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An Explication of a passage in the Treatise of Things 〈◊〉〈◊〉, &c.
WHereas in the Treatise concerning the Indifferency of humane actions, pag. 54. as also in my Reply to Dr. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Vindication, &c. page 5. I layd down this for a Rule out of some School-men, viz. That 〈◊〉〈◊〉 things privatively opposite there's no medium, no middle, either of abnegation, or of participation, in capable subjects; I finde some to make a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 concern∣ing the latter, the middle of participation; for such a medium (say they) is the dawning and twi-light betwixt light and darknesse; to have one eye betwixt sight and blindnesse; such a medium is a disposition unto a disease, betwixt health and that disease. But this doubt would soon vanish, if men would heed the li∣mitations that are usually given of it.
The first is, that there is not such a medium of participation betwixt privative opposites, as there is in 〈◊〉〈◊〉, in contrary qualities; for here, each of the extreams is positive and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, verè ens, whereas in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 opposites, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of them is more non ens than ens.
A second you have in Scheibler in his Topicks, c. 20. n. 72. having quoted a saying out of Plutarch, that non datur 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he referreth, for limitation, unto what hee had said concerning the intension and remission of privation, n. 43, 44, 45. There he layeth down this Canon, privatio 〈◊〉〈◊〉 suscipit magis & minus. Privations have no degrees, are not intended nor remitted. But this he tels us is to be understood of not partial privations, such as those now in∣stanc'd in: for such are privations onely secundum 〈◊〉〈◊〉; but of total privations, such as blindnesse, dumbnesse, deafnesse, death. These are uncapable of degrees, and so likewise there can be no mixture, or cohesion of them. The same for sub∣stance we have in Aquinas, 1. 2ae q. 18. a. 8. ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Duplex est priva∣tio, quaedam quae consistit in privatum esse: & haec nihil 〈◊〉〈◊〉, sed totum aufert: ut caecitas totaliter aufert 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & tenebrae lucem, & mors vitam; & inter hanc pri∣vationem, & habitum oppositum non potest esse aliquod medium circa proprium susceptibi∣le, Est autem alia 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quae 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in privari, sicut aegritudo est privatio sanita∣tis, non quod tota sanitas sit sublata, sed quod est quasi quaedam via ad totalem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sanitatis, quae 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mortem. Et ideo talis privatio, cùm a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 relinquat, non sem∣per est immediata cum opposite habitu. The summe and sense of this is, that priva∣tions and their habits are immediately opposite, if we speak of privations in facto esse, not in fieri. Now that Aquinas here speaks of medium participationis, is the Comment of Gregory de Valentia, Tom. 2 dis. 2. q. 13. punct 5. This adver∣tisement I thought fit to insert, for the prevention of unnecessary cavils: But yet I must confesse, that medium participationis was put into the rule ex abundanti, and contributes nothing to the matter in hand: So that the Reader, if hee please may leave it out; for the stresse of the proof lyes only upon this, viz. that betwixt things privatively opposite, theres no medium of abnegation in capa∣ble subjects. And this is affirmed so unanimously by all, as that I know not so much as one Dissentient.