A second part of The mixture of scholasticall divinity, with practical, in several tractates: wherein some of the most difficult knots in divinity are untyed, many dark places of Scripture cleared, sundry heresies and errors refuted ... Whereunto are annexed, several letters of the same author, and Dr. Jeremy Taylor, concerning Original Sin. Together with a reply unto Dr. Hammonds vindication of his grounds of uniformity from 1 Cor. 14.40. By Henry Jeanes, minister of Gods Word at Chedzoy in Somersetshire.

Jeanes.

This is a modall Syllogisme, framed exactly according to the rules of Logick touching modall Syllogismes; as for that Syllogisme which you parallel unto it, it hath no alliance with it; for both the premises of mine are true, and the Minor of yours is grosly and palpably false; for unjust lawes are not, in propriety of speech, lawes, but are so termed only equivocally, as a painted, a dead man, is said to be a man: turpe praeceptum non est lex, sed 〈◊〉〈◊〉, for obligation is essentiall unto a law; now every law obligeth in the name of God, by authority derived from him, and the glorious name of God cannot oblige unto any thing that is unjust: the Fathers, Schoolmen and ancient Philosophers are all so unanimous in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of this, and have for this their assertion such pregnant and convincing reasons, as that I cannot but wonder, that a man of your learning should be of an other opinion; but in your next we shall hear what arguments you have for your distent: In the mean while, I shall desire the Reader to take notice of the wit∣nesses, and reasons produced, amongst many others, by Suarez, and Gregory de Valentia, for what I affirme,

1. Suarez de legib. lib 1. cap. 9. De ratione, & essentia legis, est, inquit, ut praecipiat justa: Assertio est non solum certa secundum fidem, sed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 clara secundum naturalem rationem. Et ita 〈◊〉〈◊〉 tradunt non solum Theologi, & Patres inserius alle∣gandi, sedetiam passim Philosophi &c. Verum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 haec ipsa conditio dupliciter ex∣plicari potest, scilicet vel negative, ut scilicet quod 〈◊〉〈◊〉, nec injustum, nec turpe sit; vel positive, ut sit justum & 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

Conditio ergo haec praecipue intelligitur 〈◊〉〈◊〉 modo, & sic est evidens, alia vero rati∣one invenitur in legibus divinis, & aliter in humanis. In divinis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ratio est recti∣tudo per essentiam divinae voluntatis. Est enim Deus summe bonus, & ideo non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a∣liquid pravum praecitere. &c.

De legibus autem humanis, hoc fundatur in alio principio. Nam legislator humanus non habet voluntatem 〈◊〉〈◊〉, sicut Deus, & ideo quantum est ex se, & quoad 〈◊〉〈◊〉, potest interdum iniqua praecipere, ut constat: non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 habet potestatem ad obligandum per iniquas leges, & ideo licet iniqua praecipiat, tale praeceptum non est lex, quia vim, cut valorem ad obligandum non habet. &c.

Et ita est clara ratio assertionis, tum quia illa potestas, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 obligandi, est a Deo, quae tem a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt: Ergo est data in bonum, & in 〈◊〉〈◊〉, non in ma∣lum, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in destructionem: Tum etiam quia nullus inserior potest obligare contra 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 superioris; sed lex praecipiens pravum actum est contra legem Dei prohibentis illum: Ergo non potest obligare, quia impossibile est, homines simul obligari ad agendum, & non agendum aliquid: si autem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est prohibitum lege divina, non totest lex inferioris tollere illam superioris obligationem: Ergo nee potest inducere 〈◊〉〈◊〉: Ergo e∣jus lex tali opere non potest esse valida. Et de hac justitia legis lequebatur August. lib. 1. de libero arbit. cap. 5. cum dixit, mihi lex esse non videtur, quae justa non fuerit. Et de eadem intelligi potest, quod dicit lib. de vera relig. cap. 31. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 se∣gum temporalium, si vir bonus est & sapiens, legem consulit aeternam, ut secundum ejus in∣commutabiles regulas, quid sit pro tempore vitandum, jubendumque discernat. Vnde si∣cut lex aeterna solum just a praecipit, quia est ipsa justitia per essentiam, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a vero lex humana esse debet paerticipatio ejus, & ideo non potest valide praecipere, nisi 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & ho∣nesta, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 illud Prov. 8. Per me Reges regnant, & legum conditores justa decernunt.

