colours, as they are laid by the Pencil on the Table itself, markout very odd and unusual Figures, and have no discernable order in their Position. This Draught, thus made up of parts, wherein no Symmetry nor Order appears, is, in it self, no more a confused Thing, than the picture of a cloudy Sky; wherein though there be as little order of Colours, or Figures to be found, yet no body thinks it a confused Picture. What is it then, that makes it be thought confused, since the want of Symmetry does not: as it is plain it does not; for another Draught made, barely in imitation of this, could not be called confused? I answer, That which makes it be thought con∣fused, is the applying it to some Name, to which it does no more discer∣nably belong, than to some other; v. g. when it is said to be the Pi∣cture of a Man, or Caesar, then any one with reason counts it confu∣sed: because it is not discernable, in that state, to belong more to the name Man, or Caesar, than to the name Baboon, or Pompey; which are supposed to stand for different Ideas, from those signified by Man, or Caesar. But when a cylindrical Mirrour, placed right, hath reduced those irregular Lines on the Table, into their due order and proportion, then the Confusion ceases, and the Eye presently sees, that it is a Man, or Caesar; i. e that it belongs to those Names; and that it is sufficiently distingui∣shable from a Baboon, or Pompey; i. e. from the Ideas signified by those Names. Just thus it is with our Ideas, which are, as it were, the Pictures of Things. No one of these mental Draughts, however the parts are put together, can be called confused, (for they are plainly discernible as they are,) till it be ranked under some ordinary Name, to which it cannot be discerned to belong, any more than it does to some other Name, of an al∣lowed different signification.

§. 9. Thirdly, A third defect that frequently gives the name of Confu∣sed, to our Ideas, is when any one of them is uncertain, and undetermined. Thus we may observe Men, who not forbearing to use the ordinary Words of their Language, till they have learn'd their precise signification, change the Idea, they make this or that term stand for, almost as often as they use it. He that does this, out of uncertainty of what he should leave out, or put into his Idea of Church, or Idolatry, every time he thinks of either, and holds not steady to any one precise Combination of Ideas, that makes it up, is said to have a confused Idea of Idolatry, or the Church: Though this be still for the same reason that the former, viz. Because a mutable Idea (if we will allow it to be one Idea) cannot belong to one Name, rather than another; and so loses the distinction, that distinct Names are designed for.

§. 10. By what has been said, we may observe how much Names, as supposed steady signs of Things, and by their difference to stand for, and keep Things distinct, that in themselves are different, are the occasion if denominating Ideas distinct or confused, by a secret and unobserved refe∣rence, the Mind makes of its Ideas to such Names. This, perhaps, will be fuller understood, after what I say of Words, in the Third Book, has been read and considered. But without taking notice of such a reference of Ideas to distinct Names, as the signs of distinct Things, it will be hard to say what a confused Idea is. And therefore when a Man design••, by any Name,

a sort of Things, or any one particular Thing, distinct from all others, the complex Idea he annexes to that Name, is the more distinct, the more particular the Ideas are, and the greater and more determinate the num∣ber and order of them is, whereof it is made up. For the more it has of these, the more has it still of the perceivable differences, whereby it is kept separate and distinct from all Ideas belonging to other Names, even those that approach nearest to it, and thereby all confusion with them is avoided.

§. 11. Confusion, making it a difficulty to separate two Things that should be separated, concerns always two Ideas; and those most, which most approach one another. Whenever therefore we suspect any Idea to be confused, we must examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot easily be separated from, and that will always be found an Idea belonging to another Name, and so should be a different Thing, from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct; being either the same with it, or making a part of it, or, at least, as properly call'd by that Name, as the other it is ranked under; and so keeps not that difference from that other Idea, which the different Names import.

§. 12. This, I think, is the confusion proper to Ideas; which still carries with it a secret reference to Names. At least if there be any other confusi∣on of Ideas, this is that which most of all disorders Mens Thoughts and Discourses: Ideas, as ranked under Names, being those that for the most part Men reason of within themselves, and always those which they com∣municate about, with others. And therefore where there are supposed two different Ideas, marked by two different Names, which are not as distinguishable as the Sounds that stand for them, there never fails to be confusion: And where any Ideas are distinct, as the Ideas of those two Sounds they are marked by, there can be between them no confusion. The way to prevent it, is to collect and unite into our complex Idea, as precise∣ly as is possible, all those Ingredients, whereby it is differenced from o∣thers; and to them so united in a determinate number, and order, apply steadily the same Name. But this neither accommodating Mens ease or vanity, or serving any design, but that of naked Truth, which is not always the thing aimed at, such exactness, is rather to be wished, than hoped for. And since the loose application of Names, to uncertain, and almost no Ideas, serves both to cover our own Ignorance, as well as to perplex and confound others, which goes for Learning and Superiority in Knowledge, it is no wonder that most Men should use it themselves, whilst they complain of it in others. Though yet, I think, no small part of the confusion, to be found in the Notions of Men, might, by care and ingenuity, be avoided; yet I am far from thinking it every-where wilful. Some Ideas are so complex, and made up of so many parts, that the Memory does not easily retain the very same precise Combination of simple Ideas, under one Name; much less are we able constantly to divine for what precise complex Idea such a Name stands in another Man's use of it. From the first of these, follows confusion in a Man's own Reasonings and Opinions within himself; from the latter, frequent confusion in discoursing and argu∣ing with others. But having more at large treated of Words, their De∣fects and Abuses in the following Book, I shall here say no more of it.

§. 13. Our complex Ideas being made up of Collections, and so variety of simple ones, may accordingly be very clear and distinct in one part, and very obscure and confused in another. In a Man who speaks of a Chiliade∣ron, or a Body of a thousand sides, the Idea of the Figure may be very confused, though that of the Number be very distinct: so that he being

able to discourse, and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex Idea, which depends upon the Number of a Thousand, he is apt to think, he, has a distinct Idea of a Chiliaëdron; though it be plain, he has no pre∣cise Idea of its Figure, so as to distinguish it, by that, from one that has but 999 sides: The not observing wherereof, causes no small Error in Men's Thoughts, and confusion in their Discourses.

§. 14. He that thinks he has a distinct Idea of the Figure of a Chiliaëdron, let him for Trial's-sake take another parcel of the same uniform Matter, viz. Gold, or Wax, of an equal Bulk, and make it into a Figure of 999 sides. He will, I doubt not, be able to distinguish these two Ideas one from another by the Number of sides; and reason, and argue distinct∣ly about them, whilst he keeps his Thoughts and Reasoning to that part only of these Ideas, which is contained in their Numbers; as that the sides of the one, could be divided into two equal Numbers; and of the o∣ther, not, &c. But when he goes about to distinguish them by their Figure, he will there be presently at a loss, and not be able, I think, to frame in his Mind two Ideas, one of them distinct from the other, by the bare Fi∣gure of these two pieces of Gold; as he could, if the same parcels of Gold were made one into a Cube, the other a Figure of five sides. In which in compleat Ideas, we are very apt to impose on our selves, and wrangle with others, especially where they have particular and familiar Names. For being satisfied in that part of the Idea, which we have clear; and the Name which is familiar to us, being applied to the whole, containing that part also, which is imperfect and obscure, we are apt to use it for that con∣fused part, and draw deductions from it, in the obscure part of its Sig∣nification, as confidently as we do from the other.

