A second part of The mixture of scholasticall divinity, with practical, in several tractates: wherein some of the most difficult knots in divinity are untyed, many dark places of Scripture cleared, sundry heresies and errors refuted ... Whereunto are annexed, several letters of the same author, and Dr. Jeremy Taylor, concerning Original Sin. Together with a reply unto Dr. Hammonds vindication of his grounds of uniformity from 1 Cor. 14.40. By Henry Jeanes, minister of Gods Word at Chedzoy in Somersetshire.

ALl that I have to say concerning Originall Righteousnesse shall be reduced unto two heads. 1. An sit. 2. Quid sit.

First, Inquire we concerning its An sit; for the Socinians deny, that there was any such thing, as you may see by what Socinus himselfe saith, in his Prelections, Chap. 3. and with him Dr Jeremy Taylor fully accords, in diverse places of his bookes; [Further explication of Originall sinne, pag. 461.] The matter of Originall Righteousnesse is a thing framed in the Schoole forges; but not at all spoken of in Scripture, &c. [An an∣swer to a letter touching Originall sinne, pag. 5.] When the Luth••ran, and the Roman dispute, whether justice, and Originall righteousnesse in Adam was naturall, or by grace, it is de non ente. [Unum necessa∣rium, pag. 380.] Innocency of Actuall sin seemes to be that which Divines call Originall Righteousnesse, there being no other either taught or reasonable: who these Divines are, that he speaks of, I cannot guesse, unlesse it be his reverend friends, the Socinians, and some 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that tread in their steps; for, excepting them, the gene∣rality of both Protestants, and Papists dissent from this conceit of his, touching Originall Righteousnesse; but the censure of Soci∣nianisme is that which Dr Taylor despiseth, and smileth at, as a trifling noise, a boyes trick, a womans argument, &c: and therefore we shall oppugne his, and the Socinians opinion by arguments, and they shall be taken from Scripture, and Reason.

First, From Scripture.

The first place is, Gen. 1. 26, 27. God said, let us make man in our

Image, after our likenesse &c. and the principall part of this Image stood in Originall Righteousnesse, as is apparent by Pauls expo∣sition thereof, Ephes. 4. 24. Col. 3. 10.

A second place is, Gen. 1. 31. And God saw every thing that he had made, and behold it was very good; man therefore was in his kind created very good: and the goodnesse proper unto a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 crea∣ture is a morall 〈◊〉〈◊〉, the righteousnesse which we here speake of: so that, 'tis impossible for man to be very good, unlesse his under∣standing be full of saving light, truth, and knowledg, and his will, affections, and whole man of holinesse. Socinus [praelect. cap. 3.] hath here a very sorry shift: 〈◊〉〈◊〉, (〈◊〉〈◊〉,) ibi non de animi 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 de justitia sermonem esse, sed de aptitudine & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad id, quod Deus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sibi 〈◊〉〈◊〉. I Answer (saith he) that by goodnesse is meant the fitnesse, and conveniency of every thing for that end, which God hath appointed: but, this is so far from infirming our argument, as that it rather makes unto the confirmation thereof: because, as I shall shew anon, man can∣not be fitted, and qualified for the end, unto which God hath de∣signed him without a positive righteousnesse.

A third place is Eccles. 7. 29. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 this onely have I found, that God hath made man upright: the word translated upright, is jaschar: and that usually denoteth one, that is upright, not onely with a negative uprightnesse, an uprightnesse of innocency, an exemption from sinne; but also with a positive uprightnesse, an uprightnesse of vertue, purity, and holinesse. Johannes Junius (in his refutation of Socinus his Prelections) observeth, that the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 render it here by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that signifieth strait, or right, [Matth. 3. 3. Mark. 1. 3. Luk. 3. 4, 5: Acts 8. 21, 13, 10. 2 Pet. 2. 15.] elsewhere by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, righteous, or just, [Prov. 17. 26. Numb. 23. 10.] by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 good [Deut. 12. 28.] by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 good, or faire; by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 pure or cleane [Job. 3 3. 3.] and doth not this amount to more, then a meere innocency, a bare absence of vice? he noteth as much also concerning the La∣tine word rectus; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in line â non negat tantum, sed & ponit aliquid. [Cicer. 1. Offic.] 〈◊〉〈◊〉 autem officium, rectum opinor vo∣cemus, quod graeci 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. [Idem 2. de finibus.] quae autem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aut recta, aut 〈◊〉〈◊〉, facta dicimus, si placet, illi autem vocant 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, omnes numeros virtutis continent, valet ergo idem quodjustum, ut cum Virgil. 1. Aeneid. dicit, & mens sibi conscia recti.

