An essay concerning humane understanding microform

THE CONTENTS.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I. Introduction.

SECT.

• 1. An Enquiry into the Vnderstan∣ding pleasant and useful.
• 2. Design.
• 3. Method.
• 4. Vseful to know the extent of our Comprehension.
• 5. Our Capacity proportioned to our State and Concerns, to discover things useful to us.
• 6. Knowing the extent of our Capaci∣ties will hinder us from useless Cu∣riosity, Scepticism, and Idleness.
• 7. Occasion of this Essay.
• 8. Apology for Idea.

CHAP. II. No innate speculative Principles.

SECT.

• 1. The way shewn how we come by any Knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate.
• 2. General Assent the great Argu∣ment.
• 3. Vniversal Consent proves nothing innate.
• 4. What is, is; and, It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, not universally assen∣ted to.
• 5. Not on the Mind naturally im∣printed, because not known to Children, Idiots, &c.
• 6, 7. That Men know them when they come to the use of Reason, answer'd.
• 8. If Reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate.
• 9—11. 'Tis false that Reason discovers them.
• 12. The coming to the Vse of Reason, not the time we come to know these Maxims.
• 13. By this, they are not distinguished from other knowable Truths.
• 14. If coming to the use of Reason were the time of their discovery, it would not prove them innate.
• 15, 16. The steps by which the Mind at∣tains several Truths.
• 17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not in∣nate.
• 18. If such an Assent be a mark of in∣nate, then that One and Two are equal to Three; that Sweetness is not Bitterness; and a thou∣sand the like must be innate.
• 19. Such less general Propositions known before these universal Maxims.
• 20. One and One, equal to Two, &c. not general nor useful, answered.
• 21. These Maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate.
• 22. Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the Mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing.
• 23. The Argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a false supposi∣tion of no precedent teaching.
• 24. Not innate, because not universally assented to.
• 25. These Maxims not the first known.
• 26. And so not innate.
• ...

• 27. Not innate, because they appear least, where what is innate shews it self clearest.
• 28. Recapitulation.

CHAP. III. No innate practical Principles.

SECT.

• 1. No moral Principles so clear and so generally received, as the forementioned speculative Ma∣xims.
• 2. Faith and Iustice not owned as Principles by all Men.
• 3. Obj. Though Men deny them in their Practice, yet they admit them in their Thoughts, answered.
• 4. Moral Rules need a Proof, ergo not innate.
• 5. Instance in keeping Compacts.
• 6. Vertue generally approved, not be∣cause innate, but because profi∣table.
• 7. Men's Actions convince us, that the Rule of Vertue is not their internal Principle.
• 8. Conscience no proof of any innate Moral Rule.
• 9. Instances of Enormities practised without remorse.
• 10. Men have contrary practical Prin∣ciples.
• 11—13. Whole Nations reject several Mo∣ral Rules.
• 14. Those who maintain innate practi∣cal Principles, tell us not what they are.
• 15—19. Lord Herbert's innate Principles examined.
• 20. Obj. Innate Principles may be cor∣rupted, answered.
• 21. Contrary Principles in the World.
• 22—26. How men commonly come by their Principles.
• 27. Principles must be examined.

CHAP. IV. Other Considerations about innate Prin∣ciples, both Speculative and Practical.

SECT.

• 1. Principles not innate, unless their Ideas be innate.
• 2, 3. Ideas, especially those belonging to Principles, not born with Chil∣dren.
• 4, 5. Identity an Idea not innate.
• 6. Whole and Part not innate Ideas.
• 7. Idea of Worship not innate.
• 8—11. Idea of GOD not innate.
• 12. Suitable to GOD's Goodness, that all Men should have an Idea of Him, therefore naturally imprin∣ted by Him; answered.
• 13—16. Ideas of GOD various in diffe∣rent Men.
• 17. If the Idea of GOD be not innate, no other can be supposed innate.
• 18. Idea of Substance not innate.
• 19. No Propositions can be innate, since Ideas are innate.
• 20. Principles not innate, because of little use, or little certainty.
• 21. Difference of Men's Discoveries depends upon the different appli∣cation of their Faculties.
• 22. Men must think and know for them∣selves.
• 23. Whence the Opinion of innate Prin∣ciples.
• 24. Conclusion.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I. Of Ideas in general.

SECT.

• 1. Idea is the Object of Thinking.
• 2. All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflexion.
• 3. The Objects of Sensation one Sourse of Ideas.
• 4. The Operations of our Minds about sensible Ideas, the other Sourse of them.
• 5. All our Ideas are of the one or the other of these.
• 6. Observable in Children.
• 7. Men are differently furnished with these, according to the different Objects they converse with.
• 8. Ideas of Reflexion had later, be∣cause they need Attention.
• 9. The Soul begins to have Ideas, when it begins to perceive.
• 10. The Soul thinks not always; for, First, it wants Proofs.
• 11. Secondly, It is not always conscious of it.
• 12. Thirdly, If a sleeping Man thinks without knowing it, the sleeping and waking Man are two persons.
• 13. Fourthly, Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming, that they think.
• 14. Fifthly, That Men dream without remembring it, in vain urged.
• 15. Sixthly, Vpon their Hypothesis, the Thoughts of a sleeping Man ought to be most rational.
• 16. Seventhly, On this Hypothesis the Soul must have Ideas not derived from Sensation or Reflexion, of of which there is no appearance.
• 17. Eightly, If I think when I know it not, no body else can know it.
• 18. Ninthly, How knows any one that the Soul always thinks? For if it be not a self-evident Proposition, it needs proof.
• 19. Tenthly, That a Man shoul•• be busie in thinking, and yet not retain it the next moment, very impro∣bable.
• 20—24. No Ideas but from Sensation or Re∣flexion, evident, if we observe Children.
• 25. In the reception of simple Ideas, the Vnderstanding is most of all passive.

CHAP. II. Of simple Ideas.

SECT.

• 1. Vncompounded Appearances.
• 2, 3. The Mind can neither make nor destroy them.

CHAP. III. Of Ideas of one Sense.

SECT.

• 1. As Colours of Seeing, Sounds of Hearing.
• 2. Few simple Ideas have Names.

CHAP. IV. Of Solidity.

SECT.

• 1. We receive this Idea from touch.
• 2. Solidity fills Space.
• 3. Distinct from Space.
• 4. From Hardness.
• 5. On Solidity depends Impulse, Re∣sistence, and Protrusion.
• 6. What it is.