§. 15. Having frequently in our Mouths the Name Eternity, we are apt to think, we have a positive comprehensive Idea of it, which is as much as to say, that there is no part of that Duration, which is not clearly contained in our Idea. 'Tis true, that he that thinks so, may have a clear Idea of Duration; he may also have a very clear Idea of a very great length of Duration; he may also have a clear Idea of the Comparison of that great one, with still a greater: But it not being possible for him to include in his Idea of any Duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole Extent to∣gether of a Duration, where he supposes no end, that part of his Idea, which is still beyond the Bounds of that large Duration, he represents to his own Thoughts, is very obscure and undetermined. And hence it is, that in Disputes and Reasonings concerning Eternity, or any other Infinite, we are very apt to blunder, and involve our selves in manifest Ab∣surdities.

§. 16. In Matter, we have no clear Ideas of the smalness of Parts, much beyond the smallest, that occurr to any of our Senses: and therefore when we talk of the divisibility of Matter in infinitum, though we have clear Ideas of Division and Divisibility, and have also clear Ideas of Parts, made out of a whole, by Division; yet we have but very obscure, and confused Ideas of Corpuscles, or minute Bodies, so to be divided, when by former Di∣visions, they are reduced to a smalness, much exceeding the perception of any of our Senses: and so all that we have clear, and distinct Ideas of, is of what Division in general, or abstractly is, and the Relation of Totum and Pars; But of the bulk of the Body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain Pro∣gressions, I think, we have no clear, nor distinct Ideas at all. For I ask any one, Whether taking the smallest Atom of Dust he ever saw, he has any di∣stinct Idea, (bating still the Number which concerns not Extension,) betwixt the 100,000, and the 1000,000 part of it. Or if he think he can refine

his Ideas to that Degree, without losing sight of them, let him add ten Cyphers to each of those Numbers; for that will bring it no nearer the end of infinite Division, than the first half does. I must confess for my part, I have no clear, distinct Ideas of the different Bulk, or Extension of those Bodies, having but a very obscure one of either of them. So that, I think, when we talk of Division of Bodies in infinitum, our Idea of their distinct Bulks or Extension, which is the Subject and Foundation of Divi∣sions, comes to be confounded, and almost lost in Obscurity. For that Idea, which is to represent only Bigness, must be very obscure and confused, which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big, but only by Number: so that we have clear, distinct Ideas, we may say of Ten and One, but no distinct Ideas of two such Extensions. 'Tis plain from hence, that when we talk of infinite Divisibility of Body, or Extension, our distinct and clear Ideas are only of Numbers: but the clear, distinct Ideas of Extension, after some Progress of Division, is quite lost: and of such minute Parts, we have no distinct Ideas at all; but it returns, as all our Ideas of Infinite do, at last to that of Number always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any distinct Idea of actual, infinite Parts. We have, 'tis true, a clear Idea of Division, as often as we will think of it: but thereby we have no more a clear Idea of infinite Parts in Matter, then we have a clear Idea of an in∣finite Number, by being able still to add new Numbers to any assigned Number we have: endless Divisibility giving us no more a clear and di∣stinct Idea of actually infinite Parts, than endless Addibility (if I may so speak) gives us a clear and distinct Idea of an actually infinite Number: they both being only in a Power still of increasing the Number, be it alrea∣dy as great as it will. So that of what remains to be added, (wherein consists the Infinity,) we have but an obscure, imperfect, and confused Idea; from or about which we can argue, or reason with no Certainty or Clearness, no more than we can in Arithmetick, about a Number of which we have no such distinct Idea, as we have of 4 or 100; but only this relative obscure one, that compared to any other, it is still bigger: and we have no more a clear, positive Idea of it, when we say or conceive it is bigger, or more than 400, 000, 000, than if we should say, it is bigger than 40, or 4: 4000, 000, 000, having no nearer a proportion to the end of Addition, or Number, than 4. For he that adds only 4 to 4, and so proceeds, shall as soon come to the end of all Addition, as he that adds 400, 000, 000, to 400, 000, 000. And so likewise in Eternity, he that has an Idea of but four years, has as much a positive compleat Idea of Eternity, as he that has one of 400, 000, 000 of Years: For what remains of Eternity beyond ei∣ther of these two Numbers of Years, is as clear to the one as the other; i. e. neither of them has any clear positive Idea of it at all. For he that adds only 4 Years to 4, and so on, shall as soon reach Eternity, as he that adds 400, 000, 000 of Years, and so on; or if he please, doubles the Increase as often as he will: The remaining Abyss being still as far be∣yond the end of all these Progressions, as it is from the length of a Day, or an Hour. For nothing finite, bears any proportion to infinite; and therefore our Ideas, which are all finite, cannot bear any. Thus it is al∣so in our Idea of Extension, when we increase it by Addition, as well as when we diminish it by Division, and would enlarge our Thoughts to in∣finite Space. After a few doublings of those Ideas of Extension, which are the largest we are accustomed to have, we lose the clear distinct Idea of that Space: it becomes a confusedly great one, with a Surplus of still grea∣ter; about which, when we would argue, or reason, we shall always find our selves at a loss; confused Ideas in our Arguings, and Deductions from them, always leading us into confusion.

CHAP. XXIX. Of Real and Phantastical Ideas.

§. 1. BEsides what we have already mentioned, concerning Ideas, other Considerations belong to them, in reference to things from whence they are taken, or which they may be supposed to represent; and thus, I think, they may come under a threefold distinction; and are,

• First, Either real, or phantastical.
• Secondly, Adequate, or inadequate.
• Thirdly, True, or false.

First, By real Ideas, I mean such as have a Foundation in Nature; such as have a Conformity with the real Being, and Existence of Things, or with their Archetypes. Phantastical or chymerical, I call such as have no Foundation in Nature, nor have any Conformity with that rea∣lity of Being, to which they are tacitly referr'd, as to their Archetypes. If we examine the several sorts of Ideas before-mentioned, we shall find, that,

§. 2. First, Our simple Ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of things. Not that they are all of them the Images, or representations of what does exist, the contrary whereof, in all but the primary Qualities of Bodies, hath been already shewed. But though Whiteness and Cold∣ness are no more in Snow, than Pain is; yet those Ideas of Whiteness and Coldness, Pain, &c. being in us the Effects of Powers in Things with∣out us, ordained by our Maker, to produce in us such Sensations; they are real Ideas in us, whereby distinguish the Qualities, that are really in things themselves. For these several Appearances, being designed to be the Marks, whereby we are to know, and distinguish Things we have to do with; our Ideas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing Characters, whether they be only constant Effects, or else exact Resemblances of something in the things themselves: the rea∣lity lying in that steady correspondence, they have with the distinct Con∣stitutions of real Beings. But whether they answer to these Constitutions, as to Causes or Patterns, it matters not; it suffices, that they are constant∣ly produced by them. And thus our simple Ideas are all real and true, be∣cause they answer and agree to those Powers of Things, which produce them in our Minds, that being all that is requisite to make them real, and not fictious at Pleasure. For in simple Ideas, (as has been shewed,) the Mind is wholly confined to the Operation of things upon it; and can make to it self no simple Idea, more than what it has received.

