An exact collection of the works of Doctor Jackson ... such as were not published before : Christ exercising his everlasting priesthood ... or, a treatise of that knowledge of Christ which consists in the true estimate or experimental valuation of his death, resurrection, and exercise of his everlasting sacerdotal function ... : this estimate cannot rightly be made without a right understanding of the primeval state of Adam ...

SECT. IV.

Of that Faculty of the Reasonable Soul which we com∣monly call Free-will. Of the Root and several Branches of it, in the Generality. What Branches or Portion of this Free-will is in the Man al∣together Vnregenerate, or in debauched or hei∣nous Sinners.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the Difficulties of the Controversies Concerning Free-Will, with the Reasons why They have troubled the Church so long.

1.IF we should abstract this Problem from the Difficulties wherewith it may seem to be intangled by the former discourses Concerning our Servitude to Sin, and consider it only in its own Nature and Essence: this Question alone hath ministred more matter of intricate Disputes,* 1.1 then any other Controverted Point in Theologie. He that hath leasure, skill, and opportunity to take an accurate Historical Survey of the the true State, (or rather of the Instability or ill sta∣ted Tenour) of this Point since the death of our Saviours Apostles or other Canonical Writers of the New Testament, will easily discover that the Disputes about it Pro and Con have been like to a Pair of Scales which never came to any Permanent Stay or constant Settling upon the right Center, but have one while wagled this way, another while that way. The Orthodoxal Truth Con∣cerning this Point, as it was taught by our Saviour himself and by his Apostles, and maintained by those who did immediately succeed them, is; That there was no other State or Fatality in Humane Affairs or Events, save only This, That such as sought after Glory and Immortality by well doing, should undoubtedly be rewarded according to their Works; that all such as continue in impious or un∣godly Courses, shall treasure up Wrath against the Day of Wrath, and bring a Necessity upon themselves of being Everlastingly tormented.

2. The Stoicks first, and after them the Manichees did oppose this Hea∣venly Doctrine, by maintaining a strange and more then Brutish Opinion, which had been hatched before our Saviour Christ was born, to wit, That all Ef∣fects or Events whether contrived by men, or otherwise projected by Na∣ture

it self, did fall out by an Indispensable and Unconquerable Necessity. The Necessary Issue of this Doctrine (as was apprehended by all Christian Antiqui∣ty) did amount thus high,* 1.2 That all those Exhortations to repentance, to sancti∣ty or to newness of life, and to the practise of Good works Moral or Spiritual (whether these were given to us men, by our Saviour Christ, or by his A∣postles) had been better directed to Horse or Mule (or other more Docile Rea∣sonlesse Creatures) then unto the unregenerate Man, from whom to take away all Freedom of Will, (as Fate or Necessity doth) were to make him a Degree Lower, and place him in an Estate or Condition of life much worse, then the most foolish or most noisom Reasonlesse Creatures do, by their Cre∣ators Bounty, enjoy.

3.* 1.3 The Ancient Fathers of the first and best Ages, Justin Martyr, Origen, Athanasius, Nyssen, Jerom, &c. did so zealously intend the Extirpation of this Heresie, or rather Heathenish Infidelity, which necessarily deprived men (whether regenerate or unregenerate) of all Freedom of Will in what Action soever, that they seldom mentioned the Use or necessity of Grace, for per∣formance of Actions truly Good. For this (as some have well observed) was impertinent to the Question then only agitated betwixt Them & Grace∣lesse men, Stoicks,* 1.4 I mean, or Manichees. They only sought to fortifie the Sentence Contradictory unto these Blasphemous Tenents Concerning the Abso∣lute Fatality of Humane Actions, whether Good or Bad. Now Pelagius having observed, that such of these Reverend Fathers as lived and writ before him, did say little or sometimes nothing for Magnifying of Grace, but ex∣ceeding much and very well for establishing some kind of Free-Will in men, more then is to be found in beasts, took hence Occasion to exalt Free-will and depresse Grace; even whilest the Controversie was, about the Concur∣rence of Gods Free Grace and mans Free-will; a Point not thought of amongst Christians in Primitive Times; it being then taken as granted by all,* 1.5 that however Free-Will be Necessary unto salvation (a Quality without which a man is neither capa∣ble of Reward nor Punishment) yet the only Cause of mans Redemption from Servitude to sin, or of Salvation by such Redemption, was the Free-Grace of God, as it issues from the Sole Fountain of Life and Grace, The Man Christ Jesus, God Incarnate.

4. Pelagius having drawn the one Scale of this Dispute so far awry on the one side, did provoke certain Monks in Africk (whose Founder or principal Benefactor was one Valentinus) to wrest the other Scale as far amisse on the otherside, and to jump with the Stoicks or Manichees Opinion. This stirred up the spirit of that most Learned Father of those times (I mean for Rational or Scholastick disputes) S. Austin, to attempt the drawing of a Middle Line between these Two Extravagancies or Extremities, which he oftentimes performed with a steady and constant hand, yet sometimes, too often (if so it had pleased the Lord) did faulter. Since his death, not only the fore-mentioned Difficultie Concerning The Compossibility of Gods Free Grace and mans Free-Will, but the very true and punctual meaning of this Learned Moderator, hath been by his Followers, whether Fathers, Schoolmen or Others, so meanly Tufted, and so unskilfully hunted after, as a Man that would take pains to read them may fitly apply that Conceit, which a pleasant Wit entertained, of a Text forsaken by the Preacher or pro∣fest Handler of it, to the true State of the main Question Concerning Freedom of Will; that is, A march Hare might have sit upon it and never have been

started for all the barking and bauling of Contrary Factions or opposite Sectaries; some Three or Four (not so well esteem'd or seconded as they deserved) only excepted.

5. One Principal Reason of so little Speed and lesse good Successe in this Search, hath been; because the most of such as have undertaken this Task, usually took no more of the main Controversie into due consideration then did lie just under their Level, or between them and the Scope at which they aimed. And that was if not only, yet principally the Confutation of others Errors or Heretical Doctrine: an attempt which seldom finds any good At∣chievance, unlesse it be managed with much discretion, with moderation of passions or affections. Nor will this suffice unlesse the Party thus qualifi∣ed be enabled with Good Literature, distinctly to set down the true and Po∣sitive Grounds of that Truth, about whose meaning or extent, Questions usually arise; or to resolve the several Branches of Controversies moved, into their first Stems, roots, or seeds. He that will adventure to write or speak of Election, Reprobation, or Predestination, before he be so well instru∣cted in the Grounds of Philosophy both Natural and Moral, as to understand the Nature, Properties, and several Stems of Free-Will, or to make search af∣ter all or any of these, before he clearly know what Necessity and Contingency are; wherein they differ, or how they sometimes intermingle, or the one of them grow into the other, shall (as too Many in our times have done) so Crosse-shackle himself with Ramistical Pot-Hooks or Dichotomies, that he shall be inforced either to stumble or enterfere at every second or third step. For avoiding this inconvenience, into which I had from my Youth observed many otherwise Learned Writers (through want of skill in true and solid Logick, but especially in Philosophy) to fall, I have premised what I hope was rightly conceived concerning the fore-mentioned Fundamental Points of† 1.6 Fate, Necessity, and Contingency. And by help of those Principles as clearly as the matter would suffer heretofore discuss'd at large, I trust I shall be able to treat of this present Argument of Free-Will, and hereafter of Pre∣destination so farr as is fitting (or shall be permitted me by Authority) Con∣sequently to mine own Grounds or Positions, without enterfering or stum∣bling in my course; without crossing or trenching upon any point of Ca∣tholick Faith or Orthodoxal Doctrine.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the divers Acceptions or Significations of Freedom or Freenesse: And of the several sorts or Degrees of Freedom in Creatures inanimate, Vegeta∣ble, Sensitive, and Rational.