But to passe on unto the New Testament; and there (by the Apo∣stle Paul) we have the particulars of that uprightnesse, and the image of God, in which the first man was created clearly expressed: to instance first in that, which was the leading grace unto all o∣thers, a true saving and sanctifying knowledge: and that, man was endued with such a knowledge, when he was created, may be easi∣ly concluded from, Col. 3. 10. And have put on the now man, which is renewed in knowledge, after the image of him, that created him: here, that knowledge, which is restored to man in his regeneration, hath for it's exemplar the image of God stamp'd upon man in his creation; and therefore Beza(n) 1.1 renders, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in agnitionem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 imagini ejus, renewed in knowledge suitable, and agreable unto the image of God; the knowledge there∣fore of the regenerate man represents, at least inpart, the image of God in the first man when created, & consequently knowledge was a branch of that image of God, in which the first man was created.

Dr. Taylor speakes detractingly of the knowledge of Adam in his state of integrity [Unum necessarium, pag: 373.] neither can we guesse (saith he) at what degree of knowledge Adam had before his fall: certainly, if he had so great a knowledge 'tis not likely he would so cheaply have sold himsefe, and all his hopes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of a greedy appetite to get some knowledge.

But we may goe further than guesses, and that with good war∣rant from scripture; for.

First, God created man in his image: and, wheresoever the image of God is, there is an assimilation unto God in understanding, wise∣dome, and knowledge, though with great inequality.

Secondly, that this knowledge was, notitia 〈◊〉〈◊〉, an affectio∣nate practicall knowledge, that drew after it suitable affections, and actions, appeareth by these foure arguments.

First, because words of knowledge, in Scripture doe imply an∣swerable affections, and practises.

Secondly, the word [Coll. 3. 10.] is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 'tis rendred, by latine Interpreters, rather agnitio, than cognitio; not a bare know∣ledge, but knowledge with an acknowledgement.

Thirdly, it could not be inferiour to that knowledge, which is a part of the new man; for it was the patterne, and samplar thereof: the new man is renewed in knowledge after the image of God.

Fourthly, in the now quoted place [Coll. 3. 10.] knowledge is (by a synecdoche of the part for the whole) put for the whole new man; and the image of God in the first man is, (by a synecdoche of the whole for the part) put for his knowledge: now, for these Synecdoches, what better, and more probable reason can be assigned, thanthe connexion of knowledge with the principall parts of God's image, as in the new, so in the first man.

Thirdly, the scripture ascribes divers things unto man, in his state of innocency, unto which a very great measure of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was requi∣site: he was made head of all mankind, Lord of the universe; he gave names unto all the cattle, unto the sowles of the aire, and to every beast of the field, Gen. 2. 20: and doubtlesse, they were apt names, significant of their natures; because given by appointment, and ap∣probation of God himselfe: God brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them, and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof, Gen. 2. 19: besides, God created man for his service; the Lord hath made all things for himselfe (saith the wise man) Prov. 16 4: to wit, to serve him, according to the capacity of their severall natures: now man's nature was rationall; and therefore his end was a reasonable service; and, to guide him in the way hereunto, he had the law of nature written in his heart: now all these particulars joined together required, even a fullnesse of knowledge. Politique Princes on earth will choose none but wise, and prudent persons for their deputies; and can we then imagine, that an omniscient God made choice of an ignorant, and unknow∣ing Viceroy? God gave him dominion over the fishes of the sea, and o∣ver the fowle of the aire, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth: and why should not his intellectualls hold proportion with his dominion, and be as vast, and extensive? it is altogether improbable, that God should give him so great, and large a scepter, and not qualify him for the weilding of it: he was nomenclator unto the creation, and for such an office he was altogether unmeet, if he were ignorant of the es∣sences, and qualities of creatures: doubtlesse, he knew the end, for which he was created; the duties, that were injoined him; the light, and law of nature shone not more dimly in his breast, when he was in his integrity, than it doth in his laps'd posterity; and in the worst of them, the law is written in their hearts, Rom. 2. 15. We

