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PRoceed we now, from the Greatness of One Counsellor, to the Combination of Divers: which (to vary the Phrase) is no other than a form'd Confederacy in the Councel against the Monarch. Wherein we shall briefly lay down; first, The Advantages of the Faction; the Method, next: And lastly, The Marks of it.
Their Advantages are great, and many; in Regard both
of their Priviledges, exempting them from Question;* 1.1 of their Power to offend their Enemies, and Protect their Friends; and in Consideration of their Opportunities to look into both hands, and play their Cards accordingly.
In their Method of proceeding,* 1.2 This is their Master-piece; not only to do all the hurt they can, under a colour of Good; but to Engage Persons of more Honesty, than Vnderstanding, in Offices, seemingly Serviceable, but Effectually Pernici∣ous to the Publick: By which Artifice, those that are Friends to the Government, do unwarily serve the Crafty Enemies of it; secretly undermining the Honour of the Prince, under Pretext of advancing his Profit; lessening his Power at Home, under the Disguise of making him more formidable Abroad; and where they cannot persuade an Interest, if it be consi∣derable, they will not stick to purchase it.
As to the rest, the Method is rather tacitly to Invite and Countenance a Sedition, than openly to Head it;* 1.3 and to En∣gage rather for it, then with it, till the hazard of the first on∣set be over. In truth, the first Essay of a Tumult is but a Tryal how the Ice will bear; and the Popular Faction in the Councel, is more concern'd, in case of a Disaster, how to bring their Friends Off, than to venture the leading them On, for fear of One. Whence it comes to pass, That by the Obli∣gation of Encouraging, and Preserving their Party, they are Cast upon a Scurvy Necessity of Discovering Themselves.
Their Marks are many; for they are known by their Haunts;* 1.4 by their Cabales; by their Debates; by their Domesticks; by their Favorites; and by their manner of Conversation, and Behaviour.
If there be any Schismatical Teacher that's Craftier, and Sly∣er then the Rest,* 1.5 you may be sure of my Lord's Coach at His Preachment: It gives a Reputation to the Conventicle, besides the Gracious Looks at Parting, that pass betwixt his Honour and the Brethren: which Enterchange, is but a secret way of Sea∣ling and Delivering a Conspiracy.
Look into their Cabales, and ye shall find them all of a Tribe, and Leaven; Close, Sedulous, and Vnited:* 1.6 Their dayly Meetings relishing of a Design, as being Compos'd rather for Councel, than Entertainment.
In their Debates,* 1.7 you'l know them by their Pleas, Shiftings, De∣layes, Extenuations, Distinctions, their, Frequent, and Industrious
Obstructions of Dispach in favour of Faction. By their Zealous Intercessions for the Enemies of the Prince, and their Coldness for his Friends; by their watchfullness to Seize all Opportunities of helping the Guilty, and of Surprizing the Innocent: by their in∣jecting of Snares, and Scruples, to Amuse, and Distract those that are for the Government, in Order to the Benefit of such as are against it; wherein it is worth a Note, that they all Vote the same way, and, without Question, to the same Purpose: for they shall sooner destroy a Loyal Subject upon a Calumny, than punish a Traytor Convict; and prosecute one man for Writing, or Saying, that it is possible for a Prince to have a Judas in his Counsell, when another shall scape unquestion'd, or perhaps be justifi'd, that calls his Soveraign a Tyrant; and defends the Murther of Kings.
They may be guess'd at likewise in some measure, by their Domesticks:* 1.8 Especially, by those of near Relation to Trust, Privacy, and Business; as Chaplains, Secretaries, &c. Nor is it enough to have it, like Master like Man, unless it be, like Lady like Woman too; for the pure strain must run quite Thorough, for fear of Tales out of School, and Discovering the Secrets of the Family. But This Rule is not Vniversal.
From their Favourites,* 1.9 much may be gather'd; first, from their Principles, and Abilities. And Then from the Frequen∣cy, Privacy, and Particularity of their Entertaining them.