CHAP. V.

Of simple Ideas by more than one Sense.

CHAP. VI. Of simple Ideas of Reflexion.

SECT.

• 1. Are the Operations of the Mind about its other Ideas?
• 2. The Idea of Perception, and Idea of Willing, we have from Refle∣xion.

CHAP. VII. Of Simple Ideas, both of Sensation and Reflexion.

SECT.

• 1—6. Pleasure and Pain.
• 7. Existence and Vnity.
• 8. Power.
• 9. Succession.
• 10. Simple Ideas the Materials of all our Knowledge.

CHAP VIII. Other Considerations concerning simple Ideas.

SECT.

• 1—6. Positive Ideas from privative Cau∣ses.
• 7, 8. Ideas in the Mind, Qualities in Bodies.
• 9, 10. Primary and Secondary Quali∣ties.
• 11, 12. How primary Qualities, produce their Ideas.
• 13, 14. How Secondary.
• 15—23. Ideas of primary Qualities are re∣semblances; of secondary, not.
• 24, 25. Reason of our mistake in this.
• 26. Secondary Qualities two-fold; First, Immediately perceivable; Secondly, Mediately perceivable.

CHAP. IX. Of Perception.

SECT.

• 1. It is the first simple Idea of Re∣flexion.
• 2—4. Perception is only when the Mind receives the Impression.
• 5, 6. Children, though they have Ideas, in the Womb, have none innate.
• 7. Which Ideas first is not evident.
• 8—10. Ideas of Sensation often changed by the Iudgment.
• 11—14. Perception puts the difference be∣tween Animals and inferior Be∣ings.
• 15. Perception the inlet of Know∣ledge.

CHAP. X. Of Retention.

SECT.

• 1. Contemplation.
• 2. Memory.
• 3. Attention, Repetition, Pleasure, and Pain fix Ideas.
• 4, 5. Ideas fade in the Memory.
• 6. Constantly repeated Ideas can scarce be lost.
• 7. In remembring the Mind is often active.
• 8. Two defects in the Memory, Obli∣vion and Slowness.
• 9. Brutes have Memory.

CHAP. XI. Of Discerning, &c.

SECT.

• 1. No Knowledge without it.
• 2. The difference of Wit and Iudg∣ment.
• 4. Clearness alone hinders Confusion.
• 4. Comparing.
• 5. Brutes compare, but imperfectly.
• 6. Compounding.
• 7. Brutes compound but little.
• 8. Naming.
• 9. Abstraction.
• 10, 11. Brutes abstract not.
• 12, 13. Idiots and mad Men.
• 14. Method.
• 15. These are the beginnings of hu∣mane Knowledge.
• 16. Appeal to Experience.
• 17. Dark room.

CHAP. XII. Of Complex Ideas.

SECT.

• 1. Made by the Mind out of simple ones.
• 2. Made voluntarily.
• 3. Are either Modes, Substances, or Relations.
• 4. Modes.
• 5. Simple and mixed Modes.
• 6. Substances Single or Collective.
• 7. Relation.
• 8. The abstrusest Ideas from the two Sources.

CHAP. XIII. Of Space, and its simple Modes.

SECT.

• 1. Simple Modes.
• 2. Idea of Space.
• 3. Space and Extension.
• 4. Immensity.
• 5, 6. Figure.
• 7—10. Place••
• 11—14. Extension and Body not the same.
• 15—17. Substance which we know not, no proof against Space without Body.
• 18, 19. Substance and Accidents of little use in Philosophy.
• 20. A Vac••um beyond the utmost bounds of Body.
• 21. The power of annihilation proves a Vacuum.
• 22. Motion proves a Vacuum.
• 23. The Ideas of Space and Body di∣stinct.
• 24, 25. Extension being inseparable from Body, proves it not the same.
• 26. Ideas of Space and Solidity distinct.
• 27. Men differ little in clear simple Ideas.

CHAP. XIV. Of Duration.

SECT.

• 1. Duration is fleeting Extension.
• 2—4. Its Idea from Reflexion on the train of our Ideas.
• 5. The Idea of Duration applicable to Things whilst we sleep.
• 6—8. The Idea of Succession not from Motion.
• 9—11. The train of Ideas has a certain degree of quickness.
• 12. This train the measure of other Suc∣cessions.
• 13—15. The Mind cannot fix long on one invariable Idea.
• 16. Ideas, however made, include no sense of Motion.
• 17. Time is Duration set out by Mea∣sures.
• 18. A good measure of Time must di∣vide its whole Duration into equal periods.
• 19. The Revolutions of the Sun and Moon the properest Measures of Time.
• 20. But not by their motion, but perio∣dical appearances.
• 21. No two parts of Duration can be certainly known to be equal.
• 22. Time not the measure of Motion.
• 23. Minutes, Hours, and Tears, not necessary measures of Duration.
• 24. The measure of Time two ways ap∣plied.
• 25—27. Our measure of Time applicable to Duration before Time.
• 28—31. Eternity.

CHAP. XV. Of Duration and Expansion considered together

SECT.

• 1. Both capable of greater and less.
• 2. Expansion not bounded by Matter.
• 3. Nor Duration by Motion.
• 4. Why Men more easily admit infinite Duration, than infinite Expansion.
• 5. Time to Duration is as Place to Expansion.
• 6. Time and Place are taken for so much of either, as are set out by the Existence and Motion of Body.
• 7. Sometimes for so much of either, as we design by measures taken from the bulk or motion of Bodies.
• ...

• 8. They belong to all Beings••
• 9. All the parts of Extension are Ex∣tension; and all the parts of Du∣ration, are Duration.
• 10. Their parts inseparable.
• 11. Duration is as a Line, Expansion as a Solid.
• 12. Duration has never two parts to∣gether, Expansion altogether.

CHAP. XVI. Of Number.

SECT.

• 1. Number the simplest and most uni∣versal Idea.
• 2. Its Modes made by Addition.
• 3. Each Mode distinct.
• 4. Therefore Demonstrations in Num∣bers the most precise.
• 5, 6. Names necessary to Numbers.
• 7. Why Children number not earlier.
• 8. Number measures all Measurables.

CHAP. XVII. Of Infinity.

SECT.

