A memento treating of the rise, progress, and remedies of seditions with some historical reflections upon the series of our late troubles / by Roger L'Estrange.

A MEMENTO.

CAP. I. THE Matter and Causes OF SEDITIONS.

THE Matter of Seditions (according to Sir Francis Bacon;* 1.1 whose words and Authority I shall often make use of in this little Treatise) is of two kinds; much Poverty and much Dis∣contentment.

The Causes and Motives of Seditions he reckons to be these: Innovation in Religion; Taxes;* 1.2 Alteration of Laws and Customs; Breaking of Priviledges; General Oppression; Advancement of unworthy Persons; Strangers; Dearths; Dis∣banded Souldiers; Factions grown desperate. And whatsoever in offending People, joyneth and knitteth them in a Common Cause.

These Inconveniences, either seasonably discover'd, coloura∣bly pretended, or secretly promoted, are sufficient to the foun∣dation of a Civil War. In which Negative and dividing Po∣liticks, none better understood themselves than the Contri∣vers of our late Troubles: not only improving and foment∣ing Discontentments where they found them, and creating violent Iealousies, where there was but any place to imagine them; but they themselves were the greatest Gainers, even by those Grievances against which they complained: Reap∣ing a double Benefit, first, from the Occasion of the Difference, and then from the Issue of it.

When a seditious Humour is once mov'd, the best Remedy is to cut off the Spring that feeds it:* 1.3 by pleasing all sorts of People, so far as possible, and by disobliging none, but upon Necessity. Which publick tenderness must be so managed, that the Majesty of the Prince be not lost in the Goodness of the Person: for nothing can be more Dangerous to a Monarch, than so to over-court the Love of his People, as to lose their Respect, or to suffer them to impute that to his Easiness which ought to be ascrib'd purely to his Generosity.

* 1.4Offences of that daring and unthankful quality, can scarce be pardon'd, without some hazard to the Authority that re∣mits them: Secret Contempts being much more fatal to Kings, than publick and audacious Malice; the latter commonly spending it self in a particular and fruitless Malignity toward the Person (and that with Terrour too, as being secur'd un∣der a thousand Guards of Majesty and Power) whereas the Other privily taints the whole Mass of the People, with a Mutinous Leaven, giving Boldness to contrive, Courage to exe∣cute; and, if the Plot miscarries, there's the Hope of Mercy to ballance the peril of the Vndertaking. For a Conclusion of this Point, He that but thinks Irreverently of his Prince, De∣poses him.

Concerning the Materials of Sedition; viz. Poverty and Discontentment: it would be endless to dissolve these General H••o••s into Particular Rules: the best Advise in this Case must be General too; that is, to endeavour to remove whatever Causes them, referring the Particulars to Counsel and Oc∣casion.

'Tis very well observ'd by the Lord St. Albans, touching Poverty:* 1.5 [So many overthrown Estates, so many Votes for

Troubles; and if this Poverty and broken Estate in the better sort, be joyn'd with a Want and Necessity in the mean people, the Dan∣ger is Great and Imminent:] Which to prevent, [Above all things (says the same Author) good Policy is to be used, that the Treasure and Moneys in a State be not gathered into few hands.; for otherwise a State may have a great Stock, and yet starve: And Money is like Muck, not good except it be spread.] And again,* 1.6 [A numerous Nobility causeth Poverty and Incon∣venience in a State, for it is a Surcharge of Expence.

As to the Seeds of Discontentments, they are as various as the Humours they encounter; dependent many times upon Opinion, and inconsiderable in themselves, however Notorious in their Effects.

Touching the Discontentments themselves, it is the Advice of the Lord Verulam,* 1.7 [That no Prince measure the Danger of them by this; Whether they be Iust or Vnjust? for that were to imagine people to be too reasonable. Nor yet by this, whether the Griefs whereupon they rise, be in Fact, great or small; for they are the most dangerous, where the Fear is greater than the Feeling.

Such were those furious and implacable Iealousies, that started the late War, which doubtless may more properly be accounted among the Dotages of a Disease, or the Illusions of a dark Melancholy; than the deliberate Operations of a sober Reason.

Proceed we now from the Matter and more remote Causes of Seditions, to the Approaches and Prognosticks of them.

CAP. II. The Tokens and Prognosticks of Sedition.

IT is in many Cases with Bodies Politick, as it is with Na∣tural Bodies; both perish by delaying till the Distemper be grown too strong for the Medicine: Whereas by watching over, and applying to the first Indispositions of the Patient, how easie is the Remedy of a Disease, which in one day more perhaps becomes Incurable? Some take it for a point of Bra∣very

not to own any Danger at a distance, lest they should seem to fear it. Others are too short-sighted to discern it: So that betwixt the Rash and the Stupid, (a large proportion in 〈…〉〈…〉 of the World) we are past the help of Physick 〈…〉〈…〉 can perswade our selves we need it.

Dangers (says the Incomparable Bacon) are no more light, if they once seem light; and more dangers have deceived Men, than 〈◊〉〈◊〉 them. Nay, it were better to meet some Dangers half-way, though they come nothing near, than to keep too long a Watch upon their Approaches; for if a man watch too long, it is odds he will fall asleep.]

Neither let any man measure the Quality of the Danger, by that of the Offender: For again, ['tis the Matter, not the Person that is to be consider'd; Treason is contagious, and a Ra∣scal may bring the Plague into the City, as well as a great Man.] I do the rather press this Caution, because Security was the Fault of those to whom I direct it.

But what avails it to be wary of Dangers, without the skill and providence to fore-see and prevent them? Or what hin∣ders us from the fore-knowledge of those Effects, to which we are led by a most evident, and certain train of Causes? States have their Maladies as well as Persons; and those ill habits have their peculiar Accidents and Affections; their proper Issues and Prognosticks: upon the true judgment of which Cir∣cumstances depends the Life and Safety of the Publick. Not to play the fool with an Allegory; Be it our care to observe the Gathering of the Clouds, before they are wrought into a Storm.

Among the Presages of foul Weather, the Lord St. Albans reckons Libels and licentious Discourses against the Government,* 1.8 when they are frequent and open: and in like sort, false news often running up and down, and hastily imbraced, to the disadvantage of the State.

We need not run beyond our Memories to agree this Point, it being within the Ken of our own Notice, that Libels were not only the Fore-runners, but in a high Degree, the Causes of our late Troubles: and what were the frequent, open, and licentious Discourses of Cloak-men in Pulpits, but the ill-boding Play of Porpisces before a Tempest?

We may remember also the false News of Plots agninst the Religion and Liberties of the Nation, and how the King was charg'd as an Abetter of the Design.

We may remember likewise, how the Irish Blood was cast upon the Account of his late Sacred Majesty, even by Those men whose guilty Souls are to Reckon with Divine Justice for every Drop of it.

Neither have we forgotten with what Care and Diligence these Falshoods were dispers'd; with what Greediness they were swallow'd; nor what ensu'd upon it.

If we look well about us, we may find this Kingdom, at this Instant labouring under the same Distempers; the Press as busie and as bold; Sermons as factious; Pamphlets as sedi∣tious; the Government defam'd. The Lectures of the Faction are throng'd with pretended Converts; and scandalous Re∣ports against the King and State, are as currant now as they were twenty years ago.

These were ill Tokens then, and do they signifie just no∣thing now? What means all This but the new Christening of the Old Cause? the doing over again of the Prologue to the last Tragedy?

Sir Francis Bacon proceeds, [That Disputing, Excusing, Cavelling upon Mandates and Directions,, is a kind of shaking off the Yoak, and Assay of Disobedience; especially if in those Dispu∣tings, they which are for the Direction, speak fearfully and ten∣derly; and those that are against it, audaciously.

Herein is judiciously expressed the Motion or Gradation, from Duty to Disobedience. The first step is to Dispute; as who should say, I will if I may. The very Doubt of Obeying, subjects the Authority to a Question, and gives a dan∣gerous Hint to the People, That Kings are accountable to their Subjects.

To Excuse is a Degree worse, for that's no other than a Refusal of Obedience in a Tacit Regard either of an unjust Com∣mand or of an unlawful Power.

To cavil at the Mandates of a Prince, is an express Affront to his Dignity, and within one Remove of Vio∣lence.

Through these Degrees, and slidings from Bad to Worse, from one Wickedness to Another, our late Reformers Travel'd the whole Scale of Treason; as the Scene chang'd, shifting their Habits, till at last, quitting the Disguise of the Kings Loyal Subjects, they became his Murtherers.

What's more familiar at this Day, than disputing His Ma∣jesties Orders; disobeying his Proclamations, and vilifying Acts of Parliament? Whereof there are so many, and so Audaci∣ous Instances, it shall suffice to have made this General men∣tion of them.

Another Observation is, that, When Discords and Quar∣rels, and Factions, are carried openly and audaciously, it is a Sign the Reverence of Government is lost.

This was the temper of that Juncture, when the Schismati∣cal Part of the two Houses, and the Tumultuary Rabble joyn'd their Interests against Bishops, and the Earl of Strafford; which Insolence was but a Prelude to the succeeding Rebellion.

And are not Factions carried Openly and Audaciously now? when the Promoters, and Iustifiers of the Murther of the late King, are still continued publick Preachers, without the least pretence to a Retraction; Dictating still, by Gestures, Shrugs, and Signs, That Treason to their Auditory which they dare not Vtter? What are their Sermons, but Declamations a∣gainst Bishops: Their Covenant-keeping Exhortations, but the contempt of an establish'd Law? How it comes to pass, Heaven knows; but These Honest Fellows can come off for Printing and publishing down-right Treason, when I have much ado to scape for Telling of it.

Whither these Liberties tend, let any Man look over his shoulder, and satisfie himself.

When any of the Four Pillars of Government, are mainly shaken, or weakened,* 1.9 (which are Religion, Iustice, Counsel, and Treasure,) Men had need to pray for fair weather.

To speak only of the last, The want of Treasure was the Ruine of the late King; Through which defect, his Officers were expos'd to be Corrupted, his Counsels to be Betray'd, his Armies to be ill pay'd, and consequently not well Disciplin'd: Briefly, where a Prince is Poor, and a Faction Rich, the Purse is in the wrong Pocket.

Multis little Bellum, is an assured and infallible Sign, of a State disposed to Seditions and Troubles, and it must needs

be, that where War seems the Interest of a People, it should be likewise the Inclination of them.

Touching the General Matter, Motives, and Prognosticks of Sedition, enough is said; We'l now enquire into the special cause of the late Rebellion.

CAP. III. The True Cause of the late War, was AMBITION.

THE True Cause of the late War, was Ambition: which being lodg'd in a confederate Cabale of Scotch, and English,* 1.10 drew the corrupted Interests of both Kingdoms into the Con∣spiracy: to wit, the factious, covetous, Malecontents, Criminals, Debters: and finally, all sorts of men, whose crimes, necessities, or passions, might be secur'd, reliev'd, or gratifi'd by a change of Government. To these, were joyn'd, the credulous, weak Multitude; the clamour being Religion, Law, and Liberty. And here's the summ of the Design, Pretence, and Party.

This League we may presume was perfected in 1637. First from the Kings Charge of High-Treason against Kimbolton, and the Five Members; Secondly from the correspondent pra∣ctices in both Nations, appearing manifestly about that time: Next, 'tis remarkable, that the English pardon has a Retro∣spect to the beginning of the Scotch Tumults; (Ian. 1. 1637. Three Years before the meeting of the Long Parliament) which Provision seems to intimate That Conspiracy. And now the Poyson begins to work.

Upon the 23 of Iuly in the same Year, (according to a pub∣lique Warning given the Sunday before) the Dean of Edin∣burgh began to read the Service-Book in the Church of Saint Giles: whereupon ensued so horrid a Tumult,* 1.11 that the Bishop was like to have been Murder'd in the Pulpit; and after Ser∣mon scaped narrowly with his Life to his Lodgings.

The particular recital of their following Insolencies upon the Bishop of Galloway, the Earls of Traquair and Wigton; the besieging of the Council-House, and contempts of the Coun∣cil, their audacious Petitions against the Service-Book, and Cannons, I shall pass over, as not belonging to my purpose.

* 1.12Upon the 19 of Febru. following, a Proclamation was pub∣lish'd against their Seditious Meetings, which they encounter with an Antiprotest, and presently erect their publick Tables of Advice and Counsel for Ordering the Affairs of the Kingdom: The Method whereof was This. Four principal Tables they had. One of the Nobility; a Second of the Gentry; a Third of the Burroughs; a Fourth of Ministers. And these Four were to prepare Matters for the General Table; which consisted of Com∣missioners chosen out of the Rest.

The first Act of this General Table was their Solemn Cove∣nant;* 1.13 a Contrivance principally promoted by persons former∣ly engaged in a Conspiracy against the King, and, among others, by the Lord Balmerino, a Pardon'd Traytor, and the Son of One.* 1.14 His Father had been a Favourite, and principal Secretary to King Iames, and rais'd by him out of Nothing, to his E∣state, and Dignity. Yet was this Thankless Wretch Arraign'd for, and Attainted of High-Treason, and after Sentence to be Drawn, Hang'd, and Quarter'd, he was by the Kings Mercy pardon'd, and restor'd. Another eminent Covenanter was the Earl of Arguile, of whom Walker gives this Accompt.

He brought his Father to a pension; outed his Brother of his E∣state Kintyre;* 1.15 ruin'd his Sisters by cheating them of their portions, and so enforcing them into Cloysters.

It must needs be a Conscientious Design with such Saints as These in the Head of it.

* 1.16This Covenant was effectually no other then a Rebellious Vow to oppose the Kings Authority, and Iustifie Themselves in the ex∣ercise of the Soveraign power, which they assum'd, to a degree even beyond the claim of Majesty it self, pleading the Obliga∣tion of the Covenant,* 1.17 to all their Vsurpations.

They Levyed Men and Moneys; Seiz'd the Kings Magazines and strong Holds;* 1.18 Rais'd Forts; Begirt his Castles; Affronted his Majesties Proclamations; Summon'd Assemblies; Proclaim'd Fasts; Deprived, and Excommunicated Bishops; Abolish'd Epis∣copacy; Issued out Warrants to choose Parliament-Commissioners; Renounced the Kings Supream Authority; Trampled upon Acts of Parliament; pressing their Covenant upon the Privy-Council. They gave the last Appeal to the generality of the People; dis∣charging Counsellors, and Iudges, of their Allegiance, and threat∣ning them with Excommunication, in case they disobeyed the Assembly.

All this they did, according to the Covenant; and whether This was Religion or Ambition, let the World judge.

These Affronts drew the King down with an Army to the Borders; and within two Miles of Barwick, the two Bodies had an Enterview, March 28, 1639. But the Scots craving a Treaty, his Majesty most graciously accorded it;* 1.19 Commissi∣oners were appointed, Articles agreed upon, and a Pacifica∣tion concluded, Iune 17.

Not one Article of this Agreement was observ'd on the Co∣venanters part; but immediately upon the Discharge of his Majesties Forces, the Scots brake forth into fresh Insolencies,* 1.20 and the Incroachments upon the Prerogative; addressing to the French King for Assistance against their Native Soveraign: And yet the Quarrel was, as they pretended for the Protestant Religion, and against Popery.

In August 1640, they entred England,* 1.21 and upon a Treaty at Rippon soon after, a Cessation is agreed upon, referring the Decision of all Differences to a more General Treaty at London.

In November began the Long Parliament; and now the Scene is London: Where with great License and Security, Parties are made,* 1.22 and Insolencies against the Government committed and authorized under protection of the Scotch Army, and the City-Tumults. By degrees, Matters being prepar'd and ripened, they found it opportune soon after, to make something a more direct Attempt upon the Sove∣raignty, but by Request first; and resolving if that way fail, to try to force it.

In Ianuary they Petition for the Militia: In February they secure the Tower; and in March Petition again for't: But so, that they Protest, If his Majesty persist to deny it, they are re∣solv'd to take it:* 1.23 And the next day it is Resolved upon the Question, That the Kingdom be forthwith put into a posture of Defence by Authority of both Houses of Parliament.

In April 1642, the Earl of Warwick seizes the Navy,* 1.24 and Sir Iohn Hotham, Hull; Refusing the King Entrance, which was justified by an ensuing Vote; and his Majesty proclaim∣ing him Traytor for it, was Voted a Breach of Priviledge.

In May, they pretended Governour of Hull sends out War∣rants to raise the Trained Bands, and the King (then at York) forbids them; moving the County for a Regiment of the

Trained Foot,* 1.25 and a Troop of Horse for the Guard of his Roy∣al Person: Whereupon it was Voted, That the King, seduced by wicked Counsel, intended to make a War against his Parlia∣ment, and that whosoever shall assist him, were Traytors.

They proceeded then to corrupt and displace divers of his Servants,* 1.26 forbidding others to go to him. They stop and seise his Majesties Revenue; and declare, That whatsoever they should Vote, is not by Law to be questioned either by the King or Subjects; No Precedent can limit or bound their Proceedings. A Parliament may dispose of any thing wherein the King or People have any Right. The Soveraign Power resides in Both Houses of Parliament. The King hath no Negative Voice. The levying of War against the Personal commands of the King, though accompanied with his Presence, is not a levying of War against the King: but a levying War against his Laws and Authority, which they have power to declare) is levying War against the King. Treason cannot be committed against his Person other∣wise then as he was Intrusted. They have Power to judge whe∣ther he discharge his Trust or not; that if they should follow the highest Precedents of other Parliaments Patterns, there would be no cause to complain of want of Modesty or Duty in them; and that it belonged only to them to judge of the Law.

Having stated and extended their Power, by an absurd, ille∣gal, and impious severing of the King's Person from his Office, their next work is to put Those Powers in execution; and to subject the Sacred Authority of a lawful Monarch, to the Ridiculous and Monstrous Pageantry of a Headless Parliament; And That's the Business of the 19 Propositions demanding.

That the great Affairs of the Kingdom and Militia may be ma∣naged by Consent and Approbation of Parliament;* 1.27 all the great Affairs of State, Privy-Council, Ambassadors, and Ministers of State, and Judges, be chosen by Teem; that the Goverment, Education, and Marriage of the King's Children, be by Their Consent and Approbation; and all the Forts and Castles of the Kingdom, put under the Command and Custody of such as They should approve of, and that no Peers to be made hereafter, should Sit and Vote in Parliament.

They desire further, That his Majesty would discharge his Guards; Eject the Popish Lords out of the House of Peers, and put the Penal Laws against them strictly in Execution: and fi∣nally, That the Nation may be govern'd either by the Major part

of the Two Houses, or in the Intervals of Parliament, by the Major part of the Councel; and that no Act of State may be e∣steemed of any validity, as proceeding from the Royal Authority without Them.

Upon these Tearms they insisted,* 1.28 and Rais'd a War to Ex∣tort them: So that 'tis clear, they both design'd and fought to Dethrone his Majesty, and exercise the Soveraign Power them∣selves; which was to Suit their Liberty of Acting to that of Sitting, and to make themselves an Almighty, as well as an Everlasting Parliament.

CAP. IV. The Instruments and Means which the Conspirators imployed to make a Party.

THat their Design was to usurp the Government, is manifest: Now to the Instruments and Sleights they use to compass it.

The Grand Projectors knew very well that the strength of their Cause depended upon the favour of the Ignorant and Li∣centious Multitude;* 1.29 which made them court all people of that Mixture, to their Party; (for Men of Brain and Conscience would never have agreed to a Conspiracy, against so clear a Light, so just an Interest); and Those they found their fast Friends, whom neither the Horrour of Sin, nor the brightest Evidence of Reason was able to work upon.

To fit and dispose Both Humors to their purpose; the first Scruple they started was Religion:* 1.30 which taken as they used it, in the external form and jingle of it, is beyond doubt, the best Cloke for a Knave, and the best Rattle for a Fool in Na∣ture. Under this Countenance, the Murder of the King pass'd for a Sacrifice of Expiation: and those Brute Animals, that scarce knew the Bible from the Alcoran, were made the Arbi∣trators of the Difference.

The fear of Popery was the Leading Iealousie, which Fear was much promoted by Pamphlets, Lectures, and Conventicles:* 1.31 Still coupling Popery and Prelacy; Ceremonies and the Abomi∣nations of the Whore: by these Resemblances of the Church of England, to that of Rome, tacitly instilling and bespeaking the same dissaffection to the One, which the People had to the Other. Their zeal was first imploy'd upon the names of Priests, and Al∣tar,

the Service-Book,* 1.32 Church-habits, and Ceremonies: From Thence, they stept to the Demolishing of Church-Windows, Ima∣ges, Crosses: the Persons of the Bishops went to't next, and then the Office. Thus far the Rabble carry'd it, the Leaders at last sharing the Revenues; and here's the Reformation of the Hier∣archy compleat.

When by these Scandalous Impostures, the Duties of a Christian and a Subject;* 1.33 Conscience and Loyalty, seem once to enterfere, what can be looked for, but Rebellion, from a Loose Multitude that think themselves Discharged of their Alle∣giance?

All Governments are lyable to Abuses, and so was Ours, among the Rest;* 1.34 where Personal Faylings, and Excesses, were emprov'd into the Fame of an Vniversal Prophaneness, or A∣postacy. Nor did they reckon it enough to Expose, and Aggra∣vate particular miscarriages, and Humane Frailties; but the most horrid Crimes Imaginable,* 1.35 were without either proof, or ground, or colour, laid to the Charge of the Episcopal and Roy∣al party; Both which were ruin'd by the same Method of Ca∣lumny, and Sedition.

* 1.36The main Encouragement to their Attempt, was that, The Presbyterians had a strong Party in the Kings Councel; (and this His Majesty himself takes notice of, in his Large Decla∣ration of 1639. Pag. 124.) by which means, the Kings Coun∣cels were both Distracted and Betray'd: and the Conspirators Secure (at Worst) of Mediators for a commodious Peace, in case they Fail'd of a Successful War. Nor did this Confidence deceive them, in the following Enterview of the Armies near Barwick, where the Covenanters had been almost as easily Beaten as look'd upon, had not the Quarrel been taken up by an Importune, and dear-bought Peace, for that expedition cost more Mony, only to face the Scotch Rebels, then would after∣ward have serv'd His Majesty to have Reduced the English.* 1.37

Throughout the Menage of their Affairs, it may be Ob∣served that they had these Three Regards still in their Eye, and Care.* 1.38 1. To Reproach his Majesties Government. 2. To Animate, and Reward his Enemies: And 3. To persecute his Friends: And still as any thing Stuck, a Tumult ready at a dead lift to help it forward: For they were not Ignorant, that the King was to be Defam'd before he could be Disarm'd;* 1.39 Disarm'd, before Depos'd; Deprived of his Friends, before De∣spoyl'd

of his Rights and Privileges: and That being their De∣sign, This was Rationally to be their Method.

Their first Uproar about the Service-book, was but a wild tryal how far the Multitude would Engage,* 1.40 and the Magistrate Endure; which appeared in This, that the City-Magistrates did at first, Earnestly, and Publiquely protest, not only against the Outrage; but for the Liturgy: not daring to do Other∣wise; till a while after, Encouraged by the Boldness and Im∣portunity of the Offenders, and the Patience of some in Autho∣rity; those very Persons did in their Pulpits, and Discourses, magnifie that Beastly Crew for the Worthies of the Age, whom just before they had decry'd for Rogues and Villains: The Truth is, they were Then about to play the Rogues, Them∣selves; and when persons of Quality turn Rascals, Then do Ras∣cals become persons of Quality.

At the beginning of the Broyl, half a douzen broken heads had saved Three Kingdoms. Who would have own'd That Rabble, had they been Worsted? or, What Resistance could they have made to any Legal Opposition? But they were Flatter'd to be Quiet, and That advanc'd this Tumult to a party; the Faction growing every day more and more formidable.

As their Strength encreased, so did their Pretences, both in Number, and Weight; and nothing less would content them, then to strip the King as bare, as they had done the Bishops. The particulars of their Insolencies are too many for a Treatise, and in Truth, too foul for a Story; but in gross, nothing was wanting to the perfection of the Wickedness, which either Hypocrisie, Perjury, Treason, Sacrilege, Rapine, Oppression, Forgery, Scandal, Breach of Faith, Malice, Murther, or In∣gratitude could contribute. All which, in every Point shall be made good by several Instances, if any Man require it.

We'l now look Homeward,* 1.41 where we shall find the English Rebellion wrought, to a Thridd, according to the Trace of the Scottish Pattern.

The Press and Pulpit were already at the Devotion of the Reforming Party, the Covenanters had an Army on Foot, and the Schismatiques were prepar'd for a General Rising; at which time, his Majesty Summon'd a Parliament, to assemble in No∣vember following.

In This Contention, those of the Confederacy,* 1.42 made it their first work to engage the People, by ripping up of Common

Grievances, Breach of Laws and Priviledges; and by contend∣ing to assert their Rights, Liberties, and Religion, against the Encroachments of Prerogative, and Popery. Being secure of their Party, they propose next the Manner of accomplishing their Purpose; which must be Effected by Craft and Terrour. In Order whereunto, They first attacqu'd Two of his Maje∣sties prime Counsellors and Confidents, the Earl of Strafford, and the Arch-Bishop of Canterbury;* 1.43 (Two Persons worthy of the King's Trust and Kindness, however Worried by the Multitude). To weaken the Lords House, they nulled the Bishops Votes, and Committed Twelve of them for Treason; Five of the Iudges were Committed likewise: And to dispose the Lower-House, nothing was wanting which either Force, Flattery, Corruption, or foul-play in Elections could Procure them.

So far as the King Granted, all went well; but if his Ma∣jesty deny'd them any Thing, the Fault was laid upon his Evil Counsellors: Under which Notion all his Friends were comprehended. So that his Choice was This; either to give away his Crown, or to have it wrested from him.

In May, the Faction of the Two Houses Publish'd a Prote∣station, (which was but a Gentle slip into the Prerogative Royal to try their Interest, and by degrees to inure the Peo∣ple to their intended and succeeding Usurpations. Some four or five days after, were signed those Two Fatal Bills, for the Death of the Earl of Strafford, and the Perpetuity of the Par∣liament: And having now gain'd leave to sit as long as they please, they have little futther to ask, but that they may like∣wise do what, they list.

* 1.44Where Loyalty was made a Crime, 'twas fit Rebellion should pass for a Vertue. Upon which suitable equity, the Scots were Justified, and Voted, our Dear Brethren, 300000 l. in Iune 1641, and Six-score thousand more in August following, and so we Parted.

In this Perplexity of Affairs, the King takes a Journey in∣to Scotland,* 1.45 it possible, to secure an Interest there; but the Conspiracy was gone too far to be composed by Gentleness. Upon his Majesties Departure, the Houses Adjourn, and du∣ring the Recess, appoint a standing Committee, and They for∣sooth must have a Guard, for fear of their own Shadows. In which Interval of the King's Absence, the Usurpers lost

no time, as appear'd by their readiness to Entertain him at his Return: When the first Present they made his Majesty,* 1.46 was the Petition, and Remonstrance of December 15; which I cannot think upon, but that Text comes into my mind, of Mark 15.18. [Hail King of the Iews, and they smote him on the head with a Reed, and spate upon him, and bowed the head, and did him reverence.]

This Impious Libel was seconded with an Audacious Tu∣mult,* 1.47 even at the Gates of the King's Palace; and it was now high time for his Majesty to enquire into the Contrivers and Abettors of these and other the like Indignities; and Procla∣mation was accordingly made for the Apprehending of them; which very Proclamation was declared to be a Paper False, scandalous and Illegal.

After this Language, what had they more to do, but by Armed Violence to invade the Soveraignty, and to improve a loose and popular Sedition, into a Regular Rebellion? Which was a little hastned to, even beside the Terms of Ordinary Prudence) to implunge their Complices beyond Retreat, be∣fore they should discern that hideous Gulf into which their Sin and Folly was about to lead them. To keep their Zeal and Fury waking, the Faction had a singular Faculty at In∣venting of Plots; Counterfeiting Letters; Intercepting Messa∣ges; Over-hearing Conspiracies: Which Artificial Delusions especially asserted by the pretended Authority of a Parlia∣ment and a Pulpit) could not but work strong Effects of Scruple and Iealousie, upon a pre-judging and distemper'd People.

These were the means and steps by which they gain'd that Power, which afterward they Employed in Opposition to those very ends for which they sware they Rais'd it; lea∣ving us neither Church, nor King, nor Law, nor Parliaments, nor Properties, nor Freedoms. Behold! the Blessed Reforma∣tion: Wee'l slip the War, and see in the next place what Government they Gave us in Exchange for That they had Subverted.

CAP. V. A short View of the Breaches and Confusions betwixt the Two Factions, from 1648, to 1654.

IT cannot be expected that a Power, acquir'd by Blood and Treason; maintain'd by Tyranny; the Object of a General Curse and Horrour both of God and Nature; only Vnited a∣gainst Iustice, and at perpetual Variance with it self:—I say, it cannot be expected, that such a Power as this should be Immortal. Yet is it not enough barely to argue the Fatality of Wickedness, from the Certainty of Divine Vengeance; and There to stop:—Vsurpers are not rais'd by Miracle, nor cast down by Thunder; but by our Crimes or Follies they are Exalted, and Then, by the Fatuity of their own Counsels, down they Tumble. Wherefore let us enquire into the Springs and Reasons of their Fortunes and Falls; as well as Gaze upon the Issues of them: A timely search into the Grounds of one Rebellion, may prevent another. How the Religious Opposers of the late King advanced themselves against his Sacred Authority, we have already shew'd; be it our business here, to Observe their workings, one upon the other.

To begin with Them that began with Vs: The Presby∣terians,* 1.48 having first asserted the Peoples Cause against the Pre∣rogative, and attempting afterwards to Establish Themselves, by using Pregogative-Arguments against the People; found it a harder matter to Erect an Aristocracy upon a Popular Foun∣dation, than to subvert a Monarchy upon a Popular Pretence; or to dispose the Multitude (whom they themselves had De∣clar'd to be the Supream Power) to lay down their Autho∣rity at the Feet of their Servants. In fine, they had great Difficulties to struggle with, and more than they could o∣vercome: (I mean, great Difficulties in point of Interest, and Conduct; for those of Honour and Conscience, they had sub∣du'd long since) They strove however, till opprest by a ge∣neral hatred, and the Rebound of their own Reasonings, they Quitted to the Independent▪

Thus departed the Formal Bauble, Presbytery; succeeded, for the next Four years, by the Phanaticism of a Free-State.* 1.49 The better half of which time, being successfully Employ'd in the subjecting of Scotland, and Ireland to their power, and Model, and to compleat their Tyranny over the Kings Best Subjects, and their Vsurpations over his Royal Dominions; Their next Work was to make themselves Considerable Abroad, and 'twas the Fortune of the Dutch to feel the First proof of That Re∣solution.

Betwixt these Rival States pass'd Six Encounters in 1652. most of them Fierce and Bloody, the Last especially,* 1.50 a Tear∣ing one. Upon the whole, the Dutch lost more, but the English got little, beside the Honour of the Victory: in which particu∣lar, the Kingdom pay'd dear for the Reputation of the Common-Wealth.

This success rais'd the pride and vanity of the English, so that at next Bout, nothing less would serve them than an absolute Conquest. But while they are providing for it, and in the huff of all their Glory; behold the Dissolution of the Long-Parliament;* 1.51 which whether it began or ended, more to the satisfaction of the People, is a point not yet decided.

Dissolved however it is, and Rebuk'd for Corruptions, and Delays, by Cromwell; who with his Officers, a while after, Summon a new Representative; and Constitute a new Counsel of State, compos'd of Persons entirely disaffected to the Com∣mon-wealth. This Little, Ridiculous Convention, thought to have done mighty Matters, but the Plot Vented, and Va∣nish'd.

Some of their Memorable Fopperies are These:* 1.52 The Fa∣mous Act concerning Marriages, was Theirs; they pass'd like∣wise an Act for an Assessment of 120000 l. per Mensem; they Voted down the Chancery and Tythes; they Voted also a total Alteration of the Laws.

All of a mind they were not, and for Distinction sake, the company was divided into the Honest party, and the Godly par∣ty. Of the former, were Cromwell's Creatures, and of the O∣ther, Barebones; or rather, Harrisons; (the Person they had design'd for General, if they could perswade Cromwell to quit his Security for some additional Title of Dignity.* 1.53) These Zea∣lous Patriots Commonly brought their Bibles into the House with them; and as I am Enform'd, divers of them were seek∣ing

the Lord with Vavasor Powell, when This following Trick was put upon them.

An Hour or two sooner in the morning then usual, Decemb. 12. he that they call'd their Speaker took the Chayr; and it was presently Mov'd and Carry'd,* 1.54 (for several Reasons) to re-assign their power to him from whom they had it;* 1.55 which was im∣mediately persu'd, and so they made Cromwell a Prince, for making Them a Parliament.

This gracious Resignation produc'd that blessed Instrument of Government, by which the Hypocrite was made Protector; and now forsooth the style is chang'd from The Keepers of the Li∣berty of England by Authority of Parliament,* 1.56 into Oliver Lord Protector of the Common-wealth of England, Scotland, and Ire∣land, &c. who was Installed and Sworn, Decemb. 16. 1653.

To his Assistance was appointed a Counsel of 21. the Quo∣rum,* 1.57 13. By whom immediately upon the Death of the pre∣sent Protector, should be chosen one to succeed him, (always excepted the Right Line from the choice) 'Tis suppos'd, that Lambert had an eye upon himself in the reach of That Arti∣cle, and a particular influence upon the drawing of it, being at That time Popular enough with the Army to hope for a∣ny thing. A while after the Establishment of this Traytour, comes forth an Ordinance, Declaring Treasons; and now his Highness thinks himself in the saddle; especially having beat∣en the Dutch into One Peace, and Treated the Swede into Ano∣ther, which were proclaim'd soon after.

Having run through the Narrative of those Considerable Changes, and Confusions, of Power, which intervened betwixt the Murther of a most Gracious Prince, and the appearing Set∣tlement of an Vsurping Tyrant, we'l make a little stand here, and look behind us.

The Two Main Engines that made Cromwell Master of the Army,* 1.58 were first, The Self-denying Ordinance by which he Worm'd out the Presbyterians, and Skrew'd in his own Par∣ty: The Second, was the Vote of March 19. 1646. for the Disbanding of so many Regiments, and sending Others for Ireland. This Vote was privily procur'd by himself and Ireton: which he foresaw must necessarily enflame the Army; and so it did, never to be reconcil'd.

This Breach was the setting up of Cromwell: and the Foun∣dation of his succeding greatness.* 1.59 It was the Impression of That Vote that baffled, and purg'd the House in 47. Forced it, in 48. and Disolv'd it, in 53. after which he call'd Another, that dy'd Fe lo de fe, and Bequeathed to his Excellency the Go∣vernment.

Had the Devill himself destroy'd that Faction, the Nation would have Thank't him for't; so 'tis no wonder if his Advance was smooth, and Prosperous: but now He's Vp, how to maintain his Power, against a General Odium, and Interest; how to get himself forc'd to exchange That Temporary Title of Protector, for the more Stable, Legal, and desireable Name of King, with∣out discovering his Insatiate Longing for it: This is a Point of Mastery, and Cunning; and Possibly the Thing that break his Heart, was his Dispair to Accomplish it.

The Faction has already trod the Round of Government; The Lords and Commons, outed the King; the Commons, the Lords, the Multitude, the Commons; (and with the Fate of all Rebellious Causes; seeking Rest, but finding None) At last, up goes the Pageantry of a Monarch, Cromwell; whose Temper, Straights, and Politicks, shall be the Subject of the next Chapter.

CAP. VI. The Temper, Straights, and Politicks, of Cromwel, during his Protectorship.

THe Character of This Glorious Rebel, is no further my pur∣pose, then as it leads to a right Iudgment of his Actions, and the Confusion of his Adorers.

Of strong Natural Parts, I perswade my self he was,* 1.60 though some think otherwise, imputing all his Advantages to Corrup∣tion, or Fortune, (which will not be deny'd however to have concurr'd powerfully to his Greatness). Nor do I pretend to collect his Abilites from his Words, any more then the World could his Meaning, save that the more entangled his Discourses were, I reckon them the more Iudicious, because the fitter for his Business. His Interest obliging him to a Re∣serve, for he durst neither clearly Own his Thoughts, nor To∣tally

Disclaim them; the One way endangering his Design, and the Other, his Person. So that the skill of his Part lay in This; neither to be mistaken by his Friends, nor understood by his Enemies. By This middle Course he gain'd Time, to re∣move Obstacles, and ripen Occasions; which to emprove and fol∣low, was the peculiar Talent of that Monster.

To these enablements to Mischief, he had a Will so prostitute, and prone, that to express him, I must say, He was made up of Craft and Wickedness; and all his Faculties, nay all his Passi∣ons, were Slaves to his Ambition. In fine, he knew no Other measure of Good and Bad, but as things stood in This or That Relation to his Ends; which I the less admire, when I consi∣der that he was brought up in a Presbyterian School: where Honour, Faith, and Conscience weigh nothing, further then as they subserve to Interest. But enough of This.