Atque hinc ulterius concluditur, hanc conditionem, etiam positive intellectam esse 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 legis; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 modo singulis applicanda sit, &c.

Ex hac assertione sic declarata duo inferre possumus. Vnum est ad illam maxime 〈◊〉〈◊〉 primam conditionem positam ab Isidoro, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ut lex 〈◊〉〈◊〉 honesta, quod ex ipsa vocis proprietate satis patet. &c.

〈◊〉〈◊〉 infertur ex 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non habentem hanc justitiam, seu honestatem, non esse legem, neque obligare, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nec servari posse &c.

Unto this of Suarez I shall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 what Gregory de Valentia hath to the same pur∣pose, tom. 2. disp. 7. quaest. 1. punct. 1. Nomen 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 significat rectam a∣liquam regulam praescribentem communitati alicui perfectae modum necessarium ad bonum ejusdem communitatis &c.

Atque 〈◊〉〈◊〉 modo 〈◊〉〈◊〉 D. Thomas 〈◊〉〈◊〉, cum infra quaest. 96. art. 4, inquit leges 〈◊〉〈◊〉 magis esse violentias, quam leges. Item quaest. 90. art. 2 & 3. Vbi definit, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 commune ordinari, & ab eo, qui curam gerit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

〈◊〉〈◊〉 etiam D. Augustinus lib. 1. de libero arbitrio cap. 5. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 accepit, cum dixit, legem non videri, quae justa non sit. In quam sententiam lib. 19. de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Dei, cap. 21. inquit etiam, non esse jura dicenda, vel 〈◊〉〈◊〉, iniqua 〈◊〉〈◊〉 constituta. Atque etiam legem esse regulam aliquam rectam censuit Clemens Alexandrinus, lib. 1. Stro∣matum, cum dixit: legem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & regulam 〈◊〉〈◊〉. & injustorum. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Plato in Dialogo 〈◊〉〈◊〉 de legibus, & in Epineme, ubi asseruit, finem legis esse De∣um & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ejus. Item Philosophus lib. 5. Ethitor. cap. 1. inquiens, legalia justa esse factiva & conservativa faelicitatis, 〈◊〉〈◊〉; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Cicero lib. 2. de legitus: Constat, inquit, profecto ad salutem civium 〈◊〉〈◊〉; incolumitatem, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quie∣tam. & beatam, conditas esse leges. Et post, cum dixisset eos, qui 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 populis jara descripsissent, quidvis aliud potius tulisse, quam leges, concludit, perspicuum esse in ipso nomine leges interpretando, inesse vim, atque sententiam justi, & juris co∣lendi.

By this you may see, that in your Syllogisme there are four termes, for lawes in the Minor are taken improperly and equivocally, in the conclusion properly and uni∣vocally; But custome in my Syllogisme, both in Minor and Conclusion, is taken properly and univocally, for custome is predicated univocally of the most undecent customes.

For farther justification of my Syllogisme I shall reduce it in like manner that Logicians reduce Syllogismes made in Baroco and Bocardo, to wit, with that re∣duction which is ad impossibile or per deductionem ad absurdum: I suppose, that you will grant my premises, for the minor you confesse in terminis in the next Section; And the Major cannot be denyed with any colour of reason; for the rule of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is, in some sort, an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cause of decency, and it is impo∣ssible for the exemplary cause of decency to be undecent. Well then, I suppose, that you grant the premises, and only deny, that the inference of the conclusion from these premises is legitimate; if you grant the premises to be true, then you grant the Propositions, that are contradictory unto them, to be false, and hereupon it will follow, that if I take the contradictory of my Conclusion, and can thence, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with one of my premises conclude, that one of the premises which I sup∣pose, you grant, is false, hereby I shall convince you, that the principall conclusion, which is contradictory unto this, was true: The contradictory of my conclusion is, custome is the only rule of decency (I take contradictory largely, as some opposite propositions are said by Logicians, to be contradictory de lege) Now this I take and sub∣joyn unto my Major, and here hence I inferre the contradictory of my Minor, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which will make up this following Syllogisme.

