A memento treating of the rise, progress, and remedies of seditions with some historical reflections upon the series of our late troubles / by Roger L'Estrange.

Subsection. I. The Remedies of certain Hazards arising from the Over∣greatness of One COUNSELLOR.

ONE Over-great Counsellor may be Dangerous; First, In respect of His Particular Temper and Inclination: Second∣ly, In regard of His Credit with his Master: And lastly, In Consideration of the Influence of that Power, and Inclination upon the People.

The Over-great Counsellor we here Treat of, is as the Malus Genius of a Nation: And in Two Words, behold the Ground and Summe of the Whole Mischief. 'Tis either Vice or Weakness, apply'd to the Dishonour or Damage of a Prince and People.

Now to the Application of That Vice, or Weakness. And first, What ill use may be made of the One, and what ill ef∣fects may proceed from the Other, by vertue of his Credit with his Master.* 1.1

If He be Ambitious, He's plac'd upon the very Point for Popularity. Whom can he not Oblige, by Hopes, Rewards, Preferments? Whose Tongue cannot he Charm, either to Speech or Silence? Whose Reputation, Suit, Fortune; nay in some Cases, whose very Life it self, and Liberty, are not de∣pendent upon his Favour? If this Aspiring Humour be accom∣panied with a Sharpness of Iudging; a Felicity of Contriving; and an Impulse of Enterprizing: The Master of such a Ser∣vant should do well to Look about him.

It may be Reply'd, That doubtless so he would, if he saw any Reason to apprehend his Abuse of that Power; But the Knowledge of the Person, does sufficiently warrant the Reason of the Dispensation. To which, we answer; That though Soveraign Princes are not Accountable to Others, yet They are to Themselves; both for the Expedience and Equity of their Actions: And entring into their own Souls, it is very pos∣sible, that they may discover some Incongruities betwixt their Affections, and their Convenience. Some Incongruities I say; and such, as may Induce the wisest Prince, and the most In∣dulgent Master; even toward the most Loyal and Meriting

Servant, to limit the Graces of his Inclination, to the Rules and Respects of his Office; and to be wary, lest while He Divide his Heart with his Friend,* 1.2 he share also his Authority with his Subject: Therein, both Endangering Himself, and Grieving his People.

To Conclude; It is great Prudence in Publike Affairs, to commit little to Hazard; and it is no small Hazard, to Ex∣pose a Favourite to strong Temptations.

Where there are Servants that will employ their Masters Bounty against Himself; (and of such only we speak) If the Design be to supplant the Soveraign, many Remedies may be found out, to frustrate That Ambition. Nay (as I have al∣ready hinted) whether there be such a Design, or not; 'tis good to provide against the very Possibility of it. For, it is fitter, that the Publike should be Indebted for its well-being, to the Care of the Prince, than to the Honesty of the Favou∣rite.

* 1.3Ambitious Natures do better in the Field, than in the Court; and better yet Abroad, than at Home. If they Advance, they grow Dangerous for their Power; if they re∣ceive a Check, they become so for their Malice: Whence it comes to pass, that we see few. Seditions without a Male∣content of This Quality, in the Head of them. These are a sort of People, of whom a Prince cannot be too wary. But we are here to provide against the Ambition of a Person Rais'd by Favour, not Aspiring; and from such a One, the Peril is greater, by reason of the means he has, both to com∣pass his Ends, and to Disguise them.

Sir Francis Bacon proposes the Mating of One Ambitious Person with Another; and in Extremities, the Puzzling of him, with an Enterchange of Favours, and Disgraces, that he may not know what to Expect. Courses, no doubt, advisable, to put an Insolent Favourite to a stand; if it may be as Safe to Disoblige him, without Disarming him: but that depends much upon the Complexion of the Person, according as he is Bold or Fearful.

* 1.4There is not any thing which more Fortifies and Establishes a Monarch, than the Disposal of all Offices, and Charges of Trust, by his particular Choice and Direction, without the Interpose of any Publike Recommendation: Nor can he Trans∣fer That Care to his Great Counsellor, without a great share of

his Power. And here's the Difference; the One way they are the Honourable Dependencies of the Prince; and the Other way, they are the suspected Creatures of the Favourite; who by This Indulgence, makes One Party at Present, and Another in Expectation.