In the foregoing Chapter we have Plac'd the Protector in the Chair, but not the King in the Throne; the Power he has already, but wants the Title; and, which is worse, he dares not offer at it, being equally affray'd to own his Longing, or to miss it. In This Distraction of Thought, his Iealousie joyns with his Ambition; Sollicitous on the One hand for his Family, and on the Other for his Safety. For his Family, in point of Grandeur, and for his Safety Thus.

* 1.61After his Death, according to the Instrument, the Counsell is to chuse a Successour, and whoever gapes to be the One, is sup∣posed to wish for the Other; which probably they had rather hasten, then wait for: So that This Miserable creature being peyned, betwixt the Hazard either of enlarging his Power, or having it thus dependent; and the disdain of seeing it limited, enters into a restless suspition of his Counsell, and no way to be quieted but by depressing Those that Rais'd him. So much for the first Difficulty, a second follows.

* 1.62His Design had These Three Grand Enemies. The Royalists, The Presbyterians, and the Common-wealths-Men: the Last of which compos'd the Gross of his Army; whom he had so inu∣red to the Gust of Popularity, and Freedom, and so enflam'd a∣gainst the Tyranny of King-ship, that the bare Change of the word Common-wealth, to Kingdom, had been enough to have cast all into a Revolt.

These were the main Impediments of His Majesty that would be; and now we'l touch upon the Shifts and Tricks his High∣ness us'd to Remove them.

Cromwell having squander'd away his Mony, and taking oc∣casion from the Salisbury Rising in 1654. to Squeeze the Ca∣valiers for more; Kills two Birds with one stone,* 1.63 by Commission∣ing some of those Persons which he most apprehended in his Counsell, to do his work: whom under the Name of Major-Generals, and with a Power at Liberty, (doubtless foreseeing how they would abuse it) he places as Governours over the Several Counties. These he employs to Levy his barbarous Decimation, which when they had done, and by a Thousand In∣solencies enraged the People, he laies them aside; being now become, of the most Popular of the Party, the most Abominated Creatures of the Nation.

Touching the Royallists, no good for him was to be hop'd for There, but by Goals, Exile, Selling them for Slaves,* 1.64 Famish∣ings, or Murther: all which was abundantly provided for, by Sequestrations, Pretended Plots, High-Courts of Iustice, Spyes, Decoyes &c. Nay (for the very Dispatch sake) when they should resolve upon the Massacre, (which beyond doubt they meant us) No Cavalier must be allow'd so much as the least piece of Defensive Arms, by an Order of Nov. 24. 1655.

No Person suffer'd to keep in his house as Chaplain or School-Master, any Sequestred or Ejected Minister, Fellow of a Col∣ledge: or School-Master, nor suffer his Children to be taught by such. Nor any Person of that Quality must be permitted to Teach a School, either Publick, or Private; Nor Preach, but in his Own Family, nor Administer the Sacraments, nor Marry, nor use the Common-Prayer book, &c.

This was the only Party the Rebels fear'd and ruin'd; but for the Presbyterians they knew they'd never Ioyn to help the King; and single they were inconsiderable.

The Common-wealths-Men finally contented themselves with the Name of a Common-wealth, under the Exercise of a Single Person; so that by This Method of Engaging one Party, conni∣ving at another, and crushing the Third: This Tyrant gave him∣self the Means and Leisure to fortifie his Interests some other way.

He had already try'd a Parliament of his own Call; that met, Septemb. 3. 1654.* 1.65 Five or Six dayes are spent in dange∣rous Debates about the Government, and the Authority by which they are Convened. This, Oliver did not like, and sent them an Appointment to meet him (on the 12.) in the

Painted Chamber: where discoursing the Reciprocal tyes betwixt Him and his Parliament; The Fundamentals of the Government, as to a Single Person; the Succession of Parliaments; their mu∣tual Interest in the Militia; and Liberty of Conscience; and that These Particulars they were Entrusted to maintain; con∣cluded, that finding a Design among them to overthrow That Settle∣ment he was necessitated to appoint a Recognition, for every Man to sign, before he could be re-admitted into the House; which Re∣cognition was as follows.

* 1.66IA. B. do hereby Promise and Engage my self to be true and faith∣ful to the Lord Protector, and the Common-wealth of Eng∣land, Scotland, and Ireland: and that according to the Tenure of the Indenture, whereby I am returned to serve in This Present Parliament; I will not propose, or give my consent to alter the Go∣vernment, as it is setled in one Single Person and a Parliament.

This was no Conventicle for Cromwell's Turn; so that af∣ter Five Months sitting, This Puppet of a Prince did formally dissolve it, in hope the next might use him better.

His Credit though but small at Home, had better luck a∣broad; The Dutch, the Sweed, and then the French, entred a League with him, and the effect of this Conjunction hasten'd his Ruine. I must not overslip that One Condition with the French, was the Extrusion of our Gracious Sovereign, with his Ad∣herents, out of the French Kings Dominions.

Flush'd with Success, and Vanity, nothing less serves us now, then the Spaniards part of the West-Indies. By whose advice, it matters not;* 1.67 but in Decemb. 1654. a Considerable Fleet sets Sail from Ports-Mouth, and about mid-April, 1655. ar∣rives at St. Domingo; Briefly, the Voyage was disastrous, and those that Scap'd the Fate of That Attempt, dispos'd their Af∣ter-game for Iamaica. To Ballance This disgrace, Blake made amends at Tunis,* 1.68 firing Nine Frigates in the Port Ferino, and came off fair at last.

Olivers nex design was to intercept the Plate-Fleet; and within four Leagues of the Bay of Cadiz,* 1.69 the English engaged eight Galeons, whereof only One Scap'd, Two were Taken, and the Rest Sunk, Burnt, or Stranded: This disappointment to the Spaniard was a bitter one, and the Success as seasonable to the English; Yielding them both a Prodigious Booty, and a

Dreadful Reputation. But these Successes were to Cromwell, as a good Hand, or two, to a Young Gamester; only Temptations to a Course will ruine him.

While these Exploits were driving on, Abroad, Others were in the Forge at Home. Here, to gain Love; There, Awe and Credit, with as much Money toward the Purchase as the Fates pleas'd. Upon the Royallists, his Flatteries wrought little, as being a Party mov'd neither by Security, nor Profit, (where the King's Interest was the Question.) Both which, they freely Sacrificed in their first dutiful Engagement with him: and to the last stood firm, through the whole course of Oliver's most furious Extremities. But other Instruments there were of a more tractable and complying Temper, and These Foresooth, (Ten, Twenty perhaps in a Country) worship'd the Golden Calf, and in the Name of the People of England, Ad∣dressed, Congratulated,* 1.70 [Engaged themselves to stand by and as∣sist him to the Vttermost, in the discharge of the Trust which so remarkably was devolved upon him.] This is the Style of that from Bucks.

To these Appearances of a general Good-liking, were added the Conjoynt-endeavours of his Dependents and Allies;* 1.71 which being Numerous in Truth, and Considerable by Employment, gave no small Succour and Support to his Ambitious Project, and Tot∣tering Greatness. As by the Influence they had upon the Iun∣cto, in Sep. 1656, more eminently appear'd; consisting of near a 100 Military Officers, 40 or 50 of his Allies, Domesticks, and particular Creatures; (I speak the least) beside their Seconds: a mixture there was likewise of certain Persons truly Honourable, but divers being excluded, and the rest over∣voted, their Interest came to nothing.

These were no Strangers to their Masters pleasure, and what That was, may be collected from the Votes they passed to please him. The Main were these:

1. An Act for Renouncing and Annulling the Title of Charles Stuart to the Three Kingdoms.

2. For the Securing of the Protectors Person, and preserving the Peace of the Nation.

3. The humble Petition and Advice.] Wherein was plenti∣fully provided whatever might conduce to his Establishment, the most material Points being these following. (Only Pro∣tector should have been King, if he had pleas'd.)

* 1.721. That under the Name and Style of Lord Protector, &c. He should in his Life-time Declare his Successor, and Govern ac∣cording to the Petition and Advice, in Matters therein exprest, and in other things according to the Law of the Land.

2. That he would call Parliaments for the future, Consisting of Two House, &c. —and Triennial at least.

3. That the Quorum of the Other House be One and twenty, and the Number not above Seventy,* 1.73 Nominated by his Highness, and Approved by that House.

4. That the Quorum of his Privy Council be Seven,* 1.74 and the Number not exceeding One and twenty: and that Sitting, the Parliament, the Standing Forces of this Commonwealth be dis∣posed of by the chief Magistrate, with the Consent of both Hou∣ses; and in the Intervals, by advice of his Council.

* 1.755. That a constant yearly Revenue of Thirteen hundred thou∣sand pounds be forthwith Settled, and no Part thereof to be rai∣sed by a Land-Tax: A Million of this Money for the Navy and Army, the rest for the Support of the Government: Other Tem∣porary Supplies being left to the Iudgment of the House of Commons.

* 1.766. That all that ever serv'd the King Loyally and Constantly, be made Incapable for ever of any Office or Place of Trust in any of the Three Nations. The Rest is Formality.

To these Propositions, his Highness AMEN is not to be doubted, and in Form, May 25. 1657.

The LORD PROTECTOR doth Consent.

Here's in the First, his Family Secur'd. In the Second, his Interest; (3. One House consisting of his own Creatures). In the Fourth, the Standing Army is his own; (that is, in the Inter∣vals of Parliaments, which he can Dissolve at pleasure). In the Fifth, a Revenue proposed: And lastly, His Enemies cast at his Feet.

On the Day following (Iune 26. was presented an Ad∣ditional and Explanatory Petition and Advice: Desiring,

That Forty and One Commissioners be appointed by Act of Par∣liament, who, or any Five of them, shall be Authorised to Exa∣mine the Capacities of Members to be chosen into future Parlia∣ments, and every unqualified Member to forfeit a Thousand pounds, and suffer Imprisonment till he pay it.]

The Forms of several Oaths are likewise offered, to be taken by the Protector, his Council and Members of Parliament; and, his Highness is further desired to Issue forth his Summons in due form

of Law to such as he should think fit to Call to his Other House. To all which—

The LORD PROTECTOR doth Consent.

Divers Bills his Highness pass'd, that his people scarce thank'd him for; Mony-Bills very many, and so the Thing was Ad∣journ'd till the Twentieth of Ian. next.

But we must not forget the Solemn Investiture of the Pro∣tector, by Authority of Parliament; (forsooth) and yet we must not make the Bauble Proud neither, by saying too much on't.

The Foolery was perform'd in Westminster Hall, where his Highness was presented with a Coat: to wit,* 1.77 A Robe of Pur∣ple-Velvet, lin'd with Ermins; A Bible, Gilt and Bossed; a Sword: And lastly, a Scepter of Massie Gold. When he was Girt and Vested, he lift up his Eyes to Heaven, and took an Oath, (not the First he had broken by many a Thousand) which being dispatch'd, Mr. Manton Consecrated the Independent F••ppery, with a Presbyterian Blessing; after which his Highness being Publish'd and Proclaim'd, the Comedy concluded.

But Comedy and Mr. Manton will scarce agree in the same Period: and why? Let us Expostulate. Does not a Counterfeit or a Mimique better become a Stage than a Pulpit? Or is it not as lawful to see Honest Lacy play a snivelling Schisma∣tick, as a perfidious bloody Traytor to sustain the Person of a Gracious Prince? Yet here his Holiness Acts his Part him∣self; (or in the Gibberish of the Brethren) performs the Duty of the Day: Pronouncing a Blessing upon the horrid and ridiculous Spectacle.

Did not Mr. Manton know that Cromwell was an Impostur; and that the Purple Robe he ware, belong'd not to his Shoulders? How as a Minister of the Gospel then, could he Officiate to such a piece of Pageantry? It minds me of Mazarine's Kinsman, that upon a Good-Friday, in Derision, Crucified a Frog.

He knew moreover, that he was a Murderer, and an Vsurper, and that the Gawdy Bible then before him, was but to Him the Book he Conjur'd by. How as a Christian could he own the Augury?

Further, He knew whose Blood he had Spilt, whose Rights he usurped; and that the murther'd Father, and his injur'd Succes∣sor were Both his SOVERAIGNS: The Ceremonial Sword and Scepter likewise he knew the meaning of. How as a Subject then could he submit to Countenance so Undutiful an Vndertaking?

Lastly, He knew that the Design was (in Truth utterly A∣theistick, but in shew) Independent. How as a Presbyterian could he agree to't?

For all this now, Mr. Manton may thank himself. 'Tis true, he did Exceeding well, on the late Fast, to reckon Drunkenness, and Prophaness among Those Crying Sins that draw God's Iudge∣ments upon a People, and Earnestly to press a Reformation. But, how come Playes into the Rank of these Provoking Sins? Or, what does Histriomastix in the Pulpit? [The Theaters (it seems) are so Throng'd with Coaches, his Greatness can scarce pass the Streets: Those Temples of Satan, &c.] And what would he now have the World believe of Those that Frequent Them? Is not this, Lashing of a Party, under the disguise of taxing a Vice? or Certainly, 'tis a Strange Conscience, that adores Cati∣line in a State, and Scruples him upon a Stage. Would not a Whip on the Other hand do well sometimes?

I would go Five Miles barefoot to hear a Presbyterian Preach, that the first War in 1642. Rays'd by the LORDS, and COM∣MONS was a REBELLION.

It must not be supposed that the first Tender of the Petition and Advice under the Regall Stile, was without Cromwells Pri∣vity, and Liking; and beyond doubt, the Title was a Bait he Lick't his lips at: but the Old Fox durst not Bite; and he had Reason to be shy, finding how great a Flame the first Bruit of the Proposition had Rays'd among the Sectaries: That very Ninth of Aprill, when a Committee was appointed, to treat his Highness Scruples into a Satisfaction, being design'd for a Tu∣multuary Attempt upon his Government; and divers of the Plotters apprehended.

'Twas This, that put the Gentleman to his Hums and Haws; that makes him Sick to day, Late to marrow, Busie the next; and when he speaks, Chewe false, or utter Oracles: all these put-offs, tending only to gain Time, to find how the Tide serves, and Taste how the Proposal Relishes. At Last, the Crafty Sir, fearing the distance too wide for a single Step, resolves ra∣ther to make Two on't; and to content himself at present to be Install'd Protector, with such Additional Powers as were then offer'd, leaving the Complement of his Regality to the next meeting.

During the Prorogation, Cromwell patch'd up his Other House, who took their seats (the Term of the Adjournment being expir'd) in the Lords House. Such Peers they were,* 1.78 as in good Truth the Commons were not only asham'd of, but gall'd to see the Affront they had done Themselves,* 1.79 by their own Follies in permitting them. Some few there were of Quality, and Moderation, Whose Names were only mix'd to Grace the Rabble.

And now forsooth the Mushrome-Fobs begin to talk of Dig∣nities and Priviledges. Prodigious Impudence and Folly!* 1.80 Two of these Fellows Pride, and Berkstead quarrell'd upon the Bench at Hicks his Hall, about the meaning of [the PREAMBLE that went AFTER.]

The Commons (though a little late) resented the Indignity of Truckling under such Cattell,* 1.81 and not enduring an Vpper-House so like a Bear-Garden, they presenly took in their for∣merly Secluded Fellowes, and fell to work upon the Authority of That New Creation, not sparing His that Plac'd them there. This course would soon have bred ill blood; and Cromwell, after 15 Dayes tryal of their Humour, did Prudently Dissolve them.

From that Degree of Confidence, to Fall beyond Ressource, and from That point of Power, to become Ridiculous; did but demonstrate to him the Vanity of his Ambitious Hopes, and that he aim'd at Things Impossible.

Of all the Cross-Encounters of his life,* 1.82 This sank the Deep∣est, and the Impression of That Anguish, went with him to his Grave; as may be fairly Gather'd from the wild dispropor∣tion of his following Actions: which, well consider'd, will ap∣pear rather the Products of Revenge, Rage, and Despair, then the form'd Regular Politicks of his wonted Reason.

Yet that he might not seem to abandon the persuit, and ut∣terly despond; some Five weeks after the breaking up of the late Assembly, The Major of London and his Brethren were summon'd to White-Hall,* 1.83 and there (March. 2. 1658.) the Citts are told a Formal Tale of the King of Scots; 8000 Men in Readiness, and 22 Vessels to Transport them. A General Plot, The City to be fired, and twenty Terrible Things, to start and Settle a New Militia, which in some Six weeks time was per∣fected.

And Now from all Parts are to be procur'd Addresses:

which are no other then Leagues Offensive, and Defensive Be∣twixt the Faction, and the Vsurper.

* 1.84Sweet London leads the way; Then Michell's, Ashfields, Cobbetts, Regiments: The Officers of the English-Army; and the Commission-Officers in Flanders. All these in March.

In April; the Officers of Biscoes Regiment: and the Com∣mission Officers of the Militia in Suffolk, Leicester, Sussex, and my Country-men of Norwich. After These, follow the Soul∣diery of South-Wales, and Daniels Regiment. The Well-affect∣ed of Nottingham, &c.

These Numerous and Pretending Applications, were but False Glosses upon his Power; and Cromwell was too wise to think them Other; Gain'd by Contrivement, Force, or at least, Im∣portunity. Half a Score pitifull wretches call themselves the People of such or such a County, and here's the Totall of the Rec∣koning. 'Tis Rumour'd that his Daughter Cleypoole, in the Agonies of her Death-Sickness rang him a Peal that troubled him. Whether 'twere so, or no, 'tis past Dispute, his Grand Distress was for the Loss of That which while he hop'd to gain, made the most horrid of his helpfull Sins, seem Solaces and Pleasures.

While by the Artifice of These Addresses, his broken Inte∣rest is pieced as Fair as well it may, his Care is Divided be∣tween the engaging of One Party, and the Destroying of Another. And under the Masque of a pressing and Pious Necessity, he breaks out into such Enormous Cruelties,* 1.85 such Wanton, and Conceited Butcheries, that, had not his Brain been Crackt, as well as his Conscience Sear'd, he would not have gone so Phan∣tastical a way to the Devill. Some of the Martyrs Hearts were quick and Springing in the Fire, (as I had it from several Eye-Witnesses). Ashton did but desire to be Beheaded, and it was seemingly Granted, but the Order kept till 'twas too late, and Then tendered with a Ieere.

London was made the Altar for These Burnt Offerings: God grant That City be not at last purg'd by Fire, (I mean, before the General Confiagration) for Those Polluting Flames. The Crime was Loyalty, and made out against them, more by the doubling Artifice of Mercenary Tongues, than any Pregnancy of Proofes.

What could This Furious and Inhumane Rigour avail That miserable Politician, further then as it Gratifi'd his Malice, and

Revenge, for his Lost Hopes, and Fortunes! Without a Par∣a••••ment, or somewhat like one, he Perishes for want of Mony; and an Assembly to his mind throughout, he utterly despairs of: so that no Remedy remains, but by extremities of Violence and Bloud to do his Business. And to That end, he faintly labours the new Modelling of his Army, a way, which he had found by Long Experience, made Enemies, as well as Friends: Those certain, and Implacable; These, prone to change their Interest, and without Mony, True to None. In fine, his Fate was Irresistible, and his Tormented Soul Inconsolable. He Sinks, Sickens, and Dies: Upon the Day of his grand Anniversary, for Dunbar, and Worcester. (Sept. 3.)

The Night before his Death,* 1.86 arose a Tempest, that seem'd to signifie the Prince of the Ayre had some great work in hand: and 'tis Remarkable, that during his Vsurpation, scarce any Eminent Action passed without a furious Storm.

I have drawn This Chapter to a length beyond my intenti∣on, and should be too too Tedious to run through all his Wiles, which were No other than an Habitual Craft, diffused throughout the entire Course of his Tyranny. But certain General rules he impos'd upon himself, which must not be omitted.

One was, to Buy Intelligence at any Rate, by That means making every Plot bear it's own Charges.* 1.87

2. Never to Engage Two Parties at once; but to Flatter, and Formalize with the One, till he Ruin'd the Other: Which was the Reason that he durst never make the Presbyterians Desperate, for fear of Necessitating them to side with the King.

3. To extirpate the Royallists by all possible means, as Po∣verty, Bondage, Executions, Transplantations; and a Devise he had to dispose of several Levies, out of That Party, Some to serve the Spaniard, Others the French, that they might be sure to meet in Opposition, and cut One the Others Throats.

4. He ever made his Army his own Particular Care.

5. To keep the Nation in a perpetual Hatred, and Iealousie of the Kings Party; which he promoted either by forging of Plots; or Procuring Them.

So much for Olivers Temper, Straights, and Politicks.

CAP. VII. A short Account from the Death of the Tyrant Oliver, to the Return of Charles the Second, (whom God Preserve from his Fathers Enemies.

THe Heart of the Cause was broken long since, and now the Soul of it is gone; though the Protectorate be for∣mally devolv'd to Richard, as the Declar'd Successour to his Fa∣ther. Whether Declar'd or not, was (I remember) at That time a Question. But whether Thus or So, it Matters not. Oliver is Dead, his Son Proclaim'd, and at night Bon-fires, with all the Clamor, Bustle, and Confusion that commonly attends those Vulgar Jollities. The Souldiers took the Alarm, and in my hearing threatned divers for daring to express their Joy so unseasonably: but they came off with telling them that they were glad they had got a New Protector, not that they had lost the Old. In Truth, the New Protector was look'd upon as a Person more Inclinable to do Good, than Capable to do Mischief, and the Exchange Welcome, to all that Lov'd his Majesty.

By the Court-Interest (as they call'd it,) Addresses thick and threefold were brought in, to Condole, and Gratulate; but Those Complements had no Sap in them: The Dutch, the Swede, and the French, sent their Embassadours on the same Errand. And now the Funerals come on; A Solemn, and Expensive Pageantry; yet, in my Conscience, the Chief-Mour∣ners were his Highness Drapers.

These Ceremonies over, to keep the Wheel in Motion, a Supply was Resolv'd upon for the King of Swede, and little further of Moment, before Ian. 27. When (in the Language of the Time) met Richards Parliament. The First, and Last of his Reign.

It cost These people some time to agree the Powers of the Chief-Magistrate,* 1.88 and the New Peerage, which came to this re∣sult, that Richard should be Recognized; but with limitations, consistent with the Rights of Parliament, and People: and that for quiet sake [they would transact with the Persons then sitting in the Other House, as an House of Parliament during that Ses∣sion.]

The House proceeded by Degrees to make dangerous In∣spections into the Militia, the Revenue; to look into the Ex∣orbitances of Major Generals, to threaten the Excise; and finally, by all Popular pretenses, to engage the Multitude; Effectually against both Protector and Army, enduring the Go∣vernment neither of the One, nor of the Other.

Whereupon, the Officers set up a Counsel at Wallingford-House, the Protector advises at White-hall, and Aprill 6. 1659. comes a Paper to Richard from the Generall Counsell of Offi∣cers, Entituled, A Representation and Petition, &c. importing, [the great danger the Good Old Cause is in, from Enemies of all sorts, the Poverty of the Souldiery; the Persecution of Tender con∣sciences, &c. which Particulars they Petition his Hignesse to repre∣sent to the Parliament, with their Desire of Speedy Supply, and Certainty of Pay for the future: Declaring likewise their Resolu∣tion, with their Lives and Fortunes to stand-by, and assist his High∣ness and Parliament, in the plucking the Wicked out of their places wheresoever they may be discovered, &c.]

The Paper boded a Purge, at least. Sign'd it was by 230 Officers, presented by Fleet-wood; Publish'd throughout the Ar∣my, and followed soon after with a Day of Humiliation: (the never-failing Sign of Mischief at hand.)

In this Juncture,* 1.89 Each of the Three Parties was Enemy to the Other Two, saving where Either Two were united to Maintein themselves against the Third: and All Three of Them Ene∣mies to the Good of the Nation.

The House being Biass'd for a Common-wealth, and not yet enabled to go Through with it, Dreaded the Army on the one hand, and Hated. the Single-Person on the Other.

Richard, finding his Power limited by the Members, and En∣vy'd by the Officers, willing to please Both, and Resolv'd to Haz∣zard nothing, becomes a Common Property to the House and Army; a Friend to Both by Turns; Theirs to day, T'others to Morrow, and in all Tryals Meekly submitting to the Dispensa∣tion.

The Army on the other side had their Protector's Measure to a Hair;* 1.90 and behind him they Stalk'd to Ruffle That Faction in the House, that was now grown so Bold with the Military Interest: and it behov'd them to be quick, with (as the Case stood Then) so Popular an Enemy.

The Members kept their Ground, and April 18. pass'd These following Votes.

* 1.91First, That, during the sitting of the Parliament, there should be no General Counsell, or meeting of the Officers of the Army with∣out Direction, Leave, and Authority of his Highnesse the Lord Protector, and Both Houses of Parliament.

Secondly, That no Person shall Have and Continue any Command, or Trust in any of the Armies, or Navies of England, Scotland, or Ireland, or any of the Dominions and Territories thereto belong∣ing, who shall refuse to Subscribe, That he will not disturb or inter∣rupt the free meeting in Parliament, of any the Members of ei∣ther House of Parliament, or their freedom in their Debates and Counsels.

Upon these Peremtory Votes, Richard Faces about, joyning his small Authority, to forbid their Meetings; and great Assu∣rances are Enterchang'd, to stand the Shock, of any Oppo∣sition.

Two or three days they stood upon their Guards, conti∣nuing in that snarling Posture,* 1.92 till April 22. when Richard at the suit (or rather menace) of Disborough and his Fellows, signs a Commission to Dissolve his Parliament; which to pre∣vent, the Members Adjourn for Three days; and to avoid the shame of falling by an Enemy, the Catoe's kill themselves. For at the Three days end, they find the Dore shut, and a Guard up∣on the Passage, to tell them, They must Sit no more; Their Dis∣solution being also Published by Proclamation.

His Highness steps aside next; and now the Army undertakes the Government.* 1.93 They Modell, Cast about, Contrive, and, after some Ten Days fooling with the Politiques, they found it was much a harder matter to Compose a Government, than to Disor∣der it, and at This Plunge, besought the Lord [after their Wandrings and Back-slidings, to shew them where they turned out of the Way,* 1.94 and where the Good Spirit left the Good Old Cause, that through Mercy they might Return and give the Lord the Glory.

At last, they call to mind, that the Long Parliament sitting from 1648. to 1653. were eminent Assertours of that Cause, and had a Special Presence of God with them: Wherefore they Earnestly de∣sire Those Members to Return to the Exercise of their Trust,* 1.95 &c.—]

This is the Tenor of that Canting Declaration, which the Army-Officers presented Lenthall (the Good-Old-Speaker) with, at the Rolls, May 6. in the Evening; where a Resolve was

taken by several of the Members, to meet next morning in the Painted Chamber, and There to advise about their Sit∣ting.

They met accordingly, and made a shift, by Raking of Goals, to get together a Quorum,* 1.96 and so they sneak'd into the House of Commons, and There Declar'd for a Common-wealth, passing a Vote expresly against the Admission of the Members, Secluded in 1648.

This Device was fa-fetch'd, and not long-liv'd, but these were Old Stagers, and no ill Menagers of their Time.

To make short; they Erect a Counsel of State, Place, and Displace; mould their Faction; settle the Godly, appoint their Committees, and so soon as ever they are Warm in their Gears, begin, where they left in 1653; Fleecing the Nation, and Flaying the Cavaliers, as briskly, as if 'twere but the Good-morrow to a Six-Years Nap.

But the sad Wretches were filthily mistaken, to think Themselves brought in again to do their own Business; for the Army makes bold to Cut them out their work in a Petiti∣on of May 12. containing 15. Proposals, desiring,

First; a Free-state.] 2. Regulation of Law and Courts.* 1.97] 3. An Act of Oblivion, since April 19. 1653.] 4. All Lawes, &c. since 1653. to stand good until particularly Repleal'd.] 5. Pub∣lique Debts since 1653. to be Paid.] 6. Liberty of Worship, &c. not extending to Popery or Prelacy.] 7. A Preaching Ministry.] 8. The Reformation of Schools, and Vniversities.] 9. The Ex∣clusion of Cavaliers, and loose Persons from Places of Power, or Trust.] 10. The Employment of the Godly in such Places.] 11. To provide for a Succession of the Legislative Authority.] 12. That Charles Fleetwood be Commander in Chief at Land.] 13. That the Legislative Power be in a Representative of the People; and of a Select Senate, Coordinate in Power.] 14. That the Executive-Power, be in a Counsell of State.] 15. That the Debts of his Late Highness, and his Father, contracted since Decemb. 15. 1653. may be satisfi'd, and Twenty Thou∣sand Pounds per Annum setled upon him, half for Life, and half to him and his Heirs for ever.

The Principal point was Fleetwoods Command, which they agreed to; only reserving the Supreme Power to Themselves, and constituting the Speaker, Generalissimo; in the Name of the Pariament: which wariness shewed that they understood one-another.

For a while, the Iuncto treated the Army like Apes, with a Bit and a Knock, Flattering some and Removing others, as they saw expedient: Particularly the Two Sons of the Late U∣surper, were fairly laid aside, Submitting and Resigning in Excellent Form, and without making two words on't.

The High and Mighty did not, all this time, forget, that the Key of the Work, was Money; nor in Truth did they well consider, that they were call'd back by the Army only to Raise it. But On they went through Thick and Thin, and such Ig∣noble, sordid Courses they took to Levy it, that, in Effect, to Stop the Souldiers Mouths, they brake their own Necks; the Nation not enduring any Longer that such a pilfering Covy of Pick-Pockets should call Themselves a Parliament.

This Universal Hatred, and Disdain of their Proceedings, provoked a General Seizure of Men, Horse, and Arms: and in Effect, the Plot was General; but what by Treachery, De∣lays, Babling, Disappointments, and Scruples of taking in the Royal Party, (by those that never meant His Majesty, or his Friends should be the better for't) the whole was Dash'd.

I well remember one Particular, in That Transaction, that pass'd my Understanding, and Methought smelt of Treason. It was extreamly labour'd, that the King might be perswaded to come Over; and That too, before any Port was secured, or Men Embodyed, on the bare hopes of the Design, to engage his Sacred Person.

After the Cheshire-Rout, Lambert Retires to his House at Craven, and there ('tis thought) contrives the Ruine of the Rump. Which unforeseeing Creature, (dreaming of nothing Less) flies higher now then ever,* 1.98 Imposing upon the House, and the Militia, an Oath of Abjuration, not only Renouncing the Title of Charles Stuart, but the whole Line of the Late King Iames, And then besides Excise, Customs, Forfeitures, and Confiscations, out comes an Assessment of 100000 l. per Men∣sem. They dis-incorporate the City of Chester, &c.

* 1.99In the Carier of their head-strong, and unbridled Fury, the first Check they receiv'd, was from a Petition and Proposals

then on foot in Lamberts Army. Whereupon they Order Ashfield, Cobbet, and Duckenfield, (Three of the Principal A∣bettours of it) to bring in the Original Paper, which was ac∣cordingly done, and Caus'd this Vote,

That to have any more General Officers in the Army, than are already settled by Parliament, is needless, chargeable and dan∣gerous to the Common-wealth.

Upon this Vote, the Officers appear'd to acquiesce; but Octob. the 5. Matters were re-enforced, Disborough presenting the House with a Representation, and Petition, from the Generall Councell of the Army. For which, from the Teeth outwards, the Officers had Thanks.

The Conventicle and the Army began now to speak English, and the Members seeing their Dissolution at hand, however cast This Block in the Armies way; Enacting,

That it should be adjudg'd High-Treason for any Person or Per∣sons after the Eleventh of Octob. 1659. to Raise Monies without the Peoples Consent in Parliament.

This being passed; They Vncommission'd Nine of the Army-Officers; to wit, Lambert, Desborough, Berry, Kelsey, Ashfield, Cobbett, Creed, Packer, and Barrow. They voyded Fleetwoods Commission also, Investing the Command of the Army in Seven Persons, himself being one, and any Three to be a Quorum.

Hereupon the House adjourns, and Hazelrigg, Morly and Walton (Three of the Seven) repair to the Speakers Chamber, forthwith dispatching Orders to Draw their Troops toge∣ther. The Army-Party do the like, and March to the Palace-Yard at Westminster,* 1.100 (their Appointed Rendezvouz) where The Two Parties for That Night and part of the next day made Faces at One another; and finally, the Souldiery dis∣miss'd the Senate.

Now was the Government once again in the Army; who after Thirteen days deliberation how to bestow it, Octob. 26. Disposed of it to a Committee of Safety,* 1.101 consisting of 23 Per∣sons: Empower'd at Large; to advise upon Occasion with the Principal Officers of the Army; and within Six-weeks time, to bring in a Form of Government. Their Reign was short and troublesom; as 'tis reported, Feak told Sir Harry Vane upon his Vnction, that his was like to be. They make Fleetwood their Commander in Chief, and constitute a New Militia.

Scarce were these Worthies warm in their Seats, but the News comes that Scotland's in Disorder, and Barwick in a wrong hand. Whereupon Lambert marches Northward; soon after which, comes on a Treaty, that gave General Monk (now Duke of Albemarle) leisure to purge his Army, and to put Icotland in a Posture of Security.* 1.102 By These Delays, and want of Monys. Lambert's Army Moulders away; and briefly London is left to Thin, that Sir Harry Vane's Privy List of Congregationals was the danger they most Apprehended.

The first step toward their Deliverance, was a Petition desiring the Assistance of the Common-Counsell for the Procurement of a Free-Parliament: Promoted by the Honest-Part of the City, and Cross'd by some Factious Magistrates of the Walling∣fort Leaven.

This Baffle did but more Incense the Petitioners, and upon Monday,* 1.103 Decemb. 5. Horse and Foot were Commanded into the City to hinder the prosecution of it. Where, by surprize, Hewson the Cobler knocks Two or Three Citizens on the head, barbarously wounding and affronting others, till at last, Mul∣titudes being drawn together, and ready to fall in among them (where not a Red-Coat could have scap'd without a Miracle) the Quarrel, forsooth, was taken up by some of the Formali∣ties, and then excus'd, to the Committee of Safety, as if the fault had been the Cities. The Army had at this time their Guards in Pauls, and Gresham-Colledge.

During these Broyles, Hazelrigg, Morly, and Walton, pos∣sess themselves of Portsmouth,* 1.104 and the Forces employ'd to re∣duce it, joyn with them. The Fleet drives the same Interest likewise: only the Troops in London were at a stand, and fair for any Purchaser, but the Opportunity was slipp'd.

Upon the 26. of Decemb. the Rump sits once again,* 1.105 and Empowers Seaven Commissioners, or any Three of them, to Command the Army; Here, the Secluded Members of 1648, put in for their Right of Sitting; whereupon a Vote is pass'd for taking the Case of Absent Members into Consideration, upon the fifth of Ianuary next; and upon the Day appointed, they Re∣solve,

That the Members Discharg'd from Voting, or Sitting in 1648. and 49. do stand duly Discharg'd by Iudgement of Parliament, and that Writs do Issue forth for New in their Places.

And now They think their Game Cocksure, having already Voted the Disbanding of Lambert's Army; Setled their Coun∣sell of One and Thirty; and Offer'd Grace to the Revolted Offi∣cers, (Lambert himself, by Name) that would lay down before the Ninth of Ianuary; whereupon, Lamberts Forces disperse,* 1.106 He himself submits, and the General receives an Invitation to London.

In Conclusion, after Many Indignities cast upon the Honest Part of the Nation, for desiring a Free-Parliament, by That wretched Conventicle, that intended only to Perpetuate it self; The General arrives at London, Feb. 3. and upon the 7. comes out the 100000 l. Tax,* 1.107 which produced a Common-Counsell the day following to advise upon it: where it was Resolv'd, To adhere to a former Vote of the Court in the Nega∣tive. This Refusal puzzled the Counsell of State, who without being Masters of the City, and of Money, were able to do lit∣tle; so that they forthwith Order'd the Reducing of the City, by Emprisoning half a Score of their Citizens; and, upon another Denyal, to take away their Posts, and Chains,* 1.108 and destroy their Gates and Portcullisses; which was accordingly Executed, but with such Regret, that thereupon they lodg'd the Govern∣ment of the Army in Five Commissioners, (the General being One) with Evident Design to wipe him of his Employment. But Their Ingratitude wrought little with him, whose Acti∣ons were only steer'd by the Compass of Loyalty and Pru∣dence. So that having humour'd the People at Westminster, till they had made themselves sufficiently Odious, and abundant∣ly try'd the Affections of the City to his Design in hand: Up∣on the 11 of Feb. he gave the House to understand the Neces∣sity of their timely Dissolution, in order to the right of Suc∣cessive Parliaments; the very hopes of which Release gave the People a Joy, to the Degree of Madness.

Upon the 21. were re-admitted the Secluded Members of 1648. by whom were Writs Issued out for a Representative,* 1.109 to meet upon the 25. of April 1660. and March 16. 1659. they formally Dissolve themselves, Committing the Govern∣ment in that Interval, to a Counsel of State. Upon the day Appointed, the Convention meets, but not altogether so Leaven'd as by the Qualifications was intended; Excluding Father and Son of such as had serv'd the King, from the E∣lection. In fine, the Major Part of that Assembly, according

to their Duty, gave the King his own again, without those Shackles and Conditions which the Qualifiers would have Impos'd upon his Majesty: Upon whose Legal and Imperial Freedom, depends the Safety and Well-being of his People.