§. 3. Though the Mind be wholly passive, in respect of its simple Ideas: Yet, I think, we may say, it is not so, in respect of its complex Ideas: For those being Combinations of simple Ideas, put together, and united under one general Name; 'tis plain, that the Mind of Man uses some kind of Liber∣ty, in forming those complex Ideas. How else comes it to pass, that one Man's Idea of Gold, or Justice, is different from another's: But because he has put in, or left out of his, some simple Idea, which the other has not. The Question then is, Which of these are real, and which barely imaginary Combinations: what Collections agree to the reality of Things, and what not? And to this I say, That

§. 4. Secondly, Mixed Modes and Relations, having no other reality, but what they have in the Minds of Men, there is nothing more requi∣red

to those kind of Ideas, to make them real, but that they be so framed, that there be a possibility of existing conformable to them. These Ideas, being themselves Archetypes, cannot differ from their Achetypes, and so can∣not be chimerical, unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent Ideas. Indeed, as any of them have the Names of a known Language assigned to them, by which, he that has them in his Mind, would signifie them to others, so barely Possibility of existing is not enough; they must have a Conformity to the ordinary Signification of the Name that is given them, that they may not be thought phantastical: as if a Man would give the Name of Justice to that Idea, which common use calls Liberality: But this Phantasticalness relates more to Propriety of Speech, than Reality of Ideas. For a Man to be undisturbed in Danger, but sedately to consider what is fittest to be done, and to execute it steadily, is a mixed Mode, or a complex Idea of an Action which may exist. But to be undisturbed in Danger, without using ones Reason or Industry, is what is also possible to be; and so is as real an Idea as the other. Though the first of these, having the Name Courage given to it, may, in respect of that Name, be a right or wrong Idea: But the other, whilst it has not a common re∣ceived Name of any known Language assigned to it, is not capable of any Rectitude or Deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but its self.

§. 5. Thirdly, Our complex Ideas of Substances, being made all of them in reference to Things existing without us, and intended to be Representa∣tions of Substances, as they really are, are no farther real, than as they are such Combinations of simple Ideas, that are really united, and co-exist in Things without us. On the Contrary, those are phantastical, which are made up of such Collections of simple Ideas, as were really never uni∣ted, never were found together in any Substance; v. g. a rational Crea∣ture, consisting of a Horse's Head, joined to a body of humane shape, or such as the Centaurs are described: Or, a Body, yellow, very malleable, fusible, and fixed; but lighter than common Water: Or, an uniform, un∣organized Body, consisting as to Sense, all of similar Parts, with Per∣ception and voluntary Motion joined to it. Whether such Substances, as these, can possibly exist, or no, 'tis probable we do not know: But be that as it will, these Ideas of Substances, being made conformable to no Pattern existing that we know; and consisting of such Collections of Ideas, as no Substance ever shewed us united together, they ought to pass with us for barely imaginary: But much more are those complex Ideas, which contain in them any Inconsistency or Contradiction of their Parts.

CHAP. XXX. Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

§. 1. OF our real Ideas, some are Adequate, and some are Inadequate. Those I call Adequate, which perfectly represent those Arche∣types, which the Mind supposes them taken from; which it intends them to stand for; and to which it refers them. Inadequate Ideas are such, which are but a partial, or incompleat representation of those Archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain,

§. 2. First, That all our simple Ideas are adequate. Because being no∣thing but the effects of certain Powers in Things, fitted and ordained by GOD, to produce such Sensations in us, they cannot but be correspon∣dent, and adequate to those Powers: And we are sure they agree to the reality of Things. For if Sugar produce in us the Ideas which we call Whiteness, and Sweetness, we are sure there is a power in Sugar to pro∣duce those Ideas in our Minds, or else they could not have been produ∣ced. And so each Sensation answering the Power that operates on any of our Senses, the Idea so produced, is a real Idea, (and not a fiction of the Mind,) which has no power to produce any simple Idea; and cannot but be adequate, since it ought only to answer that power: and so all simple Ideas are adequate. 'Tis true, the Things producing in us these simple Ideas, are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the causes of them; but as if those Ideas were real Beings in them. For though Fire be call'd painful to the Touch, whereby it signified the power of pro∣ducing in us the Idea of Pain: yet it is denominated also Light, and Hot; as if Light, and Heat, were really something in the Fire, more than a power to excite these Ideas in us; and therefore are called Qualities: in, or of the Fire. But these being nothing, in truth, but powers to excite such Ideas in us, I must, in that sense, be understood, when I speak of secundary Qualities, as being in Things; or of their Ideas, as being in the Objects, that excite them in us. Such ways of speaking, though accommodated to the vulgar Notions, without which, one cannot be well understood; yet truly signifie nothing, but those Powers, which are in Things, to excite certain Sensations or Ideas in us. Since were there no fit Organs to receive the impressions Fire makes on the Sight and Touch; nor a Mind joined to those Organs, to receive the Ideas of Light and Heat, by those impressi∣ons from the Fire, or the Sun, there would yet be no more Light, or Heat in the World, than there would be Pain, if there were no sensible Crea∣ture to feel it, though the Sun should continue just as it is now, and Mount AEtna flame higher than ever it did. Solidity, and Extension, and the termination of it, Figure, with Motion and Rest, whereof we have the Ideas, would be really in the World as they are, whether there were any sensible Being to perceive them, or no: And therefore those we have rea∣son to look on, as the real modifications of Matter; and such as are the exciting Causes of all our various Sensations from Bodies. But this be∣ing an Enquiry not belonging to this place, I shall enter no farther into it, but proceed to shew what complex Ideas are adequate, and what not.