1. FReedom or Freeness in our English tongue sometimes imports no more then spontaneum doth in Latin.* 1.7 And according to this Sense or signi∣fication, every thing is said to be done Sponte or Freely, or Freely to come to pass, which is done or comes to passe by the proper or Natural Incli∣nation of any bodily Substance, Whether it be endowed with life, or sense, or with motion only. Thus we say, the Water hath a Free-Course, or run∣neth Freely when it runs that way which Nature inclines it, without any Let or Hinderance, or without any Artificial or External Help to draw, move, or impell it. Freedom in this sense is opposed only to Coaction, to Constraint, or Inforcement. As when water is drawn or impelled to such a course,

which left to it self it would not take, we say it is a Forced Stream or Current; not a Free Stream: And so we call those Grounds, Forced, which bring forth little or no fruit, without great labour, toyl or cost, unto such as Till or dress them. And in this Sense the Latin word Liberum, unto which our English Freedom or Liberty doth more properly and directly answer, then unto the Latin Spontaneum, is sometimes used, to wit, as it is opposed only to Co∣action or Inforcement: So a Poet describing the happy Estate of the world in the Golden Age, saith,—Ipsa{que} tellus Omnia liberiùs nullo poscente ferebat. The Earth did bring forth all things necessary or expedient for the use or comfort of man Freely: that is, Of its own Accord, without the Labour, industry, or provident dressing of man. Thus, This, and Other * 1.8 Poets speak of the Golden Age, from some Broken Notions or Traditions of mans First Estate in Paradise, and of that Estate wherein the world and all things should have continued, if Man had not fallen. But this Temper of the Earth is much altered, or rather inverted by the fall of man. Most men (it may be) have heard or read of that Answer which an Ancient Philosopher made to this Question;* 1.9 [Why Nettles, Thistles, and other like weeds should grow so fast in such abundance, of their own accord; when as flowers, herbs, or comfortable fruits did not grow at all, or seldom come to any good proof with∣out the extraordinary pains or skill of man?] The best Answer which the Philosopher could make was this; [That the Earth was a Natural and Kind Mo∣ther unto Nettles, weeds, and grass; but a Step-mother only to Flowers, Herbs, or Fruit.] Now the Answer, though for those times held witty, was no way Satisfactory. For a man might have further asked him;

why the Earth should be a kind mother and Loving nurse to weeds; and a hard or Cruel Step-mother to herbs or Fruits?

Unto this Question the youngest Child amongst us that is rightly Catechized in the Grounds of Religion, or hath but read the three first Chapters of the first Book of Moses, may give a more full and satisfactory Answer, then the wisest Philosophers, without the Principles of Christian Religion, could do. The Cause then or Reason is from the Curse wherewith God cursed the Earth for mans Transgression, Gen. 3. 17, ••8, 19. Because thou hast eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee, saying, thou shalt not eat of it: cursed is the ground for thy sake: In sorrow shalt thou eat of it, all the dayes of thy life. Thorns also and Thistles shall it bring forth to thee: and thou shal•• eat the herb of the field. In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground. But though the Heath••n•• could not know this Story by Light of Nature: yet thus much being revealed or made known unto them, they might easily have gathered; That if the Earth was thus accursed for Mans sake, the Nature of man was first accursed or corrupted: As in very deed this preposterous and untoward inclination of the Earth to bring forth weeds Freely and plentifully, and good Fruit hardly or by Constraint or Coaction, is but an Emblem or visible Picture of the un∣toward and corrupt disposition of mans heart to bring forth the Fruits of the Flesh Voluntarily, Freely and plentifully; whereas it doth not, it cannot bring forth the Fruits of the Spirit, without the skill and husbandry of Him that made it. We have the seeds of sin and iniquity planted in us by Nature; and they fructisie and increase by our sloath and negligence. As for the fruits of Righteousnesse, the Seeds of them must be sown in us by the Spirit of God: And being sown, they do not grow up and prosper without his Ex∣traordinary

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Blessing upon his own plants, and his Servants Labours. Though Paul may plant, and Apollo water, yet it is God only that gives the increase, I am the Vine (saith our Saviour, John 15. 1.)and my Father is the Husband∣man: And (as the Apostle, 1. Cor 3. 9. speaks) we are his Husbandry. So that in Respect of the Fruits of Righteousness and Works Spiritual, mans Nature is not Free according to this First Acception or Sense of Freedom; that is, as it was opposed unto Coaction: But in respect of the Fruits of the Flesh our cor∣rupt Nature is most Free; These it brings forth of its own accord more Freely and more plentifully then the Earth (which God hath cursed for mans sake) doth Nettles, Thistles, or any worse kind of weed. And yet the more Freely our Nature brings forth the Fruits of sin, the more deeply it is still tainted with the Servitude of Sin. So that Freedom and Servitude in some cases, at least in respect of divers Objects, are not Opposite, but Coincident or Compatible in One and the same subject or Person.