can doe more than ghesse at the dictates of right reason, or else we should be at a losse touching all first principles, both speculative, and practicall; and there is no question to be made, but that Adam, before his fall, knew all the dictates of right reason, and assented unto them, and therefore we are not, in such an utter uncertainty, touching the knowledge Adam had before his sall, as Dr. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 would beare us in hand.

But let us weigh the Doctor's argument. Certainly if he had so great a knowledge, 'tis not likely he would so cheaply have sold himselfe, and all his hopes out of a greedy appetite to get some knowledge.

The answer is very easy, and obvious: This greedy appetite to get that knowledge promised by the Serpent, was undenyably a great sinne, and therefore to say it could be in him before his fall, were a very grosse contradiction: for this were to affirme, that sin was in him in a state of innocency, when he was without sinne; that he sinned, before he sinned: and, if it were not in him before his fall, I would know of the Dr. and all his admirers, how it can be an argument against the greatnesse of his knowledge before the fall? It is a common opinion among'st both(o) 1.2 Papists, and Protestants, that this greedy appetite proceeded, not from error, or ignorance, but from incogitancy, inconsideration, or inadvertency.

But I proceed on unto the last place. Ephes. 4. 24. And that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousnesse, and true holinesse, here, (by the consent of most Interpreters) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, after God, is as much as, after or according to the image of God and, by this interpretation, it will follow, that the image of God consisted principally in righteousnesse and true holinesse, and these are so com∣prehensive, as that they take in all graces, and vertues whatsoever: Junius [in his conference with Arminius] speakes of some, who un∣derstand that clause [after God] concerning the power, and ver∣tue of God, working this righteousnesse, and true holinesse: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 contendam (inquit) quod multi interpretantur [secundum Deum] ac si 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Apostolus virtute Dei agentis in nobis: But Dr. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 [in his animadversions upon the said conference] tel's Junius: first, that this interpretation is opposite unto his own interpretation of the words, and then, he confesseth his ignorance os any, that are the authors of such an exposition: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 contenderes, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ipsi contra∣diceres, ut qui ad Gen. 1. 26: hac ipsa 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, de imagine Dei in

homine interpreteris. Qui vero illi sint, qui contra instituunt mihi nondum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est [pag. 39. cap. 1.] But, I shall further, unto this sense of the place, oppose an argument from the signification of the particle [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] which here, in all probability, rather deno∣teth the relation of righteousnesse, and true holinesse unto it's 〈◊〉〈◊〉, than unto it's cause, physically procreant.

By what hath been said, the reader may be informed, how remote from truth an other passage of Dr. Taylors is [in his Unum necessa∣rium, p362.] What gifts and graces, or supernaturall endowments God gave to Adam in his state of innocency, we know not, God hath no where told; and of things 〈◊〉〈◊〉 we commonly make wild conjectures.

God, you see, hath told us, that he created man after his image, in knowledge, righteousnesse, and true holinesse; that he made him very good, that he made him upright: now, whether the Dr. hath the forehead to affirme, that all this signifieth noe gifts, graces, or super∣naturall endowments, which God gave to Adam in his state of innocency? and what proofes he will bring, for so strange an as∣sertion, we will leave unto the issue?