§. 3. Secondly, Our complex Ideas of Modes, being voluntary Collecti∣ons of simple Ideas, which the Mind puts together, without reference to any real Archetypes, or standing Patterns, existing any where, are, and cannot but be adequate Ideas. Because they not being intended for Co∣pies of Things really existing, but for Archetypes made by the Mind, to rank and denominate Things by, cannot want any thing; they having each of them that combination of Ideas, and thereby that perfection the Mind intended they should: So that the Mind acquiesces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the Idea of a Figure, with three sides, meeting at three Angles, I have a compleat Idea, wherein I require nothing else to make it perfect. That the Mind is satisfied with the perfection of this its Idea, is plain, in that it doe; not conceive, that any Understanding hath, or can have a more compleat or perfect Idea of that thing it signifies by the word Triangle, supposing it to exist, than it self has in that complex Idea of three Sides, and three Angles: in which is contained all that i••, or can be essential to it, or necessary to compleat it, where-ever or howe-ever it exists. But in our Ideas of Substances, it is otherwise. For there desiring to copy Things, as they really do exist; and to represent to our selves that Constitution, on which all their Properties depend, we perceive our Ideas attain not that Perfection we intend: We find they still want something we should be glad were in them; and so are all inadequate. But mixed Modes and Relations, being Archetypes without Patterns, and so having nothing to represent but themselves, can∣not but be adequate, every thing being so to it self. He that as first put together the Idea of Danger perceived, absence of disorder from Fear, se∣date consideration of what was justly to be done, and executing of that without disturbance, or being deterred by the danger of it, had certainly in his Mind that complex Idea made up of that Combination: and inten∣ding it to be nothing else, but what it is; nor to have in it any other simple Ideas, but what it hath, it could not also but be an adequate Idea: and laying this up in his Memory, with the name Courage annexed to it, to signifie it to others, and denominate from thence any Action he should observe to agree with it, had thereby a Standard to measure and denomi∣nate Actions by, as they agreed to it. This Idea thus made, and laid up for a Pattern, must necessarily be adequate, being referred to nothing else but it self, nor made by any other Original, but the Good-liking and Will of him, that first made this Combination.

§. 4. Indeed, another coming after, and in Conversation learning from him the word Courage, may make an Idea, to which he gives that name Courage, different from what the first Author applied it to, and has in his Mind, when he uses it. And in this case, if he designs, that h••s Idea in Thinking, should be conformable to the other's Idea, as the Name he uses in speaking, is conformable in sound to his, from whom he learned it, his Idea may be very wrong, and inadequate. Because in this case, ma∣king the other Man's Idea the pattern of his Idea in thinking, as the other Man's Word, or Sound, is the pattern of his in speaking, his Idea is so far defective and inadequate, as it is distant from the Archetype and Pattern he refers it to, and intends to express and signifie by the name he uses for it: which name he would have to be a sign of the other Man's Idea, (to which, in its proper use, it is primarily annexed,) and of his own, as agreeing to it: to which if his own does not exactly correspond, it is faulty and in∣adequate.

§. 5. Therefore these complex Ideas of Modes, when they are referred by the Mind, and intended to correspond to the Ideas in the Mind of some other intelligent Being, expressed by the Names, we apply to them, they may be very deficient, wrong, and inadequate. Because they agree not to that, which the Mind designs to be their Archetype, and Pattern: In which respect only, any Idea of Modes can be wrong, imperfect, or inadequate. And on this account, our Ideas of mixed Modes are the most liable to be faulty of any other: but this refers more to proper Speaking than Knowing right.

§. 6. Thirdly, What Ideas we have of Substances, I have above shewed: Now those Ideas have in the Mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a supposed real Essence of each Species of Things. 2. Some∣times they are only design'd to be Pictures and Representations in the Mind, of Things that do exist, by Ideas that are discoverable in them. In both which ways, these Copies of their Originals, and Archetypes, are imperfect and inadequate.

First, It is usual for Men to make the Names of Substances, stand for Things, as supposed to have certain real Essences, whereby they are of this or that Species: And Names standing for nothing but the Ideas, that are in Men's Minds, they must consequently refer their Ideas to such real Essen∣ces, as to their Archetypes. That Men (especially such as have been bred up in the Learning taught in this part of the World) do suppose certain spe∣cifick Essences of Substances, which each Individual in its several kind is made conformable to, and partakes of, is so far from needing proof, that it will be thought strange if any one should do otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the specifick Names, they rank particular Substances un∣der, to Things, as distinguished by such specifick real Essences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amiss, if it should be doubted, whe∣ther he call'd himself Man, with any other meaning than as having the real Essence of a Man? And yet if you demand, what those real Essences are, 'tis plain Men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows, that the Ideas they have in their Minds, being referred to real Essences as Ar∣chetypes which are unknown, must be so far from being adequate, that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all. The complex Ideas we have of Substances, are, as has been shewed, certain Col∣lections of simple Ideas, that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together. But such a complex Idea cannot be the real Essence of any Substance: for then the Properties we discover in that Body, would depend on that complex Idea, and be deducible from it, and their neces∣sary connexion with it be known; as all Properties of a Triangle depend on, and, as far as they are discoverable, are deducible from the complex Idea of three Lines, including a Space. But it is plain, that in our com∣plex Ideas of Substances, are not contained such Ideas, on which all the other Qualities, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common Idea Men have of Iron, is a Body of a certain Colour, Weight, and Hard∣ness; and a Property that they look on as belonging to it, is malleableness. But yet this Property has no necessary connexion with that complex Idea, nor any part of it: and there is no more reason to think, that malleable∣ness depends on that Colour, Weight, and Hardness, than that that Co∣lour, or that Weight, depends on its malleableness. And yet, though we know nothing of these real Essences, there is nothing more ordinary, than that Men should attribute the sorts of Things to such Essences. The par∣ticular parcel of Matter which makes the Ring I have on my Finger, is forwardly, by most Men, supposed to have a real Essence, whereby it is

Gold; and from whence those Qualities flow, which I find in it, viz. its pecu∣liar, Colour, Weight, Hardness, Fusibility, Fixedness, and change of Colour upon a slight touch of Mercury, &c. This Essence, from which all these Properties flow, when I enquire into it, and search after it, I plainly per∣ceive I cannot discover: the farthest I can go, is only to presume, that it being nothing but Body, its real Essence, or internal Constitution, on which these Qualities depend, can be nothing but the Figure, Size, and Connexion of its solid Parts; of neither of which, I having any distinct perception at all, I can have no Idea of its real Essence, which is the cause that it has that particular shining yellowness; a greater weight than any thing I know of the same bulk; and a fitness to have its Colour changed by the touch of Quicksilver. If any one will say, that the real Essence, and internal Constitution, on which these Properties depend, is not the Figure, Size, and Arangement or Connexion of its solid Parts, but something else, call'd its particular form; I am farther from having any Idea of its real Essence, than I was before. For I have an Idea of Figure, Size, and Si∣tuation of solid Parts in general, though I have none of the particular Fi∣gure, Size, or putting together of Parts, whereby the Qualities above-men∣tioned are produced; which Qualities I find in that particular parcel of Matter that is on my Finger, and not in another parcel of Matter with which I cut the Pen I write with. But when I am told, that something besides the Figure, Size, and Posture of the solid Parts of that Body, is its Essence, something called substantial form, of that, I confess, I have no Idea at all, but only of the sound Form: which is far enough from an Idea of its real Essence, or Constitution. The like ignorance as I have of the real Essence of this particular Substance, I have also of the real Es∣sence of all other natural ones: Of which Essences, I confess, I have no distinct Ideas at all; and I am apt to suppose, others, when they examine their own Knowledge, will find in themselves, in this one point, the same sort of ignorance.