2. This kind of Freedom which is only opposed to Coaction or Inforce∣ment, * 1.10 though it be truly and properly in Creatures Inanimate and void of life: yet is it in an higher Degree in Creatures Vegetable or Sensitive. Inanimate or Livelesse creatures have their Inclinations so set by† 1.11 Nature, that no Contrary Inclination can be implanted in them by Custome: As if you move a stone every hour of the day upwards, it will still move its selfas Freely and as swiftly downwards, as it did at the First. We cannot work any Inclination or propension in it,* 1.12 either to move it self upwards, or to be more easily moved by us. But Vegetables of what kind soever, Grasse Corn, (or weeds which growup with them) Herbs or plants; albeit they have no Freedom or power at all to move themselves out of the places wherein they grow: yet have they a Natural Faculty to increase themselves, or be aug∣mented by the Benignity of the Earth wherein they grow, and the influence of moysture and heat from Heaven; A Capacity withal, which stones or other inanimate Creatures have not, to be much bettered both in growth and quality by the industry or skilful husbandry of man. Another degree or rank of Animate or Living Creatures there is, which the Grecians call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ and the Latines, as well as they can expersse the Greek, Stirp-Animalia, (or Plant-Animalia) that is, Living Creatures in some respects best resembling meer Vegetables; in others, Sensitives, which we call Animalia. The most of this rank Live in the Sea, as Oysters, Cockles, Mustles, or other duller kinds of Shel-Fishes, which herein agree with meer Vegetables, in that they can hard∣ly move themselves out of their places, as from the Rocks or Sands wherein they breed, and yet have a Sense or feeling of their proper Nutriment, or of its want; which meer Vegetables have not; and a Motive power within themselves, (answerable to this sense of pain or pleasure) of opening or shutting their mouthes, or those instruments of Sense by which they suck in their food or nutriment. Some Land Creatures there be (if we may be∣lieve good Writers without our own Experiments) that hold the same Cor∣respondency between meer Vegetable and Sensitive Creatures, which the fore∣mentioned Shel-Fishes or Sea-Creatures do. To omit the reports of the Russian Lamb or other like Sensitives which are fastned to the Earth out of which they grow: It hath been in my hearing, and in a Solemn Audience avouched by as great a Philosopher and Divine as any that have written of the West Indies; That there is a kind of herb or Plant about Portrico, which though it cannot move it self out of its place, yet hath as nimble & wilie mo∣tions within it self; as great a Command over its own Branches, to decline ungrateful touches, as any perfect Sensitive Creatures have, which are tied to a certain Station or setled Footing.

3. Creatures truly Sensitive, (that is, such as far exceed Vegetables or the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) besides the Sense of pain in want or indigence of food, or the plea∣sure they take when it is in competent measure afforded them,* 1.13 have a Power (some greater some lesse) to Move themselves out of their places, and to seek their Nutriment; and after satisfaction made to hunger, to betake them∣selves unto places most convenient for their Rest or Sleep, This Capacity of sense, whether of pain or pleasure, or of motion to enjoy the one and avoid the other, is in every Sensitive Creature, even in the worm, or snail in some degree or other, but not Equal in all. Some are most swift in their Motions, though much defective in other sense, as Flies, Gnats, Beetles or other meaner Volatile or flying Creatures which are not capable of durable pain, nor of Memory to avoid such pain as they are capable of; being apt to be quelled with such light blows or touches, as cannot annoy stronger Sensitives or Four-footed Beasts. Amongst the more perfect or stronger sort of Sensitives or Brutes, some are indued with better Memory, or Dex∣terity of Exercising their senses or motive Faculties, then we 〈◊〉〈◊〉 are. But the best of meer Sensitive Creatures, especially such as are by nature tam••, or apt to be tamed, as Horses, Hounds, Haukes, &c. although they have no other Freedom then that which is opposed to Coaction: yet are their In∣clinations alterable by Custome, as Lyoung u•• made proof and Demostration to the Lacedemonians by his two* 1.14 wh••lps of the same kind; whose inclina∣tions by nature were the same, yet Both much altered by breeding or training.

4. Wherein then do we Reasonable Creatures exceed the best of these docile Sensitives? In this; That albe••t they exereise their Faculties of sense or motion more dexterously and more sagaciously by instinct of nature, and have a greater aptnesse to perceive approaching denger, or to receive impressions or occurrences from wind and weather, then men have: yet have they no power, no Freedom at all to Reflect upon such Occurrences or Impressions; much lesse to Calculate or weigh them aright, but an excel∣lent Capacity only to entertain them as they are offered. Thus sheep and other cattel; divers sorts of birds or fouls of the air do often unwittingly Prognosticate the alteration or change of weather by their voice or motions, before wiser men or Astronomers can take just notice of it, save only by Their motions, voyces, or gestures.

5. Now as Sensitive Creatures do farr exceed meer Vegetables in sense of pain or pleasure,* 1.15 and in the motive Faculty: so the Reasonable Creature doth farr excel the best and most docile Sersitives in a Faculty or Power pe∣culiar to himself alone amongst all visible or Corporeal Substances, That is, in a Power to Reslect upon what he hath seen, heard, or felt, or remembers, either concerning motions or impressions made by or within himself, or in any other part or member of this visible world. A Power or Faculty Like∣wise Every son of man who hath attained unto the use of Reason, hath to number such Occurrences as have befallen himself, or such as he hath ob∣served to befal others, or to have happened (however) within his Me∣mory, and a further Branch of the same Reflective Power or Faculty to Calcu∣late and weigh them with their Circumstances whether of Time or Place, and to Compare Occurrences past, or matters observed before with Occasions or Occurrences present, and out of the Consideration of both, to make Obser∣vations or Presages of what by probable Conjecture may ensue.

6. From this Reflective Power or Faculty and the Branches of it, all of them being Peculiar to man, amongst all visible or middle-world-Creatures, doth

that Freedom of Will immediately Result: the search of whose several Bran∣ches, whether growing by Nature and bettered by Gods special Providence, or immediately implanted or ingrafted by Grace, is the principal Subject of the Treatises following.

7. The First Root of this kind of Freedom, as it is Mans Peculiar above all other visible Creatures, is, That Reflective Power before-mentioned upon his Observations, whether made upon the dispositions or Docility of Sensitive Creatures wild or tame, or upon the suggestions or Operations of his own sen∣ses, or that part of those Faculties of his Soul or Body, in which he is rather a Sensitive Contradistinct to meer Sensitives, then any way supereminent to them. Now there is not, at least there ought not to be, any scruple or Que∣stion; Whether every man which hath attained to the use of Reason or of ordinary discretion, have not the same Power or Faculty to correct or im∣prove his own natural Dispositions' or Sensitive Inclinations, which Lycurgus practised with good successe upon his Two Whelps of the same kind. No Que∣stion again there is or ought to be, Whether Parents or other Instructers have not the like Power to correct or alter the inclinations of Children in their Minority or Nonage, by good Discipline or Education. Whence if we should grant that Postulatum or supposition which Galen that great Philo∣sopher and Physitian with much diligence hath endeavoured to Demonstrate, [Mores animi sequuntur temper amentum Corporis: that the manners or disposi∣tions of men unto moral vertues or vices, necessarily depend upon the Temperature of the body:] Yet can it never be evinced or made Probable, that the Peculiar Temperature of any mans body, may not be altered by the forementioned Reflective Power which every man hath, and may exercise over his own sen∣ses, humours, or manner of dyet; or to ruminate upon the Advertisments given him by Philosophers or Physitians, either for correcting his inordinate appetites or dispositions, or for improvement of such seeds of vertue as are in some degree or other, by nature implanted in men or Children of the worst Temperature of Body. And though Galen, for ought we know, did dye uncured of that Erronious or Heretical Opinion which was the scope of his Book, or of that distemperature whether of body or of mind which did breed that Opinion: Yet a Late Learned† 1.16 Commentator hath so cured his Book, that sober young Students may peruse or visit it without danger of infection from it.