CAP. VIII. The Vsurper Oliver was principally distress'd by the War with Spain, and his Standing Army.

WE have now brought Rebellion from the Cradle to the Grave; We have seen it Triumphant, and now we see it in the Dust, subjected at the Feet of our Most Gracious Soveraign, to account for the Blood of his Royal Father. Be it our Business next to enquire, What hindred Oliver from Establishing himself? Upon what Reason of State, Cause, Er∣rour, or Necessity, that prosperous Vsurper fail'd.

But some will not allow he fail'd; as if the sole Fatality of the Cause was his Decease; and the Design only miscarried through the ill Manage of a weak Successor. For granted; by good Order, it might have been Caudled up, and kept above ground a little longer: But still it seems to Me, that before Oliver Dy'd, the Cause was Bed-rid, and Hectick, past Re∣covery.

* 1.110Opinion is Free; any Mans as Mine, and Mine as any Mans: so that submitting my Reasons to the Wise, and Re∣commending my Weakness to the Charitable, I proceed.

Cromwell did wisely to take his Rise to the Soveraignty upon the Necks of those Vsurpers whom he cast out in 1653. For in the same Action, he Oblig'd the People, Master'd his Ene∣mies, and Fill'd his Pockets. Yet were not those Means that advanc'd the Tyrant, sufficient to Establish him.

One Obstacle was the Inconsistence of his Doctrine with his Design:* 1.111 for the same Arguments that Rais'd him, Ruin'd him. The People were instructed to Destroy Kings, not to set them Vp: and beside, he that had so many Sharers in the Hazzards of the Rebellion, could not fail of some Competitors for the Benefit of it.

Further, he had no considerable Party sure to his Interest; and all, but his Meer Creatures and Allies, were utter Ene∣mies to it. The City Hated him for their Loss of Trade; the Country, for their Taxes; the Royalists, for his Rebellion,* 1.112 and Cruelty; the Presbyterians, for his Breach of Covenant, (That is, for not destroying the King after Their Way); The Le∣vellers, for his Ambition; and, in fine, all the hope he had, was to New-Modell an Army to his purpose; that fail'd him too at last, for want of Money, and Credit to maintain it. Which Want was chiefly hasten'd, and procur'd by his precipi∣tate Breach with Spain, together with the Necessity of keep∣ing up a Standing Army.

The former of These was doubtless his Mistake;* 1.113 (or ra∣ther a Temerity scarce advised upon.) For having brought the Hollander to his Knees, (the only Stranger he had then to fear) and after That, shak'd hands with him; his next Course should have been by Thrift and Popularity to Ingratiate him∣self at Home, and not by a Rambling, Needless, and Expensive War, to squander away the life-blood of the Na∣tion, and in That Indigent Extremity of the State, to make Ducks and Drakes with the Publick Treasure. Nor was the Consequence less Fatal to him, than was the Enterprize (to a common Eye) Imprudent: the hopes of carrying his Design, in no wise Countervailing the risque he ran of losing all he had Got, in case he missed it.

I might Instance in a Thousand ways of Profusion, and Op∣pression Common to all Usurpers, both Practised by Him, and exposing him to great Necessities, but I shall rather bestow the rest I have to say,* 1.114 upon the Fatality of that Tyrant's Conditi∣on; Which forced him to make use of for his Safety, the greatest of all Dangers, to wit, A Standing Army.

For Order sake, We'll first Consider, Vpon what Pretense, and to what end 'twas Rais'd.

In the Next Place; We'll see what it produc'd, and weigh the Benefits with the Inconveniences.

Lastly; Wee'll look into the probable Effects, and Influence of it; as related to the English Temper, Custom, and Government.

To the first; what I here call a Standing Army;* 1.115 was but the Emprovement of a Slight Temporary force rais'd, (in pretense at first) as an Expedient against Plots, (being indeed it self the Greatest) but Encreas'd, Continued, and Carried on, by Policy,

and Power. This Project came from the Cabale in 1641. Couch'd under the Notion of A Guard for the House of Com∣mons:* 1.116 [Who conceiv'd that they could not with the Safety of their Persons, (upon which the Safety and Peace of the whole Kingdom did then depend) sit any longer Vnarmed, and Vnguarded] — so great were their [Apprehensions,* 1.117 and just Fears of mischievous Designs, to ruine and destroy them]

This was the Popular Colour for that Guard; Plots, and the Safety of the Publick. Where the Plot was, in Truth; and where the Real Danger; may be gather'd from the Practises of Those Armies, whereof The Guard aforesaid was but the Rise and Foundation. (And That's the point we handle next.)

* 1.118The setting of This little Force a foot, was a fair Step to∣ward the Militia; One Guard begetting Another; and the same Reason standing good, for the Augmenting, and Vphold∣ing of Those Troops, which was employ'd for the first Raising of them. The Parliament was first in Danger; the City, Next; and Then the Nation: and as their Iealousies Encreas'd, so must Their Forces, till by Degrees they grow to an Army. The King, and his Adherents, they call the Common-Enemy; whom they Invade and Vanquish.

Here's their work done in short; what have they now to fear? Only New-Modelling, or Disbanding. A blessed Tran∣slation of the Government, from the Rule of the Law, to the Power of the Sword! and There to abide, till One Army be re∣mov'd by Another: That is, the Tyranny abides; tho' under evera I Formes, and Tyrants.

Our LEGIONS of the Reformation, were Rais'd by certain Rebellious Lords, and Commons; and Seconded by the City of London. We'll see now, how they behav'd them∣selves towards their Masters and Friends.

In 1647. the Army Reformes, and Purges the House; Presses their Dissolution.* 1.119 Seizes their General Pointz in the North; Squeezes and Menaces the City of London; Marches up to it, and in Triumph through it. Takes Possession of the Tow∣er; Charges the Mayor with divers Aldermen and Citizens, of High-Treason. Alters their Militia's, and Common-Counsel; and finally, gives the Law to the House, and That to the Nation.

In Decemb. 1648. the Army gives the House another Purge; and the year following, Cromwell himself had like to have been out-trick'd by the Levellers about Banbury.

In 1653. The Army Casts off the Old Conventicle, and up∣goes Oliver, who calls Another; only to get a Tax and Title: and when They had done the One half, and made way to the Other; off goes That too. The Next was call'd in 1654. another after That in 1656. and Both were serv'd with the same Sauce.

If Cromwell could as easily have moulded the Army, as That did the House, his business had been done with half the Cere∣mony; but Mony was Their business, and Kingship His, so that they help'd him in the One, and Cross'd him in the Other.

In Septemb. 1658. Oliver Dies; and Then,* 1.120 they are Ri∣chard's Army; whose puisne Highness must have His Parlia∣ment too. They meet; and notwithstanding a huge Pack of Officers and Lawyers, the Vote prov'd utterly Republican, and Friend, neither to Single-Person, nor Army.

Now, Richard takes his turn: but first, down goes his Par∣liament: and for a while, the Army-Officers, undertake the Government.

Some Ten days after, up with the Rump again, and then they'r Lenthall's Army: which, in Octob. 1659. throws out the Rump, and now they'r Fleetwood's Army. Enter the Rump once more in Decemb. and once more the Army comes about a∣gain. The Rump's next Exit, is for ever, March the 16. 1660.* 1.121

Behold the Thorough Reformation; and every Change Seal'd with a Sacrament, to have been an Act of Conscience, and gui∣ded by a Divine Impulse.

Behold the Staff of the Rebellion; both the Support and Pu∣nishment of it; a Standing Army.

While Plots could either be Procured, or credibly suggested, the Innocent were their Prey, and when That entertainment fail'd them, they worried one another: never at Peace; betwixt the Strife, first to Subject the Nation, and then to Govern it.

So long as the Royal Interest was in Vigour; it was the Faction's Policy to engage all sorts of People,* 1.122 whom they could possibly Unite against That Interest, however Disagree∣ing among Themselves, their first work being only to Destroy the King) and This was the Composition of the first Army.

From Killing they Proceed to take Possession; and here En∣sues a greater Difficulty.* 1.123

A Force is Necessary still, but the State of the Dispute being Chang'd, the Former Mixture is not for their present purpose:

the Conspiratours that agreed to overthrow the Government, being now Divided who shall Enjoy it. Hereupon, they fall to Sorting and Purging of Parties; the Independent at last carry∣ing it, and Oliver in the Head of them.

* 1.124After this Decision of the Contest betwixt the Two Facti∣ons, the Army it self divides; and Cromwell is now more puzzled with the Private Contrivements of his own Officers, then he was before with the open Power of his profess'd E∣nemies, for they are clearly for his Ruling with them, but not over them: so that unless he can both Vphold them for his Security, and Modell them for his Design, he does nothing: In Both He labour'd, and beyond Question, Dy'd in the De∣spair of perfecting Either, finding upon Experience, that his Ambition was as Intolerable to his Party, as the Charge of Continuing his Army was to the Publique; and what the Latter was, we'l read in his own words, deliver'd at a Conference, April 21. 1657.

The present Charge (says he) of the Forces both by Sea and Land, including the Government, will be 2426989 l. The whole pre∣sent Revenue in England, Scotland, and Ireland, is about 1900000 l. I think this was Reckoned at the Most, as now the Revenue stands: Why now towards This, you settle by your In∣strument 1300000 l. for the Government, and upon That Ac∣compt to maintain the Force by Sea and Land, and This with∣out Land Tax I think, and this is short of the Revenue, that now may be Raised by the Government, 600000 l. because you see the Present Government is 1900000 l. and the whole Summ which may now be Raised, comes short of the Present Charge to 542689 l. And although an End should be put to the Spanish War, yet there will be a Necessity of the Preservation of the Peace of the Three Nations, to keep up the Present Established Army in England, Scotland, and Ireland; and also a consider∣able Fleet, for some good Time; until it shall please God to Quiet, and Compose Mens Minds, and bring the Nation to some better Consistency: so that Considering the Pay of the Army, coming to upwards 1100000 l. per annum, and the Government 300000l. it will be necessary, that for some convenient Time, seeing you find things as you do, and it is not good to think a Wound healed before it be; that there should be Raised over and above 1300000 l. the Summ of 600000 l. per annum, which makes up the Summ of 1900000 l. That likewise the

Parliament declare how far they will carry on the Spanish War; and for what Time, and what farther Summ they will raise for the carrying on the same, and for what Time, and if these Things be not Assertained, as one saith, Money is the Cause certainly, what ever the Cause is; if Money be Wanting, the business will fall to the ground, and all our La∣bour will be Lost, and therefore I hope you will have a care of our Vndertakings.

How many Souls, Lives, Millions; and Noble Families;* 1.125 How well a Temper'd Government; How Gracious a Prince, and happy a People, were by This Cursed Army Destroy'd; will need no more then their own Consciences to determine, when Divine Vengeance shall call them to a Reckoning. It brought forth (briefly) the worst of Crimes, and Mischiefs, without the least Tincture of a Comfort, or shadow of a Be∣nefit. Nor was it likely to do other, if we consider either the People, Place, Custome, or Government, they were to work upon.

Concerning the People (first) [Populi ferè omnes ad Aquilo∣nem positi,* 1.126 Libertatem quandam spirant] 'Tis Bodin's observati∣on, that your Northern Nations are Generally keen Assertours of Freedom; (which for their Parts, the English made too true) How could it be Expected then, that a People, which Op∣pos'd their Lawful Prince for the fear of Slavery, should ever finally Submit to a Rebellious Vsurper under the Actual and Shameful Extermity of it? This Reluctancy of Humour in the Generality, joyn'd with the Particular Vigilance, Loyalty, and Enterprizings of the Royalists; render'd those Courses Neces∣sary at present, to the Vsurper, which must certainly sink him in the End.

Nor was it more against the Genius of the People, than a∣gainst the Interest and Reason of the Place.

The Place, we are to consider as an Island; no Forreign Danger then in view, to Palliate the Oppression of an Army; nor any Subject whereupon to turn the Influence of it. No Stranger in the Case concern'd; only at Variance with our selves; we breed and nourish in our proper bowels, the Evil that Devours, or, at the best, Consumes us. The Army fear'd the Plots, but 'twas the Nation felt, them, and the Result of all was only a Dispute betwixt the Civil and the Military Power; Law, and Necessity: so that Effectually (the two Parties of

this Division thus Enterwatching and Counter-Plotting one another) we were rather in a State of War than a Posture of Security, the People being at this Election, either to Resist, or Starve, and the Army, as much oblig'd, to make good their undertaking, or fall to nothing. What could be Rationally the Issue of these Provocations, and Animosities, but either the Destruction of the Army by the People; or of the People by the Army, in Order to a General Quiet? Neither of them being safe, but by the Ruine, and Subjection of the Other. If the People refuse to Pay, they are Presently Dis-affected; if the Souldiery be their own Carvers, they are lookt upon as Tyrannical, and Insolent; and here's Matter furnish'd for a Civil War.

Now That which makes the Case Worse, is (as I said) that being Islanders, and wanting the Colour of Arming against Dangerous Neighbours, we are forced to spend that humour in Mutiny among our selves, which might Otherwise be Di∣verted by, and Employ'd upon, a Publique Quarrel.

A Disgression to the State of FRANCE.

* 1.127Upon the Continent 'tis Otherwise; as in France, (for the Purpose) where though the King Entertains a Stand∣ing Army of 12000. and about Fourscore Regiments more, in Flanders, Italy, Catalogne, and Luxemburgh; (besides Stran∣gers) There's yet the Countenance of an Interest, and a Pru∣dential Ground for't: to Ballance the Power, or at least Check the Progress of his Ambitious Neighbour Spain. For (says the Duke of Rohan in his Interest of France) Il faut opposer La Force á la Force.* 1.128 Car ni les persuasions, ni la Iustice des armes, ne fera la loi à celui qui sera armè, tellement que la France doit se re∣trencher de toute autre despence moins utile, & estre tousiours pu∣issamment arme. [Force must meet Force, for 'tis the Sword that gives the Law to Equity, and Reason; wherefore let France rather be sparing in any other way, then in the Constant Entertain∣ment of a Puissunt Army]

It may be Argu'd too, that the Exercise of Armes, is the Profession of the French Nobility, and in Effect, 'tis only War abroad keeps them in Peace at home. Yet even in France it self, where the Necessity of a Standing-Army is bolster'd up with so many fair Appearances, the Effects are Dismal, how plausible soever the first Occasion seem'd.

Where it began, or what it was, not a rush matter, but, that by Gradual encroachments, from small and Temporary Pretenses, 'tis now grown to a Constant, and unlimited Excess, he that knows any thing of France, cannot be Ignorant.

They that fetch it from Guntran King of Orleans, 587. look too far back methinks, and entitle the Tyranny to too fair a President. His Case being This.

Guntran was the Surviver of Four Brothers; Sons of Clotaire the First; the other Three, being Cherebert, Chilperic, and Sigi∣bert. The Eldest of these, Dyed Childless, and the Other two were Murther'd by the Practises of Fredegonde, (first the Mi∣stris, and afterward the Wife of Chilperic.)

Sigibert, supinely indulging himself in the height of his Conquests, and Pleasures, was Stabb'd in his own Palace by a Couple of Souldiers, employ'd by Fredegonde, who did as much at last for her Husband Chilperic; having first Caused him to Murther his Son Clovis; to Divorce one Wife, and Strangle another. The Story is Short, and a little Curious.

Fredegonde had a Gallant, called, Landry de la Tour, by Her, Preferr'd to be Duke of France and Mayor of the Palace).

The King comes one Morning in his Hunting-Dress into the Queens Chamber, as she was busie about her Head, with her Hair over her Eyes; and (without a word speaking) tickles her on the Neck with the Twigg-end of his Riding∣wand, Ah Landry (says she) That's not Cavalier like, to come Behind. The King was as much surpriz'd with the Discovery, as Fredegonde with the Mistake; and went his way with the Thought of it in his Countenance. Landry is presently sent for by the Queen, They discourse the Accident, Debate the Consequences, and in the End, Complot to have Chilperic Mur∣thered as he returns from the Chase; which was Executed, with much Ease and Security, the King being only attended with a Single Page, who Dy'd with his Master, and the Murtherers escap'd.

This Chilperic had, by Fredegonde, Clotaire the Second, (but Four Moneths old at the Death of his Father) and the Regency of King and Kingdom was Committed to Guntran, (the young Kings Uncle by the Fathers side) The Regent, warn'd by the Miscarriage of his Brothers, and being enformed that the same Hand by which they fell, sought His Life also: Establishes

a Considerble Guard, constantly to attend his Person: which was both suitable to his Wisdom,* 1.129 and Dignity; as a Security, against not only the Stroke of Violence, but the very Thought of it, and a fit Circumstance of Majesty.

The Influence of This Force went not far, nor, in Truth, the Royalty of their first Race of Kings,* 1.130 much farther: whose ei∣ther Lenity or Aversness to Business of State, gave their Great Counsellours the means to Vsurp, and Transferr Their Authority, which Confidence they abused to the Supplanting of their Masters.

Complaints, Suits, References, Addresses, must be made, for∣sooth, to the Majors, not to the Kings: They undertake the Disposition of Monies, and Offices; the Menage of Treaties and Alliances: They Grant, Revoke at Pleasure: Briefly, from 632. to 750. France was rather under a Majoralty, then a Mo∣narchy: and Then, (Pope Zachary, having first Absolv'd the French of their Oath of Obedience) the Race of Chilperic is Laid By;* 1.131 Himself (the Fourth of that Name) formally Degra∣ded, and Cast into a Monastery, by Decree of Parliament; and Pepin Install'd in his Stead. Thus did the Son of the Last Great Subject make himself the First of the Second Race of Kings: of which, in requital for too much said upon the Former, I shall say nothing at all. Nor much more upon this Subject; save only that Charles the VII. and his Successour Lewis the XI. Laid the first firm Foundation of the Military Power; to which, Charles the VIII. Francis the I. &c. have since fur∣nish'd their Additionals, and Superstructures, to make the Ty∣ranny compleat.

'Tis Truth; the Splendor, and Profusion of the Court and Camp, is Dazling, and Prodigious; they swim in Pleasures and Plenty: but he that turns his Eye toward those Miserable Animals, the Peasants, that with their Blood, and Sweat, Feed and Support that Luxe, and Vanity (with hardly bread for their own Mouths,) will find it much a different Prospect; the great Enhansers of the Charge claiming Exemption from the burthen of it.

He that would see the Glory of the One Part, and the Sla∣very of the Other,* 1.132 needs only read L'EST AT de la FRANCE, of 1661. Treating of the Officers of the Crown, Honours, Governments, Taxes, Gabelles, &c. He shall there find the Ve∣nality of Officers, and Their Rates; the Privileges of the Nobi∣lity,

and Their Encrochments; Who are Exempt from Pay∣ments; or rather, that the Country-man Payes for All. To make an end, let him also observe the Power, and Partiallity of their Supereminent Parliament of Paris.

The Book I mention, is of undeniable Authority, where∣in Account is given of, at the least, Eight Millions (English) arising from Three Taxes only; * 1.133 and for the sole behoof and Entertainment of the Souldery (their Tailles, Taillon, and Subsistance) Beside their Aides; (an Imposition upon all sorts of Merchandise, Salt Excepted ) which must needs by a Vast Income: and their Gabelle upon Salt; that brings in near Two Millions more. Not to insist upon Casualties, and infinite other Inventions for squeezing, which they practise: The Plough maintains the Army. [Take notice that this Reflection was Calculated for the State of France in 1661.]

Give them their Due, their Noblesse are Brave and Ac∣complish'd Men, and the Brunt of all Hazzards lies totally upon Them; but scarce in Nature is there a more abject Com∣monalty: and to conclude; Such is their Condition, that without War, they cannot Live: if not Abroad, they are sure to have it at Home.

Let it be Noted too: the Taxes follow'd their Army, not their Army the Taxes; for 'tis One thing to Levy Money to Raise Guards, and Another thing to Levy Guards to Raise Money: the One appearing to be done by Consent, the Other by Force. (I use Guards and Army promiscuously, as only taking a Guard for a small Army, and an Army for a stron∣ger Guard.)

If a Standing Army subjects France to so many Inconveni∣ences, (whereof History is full) where the Strength lies in the Nobility; * 1.134 How much more Hazzardous was it to Eng∣land, where the Welfare of the whole, depended upon the Affections and Interest of the Middle-rated People: Especially under an Vsurper, that was driven to uphold himself upon the daily Consumption of the Nation: (and a Body that becomes every day Weaker than Other, must not expect to be long∣liv'd.

So much for the Inconvenience of Cromwell's Standing Army, as to the Situation of England, together with a View of the Effects of it in France. We'l now consider what Wel∣come

it was like to find upon the Point of Experience, or Custom.

Alteration of Customs, is a work of Hazzard, even in Bad Customs; * 1.135 but to change Customs under which a Nation has been happy, for Innovations, which upon Experience they have found Fatal to them, is matter of great Peril to the Vnder∣taker. But I look upon Oliver's Case, as I do upon a Proposi∣tion, of such or such a Mate at Chesse: where there are sever∣ral ways to come within One on't, and None to Hit it. The Devil and Fortune had a mind to Puzzle him. He Prefers his Pawns; Transposes, Shifts his Officers; but all will not do: He still wants either Men or Money; if he Disbands, he has too few of the One; if he holds up, he has too little of the Other. Such in Truth, was this Tyrants Exigence, that he was forc'd to That, which the Lawful Possessors of the Eng∣lish Crown would never venture upon: No, nor the Vsurpers neither, before our Blessed Reformers of 1641. But

—Where will those People stay, That thorough God, and Majesty, make way.

Our Saxon Kings contented themselves with a Law, What Arms every man of Estate should find, and a Mulct upon such as did Detractare Militiae. * 1.136

* 1.137 Edmond Ironside after his Duel with Camillus the Dane; and a Composition, to divide the English and Danish Kingdoms be∣twixt them and their Heirs, kept no Army on foot to Guard the Agreement; Neither did the Danes (who after his Death, Treacherously Seiz'd the Kingdom) to maintain their Conquest.

William the Conquerour, that subdu'd both English and Danes, thought himself safe enough in creating Tenures by Knights-Service, and permitting Proprieties; * 1.138 though at that time under such Jealousies, that he took divers of his English Prisoners into Normandy with him, for fear of a Commotion in his Absence.

* 1.139William Rufus, and after Him, his Brother Henry the First, (tho' the Vsurpers of the Senior Right of their Elder Brother Robert) set up his Rest upon the same Terms: And so did Henry the II, after a long Contest with King Stephen, and notwithstanding the unruliness of most of his Sons.

Henry III and then Edward I, after the Barons Warrs

Employ'd no Standing Army to secure themselves: neither did Edward or Richard the Second; * 1.140 notwithstanding a Po∣tent Faction of the Nobility bandying against the Latter of them.

Neither did the Henries IV, V, and VI, in the Grand Schism of York and Lancaster, ever approve of it. * 1.141 Nor Henry VII, (as Wise and Iealous as any of his Predeces∣sours.)

If any thing could have warranted the Adventure, me∣thinks the Topsie-turvy and Brouillery which Henry the VIII, Introduc'd, might have perswaded, or provok'd it. * 1.142 But neither There, nor in the following Toss and Tumble of Religion, from Edward VI, to Queen Mary, and then back again to Queen Elizabeth, was it put in Practice.

King James had no Temptation to it. King Charles the Martyr, was indeed charg'd with the Intention of it, and so he was with being Popishly affected; * 1.143 (In Truth, with what not?) and the One as true as the Other. But who were They that laid This to His Charge? Even Those very Persons (some of them that advised Oliver to keep a Standing Army of 10000 Horse, and 20000 Foot, to Awe and Scourge the Nation. A Course unknown to our Forefathers; and by the Best and Worst of Former Princes equally disallow'd; the Bad not judg∣ing it Safe, nor the Good, Expedient.

But other more Convenient, and as Effectual, means they had, either to Prevent Dangers, or Suppress Them, as their Custom of Friborges, or Frank-Pledges, Enquests, Oathes, and Penalties, Tenures by Knights-Service, Commis∣sions of Array, &c. * 1.144 Which being of approv'd Benefit, and Equality, were much more suitable to the Genius and Inte∣rest of the People, than a Standing Army; which to allow, had been no other than to deliver up the Strength of the Nation, into the hands of a Faction.

Now was it less against the Government, than against the Humour of the Nation. * 1.145 Put a Parliament over the Nation, and an Army over the Parliament, Who Governs? But all Oliver's Geese were Swans; and his Souldiers Saints. Did they not Take what they would; Give what they would; Raise and Pluck-down at Pleasure? Nay, Effectually, did ever any Standing-Army Other, if they had nothing Else to do? Had they not already got the trick of calling the people together,

to get money of them; and then sending them away like Buz∣zards, when they had gotten it; of Packing, and Qualifying; Engrossing of Powers and Offices; Cantonizing the Nation? Was it to be expected they should restore the Right Line again, when they had set up the Wrong? The King, when they had erected a General; The Law, when they had Master'd it by the Sword? They did not Tug so hard, for that they meant to part with Easily. What they got by Rebellion, was to be maintain'd by Tyranny; and Necessity was sure at Last to do the Work of Conscience.

I Think, more need not be said to Oliver's Standing Army. * 1.146 His Mony could not last always, and when he wanted That once; he was certain to find his Army as Dangerous an Enemy, as it had been a Faithfull Friend to him in his Prosperity.

Nay truly, 'bate his Vsurpation; his want of Faith and Honour,—But Rather then Prophane the Sacred Character of God's Vicegerant by joyning Majesty and Cromwell in the same Supposition; let us Imagine rather a Wise and Lawfull Prince in the place of that Vsurper: and yet it may be a Question, How far a Standing Army would have Consisted with the Interest, even of a Rightfull Monarch.

First; As the Nation was Poor, and in no Condition for the Charge of it. Next; as it was Impoverished by an Ar∣my; and therefore ill-persuaded of That Expedient. Thirdly; the Prince himself must have been Poor; (in Olivers Place) and what should a Poor Prince have done with a Standing Ar∣my, over a Poor and Discontented People?

The Interest of This world is Money. * 1.147 Subjects Rebell; Ar∣mies Divide; and Kingdoms fall to nothing, for want of it: That which Fools call Fortune, being (to men of clearer sight) only the Favourable Influence of Treasure. 'Tis That, which Carries Towns, Causes, and Armies; puts Knaves in Honest mens places; Corrupts Cousells, and Supplants Govern∣ments: the People wear their hearts at their purse-strings; and a General Oppression, is ever accompanied with a General Desire to Remove it. I speak of what they do, not what they ought to do; for all men are not of a Constitution to hang, and Starve for Conscience. In fine, where the State is Necessi∣tous, and a Faction Wealthy, That Prince (as is already hinted) that erects a Standing Force, in that condition, does but pro∣vide an Army for his Enemies. Not to insist upon the hazzards,

arising either from the People, if the Principal Officers have too little Power; or from the Officers Themselves, if they have too much; by which, not only the Publick Peace, but the Mo∣narchy it self, is Endanger'd: the Kings Crown depending up∣on the Revolt of a Province. What can be more perillous then This Conjuncture; where there is so great a Temptation, on the one hand, and so great a Provocation on the other; where the Multitude wait only for a Head, and the Ambitious for a Party?

But why do I discourse the Mischiefs of a Standing Army? They are too many, great and Obvious, to admit a Question. What are the Benefits of it Rather? * 1.148 Is it either safe to any Purpose, or usefull to the common and pretended end of it, even under a Lawfull and Hereditary Monarch?

It's true; a Prince may deal with his Dominions, as the Gentleman did with his Estate, that turn'd an Inheritance in∣to an Annuity, because he would rather have it Large, then Long, and That's the Fairest of a Forc'd Government; Suppose he save himself for his own time; what will become then of his Successour? But that we'll waive too; and Consider, what's the Fruit of it to himself?

Is he the Richer for't? Alas, the Contrary: the Nation bears a Double Burthen, and the Army Sucks the better half of the Advantage. * 1.149 Is he the Safer? Neither: for a Mutiny in his Army, is both more likely, and more dangerous, then a Tumult among his People. In fine; A Standing Army may promote a Faction, but 'tis the Law preserves the Publick, and conse∣quently the King.

That Monarch that Secures himself from Private Practises by a Choice, Full, and Honourable Guard, well Paid, and Dis∣ciplin'd, about his Royall Person; * 1.150 as to the Rest shall find the Strict and timely Execution of Good Laws the best Publick Se∣curity against Sedition.* 1.151

'Tis a Cheap Remedy, and therefore Acceptable to the Ge∣nerality: A Legall one; so that the Delinquents Themselves cannot Complain of it; and Lastly, 'tis a Sure one: which if it be, what can be more advisable for any Prince and Peo∣ple? In Truth; so Sure it is, that I'm to seek ('bate only Mat∣ter of Claim) where ever any Setled Government was Em∣broyl'd, but either by the Interest of a Standing Force; or the Remissness of Authority, in the Execution of Establi'd Laws.

The Necessity of a Royall Guard is Evident; the Number must be suited to the differing Exigences of Times and Places: but with This General Regard: That it be not only sufficient to the Safety of a Prince; but Honorary likewise, and Accom∣modate to his Dignity; and Demonstrative rather of his Pow∣er then of his Danger.

But be the Body Great or Small; Nay, we'l suppose it e∣qual, to a Standing Army (but not Distributed (as That is) into County-Troops, and Provincial Governments) Call it a Guard still, for the very Name of the Other sounds like a Grie∣vance. The One, supposing only the Peoples Care of their So∣veraign; the Other intimating the Soveraigns Jealousie of his People. Let me not be understood as in allowance of This Over∣proportion: for such a Guard is but an Army in Disguise.

There may be Temporary Occasions indeed, for Temporary, and Extraordinary Levies, but the word Temporary, is com∣monly attended with such a Train of Reasons for Perpetuity; that if the Occasion be not very Manifest, the World is apt to doubt of the Necessity. Not that the Generality have any Right to judge of, or Debate the Grounds of a Change; but I suppose that Their Opinions, and After-feelings will not be de∣ny'd to have some Influence upon the Event of it.

To Conclude; That Pince is Great, Safe, and Happy, that Commands by his Armes, Abroad, and Governs by his Laws at Home. The Apprehension of Conspiracies and Plots, in my opinion, weighs not much; or if there be any danger; the failing is rather in the Constitution or Administration, then in the want of Power to keep the People quiet: Good Laws, and Good Officers, will do the Business, without an Army; and if the Instruments be bad, The Hazzard's Ten times greater with it.

It will be needful here, for the Clearing of the Question, to make a Particular Enquiry concerning Seditions; and that's the Point we'l handle in the Next Chapter; which, for Or∣der sake, we shall divide into Seven Sections, with their Sub∣divisions as occasion shall require.

CAP. IX. Of Seditions in Particular; and shewing in what manner they arise from These Seven Interests. The Church, the Bench, the Court, the Camp, the City, the Countrey, and the Body Representative.

IN the first Chapter of this Tract, we have touch'd upon the Matter and Causes of Seditions in General: We must be now a little more Particular.

The Scene's Vtopia; and we'l Divide it, into Seaven Inte∣rests, The, Church, the Bench, the Court, the Camp, the City, the Countrey, and the Body Representative: the least consider∣able of which, being in any great disorder, hazzards the whole; and That, either by engaging in some Actual Violence against the Government; or by some Irregularity of Pro∣ceeding that may Provoke or Cause it. Of These in their Course, and first of the Church.

§ I. Seditions arising from the CHURCH.

THose Troubles in the State which derive from Distem∣pers in the Church, proceed either from Faction, Igno∣rance, or Scandal.

The Strongest Tie upon Reasonable Nature, is Conscience;* 1.152 and the Stubbornest Consciences, are Those that do they know not What, they know not Why. In Truth, what is Conscience without Vnderstanding, but as well-meaning Madness? And That's the Fairest Sense my Charity can afford to the Blind Zeal of a Transported Multitude. If Conscience bids them Kill the King; Rob the Church; and Tear up the Foundations of Both Governments; They'l do it: Nay, More, This has been done, and Providence it self Proclaim'd for the Doer of it. Great Heed should then be taken, what Persons are Entrust∣ed with the Care of Souls, since the Consequence of a Factions Preacher, and a Mistaken Conscience, proves many times the Ruine both of Prince and People.

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Under the Note of Faction, I comprize all Opinions deli∣vered Publickly, and with Design; against the Doctrine, Pra∣ctice, or Authority of the Church. Reduce it, in Short, to Haeresie, and Schism. The former whereof, reflecting only upon Matters of Faith, concerns rather Religion, then Govern∣ment: and lyes beyond the Line of my purpose; but in This Place; the Latter is the Question, and, briefly as we may, we'l take a view of the Rise, the Method, the Design, and the Effects of it.

It is with Church-men as with other Mortals; There are of all Sorts, Good, Bad, and Indifferent. Some we have known, whom neither the Loss of Dignity, Fortune, Freedom, no, nor the Loss of Life it self, could ever move from the strict Rule of Conscience, Magnanimity, and Duty. Others we have seen to Exercise these Cruelties, (though Eccle∣siasticks themselves) upon the Nobler Sort of their own Function. And some again, we have observ'd to shift with every Turn, and Steer by Interest; still putting on the Livery of the Prevailing Party: Squaring the Rule, and Will of Heaven to the Appetites and Passions of Humanity. So that upon the whole, 'tis evident; some Clergy-men are Quiet, because they have Preferments, and Others Troublesom, because they want them.

The Principal Ingredients into Schism, are These; Ambi∣tion, Avarice, Popularity, and Envy; The Scope of it is to destroy Authority, and advance a Faction. Now how to ac∣complish This, is the Great Work; for a Rent in the Church signifies nothing without a Sedition in the State: and in This manner they proceed.

First, In a Style of Holy Tenderness they slily disaffect the People against the Rights of the Church,* 1.153 as in themselves un∣lawful; and utterly Destructive of Christian Liberty.

* 1.154To strengthen, and advance the Imposture, what do they next, but rip up all the Failings, and shew the Nakedness of their Superiours? Still aggravating what they find, and creating Scandalous Matter where they want it.

When the Multitude are once mov'd in Conscience against the Impositions,* 1.155 and in Passion against the Imposers; their next attempt is upon the Authority, and then They divide into Separate Assemblies, which under colour of so many Conscien∣tious Dissenters from the Ceremonies of the Church, are infal∣libly so many Contrivers against the Peace of the Kingdom.

For here comes in the Civil Power to prohibit their Seditious Meetings, and Then, the Saints (they cry) are Persecuted: The Cause is God's;* 1.156 and they are ty'd in Conscience to bind their Kings in Chains; and through all Extremities to persue a Reformation: This is the Fruit of Tolerating a Faction under a Countenance of Conscience. Nor is it any wonder to see those wretches draw their Swords against Their Soveraign in the Field, whose Souls are turn'd against him in the Pulpit.

But 'tis Objected, that some Ministers do really make a Con∣science, of Conformity. Truly, the better for Them, if they forbear upon That Accompt; but 'tis the same thing to the Publick, upon what account soever; for they Prescribe, what they Practise, and by the President of Sticking upon a Doubt of Conscience,* 1.157they open a Door to Disobedience upon any Pre∣tence of it, breaking the Bond of Vnity in favour of a Particu∣lar nicety of Opinion.

Very notable is The Determination of the Lord St. Al∣bans, in This Case [In Points Fundamental,* 1.158 he that is not with us is against us. In Points not Fundamental, he that is not a∣gainst us, is with us.]

Let this suffice to shew the Political Inconvenience of Enter∣taining Schismatical Preachers. It may be now a Question, How far a Christian Magistrate may justifie the sufferance of any man to exercise the Ministery, within his Dominions,* 1.159 that's a pro∣fess'd Enemy to Episcopacy: Which I Offer, with the fit Mo∣desty of a Proposal, and with Reverence, to the better enform'd. But if, as the Danger of such a Mixture is Evident, so the Law∣fulness of it shall appear doubtfull, their own Argument is then turn'd against Themselves, and we have both Scripture and Experience on our side, over and above.

The Three Questions, wherewith King Charles the Martyr Choak'd the Presbyterian Ministers in the Isle of Wight, Remain still Unresolv'd, and they are These.

First, Is there any Certain Form of Church Government at all prescrib'd in the World?* 1.160

Secondly, If there be any Prescript Form, Whether or no may the Civil Power Change the same, as they see Cause?

Thirdly, If any Prescript Form there be, and That unchange∣able; If it were not Episcopal, what was it?

In Fact, the Constant Exercise of Church-Prelacy is so ma∣nifest, that the whole stream of Story, and Tradition Runs E∣piscopal:

which to Oppose, were to deny the only Means of knowing whether it were so, or not.

Is it the Right they Question? Take then the learned Bi∣shop Sanderson's Deduction of it.