§. 7. Now then, when Men apply to this particular parcel of Matter on my Finger, a general Name already in use, and denominate it Gold, Do they not ordinarily, or are they not understood to give it that Name, as belonging to a particular Species of Bodies, having a real internal Es∣sence; by having of which Essence, this particular Substance comes to be of that Species, and to be called by that Name? If it be so, as it is plain it is, the name by which Things are marked, as having that Es∣sence, must be referred primarily to that Essence; and consequently the Idea to which that name is given, must be referred also to that Essence, and be intended to represent it: which Essence, since they who so use the Names, know not their Ideas of Substances must be all inadequate in that respect, as not containing in them that real Essence, which the Mind in∣tends they should.

§. 8. Secondly, Those who, neglecting that useless Supposition of un∣known real Essences, whereby they are distinguished, endeavour to copy the Substances, that exist in the World, by putting together the Ideas of those sensible Qualities, which are sound co-existing in them, though they come much nearer a likeness of them, than those who imagine they know not what real specifick Essences: yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate Ideas of those Substances, they would thus copy into their Minds: nor do those Copies, exactly and fully, contain all that is to be found in their Ar∣chetypes. Because those Qualities, and Powers, of Substances, whereof we make their complex Ideas, are so many and various, that no Man's complex Idea contains them all. That our abstract Ideas of Substances,

do not contain in them all the simple Ideas that are united in the Things themselves, is evident, in that Men do rarely put into their complex Idea of any Substance, all the simple Ideas they do know to exist in it. Because endeavouring to make the signification of their specifick Names, as clear, and as little cumbersome as they can, they make their specifick Ideas of the sorts of Substances, for the most part, of a few of those simple Ideas which are to be found in them: But these having no original precedency, or right to be put in, and make the specifick Idea, more than others that are left out, 'tis plain that both these ways, our Ideas of Substances are de∣ficient, and inadequate. The simple Ideas whereof we make our com∣plex ones of Substances, are all of them (ba••ing only the Figure and Bulk of some sorts) Powers; which being Relations to other Substances•• we can never be sure we know all the Powers that are in any one Body, till we have tried what Changes it is fitted to give to, or receive from other Sub∣stances, in their several ways of application: which being impossible to be tried upon any one Body, much less upon all, it is impossible we should have adequate Ideas of any Substance, made up of a Collection of all its Properties.

§. 9. Whosoever first light on a parcel of that sort of Substance, we de∣note by the word Gold, could not rationally take the Bulk and Figure he observed in that lump, to depend on its real Essence; on its internal Con∣stitution. Therefore those never went into his Idea of that Species of Bo∣dy: but its peculiar Colour, perhaps, and Weight, were the first he ab∣stracted from it, to make the complex Idea of that Species. Which both•• are but Powers; the one to affect our Eyes, after such a manner, and to produce in us that Idea we call Yellow; and the other to force upwards any other Body of equal bulk, they being put into a pair of equal Scales, one against another. Another, perhaps, added to these, the Ideas of Fusibi∣lity and Fixedness, two other passive Powers, in relation to the operation of Fire upon it: Another, its Ductility and Solubility in Aq. Regia, two other Powers, relating to the operation of other Bodies, in changing its outward Figure, or Separation of it, into sensible Parts. These, or part of these, put together, usually make the complex Idea in Mens Minds, of that sort of Body we call Gold.

§. 10. But no one, who hath considered the Properties of Bodies in ge∣neral, or this sort in particular, can doubt that this, call'd Gold, has infinite other Properties, not contained in that complex Idea: Some, who have examined this Species more accurately, could, I believe, enumerate ten times as many Properties in Gold; all of them as inseparable from its in∣ternal Constitution, as its Colour, or Weight: And 'tis probable, if any one knew all the Properties, that are by divers Men known of this Metal, there would an hundred times as many Ideas, go to the complex Idea of Gold, as any one Man yet has in his; and yet that not, perhaps, be the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it. The changes that that one Body is apt to receive, and make in other Bodies, upon a due appli∣cation, exceeding far, not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear so much a Paradox to any one, who will but consider, how far Men are yet from knowing all the Properties of that one, no very compound Figure, a Triangle, though it be no small numbers that are already by Mathematicians discovered of it.

§. 11. So that all our complex Ideas of Substances are imperfect and in∣adequate: which would be so also in mathematical Figures, if we were to have our complex Ideas of them, only by collecting their Properties, in reference to other Figures. How uncertain, and imperfect, would our

Ideas be of an Elypsis, if we had no other Idea of it, but some few of its Properties? Whereas having in our plain Idea, the whole Essence of that Figure, we from thence discover those Properties, and demonstratively see how they flow, and are inseparable from it.

§. 12. Thus the Mind has three sorts of abstract Ideas, or nominal Es∣sences:

First, Simple Ideas, which are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Copies; but yet certainly adequate. Because being intended to express nothing but the power in Things to produce in the Mind such a Sensation, that Sensation, when it is produced, cannot but be the Effect of that Power. So the Paper I write on, having the power, in the Light, (I speak according to the common Notion of Light,) to produce in me the Sensation, which I call White, it cannot but be the Effect of such a Power, in something without the Mind; since the Mind has not the power to produce any such Idea in its self, and being meant for nothing else but the Effect of such a Power, that simple Idea is real and adequate: the sensation of White, in my Mind, being the Effect of that Power, which is in the Paper to produce it, is perfectly adequate to that Power; or else, that Power would produce a different Idea.

Secondly, The complex Ideas of Substances are Ectypes, Copies too; but not perfect ones, not adequate: which is very evident to the Mind, in that it plainly perceives, that whatever Collection of simple Ideas it makes of any Substance that exists, it cannot be sure, that it exactly an∣swers all that are in that Substance. Since not having tried all the Ope∣rations of all other Substances upon it, and found all the Alterations it would receive from, or cause in other Substances, it cannot have an exact adequate Collection of all its active and passive Capacities; and so not have an adequate complex Idea of the Powers of any Substance existing, and its Relations, which is that sort of complex Idea of Substances we have. And, after all, if we could have, and actually had, in our complex Idea, an exact Collection of all the secundary Qualities, or Powers of any Substance, we should not yet thereby have an Idea of the Essence of that Thing. For since the Powers, or Qualities, that are observable by us, are not the real Essence of that Substance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any Collection whatsoever of these Qualities, cannot be the real Es∣sence of that Thing. Whereby it is plain, that our Ideas of Substances are not adequate; are not what the Mind intends them to be. Besides, a Man has no Idea of Substance in general, nor knows what Substance is in it self.