A Wariness in This Particular, breaks the Neck of his Design.

It is good also for a Prince Fairly, and Publikely to Refuse him some Requests, and where the Suit is too bold, to Check Him for Others: That the World may see, that there are Some things which he cannot obtain; and Others, which he must not Dare to Ask. Whereas, if He carries all without Reserve, the Majesty of the Soveraign is lost in the Power of the Favourite. The Advice of King Charles, the Martyr, to His Sacred Majesty now in Being, shall put an End to This Point.

Never repose so much upon any mans single Counsel, Fi∣delity, and Discretion,* 1.5 in managing Affairs of the First Magnitude (that is, Matters of Religion, and Iustice) as to Create in your self or others, a Diffidence of your own Iudgment, which is likely to be always more Con∣stant, and Impartiall to the Interests of the Crown and Kingdom, than any mans.

This may suffice to Prevent a dangerous Over-greatness:* 1.6 But if it be found Necessary to Crush it; (as in case of a bold, and manifest Transgression of Duty, and Violation of Law) Something like an English Parliament does it best; and much better to be promoted by the People, than by the Soveraign.

A Second Danger is, when a Prime Minister employs his Credit to uphold a Faction: and it is the more Dangerous,* 1.7 by the hardness to know what it is. As whether it be Ambition, Corruption, Popularity: Or in fine, some other Secret Inte∣rest. It may be, they have need of One-another.

Nothing can be more perillous then▪ This Correspondence, when a proper Instrument has the manage of it.* 1.8 Oh how he Detests the Faction! But yet Truly, in such and such Cases; and for such and such Persons; and upon This or That Nick

of Time, if Matters were Order'd So and So. And Then, the Insolence of a Schism is Palliated with the Simplicity of a Scruple: And for such Cases as will bear no other Plea, is found out the Colour of an Indisputable Necessity. Not to pro∣secute the several Artifices, by which some Truths are Dis∣guised, others Suppress'd: Those Suits Promoted; These Com∣plaints Smother'd: And finally; by which, both Men and Things are quite misrepresented.

Kings cannot possibly see all Things with their own Eyes, nor hear all Things with their own Ears;* 1.9 so that they must commit many great Trusts to their Ministers.] The Hazard then is Great, when the Confident of the Monarch is the Advocate for the Enemies of the State. But above all, if he be Surly and Imperious to the Try'd Servants of the Crown: That looks like a Design, to Introduce one Party to Betray the Prince, and to Discourage or disable Another from serving him.

We are here upon a Supposition, That a Master may be mista∣ken in a Servant; and that a Servant may abuse his Credit with his Master. In case This be; What Remedy?

Supposing the Favourite still in Credit, we must Imagine the Soveraign still in the Mistake; and therefore not expect a Remedy as to the Person, but rather fetch Relief from some General Rules of Government: which shall neither disoblige the Favourite, if he be Honest; nor expose the Prince, if He be Other: But this is better done at the Beginning of a Kings Reign, than in the Middle of it; better upon Iudgment of State, than Vrgency of Occasion.

The certain Help is a fit Choice of Officers and Servants. Especially in such Places as have Numerous Dependencies;* 1.10 for otherwise, Three or Four Persons Leaven the Court; half a Dozen more the Souldiery; and in Conclusion, a great Fa∣vourite, with a few select Instruments of his own making, may, at his Pleasure, seize the Government. This was the Rise of the Second Race of Kings in France.

Yet God forbid, that Princes should make Themselves, and their Privadoes,* 1.11 miserable, by Eternal, Causeless, and Vn∣quenchable Iealousies: That Kings should be Debarr'd That Blessing and Relief, without which, Life's a Plague, and Royalty a Burthen. That is, the Vse and Comfort of a Friend; [to whom (as the Oraculous St. Albans) He may Impart his Griefs, Ioys, Fears, Hopes, Suspicions, Counsels, and whatso∣ever

lies upon his Heart, to oppress it; in a kind of Civill Shrift, or Confession:] and from whence, (with the same Author) he may reap, [Peace of affections, and support of Iudgment.]