The True Composition of a Confident fit for such a States∣man as we here speak of, is This.
He must be One that knows the Right, and Opposes it; for there is then less Danger of his Conversion,* 1.10 and Consequent∣ly, of Discovering his Patron. Let him be likewise a man of Sobriety, in his outward appearances; of Reputation with his Par∣ty; and well-grounded in the Niceties of the Controversie: he must be also a Master of his Passions, Peremptory in his mistakes; and (right or wrong) never without a Text at hand for his O∣pinions.
When a Person of This Character, repairs often to a Counsellour of State, a man may, without a Scandalum Magna∣tum, take the Boldness to suspect his business. But if to Frequency, be added Privacy, it makes the Matter worse; and These Instruments are commonly taken in by Owl-light, or at the Backdoor.
Nor is the Particularity they shew to this kind of Cattell
less Remarkable. Ye shall se a Factious Libeller, or Schisma∣tick taken into my Lords Closet, when a Person of Honour, and Integrity cools his heels in the Hall. One Lawyer admit∣ted, that has Got just as much by Betraying his Country, as A∣nother, (that is Rejected) has Lost by Serving it. Briefly; look through the Offices they dispose of, both Civil, and Military, and in the Persons you may see the Cause they Favour.
Another way of Detecting them, is from their Conversati∣on, and Behaviour.* 1.11 They take up other Looks, Phrase, Accent, Habit, Motion, Gesture, than their Neighbours. All which Together, are but a Certain Idiome, or Propriety, of the Faction.
Further; ye shall see a States-man, on the sodain, grow more Devout in Publick, then many an honest man is in Private; and Start from his Politicks, into Cases of Conscience. This Affords matter of Wonder, if not of Question: but observe him; and if he be more Scrupulous of Obeying the Law in some Cases, than he is of opposing it in Others, Pronunce him a Iugler.
So much for the Contrivers of Seditions.
Another sort there are of Honester Ill Subjects;* 1.12 a People, I mean, that Hate the Sedition it self, although they Love the Occasion of it. Than These, none make a Greater Conscience of Speaking Reverently of their Sovereign; yet none in shew more Careless what they make Others Think of him. Fiercer declaymers against Rebellion, there are not in the world; but do they Imagine that, it is no sin to Cause, what is so hor∣rid an Impiety to Commit? They'l say perchance, They do not Cause it; Yes, yes, there are that do. That is; there are In∣satiable Beggers, that suck like Leeches, till they Burst; Ask∣ing they very Bread out of the Mouths of Famishing Thousands; only to add unto their Private Superfluities, or furnish Orna∣ment for Luxe, and Vanity. Are not these Persons in a high Degree Accountable for the Effects of That Oppression?
If Those that follow Courts, would but Consider, how ma∣ny Snares beset the Thrones of Princes;* 1.13 what Envy waits upon their Trayn; how many Spyes upon the Actions of their Servants; They would tread warily. This is not yet to Blame all Courts, but where they are Vitious, or Corrupt, to shew the Desperate Events of those Disorders: whereof a General Poverty is not the least Considerable; and That ine∣vitably begets a General Discontentment.
But what's all This to a Sedition? Shall People Rebel because
they are Poor? No no, they should not; but what if they will do, what they ought not to do? [Let no Prince (says the Lord St. Albans) measure the Danger of Discontentments, by This; whether they be Just, or Unjust: for That were to Imagine People to be too Reasonable.] So that the Question is not, whe∣ther the Cause can warrant a Commotion; but whether pro∣bably it may Provoke one? And whether the Multitude will not rather Tumult, then Starve. It is not Here, Delirant Re∣ges, Plectuntur Achivi— but on the Contrary; Delirant A∣chivi, Plectuntur Reges; The Faults of Servants are Reveng'd upon the Heads of their Masters. But to Reason the Matter orderly, and by Degrees, take it Thus.