§. 14. Thirdly, Complex Ideas of Modes and Relations, are Originals, and Archetypes; are not Copies, nor made after the pattern of any real Exi∣stence, to which the Mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to answer. These being such Collections of simple Ideas, that the Mind it self puts together, and such Collections, that each of them contains in it precise∣ly all that the Mind intends it should, they are Archetypes and Essences of Modes that may exist: and so are designed only for, and belong only to such Modes, as when they do exist, have an exact conformity with those complex Ideas. The Ideas therefore of Modes and Relations, cannot but be adequate.

CHAP. XXXI. Of True and False Ideas.

§. 1. THough Truth and Falshood, belong, in Propriety of Speech, only to Propositions; yet Ideas are oftentimes termed true or false (as what Words are there, that are not used with great Latitude, and with some deviation from their strict and proper Significations,) Though, I think, that when Ideas themselves are termed true or false, there is still some secret or tacit Proposition, which is the Foundation of that Denomi∣nation: as we shall see, if we examine the particular Occasions, wherein they come to be called true or false. In all which, we shall find some kind of Affirmation, or Negation, which is the Reason of that Denomination. For our Ideas, being nothing but bare Appearances or Perceptions in our Minds, cannot properly and simply in themselves be said to be true or false, no more than a single Name of any thing, can be said to be true or false.

§. 2. Indeed, both Ideas and Words, may be said to be true in a metaphysi∣cal Sense of the Word Truth; as all other Things, that any way exist, are said to be true; i. e. really to be such as they exist. Though in Things called true, even in that Sense, there is, perhaps, a secret reference to our Ideas, look'd upon as the Standards of that Truth, which amounts to a mental Proposi∣tion, though it be usually not taken notice of.

§. 3. But 'tis not in that metaphysical Sense of Truth, which we en∣quire here, when we examine, whether our Ideas are capable of being true or false; but in the more ordinary Acceptation of those Words: And so I say, that the Ideas in our Minds, being only so many Perceptions, or Appearances there, none of them are false. The Idea of a Centaur, ha∣ving no more Falshood in it, when it appears in our Minds; than the Name Centaur has Falshood in it, when it is pronounced by our Mouths, or written on Paper. For Truth or Falshood, lying always in some Affir∣mation, or Negation, Mental or Verbal, our Ideas are not capable any of them of being false, till the Mind passes some Judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies something of them.

§. 4. When ever the Mind refers any of its Ideas to any thing extraneous to them, they are then capable to be called true or false. Because the Mind in such a reference, makes a tacit Supposition of their Conformity to that Thing: which Supposition, as it happens to be true or false; so the Ideas themselves come to be denominated. The most usual Cases wherein this happens, are these following:

§. 5. First, When the Mind supposes any Idea it has, conformable to that in other Men's Minds called by the same common Name; v. g. when the Mind intends, or judges its Ideas of Iustice, Temperance, Religion, to be the same, with what other Men give those Names to.

Secondly, When the Mind supposes any Idea it has in it self, to be con∣formable to some real Existence. Thus the two Ideas, of a Man, and a Cen∣taur, supposed to be the Ideas of real Substances, are the one true, and the other false; the one having a Conformity to what has really existed; the other not.

Thirdly, When the Mind refers any of its Ideas to that real Consti∣tution, and Essence of any thing, whereon all its Properties depend: and thus the greatest part, if not all our Ideas of Substances, are false.

§. 6. These Suppositions, the Mind is very apt tacitly to make concer∣ning its own Ideas. But yet if we will examine it, we shall find it is chiefly, if not only concerning its abstract complex Ideas. For the natural ten∣dency of the Mind being towards Knowledge; and finding if it should pro∣ceed by, and dwell upon only particular Things, its Progress would be ve∣ry slow, and its Work endless: Therefore to shorten its way to Knowledge, and make each Perception the more comprehensive; the first Thing it does, as the Foundation of the easier enlarging its Knowledge, either by Contemplation of the things themselves, that it would know; or confe∣rence with others about them, is to bind them into Bundles, and rank them so into sorts, that what Knowledge it gets of any of them, it may there∣by with assurance extend to all of that sort; and so advance by larger steps in that which is its great Business, Knowledge. This, as I have elsewhere shewed, is the Reason why we collect Things under comprehensive Ideas, with Names annexed to them into Genera and Species; i. e. into kinds, and sorts.

§. 7. If therefore we will warily attend to the Motions of the Mind, and observe what Couse it usually takes in its way to Knowledge, we shall, I think, find that the Mind having got any Idea, which it thinks it may have use of, either in Contemplation or Discourse; the first Thing it does, is to abstract it, and then get a Name to it; and so lay it up in its Store-house, the Memory, as containing the Essence of a sort of Things, of which that Name is always to be the Mark. Hence it is, that we may often observe, that when any one sees a new Thing of a kind that he knows not, he pre∣sently asks what it is, meaning by that Enquiry nothing but the Name. As if the Name carried with it the Knowledge of the Species, or the Essence of it; whereof it is indeed used as the Mark, and is generally supposed an∣nexed to it.

§. 8. But this abstract Idea, being something in the Mind between the thing that exists, and the Name that is given to it, it is in our Ideas, that both the Rightness of our Knowledge, and the Propriety or Intelligible∣ness of our Speaking consists. And hence it is, that Men are so forward to suppose, that the abstract Ideas they have in their Minds, are such as agree to the Things existing without them, to which they are referr'd; and are the same also, to which the Names they give them, do by the Use and Propriety of that Language belong: For without this double Confor∣mity of their Ideas, they find, they should both think amiss of Things in themselves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

§. 9. First then, I say, That when the Truth of our Ideas is judged of, by the Conformity they have to the Ideas which other Men have, and com∣monly signifie by the same Name, they may be any of them false. But yet simple Ideas are least of all liable to be so mistaken. Because a Man by his Senses, and every Day's Observation, may easily satisfie himself, what the simple Ideas are, which their several Names, that are in common use stand for, they being but few in Number; and such, as if he doubts, or mistakes in, he may easily rectifie by the Objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is seldom, that any one mistakes in his Names of simple Ideas; or applies the Name Red, to the Idea of Green; or the Name Sweet, to the Idea Bitter: Much less are Men apt to confound the Names, belong∣ing to different Senses; and call a Colour, by the Name of a Taste, &c. whereby it is evident, that the simple Ideas, they call by any Name, are commonly the same, that others have and mean, when they use the same Names.