Nay, take the Subject's Interest in too;* 1.12 what can be more Desirable, then for a Prince to have a Watchfull, Wise, Faith∣full Counsellour; and the People, a Firm Prudent Patriote, in the same Noble Person? Accursed be the man that envies ei∣ther. Yet Here's a Line still drawn betwixt Majesty and Kindness; which the One cannot pass, without Diminution, nor the Other transgress without Presumption. In fine; the Right of Placing, or Displacing Officers, lies on the Kings side of the Chalk, and falls under the Head of Reward or Punish∣ment.

King Iames in the second Book of his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, de∣livers Excellent Advises to Prince Henry, concerning the Choice of Servants.

First, See that they be of a Good Fame,* 1.13 and without Blemish.

Next, See that they be Indued with such honest Qua∣lities,* 1.14 as are meet for such Offices as ye ordain them to serve in; that your Iudgment may be known in Employ∣ing every man according to his Guifts.

Thirdly, I charge you, according to my Fatherly Au∣thority, to preferr Specially to your Service,* 1.15 so many as have truely served Me, and are able for it. — For if the Haters of your Parents cannot Love you, it follows of Ne∣cessity, that their Lovers must Love you.

Chuse your Servants for your own Vses, and not for the Vse of Others: and hearken not to Recommendati∣ons,* 1.16 more for serving in effect, their Friends that put them in, then their Masters that admit them.

Especially take good heed to the choice of your Ser∣vants,* 1.17 that you preferr to the Offices of the Crown and Estate: for in other Offices, ye have only to take heed to your own Weal, but these concern likewise the Weal of your People; for the which, ye must be Answerable to God. Be carefull to Prefer none, as ye will be answera∣ble to God, but for their worthiness.

* 1.18Employ every man as ye think him Qualifi'd; but Vse not one in all Things, lest he wax Proud, and be Envy'd by his Fellows.

These were the Directions of a Prince, than whom no Man spake more upon Experience: and very hardly shall a Sove∣raign that takes This Course, even upon any Account, Mis∣carry.

Another Profitable Course might be for a Prince to set his Favourite his Bounds, afore-hand.* 1.19 As for the Purpose; that in such and such Particulars, concerning Law, and Religion, or wherein his Peculiar Interest is concern'd; he never pre∣sume to move him above Once; and that in certain Other Cases, he presume not to move him at all. By these means, the Favourite is minded of his Duty, the Prince of his Digni∣ty: and both secur'd; the One from the Hazard of Grant∣ing too much; the Other from the Temptation of Asking it. So far from being Impracticable, is This Proposition; that on the contrary, 'tis Obvious and Easie. As for Instance.

There are some things which a King cannot Grant as a Christian; Others, which he cannot Grant as a King: and some again, which he cannot Grant as a Wise man. So that Reserving to himself, a Freedom (even from Sollicitati∣on) in These Niceties of Conscience, Honour, and Convenience; the Favourite may make his Best of the Rest.* 1.20 The Rela∣tion betwixt a Governour, and his People, is like That of Man, and Wife: A man may take his Friend into his Arms, but not into his Bed. To make an end of This; That Fa∣vourite that presses his Master to any thing which evidently exposes him, to Contempt or Hatred, does probably Design his Ruin.

To run through the whole Body of Humane Frailties, would be too Tedious; Let it suffice, that Those Vices (whether Devillish, or Brutish) which in a Private man, are Mischievous, or Shamefull, are much more so in a Person ar∣med with Power to Execute the Malice, and qualified with an Eminence, to Recommend a lewd Example.

Where a Great Trust is committed to a Weak Person; It matters not much to the Publick, whether he be True, or False: for Futility, in him, has the Effect of Treachery in a∣nother: The One Blabs his Masters Secrets, and the Other Betrayes them.

The Third Hazard from the Over-greatness of One Counsel∣lour,* 1.21 arises from the Influence of his Power, and Inclination upon the People: And That, either as to their Love, or Hatred. The Popular Part we have already done with: (that is, so far as it concerns the making of a Party to Him∣self; and the Remedies of That Danger) That which remains, shall be devided into Pride, Coveteousness, and Misadvise.

