A memento treating of the rise, progress, and remedies of seditions with some historical reflections upon the series of our late troubles / by Roger L'Estrange.

Sect. IV. How to Prevent Disorders arising from the CAMP.

THE Dangers from the Camp,* 1.1 are Principally these Three; Mutiny, Revolt, or Popular Risings, (provoked by the Oppression or Insolence of the Souldiery) Of These, in their Order.

Mutinies may be Caus'd by Want of Pay;* 1.2 some defect of Discipline; by New-Modelling; Disbanding; Disgrace, &c. And all These Disorders may be procur'd by the Artifice of some particular Persons that aim at an Advantage by them.

That Prince that Raises an Army which he cannot Pay Himself, raises it (in effect) for some body else that can. In short, a very great Hazard it is, to have the Souldiery Depen∣dent upon any Other Interest then That of the Monarch. Where it so falls out, that a Prince lies subjected to the Double Inconvenience, both of having an Army, and of Want∣ing Mony; Let him be sure of a most Exquisite Choice of Offi∣cers, both for Honesty, and Ability: That the Body likewise may be well Chosen, and well Govern'd. For he has enough to do, that undertakes to keep his Troops in Order, with∣out Pay; but if they want Affection too, the Point is Despe∣rate. This is the Nick of Danger, and Temptation; for a Necessitous Army, of This Mixture, is any man's Mony that

will offer for it: Wherefore in such a Juncture, a Monarch cannot be too wary, of all Popular and suspected Practices. Let him be sparing also, even in his Personall, and Private Expenses, at such a time as This: For Military Spirits are ap∣ter to take fire then Other People; and so distrust the Kind∣ness of their Master, if they observe that he has Mony for his Pleasures, and none for his Servants. An Observation, possibly neither Fit, nor True: However, when men are discontented, they look upon small kindnesses as Nothing, and they see Injuries Double.

The next hazard is, upon the Point of Discipline;* 1.3 which, in an unpaid Army, can very hardly be Preserv'd, but by the Exceeding Worthiness, and Prudence of the Officers. Nor by That neither, beyond their Interest and Credit of Persuad∣ing: for Punishment were Tyranny without Wages.

The New-Modelling of an Army is also a tickle Vn∣dertaking: and so is the Disbanding.* 1.4 The Former is the sharper Disobligation; but 'tis but Personall: The Latter is the more Dangerous, for it Destroyes the Trade: And the Perill is either from the Influence of some Chief Offi∣cers in the One; or from a Disposition common to all Military, as well as Naturall bodies, in the Other: that is, an Averseness to Dissolution. Both the One and the Other, are a work to be dispatch'd with as much Care, and with as little Noise, as possible: very Tenderly, and by Degrees.

If any Trouble be Apprehended from the Displacing of some Particulars,* 1.5 (as he may possibly ressent the Loss of Power; or the Disgrace of being singled out to lose it after such a Manner) 'tis but Casting out to him the Lure of a Better Office, or of a Higher Preferment: where∣in he may be more Serviceable to himself, and less Dan∣rous to the Publick. Or if he be too Crafty to stoop to That; the way is to begin with his Dependencies. This leaves him Naked; and the Other Satisfied: At least in shew, since to the World he appears rather Exalted, then Ejected.

Disbanding is a Nicer piece of business:* 1.6 The very Word is scarce to be Mention'd, till the Thing is Done. For 'though the State may be Iudge when 'tis Convenient to Raise an Ar∣my; the Souldiery are commonly the Iudges when 'tis time to

lay it down again. A Good Preparatory to This, is Modelling, and Dispersing, before they have the wind of the Design to prevent their uniting against it. And by Degrees; One Regi∣ment at a time▪ to keep the Rest Quiet, in hope of Continu∣ing. Let That be done by Lot too, for the Losing Party will sooner forgive a Mischance, then an Vnkindness. Touching Mutinies that proceed either from opinion of Disgrace; dis∣pute concerning Precedency, Command, Provision, Quarter, &c. they may be referr'd to want of Discipline.

The Causes of Revolts,* 1.7 may be as many as of Discontents: But the Principal, are either Fear, Despair, Revenge, or In∣constancy in the Common-Souldiery. And they may likewise be Procur'd, either by the Ambition, or Corruption of the Chief Officers.

The best Security against These General Defections,* 1.8 is in the Original Election, and Constitution of the Army. Wherefore let heed be taken (as near as may be) even to the fitness of the meanest Private Souldiour: which in a fair degree may be attain'd, by good choice of Valiant, Prudent, Vigilant, and Faithfull Officers. Why should a Kingdom be hazarded for a Trifle? How small a matter added to either side carries an Equall Balance! A Word, a Thought, an Imagination, a Mi∣stake turns the Fortune of the Day, and Decides the Battell. Is any thing more ordinary then a Panique Terrour, in a Croud of People? which, as Mr. Hobbs hints in his Leviathan; is only an Apprehension of Danger, in the first man that Runs; the Rest, Fearing, and Running by example, every man sup∣posing his Fellow to know why. At This Rate, Ten Cow∣wards may destroy Twenty Thousand Valiant men.

Against Despair; Arguments are best upon the Place: Re∣venge may be Prevented by a Generous, and Military Severity. So that they shall neither have any Provocation to the At∣tempt, nor Security in the Execution: But against Their In∣constancy there is no Remedy.

The mischieves which may arrive upon the account of Am∣bition, or Corruption, are searce to be Prevented, but by chusing Persons of an Impregnable Fidelity; or Otherwise the Fairest Bidder carries it. And against Popular Risings, nothing bet∣ter then a Strict Discipline; and an Impartiall Iustice betwixt the Souldiery and the Country. It does well also, to Interess Both Parties, (Civill, and Military) as fairly as possible, in

the Common Care of the Publick: For a Pure Military Force has the Face rather of an Enemy, then of a Guard: But where Persons of Eminent Repute, and Integrity in the Coun∣try are joyned in Commission with others as Eminent for Martial Affaires, Both sides are satisfi'd, and the Common Good better provided for.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Dangers from the Camp.
• * 1.2

  How Mutinies may be caused.
• * 1.3

  Good Pay will bear good Discipline.
• * 1.4

  Modelling and Disbanding are dangerous.
• * 1.5

  How to New model an Army.
• * 1.6

  How to Dis∣band.
• * 1.7

  The Causes of Revolts.
• * 1.8

  A good Choice is the best Se∣curity against a Revolt.