8. But the Principal, if not the only Stem of the fore-mentioned Freedom, consists in mans Power to Reflect upon his own Rational Thoughts or Projects. And this Power or Faculty no man, no power on earth can alter or take from another, how mean soever. For it is truly said, if it be rightly applied, that Thought is Free, not from Punishment, if we think amisse, For the Sear∣cher of Hearts will Judge the most Secret Thoughts: but Free from Coaction, from constraint, or inforcement, We may be commanded or inforced to Do what another will have us to do: but we cannot be compelled to think what another would have us think; or to Will what they would have us to Will. They may Propose some Particular unto us being in it self very Good and agreeable unto our desires: yet the Goodness of it unlesse we please, cannot constrain or enforce us to desire it for that time. If we want some other Particular Good of the same kind to Counterpoyze or withdraw our De∣sire from it, the very Goodness of the Free exercise of our own Will, will suf∣fice. The very Trial or Experiment of this our Freedom and Power to ab∣stain from many things in themselves desireable, and with which most men

are tempted and overswayed, is oft-times more Pleasant, then any Particular Sensitive Good.

9. This is all I had to say Concerning such several Kinds or Degrees of Freedom or Power in Visible Creatures, or of Free-Will a Faculty Peculiar to man, as may be Learn'd from the Book of Nature. All these several Sorts or Degrees of Freedom hitherto expressed in English, are answerable to that which the Latines call Spontaneum, Liberum, or Libera Voluntas. But whe∣ther Liberum Arbitrium, an Expression (used by many good Latin-Writers) of the Greek 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, be a Style whereof men in this Life be capable; Or what Ranks of Men be Capable of It, is a Point which cannot be determined without Examination of the Properties of Free Causes or Agents.

CHAP. XXVI.

Containing the Definition and Properties of Free Causes or Agents properly so called.

1. CAusa Libera est, quae,* 1.17 positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, potest agere vel non agere. This Definition of a Free Cause so far as it con∣cerns Man, whether Regenerate or Unregenerate, is Orthodoxal and Sound; but not so Orthodoxal and sound in respect of all Free Agents, at least not so unquestionable in respect of them. For there is all Free Agrents an Agency as well Immanent as Transient. That we call (as our betters before us have done) An Agency Immanent, Which produceth no Effect, save only in the Agent.* 1.18 But every true Cause whether Free or Natural, is alwayes pre∣sumed able to produce some Effect Extra Se, which shall not be terminated Within its Self,* 1.19 but such as doth or may appear in the Visible Book of the Creatures.

2. The Omnipotent Agent or Supreme Cause of Causes, throughout all Eternity can work or not work Whatsoever, Whensoever, it pleaseth him, without any Matter Praeexistent to his Work, or any Condition requisite or Praerequired to his working. He Freely, that is, without Necessity, made all things of Nothing, without any Counsellor or Adviser either for propo∣sing or solliciting, much lesse for Limiting or prescribing the Laws or man∣ner of all secondary Causes workings, or of the Effects possible to be wrought by them. The Bounds or Limits of all Secondary Agents Operations, are Necessity and Contingency. Such Agents as by the Laws respectively given unto them by the Supreme Agent and Lawgiver, are said to produce their Operations by Necessity, or by Determination to This or That purpose and to no other, cannot without Solecism be accounted or called Free Agents or Causes. The premised Definition then, [Causa libera estquae positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, &c.] must be restrained to the Angelical and Humane Nature.* 1.20 Neither of these two Natures or Agents can produce any Real Effect Extra Se Without Themselves, unlesse they have some Matter praeexi∣stent to work upon: nor any Immanent Action Within themselves, without such Concomitancies or Assistancies as are requisite to the Use or Exercise of their natural Freedom, So that both of them are only so farr Free in their Actions or Choices, as the Omnipotent Creator shall permit or give them leave to use or exercise their natural Freedome. Now their Natural Freedom as it is opposed to that which we call Spontaneum or Lubency in Vegetables only, or

meer Sensitive Creatures, is but a Branch (as hath been intimated before) of Contingency;* 1.21 so that we cannot annoy and hurt the One, but we must annoy and hurt the Other. Id Contingens est, quod potest esse vel non esse; That, only in true Philosophie and Divinity is properly Contingent, which heretofore so hath been, as it might not have been; or hereafter may as well not be, as really be, or come to passe. So far then is that Vulgar, but lately received opinion [That nothing is Contingent, save only in respect of Second Causes] from all shew of Truth or Probability; that all things indeed besides the Supreme Agent or Causes of Causes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, are in respect of Him, Contingent. For HE alone be∣ing Absolutely, Independently, and Uncontrollably Free in all his Acti∣ons, had an Absolute Freedom either to Create, or not to Create this World as now it is; an Absolute Freedom Likewise to endow Angels or men with such a Freedom as now they have, that is, a Power of Contingency in their O∣perations, or rather of producing Effects Contingent, that is, such Effects as have been so produced by them as that they might not have been produced, or may hereafter (alwayes presupposing the Limitation or moderation of the Supreme Cause or Agent) be produced or not produced.

3. This kind of Freedom is of Two Sorts, or rather hath two Branches: It is either of meer Contradiction,* 1.22 or of Contrariety. Or in other Termes, it is either Quoad Exercitium, or Quoad Specificationem. As for Example: It is Free for us to walk or not to walk in the morning. And if we resolve, not to walk, not determining what else to do; this is Libertas Contradiction is, or quoad Exercitium. It is likewise Free for us to read or not to read: And after we have resolved to read some Book or other, it is Free for us to make choice of some Godly Treatise, or of some Lascivious Pamphlet. In choos∣ing the one and refusing the other, we are said to do Freely Libertate Contrarie∣tatis, or quoad Specificationem.

4. All the Controversie amongst Divines is about the Second kind of Free∣dom, which is opposed to Necessity. About this, the Question is, Whether it be Common to every Rational or Intelligent Nature: Or if in some Degree or other it be Common to all; how far Communicable to every such Nature, accord∣ing to their several states or Conditions?

5. Without prejudice to other Mens Opinions, which we rather seek to Reconcile & to be reconciled unto, then to Contradict or to be Contradicted by them; Our First Assertion shall be This. [There is no Rational or Intelli∣gent Nature, but is Free according to the Second Kind of Freedom: (that is, It is Freed from all Necessity of doing or not doing of what it doth or doth not) in Respect of some Acts, Operations, or Objects.] This Assertion we take as granted out of the Grounds of Philosophie. For this Freedom whereof we treat, is one of the most Essential, if not the very First and Radical Prerogative which Reason hath above Sense.