• 1. Infinity, in its original intention, attributed to Space, Duration, and Number.
• 2, 3. How we come by the Idea of Infinity.
• 4. Our Idea of Space boundless.
• 5. And so of Duration.
• 6. Why other Ideas are not capable of Infinity.
• 7. Difference between infinity of Space, and Space infinite.
• 8. We have no Idea of infinite Space.
• 9. Number affords us the clearest Idea of Infinity.
• 10—11. Our different conception of the In∣finity of Number, Duration, and Expansion.
• 12. Infinite Divisibility,
• 13, 14, 17, 18. No positive Idea of Infinite.
• 15, 16, 19. What is positive, what negative in our Idea of Infinite.
• 20. Some think they have a positive Idea of Eternity, and not Space.
• 21. Supposed positive Ideas of Infini∣ty cause of Mistakes.
• 22. All these Ideas from Sensation and Reflexion.

CHAP. XVIII. Of other simple Modes.

SECT.

• 1, 2. Modes of Motion.
• 3. Modes of Sounds.
• 5. Modes of Tastes.
• 7. Modes of Colours.
• 8. Why some Modes have, and others have not Names.

CHAP. XIX. Of the Modes of Thinking.

SECT.

• 1, 2. Sensation, Remembrance, Contem∣plation, &c.
• 3. The various attention of the Mind in Thinking.
• 4. Hence probable that Thinking is the Action, not Essence of the Soul.

CHAP. XX. Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain.

SECT.

• 1. Pleasure and Pain simple Ideas.
• 2. Good and Evil what.
• 3. Our Passions moved by Good and Evil.
• 4. Love.
• 5. Hatred.
• 6. Desire.
• 7. Ioy.
• 8. Sorrow.
• 9. Hope.
• 10. Fear.
• 11. Despair.
• 12. Anger.
• 13. Envy.
• 14. What Passions all Men have.
• 15, 16. Pleasure and Pain what.
• 17. Shame.
• 18. These instances to shew how our Ideas of the Passions are got from Sensation and Reflexion.

CH••P. XXI. Of Power.

SECT.

• 1. This Idea how got.
• 2. Power active and passive.
• 3. Power includes Relation.
• 4. The clearest Idea of active Power had from Spirit.
• 5. Will and Vnderstanding, two Powers.
• 6. Faculties.
• 7. Whence the Ideas of Liberty and Necessity.
• 8—12. Liberty what.
• 9. Supposes the Vnderstanding and Will.
• 10. Belongs not to Volition.
• 11. Voluntary opposed to involuntary, not to Necessary.
• 13. Necessity what.
• 14—20. Liberty belong not to the Will.
• 21. But to the Agent or Man.
• 22—24. In respect of willing, a Man is not free.
• 25—28. The Will determined by something without it.
• 29. The greater apparent Good deter∣mines the Will.
• 30—32. This is a Perfection of humane Nature.
• 33. And takes not away Liberty.
• 34, 35. Why Men chuse differently.
• 36. Why they chuse amiss.
• 38. From the different appearance of Good.
• 39. And judging amiss on these Ap∣pearances.
• 40—42. First, in comparing present and fu∣ture.
• 43. Secondly, In thinking wrong of the greatness or certainty of the Con∣sequence of any Action.
• 44. Causes of wrong Iudgment, Igno∣rance, Inadvertency, Sloth, Pas∣sion, Fashion, &c.
• 45. Preference of Vice to Vertue, a manifest wrong Iudgment.
• 47. Recapitulation.

CHAP. XXII. Of Mixed Modes.

SECT.

• 1. Mixed Modes what.
• 2. Made by the Mind.
• 3. Sometimes got by the Explication of their Names.
• 4. The Name ties the Parts of the mixed Modes into one Idea.
• 5. The Cause of making mixed Modes.
• 6. Why Words in one Language, have none answering in another.
• 7. And Languages change.
• 8. Mixed Modes, where they exist.
• 9. How we get the Ideas of mixed Modes.
• 10. Motion, Thinking and Power, have been most modified.
• 11. Several Words seeming to signifie Action, signifie but the Effect.
• 12. Mixed Modes, made also of other Ideas.

CHAP. XXIII. Of the Complex Ideas of Substances.

SECT.

• 1. Ideas of Substances how made.
• 2. Our Idea of Substance in general.
• 3—6. Of the sorts of Substances.
• 4. No clear Idea of Substance in ge∣neral.
• 5. As clear an Idea of Spirit, as Body.
• 7. Powers a great part of our complex Ideas of Substances.
• 8. And why.
• 9. Three sorts of Ideas make our complex ones of Sustances.
• 10, 11. The now secondary Qualities of Bodies would disappear, if we could discover the primary ones of their minute Parts.
• 12. Our Faculties of Discovery suited to our State.
• 13. Conjecture about Spirits.
• 14. Complex Ideas of Substances.
• 15. Idea of spiritual Substances, as clear as of bodily Substances.
• 16. No Idea of abstract Substance.
• ...

• 17. The Cohesion of solid Parts, and impulse the primary Ideas of Body.
• 18. Thinking and Motivity, the pri∣mary Ideas of Spirit.
• 19—21. Spirits capable of Motion.
• 22. Idea of Soul and Body compared.
• 23—27. Cohesion of solid Parts in Body, as hard to be conceived, as Thinking in a Soul.
• 28, 29. Comm••nication of Motion by Im∣pulse, or by Thought, equally intel∣ligible.
• 30. Ideas of Body and Spirit compa∣red.
• 31. The Notion of Spirit involves no more difficulty in it, than that of Body.
• 32. We know nothing beyond our simple Ideas.
• 33—35. Idea of God.
• 36. No Ideas in our Complex one of Spi∣rits, but those got from Sensation or Reflexion.
• 37. Recapitulation.

CHAP. XXIV. Of Collective Ideas of Substances.

SECT.

• 1. One Idea.
• 2. Made by the Power of composing in the Mind.
• 3. All artificial Things are collective Ideas.

CHAP. XXV. Of Relation.

SECT.

• 1. Relation what.
• 2. Relations without correlative Terms, not easily perceived.
• 3. Some seemingly absolute Terms contain Relations.
• 4. Relation different from the Things related.
• 5. Change of Relation may be with∣out any Change in the Subject.
• 6. Relation only betwixt two Things.
• 7. All Things capable of Relation.
• 8. The Ideas of Relations clearer of∣ten, than of the Subjects related.
• 9. Relations all terminate in simple Ideas.
• 10. Terms leading the Mind beyond the Subject denominated, are Re∣lative.
• 11. Conclusion.