All men do naturally Covet Power; Partly for their Securi∣ty;* 1.14 and in Part, for Glory: not considering, that what Each Individual desires, All cannot enjoy; but finding Themselves Plac'd by Nature in a State of Equality, they are apt to Be∣lieve, that One man has as good a Title to Dominion as Ano∣ther: and from this Levelling opinion proceeds that Envy which we find Generally in the Common-People against their Governours.
Upon the same Grounds, they Contend for Liberty; and since they cannot Rule, they would at least be Free from the Restraint of Laws and Impositions. But this must not be, neither.
Why Then, let them but know the Bounds of their Sub∣jection, the Law, by which they are to be Govern'd. Yes, That they may; and when they are once enur'd, and wonted to the soft yoak of Political Order, and Authority; their fur∣ther Care is chiefly Profit, or Pleasure; and to provide them∣selves of such Conveniences, as to man's Life are either Necessa∣ry or Delightfull, and Here they Rest.
This is the summ of the Vulgar Politicks: Allow the People These Private Conveniences, and keep but the Priests, and Law∣yers, from Prating to them of Christian Liberty, and Fundamen∣tals; the Generality shall never trouble the State with Sediti∣ons: but he that strips them of their little Lavely-hood, rifles a Neast of Hornets. From whence ensues This double Mischief: A Great deal of Mony is drawn into a few hands; and a Great number of People are left without any at all: Two Hazards that might pose a wise Prince which rather to submit to.
As a General Poverty yields the most desperate matter for Sedition; so are the disorders of a Court the most likely means
to produce a General Poverty: and it is done, by Corruption. Begging, or Non-Payment of Debts.
Corruption is a great Dreyner; for he that Gives must Take; he that Buyes, will Sell.* 1.15 But the Influence which Corruption has, upon the Constitution and Morals of a Court, is more No∣torious; especially, if it begin Above; and in a place where the Honester Part is the Poorer. First, it facilitates the Intro∣ducing of a Faction; for he that designs to make a Party, shall be sure to out-bid him that only offers at an Office. Beside that it makes men Knaves in their own Defence; after a dear Bargain, to lick themselves whole again: and quenches the most generous Inclinations, by frustrating the bravest Acti∣ons; and conferring those Dignities, and Preferments upon unsuitable Persons for Mony, which are the Proper Rewards of Virtue, and Honour. In all these Transactions, the Prince is sold into the hands of his Enemies.
In short;* 1.16 Corruption does more Immediately expose a Mo∣narch, and Embroyle a Court; but Inordinate Begging does more Empoverish and distress a People: particularly, if the Request be preter-Legall, and pinching, either upon Trade or Tillage: in which cases the Benefit of a Single Person enters into Com∣petition with the Quiet, and Security of a Nation.
There is an Evill yet behind, which of all Evills, so trivial in appearance, is (possibly) of the most fatall,* 1.17 and malitious consequence: and That is, the Non-Payment of Debts: which not only draws upon a Court the most Violent of all Passions; (Envy, and Hatred) but upon Monarchy it self, a Popular Pre∣judice.
'Tis Dangerous, in regard both of the Quality, and Number of their Creditours; They are (for the most part) Citizens; Poor, and Many. They lie together in a Body, meet daily, conferring, and dispersing their Complaints, and Clamours: they Break at last, and Then they Tumult.
The Advanta∣ges of a Con∣federacy in Councell.
Their Method.
Rather to Countenance a Sedition, then Head it.
How to know the Faction.
By their Haunts.
By their Ca∣bales.
By their De∣bates.
By their Do∣mesticks.
By their Fa∣vourites.
The Composi∣tion of a fit In∣strument for a Corrupt States-man.
By their Con∣versation and Behaviour.
An honester sort of Ill Sub∣jects.
A Caveat to Courtiers.
The Politicks of the Vulgar.
The Effects of Corruption in a Court.
Court-Beggers
Non-payment of Debts.