Leaving other men to the liberty of their own Iudgments, my opi∣nion is,* 1.161 that EPISCOPAL GOVERNMENT is not to be derived meerly from Apostolical Practice or Institution: but that it is originally founded in the Person and Office of the Messias, our Blessed Lord JESUS CHRIST. Who being sent by his Heavenly Father to be the great Apostle [HEB. III. 1.] Bishop and Pastor, [1 PET. II. 25.] of his Church, and anoint∣ed to that Office immediately after his Baptism by JOHN, with power and the Holy Ghost [ACT. X. 37—8.] descending then upon him in a bodily shape [LUK. III. 22.] did afterwards, before his Ascension into Heaven, send and impower his holy Apo∣stles, (giving them the Holy Ghost likewise as his Father had given him) in like manner as his Father had before sent him [JOH. XX. 21.] to execute the same Apostolical, Episcopal, and Pasto∣ral Office for the ordering and governing of his Church untill his coming again: and so the same Office to continue in them, and their Successours, unto the end of the World. [MAT. XXVIII. 18—20. Thus far the Reverend Bishop.

Some will Pretend, that This only proves the Authoritative Power they receiv'd by their Mission, but no Succession to the Office.

* 1.162 For That; Observe the Mandate, [Go, Teach ALL Na∣tions.] Personally, and Actually they could not do it; but in Effect, and Virtually, 'tis out of doubt, they did it: and How, but by their Delegates? For otherwise; our Saviour Com∣manded them a Thing Impossible. Briefly; if the Gospel was to be Preach'd to All Nations, (which no Christian will de∣ny) and if (according to the Literal direction of the Or∣der) the Gospel could not be Preach'd to all Nations, by so few Persons as were Then Commission'd; what follows, but the Evident Necessity of a Substitution; which Delegation be∣ing granted, clears the Dispute: for 'tis Indubitable that What Authority soever our Saviour vested the Apostles with, the same likewise was from Them transmitted to their Success∣ours; Who (in the words of his late Sacred Majesty) succeed into the same Apostolical Power, and Function, which the Apostles, as Ordinary Pastors, had. Qui in Dominium alterius succedit,

Iure ejus uti debet. He that succeeds to the Government of a∣nother, succeeds also to his Rights of Governing. And Mark This further; that the Apostles Powers, and Com∣missions, were granted before the Descent of the Holy Ghost: and relating only to matters of Ordinary use, and per∣petual Establishment in the Church; the extraordinary Gifts of the Apostles not at all proving them extraordi∣nary Officers.

Now how far a Prince may safely either Act,* 1.163 or Suffer the vio∣lation of a Church-Government of This Authority, I am not yet instructed.

In fine; it is most certain, that a Divided Clergy makes a Divided Nation; and by how much Religion is the fairest of all Pretenses; Conscience the deepest of all Impressions; Preach∣ing and Praying the most Popular and Publick of all Operations:: by so much are Disaffected Church-men the most Pernitious and Intolerable of all disloyal Instruments. No Calumny being so Plausible,* 1.164 as That which drops from the Lips of Persons fa∣mous for an External form of Piety: No Hypocrites so abomi∣nable, as Those that Tithe Mint, and Cummin, and yet neglect Mercy and Iudgment: that under colour of long Prayers devour Widows houses, &c. And no sting so Deadly, as That from a Snake in a mans own bosome.

We have now done with the Schismatick; the Active and Industrious promoter of Seditions. The Matter he works upon, is Scandal; either Suppos'd or Real; and That comes next.

In all Invectives against the Church, the Scandalous, Negli∣gent, and Insufficient, March hand in hand:* 1.165 to which are op∣posed a Party that stile themselves a Godly, Painfull, and Able Ministery. Thus with the Boasting, and Censorious Pharisee, does the Proud Schismatick advance himself above his Bre∣thren, calling Good Evil, and Evil Good; imposing equally up∣on the People, by an uncharitable Iudgment, and Report, on the One side, and a fictitious Holiness, on the Other.

Not to excuse all Clergy-men, nor to extenuate the Crimes of any of them. Iudas his Treason was the Fouler because of his Profession: and yet the Eleven were never the worse, because of Iudas his Treason.

We'l Grant,* 1.166 that for a Minister to spend one Hour of the week in a Pulpit, and the rest in a Tavern; to Undo a good Sermon by an Ill Example; and to discredit a Strict Doctrine

by a Loose Life; is to extinguish the Reverence that is due to the Function; and to make Preaching look only like a Politick Ordinance to keep the People in Order. Not that the Do∣ctrine is ever the worse for the Person, nor the Priesthood the less Venerable for the abuse of it; but it ministers matter of Scandal, and Exception: and with the Simple it passes for an Argument against the Government.

* 1.167But as the Habit of Drunkenness, and Prophaness, in a Church∣man is most unsufferable; so is it on the other hand a Practice Diabolical, to put all their Actions upon the Tent, and Skrew up every allowable, and social Freedom to the construction of a Scandal. As if there were no Medium to be admitted, be∣twixt the Angel and the Brute. Are they not Men; and e∣qually subjected to Infirmities, with other Men? 'Tis true; their Calling is Divine, but their Persons are Humane; and as much is required, in regard of Their Ministery: so somewhat also is to be born with in respect of their Humanity. Re∣member, there were those that call'd our Saviour himself a Wine-bibber.

Alas; For a Minister to Drink a Glass of Wine in a Ta∣vern, is made a mighty business: Nay, to be only Pleasant, and well-humour'd, is by some, cast in their dish as an Ayre too Light for the Severity of their Profession: as if the Messengers of Ioy, the bearers of good-tidings to the world, were only to be sad Themselves, and look, as if either They suspected the Truth of their Errand, or their Title to the Benefit of it.

However, since there are Those that will make use of small Occasions to do great Mischiefs;* 1.168 It is a Point of Pious Pru∣dence, fairly to shun appearances of Scandal; but 'tis indeed of high, and absolute Necessity, to Punish, or Remove the Scandal it self: as That which both provokes a Judgment from Hea∣ven, and stirs up the People to execute it. Yet let us put some difference betwixt Sins of Appetite, and Sense; and Sins of Malevolence: in the Former, a man playes the Beast; but in the Latter, he playes the Devill.

I look upon Ignorance also, as a Species of Scandal; even al∣though in a Good Man;* 1.169 for every Good Man makes not a Good Minister; nor do I know which is more tolerable; Habitual Prophaneness, and Sensuality in a Divine, or Ignorance in a Teach∣er: the hazzard of False Doctrine, or the Influence of an ill Example.

Touching the Body of the Clergy, enough is said, to shew the dangerous Effects of Schism, and Scandal; the One tend∣ing Directly to Sedition, the Other, Consequentially.

There remains another Stumbling-block,* 1.170 and That con∣cerns the Governours of the Church; who are commonly charged with Innovations, Rigour, Pride, or Avarice. They are capable of All This, as they are Men; but never the more blameable for a Clamour Levell'd at them as they are Rishops: There being great Difference, betwixt Personal Reproof, and a Factious Confederacy: betwixt the seasonable Freedom of Counsel, or Reprehension, duly Circumstanc'd; and the con∣tumacious Insolence of Subjects toward their Superiours. In fine, a likely Tale does their Feat as well as a certain Truth; only they accommodate all their Stories to the Design of over-turning the Government, and to the Gust of the Mul∣titude.

The Sound of Innovations, and of Popery, in some places,* 1.171 goes a great way with the Common People toward a Sedition. They Fear, they Wish, they Love, they Hate, they know not what: and yet, against this Terrible Nothing, shall they engage their Lives and Fortunes, as Zealously, as if their Souls lay at Stake; and as Ridiculously, as if they Phansy'd These same Innovations to be an Army of Flying Dragons, and the Pope leading them on upon a Hobby-horse. With this De∣vice, the Multitude is first startled, and then every Bush is a Thief; Church-Habits are the Trumpery of Rome; Decency is Superstitious; Kneeling, direct Idolatry: And finally, to Im∣pose all This, is interpreted, A violence upon the Consciences of the Godly. Thus from the very Method of Agreement is rais'd an Argument for Separation; and Christian Liberty is render'd Destructive of Humane Authority.

Another General Objection, among the Prouder Brethren, is the Pride of Bishops; their Lording it over God's Heritage:* 1.172 which through the Person, Wounds the Office, Incensing the Multitude against the Power it self, under pretext of blaming the unlawful Exercise of it. Suitable to the Dignity of Bi∣shops, and Correspondent to the Duty of them, ought to be the Revenue: (that is, sufficient both for Honour and Hos∣pitality) in which Particular, the Ecclesiastical Patrimony, is by some People thought as much too Large, as the Iurisdi∣ction; and from a false and envious Calculation of Bishops

Rents, occasion is taken to inveigh against their Avarice; ex∣posing them at once, both as a Grievance, and a Booty. Thus, like the Devil, the Schismatick advances his Kingdom by Slan∣der, and thrives by the Sins of the People.

We have dwelt long upon this Subject of the Church; but with the next, The Bench, we shall be quicker.

§. II. THE BENCH.

THe Two main Springs that Move and Govern the Affe∣ctions of reclaim'd Nature, are Conscience and Law. By the Former we are oblig'd,* 1.173 in relation to our Immortal Beeing; and by the Other as Men Link'd in Society. Our Priests and Iudges, are the Oracles we depend upon, for Counsel, and Instruction; in both these Grand Concerns: and if They de∣ceive us, what greater Misery can befall a Nation, than to have Iuglers, and Impostors, take up the Bench and Pulpit? Cousening the Vulgar with False Weights and Measures, of Truth and Reason; and uttering their Licentious Prevarica∣tions, for Law, and Gospel? In which Case, the greater the Modesty and Vertue of the Common-people, the greater is the Peril of the Delusion: it being their Duty to submit, to the Reason of the One, and to Believe the Doctrine of the Other, without disputing either, unless in Matters most Notoriously Repugnant to the Elements of Polity and Religion. And he's not his Crafts-master, that cannot give, even to the foulest Purpose; a Colour fair enough to cheat a Multitude. What Wickedness is there, for which a corrupt Divine shall not produce a Text; and a shifting Lawyer a President? But enough is said of the Former, and too much in Preface to the Latter.

* 1.174Those Faults, among the Professors of the Law, which fre∣quently cause Seditions (although not in Themselves Sedi∣tious) are, Corruption; Partiality; Oppression; Chargeable Delays: or, in a word, the Non-administration of speedy Iu∣stice. Whereupon must necessarily ensue Poverty. Factions, Animosities, &c.

The Consequences are Dangerous likewise, of over-strain∣ing the Prerogative; and so of Depressing it: both which may be done, either out of Zeal, or with Design. But, be the

Intention of the Doer what it will, the Effects of the Thing done are Mischievous, for it injects Fears and Iealousies of Tyranny, on the one side; and begets False and bold Opinions and Attempts of Liberty on the other: engaging all Humours against the Government, whom either the Hopes and Gust of Freedom, or the Dread of Oppression can work upon. But Personal Vices and Mistakes, we may put upon the Roll of Slow Poysons, that do the Deed, though it be long first.

There are another sort of Lawyers,* 1.175 whose Malice is of a Quicker, and Stronger Operation; under whose Lips is the poy∣son of Asps: or rather, whose Tongues are Daggers, turning the Point of Law, upon the Law it self; wounding the Eagle with a Feather from his own Wing, and Stabbing the Persons of Princes with their own Authority. These are the Execrable Regicides; and the Tumultuary Rabble are but the Ministers of their vile Purposes. Alas! in Matter of Law; by whom should the simple Multitude be directed, if not by Lawyers? (as by Divines, in point of Conscience.) Whether is the greater Offender then; that Ignorant Wretch that draws his Sword against his Soveraign, on the behalf of Law and Reli∣gion: (as he supposes:) Or, Those Abominable Sedu∣cers, that by wrested Scriptures, pretended Inspirations; by misconstruction of Laws, misapplying of Presidents; Tortu∣ring or Embezelling of Records; inveigle the Poor Creature into a Good Opinion of so foul an Enterprize? What signifies the Event of a Popular Action, compared with the deliberate Contrivance, Allowance, and Direction of it; more than the Effect of some dull Passive Instrument, employed by such or such an Agent? Or, if a Prince be Murther'd; whether's the more to blame, the Axe, or the Executioner; the Bul∣let, or the Marks-man? So much for the BENCH, now to the COVRT.

§. III. The COURT.

BY the Court-Interest, is meant That Party, which more Immediately depends upon the Grace and Favour of the Prince: and here (as elsewhere) Seditions are either Plotted or Occasion'd.

Touching the Plotters of Seditions;* 1.176 Some out of Avarice, with Iudas, Betray their Masters. Others, are spurred on by Ambition, with Absolom to Supplant Them. One man is puft up by Popularity; a Second, stung with Envy; a Third, with Iealousie; a Fourth, Transports himself with Revenge, or some other Personal Animosity. In fine, These various Humours, make but One Party; and the Covetous, Ambitous, &c.— agree in the same Conspiracy.

Of the Contrivers of Sedition, some strike directly at the Governour;* 1.177 Others, at the Government: and a Third Sort, by crafty Circumstances, and Windings, chuse rather to Mine the Regal Authority, then Batter it; and to work out a Prince by a Skrew, rather then force him by an Army.

The first fort of Contrivances here Specifi'd, are such as clayming to the Crown,* 1.178 Themselves, Challenge the Prince that wears it, as an Vsurper: And These, by making a fair Title to the People, joyn'd with a little Popular skill of Humouring the Multitude, may with great ease engage a Party, in favour of a Person whom they Love, against a Right which they can∣not understand.

Concerning such as directly oppose the Form of Monarchy, upon a Principle of Iudgment;* 1.179 much needs not be said, be∣cause they are neither many, nor considerable: for, to maintain That Paradox, they must overthrow all Story, Sacred, and Prophane; the Practice of all Ages, and the Reason of all Go∣vernments.

* 1.180A Third sort of Contrivers, are Those who under fair ap∣pearances of Loyalty, and Publickness, of Spirit, Masque their Seditious Intents, and Drive on a Particular Interest. From which kind of evill Instruments, even the Cabinets, and Pri∣vate Counsels of Princes are not absolutely Free; and (accor∣ding to Sir Francis Bacon) the hazzard arises, either from an

Over-greatness in one Counsellour; or, an Over-strict Combina∣tion in Divers; which are (says he) things soon found and holp∣en. For Perspicuity sake, we'l treat of this Division in Sub∣sections.

Subsection. I. Over-greatness in one Counsellor.

THe Over-greatness in one Counsellour, is to be understood Principally, in Respect of his Credit with his Master; and partly, in Regard of those great Offices, and Riches which are commonly heap'd upon great Favourities, giving them the means of over-awding the Honesty of their Inferiours, and of ingratiating themselves with the People; at least with so ma∣ny of them as will be drawn to their Party, either by Fear, or Promotion.

Where it happens that a Prince his Heart is touch'd with the Magick of so much Kindness for a Subject,* 1.181 as to make him dangerously Over-great: it is not either Wisdom, or Virtue, that can properly deliver him from That Charme, but it must be rather Time, and Experience, that shall Dis-enchant him, Nor is it a Fault in a Prince, to comply with a Natural Incli∣nation; but it is a Barbarous Ingratitude in a Subject to abuse it, by Endeavouring, (Comparatively) to Darken the Sun, with the sparklings of a Refracted light, shot from his own Glory.

In This Case, the Happiness of a Nation depends not abso∣lutely upon the Prudence of the Governour; but, in some De∣gree, upon the Honesty of the Favourite: not altogether up∣on Counsell, but much also upon Enformation: nor upon That neither, so much concerning the State and Quality of Affairs, as touching the Fitness of Instruments to menage them, and the Faith, and Abilities of Persons. [In vain is it,* 1.182 (says the Profound St. Albans) for Princes to take Councell concerning Mat∣ters, if they take no Councell likewise concerning Persons.]

Is a Kingdom in Danger of Invasion, or Sedition? To Ob∣viate That Danger by a Force, is a Rational Expedient. But he that Arms his Enemies instead of his Friends, Encreases the Danger. It were neither safe, nor Royall, for a Prince to Walk, or Sleep without a Watch about him. But

were he not better be Alone, then take Assassins into his Guard, or Red-chamber? In fine; Great is the Hazard of Mistaking Persons? Great is the Crime of the Industrious Au∣thors of such Mistakes; and Great the Infelicity of a Monarch so Mistaking.

Nay, which is worst of all, in This Particular, the Noblest Dispositions are the most lyable to be Deceiv'd,* 1.183 and only Om∣niscience, or Ill-Nature can totally Secure a Prince from the Delusion. Imagine a Servant receiv'd into the Arms of his Master, Crowned with Honour and Bounty; and in This State of Favour, giving advice concerning Persons that are mere strangers to the Monarch: Who fit, or unfit, for such or such Employment; who false, or Loyall, &c. How should a Prince suspect a Subject under so many Obligations to Fidelity?

Although Abuses of This Kind are in Themselves suffici∣ently Mischievous,* 1.184 yet are they the more so, by reason of the Difficulty, and Perill to Rectifie them; for, in many Cases, (as Sir Francis Bacon) the Truth is hard to know, and not fit to utter.

He that would duely Execute This Office, must first, Resolve to feel the weight of a Potent Adversary;* 1.185 and Sacrifice his Hopes, his Fortunes, his Freedom, (nay, and perhaps, in Con∣sequence, his Life) to his Duty.

He must be wary too, that not a Syllable pass from his Lips, or Pen, which by the utmost force of Misconstruction, may seem to glance upon the Monarch: wherein, his Loyalty is not less concern'd, than his Discretion; for 'tis a fouler Crime Publickly to Defame a Prince, then Privately to mis-persuade him. Let him but keep himself to the Fact, (as whether This or That be True or False, not medling with the Equity, and Reason of the matter) he may with as much Honour, and good-manners, advertise his Prince of a Mistake, as believe that he is no God.

The Application of This Over-greatness is exceeding vari∣ous, nor is the Grace it self less Beneficial to the Publick, when Nobly Lodg'd, than it is the Contrary, when so large a Bounty is pour'd into a Thirsty and Narrow soul. But we are Ty'd in This Place to discourse the Irregularities of Power, not the blessed Emprovements of it.

We might reckon the Art of Flattery,* 1.186 among the main Condurements to a Court-Design: But, That's one of the Knacks we Learn without a Teacher. So Common it is, that he that cannot shift his Face and Humour, 'tis odds, can hardly shift his Linnen: (he is so Poor, I mean) In This Particular: the Confidents of Princes, being generally of their Masters Age and Inclination, or thereabout, have great Advantages, both for the Freedom of Access, and Privacy: the Timeing of Af∣fairs; and the more Clear Discovery of their Natures.

How the aforesaid Inconveniences may be holpen, shall be the Subject of the next Chapter; but to Discern them in the Intention, falls properly under Consideration in This.

To give the better Guess at the Design of This Over∣great-One, see how he stands Affected,* 1.187 first to the Religion of the Place he Lives in. 'Tis possible, the Conscience of a Ca∣tholick Good, may over-rule him, to the Hazard of a Good which he conceives less Vniversal: and some Light, may be taken toward this Discovery, from the Observation of his Familiars; but much more from his Natural Temper, and from the Tenor of his Life. (i. e. if he be Naturally Melan∣cholick, and Scrupulous) he may be suspected to be Conscien∣tiously Seditious.

Is it Ambition moves him?* 1.188 Ye shall then find him scatter∣ing his Donatives among the Souldiers. The Town has not Poor enow for him to Relieve, nor Rich enow for him to Ob∣lige. He carries his Hat in One Hand, and his Heart in the O∣ther. Here he Lends a Smile; There he Drops a Nod: with These Popular Incantations bewitching the Multi∣tude.

Is the Good of the Subject the Question? Who but He to Ease the People in Publick, of the Grievances which himself had Procured in Private; and in fine, no man so fit to be made a Iudge in Israel. To All This; he must be Daring in his Person, Close in his Purpose, Firm to his Dependencies, and rather stooping to the Ordinary People, than mixing with them, he'l do no good on't else.

To Proceed; let him be Watch'd,* 1.189 how he Employs his Power, and Faveur, whether (with Machiavel) more to the Advantage of his Master; or, to his own particular Benefit: and Then, whether (according to the Lord St. Albans) He applies himself more to his Masters Business, or to his Nature;

And rather to Advise him, than to feed his Humour. If he be found to study his Masters Passions, more than his Ho∣nour, and to Prefer his Private Interest, to his Duty, 'tis an Ill sign.* 1.190

* 1.191And 'tis no good one, if the Favourite grows Rich, and the Prince Poor: (especially if the Former be the Cause of the Latter) but it is much a worse, if he Presume to grasp Authority, as well as Treasure. It looks as if the suppos'd Equality of Friendship, had Drown'd the Order of Subjection.

* 1.192Take Notice next, of the Proportion betwixt the means he uses, and his suspected ends.

Does he Engross the Disposition of all Charges and Prefer∣ments? See in what Hands he Places Them. Does he endea∣vour to obstruct all Grants of Grace, and Benefit, that pass not through his own Fingers? That's Dangerous: For (says Sir Francis Bacon) [When the Authority of Princes, is made but an Accessary to a Cause, and that there be other Bands that Tye fa∣ster, than the Band of Soveraignty, Kings begin to be put almost out of Possession.

Mark then again what Kind of Persons he Promotes, and for what likely Reasons,* 1.193 whether for Money or Merit; Ho∣nesty, or Faction? Observe likewise the Temper and Quality of his Complicates and Creatures; and whether his Favours be Bounties, or Purchases. If the Former, Judge of his Design, by his Choice. If the Latter, 'tis but a Money-business; which Avarice meeting with an over-weening vanity of mind, is ma∣ny times mistaken for Ambition. In fine; what Ambition does at Hand, Corruption does at Length; nor is the Power of the One, more dangerous, than the Consequence of the Other.

Sub-section II. The Combination of divers Counsellors.

PRoceed we now, from the Greatness of One Counsellor, to the Combination of Divers: which (to vary the Phrase) is no other than a form'd Confederacy in the Councel against the Monarch. Wherein we shall briefly lay down; first, The Advantages of the Faction; the Method, next: And lastly, The Marks of it.

Their Advantages are great, and many; in Regard both

of their Priviledges, exempting them from Question;* 1.194 of their Power to offend their Enemies, and Protect their Friends; and in Consideration of their Opportunities to look into both hands, and play their Cards accordingly.

In their Method of proceeding,* 1.195 This is their Master-piece; not only to do all the hurt they can, under a colour of Good; but to Engage Persons of more Honesty, than Vnderstanding, in Offices, seemingly Serviceable, but Effectually Pernici∣ous to the Publick: By which Artifice, those that are Friends to the Government, do unwarily serve the Crafty Enemies of it; secretly undermining the Honour of the Prince, under Pretext of advancing his Profit; lessening his Power at Home, under the Disguise of making him more formidable Abroad; and where they cannot persuade an Interest, if it be consi∣derable, they will not stick to purchase it.

As to the rest, the Method is rather tacitly to Invite and Countenance a Sedition, than openly to Head it;* 1.196 and to En∣gage rather for it, then with it, till the hazard of the first on∣set be over. In truth, the first Essay of a Tumult is but a Tryal how the Ice will bear; and the Popular Faction in the Councel, is more concern'd, in case of a Disaster, how to bring their Friends Off, than to venture the leading them On, for fear of One. Whence it comes to pass, That by the Obli∣gation of Encouraging, and Preserving their Party, they are Cast upon a Scurvy Necessity of Discovering Themselves.

Their Marks are many; for they are known by their Haunts;* 1.197 by their Cabales; by their Debates; by their Domesticks; by their Favorites; and by their manner of Conversation, and Behaviour.

If there be any Schismatical Teacher that's Craftier, and Sly∣er then the Rest,* 1.198 you may be sure of my Lord's Coach at His Preachment: It gives a Reputation to the Conventicle, besides the Gracious Looks at Parting, that pass betwixt his Honour and the Brethren: which Enterchange, is but a secret way of Sea∣ling and Delivering a Conspiracy.

Look into their Cabales, and ye shall find them all of a Tribe, and Leaven; Close, Sedulous, and Vnited:* 1.199 Their dayly Meetings relishing of a Design, as being Compos'd rather for Councel, than Entertainment.

In their Debates,* 1.200 you'l know them by their Pleas, Shiftings, De∣layes, Extenuations, Distinctions, their, Frequent, and Industrious

Obstructions of Dispach in favour of Faction. By their Zealous Intercessions for the Enemies of the Prince, and their Coldness for his Friends; by their watchfullness to Seize all Opportunities of helping the Guilty, and of Surprizing the Innocent: by their in∣jecting of Snares, and Scruples, to Amuse, and Distract those that are for the Government, in Order to the Benefit of such as are against it; wherein it is worth a Note, that they all Vote the same way, and, without Question, to the same Purpose: for they shall sooner destroy a Loyal Subject upon a Calumny, than punish a Traytor Convict; and prosecute one man for Writing, or Saying, that it is possible for a Prince to have a Judas in his Counsell, when another shall scape unquestion'd, or perhaps be justifi'd, that calls his Soveraign a Tyrant; and defends the Murther of Kings.

They may be guess'd at likewise in some measure, by their Domesticks:* 1.201 Especially, by those of near Relation to Trust, Privacy, and Business; as Chaplains, Secretaries, &c. Nor is it enough to have it, like Master like Man, unless it be, like Lady like Woman too; for the pure strain must run quite Thorough, for fear of Tales out of School, and Discovering the Secrets of the Family. But This Rule is not Vniversal.

From their Favourites,* 1.202 much may be gather'd; first, from their Principles, and Abilities. And Then from the Frequen∣cy, Privacy, and Particularity of their Entertaining them.

The True Composition of a Confident fit for such a States∣man as we here speak of, is This.

He must be One that knows the Right, and Opposes it; for there is then less Danger of his Conversion,* 1.203 and Consequent∣ly, of Discovering his Patron. Let him be likewise a man of Sobriety, in his outward appearances; of Reputation with his Par∣ty; and well-grounded in the Niceties of the Controversie: he must be also a Master of his Passions, Peremptory in his mistakes; and (right or wrong) never without a Text at hand for his O∣pinions.

When a Person of This Character, repairs often to a Counsellour of State, a man may, without a Scandalum Magna∣tum, take the Boldness to suspect his business. But if to Frequency, be added Privacy, it makes the Matter worse; and These Instruments are commonly taken in by Owl-light, or at the Backdoor.

Nor is the Particularity they shew to this kind of Cattell

less Remarkable. Ye shall se a Factious Libeller, or Schisma∣tick taken into my Lords Closet, when a Person of Honour, and Integrity cools his heels in the Hall. One Lawyer admit∣ted, that has Got just as much by Betraying his Country, as A∣nother, (that is Rejected) has Lost by Serving it. Briefly; look through the Offices they dispose of, both Civil, and Military, and in the Persons you may see the Cause they Favour.

Another way of Detecting them, is from their Conversati∣on, and Behaviour.* 1.204 They take up other Looks, Phrase, Accent, Habit, Motion, Gesture, than their Neighbours. All which Together, are but a Certain Idiome, or Propriety, of the Faction.

Further; ye shall see a States-man, on the sodain, grow more Devout in Publick, then many an honest man is in Private; and Start from his Politicks, into Cases of Conscience. This Affords matter of Wonder, if not of Question: but observe him; and if he be more Scrupulous of Obeying the Law in some Cases, than he is of opposing it in Others, Pronunce him a Iugler.

So much for the Contrivers of Seditions.

Another sort there are of Honester Ill Subjects;* 1.205 a People, I mean, that Hate the Sedition it self, although they Love the Occasion of it. Than These, none make a Greater Conscience of Speaking Reverently of their Sovereign; yet none in shew more Careless what they make Others Think of him. Fiercer declaymers against Rebellion, there are not in the world; but do they Imagine that, it is no sin to Cause, what is so hor∣rid an Impiety to Commit? They'l say perchance, They do not Cause it; Yes, yes, there are that do. That is; there are In∣satiable Beggers, that suck like Leeches, till they Burst; Ask∣ing they very Bread out of the Mouths of Famishing Thousands; only to add unto their Private Superfluities, or furnish Orna∣ment for Luxe, and Vanity. Are not these Persons in a high Degree Accountable for the Effects of That Oppression?

If Those that follow Courts, would but Consider, how ma∣ny Snares beset the Thrones of Princes;* 1.206 what Envy waits upon their Trayn; how many Spyes upon the Actions of their Servants; They would tread warily. This is not yet to Blame all Courts, but where they are Vitious, or Corrupt, to shew the Desperate Events of those Disorders: whereof a General Poverty is not the least Considerable; and That ine∣vitably begets a General Discontentment.

But what's all This to a Sedition? Shall People Rebel because

they are Poor? No no, they should not; but what if they will do, what they ought not to do? [Let no Prince (says the Lord St. Albans) measure the Danger of Discontentments, by This; whether they be Just, or Unjust: for That were to Imagine People to be too Reasonable.] So that the Question is not, whe∣ther the Cause can warrant a Commotion; but whether pro∣bably it may Provoke one? And whether the Multitude will not rather Tumult, then Starve. It is not Here, Delirant Re∣ges, Plectuntur Achivi— but on the Contrary; Delirant A∣chivi, Plectuntur Reges; The Faults of Servants are Reveng'd upon the Heads of their Masters. But to Reason the Matter orderly, and by Degrees, take it Thus.

All men do naturally Covet Power; Partly for their Securi∣ty;* 1.207 and in Part, for Glory: not considering, that what Each Individual desires, All cannot enjoy; but finding Themselves Plac'd by Nature in a State of Equality, they are apt to Be∣lieve, that One man has as good a Title to Dominion as Ano∣ther: and from this Levelling opinion proceeds that Envy which we find Generally in the Common-People against their Governours.

Upon the same Grounds, they Contend for Liberty; and since they cannot Rule, they would at least be Free from the Restraint of Laws and Impositions. But this must not be, neither.

Why Then, let them but know the Bounds of their Sub∣jection, the Law, by which they are to be Govern'd. Yes, That they may; and when they are once enur'd, and wonted to the soft yoak of Political Order, and Authority; their fur∣ther Care is chiefly Profit, or Pleasure; and to provide them∣selves of such Conveniences, as to man's Life are either Necessa∣ry or Delightfull, and Here they Rest.

This is the summ of the Vulgar Politicks: Allow the People These Private Conveniences, and keep but the Priests, and Law∣yers, from Prating to them of Christian Liberty, and Fundamen∣tals; the Generality shall never trouble the State with Sediti∣ons: but he that strips them of their little Lavely-hood, rifles a Neast of Hornets. From whence ensues This double Mischief: A Great deal of Mony is drawn into a few hands; and a Great number of People are left without any at all: Two Hazards that might pose a wise Prince which rather to submit to.

As a General Poverty yields the most desperate matter for Sedition; so are the disorders of a Court the most likely means

to produce a General Poverty: and it is done, by Corruption. Begging, or Non-Payment of Debts.

Corruption is a great Dreyner; for he that Gives must Take; he that Buyes, will Sell.* 1.208 But the Influence which Corruption has, upon the Constitution and Morals of a Court, is more No∣torious; especially, if it begin Above; and in a place where the Honester Part is the Poorer. First, it facilitates the Intro∣ducing of a Faction; for he that designs to make a Party, shall be sure to out-bid him that only offers at an Office. Beside that it makes men Knaves in their own Defence; after a dear Bargain, to lick themselves whole again: and quenches the most generous Inclinations, by frustrating the bravest Acti∣ons; and conferring those Dignities, and Preferments upon unsuitable Persons for Mony, which are the Proper Rewards of Virtue, and Honour. In all these Transactions, the Prince is sold into the hands of his Enemies.

In short;* 1.209 Corruption does more Immediately expose a Mo∣narch, and Embroyle a Court; but Inordinate Begging does more Empoverish and distress a People: particularly, if the Request be preter-Legall, and pinching, either upon Trade or Tillage: in which cases the Benefit of a Single Person enters into Com∣petition with the Quiet, and Security of a Nation.

There is an Evill yet behind, which of all Evills, so trivial in appearance, is (possibly) of the most fatall,* 1.210 and malitious consequence: and That is, the Non-Payment of Debts: which not only draws upon a Court the most Violent of all Passions; (Envy, and Hatred) but upon Monarchy it self, a Popular Pre∣judice.

'Tis Dangerous, in regard both of the Quality, and Number of their Creditours; They are (for the most part) Citizens; Poor, and Many. They lie together in a Body, meet daily, conferring, and dispersing their Complaints, and Clamours: they Break at last, and Then they Tumult.

Sect. IV. The CAMP.

* 1.211THe Two Grand Interests of the Souldiery, are Pay, and Honour; that is such Honour as belongs to them as Sword-men. As for Instance; 'tis their Profession not to put up Affronts: They do not love to have their Vnder-Officers rais'd over their heads: New-Modelling, or Disbanding is a Thing they do not like; and a Publick disgrace is never to be forgiven.

By Ill Order in These Two Particulars, are commonly oc∣casion'd Mutinies, and Revolts: which become then most pe∣rillous when a disobliged General has a Purse to Engage a Discontented Army. We speak here, of an Army Employ'd by a Prince, as a Security against his own Subjects, which is quite another Case then against a Foreign Enemy; for the same Popular and Ambitious Humour, that in a Commander Abroad, is most Proper,* 1.212 and Necessary, is, on the Contrary, as Danger∣ous at Home. The safety of the State depending only upon the Insuperable Virtue, and Fidelity of such a Person.

Some Armies we have known to Prove Troublesome, and to Divide,* 1.213 upon Pretenses of Religion; but, a Holy War is a Contradiction; and a Story only fit to pass upon Women and Children. Upon the whole, it seems that an Army, within it self, and without any Separate Interest, may be troublesome upon These Three Accounts: Either Want of Pay; which causes a General Mutiny: or Disgrace; which (more Peculi∣arly reflecting upon such or such Officers, Troops, or Parties) provokes Animosities, Factions, and Revolts: or Ambition; which more directly attempts upon the Sovereignty. It may be also Hazardous, by reason of some Errour in the Constituti∣on of it. That is; if it be composed of Persons Ill-affected to the Government, it cannot rationally be expected, that it should labour to Preserve, what it wishes to Destroy.

But we are treating of Distempers acquir'd; and rather proceeding from the ill menage of an Army, than from the first Mis-choice, or founded in the Iudgment of it. Concern∣ing a Standing-Army, enough is said in the foregoing Chapter:

a word we'l add; It is in This Regard, an Affair of a Pee∣vish Quality; that either a General has too little Power to do his Masters Business, or enough to do his own.

As it is not safe for a Monarch, at any time, to entrust the Chief Officer of an Army, with so much Power,* 1.214 for fear of a Sedition, as may enable him to move a Rebellion. So is it a work of great Skill and Difficulty, so dexterously to Resume, or Ballance that over-grown Power, as to bring it under Com∣mand, without discovering such a Iealousie, as may Provoke him to abuse it. Let This suffice, as to the Disorders of an Army within it self.

Another Hazard is, lest it be Corrupted into a Dependence, upon some other Interest: into which Defection, it may be partly Driven by the Neglect or Vnkindness of the Prince, and partly Drawn by the Allurements of Profit and Reward.

Having spoken of the Mischief a Seditious Army may Doe; very briefly let us behold what Mischiefs a Vicious and Vn∣disciplin'd Army may Cause.

There never fails to be an Opposition betwixt the Civil, and the Military Power; and in like manner betwixt the Peo∣ple and the Souldiery. Whom nothing else can Reconcile but down-right Force and Necessity. So that the fairest State of a Nation over-aw'd by an Army of their own Country men, is an extorted Patience, accompany'd with Readiness to em∣brace any opportunity of working their Deliverance.

If at the best, the bare appearance of a Force be so Gene∣rally distastfull; what Havock will not the Licentious abuse of it Cause in a Kingdom? Especially in Populous Towns where One Affront Exasperates a Million, and 'tis not two hours work to destroy an Army.

A Royall Guard is of another Quality; and such it ought to be for Choice and Number;* 1.215 as both suitable to the Charge they undertake, for the Safety of The Sacred Person of their Prin∣ce, and sufficient to the Execution of it.

Sect. V. The CITY.

BY the City, we intend the Metropolis of a Kingdom; which, in many Respects, challenges a Place and Conside∣ration in This Chapter of Seditions; Particularly, in Regard of Inclination and Power.

* 1.216 There is not (Generally speaking) so fair an Intelligence between the Court, and City, as for the Common Good of Both were to be wish'd: and This proceeds Chiefly from a Pride of Blood,* 1.217 on the One side, and of Wealth, on the Other; breeding mutual Envy between them.

This Envy, by degrees, boyles up to an Animosity, and Then, Tales are Carried to the Monarch, of the insolence of the Citizens; and Stories, on the other side, to the People, of the Height, and Excesses of the Court; and Here's the Embryo of a Sedition. From Hence, each Party enters into a Cross Contrivement. These, how to tame the Boldness of the One; and Those, how to supplant the Greatness of the Other: Both equally unmindfull of their Inseparable Concerns: the Citizen, that he holds his Charter of the Bounty of his Prince; and the Courtier, that it is a flourishing Trade that makes a flou∣rishing Empire. By These Heats, is a City-Humour against the Court, emprov'd into a Popular Distemper against the King: and here's the Inclination of a Disorder'd City.