CHAP. XXVI. Of Cause of Effect, and other Relations.

SECT.

• 1. Whence their Ideas got.
• 2. Creation, Generation, making Al∣teration.
• 3, 4. Relations of Time.
• 5. Relations of Place and Extension.
• 6. Absolute Terms often stand for Relations.

CHAP. XXVII. Of other Relations.

SECT.

• 1. Proportional.
• 2. Natural.
• 3. Instituted.
• 4. Moral.
• 5. Moral Good and Evil.
• 6. Moral Rules.
• 7. Laws.
• 8. Divine Law the measure of Sin and Duty.
• 9. Civil Law, the measure of Crimes and Innocence.
• 10, 11. Philosophical Law, the measure of Vertue and Vice.
• 12. Its Inforcements, Commendation, and Discredit.
• 13. These three Laws the Rules of mo∣ral Good and Evil.
• 14, 15. Morality is the Relation of Actions to these Rules.
• 16. The denominations of Actions of∣ten mislead us.
• 17. Relations innumerable.
• 18. All Relations terminate in simple Ideas.
• 19. We have ordinary as clear (or clearer) Notion of the Relation, as of its Foundation.
• 20. The Notion of the Relation is the

• same, whether the Rule any Action is compared to, be true or false.

CHAP. XXVIII. Of Clear and Distinct, Obscure and Con∣fused Ideas.

SECT.

• 1. Ideas some clear and distinct, o∣thers obscure and confused.
• 2. Clear and Obscure, explained by Sight.
• 3. Causes of Obscurity.
• 4. Distinct and confused, what.
• 5. Objection.
• 6. Confusion of Ideas, is in reference to their Names.
• 7. Defaults which make Confusion. First, complex Ideas made up of too few simple ones.
• 8. Secondly, Or its simple ones jum∣bled disorderly together.
• 9. Thirdly, Or are mutable and un∣determined.
• 10. Confusion without reference to Names, hardly conceivable.
• 11. Confusion concerns always two I∣deas.
• 12. Causes of Confusion.
• 13. Complex Ideas may be distinct in one part, and confused in another.
• 14. This if not heeded, causes Confu∣sion in our Arguings.
• 15. Instance in Eternity.
• 16, 17. —Divisibility of Matter.

CHAP. XXIX. Of Real and Fantastical Ideas.

SECT.

• 1. Real Ideas are conformable to their Archetypes.
• 2. Simple Ideas all real.
• 3. Complex Ideas are voluntary Com∣binations.
• 4. Mixed Modes made of consistent Ideas are real.
• 5. Ideas of Substances are real, when they agree with the Existence of Things.

CHAP. XXX. Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

SECT.

• 1. Adequate Ideas, are such as per∣fectly represent their Archetypes.
• 2. Simple Ideas all adequate.
• 3. Modes are all adequate.
• 4, 5. Modes in reference to settled Names, may be inadequate.
• 6, 7. Ideas of Substances, as referr'd to real Essences not adequate.
• 8—11. Ideas of Substances, as Collections of their Qualities, are all inade∣quate.
• 12. Simple Ideas 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and adequate.
• 13. Ideas of Substances are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in∣adequate.
• 14. Ideas of Modes and Relations are Archetypes, and cannot but be adequate.

CHAP. XXI. Of true and false Ideas.

SECT.

• 1. Truth and Falshood properly be∣longs to Propositions.
• 2. Metaphysical Truth contains a ta∣cit Proposition.
• 3. No Idea as an appearance in the Mind true or false.
• 4. Ideas referred to any thing may be true or false
• 5. Other Men's Ideas, real Exi∣stence, and supposed real Essences, are what Men usually refer their Ideas to.
• 6—8. The cause of such references.
• 9. Simple Ideas may be false in refe∣rence to others of the same name, but are least liable to be so.
• 10. Ideas of mixed Modes most liable to be false in this sense.
• 11. Or at least to be thought false.
• 12. And why.
• 13. As referred to real Existences, none of our Ideas can be false, but those of Substances.
• 14—16. First, Simple Ideas in this sense not false, and why.
• 15. Though one Man's Idea of Blue, should be different from ano∣ther's.
• ...

• 17. Secondly, Modes not false.
• 18. Thirdly, Ideas of Substances are false, when the Combination is made of simple Ideas that do never co-exist; or has in it the negation of any one that does constantly coexist.
• 19. Truth or Falshood always supposes affirmation or negation.
• 20. Ideas in themselves neither true nor false.
• 21. But are false, First, when judged agreeable to another Man's Idea without being so.
• 22. Secondly, When judged to agree to real Existence, when they do not.
• 23. Thirdly, When judged adequate without being so.
• 24. Fourthly, When judged to repre∣sent the real Essence.
• 25. Ideas when false.
• 26. More properly to be called Right or Wrong.
• 27. Conclusion.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I. Of Words or Language in general.

SECT.

• 1. Man fitted to form articulate Sounds.
• 2. To make them signs of Ideas.
• 3, 4. To make general Signs.
• 5. Words ultimately derived from such as signifie sensible Ideas.
• 6. Distribution.

CHAP. II. Of the Signification of Words.

LECT,

• 1. Words are sensible Signs necessary for Communication.
• 2, 3. Words are the sensible Signs of his Ideas who uses them.
• 4. Words often secretly referred, First, to the Ideas in other Men's Minds.
• 5. Secondly, To the reality of Things.
• 6. Words by use readily excite Ideas.
• 7. Words often used without signifi∣cation.
• 8. Their Signification perfectly arbi∣trary.

CHAP. III. Of general Terms.

SECT.

• 1. The greatest part of Words general.
• 2. For every particular thing to have a name is impossible.
• 3, 4. And useless.
• 5. What things have proper names.
• 6—8. How general Words are made.
• 9. General Natures are nothing but abstract Ideas.
• 10. Why the Genus is ordinarily made use of in Definitions.
• 11. General and universal are Crea∣tures of the Vnderstanding.
• 12. Abstract Ideas are the Essences of the Genera and Species.
• 13. They are the Workmanship of the Vnderstanding, but have their foundation in the similitude of things.
• 14. Each distinct abstract Idea is a di∣stinct Essence.
• 15. Real and nominal Essence.
• 16. Constant connexion between the Name and nominal Essence.
• 17. Supposition that Species are distin∣guished by their real Essences useless.
• 18. Real and nominal Essence the same in simple Ideas and Modes, diffe∣rent in Substances.
• 19. Essences ingenerable and incorru∣ptible.
• 20. Recapitulation.