It is seldom seen, that a Proud man in Power,* 1.22 is not withall Insolent, Vain, and Cruell. The first to his Superiours, where they will suffer it. The next to his Equalls, till they are sick of it. and the Third, to his Inferiours, till he is Hated for it.

A Favourite of this Temper, makes it his Glory to be thought the Dictatour to his Master: Disputing, Excusing, Cavilling, upon Mandates and Directions, (as Sir Francis Ba∣con) His style, is Ego & Rex Meus; and the Consequence of this boldness is to lessen the Soveraign in the Eyes of his Subjects.

It is harder for a Prince to Discover this Audacious Hu∣mour, then to Crush it;* 1.23 let but the King withdraw his Fa∣vour for one Moment, and of himself, he falls below the Scorn of those he lately Trampled on.

If he be Covetous; The Person of the Prince, and the Ho∣nour of the Nation are expos'd to Sale:* 1.24 and the People sque∣zed to fill his Coffers, till they have not Bread left for their own Bellies.

We here suppose the Worst; add yet even these Extremi∣ties, are not quite Deplorate, and Helpless. Spunges will Spue, as well as Suck; and 'tis but the Monarch's sending of the Popular Assembly in quest of the Publick Treasure, to fetch it up again.

Now whence proceeds this Mischief, but from Misadvise? not want of Prudence, but of Enformation: or which is worse;* 1.25 from Tales fram'd to the Passion, and Advantage of the Teller. He's made an Enemy to the State, that's not a Friend to this or that Design. Dangers are Pretended, where there are none; and Security, where there are: And (which is the Curse of these Ill-Offices) the Wisest, and the Bravest of Princes, are subjected to Delusion, and Surprize, in Common with their Contraries. Could Solomon's Wisdom tell him which of the Two Harlots was the Mother of the Child,

without a further means of Decision? Or Could Caesar's Courage oppose the Fate of the Senate? In Matters of Fact, Princes, as well as Others, are to be Instructed by Report; and if from a Person whom they have Reason to believe, they receive notice of a Matter whereupon they have not▪ Time to Deliberate; their Proceedings are to be directed by the fairest appearance of that Relation. In fine, if a Servant will betray his Master, there's no avoiding it, for he must trust somebody. [Remember well saies Sir Francis Bacon in a Letter of Advice to the late Duke of Buckingham) the great trust you have undertaken;* 1.26 you are as a Continual Centinell, alwaies to stand upon your Watch, to give him (the King) True Intelli∣gence. If you Flatter him, you betray him; If you Conceal the Truth of those things from him which concern his Iustice, or his Honour, (although not the safety of his Person) you are as dan∣gerous a Traytor to his State, as he that rises in Arms against him.]

If such as only withdraw their Allegeance from their Prince, are so Criminal; how much are they to blame then, that, where his Conscience, Life, and Dignity, lie all at stake, abuse, and misposses him! That cry; Not that way Sir, for the Lord's sake, go this way rather! and so betray him, from his Guards into an Ambush.

But Centaurs are scarce more Monstrous in Nature, then these men are in Manners; and I may seem perhaps very hard driven for want of work, to employ my time in search∣ing out of Remedies, for Mischiefs so Improbable. Truly his Conceipt, that imputes the Omission of a Law against Parri∣cides, to a Presumption that the Crime would never be com∣mitted, does not at all divert me from believing, that Pru∣dence is to provide for the Worst:* 1.27 and nothing left to Chance, that may be secur'd by Counsell. Wherefore, I proceed to my Prevention.

Since the only Certainty of what is Done, or Said, comes from the Eye, or Ear; and that the Soveraign cannot be every where; so that he must either give Credit to Relation; or know nothing of Affairs at a Distance; let us Consider, by what means a Prince may most probably escape the Snares of a Mis-enformer.