§. 10. Complex Ideas are much more liable to be false in this respect; and the complex Ideas of mixed Modes, much more than those of Substances: Because in Substances, (especially those, which the common and unbor∣rowed Names of any Language are applied to,) some remarkable sensible Qualities, serving ordinarily to distinguish one sort from another, easily preserve those, who take any Care in the use of their Words, from apply∣ing them to sorts of Substances, to which they do not at all belong. But in mixed Modes, we are much more uncertain, it being not so easie to determine of several Actions; whether they are to be called Iustice, or Cruelty; Liberality, or Prodigality. And so in referring our Ideas to those of other Men, call'd by the same Name, ours may be false; and our Idea we call Justice, may, perhaps, be that which ought to have another Name,

§. 11. But whether or no our Ideas of mixed Modes are more liable than any sort, to be different from those of other Men, which are marked by the same Name: This at least is certain, That this sort of Falshood is much more familiarly attributed to our Ideas of mixed Modes, than to any other. When a Man is thought to have a false Idea of Iustice, or Gratitude, or Glory, it is for no other Reason, but that his agrees not with the Ideas, which each of those Names are the Signs of in other Men.

The Reason whereof seems to me to be this, That the abstract Ideas of mixed Modes, being Men's voluntary Combinations of such a precise Col∣lection of simple Ideas; and so the Essence of each Species, being made by Men alone, whereof we have no other sensible Standard, existing any where, but the Name it self, or the definition of that Name: We have no∣thing else to refer these our Ideas of mixed Modes to as Standards, to which we would conform them, but the Ideas of those, who are thought to use those Names in their most proper Significations; and so as our Ideas con∣form, or differ from them, they pass for true or false. And thus much concerning the Truth and Falshood of our Ideas, in reference to their Names.

§. 13. Secondly, As to the Truth and Falshood of our Ideas, in reference to the real Existence of Things, when that is made the Standard of their Truth, none of them can be termed false, but only our complex Ideas of Substances.

§. 14. First, Our simple Ideas, being barely such Perceptions, as God has fitted us to receive, and given Power to external Objects to produce in us by established Laws, and Ways, suitable to his Wisdom and Goodness, though incomprehensible to us, their Truth consists in nothing else, but in such Appearances, as are produced in us, and must be suitable to those Powers, he has placed in external Objects, or else they could not be produced in us: And thus answering those Powers, they are what they should be, true Ideas. Nor do they become liable to any Imputation of Falshood, if the Mind (as in most Men I believe it does) judges the Ideas to be in these Things them∣selves. For God in his Wisdom, having set them as Marks of Distin∣ction in Things, whereby we may be able to discern one Thing from another; and so chuse any of them for our uses, as we have Occasion: It alters not the Nature of our simple Idea, whether we think that the Idea of Blue, be in the Violet it self, or in our Mind only; and only the Power of producing it by the Texture of its Parts, reflecting the Particles of Light, after a certain Manner, to be in the Violet it self. For that Tex∣ture in the Object, operating regularly and constantly, producing the same Idea of Blue in us, it serves us to distinguish, by our Eyes, that from any other Thing, whether that distinguishing Mark, as it is really in the

Violet, be only a peculiar Texture of Parts, or else that very Colour, the Idea whereof (which is in us) is the exact resemblance. And it is equally from that Appearance, to be denominated Blue, whether it be that real Colour, or only a peculiar Texture in it, that causes in us that Idea: Since the Name Blue notes properly nothing, but that Mark of Distinction, that is in a Violet, discernable only by our Eyes, whatever it consists in, that being beyond our Capacities distinctly to know, and, perhaps, would be of less use to us, if we had Faculties to discern.

§. 15. Neither would it carry any Imputation of Falshood to our sim∣ple Ideas, if by the different Structure of our Organs, it were so ordered, That the same Object should produce in several Men's Minds different Ideas at the same time; v. g. if the Idea, that a Violet produced in one Man's Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a Marigold produced in another Man's, and vice versâ. For since this could never be known: because one Man's Mind could not pass into another Man's Body, to perceive what Appearances were produced by those Organs; neither the Ideas hereby, nor the Names, would be at all confounded, or any Falshood be in either. For all Things that had the Texture of a Violet, producing con∣stantly the Idea, which he called Blue; and those which had the Texture of a Marigold, producing constantly the Idea, which he as constantly called Yellow, whatever those Appearances were in his Mind; he would be able as regularly to distinguish Things for his Use by those Appearan∣ces, and understand, and signifie those distinctions, marked by the Names Blue and Yellow, as if the Appearances, or Ideas in his Mind, received from those two Flowers, were exactly the same with the Ideas in other Men's Minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the sensible Ideas, produced by any Object in different Men's Minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernably alike. For which Opinion, I think, there might be many Reasons offered; but that being besides my present Busi∣ness, I shall not trouble my Reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary Supposition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either for the Improvement of our Knowledge, or Conveniency of Life; and so we need not trouble our selves to examine it.

§. 16. From what has been said concerning our simple Ideas, I think, it evident, That our simple Ideas can none of them be false, in respect of Things existing without us. For the Truth of these Appearances, or Perceptions in our Minds, consisting, as has been said, only in their being answerable to the Powers in external Objects, to produce by our Senses such Appea∣rances in us: and each of them being in the Mind, such as it is, suitable to the Power that produced it, and which alone it represents, it cannot upon that Account, or as referr'd to such a Pattern, be false. Blue or Yellow, Bitter or Sweet, can never be false Ideas, these Perceptions in the Mind, are just such as they are there, answering the Powers appointed by God to produce them; and so are truly what they are, and are inten∣ded to be. Indeed the Names may be misapply'd; but that in this respect, makes no Falshood in the Ideas: As if a Man ignorant in the English Tongue, should call Purple, Scarlet.

§. 17. Secondly, Nether can our complex Ideas of Modes, in reference to the Essence of any Thing really existing, be false. Because whatever com∣plex Idea I have of any Mode, it hath no reference to any Pattern exist∣ing, and made by Nature: it is not supposed to contain in it any other Ideas, than what it hath; nor to represent any thing, but such a Compli∣cation of Ideas, as it does. Thus when I have the Idea of such an Action of a Man, who forbears to afford himself such Meat, Drink, and Cloathing,

and other Conveniencies of Life, as his Riches and Estate will be suffici∣ent to supply, and his station requires, I have no false Idea; but such as represents an Action, either as I find, or imagine it; and so is ca∣pable of neither Truth, or Falshood. But when I give the name Frugality, or Vertue, to this Action, then it may be called a false Idea, if thereby it be supposed to agree with that Idea, to which, in propriety of Speech, the name of Frugality doth belong; or to be conformable to that Law, which is the Standard of Vertue and Vice.