6. Our second Assertion shall be This: [The most Excellent Intellectual Na∣ture, the very Excellency of Nature, Essence and Intellection, is not Free with this Freedom of Indifferencie or Option in respect of Every Object.] God Almighty himself is not Free with this kind of Freedom, to Act or intend Good or Evil. The Infinity of his Transcendent Goodnesse, or (which is all one) the Immen∣sity of his All-Sufficiency, absolutely exempts him from all Temptation or Possibility of intending harm to any of his Creatures which are capable of wrong. In that he is the Infinite Fountain of Goodnesse Moral, he cannot be the Author or Abetter of any thing which is Morally Evil: Nay the very best Operation that can be ascribed to the Almighty Father (to wit, the Eternal Generation of his only Son) is not Free in the Second but only in the

Former Sense above mentioned. He was begotten of the substance of his Father before all Worlds, by Necessity more then Natural. And He that from Eternity thus begat Him, doth so infinitely and Eternally Love his only Begotten Son, as he can never cease to Love Him, or begin to hate Him. So that the Almighty Himself in respect of his Love to his Only Son, was never Free according to either Branch of Freedom mentioned, to wit, either with the Freedom of contrariety or contradiction. But (as the Apostle saith) Of his own Will begot he Vs with the word of Truth: We are his Sons by Adoption, not by Nature, nor by any Necessity Equivalent to that which is Natural. It was more Free for him to adopt or not to adopt us, then it is for any Father to appoint his Heirs or Executors, or to Estate or dispossesse his Children.

7. In as much as Goodnesse is the Essential Object of our heavenly Fathers most Holy Will; it is most Essential and most Necessary to Him, to Will nothing, but that which is Good: Yet is He not hereby either Essentially or necessarily tied to will This or That Particular Good. All things that are truly Good were Created by Him: Nor was it Necessary that he should Create these Parti∣culars and no others. Yea, it was Free for him to create or not to create any thing at all. So then within the Sphere of Goodnesse, He is Liberum Agens, An Agent most Free. It was Free for him to create or not to create us: It is Free for him to preserve or not preserve us; yea to preserve or destroy us: It is Free for him to Elect or not to Elect us, or to destinate us to Life or Death Eternal. He woundeth and he maketh whole: He giveth Life and taketh it away at his pleasure: He bringeth down unto the grave, and raiseth up the Dead again:‖ 1.23

He Freely bestows his Blessings on whom he will, when he will, and in what measure he will.

It was Free for him to Decree or not to Decree any thing concerning us: Nor hath he Decreed any thing for us or against us which may be prejudicial to his Eternal Liberty. For if his supposed Decrees should Necessitate His Will in those Particulars wherein it was absolutely and from Eternity Free, he should Freely make himself or his Will, Mutable: whereas we are bound to Believe that His Will is immutably Free; or that the very Freedom of His Will is Immutable.

8.* 1.24 The Angelical Nature was created Free in respect of Good and Evil. Every Angel had a Twofold Power or Possibility: One of continuing in Good∣nesse or in the Way of Life; Another of diverting from it to the Wayes of Death. Satan and his Angels have lost all Freedom in respect of Goodnesse in the Wayes of Life, but not all Freedom Simply. For albeit they have no Possibility left them, of doing or willing any Good: yet have they manifold Possibilities of doing several Evils; more Free to Sin, then before. They have brought a Necessity upon themselves of intending nothing but that which is hurtful to the Sons of men: but they do not Necessarily intend This or That Particular Hurt which they do de Facto, and no other: nor do they so Necessarily hurt This or That Particular Person at This Instant, but that it was possible for them to let him alone, and to hurt some other. Some or more (it may be) of this infernal Crew are alwayes attending our Publick or Pri∣vate Meetings, especially about Sacred Affairs or Devotions. The only End of their coming is to dishonour God, and to do mischief unto man. In respect of this End indefinitely taken they are not Free, unlesse with that kind of Free∣dom which is opposed only unto Coaction: Both Branches of this End they intend so willingly, that they cannot cease to intend them, or to will the Contrary.

9. Yet notwithstanding this Necessity, they have Freedom left to cull or chuse out the Parties whom they mean to tempt: And after they have de∣termined on the Party, they have Freedom left to make choice of the Particular Temptation; as whether to sollicite them to Pride, rather then to Lust, whe∣ther to provoke them to Anger, or to ungodly mirth. A true Freedom like∣wise they have (after the choice of temptation made) to continue, or change their Baits, to prosecute, or give over their particular present Pojects.

10. The Angels which kept their First Station when the Rebellious did forsake it, have since by Gods Providence lost all Freedom of Will to do Evil; but with increase of their Freedom in doing well. A Necessity is Laid upon them of serving God and him only, yet not hereby necessarily constrained or wrought, no, not by the Incomprehensible and Sweet Contrivance of the Divine Decree, to do Him this Particular Service at this time and no other; not Necessarily enjoyned by Gods Will or their own, to abide so long in this place as they do, and no longer or shorter while. Their Intentions to wards man are alwayes Good, yet not Necessarily bound to do that Determinate Good which they do to this man and no other. To make choice of the Party whom at this instant they especially mean to Protect, is as Free for them as it is for us, among a multitude of Beggars to make choice of some one or two, on whom to bestow our Benevolence. Now in the dispensing of Alms to the needy, or bequeathing Legacies to our friends, we are (I take it) Free, not only from Necessity of Coaction or constraint, but also Free from such Necessity as by vertue of the Eternal Decree is Inevitable.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of the Difference betwixt Servitude and Freedom in Collapsed Angels, and unregenerate men: and of the inequality of Freedom in respect of divers Objects and degrees in Natural men.

1. BUt before we come to speak of the Unregenerate Mans Free-will and its proper Subject,* 1.25 we must lay this Charge upon the Reader, not to interpret or rather mistake us, as if we Questioned; Whether Man were able to do Any Thing or no without Gods Concourse or Assistance; or any Spiritual Good Thing without Grace. We only seek [what kind of Freedom or Possibility of avoiding Evil, or doing better, or lesse Evil then oft-times we do, is appointed to man by the Immutable Decree.] If this Decree allow or permit us any Freedom of Will in these Points: they wrong mankind much, and the Divine Nature more, that seek either by Nice Di∣stinctions utterly to take it from us, or by Timorous Scrupulosities to quell or weaken our spirits or industrie in use of It. This Point also I would com∣mend to every Readers Consideration; That between a meer natural man, and a Man utterly forsaken of God, there is a Mean or Difference; yea per∣haps a greater Difference (in respect of the end of these insuing Quaeries, to wit, the salvation of mens souls) then is between the State of a man Ut∣terly for saken of God, and of Satan and his Angels.

2. In respect of Good and Evil the Humane Nature in the First Creation was as truly and as properly Free, as the Angelical. The First Man was Like

his Creator truly and inherently Good, indued with Power of doing Well: But this his Power was matched with a Possibility of doing Evil. And by his Free and wilful Reduction of this Power into Act, He and his Children have utterly lost all Possibility of doing Well. By nature, All of us are the Children of Wrath; the Servants of sin from our birth: Nor can we be Freed from this S••rvitude till we be made the Sons of God by the Grace of Adoption.