* 1.218As to their Power; they have Men, Money, and Arms, at an hour's warning; the very Readiness of which Provision makes it worth double the Proportion. Their Correspondencies are Commonly strong, and Firme; and their dependencies Numerous: for the Pretense, being Trade, and Liberty, hooks in all Places of the same Interest, to the same Faction: Beside That Gene∣ral device, (seeming Religion) that stamps the Cause, and Prints a GOD WITH US upon it. In fine; a Potent, and a Peevish City is a shrew'd Enemy.

* 1.219Their first work is to Possess the Vulgar with This Noti∣on, that in some Cases the Monarch is limited, and the Subject free: intending, that the Prince is bounded by the Law, and that the People are at Liberty, where the Law is

silent; and so likewise in points of Conscience. (By which Ar∣gument, the People Govern, where there is no express Law, and the King only where there is.)

Taking it once for Granted, that the Prince is Limited by the Law; (which Conscientiously he is; for in observing the Law; he does but keep his own word) They presently Conclude,* 1.220 that if the King transgress the Rule of his Power, he forfeits the Right of it: and that for such a Violation, he is account∣able to the People, for whose Behoof the Law was made. This is a Specious, but a Poysonous Inference, and rather adapted to a Mutinous Interest, than to a Peaceable, and candid Reason.

Let a Transgression be supposed; are there any Laws Paenal upon the Monarch? But there are none that warrant Tyranny. Right; but there are some yet that forbid Rebellion; and (without questioning the cause) that declare all Violences what∣soever, upon the Person, or Authority of the King, to be Crimi∣na Laesae Majestatis, or Treason. Are there any Laws now on the Other side, that depose Kings for Male-administration? If none, the Law being Peremptorily against the One, and only not for the Other: what does it, but constitute the Subject, in all cases, accountable for his Resistance, to the Sovereign;* 1.221 and Leave the Supream Magistrate, in all cases, to answer for his Mis-government to Almighty God? But let the Controver∣sie pass, for we are not here so much to enter into the True State of Matters, as to deliver their Appearances.

And now is the time to bring the Faylings,* 1.222 and Mis∣fortunes of the Prince upon the Stage; and by exposing him Naked before the Multitude, to make his Person Cheap, and his Government Odious to his People. Which they Effect, by certain Oblique Discourses from the Press, and Pulpit; by Lamentable Petitions, craving Deliverance from such and such Distresses of Estate; or Conscience: and These they Print, and Publish; converting their (pre∣tended) supplications for Relief, into bitter Remonstrances of the Cruelty and Injustice of their Rulers.

By These wiles are the Vulgar drawn to a dislike of Mo∣narchy; and That's the Queue to a discourse of the Advan∣tages of a Popular Government. (The next step to the De∣sign of introducing it) There's none of This or That they cry at Amsterdam: and in short; from these Grudgings of Mu∣tiny;

These Grumblings against Authority, they slide Insensi∣bly into direct, and open Practises against it. Alas! what are These Motions, but the sparkling of a Popular Disposition, now in the Act of Kindling; which only wants a little Blow∣ing of the Cole, to Puff up all into a Flame?

From the Leading, and Preparatory Motives to Sedition, now to the more Immediate and Enflaming Causes of it: which are reducible either to Religion, Oppression, Privileges, or Poverty.

Subsection I. Seditions which concern Religion.

* 1.223THose Seditions which concern Religion, referr either to Doctrine, or Discipline: Haeresie, or Schism. The For∣mer, is a Strife (as they say) for a better, or a worse: a Con∣test betwixt the Persuasion of the People, and the Religion of the Government, in matter of Faith; and tending either to Overthrow the One, or to Establish the Other. In This Case, the People, may be in the Right, as to the Opinion, but never so as to justifie the Practice: for Christianity does not dissolve the Order of Society. To Obey God, rather than Man, is Well: Let us Obey him then; in not Resisting those Powers to which his Ordinance hath Subjected us.

Touching This, (with the Brethren's Leave) I take it to be the more Venial-Mortal Sin of the Two. That is; the Rebellion of Haeresie,* 1.224 is less unpardonable, than That of Schism: in regard first, that the Subject of the Difference is a matter of greater Import: Secondly, 'tis not Impossible, but the Mis-per∣suasion may be founded upon Invincible Ignorance. I do not say that I had rather be an Arrian, than a Calvinist; but I a∣verr, that he is the foulest Rebell, that for the Slightest Cause, upon the Least Provocation, and against the Clearest Light, Murthers his Sovereign.

* 1.225Those Seditions, which are mov'd upon account of Schism, are commonly a combination of Many against One; of Errour against Truth: and a Design, that strikes as well at the Civil Power, as the Ecclesiastick.

This being a Subject which both in the first Section of This Chapter, and Else-where, is sufficiently discours'd upon; we shall rather address our selves to the Means (Peculiar to a City) of comforting, and aiding these unquiet agitations,* 1.226 as more properly the Business of our present Argument.

Great Towns have first the Advantage of Great Numbers of People, within a Small Compass of Place; where,* 1.227 with much Ease, and Privacy; Those of the Faction may hold their full, and frequent Meetings, Debate, Contrive, nay, and Execute with all Convenience. For when the Plot is Laid; the Man∣ner, and the Time, Appointed: there's no more trouble for the Rendezvous; the Partie's Lodg'd already, the Town it self being the most Commodious Quarter. 'Tis in respect of these favourable concurrences, that men of Turbulent, and Factious Spirits, rather make choice of Populous Cities to Practise in.

Another Hazard may arise from the Temper of the Inhabi∣tants, as well, as from the Condition of the Place; and from the very Humour, and Application of the Women, in a notion distinct from That of the Men.

From the Temper of the Inhabitants; first, as partaking u∣sually of the Leaven of their Correspondents;* 1.228 whom we find very often, both Famous for Trade, and Notorious for Schism. (But Men are Generally so good-Natur'd, as to think well of any Reli∣gion they Thrive under.)

Further; their Employment being Traffick, or Negotiating for Benefit; and their Profession being to Buy as Cheap as they can, and to Sell, as Dear: without any measure between the Risque, or Disbursment; and the Profit: they are commonly better Accountants, than Casuists; and will rather stretch their Religion to their Interest, than shrink their Interest to their Religion.

They have again, so superstitious a Veneration for the Iu∣stice of Paying Mony upon the Precise Hour; that they can ve∣ry hardly believe any man to be of the right-Religion, that Breaks his Day. And observe it, let a Prince run himself deep in Debt, to his Imperial City, they shall not so much Cla∣mour at him for an ill Pay-Master, as upon a Fit of Holiness, suspect him for an Heretick, or Idolater: Proposing a Tumult, as the ready way to Pay themselves; and That I reckon as the first step into a Rebellion.

Now, how the Women come to be concern'd? That

first: and Then; why the City-Dames more then Other?

It is the Policy of all Cunning Innovatours, when they would put a Trick upon the World in matter of Religion,* 1.229 which they desire may be Receiv'd with Passion, recommended with Zeal, and Dispersed with Deligence, to begin (with the strong∣er Sex, though the Weaker Vessel) that excellent Creature, Woman. And This Course, they take out of These Conside∣rations.

First, as That Sex is Naturally scrupulous, and Addicted to Devotion;* 1.230 and so, more susceptible of delusive Impressions, [ 1] that bear a face of Piety.

[ 2] Secondly, as it is too Innocent, to suspect a Deceipt, and too Credulous, to Examine it; so is it probably not crafty enough to Discover it.

[ 3] Thirdly, Women are supposed, not only to Entertain what they Like, with more Earnestness of Affection, but also to im∣part what they know, with a Greater Freedom of Communica∣tion: which proceeds from a Particular propensity in That Gra∣cious Sex, to enter into a strict Intelligence, concerning Matters Curious, and Novell.

[ 4] Fourthly, They are as well the Best Advocates, as the Freest Publishers.* 1.231 Get them but once engaged, and at next word all their Children are to be taught short-hand, and new Cate∣chisms; the Table shall be blest in a Tune; not the Heel of a Lark; no, not so much as a Prune in the White-Broth, shall scape without a Particular Benediction. And Then, the Wrought Cushion;* 1.232 the Damask Napkin; the Best Room, and the First Cut at the Table, are reserved for the Adored Genius of the Family. The Good Man of the House, shall not presume to Close his Eyes, without an Opiate, (to make it English) accord∣ding to the Directory; and when he opens them again, next day, 'tis odds, he finds his wakefull Bedfellow Shifting her Lin∣nen, and Preparing for a Mornings Exercise. This Reverend Wight has commonly some Skill in Physick too; enough to Comfort a Professing Sister that Keeps her Bed, (for grief no doubt) because her Lord (perhaps) is call'd aside by State, or Business.

Nor does The Pious Matron Confine her Bounteous Dispen∣sations within the Circle of her Private Family; but with an Over-flowing Charity, reaches a helping hand to all the Members of the Distressed Brother-hood; and (like a Christian to the

very Letter) Layes every thing in Common. These are the Early and Late Advocates; the warm Sollicitresses; What Husband would not Glory to see his Wife, and Fortune so dispos'd of?

Let not some few Mistakes persuade the world yet, that Woman is [not,] of all Creatures, the most accomplish'd, and the best dispos'd to the End she was made for.

That Women are (in General) the fittest Agents of all O∣thers, for a Religious Errour, to me seems past a Question: Now; why a City-Dame, is for That Purpose, the fittest In∣strument even of all Sorts of Women.

First, her Employment's Little; she keeps much at Home; and her dead Leisures, are, beyond doubt, not absolutely Thoughtless. Is not her Mixture Sociable, as That of other Mortals? Phansie her Solitary Entertainment now. Does not she wish to see, and to be seen, as well as other Women? Nay, does she not Contrive too, how to Compass it? Playes there are none perhaps, at hand; Festivals come but seldome.

While shee's Thus casting, How and How; in Steps the Tempter; dreams out an Hour or Two in Prologue, and at last, happily hits her Humour; asks her what Church she goes to? and invites her to a Lecture. Away she goes;* 1.233 enters her self a Member of his Congregation; never to be Reclaimed, and so Farewell she.

After all This, let me profess, I take the better sort of Ci∣tizens, for an Intelligent, Frank, and Sober People; nor do I find more Prudence, Modesty, Virtue, then under That Deno∣mination. Yet is it not to be Expected, that so Vast a Multi∣tude should be without some Loose Examples. And I divide the Blame, even There too, betwixt an Idle Course of Life, and the Alluring Artifice of their Seducers. But this I stick to: A Schismatical Clergy infects the Women; They the City; and a Schismatical City destroyes a Kingdom.

Sub-section II. Oppression.

OPpression provokes Sedition, many waies; and many waies it is Procur'd, even by the most Seditious Them∣selves; with Express end, that it may provoke Sedition.

The Haughty, and Imperious Rudeness of a Churlish Officer, that without either Proof,* 1.234 or Hearing, Law, or Reason, hand over head Condemns and Punishes: (only perchance to Vaunt his Power,) This is a Boldness, that Reflects upon the Safety and the Honour of his Master; rendring both the Minister hated, and the Prince suspected.

Vnlimitted Protections, Irregular and Heavy Taxes, Billetting and Free-quartering of Souldiers; The Denyall of Equal Right, &c. Stir up Seditious Humours in a City. But These are down-right Provocations.

* 1.235There are that go a cleanlyer way to work, that squeeze the People, under Colour of serving the King; winding up the Pin of Authority, till they Crack the very strings, by which That and Subjection are tack'd together. They undo all, by Overdo∣ing; and under an humble shew of holding the Stirrup, till the Prince seats himself, they draw so hard they turn the Saddle: or if he needs a Lift to help him Vp, they'l give him one, but such a One, shall cast him Over.

In fine; what ever may be Plausible for the present; fatall in the Consequence;* 1.236 wherein the Promoters may either seem Innocent, or not appear at all; and a Publick Obloquy rest upon the Soveraign; This is a Device to do Their Business.

Is there any Colourable fear of a Sedition? Their Counsell will be then, to raise such a Force, as in all likely-hood will cause a Rebellion. Are the Prince's Coffers full? Occasions will be sought to Empty Them; by Breaking with One Interest, Wedding Another. A Thousand Remedies there are for that Sur-charge of Treasure. When they have drawn the Monarch dry, they know he must be re-supply'd; and they know what a Peevish task it is, to fix Regality upon a new Bottome.

As their first Aime was to Provoke Expence, that he might Want; it will be now Their work, in such manner to sollicite

his, Supply, that he shall suffer more by the Ill Method of it, then Gain by the Recruit. Briefly, if they can Effect, that what Themselves call a Supply, the Generality may understand to be an Oppression (and so They wish it Vnderstood) The City Cla∣mours first; and Popular Tumults, are but the Forlorn to a Re∣bellion.

Not that either Force, or Cruelty,* 1.237 can ever discharge a Sub∣ject of his Allegeance; Nay, should his Prince command one of his Armes for Dogs-meat; he were a Traytor, should he yet refuse to serve his Master with the other.

Sub-section III. Privileges.

A Third Particular of no small Force upon the Genius of a City, is what concerns their Privileges;* 1.238 whereof they Principally are Tender. First, in points of Trade, and Com∣merce: Secondly, in Affairs of Order, and Custome, relating to the Counsell, and Government of the City: Thirdly, in Matters of Personal Freedom, and Advantage.

Any Empeachment in the point of Trade, they take hain∣ously; as Disappointing at once,* 1.239 the very Purpose of their Incorporations, the Hopes of their Well-being; and the main Business of their Lives. In this Respect, they are many times so Delicate, as not to distinguish between Benefits of Grace, and Rights of Privilege: clayming a Title to Those Ad∣vantages which they hold only by Favour.

They are likewise Subject to forget,* 1.240 that even their clear∣est Immunities are but Dependent, and Precarious: and they had need be minded, that to believe them Other, is to Forfeit them. For it implyes a Disacknowledgement of the Soveraign Power; which Mistake being once set a foot, obliges the Prince to Resume, for the Safety of the whole, such Indulgen∣ces as were only Granted for the behoof of a Part.* 1.241 To This he is Ty'd by evident Reason of State, and by Political Equity; both as a Wise Prince, and as a Pater Patriae, a Father of his Country. Wherefore away with These Dividing Niceties, since neither Prince, nor People can be Secure, but by Agree∣ment. What can a Single Monarch do without the Obedience, Love, and Service of his People? Or what becomes of a Di∣stracted

Multitude, without a Head to Govern Their Confusi∣ons? But This (in the words of a most Ingenious Person) is a Text upon which the Wise part of the world has used in vain to Preach to the Fools.

Since so it is, that the Vulgar will neither be Taught by Experience, nor persuaded by Reason, we are to take for Grant∣ed, that some Grievances lead to Seditions, almost as Orderly, as Natural Causes to their Effects, the Multitude ever siding with Interest, against Virtue.

The Liberty of Exporting Native Commodities raw, and un∣wrought; and of Importing (possibly) the same Materials in Ma∣nufacture, is a Matter of Evill Relish, and of Dangerous Conse∣quence. So likewise is the Employment of Strangers, where the Natives want Work; and the advancing of Forraign Trade, to the Sterving of it at home.

Concerning the Other two Particulars, before mentioned, the One Relating to the Frame of a City-Government, the O∣ther, to their Personal Privileges; it shall suffice to Note, that an Encroachment upon either of them, Endangers a Sedition.

Sub-section IV. Poverty.

* 1.242THe Last, and the most Irresistible incentive to Sedition in a City, is Poverty. That is, a Poverty proceeding from Misgovernment. Not but that Want, upon what account so∣ever is bad enough: Whether from Dearth, Losses by Fire, or, Storme; Piracies, Banquerupts; the Ravages of Warr, &c. Yet Here, there's something in the Fate, the Accident, or Manner, of the Calamity, to allay the Anguish of it. Men Quarrel not with Providence for ill Seasons; nor with the Winds, the Waves, or Flames, because of Wracks, or Conflagra∣tions. To suffer by Pirates, or Banquerupts, is but the Chance of Traffick, and the Extremities of Warr are Common Injuries. But where a Pinching Poverty Seizes a Populous City, and from a Cause too that's within the Reach of Malice,* 1.243 or Revenge; That State's concern'd betimes to look to the Disorder.

The Immediate Cause of This Necessity among the Common sort is want of Work, which proceeds from the decay from Trade, arising chiefly from a General Scarcity of Mony;

which may be Imputed to One or more, of These Ensuing Reasons.

First, The Insatiate Corruption of Rapacious, and Great Offi∣cers; in whose Coffers, as in the Grave,* 1.244 Monies are rather Buried, then laid up. Nay, as in Hell it self (I might have said) for they are as Bottomless; and of the Treasure that lies There Condemn'd, the Doom's almost as Irreversible.

These Private Hoards cannot chuse but produce a Publick Penury; when That Wealth, which would suffice to Employ,* 1.245 and Relieve Thousands, that either Beg for want of Work, or Sterve for want of Bread, is drawn into so narrow a Compass. And yet in This suppos'd Extremity of Affairs, I make a Doubt, whether is more Miserable, the Needy, or the Oppressour?

Can any Composition more certainly destroy a Nation,* 1.246 then a Concurrence of Power, Pride, Avarice, and Injustice, in the same Persons? But Then again, when the Storme comes; These are the Ionasses, that by the Rabble will be first cast O∣ver-board, to save the Vessell. And This they cannot but forethink, and Tremble at; at least, if ever they get Leisure for a Sober Thought. And let them Look which way they Please; Backward, Forward, Round-about, Vpward, Downward,* 1.247 Inward, they are beset with Objects of Terrour, and self-af∣frighted, from the Glass of their own Consciences.

Behind them, they see dreadfull Presidents of Corrupt Mini∣sters, thrown from their Slippery,* 1.248 and ill-menag'd State of great∣ness: Torne by their Enemies; scarce Pitty'd by their Friends; the Mirth of their own Creatures, and the mere Mockery of Those that Rais'd them.

Forward, they find Themselve; upon a Precipice, and in great hazard to encrease the Number of those sad Presidents.* 1.249

If they look Round-about them, they are Encompass'd with the Cryes of Widdows, and of Orphans; whose Husbands,* 1.250 or whose Fathers, lost their Lives, in the Defence, (perhaps) of their Prince, and Country. With These, are Mingled the Faint Groans of Sterving Wretches in the Last Agonies, whose Modesty chose rather to Die silent, then Complaining; and to abide the worst Effects of Want, rather then tell the more In∣tollerable Story of it. But This to Them, is not so much, as to perceive Themselves at Bay amids a Snarling Multitude.

In short; Above them, there's an All-seeing Eye,* 1.251 an Vn∣changeable

Decree,* 1.252 and an Incorruptible Iudge, that Over-looks, and Threatens Them. Below them, Hell: (or rather 'tis With∣in Them; an Accusing Conscience) If This be their Prospect, how Deplorable is their Condition!

* 1.253Are not Their Pillows stuff'd with Thornes? Or when they Venture at a Nap, do they not Dream of Robberies, and Sediti∣ons? Whom, or What do they not fear? Where is't they think Themselves Secure? Is not Their Table Spread with Snares? Does not Every Bribe look like a Bait; Every Servant, like a Spy; Every Strange Face, like somewhat that's worse? And what are their Near Friends, but either Conscious Partakers, or Dangerous, and Suspected Witnesses? They find Them∣selves Arraign'd by the Preacher; Condemn'd by the Iudge; and Strangl'd by the Executioner: For being Guilty of the Crime, and Worthy of the Punishment They cannot but Apply the Process to Themselves, and in Imagination, bear the Male∣factour Company, even from the Pulpit, to the Gibbet.

Add to all This, the Sting of an Incessant, Restless Iealousie: Not a Lock, Whisper, Hint, or Action, but they suspect Themselves the Subject of it. The Holy Text it self, where it Reproves Their Sins, Sounds like a Libell to Them. Nay, were This silly, Innocent Description of them, but in a Tongue which any man Concern'd could understand; some of Their Ears would Tingle at it.

A General Scarcity of Mony, may, in the Second Place, arise from Taxes,* 1.254 and That either Immediately, in Respect of the Burthen; or Consequentially, in Respect of the Occasion; the Inequality; the Manner of Imposing, or Levying Them; or the Subject Matter it self of the Tax.

Touching the Burthen, and Occasion: It Properly belongs to Those in Power to Judge of it, as well how much, as to what end? So in the Rest, The People are likewise to Subject Them∣selves to such Determinations as their Superiours hold Conve∣nient. Only in case of an Vndue Authority imposing, or some Illegal Course of Levying Taxes, there may be some Allowan∣cies; which to proportion to their Various Instances, is nei∣ther for This Place, nor for my Meaning.

That Subjects are to Obey Lawful Commands, without dis∣puting the Reasons of Them,* 1.255 is beyond Question. Yet is't not in the Power of Humane Nature, to keep men from Sur∣mising, and from Guessing at them. We'l Grant ye too,

that in some Cases, some People, will in some Sort, do some Things as they ought to do. Yet we are where we were; that is, they will be Guessing still.

If Taxes follow quicker, and run higher then Ordinary; they cry: so much? and the next Question's Why? ('Tis true, they should not Aske, but who can hinder them?)

Is it for the Honor or Safety of the Prince? 'Tis Conse∣quently for the Publick Good; and he deserves to be expell'd Humane Society, that narrowly prefers his Little dirty Interest, before so Sacred, and so great a Benefit.

A Third, is the Inequality of Taxes; the Over-pressing of any One Party. As if the Burthen lies heavyer upon the Ci∣ty, then Country; upon the Gentry, then Yeomanry, &c. If upon the City, they call it Spite; if upon the Country, Oppres∣sion. And in fine; fall the Disproportion where it fall can, it breeds ill bloud: for That Weight breaks the Back of any One Interest, which evenly dispos'd, would seem no heavy Load, upon the Shoulders of All. Ferre quam sortem patiuntur Om∣nes, Nemo recusat. The Consequence of This Inequality, is a Generall Ruine, but piece-meal, and One Part after Another.

Touching the Manner of Imposing, or Levying, we waive That; and pass to the Subject Matter of the Tax. (A point (how little soever reguarded) scarce less Considerable then the Totall Amount of it.)

If the Device be Novell; the People shy and ticklish: if there be Factions Stirring, and the Prince not absolutely Master, better raise Thrice the Value in the Rode of Levies, then hazzard the Experiment of a By-way. 'Tis Machiavell's advice concerning Sanguinary Cruelties; where Cruelty is Ne∣cessary, do it at once; or at least, seldome as possible. But then be sure to follow it with Frequent Acts of Clemency; by which Means, you shall be fear'd for your Resolution, and be∣lov'd for your Good-Nature: whereas a Little, and Often, Ter∣rifies Less, and Disquiets people much more, imprinting Jea∣lousies of further Inconveniencies; so that they know not what to Trust to.

Most Certain it is, that as Many petty Injuries deface the Im∣pression of One Great Benefit; so in like manner do Many slight Benefits deface the Impression of One Great Injury; the Last Act sinking deepest. For 'tis from Thence, Men Measure their expectation of the Future; and as they look for Good, or Bad, they are Peaceable or Troublesome,

* 1.256Wherefore, as it is Duty to do Well always, so 'tis Wis∣dom to do Well last; and where a Pressure cannot be avoided, not to leave standing (so near as may be) any Memorial of it: Least [When your Children shall ask their Father in time to come, saying, What mean you by these Stones? &c.—

The ways of Supplying Princes are Various, according to their Several Interests, Practices, Powers, and Constitutions. Not to lose my self in Particulars, One General shall serve for all.

It behoves a State to be very wary, how they Relieve a Present need upon the Foundation of a Lasting Inconvenience: for though in some Extremities, there is no Choice; yet it very rarely happens, that a Prince is the Better for the Mo∣ney, where he is the worse for the President. Sir Thomas Rowe in a Speech at the Council-Table, 1640. (directed to the dashing of a Project, tending to the Enfeebling of the Coyn, (as he Phrases it) Cites the Lord Treasurer Burleigh, and Sir Thomas Smith, giving their Opinion to Queen Elizabeth; in these words: That it was not the short end of Wits, nor starting holes of Devises, that can sustain the Expence of a Mo∣narchy, but sound and solid Courses. Horace his [Rem facias, Rem,—Si possis, Rectè, si non, quocunque modo Rem] will not serve the turn.

'Tis sharply said of Sir Francis Bacon; [That the Wisdom of all these Latter Times in Princes Affairs,* 1.257 is rather fine Deli∣veries, and shiftings of Dangers and Mischiefs, when they are near; than solid and grounded Courses to keep them aloof.] (But says he again) [It is the Solaecism of Power to think to Com∣mand the End, and yet not to endure the Mean.] These are the Sleights, the Ill-husbandry of Government: through which Mistakes, insensibly, a Great Revenue moulders away, and yet the State never out of Debt.

* 1.258Excessive Building is another Cause of General Soarcity; for it leaves the Country too Thin, and Over-peoples the City: Enhansing the Rate, and Consuming the Means of Living. It wasts the Nobility and Gentry; It Impoverishes also, and Disobliges the Populacy: (All that is got in the Country, being spent in the City) beside the hazardous disproportion betwixt the Head and the Body.

One Reason of this Scarcity, may be from some Defect in the Law it self. as where sufficient Provision is not made

for strict and peremptory payment upon Bond. Men will not part freely with their Mony, where they may be put off by Shifts and Delayes, and driven to a Vexatious Suit to get it In again.

Another great Inconvenience proceeds from a General Grasping at more Trade then they can Master: which causes many Failings one upon the Neck of another.

To what's already said,* 1.259 (not to be endless) we'l only add Two Causes more. The One, is the deceipt, and Knavery of Artizans, and Trades-men; who for a Private Gain betray the Interest of the Publick; and invert the Ballance of Trade, by such Abusive Manufactures, as are neither Saleable abroad, nor Ser∣viceable at Home, which both necessitates the Importation of For∣raign Commodities, and hinders the Issue of Native: beside the Treble Charge; their Dearness, and their little Vsefull∣ness consider'd.

We shall Conclude with Pride: which were't in nothing else but what's expended upon Guildings, Gold and Silver Lace, and Forraign Curiosities of Needle-work, would not be inconsiderable. But where 'tis General, and extends both to all Sorts of Superfluities, and all Degrees of Persons; That Ci∣ty goes by the Post to Ruine: for Pride, is not only the Fore-runner of Destruction, and the Cause of it; but the Loud, and Crying Provoker of it.

Sect. VI. The COUNTRY.

THat Interest which contributes the Least to a Sedition, and suffers the most by it, is That of the Country: which is properly comprised under Tillage, and Pasture. For I reckon all Populous Places, (whether Towns or Villages) that subsist by steady Traffick, or Handy-crafts, to be no other then Dependencies upon the Metropolis; which is usually, That in Proportion to the Kingdom, which the Principal Ci∣ty, of every Province, is to the Other Parts of it.

This Interest seldom or never Heads a Sedition upon it's own Account; and when it does engage, under Protection possibly of the next strong Hold, or in favour of some neighbouring,

and Seditious Market-Town, we do not find much hurt the Country-man does, so long as the Sword, and Plough are me∣naged by the same Hand. If they forsake their Husbandry, and turn Souldiers;* 1.260 they fall under another Notion. But in short; let the Cause be what it will, and the event of a Warr what it can; They are sure to be undone by it: wherefore They may well be Friends to Peace, to whom Warr is so great an Enemy.

* 1.261Is there a Warr commenced? Their Cariages must wait upon the Army, Their Provisions feed them: Their Persons attend them, yes, and Their Contribution Pay Them. Their Teams must serve the State; Their Wives, and Girls, the Souldiery: They must be Mounting Dragoons, when they should be Plowing; Lugging their Beans and Bacon to the Head-Quarter, when they should be Sowing: and at last, scarce a Lame Iade to get in that little Harvest, which the wild Troops have left them: Their Cattel are Driven away by one Party to day, Their Corn taken by another to Morrow▪ and when they are Throughly Plunder'd, because they had something; they must afterward expect to be Beaten too, be∣cause they have Nothing.

Are not These fair Encouragements to make Husbandmen Se∣ditious? And yet, This Interest is several waies made use of to Promote Sedition. Particularly, by Three sorts of Peo∣ple; The Discontented Nobleman, the Rich Churle; the Stiff, and Contentious Free-born-Subject.

* 1.262A Great Person may become Weary of the Court, and withdraw into the Country, out of divers unquiet Considera∣tions: Out of Ambition, Pride, or Revenge.

If his Trouble be Ambition,* 1.263 his Course is to strengthen himself by Popularity, and make a Party, by spending his Revenue in a Bountifull, and Open Hospitality upon the Peo∣ple: which is the most Winning and the most spreading of all Obligations. His Iades, his Kites, his Currs, are free to all co∣mers: his Family is the whole World; and his Companions are the Wits, and the best of Good-fellows.

If his Retirement be out of Pride as chusing rather to be the first Person in the Country,* 1.264 then the Second or Third at Court: His business is Popularity too, though perhaps not Aiming so high (for there are a sort of People, insufferably haughty in their Looks, Garbe, and Language; that have not

Courage enough to be Ambitious) This Man's attended by the best Parasites that are to be had for Mony.

The Third Distemper is Revenge;* 1.265 and That's the worst of the Three: In Ambition, there's somewhat that's Noble. Pride indeed, is a Base, and Abject Vice, (that is; a Cowardly Pride: Nay 'tis at best, but a Simple Sin) But Revenge is Black, and Diabolical. Let it proceed whence it will. Whe∣ther from some Affront, Repulse, Neglect; Nay, a Wry Look, or a Mistaken Hint raises this Devill.

This is a Humour now of another Complexion: Morose, Vnpleasant, and rather watchfull to Emprove an Opportunity of Mischief, then Laborious to prepare it. In the House of a Person haunted with This Fury, you shall find Throngs of Si∣lenc'd Ministers, Discharg'd Officers, Crop-ear'd Schismaticks, Broken Citizens, &c.

These are the Dangerous Malecontents, whose Differing In∣clinations of Temper are no hinderance to their Vnity of De∣sign, where the Safety of the Prince and Government is the Question.

Next to This Discontented Nobleman, Follows the Rich Churle: which is a Creature,* 1.266 that opposing Wealth to Digni∣ty, becomes the Head of the People, for his Sauciness of bear∣ing up against the Power, and Nobility of the Court. It is scarce to be Imagined, The Interest of this Chuff in a Popular Scufflle; especially, if he has gotten his Estate by a Rusticall, and Plodding Industry: for Then the Vulgar Reckon him as One of their Own Rank, and support him, as the Grace, and Dignity of their Order.

We come now to the Stiff, and Contentious Free-born-Sub∣ject: the Queintest, and the Sharpest Youth of the Three.* 1.267 He'l tell ye to a hair, upon what Point, Prerogative becomes Tyranny: How far a Subject may promote a Rebellion, and yet be honest himself, and Cleave the very Atome, that divides the Rights of King and Subject. Does any Minister of State, or Iustice pass his Commission, but the tenth part of a Scru∣ple? he cryes, 'Tis Arbitrary, Illegal, and an Encroachment upon the Birth-right of a Free-born-People. Let him be Que∣stion'd, and the Matter Scann'd, here's his Dilemma. Either by Carrying the Cause, he Iustifies, and Puffs up the People; or by Suffering for it, he Enrages them: but still Obliging them both waies; the One way as their Champion, and the Other, as their Martyr.

Upon the Summ of the Matter, That Government must be Carried very even, which These Instruments, in Combi∣nation, shall not be able to discompose.

Touching the Common Sort; it is so little in their Power to Embroyl a Kingdom, and so much less their Interest to do it, that This Little is enough said concerning Them; setting aside the Influence they have upon the Subject we are now entring upon.

Sect. VII. The Body Representative.

THe Seaventh and Last Interest we are to Treat of, is the Body Representative, which is but One Grand Interest made up of all the Rest; and as the Whole stands well, or ill-affected to the Government, so commonly does That. Yet it falls out sometime, that the Diligence, and Stickling of a Faction gets the Start of a General Inclination. It would ask an Age, to reckon up all the Inconveniencies which may arrive from the Evill Composition of This Assembly: but so strict an ac∣count will not be Necessary, in regard that the Prince may, at his Pleasure, Remedy all, by Dissolving them.

One great Defect, is that in many places they have no Sta∣ted Rule how far their Cognisance extends; No Measure of their Privileges: through which Default, more Time is spent, and too too oft, more Passion Stirr'd, about the bounds of Their Authority, then the main Business of their Meeting. Beside the desperate Influence of This Mysterious Incertainty, upon the Prince, and Publick: Under which Colour, nothing so Seditious, but it may both be Introduc'd and Protected. Sup∣pose a Notion in the Assembly directly against the Crown: The Prince takes Notice of it; and demands Reason for it. Is't not a fine Reply, that to deny Liberty of Speech; to take Notice of any Thing in Debate; to Question any One Mem∣ber without the Leave of the Rest, is a Breach of Privilege.

The Representative we here speak of, answers (the nearest of any) to the House of Commons in England; which Resem∣blance will much facilitate the task we are now upon, having only to look back into the History of Charles the Martyr, to find the Greatest Mischiefs, and the Foulest Crimes which such

a Convention in disorder may be capable of: not medling with the Names of Persons, but contenting our selves to discover the Arts, Grounds, and Occasions of Seditions, without re∣proaching the Authors of them.

The Dangerous Mixture of a Representative, we may di∣vide into these Three Parties: The Designers of Mischief;* 1.268 the Permitters of it; and the Incompetent Iudges of it: whose Failings are either of Commission, Omission, or Ignorance.

To begin with the First.* 1.269 The Designers are either the Am∣bitious Heads of the Faction, that aim at Power, as well as Profit, in the Subversion of the Government; or such Dependencies, as they can Engage by Menace, Flattery, fair Pretences, Money, or Preferment. These in their Several Places, promote the same Seditious Interest, and every man knows his Station.

They have their Contrivers, their Speakers, their Sticklers, their Dividers, their Moderators, and their Blanks:* 1.270 (their I-and NO-men) by which Method and Intelligence, all De∣bates are managed to the Advantage of the Party and Occa∣sion. They know when to Move, when to Press, when to Quit, Divert, Put off, &c. and they are as Skilful in the man∣ner of Moulding their Business, as they are Watchful for the Season of Timing it. Add to this Agreement and Con∣federacy of Design, their Zeal and Earnestness of Intention; and what will not an Indefatigable Industry, joyned to these Emprovements of Order and Counsel, be able to accomplish? [The Lower and Weaker Faction is the firmer in Conjunction (says Sir F. Bacon) and it is often seen, that a few, that are Stiff, do tire out a Greater Number, that are more Moderate.]

Yet to the Miracles that are wrought by Forecast and As∣siduity, there is still requisite a Matter predispos'd,* 1.271 and fit to work upon: and that's the Dress, or Cleanly Couching of the Project. 'Tis not at first dash to attempt the Person of the King, but the Multitude must by Degrees, be made sensible of the Faults of his Ministers; and Instructed to clamour a∣gainst Oppression and Profaneness. Why should a Free-born Subject be Press'd with Taxes and Obedience, or a Christian Libertine be ty'd to worship by a Set-form? Is it not against the Fundamentals of a Mixt Monarchy, (That ridiculous supposition) for the Supream Magistrate to Impose upon his Co-ordinate Subjects? Or, where is it commanded in the Bible, for people to Kneel at the Communion, or to stand up at Gloria Patri?

These are sore Grievances indeed, and now the Humour's ripe for Petitions to the Senate;* 1.272 which being both Procur'd and Fram'd by a Caball of the Senators themselves, cannot fail of being acceptable to the Faction: who by this Arti∣fice, get the Credit of being taken for the proper Arbitra∣tors of all Differences betwixt King and People, through which Mistake, the Popular Representative becomes both Party and Iudge, and it is then no hard matter to Guess what will be∣come of the Prerogative.

By making the most of all Complaints, and the worst of all Abuses; they bespeak a Compassion for the One side, and they provoke an Odium toward the Other: which Amplification renders exceedingly Necessary the Remedy of a Through-Reformation.

The Subject is to be Free in One Point, and the Monarch limited in Another. These Courts are to be Abolish'd, Those Counsellors to be remov'd, &c.— And in fine, when the Prince has yielded, till they want Matter for Complaint, their Fears are not less Clamorous and Important, than were their Complainings. Of which undutiful and unlimited Distem∣per, this is the certain Issue; from one Desire they proceed to another, till the Prince, to secure their Jealousie, has par∣ted with all possibility of Preserving Himself.

This is their Course, where they find the Government already in Disorder; but how to Introduce that Disorder, is quite another Point of Cunning.

They are here onely to procure those Grievances, for which they are afterward to provide Remedies, and to cast the State into a Disease, that with better Pretense they may give it Physick; Siding with the Prerogative against the Peo∣ple, in the first place, and with the Prerogative in the next. In a word, their Services are Snares; they give a little, that they may take all, and by a plausible Oppression, provoke a Barbarous Rebellion.