Unto the above mentioned scriptures there are usually added two reasons: the first, drawne from the end of the first man; the se∣cond, from the laws prescribed unto him; for without a positive righteousnesse it was impossible for him to reach this end; to obey these laws: but, of these two arguments, I shall hereafter speake more fully, and therefore, for the present, I shall passe on, from the Quod sit, unto the Quid sit of this originall righteousnesse, and here, we have a double Quid sit of it, to be inquired into: Quid nominis, and Quid rei.

To begin with Quid nominis; why the righteousnesse of the first man is called originall righteousnesse.

Foure reasons may be given for it.

First, because 'twas seated in the originall, and parent of all mankind.

Secondly, because 'twas the first righteousnesse of mankind that e∣ver was in the world, it was before any other, either habituall, or actuall.

Thirdly, because Adam received it from his very originall; and beginning; as soone as he was created, God created him in his i∣mage, after his likenesse, Gen. 1. 26, 27. God's image was stamp'd upon him the very first moment of his creation, and his righteousnesse

was the principall part of this image; God made man upright, Eccl. 7. 29: he made him, and made him upright at the same time, the es∣sence of his soule was, in order of nature, before it's uprightnesse, as being the subject thereof, and accordingly it was created be∣fore it in order of nature, but yet this is no hindrance, but that the creation of the essence of his soule, and the superinfusion of righte. ousnesse thereinto, might be simultaneos, in regard of time; unto these scriptures, I shall only adde a congruence out of the school-men.

All the other creatures were created in a perfect state, with abi∣lities for operations, suitable unto their respective ends, the hearbs were created yeelding seed, and the trees bearing fruit, Gen: 1. 12, 29: congruent therefore was it, that man the noblest of sublunary crea∣tures, should be created in such a state too; but, if he had been created without originall righteousnesse, he had been in a worse condition, than the meanest of the creatures; for, he would have been unfurnished for the ends of his creation, the glorification of, & com∣munion with God, and destitute of the seeds of his glory, and hap∣pinesse.

Fourthly, it is called originall righteousnesse in respect of Adam's posterity, because, if he had stood, it would have been coevall with the very beginnings of their beings, & so they would have received it together with their very natures: for, it was not given unto Adam only as a personal endowment, but as a gift unto the whole humane nature, he had it as the head, and representative of all mankind, and therefore his posterity were to receive it, (in regard of the habits, that were the foundation of it) when they had their humane nature derived from him: this the School-men further confirme, from (the opposite of originall righteousnesse) originall sin: originall sin is priva∣tively opposed unto originall righteousnesse, but because of the sin of Adam all his posterity are borne in originall sin, therefore if he had never sinned all of them had been borne in originall righteousnesse.

But to passe on from it's Quid nominis unto it's Quid rei, what is meant by the thing it selfe; and for the clearing of this we shall ex∣plicate these seven following particulars.

First, the materiale, secondly, the formale of it, which are (as it were) the essentiall parts of which is consisteth: Thirdly, the sub∣ject in which 'tis seated: Fourthly, the causation, or production: Fifth∣ly, the effects of it: Sixthly, the difference of it from sanctifying

grace, seventhly, the manner of it's relation unto the first man; whe∣ther it were naturall, or supernaturall to him.

First the materiale, the matter, or foundation of it; and that was all the moral perfections, all the graces, and virtues of the whole man; it was not one single habit, but an aggregate of all those habits, by which man was rendred right, and perfect, according to all his parts, and powers: Solomon saith, that God made man upright, Eccl. 7. 29: but upright he had not been, unlesse he had been sanctifi'd who∣ly, in spirit, soule, and body: the least deformity, or defect had been inconsistent with his uprightnesse: the integrity, and universality of the righteousnesse of the first man is by Arnd (as Gerard insormeth us, 〈◊〉〈◊〉: Th. ol: l. 2. p. 179.) resembled unto the beauty of Absalom, 2 Sam. 14. 25. But in all Israel there was none to be so much praysed as Absalom, for his beauty from the sole of his foot, even to the crowne of his head, there was no blemish in him: so in all mankind there was ne∣ver any so much to be praysed (Christ Jesus alone excepted) as Adam in Paradise; for his beauty of holinesse, from the sole of his feet, even to the crowne of his head; from his lowest (to wit,) his sensual faculties, unto his highest, his intellectuall faculties there was no blemish in him.