3. But though this Tenent of Reformed Churches be most true, to wit, That the Humane Nature before Adams Fall was as truly Free as the Ange∣lical, and that all the Sons of men since his Fall are as truly subject to sin as the collapsed Angels: yet neither was our Freedom before his Fall equal to An∣gelical Freedom, nor this Servitude of sin in us so great, as that which is in the Devils. For not to speak of the Elect or such as are certainly destinated to salvation; the State of Cain (the Father of Reprobates) before he slew his Brother Abel (though we consider it with reference to the Eternal Decree of Reprobation) was not so desperate, as the Estate of the old Serpent. For God certainly did never use that mild and gentle Language either to Satan or his Angels, which he did to Cain a little before he slew his Brother. And the Lord said unto Cain, why art thou wroth? and why is thy Countenance fallen? If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, sin Lieth at the door: and unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him, Gen. 4. 6, 7. Howbeit if at any time it had pleased the wisdom of God to make Lo∣ving Profers of Impossibilities to his Creatures Choice: Satan and his Angels by rule of Retaliation, had been the fittest Subjects of such Profers,* 1.26 because it is their continual Practice to delude mankind in their misery, with fair pro∣mises of those things which either they are not able, or never purpose to perform.

4. But seeing the sons of men (until they be redeemed by Christ) and wicked Spirits are both alike Servants to Sin, though their Servitude to it be not Equal: the Question is [Wherein the Inequality of their Servitude consists?] The Depth of the Angels Fall was by the Eternal Rule of Justice proportion∣ed to the Height of their knowledge and Happinesse when they stood. Now their First Station was much higher then mans; the one in Heaven, the other in Paradise. And as they sinned more wilfully and haughtily: so they continued more wilful and stubborn in the course of sin, then man. The Necessity which they brought upon themselves is Two-fold: First, a Necessity of doing alwayes that which is in its Own Nature Evil; Secondly, a Necessity of doing such evil, with positively evil intentions. It is their delight to Coun∣termand Gods Laws; to make his Negative Precepts Their Affirmatives; and his Affirmatives their Negatives. And knowing much better then most men do, with what particulars God is more specially offended: they tempt every man, (as opportunity serves) to do those things wherwith he is most of∣fended. To tempt some men unto grosse, foul, or base sins, they see it boot∣lesse. Neverthelesse in as much as no man can be without some sin or other; they sollicite all to be like themselves in one sin at least, that is, in Impeni∣tency. And to be finally Impenitent for the least sin, is more offensive to the Goodnesse and Mercy of God, then all other sins that can be by man Com∣mitted.

5. But some happily will thus far plead for Baal or Belzebub and his Fol∣lowers; That many good Turns are done by them to some men. Yet even their best Favours or greatest Benefits are worse then a biting usurers kind∣nesse. Unto this man they may lend Wealth; to that man health; to a

third procure ease from pain, or use of Limbs: but all this with purpose to get the Eternal inheritance of their Souls.

6.* 1.27 The meerly Natural or unregenerate men in some actions sin not at all against their Neighbours or Fellow. Creatures, to whom oft-times they heartily do that Good, which they truly intended. And in such Actions, Their Offence (in respect of Gods Law) is to be accounted (as I take it) Priva∣tive only, no way Positive. Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Anacharsis, perhaps Diogen••s himself and many other Heathen, would have done as the good Sa∣maritane did; to any Passenger or Citizen of the Great City. Now the Sa∣maritans Action was not against Gods Law, though not altogether accord∣ing to his Law. Neither the Intention nor Performance in Like deeds of mercy done by Heathen or meer natural men, are void of evil, because the Doers are never affected with that Sincerity of Heart, on with those Bow∣els of Compassion which Gods Law requires, much lesse with those Re∣ferencies which are due unto Gods Glory. Yet if any man be of Opinion, that the Heathen or unregenerate man doth Positively and actually sin against Gods Laws in the Best works that he can do, I will not contend with him. For albeit I think my Former Assertion to be true: yet is it not my purpose to take the truth of it for any Ground of the insuing Discourse Concerning the proper subject of mans Free-Will.

7.* 1.28 Supposing it were most true, That the best of unregenerate men do Positively and actually sin against Gods Law in every Action that they do: Yet this shall no way infringe our First Assertion which is this: The un∣regenerate man hath a true Freedom of will in the Choice of those particular Evils, into some one or other of which he necessarily fals. For as the Absolute Im∣possibility or want of Freedom to do Evil, doth not bereave the Almighty of absolute Freedom in doing Well: So neither doth the unregenerate mans Im∣possibility of doing Good, strip him of all Freedom in doing Evil. Though he cannot but do Evil, or do every thing that he doth, amisse: yet is there no Necessity that he should do so great Evil, as oft-times he doth; or do it so far amisse as he doth. Few men have any power or Freedom of Will not to be angry when they are provoked; not to allay their anger so soon as they ought, after it be once, upon what Termes soever, kindled. Yet even such as Ne••essarily sin this sin of unadvised Anger in some degree or other•• do not thereupon necessarily commit Man-slaughter, Murther, or Blasphe∣my. Many men have Power or Freedom of Will in ruling their tongues, which have no Freedom or power to stay the boyling of the heart in anger. Many again in their passions have a Free Power over their hands, which have none over their tongues. Many that can hardly hold their hands in heat of anger, have a Freedom of will not to strike with edge-tools or weapons that may make deadly wounds.

8. Every Unregenerate man at his first arrival at the Use of Reason is Free in respect of the height or Extremity of those very sins unto which he is either by General Corruption of nature or Peculiar Disposition of body, most subject. It is not Necessary that he which is by Nature, Education, and Dyet, most prone to wantonnesse,* 1.29 ••••ould delight in Adultery, or to be overtaken with temptations to Unnatural Lusts. Into Acts or Crimes whether for their kind unnatural or Prodigious, or for degree extremely evil, no natural man did ever Necessarily fall, nis•• Necessitate ex Hypothesi, that is, unlesse it were for abusing that Freedom of Will, or choice which na∣turally he hath in Ordinary evils, in things Moral or Indifferent. But by sinning in a higher Degree, or oftner in any kind then the corrupted estate

of Nature or Sin meerly inbred did Necessitate us unto, we exempt our selves from the Protection of Gods ordinary and wonted Providence: And thence exempted we naturally fall into an Estate or disposition of mind most unnatural, and bring a* 1.30 Necessity upon our selves of sinning extreamly. Finally, without Gods Special Grace, the best of us sinin every Action: without the guidance of his Fatherly Providence we sin extreamly against Every divine Commandment.