It is impossible for the only rule of Decency to be 〈◊〉〈◊〉. But Custome is the only rule of Decency. Therefore it is impossible that any custome should be undecent.

But the conclusion is false, and, I suppose, that you grant the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thereof. Now if the conclusion be false, one of the premises must needs be false; for, ex vero nil 〈◊〉〈◊〉 verum sequitur. Now 'tis not the Major, for I suppose, and that with very good reason, that it is granted by you, therefore 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Minor: now the Minor is contradictory unto the conclusion which you deny, and there∣fore the conclusion, which you denyed, is true, viz. that Custome is not the on∣ly rule of decency: for of contradictory propositions both cannot be true, Con∣tradictio semper dividit verum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 falso.

Thus you see my 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is demonstrated to be true, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ducente ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vel 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

But for the fuller 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of it, I shall propound and answer two objections, that I foresee may be made against it, by such as are not well 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Modal Syllogismes.

The first is, that the duo modi impossibile and possibile are repeated but once a peece in my Syllogisme, and in a good Syllogisme every term is to be put twice.

The answer unto this in breif is, that in a Modal Syllogisme, the modus is none of the terms, but onely a Syncategoremati cal word, so Vallius Introduct. Log. par. 3. cap. 12. In terminis, inquit, non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 modus sicut; enim in conversione propo∣sitionum modus non numeratur inter praedicata vel subjecta, sed est quid additum illis, sic in Syllogismis modalibus, modus non numeratur inter terminos, unde etiam saepe in Syl∣logismo modali non potest inferri conclusio cum modo, sed sine illo. The very same thing is taken notice of by 〈◊〉〈◊〉. concerning such Modal Syllogisms as consist of Modal compounded propositions, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 enim inquit, quod modalis particula non habeat vel rationem 〈◊〉〈◊〉, vel rationem praedicati; sed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 se ex parte copulae: inde clarum est, quod in istis modalibus Syllogismis, particula modalis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 poni potest, nempe in singulis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Syllogismorum partibus, veluti: Necesse est hominem esse animal. Necesse est Petrum esse hominem. Ergo necesse est Petrum esse animal. Hîc aio, particulam necesse, nec habere rationem praedicati, nec subjecti, sed esse ex parte copulae, quia in propositione, assumptione, & conclusione reperitur. At nullus terminus in Syllogismo ter poni potest.

A second objection is, that in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Syllogismes mentioned by Aristotle, this mixture or combination of impossibile and possibile is not at all mentioned.

For answer, Aristotle instanceth in Modal Syllogismes, wherein there is a mix∣ture of necesse and contingens, and Logicians generally hold that impossibile is re∣duced unto necessarium and possibile unto contingens. Let two speak for all.

〈◊〉〈◊〉. The but now quoted Vallius in lib. 1. prior pag. 38. Impossibile (inquit Phi∣loponus) comprehenditur sub necessario, quia quod est necessarium, est impossibile ut non sit, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quia homo est necessario animal, impossibile est ut non sit animal: & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ra∣tione quod est impossibile, est necessarium ut non sit. Similiter possibile comprehenditur sub contingenti, quod enim contingit esse, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fieri potest, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est possibile, & quod 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non esse, contingit non esse: adeoque id, quod proprie vocatur possibile, concurrit cum contingenti. He quotes also for it, if my memory fail not, Burana affirming as much ex Alexandro.

The second Author is a late one read by every Fresh-man, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 institut. Log. lib. 2 c 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 modi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 annumerantur propositionibus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉; & propositiones modi possibile, iis quae sunt modi contingit.