CHAP. IV. Of the Names of simple Ideas.

SECT.

• 1. Names of simple Ideas, Modes, and Substances, have each some∣thing peculiar.
• 2. First, Names of simple Ideas and Substances, intimate real Exi∣stence.
• 3. Secondly, Names of simple Ideas and Modes signifie always both real and nominal Essence.
• 4. Thirdly, Names of simple Ideas undefinable.
• 5. If all were definable, 'twould be a process in infinitum.
• 6. What a Definition is.
• 7. Simple Ideas why undefinable.
• 8, 9. Instances Motion.
• 10. Light.
• 11. Simple Ideas why undefinable, far∣ther explained.
• 12, 13. The contrary shewed in complex Ideas by instances of a Statue and Rainbow.
• 14. The Names of complex Ideas when to be made intelligible by Words.
• 15. Fourthly, Names of simple Ideas least doubtful.
• 16. Fifthly, Simple Ideas have few Ascents in linea praedicamentali.
• 17. Sixthly, Names of simple Ideas stand for Ideas not at all arbi∣trary.

CHAP. V. Of the Names of mixed Modes and Relations.

SECT.

• 1. They stand for abstract Ideas, as other general Names.
• 2. First, The Ideas they stand for, are made by the Vnderstanding.
• 3. Secondly, Made arbitrarily, and without Patterns.
• 4. How this is done.
• 5. Evidently arbitrary, in that the Idea is often before the Exi∣stence.
• 6. Instances Murther, Incest, Stab∣bing.
• 7. But still subservient to the end of Language.
• 8. Whereof the intranslatable Words of divers Languages are a proof.
• 9. This shews Species to be made for Communication.
• 10, 11. In mixed Modes 'tis the Name that ties the Combination toge∣ther, and make it a Species.
• 12. For the Originals of mixed Modes. we look no farther than the Mind, which also shews them to be the Workmanship of the Vnderstan∣ding.
• 13. Their being made by the Vnder∣standing without Patterns, shews the reason why they are so com∣pounded.
• 14. Names of mixed Modes stand al∣ways for their real Essences.
• 15. Why their Names are usually got before their Ideas.
• 16. Reason of my being so large on this Subject.

CHAP. VI. Of the Names of Substances.

SECT.

• 1. The common Names of Substances stand for sorts.
• 2. The Essence of each sort is the abstract Idea.
• 3. The nominal and real Essence dif∣ferent.
• 4— 6. Nothing essential to Individuals.
• 7, 8. The nominal Essence bounds the Species.
• 9. Not the real Essence which we know not.
• 10. Not substantial forms which we know less.
• 11. That the nominal Essence is that whereby we distinguish Species, farther evident from Spirits.
• 12. Whereof there are probably num∣berless Species.
• ...

• 13. The nominal Essence that of the Species, proved from Water and Ice.
• 14—18. Difficulties against a certain number of real Essences.
• 19. Our nominal Essences of Substan∣ces, not perfect Collections of Pro∣perties.
• 21. But such a Collection as our Name stands for.
• 22. Our abstract Ideas are to us the measures of Species, instance in that of Man.
• 23. Species not distinguished by Gene∣ration.
• 24. Distinguishing them by substantial Forms, not pretended to but in this part of the World. Substances distinguished into Spe∣cies, by their obvious appearances before substantial Forms were thought of.
• 25. The specifick Essences are made by the Mind.
• 26. Therefore very various and uncer∣tain.
• 27. But not so arbitrarily as mixed Modes.
• 28. Though very imperfect.
• 29. Which yet serves for common Con∣verse.
• 30. But makes several Essences signi∣fied by the same Name.
• 31. The more general our Ideas are, the more incompleat and partial they are.
• 32. This all accommodated to the end of Speech.
• 33. Instance in Cassuaries.
• 34. Men make the Species instance Gold.
• 35. Though Nature make the Simili∣tude.
• 36. And continues it in the races of Things.
• 37. Each abstract Idea is an Essence.
• 38. Genera and Species, in order to naming, instance watch.
• 39. Species of artificial Things less confused than natural.
• 40. Artificial Things of distinct Spe∣cies.
• 41. Substances alone have proper Names.
• 42. Difficulty to treat of Words with Words.
• 43, 44. Instance of mixed Modes in Ki∣neah and Niouph..
• 45, 46. Instance of Substances in Zahab.
• 47. Their Ideas imperfect, and there∣fore various.
• 48. Therefore to fix their Species, a real Essence is supposed.
• 49. Which Supposition is of no use.
• 50. Conclusion.

CHAP. VII. Of Particles:

SECT.

• 1. Particles connect Parts, or whole Sentences together.
• 2. In them consists the art of well speaking.
• 3, 4. They shew what Relation the Mind gives to its own Thoughts.
• 5. Instance in But.
• 6. This Matter but lighly touched here.

CHAP. VIII. Of Abstract and Concrete Terms.

SECT.

• 1. Abstract Terms not predicable one of another, and why.
• 2. They shew the difference of our Ideas.

CHAP. IX. Of the Imperfection of Words.

SECT.

• 1. Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts.
• 2. Any Words will serve for recor∣ding.
• 3. Communication by Words, Civil or Philosophical.
• 4. The Imperfection of Words is the Doubtfulness of their Signification.
• 5. Causes of their Imperfection.
• 6. The Names of mixed Modes doubt∣ful.

• First, because the Ideas they stand for, are so complex.
• 7. Secondly, Because they have no Standards.
• 8. Propriety not a sufficient Remedy.
• 9. The way of Learning these Names contributes also to their Doubt∣fulness.
• 10. Hence unavoidable Obscurity in ancient Authors.
• 12. First, To real Essences that can∣not be known.
• 13, 14. Secondly, To co-existing Qualities, which are known but imperfectly.
• 15. With this Imperfection, they may serve for Civil, but not well for Philosophical use.
• 16. Instance Liquor of Nerves.
• 17. Instance Gold.
• 18. The Names of simple Ideas the least doubtful.
• 19. And next to them simple Modes.
• 20. The most doubtful are the Names of very compounded mixed Modes and Substances.
• 21. Why this Imperfection charged upon Words.
• 22, 23. This should teach us Moderation, in imposing our own Sense of old Authors.

CHAP. X. Of the Abuse of Words.