9. All of us at the First use of Reason have a true Freedom of Will in avoiding such Occasions or Opportunities to sin, as being not avoided but Voluntarily and Freely affected, draw a Necessity upon us of falling into foul and grievous sins. It was perhaps impossible for AEgisthus to avoid Adultery, so long as he betroathed himself to Sloth. But it was not impossible for him (nor for any) to have avoided this disease; or at Least, to have been divorced from it, after he had been betrothed to it. The Poet in my Opinion gave us a truer Cause of this mans fault, then those Divines possibly can, which make all Events Necessary or unavoidable in respect of Gods Decree:

Quaeritur AEgisthus quare sit factus Adulter? In promptu causa est; desidiosus erat.

10. Supposing his slothfulnesse had been no sin in its self: yet would it be a grievous sin in us to say, that the Almighty did Decree he should be slothful, that he might become an Adulterer; or be an Adulterer, that he might become a Reprobate, for manifestation of his Glory. His slothful∣nesse in true Divinity was the true and Necessary Cause of his Filthinesse: But of his slothfulnesse there was no Necessary Cause,* 1.31 but a Cause Contingent only. The only Cause it had was the ill use of that Freedom which he had in doing amisse, or avoiding Occasions of doing greater evil. Now to use our Free-will further amisse then is Necessary, is meerly Contingent; no way Ne∣cessary. Albeit he could do nothing as he ought: yet he might have done lesse ill in being imployed in some honest Vocation or Lawful Exercise, then by giving himself over to Pamper, Ease, and Sloth. In Lawful imployments we are commonly freed from all other ill Guests, besides our selves: In Living Idlely or doing nothing, we make our very hearts, our brains, and souls like Empty Rooms for the Infernal Spirits to set up Shop in. The Poets Obser∣vation is very useful for all, but most Peculiar for Younger Students, and ex∣pressed in Terms to their Liking;

Si non ante Diem librum cum lumine poscas,* 1.32 Invidiâ vel amore vigil torquebere;* 1.33 si non Intendas animum studiis, & rebus honestis.

If Men would give some Divine Precepts or Sentences, full Possession of their Morning Thoughts; these would serve as so many Armed Men to keep out the suggestions of the Devil,* 1.34 the World and the flesh, from entring into their Hearts.

11. To hold this Freedom of Will in avoiding Occasions or motives to sin, is most agreeable to the Doctrine of the Reformed Churches. All which (if I mistake not) permit a Moderate and lawful Vse of Vows, not only to men already sanctified or in the estate of Grace, but unto all such as desire to avoid sin and the Motives thereunto, that they may be sanctified. In these two Points I hope we shall all agree: First, That we may not Vow any thing which is not in our Power. Secondly, That the avoidance of Occasions or

Motives to grosse or known sins is one of the most proper and most safe Ob∣jects of solemn Vows.

12. Some of our Wise and Godly Founders of Colledges, which died before Reformation begun do not tye us by oath, never to transgress in mat∣ters of Manners or Crime: But to undergo punishment for breach of good manners they strictly tye us Virtute Juramenti. What is the reason? Surely that which we said before: They well knew, that to undergo ordinary pu∣nishment, as losse of Commons, or the like, was in our Power, and Conse∣quently just matter of Vow: But to avoid al actions punishable was not (as they foresaw) in our Power; No part of the Object of our Free-will: and there∣fore they made it no Branch of that Solemn Vow which we make to God for Observation of their Statutes.

13. Now as it is Lawful to Vow strict Observance of outward means, either useful for avoiding grosser sins, or for repenting for them once com∣mitted: So God upon diligent and faithful observance of our Vows in these or the like subjects, doth not only free us from being led into grievous tem∣ptations, but so enlargeth our Freedom of Will in other Points, that by the assistance of his Gracious Providence we gain some Power over our own de∣sires and affections, which before we had not. This cannot seem strange in the course of Nature, especially if we consider it as subject to Gods Favou∣rable Providence. For seeing our carnal appetites or affections are alwayes nourished and strengthened by External Occasions or Opportunities, they must needs be starved or weakned by Substraction of this their Nutriment. And the weaker they are, the better hand the spirit or Conscience gets over them; the easier they are to be tamed and nurtured.

14. Many men have not the Power to abstain from Dainties when they are set before them, or when they are invited to taste them: And the more yielding they are to such Invitations, the greater Liberty will their Appetites take, and leave them lesse Power to abstain from riotous Feasting. But until Long Custom hath brought forth a worse disposition then we bring with us from our Cradles: it is farr more Free and Easie for us to abstain from Hou∣ses of unhallowed Mirth (or Good-Fellowship, as they are termed) then to abstain from those Courses which are usually followed in them, after we be once accustomed to them, In respect of every Negative Precept or things forbidden, it is always More Easie to avoid the First* 1.35 Occasions, then to resist insuing Opportunities. And the more Careful we are in avoiding First Tem∣ptations, the more Capable we are (as was before intimated) of Gods Pecu∣liar Providence to shield us from the assaults of Satan. Not that the lesse Abuse of our Free-will in Evil or in avoiding Occasions that lead unto it, can Merit any such Favour; but the Extream Abuse of such Free-will as we have, Exempts us from those Priviledges which Gods Infinite Bounty bestowes on us.

15. But let us take a man which hath been so far from avoiding, that he hath been alwayes industrious in seeking out Occasions to transgresse; a man that by continual entertainment of all Opportunities to sin, hath yielded up his soul to many foul and grievous sins: What Freedom of Will; what choice

of means for working Mortification or amendment, can be imagined to be left in such a Man? shall we say he hath Freedom of Will inter Mala?* 1.36 This were Destruere Suppositum. We will rather suppose him to have so far abused that Free-Will which men naturally have in doing Evil; that of Two, of Three, of Four, or more Evils proposed together, he would be ready to chuse The Very Worst; alwayes prone to imbrace those Opportunities with greatest speed, which lead to greatest mischiefs; One, Cui, e malis, id maxi∣mè placet, quod est maximum. Is there any Method or place for medicine to this disease? The wicked (saith the Prophet) are like the troubled Sea, when it cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt. There is no peace saith my God to the wicked, Esay 57. 20, 21. Now as the most dangerous and turbu∣lent seas do not rage when the winds are calm: So neither do the wicked some out their shame, when Actual Temptations or provocations cease. And in as much as Occasions and Opportunities do not at all times present themselves: Even he that hath no power to resist the least temptation that offers it self, nor Freedom of Will to refuse the greatest Evil, and chuse the least when both are actually proffered, may in the Cessation of Actual Tem∣ptations, Reflect upon his former Acts, and take a survey of his life past; especially if he be thereto occasioned or perswaded by a discreet Admoni∣tor, one that will not affright him with the Marks of Reprobation. The first Branch of Freedom, or rather, the very root of Free-Will in every Reasonable Creature, is seated in this Power of Reflexion upon its own Acts. This is the First Point or Property, wherein Reason doth exceed Sense. Now he that hath but this Branch of Freedom, to Calculate his former Acts; hath with it a Power to Charge his Soul with the heavy burthen of his sins. The Con∣science will alwayes be ready in quiet thoughts to accuse the Flesh, and urge the Soul to bear Testimony against it. And the soul or Conscience once brought to loath or dislike some special sins is thereby made more Free; apt to bewail all other sins whatsoever, whether Actual or Original. Unlesse David had been throughly stung with the Conscience of murther or Adulte∣ry, that sweet Confession had never found such perfect vent as it did: Be∣hold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me, Psal. 51. 5. Every Creature on whom the Creator hath bestowed any sense or feeling of pain or pleasure, hath Power to imploy some motive Faculty, for avoiding things grievous or hurtful, or for attaining things pleasant and useful for bettering their present Estate. And if man have any sense or feeling of his heavy burthen, he cannot but in some sort or other desire to be released from it. Upon this Principle, is that Exhortation of our Saviour, Grounded: Come unto me all ye that Labour and are heavy Laden, and I will ease you, Mat. 11. 28.