To advise upon the Choice of the Instrument; is but to say, Chuse an Honest man, and he'l not betray you: And not

to let any man deceive you twice, is but the After-game of Wisdom; for the First Errour may be Fatall. We must look- out some other Course then, and a better I know none, then a Strict Iustice, and Severity, of Reward, and Punishment.* 1.28 A False Intelligencer is as bad as a Spy. Wherefore, let a Prince suppress Calumnies, and encourage Accusations, that he may not take his Friends for his Enemies, and his Enemies for his Friends. What can be a greater Injury to the Soveraign's Ho∣nour, then by a false Story, to cause him Love where he should almost Hate, and Hate where he should Love? Punish where he should Reward, and Reward where he should Punish? It breaks the Heart of Loyalty, this sad Mistake, and strengthens the Hands of Treason. Who would dare to put these Affronts upon Majesty, and Innocence, if upon Detecti∣on, the Scandall were made as dangerous to the Reporter, as the Consequence to the Sufferer? And This we take for a suffi∣cient Mean, to keep Malitious Buzzes from the Ears of Princes.

But This is but the work half-done; for there are certain Truths as Necessary to be Told,* 1.29 as are these Calumnies to be Conceal'd; and where the Undertaker of the Office, runs a far greater Risque to serve his Prince, then the Other does to Ruin him. These Offices are discharg'd, by Mercenary Per∣sons, for Reward; and by the Worthier Sort, for Reverence-Sake, and Duty. So that betwixt the Fear of Punishment, the Hope of Benefit, and the rare Integrity of Those that stand firm without considering Either; a Prince may easily secure himself of Good Advise, and Right Intelligence; and That, (at least within himself) amply suffices to his Establish∣ment.

That Kings are Men; who Doubts? And 'tis as much Their Duty to Remember it, as 'tis Their Subjects, not to be too Prying into the Slips of their Humanity. Their Clergy are to Prescribe to their Souls; Their Physicians, to their Bo∣dies; and their Counsellours are to Advise in Point of Go∣vernment: But 'tis within the Pale of every Private Man's Commission, to offer his Intelligence. As for Example; Sup∣pose a Counsellour of State denyes the Kings Supremacy.* 1.30 Shall it be counted Sawciness in a Particular Person to acquaint the Monarch with it? We'l make an end with this. That State is in an ill Condition, where he that would save his Prince, must ruin himself: and where One Party is bolder to do the King Mischiefi,

then the Other is to do him Good. It is now high time to take another Step; and we'l stay but a Moment upon it.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Ambition dan∣gerous in a Favourite.
• * 1.2

  A Caution.
• * 1.3

  Ambition does better in a Souldier, then in a Counsel∣lour.
• * 1.4

  It is the Inte∣rest of a Prince to dispose of Offices by Par∣ticular Directi∣on.
• * 1.5

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Pag. 240.
• * 1.6

  How to crush an Insolent Favourite.
• * 1.7

  The Danger of a Favourite that upholds Faction.
• * 1.8

  And manage of his Design.
• * 1.9

  Sir F. Bacon.
• * 1.10

  How to disap∣point an Am∣bitious Design.
• * 1.11

  Favourites ne∣cessary to the Prince.
• * 1.12

  And desirable to the People.
• * 1.13

  Concerning the Choice of Servants.
• * 1.14

  Let them be Honest and Fit.
• * 1.15

  Of approved Loyalty to the Father.
• * 1.16

  Nor upon Re∣commenda∣tion.
• * 1.17

  Publick Na∣tures for Pub∣lick Places.
• * 1.18

  Not One to all Purposes.
• * 1.19

  Let a Prince set his Confi∣dent his Bounds afore-hand.
• * 1.20

  In Points of Conscience, Honour, and Convenience, let not a Fa∣vourite press the Soveraign.
• * 1.21

  The Danger of Over-greatness as to the People.
• * 1.22

  A Proud man in Power.
• * 1.23

  Easily crush'd.
• * 1.24

  A Covetous Great man.
• * 1.25

  The Mischief of False In∣telligence.
• * 1.26

  Good Advice to a Coun∣sellor.
• * 1.27

  Prudence pro∣vides for the worst.
• * 1.28

  Reward and Punishment keep People in Order.
• * 1.29

  Honest Truths are Dangerous.
• * 1.30

  A Case put.