Another sort of ill Ministers in a Representative, are the Permitters of these Abuses:* 1.273 Such as being Chosen and Entrusted for the Publick Weal, Abandon their Stations, and Deliver up their Country. Betwixt whom, and the Con∣spirators themselves, there is but this Difference: The One Quits the Breach, and the Other Enters: These, throw down

their Arms, and Those take the Town; what the One Party carries by Treason, the Other loses by Cowardice.

Of these Deserters, some are taken Off by Profit, Pleasure,* 1.274 Vanity, Sloath, Neglect or Partiality; Others are led by their Passions; as Fear, Anger, &c. In all which Cases, whoever prefers a private Interest to a Publick, Betrayes his Trust.

Some Peoples Mouths are Stopp'd with Offices, Rewards,* 1.275 fair Promises, Hopes of Preferment, &c. And These upon the very Crisis of a Debate, find Twenty Shifts, to waive the Pinch of the Dispute, and let the Question fall; even though the Crown it self depend upon the Issue of it. This is done either by coming too late, or perhaps not at all; by going away too soon, or saying Nothing when they are there: by which Dis∣couragements, the Cause is lost, only for want of their Argu∣ments and Voices to Turn the Scale.

Others are Drawn from their Duties by Pleasure;* 1.276 perhaps a Party at Tennis, Bowles,; Chards; a Pack of Dogs, a Cock∣fight, or a Horse-match, a Comedy, a Good-fellow, or a Mi∣stress. And while they are thus Employ'd, the Vigilant Fa∣ction steals a Vote that's worth a Kingdom.

Some again are so Transported with the Vanity of Dress and Language,* 1.277 that rather than serve the Publick with One hair amiss, or in One broken Period, they'l let the Publick pe∣rish. Mallent Rem-Publicam turbari, quam Capillos. These, while their Country lies at Stake, are Ordering of their Heads, and Polishing the Phrase, Shaping the Parts of a Set-Speech, till 'tis too late to use it. Nothing methinks does less be∣seem a Grave Assembly, than This same Facultatula loquendi: this same Rhetorical Twittle-tattle; it spins out so much Time in tedious Circumstances, that it makes a man e'en sick of a Good Cause, and for the very Form, prejudge the Reason of it.

Sloth and Neglect, are yet more dangerous in a Senatour; not only in Regard of Surprises from the Faction,* 1.278 but of Dis∣contentments likewise from the People. These think a Wet Day, or a Cold Morning, a sufficient Discharge of their At∣tendance: and while they are taking t'other Napp, or t'other Bottle, the Monarch perhaps has lost his Crown, or the Sub∣ject his Liberty.

Come to particular Cases, how many Families are lost by

Disappointments; by Relying upon Promises; Delays from time to time! How many Iust and Sad Petitions are thrown aside, unregarded; as serving only for waste Paper? and so far from Relief, they cannot obtain so much as a bare Reading.

* 1.279Distinguishing of Persons; in Matters of Equity, is fur∣thermore a great Abuse; where a Friend, an Acquaintance, or some By-Respect shall interrupt the Speedy and Direct Course of Iustice: (I do not say Divert; though to for∣bear helping the Right, or not to hinder the Wrong, because of such or such an Interest, is but a Negative Oppression.)

* 1.280Those that are mov'd by Passions from their Duties, are not less Culpable than the Rest. For a Good Patriot fears No∣thing, but to be Dishonest; Hates Nothing, but Iniquity; and knows no other Friend but Iustice.

Is any Thing propos'd, which to my Reason appears of Dangerous Consequence; Vnlawful to my Conscience; Disho∣nourable to my Prince, or Country? Do I Discharge my Soul to God and to the World, in not opposing it? because for∣footh 'tis my Lords Interest, or Project. Where 'tis my Of∣fice to withstand a Publick Injury,* 1.281 'tis my Act if I suffer it: Nor will it serve the turn to say, Alas! I'm but one Man, what should I struggle for? A Noble Truth and Equity, though single, ought to be maintain'd against the World. But ve∣ry rarely is That the Case; for those Particulars that, under Colour of this Singleness, relinquish and withdraw, would in Conjunction cast the Ballance. The Question is but This:

Whether shall I rather venture the Loss of an Office, or the Loss of my Country? Whether shall I rather disoblige a Pow∣erful Subject, or betray my Lawful Prince? Whether in fine, shall I rather choose, Modestly to Oppose a Faction, or Tamely to desert my Conscience.

Some we find Prepossest with Personal Animosities; and these Particular Piques,* 1.282 are many times, the Bane of Publick Designs. They do not so much heed the Matter, as the Man that Pro∣motes it; They are Resolv'd to like Nothing from That Hand; and while they are Cavelling about Niceties, and No∣things; the adverse Party runs away with the Sum of the Contest.

Another Infelicity is where Elections are Carried by Re∣commendation, Fortune, or Affection; without any Regard to the Abilities of Persons.

These are a Dangerous Party, and a fit Subject to work upon.* 1.283 for being more addicted to follow the Appearances, then Capa∣ble of Comprehending the Reasons of Things; They are not on∣ly Liable to fall into Mistakes, but Obstinate Maintainers of Them; and in all Cases Determinable by Plurality of Voices, the Greater Number of Fools weighes down the more Pruden∣tiall Counsels of Fewer wise Men: Nay, which is most Ridicu∣lous and Miserable; (but that in Popular Suffrages it must be so) His Vote many Times Casts a Kingdom, that has not Brain enough to Rule his Private Family; Deciding the Question, without understanding the Debate.

We have Prosecuted This Theme of Miscariages; far enough. From the Discovery, our next advance is to the Re∣medies of them: The harder undertaking; for Faults are more easily found, then mended.

CAP. X. How to prevent the Beginnings, and hinder the Growth of Seditions in General; together with Certain Particular Re∣medies, apply'd to the Distempers of Those Seven Interests, mentioned in the foregoing Chapter.

THe Two main Pillars that support Majesty, are Love and Reverence:* 1.284 To which are oppos'd, (as the Foundation of a Prince his Ruin) Contempt and Hatred. What are Disloy∣al Actions, but the Issue of Disloyal Thoughts? Or what are General Tumults, but the Rationall Effects of General Discon∣tents? (The Violent part being no other, then the Manifesta∣tion of a Treason already Form'd and Perfected in the Affecti∣ons) So that to set the Heart Right, is the Prime Duty of a Good Subject, and Then to observe the Law, for Love of the Authority. Kings are first Render'd Odious, or Despis'd, and in Persuance of Those Passions they come at last, to be De∣thron'd, or Murther'd. That is, to be Dethron'd, or Murther'd Actually; (for even the first Malitious Motion was Murther in the Heart, and betwixt God and our own Souls every Se∣ditious Thought is a Rebellion.)

Although no Prince can be Mighty, without the Love of his

People, or Secure under their Hatred; (the One being Neces∣sary to his Greatness,* 1.285 and the Other Sufficient to his Vndoing) yet must we not suppose the Subjects Love more Needfull to their Prince, then His to Them: since upon His Protection depends Their Welfare; no less then, upon Their Support, His Power.

Because the Hazard of disuniting is mutuall, it must not be suppos'd that it is therefore equal; nor that the Crime is so, where Tumult and Oppression are the Question. They are Both ill, but with exceeding odds of worse betwixt them: The One does but affront the Mode of Government; the O∣ther strikes at Government it self: the very Ends, and Reason of it;—Peace, Order, and Society.

A Prince without the Hearts of his Subjects, is in a bad Condition; but he that falls from Hatred, to Contempt, his Case is Desperate. For when they neither Love his Person, nor Fear his Power; They are both Provok'd to Contrive mischief, and Embolden'd to Execute it.

These are the Generall, and Enflaming Grounds of Seditions;* 1.286 which may be easily prevented, and Cut off in their next Im∣mediate Causes. The Difficulty is, for a Prince to be Popu∣lar, without making himself Cheap; to Gratifie his People, without Derogating from his Authority; and so to Comply with the Interest of his Subjects, as not to be wanting to the Ne∣cessities of his Crown. In the Due Temperation of which Mix∣ture, Consists, in a Great measure, the skill of Governing; and thereupon depends the Peace, and Safety of the Government.

In all well-ordered Monarchies, there are certain Metes and Boundaries, that Part the Rights of King, and People; and These, are either Laws, or Customs; providing for the Com∣mon Good, and Safety, both of the Subject in his Obedience, and of the Soveraign in his Authority.* 1.287 Let a Prince therefore stick to his Antient-Laws, and he may be sure his People will stick to him; and more he needs not ask, being by Those Laws ar∣med with Power sufficient to the Intent of Government: or, at the worst, if any Defect there be, the Fault is imputed to the Constitution, and not to the Person.

There may indeed occur such Cases, and Emergencies of Imminent, and Publick Danger, as (being un-foreseen by the Wisdom of former Times) are left without a Rule. Of These, beyond Dispute, The only Supream Governour is the only Su∣pream

Iudge; and under so strict a Necessity, he not only may, but ought to dispense with Common Formalities, in Order both to the Discharge of his Duty, and the Welfare of his People: His Oath of Protection,* 1.288 Implying him Vested with a Power of Protecting; and his Conscience, as a Governour, ob∣liging him to be careful of his Charge.

The Objection is Frivolous, that This Supposition opens a door to Tyranny; because that at This Rate, a Prince has no more, but to pretend a Danger, and Then to do what he pleases. 'Tis very right, a Prince may Tyrannize under This Colour; but 'tis as certain, that a People cannot Scruple This Inconvenience, without incurring a Greater: for 'tis an Opinion Destructive of Government it self; all Subjects being equally expos'd to the same Hazard, under all Governments; and it is inevita∣ble, that either the King must have it in his Power to Oppress his People, or the People have it in theirs to Destroy their Soveraign.* 1.289 (and betwixt the Ills of Tyranny and Rebellion, all the world knows the Disproportion) Wherefore let Subjects hope and be∣lieve the best of their Prince his Will, and Inclination; without medling with his Power; for it is not less his Interest to be well Obey'd, and Belov'd; then it is theirs, to be well Govern'd.

Yet when a Prince, by Exigencies of State, finds himself forc'd to waive the Ordinary Path, and Course of Law; the Less he swerves, the Better: and the more unwilling he ap∣pears to Burthen his People, the more willing shall he find them to serve him. Especially, he should be Cautelous, where men's Estates, or Freedoms, are the Question; to make the Necessity as Manifest as is possible, and the Pressure as Light,* 1.290 and as Equall, as Consists with his Honour, and Convenience: Mixing however with This General Indulgence, such a Parti∣cular Severity, where his Authority is Disputed, that the Obe∣dient may have Reason to Love his Goodness, and the Refra∣ctary, as much, to Fear his Displeasure.

By These Means, may a Prince preserve himself from the Hatred of his People, without exposing himself to their Con∣tempt; and in Order to the avoiding of That too, wee'l take up This Observation by the way: That Subjects do Generally Love, or Hate, for their own Sakes; but when they despise a Prince, it is for some Personall Weakness, or Indignity in himself.

Nothing makes a Monarch Cheaper in the Eyes of his Peo∣ple, than That which begets an ill opinion, either of his Prudence,

or Courage;* 1.291 and if they find once that he will either be Over∣reach'd, or Over-aw'd, they have his measure. By Courage here, we do not intend a Resolution only against Visible and Pressing Dangers; but an Assurance likewise, and Firmness of mind against Audacious and Threatning Counsels.

The Prudence we intend, is of a more extensive Notion; and from the most Mysterious Affairs of Royalty, descends to the most Private, and Particular Actions of a Princes Life. It enters into his Cabinet-Counsells, and Resolves; his Publick Acts of State; his very Forms of Language, and Behaviour; his Exercises, and Familiar Entertainments. In fine; It is scarce less Dangerous for a Soveraign to separate the Prince, from the Person, even in his dayly Practises, and Conversati∣ons; then to permit Others to Divide Them in their Argu∣ments:* 1.292 And in a word; to secure himself from Contempt, it behoves a Monarch to Consider, as his most Deadly Enemies, such as Brave his Authority; and by no means to allow, even in his most Acceptable Servants, and most Familiar Humours, too great a Freedom toward his Person.

Not but that a Soveraign may in many Cases Familiarize with his Subjects, and, by so doing, win the Reputation, of a Wise and Gracious Prince: Provided that the sweetness of his Nature, cause him not to forget the Severity of his Office; and that his Stooping to his People, prove not an Emboldening of them to come up to him. This is a Course to Prevent Sedi∣tion, in the First Cause, and check it in the Bud.

* 1.293But if it come once to shew it self and spread; there is first Requisite, (upon a Clear and Open Proof) a Speedy Execution of Laws to the Vtmost Rigour. I say, [upon a Clear and Open Proof] for in such cases, 'tis of great Advantage to a State, to make the Crime as evident as the Punishment, that the Peo∣ple may at once Detest the Fact and Approve the Iustice. I say Likewise [a Speedy Execution] for Delay brings many Inconveniences. It gives a Faction Time to Contrive, and V∣nite; and Boldness to Attempt: for it looks as if they that sit at the Helm were either more sensible of the Danger, or less mindfull of their Duty then becomes them. Lastly; whereas it is added, [to the utmost Rigour:] My meaning is not to ex∣tend the Severity to a Multitude of Offenders, but to Deterre the Generality by making some few, and Dreadfull Examples.

Nay my Advice should be, to Pick these Few too. They

should not be Fools, Madmen, or Beggers; but the Boldest, the Wisest, the most Circumspect and Wealthy of the Party: the Leaders, and first Starters of the Quarrel: to shew that neither Confidence should Protect them, nor their Shifts and Politicks avail them. But above All; let not their Money save Them, for That't no other then Setting of a Price upon the Head of the Soveraign.

Another Expedient to Stop a spreading Mischief, is for a Prince to keep a watchful Eye over Great Assemblies;* 1.294 which are either Irregular and Lawless; or Regular and Constant; or Arbitrary and Occasional.

Concerning the First; It is seldom seen, where the Man∣ner of a Meeting is Tumultuary, that the Business of it is not so too; and, where Many Concur in One unlawful Act, 'tis no hard matter to perswade them to agree in Another.* 1.295 So that to frustrate the Ends, and prevent the Consequences of such Meet∣ings, the surest way is for the Soveraign to employ his Au∣thority, Tamely; and strictly to Prohibit them. If That does no Good; He has no more to do, but Instantly to Scatter Them by force, and single out the Heads of the Riot, for Exemplary Punishment.

Touching Conventions which are Regular and Steady;* 1.296 It concerns the Chief Magistrate not to be without his Crea∣tures, and Discoverers, in Those Assemblies; and to see that they be well Influenc'd as to the Government. For Instance; when the People Meet to Choose Officers; when Those Offi∣cers meet to Advise upon Business, 'tis worth the while for a Prince to learn how the Pulse Beats; and Principally, to Over-watch Churches, and Courts of Iudicature: Both in regard of the hazard of Errours in Matters of Law, and Re∣ligion; and of the Multitude, being ever in readiness and hu∣mour to Entertain them.

As to Meetings Arbitrary and Occasional, heed must be taken to the Persons assembling, the Occasion which brings them Together, and the Matter whereupon they Treat; which we shall handle in their proper Places, and so pass from Generals to Particulars, beginning with the CHURCH.

Sect. I. By what Means Heresies and Schisms may be kept out of the CHURCH; Their Encrease hinder'd, and the Se∣ditious Consequences of Them Prevented: With the Re∣medies of Other Mischiefs arising from Disorders in the CHURCH.

SInce so it is, that Divisions in the Church have no further Interest in This place, than as they Lead to Seditions in the State: the shortest Cutt I know, will be to Reduce all of that Tendency to Sir Francis Bacon's Notable Comprizal of them,* 1.297 under Two Properties: [If a New Sect have not Two Properties, fear it not; for (says He) it will not spread. The one is, the Supplanting, or the Opposing of Authority esta∣blished: For Nothing is more Popular than That. The Other is, the giving Licence to Pleasures, and a Voluptuous Life. For as for Speculative Heresies (such as were in Ancient Times the Arrians, and now the Arminians) though they work mightily upon Mens Wits, yet they do not produce any great Alterations in States; except it be by the Help of Civil Occasions.] Now when a Prince meets with a Faction thus Markt, let him look to Himself: for there are against him, the best Coun∣terfeit of a Friend, and the most Deadly Composition of an Enemy; the Strongest of all Allurements; the most Popular of all Designs; and the most Rational Means to Accom∣plish it.

But the Question will be, How to Prevent, what is not as yet Discover'd? To which we answer, That the Sect here spoken of, is New, either Absolutely, or Comparatively. If Absolutely; Observe what Carnal Interest they drive: If Com∣paratively, mark what Copy they follow; and Measure the Disciple by his Master.

* 1.298One Safe and Certain Remedy, (be the Novelty what it will,) is, not to suffer any Innovation whatsoever, without a warrantable Authority: No, not so much as a Publick Dispute against an Establish'd Order, from a Private Person. Nay, more; let the Dissent be Right or Wrong, 'tis the same thing as to the Reason of Government, though not so to the Consci∣ence of the Dissenter. Suppose the Subject of an Idolatrous

Prince, within his Masters Dominions, and Contrary to his Express Order, Preaches against the Religion there Establish'd: He does well, to Discharge his Conscience, but let him have a Care of the Consequence; for if in Order to the making of Good Christians, he makes Bad Subjects,* 1.299 his Zeal will hardly acquit him of Sedition: God does not allow of Proposing Good Ends, by Ill Means; and of Reforming Religion, by Rebellion.

Let him have a Care likewise, if he comes to suffer for well-doing, how he behaves himself: for if he but open his Mouth against the Civil Magistrate, as a Persecutor, he be∣trays himself to be an Hypocrite.

There are Two Sects, whom I dare say, This Doctrine will not please; i.e. The Pontifical Presbyterians, and the Rigid Iesuits. The Latter of which, have, for Convenience sake, been True to One King: The Former, (giving the Devil his Due) since Presbyterians had a Being, were never True to Any: or if they ever were, let him that Loves Them best, or knows them better, shew me but when, where, how; and with a Ne∣verint universi, I do here Declare, I'le make a Publick Re∣cantation. Till Then, We'l take the Prebyterian for the Cock-Schismatick; and (if Sir Francis Bacon's Note holds Good.) the Dangerous New Sect: against Whom, no Caution can be too Early, no Importunity too Earnest, no Restriction too Severe.

These are They, that (according to the Lord St. Al∣bans) Propagate Religion by Wars; Force Consciences; Nou∣rish Seditions; Authorise Conspiracies and Rebellions. That put the Sword into the Peoples hand, and Dash the First Table, a∣gainst the Second. In short; all Those Popular, and Sup∣planting Politicks, which we find only here and there; Scat∣ter'd, and Thin, in Other Sects; are by These People drawn into a Practical Method, a Set-form of Sedition.

They Govern Their Looks, their Words, their Actions;* 1.300 Nay, their very Dress, Garb, and Accent, by a Rule: They are Instructed, when to Beseech, and when to Expostulate; when to Flatter, and when to Threaten; when to Offer, and when to Deny; when to Press Swearing, and when to De∣claim against it; when to Save, and w••••n to Kill▪

In the first Scene, ye have the Schismatick upon his Knees, begging his Prince into a Dispensation,* 1.301 for Scrupulous Consci∣ences,

that perhaps stick at such and such Ceremonies; the Cross, the Surplice, or the like.

* 1.302Let but the Soveraign Comply Thus far, and what's the Fruit of this Indulgence? Within a Day or Two, they come for More, and by Degrees, More still; till at Last, they find the Government of the Church as Troublesom, as they did the Rites of it; and Bishops as great a Grievance, as Ceremo∣nies. Where the King Stops, They Cavil; and now, from Pe∣titioners for Freedom to Themselves, they are Grown to be most Insolent Denyers of it to Others.

Their Art is next, to Tune the People; which is best done by the Pulpit, where One half of their Business is Invective against Prelacy, and the Other is spent in Well-Acted Sup∣plications, That God would turn the King's Heart; Accounting His yielding to all They Ask, as a Divine Assurance that their Prayers are heard. But if the Monarch still holds out; what Pity 'tis (they Cry) so sweet a Prince should be Miss-led? And then they fall upon his Evil Counsellors; still Taking all he Gives, and Strugling for the Rest; till having first Disrob'd Him of his Rights, Depriv'd Him of his Friends; Step after Step, they Attempt His Sacred Person, and at last take away His Life.

Here's their Glorious King! the End of all their Vows and Covenants, their Prayers and Fastings; or, in a word, the Summe of their Religion.

It was great Blasphemy (says Sir F. B.) when the Devil said I will Ascend and be like the Highest; But it is greater Blas∣phemy, to Personate God, and bring Him in, saying, I will Des∣cend, and be like the Prince of Darkness; and what is it bet∣ter to make the Cause of Religion, to descend, to the Cruel and Execrable Actions, of Murthering Princes, Butchery of People, and Subversion of States and Government?

He that stands firm against (not the Wit, or Bravery, but) the Fawning, and Treacherous Insinuations of This Fa∣ction, may make himself Sport with all Other Practices and Combinations whatever: and That Prescription, which helps This Evil, serves for all other Publick and Intestine Ma∣ladies.

I think we may be Positive, that there neither Is, nor ever Was in Nature, any Society of Men, without a Vitious Mixture, under what Government, or Governour-soever. I

think we may be as Positive likewise, that Those Ambitious, and Vnsatisfi'd Particulars, with which all Constitutions are infested, are only Deferr'd from troubling all Govern∣ments, by the want of Opportunities to Plot, and Contrive; and by the Hazards they meet with, in putting Those Plots in Execution.

Wherefore it ought to be a Prince his first Care,* 1.303 to Choak These Seeds of Discord: which may be Effected, by a Provi∣sion of Orthodox Ministers; (to the utter Exclusion of the Contrary) by Prohibiting Private Meetings, or Conventicles; and by taking heed to the Press. A Watchfulness in These Three Points Secures the Church from Schisms, and Conse∣quently the State from Conscientious Seditions. (At least, if I am not Mistaken in my Presumption, that there is not any fourth way of Dangerous Communication.)

Touching the Licentious abuse of the Press, and the Free∣dom of Riotous Assemblies; the Distemper is not as yet grown Bold enough, to avow Those Liberties: But from the Non-Conforming Ministers, we must expect hard Pleading.

What? [shall the Faithfull Guides be ejected,* 1.304 upon the ac∣count of Forms, or Ceremonies? because they dare not do that which they Iudge to be so great a Sin against the Lord?] May not a Dissenting Brother be an Honest man?

Our Reply shall be short, and Charitable. If the People take them for Guides, they will be the apter to follow them;* 1.305 so that the fairer their Credit is, the worse is their Ar∣gument.

Nor are they laid aside, as if the Difference it self were so Criminal, but for the evill Consequences of Retaining Them.

First, it advances the Reputation of the Dissenting Party to have the matter Look as if either the Power, or Reason were on Their side.

Next, it Subjects the Prince to be Thought Diffident, ei∣ther of his Authority to Command, or of the Iustice of the Thing Commanded.

Thirdly; a Dissenting Minister makes a Dissenting Con∣gregation.

Fourthly; it makes Conscience a Cloak for Sedition, and un∣der Colour of Dividing from the Church, it Ministers Occasi∣on for People to unite against the State.

Fifthly; it not only leads to Novel Opinions, whereof the

Vulgar are both Greedy, and Curious; but it Possesses the Multitude with These Two Desperate, and Insociable Persua∣sions. First, That the People are Iudges of the Law; and Next, That because God alone has Power over their Souls, the Soveraign has none over their Bodies.

As to the Honesty of a Dissenting Brother; his Honesty is only to himself, but his Dissent is to the Publick: and the Better the Man is, the Worse is the President.

Vpon these hazards, depends the Royalty of That Soveraign, that dispenses with the Law, to Indulge This Faction: and, which is the great Pitty of all, the better he deserves, the worse they use him. So that the only way for a Prince to deal Safely with These People, is first to lay aside That Dan∣gerous, and Fatal Goodness, and Steer his Resolutions by the Compass of a Severe, and Inexorable Reason. Not that Kings are Gods, in any Respect, more then in their Power, and Mercy; but there are certain Cases, and Instances, wherein That Power, and Mercy may be Restrain'd; and wherein 'tis possible that what is Excellent in Nature, may be a slip in Government. 'Tis One Thing for a Party to ask Pardon for a Fault already Committed, and another thing to beg a Dispensation beforehand, to Commit it. And there's this Difference also in the Issue of the Grants. The Prince has the Faction at his Mercy, the One way; and the Faction has got the Prince at Theirs, the Other. But to the Point.

Will the Monarch's yielding to this, or that, content them? They'l say 'tis all they aime at; and truly I'd believe them: would they but shew me out of their whole Tribe, any one Instance of This Moderation to save the Credit of my Cha∣rity;* 1.306 Any Presbyterian Interest in Nature that is not Rais'd upon the Ruins of a Prince, and Cimented with Broken Vows and Promises.

If it be thus; Nothing less then a Miracle can secure that Monarch that makes this Faction Master of the Pulpit: and this, King Charles, the Martyr, prov'd by sad Experience: For not a Soul that by the Instigation of Schismatical Le∣ctures deserted the Church, but became an Enemy to the State. So that Effectually a Gracious Toleration in some Cases, is by some People understood no otherwise, then as a Tacit Commission from the Person of the King to Levy a Warr against his Office. And it is very rarely that such an Indul∣gence

is better Employ'd. In which Opinion we are not a little Confirm'd by the Reflections of that Blessed Prince above mentioned.

[I wish (sayes he) I had not suffered My own Iudg∣ment to have been over-borne in some Things,* 1.307 more by o∣thers Importunities, then their Arguments: My Confi∣dence had less betrayed My self, and My Kingdoms, to Those Advantages, which some men sought for, who want∣ed nothing but Power, and Occasion, to do Mischief.] And after the utmost Tryall of Bounty and Remissness to that Faction; These are his words to his Royall Successour, [I cannot yet Learn That Lesson, nor I hope never will you, That it is safe for a King to gratifie any Faction,* 1.308 with the perturbation of the Laws, in which is wrapt up the Publick Interest, and the Good of the Community.]

Finally; Those Perfidious Creatures which at first Petiti∣on'd their Soveraign, afterwards fought against him, and Impri∣son'd him:* 1.309 Refusing him in his Distress the Comfort of his own Chaplains, in Requitall for having Granted them the Liberty of their Consciences. Who strook the Fatall Blow, it matters not: If he had not been Disarm'd, he had not been Kill'd. Subjects do not Hunt Kings for Sport; only to Catch Them, and let them go again. To Conclude; He was Persecuted with Propositions worse then Death; as by his Choice appear'd; for he Preferr'd rather to Die, then Sign Them. But to Signalize the Honor of his Memory, and the Glory of his Mar∣tyrdome, take his Last Resolution, and Profession.

I look upon it with infinite more content and quiet of Soul,* 1.310 to have been worsted in my Enforced contestation for, and vindication of, the Laws of the Land, the Free∣dom and Honour of Parliaments, the Rights of my Crown, the Iust Liberty of my Subjects, and the true Christian Religion in its Doctrine, Government, and due Encouragements, then if I had with the greatest Advan∣tages of Success, over-born them all, as some men have now Evidently done, whatever Designs they at first pre∣tended.

From a Supposition of the first Inclination to Schism, pro∣posing

also how to strangle it in the Birth: we are now to Consider it in some Degree of Growth, and Progression; and to enquire after the best means to prevent such Mischieves, as may arise from the further Encrease, and spreading of it. That is; the Mischieves of Conspiracy, which may be Pro∣moted, either be Speech, or Writing.

* 1.311The first great Hazard is when Popular Persons, are put in Popular Employments, and in Populous Places. A Cunning, and a Factious Minister, is a Dangerous Instrument in a City; and the more Dangerous, if Tollerated; for Then he stirs up Tumults by Authority: and who shall blame the Flock for Following the Shepheard?

The Liberties of Conventicles, and Pamphlets, are likewise of Desperate Influence upon the People; but These (as is al∣ready said) are easily Suppress'd by the Seasonable Executi∣on of Laws. But There's no Dallying with the Combination.

If through the fault of Negligent Officers, the Distemper be gone too far, and the Confederacy grown Strong and Bold enough to struggle with the Law. Then, Other Arts must be found out, either to Amuse, Ensnare, or Disunite the Fa∣ction. The Last Resort is violence, which must be Timely too before the Reverence of Authority is quite Lost. And let the King himself appear; not only to Ask, but Take the Heads of the Sedition; before the Quarrel is Transferr'd from his Ministers, to his Person: if he but Stoops, he Falls. How horrible a Mutiny was That which Caesar Quieted at Placentia? Single, Unarm'd and with One wretched word. (QVIRITES.)

—Nec dum desaeviat Ira, Expectat; Medios properat tent are Furores. Nor Waites he till the Hot Fit should asswage, But at the Maddest, Scorns, and Braves their Rage.

* 1.312As the Resolve was Great, and the Success Good, so doubt∣less was the Reason of This Action; For by the Sodainess, he Prevented their Agreement; and by the Generous Con∣tempt of Danger, he was almost Certain to Divide the Re∣volt; making the Nobler Part of the Mutiniers to Adore him, and the Baser, to Fear him.

If the bare Presence of a General, could have This Power upon a Disciplin'd, Incens'd, and Daring Army; what should a Lawfull Monarch apprehend, from an Vnpractic'd, and Loose Multitude?

But the Dispute is not yet Brought to This Extremity; Our Purpose in this Place, being rather to Frustrate and Disappoint the Malice in the Contrivance, than Crush it in the Execution. To which end are Requisite, great Di∣ligence, Secrecy, Watchfulness, Moderation; and (at-what-rate soever) a Strict and General Intelligence: All which together, make up a Necessary nnd Befitting Prudence.

Sir Francis Bacon's Counsel is,* 1.313 to Begin with Reforming Abuses; a Work seldom out of Season, but never more needful: then upon the very first Murmurings and Motions toward Troubles. Most especially, let Great Towns be Sup∣plyed with Good Ministers, and the Earlier, the Better, least the Multitude think it Extorted; and the Guilty become too Strong for the Innocent.

It ought to be Impartial too;* 1.314 for a Toleration on the One hand, will make Iustice it self look like a Persecution on the Other. Beside, That it takes away the Subject of the Cla∣mour, and exalts the Reputation of the Monarch, in making Him appear the Common Father of his People.

By these Means, may the Church be Purg'd of Schism, without much hazard of Sedition.

If the Plot be already Modell'd, and the Multitude Lea∣ven'd, The Soveraign is to look for Petitions, on the Behalf of Ejected Ministers; in the Names of Thousands; and Ac∣companied with the Rudeness rather of a Riot, than a Re∣quest. The Petitioners may be Put Off, Threatned, or Punish∣ed, &c. according to the Merit of their Behaviour: but let a Watch be set upon the Leaders of Those Troops: their Haunts and Correspondents. Let it be mark'd who Intercedes, who Mitigates on Their behalf.

Let the Motions of the Disaffected Clergy be likewise Ob∣serv'd, which of the Nobility they Frequent: And in fine, Spyes Employ'd upon all their Considerable Privacies: For, let the Cry be what it will, the Cause of these Disorders is Ambition.* 1.315 Of which in another Place, and with One Word more we'll Conclude this Point.

That may be Conscience in the People, which is Sedition in the Minister; wherefore in all Schismatical Ruptures, I could wish all possible Favour to the Common sort of the Laity, and as much Severity to the Offending Clergy.

Sect. II. How to prevent SEDITIONS arising from the Disor∣ders of the BENCH.

WE have Begun with the Church; and the Bench pro∣perly Follows: which is but to give Them the same Place in the Order of this Discourse, which they have in the Argument of it. Was there ever any Considerable Re∣bellion (I do not say Revolt) That was not Usher'd in by Corrupt Divines,* 1.316 or Lawyers, or Both of Them? And 'tis no Wonder; since upon These Two Interests depends the great Concern, both of our Souls and Bodies. One Reason of their Forwardness may be This; that they may do more Harm, upon Safe and Easie Tearms, than other People: Bolt a Re∣bellion out of a Text; Dethrone a King with a Moot-Point, and Execute a Bishop at a Reading. All which is done with a Wet Finger; for when a People are Discontented, 'tis but Picking a Scripture, or a Statute, for the Time and Purpose; aad Commit the Rest to Application.

These Two Interests hold so Good Intelligence, it is al∣most Pity to part Them: and Compar'd with the Rest, (supposing all in Disorder) They mind me of a Combination I have observ'd betwixt a Beagle, and a Grey-hound: the One Starts the Hare, and Yelps, the Other Catches it, but by Consent, they part the Quarry.

As I Reckon These Men of the Robe to be the very Pests of Humane Nature, when they Degenerate from the Prime End of their Institution: So take them (on the Other side) in the Due Exercise of their Callings, they are the Blessings and the Pillars of Society.* 1.317 A Word now to the Lawyer apart.

The Common Crime of Vitious Lawyers, is Avarice;* 1.318 and Those Inducements to Sedition, which (in the Chapter next fore-going This) we have divided into Corruption, Partia∣lity, Oppression, Chargeable Delays, &c. are but as several Branches from that Root of Covetousness.

Nay, take Their more Pernicious and Vile Practices; Their Misconstruction of Laws, Misapplying of Presidents, Torturing or Embezelling of Records, &c. What is All This,

but Corruption in another Dress? A Project to Embroil the Government, that They may get Money by Setling it again? Or if they can procure a Change;* 1.319 They make the best Mar∣ket they can of their Country; and Betray it to that Faction that will Give Most for't. Nay, when That's done, (and that Matters will come Right again, in spight of them) They shall Betray it back again to the Right Owner: at once Lamenting, and Adoring their Past, and Profitable Transgressions. These are the miserable Fruits of Corruption▪

Others there are that Erre through want of Iudgment. And that's a sad Case too;* 1.320 for Mistakes coming from the Lips of a Iudge, pass for Oracles.

Others there are again, that Vnderstand the Right, but in some Cases dare not Own it.* 1.321 And These deliver up the People to Day, for Fear of the King; and the Prerogative to Mor∣row, for Fear of the Subject.

From hence it seems to me, That a Prince his Chiefest Care in this Particular of the Law, lies in a Narrow com∣pass: That is, in Securing, and Preserving his Courts of Iu∣dicature from Corruption; and in Supplying them with Men of Eminent Abilities and Courage: These are the Instru∣ments to make a Prince and People Happy; Nor does any Thing more Conduce to it, than the Carrying of an E∣ven and Impartial Hand upon the Ballance of Government, and Obedience. We come now to the Choice of Persons, and There the Difficulty lies.

Some Deceive the World, by Appearing Honester than they are. Others Deceive Themselves,* 1.322 and are Honest only for want of Temptation. Some there are, that are Proof a∣gainst Money, but not against Danger. In short; Where it so much Imports a Prince not to Repent too late, it may be worth his while to Consider of his Choice in Time.

Concerning the Abilities of Persons for the Offices to which he Designs them; Common Fame, with a Little Particular Enquiry will be sufficient: but their Integrity requires a stric∣ter Scrutiny. What's such a Man's Humour? His Behaviour? His Temper? are not unnecessary Questions. And upon the Whole? If he has ever Betrayed any Friend, Trust, or Inte∣rest, either for Fear or Profit; Away with him. But if upon Tryals either Private or Publick; it appears,* 1.323 that rather than do small Injuries, he has Refus'd great Benefits: that he

has Preferr'd his Faith and Honour, before his Life and Fortune: This Evidence may serve for a Moral Assurance of an Honest Man. Whereas without this Personal and Parti∣cular Examination, not only the Future Safety, but the pre∣sent Quiet of a Kingdom may come to be endanger'd by a Mischoice of Ministers.

To Reason upon this Hazard, does not at all Impeach the Soveraign's Absolute Freedom to Elect whom He pleases; nor does it one jot justifie the Subject, that shall presume to Scan and Iudge the Actions of his Prince. But in Regard that Discontentments breed Seditions; and that Mistakings of This Quality may beget Discontentments, we Offer This Ex∣pedient as to That Consequence. And in Truth it seems to be a kind of Prophanation of the Seat of Iustice, when He Sits upon the Bench, that deserves to hold up his Hand at the Bar. To Conclude then; When a Monarch comes to Discover the Inconvenience of such Ministers, He may kill two Birds with one Stone; and Consider who Recommended them: (But they may be better Kept out, than Driven on.)

Next to the Choice of Good Persons, Succeeds the Care of Good Order, when they are Chosen: Which may be Provi∣ded for; First, By maintaining an Intelligence concerning the General Bias and Complexion of their Proceedings as to the Publick; (i. e. Whether or no they do equal Iustice be∣twixt King and People.) Secondly, By Over-watching them in Cases of more Private and Particular Concern.

Let not This Strictness appear either too much for a Prince his Business, or below his Dignity. Kingdoms are Lost for want of These Early Providences; these Little Circumspections; but it costs more to Recover them.* 1.324 Nor (in effect) is the Trouble at all Considerable; for 'tis here, as 'twas with the Tyrant, that durst not Sleep for fear of having his Throat cut.

A Mathematician comes to him, and tells him; That for so many Talents he'd secure him, and shew him such a Se∣cret, that it should be impossible for any man so much as to design upon him without Discovery. The Tyrant was con∣tent; provided that he might be satisfied of the Secret, be∣fore he parted with his Money, and so takes the Cunning∣man into his Cabinet. What was the Secret? But that he should give the fellow so much Money, & pretend that he had Taught it him.