16. So then albeit there be a true Freedom of Will in all the sons of Adam, (which are not utterly or finally forsaken of God:) yet is not this Freedom the same in all, neither in respect of its Objects or Acts, nor in respect of its Degrees or Strength. Some have a Competent Measure of Liberty to avoid Occasions or external Motives to known sins; but either no portion of like Liberty, or a very Little One, to resist such temptations to foul sins, as come upon them unexpectedly. Others have a Competent Measure of like Free∣dom to resist Temptations or Opportunities to grosse sins, but little or none at all to bewaile their natural misery, or to beat down their inbred Pride by Contemplation of Sin Original, or by Reflecting upon sins of Omission, or Positive Acts of ordinary Transgression. Others again which had deprived themselves of all Freedom for avoiding Occasions, or resisting Temptations

to certain sins; have a Larger measure of Freedom then others have, to be humbled under Gods Mighty Hand; which is in Order the First, and by disposition of the Divine Providence, the most Available means for attain∣ing Mortification; which must be the Subject of the next Discourse; where∣in I must follow my Method proposed, to wit; To discusse the true meaning of those Scriptures wherein the Difficulties or Questions Con∣cerning this Duty are properly seated. To begin with that of our A∣postle, Rom, 8. 12.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The main Point about Free∣Will, scarce well stated in any Age since the Apostles times.
• * 1.2

  See S. August. 1 Tom. 3. Books de lib. Arb. & 7 Tom. L. de lib. Arb. & Gra. c. 2. Quo∣modo jubet Deus, si non est Liberum Arbitrium?
• * 1.3

  S. Chrys. 1. Tom. Hom. 62. Orat. 2. de Fa∣to, sayes that A Fatalist can∣not be saved.
• * 1.4

  ☜
• * 1.5

  Tolle Liberum Arbitrium, non erit Quod; Tolle Gratiam Liberam non erit Quo, Salvetur.

  Tolle Liberum Arbitrium, quomo∣do Deus judicabit;

  Tolle Gratiam quomodo Salvabit mundum? Epist. 1. ad Valentin: Tom. 7.
• † 1.6

  See His sixt Book of Com. or Attributes. part 2. Sect. 2.
• * 1.7

  Of Freedom in creatures in∣animate, as it is opposed to In∣forcement.
• * 1.8

  Of that Age Ovid. Met. Lib. 1. Ipsa quoque immunis, rastroque intacta, nec ullis Saucia vome••ibus, per se dabat omnia T••l∣lus—. Mox etiam fruges Tellus inarata ferebat: Nec renovatus ager gravidis canebat aristis:
• * 1.9

  See Horace his Arva Beata. Epod. 16. Reddit ubi Cererem tellus inarata quotan∣nis, &c. Illic injussae veniunt ad mulctra capellae, &c.
• * 1.10

  Of the Radical Difference between Crea∣tures Inanimate and Ve∣getahles
• † 1.11

  Arist. Eth. Nicom. Lib 2. Cap. 1.
• * 1.12

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.13

  Of the diffe∣rence betwixt Vegetables & Sensitives, & their motive power.
• * 1.14

  Plutarch De Liberis Edu∣candis. Et in Laconicis Apophtheg.
• * 1.15

  of the true dif∣ference be∣twixt meer Sensitive and Reasonable Creatures.
• † 1.16

  Baptis••a Per∣sona.
• * 1.17

  Freedome or Liberty of choice.
• * 1.18

  Agen∣cie Imma∣nent. Tran∣sient.
• * 1.19

  Concerning this Definition, See victoria in His 13. Relectiō, upon that of Ecclus. cap. 15. Deus ab initio con∣stituit homi∣nem, & reli∣quit illum in manu consilii fui.
• * 1.20

  The Former Definition re∣strained to the Angelical & Humane Na∣ture.
• * 1.21

  Contingertia est duplex; Intrinseca, ex Electione; Extrinseca ex casu, orta. See Suarez Meta∣phys. Disp. 19. Sect. 10. Num. 4.
• * 1.22

  Free-Will of Two Sorts.
• ‖ 1.23

  Spiritus est ubi vult, sua munera dividit, u•• vult: Dat cui vult, quod vult, quantum vult, tem∣pore quo vult.
• * 1.24

  No Agent Free in respect of All: Every Rational A∣gent Free in respect of Somé Objects.
• * 1.25

  What Free∣Will in the Natural or unregenerate Man.
• * 1.26

  ☜
• * 1.27

  The Unrege∣nerate sin not, in every Acti∣on, against men.
• * 1.28

  The Unrege∣nerate man hath a true Freedom in doing Evil.
• * 1.29

  Juvenal. N••∣mo repente suit turpissi∣mus.
• * 1.30

  See Chap. 18. last Parag. and Chap. 21. Parag. 3, 4, 5.
• * 1.31

  To use Free-will extream∣ly amisse, is not Necessary but Contingent.
• * 1.32

  Hor. Epist. 2.
• * 1.33

  Lib. 1.
• * 1.34

  ☜
• * 1.35

  This is ma∣nifest in that Great Example and Champion of Chastity, ho∣ly Joseph. Who durst not stay to struggle for his Garmēt (though it cōcerned him highly to have got away that which he knew would be made a Cloke for his Mistresses sin, and a Colour of His:) but hasted and fled. Chusing rather to leave behind him a seeming Argu∣ment of his Guilt, then by longer stay (or Reasoning after those two Arguments, of Wrong done a Good Master, and Sin against a Good God, would not disswade) to incur a Real Danger, of becoming Guilty. Even so it is commanded, 2 Tim. 2. 22. Fly away from Lust. We may and must resist the Devil and fight it out against Him: but for Lust, the only way is (as when the house it on fire) Avoidance and Flight. Haste away, Escape for thy life, (and Thy Souls Life) Look not behind Thee, nor stay; lest the fire overtake thee, and so thou be consumed in the Flame.
• * 1.36

  What portion of Freedom is in such as Sin Extreamly.