§. 18. Thirdly, Our complex Ideas of Substances, being all referred to Patterns in Things themselves, may be false. That they are all false, when looked upon as the Representations of the unknown Essences of Things, is so evident, that there needs nothing to be said of it. I shall therefore pass over that chimerical Supposition, and consider them as Col∣lections of simple Ideas in the Mind, taken from Combinations of simple Ideas existing together constantly in Things, of which Patterns, they are the supposed Copies: And in this reference of them, to the existence of Things, they are false Ideas: 1. When they put together simple Ideas, which in the real Existence of Things, have no union; as when to the Shape, and Size, that exist together in a Horse, is joined, in the same com∣plex Idea, the power of Barking like a Dog: Which three Ideas, how∣ever put together into one in the Mind, were never united in Nature; and this therefore may be called a false Idea of an Horse. 2. Ideas of Substances are, in this respect, also false, when from any Collection of simple Ideas, that do always exist together, there is separated, by a direct Negation, any other simple Idea, which is constantly joined with them. Thus if to Extension, Solidity, Fusibility, the peculiar Weightiness and yel∣low Colour of Gold, any one join in his Thoughts the Negation of a greater degree of fixedness, than is in Lead, or Copper; he may be said to have a false complex Idea, as well as when he joins to those other simple ones, the Idea of perfect absolute Fixedness: for either way, the complex Idea of Gold being made up of such simple ones, as have no union in Nature, may be termed false. But if he leave out of this his complex Idea, that of Fixedness quite, without either actually joining to, or separa∣ting of it from the rest in his Mind, it is, I think, to be looked on, as an inadequate and imperfect Idea, rather than a false one: since though it contains not all the simple Ideas that are united in Nature, yet it puts none together, but what do really exist together.

§. 19. Though in compliance with the ordinary way of Speaking, I have shewed in what sense, and upon what ground our Ideas may be sometimes called true, or false; yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter in all cases, where any Idea is call'd true, or false, it is from some Judgment that the Mind makes, or is supposed to make, that is true, or false. For Truth, or Falshood, being never without some Affirmation, or Negation, Express, or Tacit, it is not to be found, but where signs are joined or separated, according to the agreement, or disagreement, of the Things they stand for. The signs we chiefly use, are either Ideas, or Words; wherewith we make either mental, or verbal Propositions. Truth lies in so joining, or separating these Representatives, as the Things they stand for, do, in themselves, agree, or disagree: and Falshood in the contrary, as shall be more fully shewed hereafter.

§. 20. Any Idea then we have in our Minds, whether conformable, or not, to the existence of Things, or to any Ideas in the Minds of other Men, cannot properly for this alone be called false. For these Represen∣tations, if they have nothing in them, but what is really existing in

Things without, cannot be thought false, being exact Representations of something: nor yet if they have any thing in them, differing from the reality of Things, can they properly be said to be false Representations, or Ideas of Things, they do not represent. But the mistake and fals∣hood is,

§. 21. First, When the Mind having any Idea, it judges and concludes it the same, that is in other Mens Minds, signified by the same name; or that it is conformable to the ordinary received signification, or de∣finition of that Word, when indeed it is not: Which is the most usu∣al mistake in mixed Modes, though other Ideas also are liable to it.

§. 22 Secondly, When it having a complex Idea made up of such a Col∣lection of simple ones, as Nature never puts together, it judges it to agree to a Species of Creatures really existing; as when it joins the weight of Tin, to the colour, fusibility, and fixedness of Gold.

§. 23. Thirdly, When in its complex Idea, it has united a certain num∣ber of simple Ideas, that do really exist together in some sorts of Crea∣tures, but has also left out others, as much inseparable, it judges this to be a perfect compleat Idea, of a sort of things which really it is not; v. g. having joined the Ideas of substance, yellow, malleable, most heavy, and fusible, it takes that complex Idea to be the compleat Idea of Gold, when yet its peculiar fixedness and solubility in Aqua Regia are as inseparable from those other Ideas, or Qualities of that Body, as they are one from another.

§. 24. Fourthly, The Mistake is yet greater, when I judge, that this com∣plex Idea, contains in it the real Essence of any Body existing; when at least it contains but some few of those Properties, which flow from its real Essence and Constitution. I say, only some few of those Properties; for those Properties consisting mostly in the active and passive Powers, it has, in reference to other Things, all that are vulgarly known of any one Body; and of which the complex Idea of that kind of Things is usually made, are but a very few, in comparison of what a Man, that has several ways tried and examined it, knows of that one sort of Things; and all that the most expert Man knows, are but few, in comparison of what are really in that Body, and depend on its internal or essential Constitution. The essence of a Triangle, lies in a very little compass, consists in a very few Ideas; three Lines meeting at three Angles, make up that Essence: But the Properties that flow from this Essence, are more than can be easily known, or enumerated. So I imagine it is in Substances their real Essences lie, in a little compass; though the Properties flowing from that internal Constitution, are endless.

§. 25. To conclude, a Man having no notion of any Thing without him, but by the Idea he has of it in his Mind; which Idea, he has a power to call by what Name he pleases, he may, indeed, make an Idea neither answering the reality of Things, nor agreeing to the Ideas com∣monly signified by other Peoples Words; but cannot make a wrong, or false Idea of a Thing, which is no otherwise known to him, but by the Idea he has of it. v. g. When I frame an Idea of the Legs, Arms, and Body of a Man, and join to this a Horse's Head and Neck, I do not make a false Idea of any thing; because it represents nothing without me. But when I call it a Man, or Tartar, and imagine it either to represent some real Being without me, or to be the same Idea, that others call by the same name; in either of these cases, I may err. And upon this account it is, that it comes to be termed a false Idea; though, indeed, the falshood lie not in the Idea, but in that tacit mental Proposition, wherein a con∣formity

and resemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if having framed such an Idea in my Mind, without thinking, either that Existence, or the name Man, or Tartar, belongs to it, I will call it Man, or Tartar, I may be justly thought phantastical in the Naming; but not erroneous in my Judgment; nor the Idea any way false.

§. 26. Upon the whole matter, I think, That our Ideas, as they are considered by the Mind, either in reference to the proper signification of their Names; or in reference to the reality of Things, may very fitly be called right, or wrong Ideas, according as they agree, or disagree to those Patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather call them true, or false, 'tis fit he use a liberty, which every one has, to call Things by those Names he thinks best; though in propriety of Speech, Truth, or Falshood, will, I think, scarce agree to them, but as they, some way or other, virtually contain in them some mental Proposition. The Ideas that are in a Man's Mind, simply considered, cannot be wrong, unless complex ones, wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other Ideas are in themselves right; and the knowledge about them, right and true Knowledge: but when we come to refer them to any thing, as to their Patterns and Archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such Archetypes.

§. 27. Having thus given an account of the original, sorts, and extent of our Ideas, with several other Considerations, about these (I know not whether I may say) Instruments, or Materials, of our knowledge, the method I at first proposed to my self, would now require, that I should immediately proceed to shew, what use the Understanding makes of them, and what Knowledge we have by them. This was that which in the first general view I had of this Subject, was all that I thought I should have to do: but upon a nearer approach, I find, that there is so close a connexion between Ideas and Words; and our abstract Ideas, and general Words, have so constant a relation one to another, that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our Knowledge, which all consists in Propositions, without considering, first, the Nature, Use, and Signification of Language; which therefore must be the business of the next Book.