This Sory comes up to Vs: The bare O∣pinion

of a Prince his Vigilance, saves him the Need and Trouble of it: And Three or Four Discoveries in his whole Raign, shall gain him That Opinion.

Touching Those Abuses which Immediately relate to the Publick; (as concerning the misconstruction of Lawyers, &c.) they are usually couch'd under the Salvo of an Ambigui∣ty. To prevent which Inconvenience,* 1.325 all Those Distincti∣ons which in Seditious times have been made use of for the Authorising, or Countenancing of Treason, might be summ'd up and Declar'd Treasonous Themselves. Such I mean, as the Co-ordinate Power of King, Lords, and Commons, The Litteral and Equitable Construction of Laws. The Per∣son, and Authority of Princes. Singulis Major, Vniversis Minor, &c. For sure it is not Reasonable, that the Clear, and Sacred Rights of Kings, should depend upon the dubious, and Pro∣phane Comments of the People.

Concerning Grievances of a more Particular Quality; the Principal of them are Injustice, and Delay: the Former whereof, is purely the Fault of the Iudge; the Other may, in some measure, and in some Constitutions, be imputed to a Defect in the Law. In This Case, the best way to prevent further Mischief, and satisfie for what is done already, is an Impartial Severity upon all Offenders as they are Detected: Especially, where Complaints are General, and the Injustice Notorious; for nothing less then a Publick Example, can a∣mount to a Publick Satisfaction.

Sect. III. How to Prevent, or Remedy Seditions arising from the Disor∣ders of the COURT.

WE have in the Last Chapter, Pag. 99. (concerning Sedi∣tions which may possibly arise from a Disorder'd Court) stated what we intend by the Court-Interest. We have like-wise Divided the Evill-Instruments, into such as either Plot Mischief, or Occasion it. We have again Subdivided the Plotters into Three Parties.* 1.326 The One whereof opposes the Title of the Governour; The Other, (as Directly) the Form of the Government: And there is a Third Party, that bring

their Ends about, by Supplications, Vows, Fasting and Pray∣er; by Forms of Piety, and Reverence: and finally; that with a Hail Master and a Kiss, Betray their Soveraign.

Concerning the Two Former; More needs not be said, than that Force is to be Repell'd by Force: and That, the Monarch is suppos'd to have always in Readiness, for the Safety of the Government. The Other, is a Serpentine, and Winding Party;* 1.327 that Steals, and Glides into the very Bosome of a Prince, and Then it Clipps and Strangles him. This is a Faction that Answers to our Iesuited Puritan.

Yet while I separate These Three, for Perspicuity of Me∣thod; let me not be understood, as if they would not mingle in Complication of Interest: For nothing is more Notorious, then that in all Commotions upon pretext of Conscience, the Religious Division is still the Receptacle of all other Disaffected Humours whatsoever. He that's an Atheist to Day, becomes an Enthusiast to Morrow; where a Crown is the Prize. Only I must confess, the Presbyterian playes the Fast and Loose of the Device, the best in the whole World. Let as many help him as will, 'tis Liberty of Conscience forsooth; but have a Care of the Purity of the Gospell, when they come to share with him. They may, if they please, (nay they shall be In∣vited to't) run the hazards of the Course with him; Ventu∣re Neck, and Body; over Hedge and Ditch; through Thick and Thin, but yet at last, the Devill a bit of the Quarry.

In fine; the Plausible Contrivers of Sedition (under what∣Mask-soever) are the People we aim at; and These are ei∣ther In the Counsell, or Out of it. Sir Francis Bacon Divides the Dangers from Within the Great Counsell, into an Over∣greatness in One Counsellour, or an Over-strict Combination in Divers, The Rest, we only look upon as Their Depen∣dencies.

Pag. 71. We proceed from the Direct Contrivance of Seditions, to the more Remote Occasions of them. As Corrup∣tion, Monopolizing; Non-payment of Debts, &c.—

This being the Order, into which we have dispos'd the Causes of Seditions; it will be suitable, that some Degree of Method be observ'd in the Remedies. But first, a word of In∣troduction.

We are to take for granted, that Sedition is a kind of Clock-work, and that the Main Spring of all Rebellions is Am∣bition.

We may be again as Confident, that never any One Monarchy was destroy'd, but with design to set up Another. (The Talk of This or That Form of Government; or of This or That Shape of Religion,* 1.328 being no more then a Ball toss'd among the People, for the Knaves to keep the Fools in play with) It's Truth, that a Sinking Monarchy lapses into an Aristocracy; and That again into a Popular State. But what's the Reason of all This?

Does any man Imagine that the Conspiratours work for One another, or for Themselves?* 1.329 They Joyn in the Necessity of a Common Assistance; but they Divide in the Proposition of a several Interest. Who is he in the Senate, that had not rather Rule Alone, then in Company, if he could help it? To be short; where more then One Govern, 'tis because what Every man Wishes; no Particular can effect. (That is to Master the Rest. (Understand me only of Medlers to over∣throw a Government.)

The next Slide from an Aristocracy, downward; comes a lit∣tle clearer yet. Some of the Craftiest of Those that help'd the Peers to Cast off the King, are now as Busie with the Peo∣ple to throw off the Nobility: and Then, they are within one Easie step, of Confusion; from whence, the next Change brings him that can carry it from the Rest, to the Soveraignty. As arrant a Mockery, is Religion, in the Mouth of a Conspi∣ratour.

Indeed it makes me smile sometime,* 1.330 to hear how Soberly Men will talk of the Religion of This or That Faction: as if a Traytour, or an Hypocrite were of Any. And then they cry,—This is against the Principles of the Presbyterians; and That against the Principles of the Independents: when (Truly, and Shortly) they are but Thus Distinguished; Those would subvert the Government, One Way; These, Another; And he that would rightly Understand them, must Read, for Presbytery, ARISTOCRACY; and DEMOCRACY, for Independency. I speak of the next Consequence, if they Prevail; not of the Vltimate Design of the Chief Leaders; for That's Monarchy) Wee'l drop ye a Little Story here.

An Officer of the Reformat on advises with an Ingenious Surgeon of my Acquaintance, about a Grief,* 1.331 (as he pretend∣ed) caught with a Streyn. After divers Questions; how and how? The Surgeon tells his Patient, that (by his leave)

the Trouble he complains of, can be no other, then (to Phrase it Modestly) a Ladies Favour. The good man blesses himself; and still it must be a Strain. Why then a Stain let it be: but This I'll tell you Sir; The Thing that Cures That Strain, will Cure the Pox. In fine; the Officer submits, and the Surgeon does his work.

* 1.332This is the Case of the two Factions, They Cry out, of their Consciences; but their Disease lyes somewhere else: and Schism is cur'd, just as they cure Sedition.

Nay; does it not behove a Prince, with the same strict∣ness to require Submission to a Ceremony,* 1.333 as to a Tax? Or why may not a Justice as well refuse to Swear Obedience, to the Civil Government, as a Minister to the Ecclesiastick? What can be more reasonable, than for a Master either to Punish, or dismiss an undutifull Servant? Briefly, That Mo∣narch that would be safe, must resolve to be Deaf to These Reli∣gious Clamours. Alas! let but the Ministers Begin; the Peo∣ple Bawle in Course: not that they are Troubled; but they'l do't in Rudeness, or Imitation. They are as arrantly Taught to do't, as a Friend of mine Taught his Beagles. Let him Gape first, and the whole Kennell falls to howling: Let him give off, they are quiet too: and just Thus stands the Case betwixt the Schismatical Clergy, and the Multitude.

But (it will be said) what's all this to the Court? Or to Se∣ditions, thence proceeding?

Oh very much. These Out-cryes of the Vulgar, are but False Alarms: The Dint is nearer hand. They have their Demagogues, and their Patrons; (as the late Glorious King, and Martyr calls them) and if a Prince look well about him, in such a juncture as is here mention'd; 'tis odds, he finds some of their Principals, even at his Ear, or Elbow. So that his first Concern is to Inspect, and Purge (where he sees Cause) his Royall Palace, Beginning with his Counsell. Where (as Sir Francis Bacon) the Danger is either, the Over-great∣ness of One; or the Combination of Divers: Which Dangers we shall Obviate with their Remedies, in Order.

Subsection. I. The Remedies of certain Hazards arising from the Over∣greatness of One COUNSELLOR.

ONE Over-great Counsellor may be Dangerous; First, In respect of His Particular Temper and Inclination: Second∣ly, In regard of His Credit with his Master: And lastly, In Consideration of the Influence of that Power, and Inclination upon the People.

The Over-great Counsellor we here Treat of, is as the Malus Genius of a Nation: And in Two Words, behold the Ground and Summe of the Whole Mischief. 'Tis either Vice or Weakness, apply'd to the Dishonour or Damage of a Prince and People.

Now to the Application of That Vice, or Weakness. And first, What ill use may be made of the One, and what ill ef∣fects may proceed from the Other, by vertue of his Credit with his Master.* 1.334

If He be Ambitious, He's plac'd upon the very Point for Popularity. Whom can he not Oblige, by Hopes, Rewards, Preferments? Whose Tongue cannot he Charm, either to Speech or Silence? Whose Reputation, Suit, Fortune; nay in some Cases, whose very Life it self, and Liberty, are not de∣pendent upon his Favour? If this Aspiring Humour be accom∣panied with a Sharpness of Iudging; a Felicity of Contriving; and an Impulse of Enterprizing: The Master of such a Ser∣vant should do well to Look about him.

It may be Reply'd, That doubtless so he would, if he saw any Reason to apprehend his Abuse of that Power; But the Knowledge of the Person, does sufficiently warrant the Reason of the Dispensation. To which, we answer; That though Soveraign Princes are not Accountable to Others, yet They are to Themselves; both for the Expedience and Equity of their Actions: And entring into their own Souls, it is very pos∣sible, that they may discover some Incongruities betwixt their Affections, and their Convenience. Some Incongruities I say; and such, as may Induce the wisest Prince, and the most In∣dulgent Master; even toward the most Loyal and Meriting

Servant, to limit the Graces of his Inclination, to the Rules and Respects of his Office; and to be wary, lest while He Divide his Heart with his Friend,* 1.335 he share also his Authority with his Subject: Therein, both Endangering Himself, and Grieving his People.

To Conclude; It is great Prudence in Publike Affairs, to commit little to Hazard; and it is no small Hazard, to Ex∣pose a Favourite to strong Temptations.

Where there are Servants that will employ their Masters Bounty against Himself; (and of such only we speak) If the Design be to supplant the Soveraign, many Remedies may be found out, to frustrate That Ambition. Nay (as I have al∣ready hinted) whether there be such a Design, or not; 'tis good to provide against the very Possibility of it. For, it is fitter, that the Publike should be Indebted for its well-being, to the Care of the Prince, than to the Honesty of the Favou∣rite.

* 1.336Ambitious Natures do better in the Field, than in the Court; and better yet Abroad, than at Home. If they Advance, they grow Dangerous for their Power; if they re∣ceive a Check, they become so for their Malice: Whence it comes to pass, that we see few. Seditions without a Male∣content of This Quality, in the Head of them. These are a sort of People, of whom a Prince cannot be too wary. But we are here to provide against the Ambition of a Person Rais'd by Favour, not Aspiring; and from such a One, the Peril is greater, by reason of the means he has, both to com∣pass his Ends, and to Disguise them.

Sir Francis Bacon proposes the Mating of One Ambitious Person with Another; and in Extremities, the Puzzling of him, with an Enterchange of Favours, and Disgraces, that he may not know what to Expect. Courses, no doubt, advisable, to put an Insolent Favourite to a stand; if it may be as Safe to Disoblige him, without Disarming him: but that depends much upon the Complexion of the Person, according as he is Bold or Fearful.

* 1.337There is not any thing which more Fortifies and Establishes a Monarch, than the Disposal of all Offices, and Charges of Trust, by his particular Choice and Direction, without the Interpose of any Publike Recommendation: Nor can he Trans∣fer That Care to his Great Counsellor, without a great share of

his Power. And here's the Difference; the One way they are the Honourable Dependencies of the Prince; and the Other way, they are the suspected Creatures of the Favourite; who by This Indulgence, makes One Party at Present, and Another in Expectation.

A Wariness in This Particular, breaks the Neck of his Design.

It is good also for a Prince Fairly, and Publikely to Refuse him some Requests, and where the Suit is too bold, to Check Him for Others: That the World may see, that there are Some things which he cannot obtain; and Others, which he must not Dare to Ask. Whereas, if He carries all without Reserve, the Majesty of the Soveraign is lost in the Power of the Favourite. The Advice of King Charles, the Martyr, to His Sacred Majesty now in Being, shall put an End to This Point.

Never repose so much upon any mans single Counsel, Fi∣delity, and Discretion,* 1.338 in managing Affairs of the First Magnitude (that is, Matters of Religion, and Iustice) as to Create in your self or others, a Diffidence of your own Iudgment, which is likely to be always more Con∣stant, and Impartiall to the Interests of the Crown and Kingdom, than any mans.

This may suffice to Prevent a dangerous Over-greatness:* 1.339 But if it be found Necessary to Crush it; (as in case of a bold, and manifest Transgression of Duty, and Violation of Law) Something like an English Parliament does it best; and much better to be promoted by the People, than by the Soveraign.

A Second Danger is, when a Prime Minister employs his Credit to uphold a Faction: and it is the more Dangerous,* 1.340 by the hardness to know what it is. As whether it be Ambition, Corruption, Popularity: Or in fine, some other Secret Inte∣rest. It may be, they have need of One-another.

Nothing can be more perillous then▪ This Correspondence, when a proper Instrument has the manage of it.* 1.341 Oh how he Detests the Faction! But yet Truly, in such and such Cases; and for such and such Persons; and upon This or That Nick

of Time, if Matters were Order'd So and So. And Then, the Insolence of a Schism is Palliated with the Simplicity of a Scruple: And for such Cases as will bear no other Plea, is found out the Colour of an Indisputable Necessity. Not to pro∣secute the several Artifices, by which some Truths are Dis∣guised, others Suppress'd: Those Suits Promoted; These Com∣plaints Smother'd: And finally; by which, both Men and Things are quite misrepresented.

Kings cannot possibly see all Things with their own Eyes, nor hear all Things with their own Ears;* 1.342 so that they must commit many great Trusts to their Ministers.] The Hazard then is Great, when the Confident of the Monarch is the Advocate for the Enemies of the State. But above all, if he be Surly and Imperious to the Try'd Servants of the Crown: That looks like a Design, to Introduce one Party to Betray the Prince, and to Discourage or disable Another from serving him.

We are here upon a Supposition, That a Master may be mista∣ken in a Servant; and that a Servant may abuse his Credit with his Master. In case This be; What Remedy?

Supposing the Favourite still in Credit, we must Imagine the Soveraign still in the Mistake; and therefore not expect a Remedy as to the Person, but rather fetch Relief from some General Rules of Government: which shall neither disoblige the Favourite, if he be Honest; nor expose the Prince, if He be Other: But this is better done at the Beginning of a Kings Reign, than in the Middle of it; better upon Iudgment of State, than Vrgency of Occasion.

The certain Help is a fit Choice of Officers and Servants. Especially in such Places as have Numerous Dependencies;* 1.343 for otherwise, Three or Four Persons Leaven the Court; half a Dozen more the Souldiery; and in Conclusion, a great Fa∣vourite, with a few select Instruments of his own making, may, at his Pleasure, seize the Government. This was the Rise of the Second Race of Kings in France.

Yet God forbid, that Princes should make Themselves, and their Privadoes,* 1.344 miserable, by Eternal, Causeless, and Vn∣quenchable Iealousies: That Kings should be Debarr'd That Blessing and Relief, without which, Life's a Plague, and Royalty a Burthen. That is, the Vse and Comfort of a Friend; [to whom (as the Oraculous St. Albans) He may Impart his Griefs, Ioys, Fears, Hopes, Suspicions, Counsels, and whatso∣ever

lies upon his Heart, to oppress it; in a kind of Civill Shrift, or Confession:] and from whence, (with the same Author) he may reap, [Peace of affections, and support of Iudgment.]

Nay, take the Subject's Interest in too;* 1.345 what can be more Desirable, then for a Prince to have a Watchfull, Wise, Faith∣full Counsellour; and the People, a Firm Prudent Patriote, in the same Noble Person? Accursed be the man that envies ei∣ther. Yet Here's a Line still drawn betwixt Majesty and Kindness; which the One cannot pass, without Diminution, nor the Other transgress without Presumption. In fine; the Right of Placing, or Displacing Officers, lies on the Kings side of the Chalk, and falls under the Head of Reward or Punish∣ment.

King Iames in the second Book of his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, de∣livers Excellent Advises to Prince Henry, concerning the Choice of Servants.

First, See that they be of a Good Fame,* 1.346 and without Blemish.

Next, See that they be Indued with such honest Qua∣lities,* 1.347 as are meet for such Offices as ye ordain them to serve in; that your Iudgment may be known in Employ∣ing every man according to his Guifts.

Thirdly, I charge you, according to my Fatherly Au∣thority, to preferr Specially to your Service,* 1.348 so many as have truely served Me, and are able for it. — For if the Haters of your Parents cannot Love you, it follows of Ne∣cessity, that their Lovers must Love you.

Chuse your Servants for your own Vses, and not for the Vse of Others: and hearken not to Recommendati∣ons,* 1.349 more for serving in effect, their Friends that put them in, then their Masters that admit them.

Especially take good heed to the choice of your Ser∣vants,* 1.350 that you preferr to the Offices of the Crown and Estate: for in other Offices, ye have only to take heed to your own Weal, but these concern likewise the Weal of your People; for the which, ye must be Answerable to God. Be carefull to Prefer none, as ye will be answera∣ble to God, but for their worthiness.

* 1.351Employ every man as ye think him Qualifi'd; but Vse not one in all Things, lest he wax Proud, and be Envy'd by his Fellows.

These were the Directions of a Prince, than whom no Man spake more upon Experience: and very hardly shall a Sove∣raign that takes This Course, even upon any Account, Mis∣carry.

Another Profitable Course might be for a Prince to set his Favourite his Bounds, afore-hand.* 1.352 As for the Purpose; that in such and such Particulars, concerning Law, and Religion, or wherein his Peculiar Interest is concern'd; he never pre∣sume to move him above Once; and that in certain Other Cases, he presume not to move him at all. By these means, the Favourite is minded of his Duty, the Prince of his Digni∣ty: and both secur'd; the One from the Hazard of Grant∣ing too much; the Other from the Temptation of Asking it. So far from being Impracticable, is This Proposition; that on the contrary, 'tis Obvious and Easie. As for Instance.

There are some things which a King cannot Grant as a Christian; Others, which he cannot Grant as a King: and some again, which he cannot Grant as a Wise man. So that Reserving to himself, a Freedom (even from Sollicitati∣on) in These Niceties of Conscience, Honour, and Convenience; the Favourite may make his Best of the Rest.* 1.353 The Rela∣tion betwixt a Governour, and his People, is like That of Man, and Wife: A man may take his Friend into his Arms, but not into his Bed. To make an end of This; That Fa∣vourite that presses his Master to any thing which evidently exposes him, to Contempt or Hatred, does probably Design his Ruin.

To run through the whole Body of Humane Frailties, would be too Tedious; Let it suffice, that Those Vices (whether Devillish, or Brutish) which in a Private man, are Mischievous, or Shamefull, are much more so in a Person ar∣med with Power to Execute the Malice, and qualified with an Eminence, to Recommend a lewd Example.

Where a Great Trust is committed to a Weak Person; It matters not much to the Publick, whether he be True, or False: for Futility, in him, has the Effect of Treachery in a∣nother: The One Blabs his Masters Secrets, and the Other Betrayes them.

The Third Hazard from the Over-greatness of One Counsel∣lour,* 1.354 arises from the Influence of his Power, and Inclination upon the People: And That, either as to their Love, or Hatred. The Popular Part we have already done with: (that is, so far as it concerns the making of a Party to Him∣self; and the Remedies of That Danger) That which remains, shall be devided into Pride, Coveteousness, and Misadvise.

It is seldom seen, that a Proud man in Power,* 1.355 is not withall Insolent, Vain, and Cruell. The first to his Superiours, where they will suffer it. The next to his Equalls, till they are sick of it. and the Third, to his Inferiours, till he is Hated for it.

A Favourite of this Temper, makes it his Glory to be thought the Dictatour to his Master: Disputing, Excusing, Cavilling, upon Mandates and Directions, (as Sir Francis Ba∣con) His style, is Ego & Rex Meus; and the Consequence of this boldness is to lessen the Soveraign in the Eyes of his Subjects.

It is harder for a Prince to Discover this Audacious Hu∣mour, then to Crush it;* 1.356 let but the King withdraw his Fa∣vour for one Moment, and of himself, he falls below the Scorn of those he lately Trampled on.

If he be Covetous; The Person of the Prince, and the Ho∣nour of the Nation are expos'd to Sale:* 1.357 and the People sque∣zed to fill his Coffers, till they have not Bread left for their own Bellies.

We here suppose the Worst; add yet even these Extremi∣ties, are not quite Deplorate, and Helpless. Spunges will Spue, as well as Suck; and 'tis but the Monarch's sending of the Popular Assembly in quest of the Publick Treasure, to fetch it up again.

Now whence proceeds this Mischief, but from Misadvise? not want of Prudence, but of Enformation: or which is worse;* 1.358 from Tales fram'd to the Passion, and Advantage of the Teller. He's made an Enemy to the State, that's not a Friend to this or that Design. Dangers are Pretended, where there are none; and Security, where there are: And (which is the Curse of these Ill-Offices) the Wisest, and the Bravest of Princes, are subjected to Delusion, and Surprize, in Common with their Contraries. Could Solomon's Wisdom tell him which of the Two Harlots was the Mother of the Child,

without a further means of Decision? Or Could Caesar's Courage oppose the Fate of the Senate? In Matters of Fact, Princes, as well as Others, are to be Instructed by Report; and if from a Person whom they have Reason to believe, they receive notice of a Matter whereupon they have not▪ Time to Deliberate; their Proceedings are to be directed by the fairest appearance of that Relation. In fine, if a Servant will betray his Master, there's no avoiding it, for he must trust somebody. [Remember well saies Sir Francis Bacon in a Letter of Advice to the late Duke of Buckingham) the great trust you have undertaken;* 1.359 you are as a Continual Centinell, alwaies to stand upon your Watch, to give him (the King) True Intelli∣gence. If you Flatter him, you betray him; If you Conceal the Truth of those things from him which concern his Iustice, or his Honour, (although not the safety of his Person) you are as dan∣gerous a Traytor to his State, as he that rises in Arms against him.]

If such as only withdraw their Allegeance from their Prince, are so Criminal; how much are they to blame then, that, where his Conscience, Life, and Dignity, lie all at stake, abuse, and misposses him! That cry; Not that way Sir, for the Lord's sake, go this way rather! and so betray him, from his Guards into an Ambush.

But Centaurs are scarce more Monstrous in Nature, then these men are in Manners; and I may seem perhaps very hard driven for want of work, to employ my time in search∣ing out of Remedies, for Mischiefs so Improbable. Truly his Conceipt, that imputes the Omission of a Law against Parri∣cides, to a Presumption that the Crime would never be com∣mitted, does not at all divert me from believing, that Pru∣dence is to provide for the Worst:* 1.360 and nothing left to Chance, that may be secur'd by Counsell. Wherefore, I proceed to my Prevention.

Since the only Certainty of what is Done, or Said, comes from the Eye, or Ear; and that the Soveraign cannot be every where; so that he must either give Credit to Relation; or know nothing of Affairs at a Distance; let us Consider, by what means a Prince may most probably escape the Snares of a Mis-enformer.

To advise upon the Choice of the Instrument; is but to say, Chuse an Honest man, and he'l not betray you: And not

to let any man deceive you twice, is but the After-game of Wisdom; for the First Errour may be Fatall. We must look- out some other Course then, and a better I know none, then a Strict Iustice, and Severity, of Reward, and Punishment.* 1.361 A False Intelligencer is as bad as a Spy. Wherefore, let a Prince suppress Calumnies, and encourage Accusations, that he may not take his Friends for his Enemies, and his Enemies for his Friends. What can be a greater Injury to the Soveraign's Ho∣nour, then by a false Story, to cause him Love where he should almost Hate, and Hate where he should Love? Punish where he should Reward, and Reward where he should Punish? It breaks the Heart of Loyalty, this sad Mistake, and strengthens the Hands of Treason. Who would dare to put these Affronts upon Majesty, and Innocence, if upon Detecti∣on, the Scandall were made as dangerous to the Reporter, as the Consequence to the Sufferer? And This we take for a suffi∣cient Mean, to keep Malitious Buzzes from the Ears of Princes.

But This is but the work half-done; for there are certain Truths as Necessary to be Told,* 1.362 as are these Calumnies to be Conceal'd; and where the Undertaker of the Office, runs a far greater Risque to serve his Prince, then the Other does to Ruin him. These Offices are discharg'd, by Mercenary Per∣sons, for Reward; and by the Worthier Sort, for Reverence-Sake, and Duty. So that betwixt the Fear of Punishment, the Hope of Benefit, and the rare Integrity of Those that stand firm without considering Either; a Prince may easily secure himself of Good Advise, and Right Intelligence; and That, (at least within himself) amply suffices to his Establish∣ment.

That Kings are Men; who Doubts? And 'tis as much Their Duty to Remember it, as 'tis Their Subjects, not to be too Prying into the Slips of their Humanity. Their Clergy are to Prescribe to their Souls; Their Physicians, to their Bo∣dies; and their Counsellours are to Advise in Point of Go∣vernment: But 'tis within the Pale of every Private Man's Commission, to offer his Intelligence. As for Example; Sup∣pose a Counsellour of State denyes the Kings Supremacy.* 1.363 Shall it be counted Sawciness in a Particular Person to acquaint the Monarch with it? We'l make an end with this. That State is in an ill Condition, where he that would save his Prince, must ruin himself: and where One Party is bolder to do the King Mischiefi,

then the Other is to do him Good. It is now high time to take another Step; and we'l stay but a Moment upon it.

Subsection II. How to frustrate a Combination of Divers Counsellors.

THe Dangers of a Combination in Divers Counsellors, are, in Respect of their Power and Priviledges; their Credit, their Dependencies, (either by Office or Expectation) Their Opportunities of Concealing or Protecting their Friends. And finally, in Respect of their Intelligence betwixt the State, and the Faction.

This Confederacy is so liable to be Discover'd, so danger∣ous to be Suffer'd, and so easie to be disorder'd, that it is scarce worth the while, to speak to so Manifest an Inconve∣nience. In little; if they are not Removed as they are found Faulty; Disgrac'd, as they appear Bold; or Secluded from such Consultations as properly concern the Difference in Que∣stion: It will be a hard matter for a Prince to struggle with a Faction that is assisted by so many Advantages. If it were nothing else but the meer point of Intelligence; it were e∣nough to Endanger the Crown; to have a Faction privy to all the Counsells, Resolves, Deliberations, and Necessities of the Monarch.

In the Lower Region of the Court,* 1.364 we have supposed Three sorts of People, that may Occasion Great Inconveniences: to wit; Insatiate Beggers; Corrupt Officers; and Ill Paymasters, I might have added two more; that is, Men of Ill Lives, and of Ill Principles. The First of these Five; I thought to have plac'd in the Vpper Division; but it Commonly belongs to Both; only These Beg oftner; the Other more: and to speak the truth of the business, where this trade is in Fashion, it may be observ'd, that there are not above Four or Five Beg∣gers in Chief,* 1.365 and the Rest Beg under them; as it falls out sometime in Popular Representatives; A few Get up, and the Rest Truckle.

Where This Humour is much Indulg'd, the Consequence of it, is not only Faction, within the Walls, but a General Dis∣contentment, and Necessity throughout the Nation: For when the Ordinary ways of Profit are dispos'd of, Recourse is had

to Project, and Invention; which, if not very tenderly me∣naged, leaves the King a sad Loser at the Foot of the Accompt. Beside, that it Anticipates the Prince his Generosity, and by Exacting, rather then Obtaining, takes away the Freedom of his Choice, and Bounty.

The way for a Prince to Help This, is either to put a Stint upon the Suitour, or a Restraint upon his Proper Good∣ness; and even where he is Resolved to Give, not to do it so∣dainly; lest he appear to Give for the Asking, without consi∣dering the Merit, (Harry the Great, of France, prohibited Beg∣ging beyond such a Limit.

Let him farther have a Particular care of Persons that grow Proud upon his Favours: The same weakness of mind that makes them Proud, will quickly make them Sawcy too: and the reason is, they think they have got the better of him.

Corrupt Officers are Another Pest of a Court,* 1.366 and Bane of a State: unless timely look'd after; and Then, the Publike may be the Better for them. And 'tis no ill Policy in some Cases, to let Them Squeeze for a while, that they may be worth the Squeezing Themselves:* 1.367 for no Supply is more ac∣ceptable to the Generality, then That which is Levy'd upon their Oppressors.

The miserable Consequence of Ill-Payment, we have briefly touch'd upon, Pag. 73. The Reason of Ill-Payment is com∣monly Ill-Pay;* 1.368 and Many must needs get Nothing, when a Few get All: from which vast Inequality, arise Factions and Want. The best Remedy for This Evil, is, first to Enable Them to Pay, and then to leave them to the Law if they Refuse. For Protections are only so far Necessary to the Dignity of a Court, as they consist with the Peace and Iustice of a Nation: that the Priviledge appear not an Affront to the Law.

When a Court Pays Ill, it had need Live Well; for when People are Poor, they grow Conscientious; and for want of Money apply themselves to hearken after Religion:* 1.369 The Se∣verest of all Reformers being a Necessitous Multitude. Espe∣cially, let them abstain from Costly Sins; for to Expend much, and Pay Nothing, is a most distastful Incongruity.

We come now to that Canker of the Government, under the Shadow of the Governour: the Ill-Principled Courtier:* 1.370 who not only causes Sedition, but is Himself the very Tincture of it. You must Expect to see all look Pale and Wither'd, where

This Worm lies suching at the Root. Can a Prince be safe, that's serv'd by his Enemies? Or a People Happy when the Soul of the Publike is in Danger? Yet, in some Cases, there may be Reason of State; and That known only to the Sove∣raign, for which some Persons, in Exception to This General Rule, may be admitted. Saving Those very Individuals, it may behove the Prince not to let any-one of the Rest escape, without a Strict Enquiry; both by what Means, and to what likely End they are There Plac'd and Entertain'd. Which if he does, and Early too; before the whole Lump has taken the Leaven; 'tis more than an Even Lay, that he'll find Reason to Remove Them. Now to the Camp.

Sect. IV. How to Prevent Disorders arising from the CAMP.

THE Dangers from the Camp,* 1.371 are Principally these Three; Mutiny, Revolt, or Popular Risings, (provoked by the Oppression or Insolence of the Souldiery) Of These, in their Order.

Mutinies may be Caus'd by Want of Pay;* 1.372 some defect of Discipline; by New-Modelling; Disbanding; Disgrace, &c. And all These Disorders may be procur'd by the Artifice of some particular Persons that aim at an Advantage by them.

That Prince that Raises an Army which he cannot Pay Himself, raises it (in effect) for some body else that can. In short, a very great Hazard it is, to have the Souldiery Depen∣dent upon any Other Interest then That of the Monarch. Where it so falls out, that a Prince lies subjected to the Double Inconvenience, both of having an Army, and of Want∣ing Mony; Let him be sure of a most Exquisite Choice of Offi∣cers, both for Honesty, and Ability: That the Body likewise may be well Chosen, and well Govern'd. For he has enough to do, that undertakes to keep his Troops in Order, with∣out Pay; but if they want Affection too, the Point is Despe∣rate. This is the Nick of Danger, and Temptation; for a Necessitous Army, of This Mixture, is any man's Mony that

will offer for it: Wherefore in such a Juncture, a Monarch cannot be too wary, of all Popular and suspected Practices. Let him be sparing also, even in his Personall, and Private Expenses, at such a time as This: For Military Spirits are ap∣ter to take fire then Other People; and so distrust the Kind∣ness of their Master, if they observe that he has Mony for his Pleasures, and none for his Servants. An Observation, possibly neither Fit, nor True: However, when men are discontented, they look upon small kindnesses as Nothing, and they see Injuries Double.

The next hazard is, upon the Point of Discipline;* 1.373 which, in an unpaid Army, can very hardly be Preserv'd, but by the Exceeding Worthiness, and Prudence of the Officers. Nor by That neither, beyond their Interest and Credit of Persuad∣ing: for Punishment were Tyranny without Wages.

The New-Modelling of an Army is also a tickle Vn∣dertaking: and so is the Disbanding.* 1.374 The Former is the sharper Disobligation; but 'tis but Personall: The Latter is the more Dangerous, for it Destroyes the Trade: And the Perill is either from the Influence of some Chief Offi∣cers in the One; or from a Disposition common to all Military, as well as Naturall bodies, in the Other: that is, an Averseness to Dissolution. Both the One and the Other, are a work to be dispatch'd with as much Care, and with as little Noise, as possible: very Tenderly, and by Degrees.

If any Trouble be Apprehended from the Displacing of some Particulars,* 1.375 (as he may possibly ressent the Loss of Power; or the Disgrace of being singled out to lose it after such a Manner) 'tis but Casting out to him the Lure of a Better Office, or of a Higher Preferment: where∣in he may be more Serviceable to himself, and less Dan∣rous to the Publick. Or if he be too Crafty to stoop to That; the way is to begin with his Dependencies. This leaves him Naked; and the Other Satisfied: At least in shew, since to the World he appears rather Exalted, then Ejected.

Disbanding is a Nicer piece of business:* 1.376 The very Word is scarce to be Mention'd, till the Thing is Done. For 'though the State may be Iudge when 'tis Convenient to Raise an Ar∣my; the Souldiery are commonly the Iudges when 'tis time to

lay it down again. A Good Preparatory to This, is Modelling, and Dispersing, before they have the wind of the Design to prevent their uniting against it. And by Degrees; One Regi∣ment at a time▪ to keep the Rest Quiet, in hope of Continu∣ing. Let That be done by Lot too, for the Losing Party will sooner forgive a Mischance, then an Vnkindness. Touching Mutinies that proceed either from opinion of Disgrace; dis∣pute concerning Precedency, Command, Provision, Quarter, &c. they may be referr'd to want of Discipline.

The Causes of Revolts,* 1.377 may be as many as of Discontents: But the Principal, are either Fear, Despair, Revenge, or In∣constancy in the Common-Souldiery. And they may likewise be Procur'd, either by the Ambition, or Corruption of the Chief Officers.

The best Security against These General Defections,* 1.378 is in the Original Election, and Constitution of the Army. Wherefore let heed be taken (as near as may be) even to the fitness of the meanest Private Souldiour: which in a fair degree may be attain'd, by good choice of Valiant, Prudent, Vigilant, and Faithfull Officers. Why should a Kingdom be hazarded for a Trifle? How small a matter added to either side carries an Equall Balance! A Word, a Thought, an Imagination, a Mi∣stake turns the Fortune of the Day, and Decides the Battell. Is any thing more ordinary then a Panique Terrour, in a Croud of People? which, as Mr. Hobbs hints in his Leviathan; is only an Apprehension of Danger, in the first man that Runs; the Rest, Fearing, and Running by example, every man sup∣posing his Fellow to know why. At This Rate, Ten Cow∣wards may destroy Twenty Thousand Valiant men.

Against Despair; Arguments are best upon the Place: Re∣venge may be Prevented by a Generous, and Military Severity. So that they shall neither have any Provocation to the At∣tempt, nor Security in the Execution: But against Their In∣constancy there is no Remedy.

The mischieves which may arrive upon the account of Am∣bition, or Corruption, are searce to be Prevented, but by chusing Persons of an Impregnable Fidelity; or Otherwise the Fairest Bidder carries it. And against Popular Risings, nothing bet∣ter then a Strict Discipline; and an Impartiall Iustice betwixt the Souldiery and the Country. It does well also, to Interess Both Parties, (Civill, and Military) as fairly as possible, in

the Common Care of the Publick: For a Pure Military Force has the Face rather of an Enemy, then of a Guard: But where Persons of Eminent Repute, and Integrity in the Coun∣try are joyned in Commission with others as Eminent for Martial Affaires, Both sides are satisfi'd, and the Common Good better provided for.

Sect. V. How to Prevent, or Remedy Seditions arising from the CITY.

WHere the Metropolis is not well Season'd,* 1.379 and in good Or∣der, Many, and Great are the Advantages it has to Di∣sturbe a Government. It has Men, Mony, and Armes always at hand. But yet let a Prince, in his Greatest Distress, have a Care how he Abandons it; for 'tis by much a more dangerous Enemy at a Distance, then at Home.