SECT.

• 1. Abuse of Words.
• 2, 3. First, Words without any, or with∣out Ideas.
• 4. Occasioned by learning Names be∣fore the Ideas they belong to.
• 5. Secondly, Unsteady Application of them.
• 6. Thirdly, Affected Obscurity by wrong Application.
• 7. Logick and Dispute has much con∣tributed to this.
• 8. Calling it Subtilty.
• 9. This Learning very little benefited Society.
• 10. But destroy'd the Instruments of Knowledge and Communication.
• 11. As useful as to confound the sound of the Letters.
• 12. This Art has perplexed Religion and Iustice.
• 13. And ought not to pass for Lear∣ning.
• 14. Fourthly, Abuse, taking them for Things.
• 15. Instance in Matter.
• 16. This makes Errors lasting.
• 17. Fifthly, Abuse setting them for what they cannot signifie.
• 18. V. g. putting them for the real Essences of Substances.
• 19. Hence we think every change of our Idea in Substances, not to change the Specie.
• 20. The Cause of this Abuse, a Suppo∣sition of Nature's working always regularly.
• 21. This Abuse contains two false Sup∣positions.
• 22. Sixthly, Abuse, a Supposition that Words have a certain and evident signification.
• 23. The Ends of Language, First, To convey our Ideas.
• 24. Secondly, to doe it with quickness.
• 25. Thirdly, Therewith to convey the Knowledge of Things.
• 26—31. How Men's Words fail in all these,
• 32. How in Substances.
• 33. How in Modes and Relations.
• 34. Seventhly, Figurative Speech also an Abuse of Language.

CHAP. XI. Of the Remedies of the fore-going Imper∣fection and Abuses.

SECT.

• 1. They are worth seeking.
• 2. Are not easie.
• 3. But yet necessary to Philosophy.
• 4. Misuse of Words the cause of great Errors.
• 5. Obstinacy.
• 6. And Wrangling.
• 7. Instance Bat and Bird.
• 8. First, Remedy to use no Word with∣out an Idea.
• 9. Secondly, Have distinct Ideas an∣nexed to them in Modes.
• 10. And distinct and conformable in Substances.
• ...

• 11. Thirdly, Propriety.
• 12. Fourthly, To make known their meaning.
• 13. And that three ways.
• 14. First, In simple Ideas by synony∣mous terms or shewing.
• 15. Secondly, in mixed Modes by defi∣nition.
• 16. Morality capable of Demonstra∣tion.
• 17. Definitions can make moral Dis∣courses clear.
• 18. And is the only way.
• 19. Thirdly, In Substances, by shewing and defining.
• 20, 21, Ideas of the leading Qualities of Substances, are best got by shewing.
• 22. The Ideas of their Powers best by Definition.
• 23. A Reflexion on the Knowledge of Spirits.
• 24. Ideas also of Substances must be conformable to Things.
• 25. Not easie to be made so.
• 26. Fifthly, Remedy, Constancy in their signification.
• 27. Where it ought to be explained, when varied.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I. Of Knowledge in general.

SECT.

• 1. Our Knowledge conversant about our Ideas.
• 2. Knowledge is the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas.
• 3. This Agreement four-fold.
• 4. First, of Identity or Diversity.
• 5. Secondly, Relative.
• 6. Thirdly, of Co-existence.
• 7. Fourthly, of real Existence.
• 8. Knowledge actual or habitual.
• 9. Habitual Knowledge two-fold.

CHAP. II. Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

SECT.

• 1. Intuitive.
• 2. Demonstrative.
• 3. Depends on Proofs.
• 4. But not so easie.
• 5. Not without precedent doubt.
• 6. Not so clear.
• 7. Each step must have intuitive Evidence.
• 8. Hence the mistake, ex praecogni∣tis, & praeconcessis.
• 9. Demonstration not limited to quantity.
• 10—13. Why it has been so thought.
• 14. Sensitive Knowledge of particular Existence.
• 15. Knowledge not always clear, where the Ideas are so.

CHAP. III. Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge.

SECT.

• 1. First, No farther than we have Ideas.
• 2. Secondly, No farther than we can perceive their Agreement or Disa∣greement.
• 3. Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledge ex∣tends it self not to all the Rela∣tions of all our Ideas.
• 4. Fourthly, Nor demonstrative Know∣ledge.
• 5. Fifthly, Sensitive Knowledge nar∣rower than either.
• 6. Sixthly, Our Knowledge there∣fore narrower than our Ideas.
• 7. How far our Knowledge reaches.
• 8. First, Our Knowledge of Identi∣ty

• and Diversity, as far as our Ideas.
• 9. Secondly, Of Co-existence a very little way.
• 10. Because the connexion between most simple Ideas is unknown.
• 11. Especially of Secondary Qualities.
• 12—14. And farther, because all connexion between any secondary a••d prima∣ry Qualities is undiscoverable.
• 15. Of Repugnancy to co-exist larger.
• 16. Of the Co-existence of Powers a very little way.
• 17. Of the Spirits yet narrower.
• 18. Thirdly, Of other Relations it is not easie to say how far. Morality capable of Demonstration.
• 19. Two Things have made moral I∣deas thought uncapable of Demon∣stration. Their Complexedness, and want of sensible Representa∣tions.
• 20. Remedies of those Difficulties.
• 21. Fourthly, of real Existence we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own, demonstrative of God's, sensible of some few other Things.
• 22. Our Ignorance great.
• 23. First, One Cause of it want of Ideas, either such as we have no Conce∣ption of, or such as particularly we have not.
• 24. Because of their Remoteness, or,
• 25. Because of their Minuteness.
• 26. Hence no Science of Bodies.
• 27. Much less of Spirits.
• 28. Secondly, Want of a discoverable connexion between Ideas we have.
• 29. Instances.
• 30. Thirdly, Want of tracing our Ideas.
• 31. Extent in respect of Vniversality.

CHAP. IV. Of the Reality of our Knowledge.

SECT.

• 1. Objection, Knowledge placed in Ideas may be all bare Vision.
• 2, 3. Answer, Not so, where Ideas a∣gree with Things.
• 4. As, First, All simple Ideas do.
• 5. Secondly, All complex Ideas, ex∣cept of Substances.
• 6. Hence the Reality of mathemati∣cal Knowledge.
• 7. And of moral.
• 8. Existence not required to make it real.
• 9. Nor will it be less true or certain, because moral Ideas are of our own making and naming.
• 10. Mis-naming disturbs not the Cer∣tainty of the Knowledge.
• 11. Ideas of Substances have their Archetypes without us.
• 12. So far as they agree with those, so far our Knowledge concerning them is real.
• 13. In our Enquiries about Substan∣ces, we must consider Ideas, and not consine our Thoughts to Names or Species supposed set out by Names.
• 14—17. Objection against a Changeling, being something between Man and Beast answered.
• 18. Recapitulation.

CHAP. V. Of Truth in General

SECT.

• 1. What Truth is.
• 2. A right joining, or separating of Signs; i. e. Ideas or Words.
• 3. Which make mental or verbal Propositions.
• 4. Mental Propositions are very hard to be treated of.
• 5 Being nothing but the joining, or separating Ideas without Words.
• 6. When mental Propositions contain real Truth, and when verbal.
• 7. Objection against verbal Truth, that it may be thus alchimerical.
• 8. Answered real Truth is about Ideas agreeing to Things.
• 9. Falshood is the joining of Names otherwise than their Ideas agree.
• 10. General Propositions to be treated of more at large.
• 11. Moral and metaphysical Truth.

CHAP. VI. Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty.

SECT.

• 1. Treating of Words necessary to Knowledge.
• 2. General Truths hardly to be un∣derstood, but in verbal Proposi∣tions.
• 3. Certainty two-fold, of Truth and of Knowledge.
• 4. No Proposition can be known to be true, where the Essence of each Species mentioned is not known.
• 5. This more particularly concerns Substances.
• 6. The Truth of few universal Pro∣positions concerning Substances, is to be known.
• 7. Because Co-existence of Ideas in few Cases to be known.
• 8, 9. Instance in Gold.
• 10. As far as any such Co-existence can be known, so far universal Propositions may be certain. But this will go but a little way, because,
• 11, 12. The Qualities, which make our com∣plex Ideas of Substances, depend mostly on external, remote, and un∣perceived Causes.
• 13. Iudgment may reach farther, but that is not Knowledge.
• 14. What is requisite for our Know∣ledge of Substances.
• 15. Whilst our Ideas of Substances contain not their real Constitu∣tions, we can make but few gene∣ral certain Propositions concerning them.
• 16. Wherein lies the general Certain∣ty of Propositions.

CHAP. VII. Of Maxims.

SECT.

• 1. They are self-evident.
• 2. Wherein that Self-evidence con∣sists.
• 3. Self-evidence not peculiar to re∣ceived Axioms.
• 4. First, As to Identity and Diver∣sity, all Propositions are equally self-evident.
• 5. Secondly, In Co-existence we have few self-evident Propositions.
• 6. Thirdly, In other Relations we may have.
• 7. Fourthly, Concerning real Exi∣stence we have none.
• 8. These Axioms do not much influ∣ence our other Knowledge.
• 9, 10. Because they are not the Truths the first known.
• 11. What use these general Maxims have.
• 12. Maxims, if care be not taken in the use of Words, may prove con∣tradictio••s.
• 13. Instance in Vacuum.
• 14. They prove not the Existence of Things without us.
• 15. Their Application dangerous about complex Ideas.
• 16—18. Instance in Man.
• 19. Little use of these Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and di∣stinct Ideas.
• 20. Their use dangerous where our Ideas are confused.

CHAP. VIII. Of Trifling Propositions.

SECT.

• 1. Some Propositions bring no increase to our Knowledge.
• 2, 3. As First, Identical Propositions.
• 4. Secondly, When a part of any com∣plex Idea is predicated of the whole.
• 5. As part of the definition of the defined.
• 6. Instance Man and Palfry.
• 7. For this teaches but the significa∣tion of Words.
• 8. But no real Knowledge.
• 9. General Propositions concerning Substances are often trifling.
• 10. And why.
• 11. Thirdly, Vsing Words variously, is trifling with them.
• ...

• 12. Marks of verbal Propositions, First, Predication in abstract.
• 13. Secondly, A part of the Defini∣tion predicated of any term.

CHAP. IX. Of our Knowledge of Existence.

SECT.

• 1. General certain Propositions con∣cern not Existence.
• 2. A threefold Knowledge of Exi∣stence.
• 3. Our Knowledge of our own Exi∣stence is intuitive.

CHAP. X. Of the Existence of a GOD.

SECT.

• 1. We are capable of knowing certain∣ly that there is a GOD.
• 2. Man knows that he himself is.
• 3. He knows also, that Nothing can∣not produce a Being, therefore something eternal.
• 4. That eternal Being must be most powerful.
• 5. And most knowing.
• 6. And therefore GOD.
• 7. Our Idea of a most perfect Being not the sole proof of a GOD.
• 8. Something from Eternity.
• 9. Two sorts of Beings, Cogitative and Incogitative.
• 10. Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogitative.
• 11, 12. Therefore there has been an eter∣nal Wisdom.
• 13. Whether material or no.
• 14. Not material, First, Because every particle of Matter is not cogitative.
• 15. Secondly, One particle alone of Matter, cannot be cogitative.
• 16. Thirdly, A System of incogitative Matter, cannot be cogitative.
• 17. Whether in motion, or at rest.
• 18, 19. Matter not co-eternal with an eter∣nal Mind.

CHAP. XI. Of the Knowledge of the Existence of other Things.

SECT.

• 1. Is to be had only by Sensation.
• 2. Instance whiteness of this Paper.
• 3. This though not so certain as demon∣stration, yet may be called Know∣ledge, and proves the existence of things without us.
• 4. First, Because we cannot have them but by the inlet of the Sen∣ses.
• 5. Because an Idea from actual Sen∣sation, and another from Memory, are very distinct Perceptions.
• 6. Thirdly, Pleasure or Pain, which accompanies actual Sensation, ac∣companies not the returning of those Ideas without the external Objects.
• 7. Fourthly, Our Senses assist one a∣nother's Testimony of the Exi∣stence of outward Things.
• 8. This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs.
• 9. But reaches no farther than actual Sensation.
• 10. Folly to expect demonstration in every thing.
• 11. Past Existence is known by Me∣mory.
• 12. The Existence of Spirits not know∣able.
• 13. Particular Propositions concerning Existence are knowable.
• 14. And general Propositions concer∣ning abstract Ideas.

CHAP. XII. Of the improvement of our Knowledge.

SECT.