The Ordinary Pretenses of a Troubled City, are either con∣cerning Religion, Oppression, Privileges, or Poverty, but still 'tis Ambition that sets the Wheel going; and it is the Mo∣narch's yielding at first, that destroyes him in the End. For while the Party is Tender, and Wavering; the Humour Cor∣vigible, and the Authority of the Prince, not as yet either exposed by Patience, or Prophan'd by Popular Contempt, and the Insolencies of the Rabble; Then is the time, to cut off all Possibility of Sedition. Murmurings are but the Smoak of Re∣bellion; the Fire's already in the Straw, but easily smother'd: That is, if seasonably look'd after: for if it break forth in∣to a Blaze, All the Buckets in the Town will hardly Quench it. The very first Mutterings against the Government, are but a pretty way of putting the Question; as who should say, Sir, May we Rebell? And the Forbearance of the Prince, seems to Answer them: Yes; Ye may. And Then, to work they go.

First, upon Religion: the most Dangerous,* 1.380 and the most wicked Quarrell in Nature. Is there a God?* 1.381 Or, Is there none? Let any Reasonable Rebell, whether Atheistick, or Religious, answer me. If a God there be; Upon what Nation will he power out the fierceness of his Wrath; Upon what Heads will he employ his Thunder? If not upon That Nation, where his Divinity is made a Stale; His Majesty Affronted in

all his Attributes: And upon Those Heads, that entitle the Basest of Corruptions to his Immaculate Purity; and the Di∣ctates of the Devill, to the Inspirations of the Blessed Spirit.

* 1.382Now to Those that say in their Heart, There is no God: They'l yet allow the Political Convenience of persuading the People otherwise. So that were This Freedom in Matters of Religion is permitted to the Multitude: Either the Abuse draws down a Vengeance from Heaven, or the Superstitious League among the People unites a Party against the Soveraign.

To deal frankly; All Seditions are to be imputed to Mis∣government:* 1.383 To the want of Early Care in the Magistrate. One Man begins; He Imparts himself to Others; They Conferr with Their Interests, and so the Mischief Branches it self, till it comes to Overspread a Nation. How easie a matter is it, to Smother a Spark in the Tinder-Box? A little Harder, to blow out a Candle: Harder yet, to put out the Fire. In short, when the Town is in a Flame, thank Him that neglected the first Spark.

The Prince that would prevent Schismaticall Seditions, in a City, must begin with the Clergy,* 1.384 and assure himself of the Pulpit. To say 'tis Dangerous; may in some Cases be a Truth. But Dangerous as it is; If it be more so, to let them Alone, What signifies that Objection? Suppose the Hazard almost des∣perate, on the One side: But there's a never failing Certainty on the Other: Here 'tis Hard; There 'tis Impossible. It is Necessary also to suppress Conventicles, Pamphlets, and all other Irregularities, which either Draw People together, or Vnite them, in Order to a Separation.

* 1.385In a Particular manner, let heed be taken, that the Ma∣gistracy of the City, consist of Persons Well-affected to the Government of the Church: And if they Struggle, let them be timely Taught, that the Liberty of their Charter, does not discharge the Bond of their Allegiance. This Strictness ought to be indispensible; for it is not to be Expected, that One Schis∣matick should Punish Another.

The Second Grievous Complaint is Oppression; and whe∣ther it be True or False, let it be strongly Vrg'd and Credited, 'tis the same thing.

Some Oppressions are Procur'd at the Instance of certain Ill Instruments about the Soveraign;* 1.386 on purpose to stir up the People against him. And this is done by shewing how Other

Princes hamper Their Capital Cities: Never considering, that the same manner of Governing will no more fit all Varieties of Custom, Temper, and Scituation, than the same Doublet and Hose will fit all Bodies. And then they Cry, This Damn'd City must be Humbled and Taken down. 'Tis very Right; but This must be spoken softly, and done warily. For to Le∣vel the Menace at the City, in stead of the Delinquent, is a great mistake. In such a Heat as This, a Prince needs no more than Three or Four Churlish and Rash Officers; Two on Three spiteful and Illegal Actions, to bring his Royalty in danger. Briefly; a Mean there is, betwixt Fury and Slumber; and equally ruinous to Princes, are Those Counsels that lead to either of These Extreams.

May not That very Thing which these People pretend they aim at, be done by Gentle, Legal, and Familiar Means? Let them Choose their own Officers; That pleases the City: But 'tis the Publick Care to see the Choice be Honest: and that secures the Prince. On the One side, no Clemency can be too great, that stands with the Rule of Government: On the O∣ther side, no Severity too strict, in Case of a Contumacy that Crosses it.

Burthensom Taxes are many times a Great Complaint, and sometimes a Iust One. Lighter, or Heavier they are ac∣cording to the various Humours of the Prince; and the dif∣ferent Exigencies of Times and Occasions; Nay, and accord∣ing to the differing Disposition in the People at several times, to understand them. Publick Necessities must be Supply'd; and the Supream Magistrate is the Iudge of Publick Necessities. Yet still where a more than Ordinary Levy is Necessary,* 1.387 the Ordinary way of Raising it may be Convenient: for the One way, they only stumble at the Present Burthen; but the O∣ther, they are startled with an Apprehension of the Perpe∣tuity of it. In which Case, it fares with Rulers, as it does with Racking Landlords, in Comparison with Those that Let better Penny-worths. The One has more in his Rental, but the Other has more in his Pocket: And the Reason is; the Tenants run away with the Rent.

Sir Francis Bacon is of Opinion, That [Taxes and Im∣posts upon Merchants, do seldom good to the King's Revenue; for that he wins in the Hundred, he loses in the Shire; the Par∣ticular Rates being Encreased, but the Total Bulk of Trading rather Decreased.]

Some Oppressions again there are, that proceed only from the violence of Extorting, and Corrupt Officers. To Com∣plaints against Abuses of this Quality, a Prince his Ear is to be ever Open; for it is in a Peculiar manner, his Duty, to Re∣lieve the Oppressed.

A Prince that Invades the Priviledges of a City,* 1.388 Breaks his Word: If they are Forfeited, he may Resume, or Remit at Pleasure: Otherwise, let them stand Sacred. It can never be safe to Govern ad Libitum: for when People find no Secu∣rity in Obedience, it puts them upon the Experiment of Sedition. If a Monarch has an Over-grown Subject, that he would be quit of; that he would Sacrifice to his Proper Advantage; let him but give him a Temptation to Encroach upon the Rights or Customs of his Imperial City: and if he take the Bait, let him Discover him, and bring him upon the Stage of a Publick Oppressor. Such an Action lays That City at his Feet. To Finish; That Prince that would have his Sub∣jects firm to Him, in Danger, must be Kind to Them, in Peace.

The Fourth and Last Motive to Sedition, is Poverty: A Terrible Enemy to a Great and Populous City;* 1.389 Nor is such a City, in Extream Want, a less Formidable Enemy to the Mo∣narch: for Hunger is neither to be Aw'd, nor Flatter'd.

The Causes of it are so many, and so incertain, 'tis hard to assign particular Remedies.* 1.390 In some Cases, Restraint of Build∣ing is convenient; In others, Sumptuary Laws; the Regula∣tion and Emprovement of Trade; The calling of Corrupt Mini∣sters to Account, &c.—For fear of the worst, it is good, if the Necessitous Party grow Numerous, for the Prince rather to make War with Them abroad, then to stay, till They make it upon Him, at Home; by That means, exchanging a Civil War, for a Forreign.

If the Mischief be too far gone, and that it breaks forth into a Direct Sedition; yet can it very hardly happen, that a Prince can warrant the forsaking of his Metropolis.

First, with Five Hundred Men he keeps a Million in Awe; That is, If He Himself, and his whole Party, be not Coup'd up under the same Roof, They can Destroy Him, by Number; and He, Them, by Fire; in case of being put to that last Extremity.

Next; Let the Prince but carry the First Scuffle, and (the World to nothing) the Town is his own. Whereas, let Him withdraw; so great is the Advantage he leaves to the Rebels, both as to the Readiness, and Proportion of Men, and Provisions for War; that (at a Distance) he may get the Better of Five or Six Pitch'd Battels, and yet Lose all at Last. For They shall sooner Re-enforce a Broken Army, than He Recruit a Scatter'd Regiment.

A Third Reason may be, that it lessens the Reputation of his Power, to give Ground.

We shall conclude with the Fourth; which is, That Citi∣zens will stand better, far from Home, than under their own Walls: for what with the Importunities of their Relations: Their Interests in view; and the Convenience of a Near Re∣treat; They Fight in Distraction. We speak here of a Ci∣vil War, for against a Forreign Force; These Reasons tran∣sport them into a more Determinate Obstination. From the City, now to the Country.

Sect. VI. How to Prevent Seditions from the COUNTRY.

IT is very rarely seen that the Country begins a Seditious Quarrel, unless in case of some Barbarous and Depopulating Tyranny, or for pure want of Bread. In Truth, their Busi∣ness is too Innocent, and They're so Full on't too, they have scarce Leisure from their Sleep and Labour to Think of Wrang∣ling; and when they do, they dread it. The hurt They do, is by Siding, and Seconding, and That Vnwillingly too: So that to keep Them Quiet, no more is Necessary, than to have an Eye upon their Patrons, and to allow the Common Sort only to Live upon their Labours.

Sect. VII. Certain CAUTIONS Directing how to Prevent and Avoid Dangers arising from the BODY REPRE∣SENTATIVE.

THere are Three Grand Hazards which Occur in the Consideration of a Body Representative. The Choice of the Persons; The Manage of Affairs; And the Subject Mat∣ter of their Consultations.

Touching the Choice; Regard must be first had to the Le∣gality;* 1.391 and Then, to the Prudence of it.: That the Candidate may be of such Age and Quality; and Chosen in such Manner, as the Law of the Place requires: And moreover, that he be a Person of Moral Integrity; A Lover of his Prince and Country; and One that Understands his Duty and Employ∣ment. There is a Duty also Incumbent upon the Electors; That they be not Corrupted by Money, Overborn by Importu∣nity, or Transported by Fear, or Favour, to an Vnworthy and Vnsuitable Choice. From the want of This Care and Fide∣lity, proceed many times the Ruine of Princes, and the Sub∣version of Kingdoms.

Before the Soveraign Summons This Grand Convention, he may consider how the Last Ended; the Present Temper of his People; and hold a Strict Intelligence concerning such Persons, and Fellowships, as are likely to Cross him.

If the Last Assembly Acted and Concluded to the Satisfaction of Himself and the Kingdom, he may Hope well of the Next: but if the Contrary, let him expect a Faction: Unless in the Intervall, he take off That Animosity: which may be attain'd by doing That Himself, as of his own meer Grace, and Mo∣tion, which may bear some Proportion with what they would have done by Their Deputies: but within the Bounds of Ho∣nour and Prudence,* 1.392 there's a great Difference; betwixt a King's Reforming of Abuses by Himself, and by his Counsell: In the One Case, it looks as if the People help'd Themselves: and makes them think better of their Own Authority, then they ought to do: In the Other, they find Themselves De∣pendent upon the Grace of the Soveraign, and ascribe the

Relief to his Bounty; In fine, it is no tamifs for a Prince still to usher in, the Call of his Great Assembly with some Parti∣cular Obligation upon his Subjects.

As to the Rest, if the Prince finds the Temper of the Peo∣ple Peevish, and Factions Boyling; such as no Clemency, and Goodness can Engage; the less Subject for Clamour he leaves them, 'tis the Better; and if upon Convening, he finds the Mixture Petulant, and Soure; he may with the less noise Dismiss them.

According to the Choice of Persons,* 1.393 will be the Manage of Affairs: The Publick Good; Particular Iustice, and the Dig∣nity of the Assembly, will be the Chief Care of a Good Choice: but if the Choice be Bad; These Noble Offices, and Regards,* 1.394 will be the Least part of their Business. They fall then into Partialities, and Sidings; Help me to day, and I'le Help you to morrow. Acts of State will be Bias'd by Particular Interests: Matters Concluded by Surprize, rather then by any formal Determination; and the Reverence of Order, and Reason will be dash'd out of Countenance, by the Voicings of Faction, and Clamour.

As Politick Bodies have no Souls, so Publick Persons should have no Bodies: but leave those Impediments of Iustice, and Distractions of Counsell; (Project and Passion) at the Dore of the Senate. In short; where such a Partiality happens,* 1.395 as we here Imagine, the Two main Mischiefs are These: The Iniquity of the end, or the Disorder of the Means. The For∣mer may in some Measure be Prevented, by an Oath to deal Vprightly: (but the Grand Failing was in the Election.) The Latter may be Regulated by such a Clearness of Rule and Method; together with such a Strictness in the Observation of That Rule, that both Every man may know his Duty, and no man dare to Transgress it.

But Concerning the Subject Matter now of their Consulta∣tions: There lies the Peril, when they come to reach at Af∣fairs Forreign to their Cognisance. The Hazard is This; step by step, They Eneroach upon the Soveraign; Claiming a Right to One Encroachment, from the President of another. So that Meeting with an unwary Prince, they Steal away his Prerogative by Inches; and when perchance His Successor comes to Resume his Right; That Pilfery is call'd the Liberty of the Subject, and There's a Quarrel started betwixt the

King and his Subjects. Then comes the Doctrine in Play, That Kings are Chosen for the Good of the People, and that the Discharge of that Trust and Care is the Condition of his Royalty. The very Truth is, All Government may be Ty∣ranny. A King has not the Means of Governing, if he has not the Power of Tyrannizing.* 1.396 Here's the short of the Mat∣ter: We are certainly Destroy'd without a Government, and we may be Destroy'd with One: So that in Prudence, we are rather to choose the Hazard of a Tyranny, than the Cer∣tainty of being worry'd by One-another. Without more words, The Vulgar End of Government is, to keep the Mul∣titude from Cutting One-anothers Throats: which they have ever found to be the Consequence of Casting off their Go∣vernours.

When Popular Conventions have once found This Trick of gaining Ground upon the Soveraign; they catch their Prin∣ces, commonly as they do their Horses, with a Sieve, and a Bridle: (a Subsidy, and a Perpetual Parliament) If They'll take the Bit, they shall have Oats. But These are the Di∣ctates of Ignorance and Malice: for such is the Mutual Tye and Interest of Correspondency betwixt a Monarch and his People; that Neither of them can be Safe or Happy, without the Safety and Felicity of the Other.

The best way to prevent the Ill Consequence of the Peoples Deputies acting beyond their Orb, is Clearly, and Particu∣larly, to State Those Reserves of the Prerogative, with which they are not to Meddle. And likewise to set forth the Metes and Bounds of their own Priviledges, which They themselves are not to Transgress.

FINIS.

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Notes

• * 1.1

  The Matter o•• Sedition.
• * 1.2

  The Causes of it.
• * 1.3

  The Remedy.
• * 1.4

  Contempt more fatal to Kings than hatred.
• * 1.5

  Poverty breeds Sedi∣••on.
• * 1.6

  A numerous Nobility cau∣seth poverty.
• * 1.7

  Fears and Jea∣lousies.
• * 1.8

  The dangers of Libels.
• * 1.9

  Sir F. B.
• * 1.10

  The Rise of the late War.
• * 1.11

  The first Tu∣mult against the Service-book.
• * 1.12

  The Covenan∣ters Usurp the Supream Au∣thority.
• * 1.13

  The Instituti∣on of the Scot∣tish Covenant.
• * 1.14

  The promo∣ters of it.
• * 1.15

  Hist. Indep. Appendix, pag. 14.
• * 1.16

  The Covenant a Rebellious Vow.
• * 1.17

  A Plea for Treason.
• * 1.18

  The Usurpati∣ons of the Co∣venanters.
• * 1.19

  A Pacification with the Scots.
• * 1.20

  Their Infi∣delity.
• * 1.21

  They enter England.
• * 1.22

  The influence of the Scotish Army, and the City-tumults, upon the Long Parliament.
• * 1.23

  The two Hou∣ses usurp the Militia.
• * 1.24

  The Rebellion begins at Hull.
• * 1.25

  The Kings de∣fence of him∣self, Voted a War against his Parlia∣ment.
• * 1.26

  Teasonous Prositions of the two Houses.
• * 1.27

  Deposing Pro∣positions of Iune 2.
• * 1.28

  Che Cause of the War, was Ambition.
• * 1.29

  The Rabble were the Pil∣lars of the Cause.
• * 1.30

  Religion the pretence.
• * 1.31

  Their Zeal agaidst Po∣pery.
• * 1.32

  The Method of the Refor∣mation.
• * 1.33

  Rebellion di∣vides God and the King.
• * 1.34

  Scandal Em∣proved,
• * 1.35

  and Invented.
• * 1.36

  The late King was betray'd by presbyteri∣ans in his Counsel.
• * 1.37

  A Dear peace, the cause of a long War.
• * 1.38

  Tria priciipia.
• * 1.39

  The Method of Treason.
• * 1.40

  Rebellion be∣gins in Confu∣sion, and ends in Order.
• * 1.41

  The English follow the Scottish pat∣tern.
• * 1.42

  The prologue to the late War.
• * 1.43

  Loyalty per∣secuted.
• * 1.44

  Rebellion re∣warded.
• * 1.45

  The King goes for Scotland.
• * 1.46

  His Welcome at his Return.
• * 1.47

  The King Af∣fronted by Tu∣mults first; And Then for complaining of them.
• * 1.48

  The Presbyte∣rians ruin'd by their own Ar∣guments.
• * 1.49

  England a Free-State.
• * 1.50

  Quarrels with the Dutch.
• * 1.51

  The Long Parliament dissolved.
• * 1.52

  Barebones Parliament: Their Acts.
• * 1.53

  Their Zeal.
• * 1.54

  Their Dissolu∣tion.
• * 1.55

  The corrupti∣on of a Con∣venticle, is the General of a Protector.
• * 1.56

  Cromwell In∣stalled, and Sworn Pro∣tector.
• * 1.57

  A Councell of one and Twen∣ty.
• * 1.58

  Cromwells Ma∣steries.
• * 1.59

  The Founda∣tion of Crom∣wels Great∣ness.
• * 1.60

  Cromwels Cha∣racter.
• * 1.61

  Cromwell Je∣lous of his Counsell.
• * 1.62

  And of his Ar∣my.
• * 1.63

  Oliver erects Major-Gene∣rals, and then fools them.
• * 1.64

  The Persecuti∣on of the Ca∣valiers.
• * 1.65

  Cromwels Test of the House.
• * 1.66

  The Recogni∣tion.
• * 1.67

  Cromwels de∣sign upon St. Domingo, Disa∣strous.
• * 1.68

  Blake makes amends at Tu∣nis.
• * 1.69

  His Success a∣gainst the Plate-Fleet near the Bay of Cadiz.
• * 1.70

  Addresses.
• * 1.71

  Oliver's Kin∣dred stood his Friends.
• * 1.72

  The Petition and Advice to Declare his Successor.
• * 1.73

  Oliver's Other House.
• * 1.74

  privy-Council.
• * 1.75

  Revenue.
• * 1.76

  Cavaliers in∣capable of Office.
• * 1.77

  Cromwell In∣stalled Pro∣tector.
• * 1.78

  Olivers Other House.
• * 1.79

  Enraged the Commons.
• * 1.80

  Thenew Peers.
• * 1.81

  The Commons pick a Quarrell with the Other House.
• * 1.82

  Olivers heart-breaking cross.
• * 1.83

  He Fools the City of London.
• * 1.84

  Addresses.
• * 1.85

  Barbarous Cruelties.
• * 1.86

  Cromwells Death.
• * 1.87

  Olivers Ma∣ximet.
• * 1.88

  Richard Re∣cognized up∣on condition.
• * 1.89

  Each of the Three Parties Enemy to the Other Two.
• * 1.90

  The Army Ruffles the House.
• * 1.91

  The House Opposes the Army.
• * 1.92

  Richard dis∣solves his Par∣liament.
• * 1.93

  And is laid a∣side himself.
• * 1.94

  The Army ac∣knowledge their backsli∣dings.
• * 1.95

  And invite the old Parliament to sit again.
• * 1.96

  The Rump.
• * 1.97

  The Armies Petition.
• * 1.98

  The Faction flies high.
• * 1.99

  The Rump and the Army Clash.
• * 1.100

  The Rump thrown out.
• * 1.101

  The Army settles a Com∣mittee of Safety.
• * 1.102

  General M. Secures Scot∣land.
• * 1.103

  Hewsons Inso∣lence toward the City.
• * 1.104

  Hazelrigg sei∣zes Portsmouth
• * 1.105

  The Rump sits again.
• * 1.106

  Lambert and his Party sub∣mit.
• * 1.107

  The City re∣fuse to Levy Monies.
• * 1.108

  The Rump of∣fended with the City.
• * 1.109

  The Secluded Members re-admitted.
• * 1.110

  Cromwel's Rise to the Sove∣raignty.
• * 1.111

  What hin∣dred his E∣stablishment.
• * 1.112

  He w••••l Gene∣rally Hated.
• * 1.113

  The war with Spain was an Oversight.
• * 1.114

  A Standing Army dange∣rous.
• * 1.115

  The Rise of Cromwels Stan∣ding Army.
• * 1.116

  Exact Collect. Pag. 44.
• * 1.117

  Ibid.
• * 1.118

  The Conse∣quences of the House of Com∣mons Guard.
• * 1.119

  The Effects of a Standing Army.
• * 1.120

  Note.
• * 1.121

  Exit The Rump.
• * 1.122

  All Factious unite against the King.
• * 1.123

  They divide.
• * 1.124

  And Subdivide
• * 1.125

  The Effects of a Military Government.
• * 1.126

  The English Impatient of Slavery.
• * 1.127

  This was cal∣culated for 1662.
• * 1.128

  It seems to be the Interest of France to maintain a Standing Ar∣my.
• * 1.129

  A Guard both Sutable and necessary about the Person of a King.
• * 1.130

  The Maries of France abus'd the Confidence of their Ma∣sters.
• * 1.131

  Pepin, the Son of a Powerfull Subject, depo∣sed his Prince, and sets up Himself.
• * 1.132

  The State of France.
• * 1.133

  The effects of a Standing Ar∣my in France.
• * 1.134

  A Standing Army more hazardous in England, than in France.
• * 1.135

  Alterations of Customs dan∣gerous.
• * 1.136

  Our Saxon Kings kept no Standing Army.
• * 1.137

  Nor Edmond Ironside.
• * 1.138

  Nor William the Conquerour.
• * 1.139

  Nor William Rufus.
• * 1.140

  Nor Hen. 3. Edw. 1. Edw. nor Ric. 2.
• * 1.141

  Nor the Hen∣ries 4, 5, 6, & 7.
• * 1.142

  Nor Hen. 8. Edw. 6. Queen Mary, nor Q. Eliz.
• * 1.143

  Nor K. James, nor Charles the MAR∣TYR.
• * 1.144

  Expedients to prevent or disappoint Dangers.
• * 1.145

  A Standing Army destru∣ctive to the Government.
• * 1.146

  An Army without Pay, is the most Dan∣gerous Enemy
• * 1.147

  Money is the Interest of the World.
• * 1.148

  What's the Benefit of a Standing Army.
• * 1.149

  The mischief and danger of it.
• * 1.150

  A Royal Guard neces∣sary and suffi∣cient.
• * 1.151

  With the timely execu∣tion of good Laws.
• * 1.152

  Conscience the strongest Tye.
• * 1.153

  The Rise of Schism.
• * 1.154

  The method of it.
• * 1.155

  The motion of Schism into Sedition.
• * 1.156

  The Design.
• * 1.157

  And Effect of it.
• * 1.158

  Note.
• * 1.159

  Qu. May an enemy to Bi∣shops exercise the Ministry?
• * 1.160

  Three Questi∣ons propound∣ded by King Charles the Martyr, con∣cerning Church Go∣vernment.
• * 1.161

  The derivati∣on of Episco∣pal Govern∣ment.
• * 1.162

  Christ's Man∣date to the Apostles.
• * 1.163

  Episcopacy unalterable.
• * 1.164

  Corruptio Opti∣mi, Pessima.
• * 1.165

  The method of Schism.
• * 1.166

  A Scandalous Clergy, makes a Seditious Layety.
• * 1.167

  Slander is the Sin and Pra∣ctice of the Devil.
• * 1.168

  Shun Appea∣rances of Scandal.
• * 1.169

  Ignorance a Species of Scandal.
• * 1.170

  Bishops bla∣med by the more blame∣able.
• * 1.171

  Fears and Jea∣lousies.
• * 1.172

  Bishops char∣ged with Pride, by the prouder Bre∣thren.
• * 1.173

  Conscience hnd Law go∣vern the World.
• * 1.174

  Occasions of Sedition.
• * 1.175

  Seditious Law∣yers and Schis∣matical Di∣vines are the most abomi∣nable Sedu∣cers.
• * 1.176

  Plotters of Se∣dition.
• * 1.177

  Are of three Sorts.
• * 1.178

  Usurpers.
• * 1.179

  Monarchoma∣chists.
• * 1.180

  Jesuited Puri∣tans.
• * 1.181

  Time is the best Tryal of Fidelity.
• * 1.182

  The Know∣ledge of Per∣sons, is more then the Un∣derstanding of Matters.
• * 1.183

  The Noblest Natures most easily Decei∣ved.
• * 1.184

  Abuses from Great Persons hardly Recti∣fy'd.
• * 1.185

  What he must do that under∣takes it.
• * 1.186

  The Art of Flattery.
• * 1.187

  Conscientious Sedition.
• * 1.188

  An Ambitious Person.
• * 1.189

  The Test of an Honest Favourite.
• * 1.190

  An ill sign.
• * 1.191

  Another as bad.
• * 1.192

  Note.
• * 1.193

  Mark again.
• * 1.194

  The Advanta∣ges of a Con∣federacy in Councell.
• * 1.195

  Their Method.
• * 1.196

  Rather to Countenance a Sedition, then Head it.
• * 1.197

  How to know the Faction.
• * 1.198

  By their Haunts.
• * 1.199

  By their Ca∣bales.
• * 1.200

  By their De∣bates.
• * 1.201

  By their Do∣mesticks.
• * 1.202

  By their Fa∣vourites.
• * 1.203

  The Composi∣tion of a fit In∣strument for a Corrupt States-man.
• * 1.204

  By their Con∣versation and Behaviour.
• * 1.205

  An honester sort of Ill Sub∣jects.
• * 1.206

  A Caveat to Courtiers.
• * 1.207

  The Politicks of the Vulgar.
• * 1.208

  The Effects of Corruption in a Court.
• * 1.209

  Court-Beggers
• * 1.210

  Non-payment of Debts.
• * 1.211

  The Interests of the Souldie∣ry.
• * 1.212

  An Ambitious Commander does better A∣broad then at-Home.
• * 1.213

  A Holy War is a Contradicti∣on.
• * 1.214

  Hazard not a Rebellion in one Place, for fear of a Sedi∣tion in ano∣ther.
• * 1.215

  The Consti∣tution of a Guard-Royall.
• * 1.216

  Court and Ci∣ty seldom a∣gree.
• * 1.217

  The Reason of it.
• * 1.218

  The Power of a City.
• * 1.219

  The Manner of Preparing the People for Se∣dition.
• * 1.220

  A Seditious Principle.
• * 1.221

  The King only Accountable to God, and the People to the King.
• * 1.222

  Cursed be the Sons of Cham.
• * 1.223

  Religious Se∣dition, either referring to Heresie, or Schism.
• * 1.224

  Rebellion up∣on a point of Heresie, more Pardonable, then That from Schism.
• * 1.225

  Seditions ari∣sing from Schism.
• * 1.226

  The Means of provoking Se∣dition.
• * 1.227

  The Advanta∣ges of Great Towns for Seditions.
• * 1.228

  Cities are in∣clinable to Se∣ditions, from the Temper of the Inhabi∣tants.
• * 1.229

  Religions In∣novatours be∣gin with Wo∣men.
• * 1.230

  Four Reasons why.
• * 1.231

  A Zealous Si∣ster.
• * 1.232

  And her Con∣fessour.
• * 1.233

  A Shee-Prose∣lyte.
• * 1.234

  Oppression causes Sedi∣tion.
• * 1.235

  A Presbyte∣rian Trick.
• * 1.236

  The Politick Hypocrite.
• * 1.237

  Loyalty is In∣dispensable.
• * 1.238

  Citizens are tender of their Privi∣ledges.
• * 1.239

  Principally in point of Trade
• * 1.240

  Their Immu∣nities are Pre∣carious.
• * 1.241

  Neither Prince nor People can be secure but by Agreement.
• * 1.242

  Poverty an Ir∣resistible In∣centive to Se∣dition.
• * 1.243

  The most dan∣gerous Po∣verty.
• * 1.244

  Corruption the Cause of Scarcity.
• * 1.245

  Private Hoards∣breed Publick Penury.
• * 1.246

  The Compo∣sition of wick∣ed Ministers of State.
• * 1.247

  The Misery of them.
• * 1.248

  If either they look back;
• * 1.249

  Forward;
• * 1.250

  Round about;
• * 1.251

  Above them▪
• * 1.252

  Below: or within them.
• * 1.253

  The Sollici∣tous estate of the Guilty.
• * 1.254

  Taxes may cause or occa∣sion a Scarcity divers ways.
• * 1.255

  Subjects are to Obey without Disputing.
• * 1.256

  Leave no Mark standing to remember a Discourtesie by. Josh. 4.6.
• * 1.257

  Shifting passes for Wisdom.
• * 1.258

  Excessive Building.
• * 1.259

  Knavery of Tradesmen.
• * 1.260

  The Country is sure to be undone by a War.
• * 1.261

  The Fruits of it.
• * 1.262

  A Discontent∣ed Nobleman.
• * 1.263

  Ambition.
• * 1.264

  Pride.
• * 1.265

  Revenge.
• * 1.266

  The Rich Churle.
• * 1.267

  The Contenti∣ous Free-born Subject.
• * 1.268

  The Dange∣rous mixture of a Represen∣tative.
• * 1.269

  The Designing Party.
• * 1.270

  Their Indu∣stry and Com∣bination.
• * 1.271

  The Matter they work upon.
• * 1.272

  Their manner of Proceeding.
• * 1.273

  The Permit∣ters of Sedi∣tious Con∣trivements.
• * 1.274

  The Deserters of their Trust are taken off
• * 1.275

  by Profit,
• * 1.276

  Pleasure,
• * 1.277

  Vanity,
• * 1.278

  by Sloth and Neglect,
• * 1.279

  by Partiality.
• * 1.280

  Passion.
• * 1.281

  Fear,
• * 1.282

  or Personal Animosity.
• * 1.283

  Fools are fit Instruments for Knaves.
• * 1.284

  Love and Re∣verence are the Pillars of Majesty.
• * 1.285

  The Power of a Prince de∣pends upon the Love of his People.
• * 1.286

  The Grounds of Sedition.
• * 1.287

  Let a Prince Stick to his Laws, and his People will stick to him.
• * 1.288

  The Oath of Protecting, im∣plies a Power of Protecting.
• * 1.289

  Where a King has it not in his Power to Oppress his People▪ They have it in Theirs to de∣stroy their King.
• * 1.290

  A Mixture of Indulgence, and Severity, Obliges the Loyal, and Aws the Re∣fractary.
• * 1.291

  The Influence of Prudence and Courage.
• * 1.292

  A Prince that bears Affronts, and Familiari∣ties from his Subjects, Les∣sens himself.
• * 1.293

  How to hinder the Spreading of a Seditious Humour.
• * 1.294

  Let a Prince keep an Eye over Great Assemblies.
• * 1.295

  Let him be Quick,
• * 1.296

  and Watchful.
• * 1.297

  The most dan∣gerous of all Seets.
• * 1.298

  A sure way to prevent Schism.
• * 1.299

  Have a Care.
• * 1.300

  The Presbyte∣rians Set-form.
• * 1.301

  And Method.
• * 1.302

  Their Mode∣sty.
• * 1.303

  The means of Preventing Schism.
• * 1.304

  Object. Petition for Peace▪ pag. 4, 5.
• * 1.305

  Answ. The Hazards of Toleration.
• * 1.306

  The Founda∣tion of Pres∣bytery.
• * 1.307

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. pag. 3.
• * 1.308

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 239.
• * 1.309

  Let Pagans blush at These Christians.
• * 1.310

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 263.
• * 1.311

  The Growth of Schism.
• * 1.312

  A Noble Re∣solve.
• * 1.313

  Let the Prince Reform be∣time.
• * 1.314

  And Impar∣tially.
• * 1.315

  Ambition is the Cause, no matter what's the Cry.
• * 1.316

  Corrupt Di∣vines and Lawyers are in the forlorn of all Rebel∣lions.
• * 1.317

  But the Con∣trary, are the Pillars and Blessings of Society.
• * 1.318

  The Common Crime of Vi∣tious Lawyers is, Avarice.
• * 1.319

  The Basest of Corruptions.
• * 1.320

  An Ignorant Judge is a Dangerous Minister.
• * 1.321

  And so is a Timorous.
• * 1.322

  A hard matter to make a good Choice.
• * 1.323

  A Rule to Choose by.
• * 1.324

  Hae nuga Seria ducunt in mala.
• * 1.325

  A way to pre∣vent Treaso∣nous Mistakes.
• * 1.326

  The Contri∣vers of Sediti∣ons are of Three Sorts.
• * 1.327

  The Puritan.
• * 1.328

  Religion is but Talk.
• * 1.329

  Every man for himself.
• * 1.330

  A Traytour is of no Religion.
• * 1.331

  No ill Story.
• * 1.332

  The Presbyte∣rian has gotten a Strain.
• * 1.333

  A Ceremony may be as well impos'd as a Tax.
• * 1.334

  Ambition dan∣gerous in a Favourite.
• * 1.335

  A Caution.
• * 1.336

  Ambition does better in a Souldier, then in a Counsel∣lour.
• * 1.337

  It is the Inte∣rest of a Prince to dispose of Offices by Par∣ticular Directi∣on.
• * 1.338

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Pag. 240.
• * 1.339

  How to crush an Insolent Favourite.
• * 1.340

  The Danger of a Favourite that upholds Faction.
• * 1.341

  And manage of his Design.
• * 1.342

  Sir F. Bacon.
• * 1.343

  How to disap∣point an Am∣bitious Design.
• * 1.344

  Favourites ne∣cessary to the Prince.
• * 1.345

  And desirable to the People.
• * 1.346

  Concerning the Choice of Servants.
• * 1.347

  Let them be Honest and Fit.
• * 1.348

  Of approved Loyalty to the Father.
• * 1.349

  Nor upon Re∣commenda∣tion.
• * 1.350

  Publick Na∣tures for Pub∣lick Places.
• * 1.351

  Not One to all Purposes.
• * 1.352

  Let a Prince set his Confi∣dent his Bounds afore-hand.
• * 1.353

  In Points of Conscience, Honour, and Convenience, let not a Fa∣vourite press the Soveraign.
• * 1.354

  The Danger of Over-greatness as to the People.
• * 1.355

  A Proud man in Power.
• * 1.356

  Easily crush'd.
• * 1.357

  A Covetous Great man.
• * 1.358

  The Mischief of False In∣telligence.
• * 1.359

  Good Advice to a Coun∣sellor.
• * 1.360

  Prudence pro∣vides for the worst.
• * 1.361

  Reward and Punishment keep People in Order.
• * 1.362

  Honest Truths are Dangerous.
• * 1.363

  A Case put.
• * 1.364

  The Lower Region of the Court.
• * 1.365

  Four or Five Beggars in Chief.
• * 1.366

  Corrupt Offi∣cers a Gene∣ral Pest.
• * 1.367

  An Excellent way of Raising Moneys.
• * 1.368

  Ill-pay the reason of Ill-payment.
• * 1.369

  Want of Mo∣ney makes People Religious.
• * 1.370

  The Ill-prin∣cipled Cour∣tier.
• * 1.371

  Dangers from the Camp.
• * 1.372

  How Mutinies may be caused.
• * 1.373

  Good Pay will bear good Discipline.
• * 1.374

  Modelling and Disbanding are dangerous.
• * 1.375

  How to New model an Army.
• * 1.376

  How to Dis∣band.
• * 1.377

  The Causes of Revolts.
• * 1.378

  A good Choice is the best Se∣curity against a Revolt.
• * 1.379

  The Danger of an Ill-order'd City.
• * 1.380

  Pretext of Re∣ligion is a dan∣gerous and wicked Quar∣rel.
• * 1.381

  Is there a God?
• * 1.382

  Or is there None?
• * 1.383

  All Seditions proceed from Misgovern∣ment.
• * 1.384

  Begin with the Clergy to prevent Schism.
• * 1.385

  Let the Magi∣stracy be well-affected.
• * 1.386

  Oppression procur'd by Ill-Instru∣ments.
• * 1.387

  Though the Levy be Ex∣traordinary, let the Way be Ordinary.
• * 1.388

  Priviledges are Sacred.
• * 1.389

  Poverty is a terrible Ene∣my.
• * 1.390

  The Prince not to forsake his Metropolis.
• * 1.391

  Let the Choice be Legal and Prudent.
• * 1.392

  Better the So∣veraign Re∣form, than the Councel.
• * 1.393

  The Effects of a good Choice
• * 1.394

  and of a bad.
• * 1.395

  The Mis∣chieves of Par∣tiality.
• * 1.396

  Better a Ty∣ranny, than an Anarchy.