• 1. Knowledge is not from Maxims.
• 2. (The occasion of that Opinion.)
• 3. But from the comparing clear and distinct Ideas.
• 4. Dangerous to build upon preca∣rious Principles.
• 5. This no certain way to Truth.
• ...

• 6. But to compare clear compleat Ideas under steddy Names.
• 7. The true method of advancing Knowledge, is by considering our abstract Ideas.
• 8. By which, Morality also may be made clearer.
• 9. But Knowledge of Bodies is to be improved only by Experience.
• 10. This may procure us convenience, not Science.
• 11. We are fitted for moral Know∣ledge, and natural Improvements.
• 12. But must beware of Hypotheses and wrong Principles.
• 13. The true use of Hypotheses.
• 14. Clear and distinct Ideas with set∣led Names, and the finding of those which shew their agreement, or disagreement, are the ways to enlarge our Knowledge.
• 15. Mathematicks an instance of it.

CHAP. XIII. Some other Considerations concerning our Knowledge.

SECT.

• 1. Our Knowledge partly necessary, partly voluntary.
• 2. The application voluntary; but we know as things are, not as we please.
• 3. Instances in Numbers.

CHAP. XIV. Of Iudgment.

SECT.

• 1. Our Knowledge being short, we want something else.
• 2. What use to be made of this twi∣light Estate.
• 3. Iudgment supplies the want of Knowledge.
• 4. Iudgment is the presuming things to be so, without perceiving it.

CHAP. XV. Of Probability.

SECT.

• 1. Probability is the appearance of agreement upon fallible proofs.
• 2. It is to supply the want of Know∣ledge.
• 3. Being that which makes us pre∣sume things to be true, before we know them to be so.
• 4. The grounds of Probability are two; conformity with our own Ex∣perience, or the Testimony of others Experience.
• 5. In this all the agreements pro and con ought to be examined, before we come to a Iudgment.
• 6. They being capable of great variey

CHAP. XVI. Of the Degrees of Assent.

SECT.

• 1. Our Assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of Probability.
• 2. These cannot always be all actually in view, and then we must content our selves with the remembrance that we once saw ground for such a degree of Assent.
• 3. The ill consequence of this, if our former Iudgment were not rightly made.
• 4. The right use of it is mutual Cha∣rity and forbearance.
• 5. Probability is either of matter of fact or speculation.
• 6. The concurrent experience of all other Men with ours, produces assurance approaching to Know∣ledge.
• 7. Vnquestionable Testimony and Ex∣perience for the most part pro∣duce Confidence.
• 8. Fair Testimony, and the nature of the Thing indifferent, produces also confident belief.
• 9. Experiences and Testimonies cla∣shing, infinitely vary the degrees of Probability.
• 10. Traditional Testimonies, the more

• more their removed, the less their Proof.
• 11. Yet History is of great use.
• 12. In things which Sense cannot dis∣cover, Analogy is the great Rule of Probability.
• 13. One case where contrary Experi∣ence lessens not the Testimony.
• 14. The bare Testimony of Revelation is the highest certainty.

CHAP. XVII. Of Reason.

SECT.

• 1. Various significations of the word Reason.
• 2. Wherein Reasoning consists.
• 3. Its four parts.
• 4. Syllogism not the great Instrument of Reason.
• 5. Helps little in Demonstration, less in Probability.
• 6. Serves not to increase our Know∣ledge, but fence with it.
• 7. Other helps should be sought.
• 8. We Reason about Particulars.
• 9. First, Reason fails us for want of Ideas.
• 10. Secondly, Because of obscure and imperfect Ideas.
• 11. Thirdly, For want of intermediate Ideas.
• 12. Fourthly, Because of wrong Prin∣ciples:
• 13. Fifthly, Because of doubtful terms.
• 14. Our highest degree of Knowledge is intuitive, without reasoning.
• 15. The next is Demonstration by rea∣soning.
• 16. To supply the narrowness of this, we have nothing but Iudgment up∣on probable reasoning.
• 17. Intuition, Demonstration, Iudgment.
• 18. Consequences of Words, and Con∣sequences of Ideas.
• 19. Four sorts of Arguments: First, Ad Verecundiam.
• 20. Secondly, Ad Ignorantiam.
• 21. Thirdly, Ad Hominem.
• 22. Fourthly, Ad Judicium.
• 23. Above, contrary, and according to Reason.
• 24. Reason and Faith not opposite.

CHAP. XVIII. Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces.

SECT.

• 1. Necessary to know their Boun∣daries.
• 2. Faith and Reason what, as contra∣distinguished.
• 3. No new simple Idea can be convey∣ed by traditional Revelation.
• 4. Traditional Revelation may make us know Propositions knowable al∣so by Reason, but not with the same certainty that Reason doth.
• 5. Revelation cannot be admitted a∣gainst the clear evidence of Rea∣son.
• 6. Traditional Revelation much less.
• 7. Things above Reason.
• 8. Or not contrary to Reason, if revea∣led, are matter of Faith.
• 9. Revelation, in matters where Rea∣son cannot judge, or but probably, ought to be hearkened to.
• 10. In matters where Reason can af∣ford certain knowledge that is to be hearkened to.
• 11. If the boundaries be not set be∣tween Faith and Reason, no En∣thusiasm, or extravagancy in Re∣ligion can be contradicted.

CHAP. XIX. Of Wrong Assent, or Errour.

SECT.

• 1. Causes of Errour.
• 2. First, Want of Proofs.
• 3. Obj. What shall become of those who want them, answered.
• 4. People hindred from Enquiry.
• 5. Secondly, Want of skill to use them.
• ...

• 6. Thirdly, Want of Will to use them.
• 7. Fourthly, Wrong measures of Pro∣bability, whereof.
• 8—10. First, Doubtful Propositions taken for Principles.
• 11. Secondly, Received Hypothesis.
• 12. Thirdly, predominant Passions.
• 13. The means of evading Probabili∣ties, 1st. Supposed fallacy.
• 14. 2dly. Supposed Arguments for the contrary.
• 15. What Probabilities determine the Assent.
• 16. Where it is in our power to sus∣pend it.
• 17. Fourthly, Authority.
• 18. Men not in so many Errours as is imagined.

CHAP. XX. Division of the Sciences.

SECT.

• 1. Three sorts.
• 2. First, Physica.
• 3. Secondly, Practica.
• 4. Thirdly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• 5. This is the first Division of the Objects of Knowledge.

FINIS.