The School-men generally affirme, that there were, in the first man in his innocency, the habits of those virtues, whose acts did include an imperfection repugnant unto that state, and they in∣stance in repentance, patience, mercy, &c. Suarez goeth further, and affirmeth; that some, though not the chiefe acts of repentance, and mercy, were consistent with the state of innocency. Licet verum sit, non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 has virtutes exercere in statu innocentiae potissimos actus su∣os, nihilominus sēper aliquos actus exercere potuisset: Primo, actus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 conditionatos, ut in poenitentiâ esset hic actus, si 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, in misericordiâ, si proximus indigeret illi 〈◊〉〈◊〉: Nam licet a∣liqui putent, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 actus esse potius intellectus, quam voluntatis, tamen esse possunt in actuali 〈◊〉〈◊〉 voluntatis de conditionato objecto. Imò illi conditionales non essent 〈◊〉〈◊〉 verè in homine, nisi fundarentur in actuali proposito voluntatis ejus. Secundo, posset exerceri actus com∣placentiae circa 〈◊〉〈◊〉 objectivam talium virtutum. Tertiò, specia∣litèr virtus poenitentiae, quamvis non posset 〈◊〉〈◊〉 malum commis∣sum posset odio habere peccatum, quod offertur ut committendum, & ha∣bere voluntatem non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Deo injuriam. Misericordia etiam 〈◊〉〈◊〉

semper, aut per se requirit dolorem in miserente, nam voluntas suble∣vandi 〈◊〉〈◊〉, si absque dolore haberi p sset, revera 〈◊〉〈◊〉 actus miseri∣cordiae. Hoc autem 〈◊〉〈◊〉, si status innocentiae duraret, posset unus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cadere, & alter innocens habere voluntatem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 illi, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 displicentiâ de malo ejus, quae posset haberi sine tristitiâ, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dolore. Et fortasse inter ipsos 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 occasiones habendi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a∣ctus. Nam licet in illis non esset propria miseria poenalis, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a∣liqua indigentia naturalis, ut parvuli 〈◊〉〈◊〉 auxilio majorum ad educationem, & ad vitanda pericula, & ignorantes, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 insipientes in∣digerent doctrinâ. Ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ergò modum non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ibi aliqua materia misericordiae, & sic 〈◊〉〈◊〉 de aliis similibus virtutibus facilè 〈◊〉〈◊〉. De hom: creat: ac stat: 〈◊〉〈◊〉: lib. 3. cap. 11.

Secondly, the Formale; the formality of this righteousnesse was (as Estius noteth in lib. 2. sent: dist: 25. sect. 5.) not so much the aggre∣gation, and collection of those habits, that rendred man perfect, as the relation of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 resulting from them: originall righteousnesse then was the rectitude of the whole man, and all his powers in re∣ference unto one another, and (in regard of their acts it was) a relation of conformity of all in man unto the rule, the revealed will of God: but heare Estius himselfe largely and clearly explicating him∣selfe in this particular. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 et si non sit dubitandum, quin 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ori∣ginalis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 bona vel omnia, vel 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in primo homine habuerit con∣juncta, quod & futurum erat in posteris ex eo nascituris statu innocen∣tiae durante; non tamen justitiae nomine 〈◊〉〈◊〉 propriè tale aliquod ag∣gregatum, seu complexum significari, sed potiùs rectitudo quaedam quae in toto homine ex partium ac potentiarum ejus ordine atque optima dispositione consurgebat. Quare justitia originalis ad omnes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 habitus, seu dispositiones, ac perfectiones potentiarum, videtur 〈◊〉〈◊〉 habuisse tanquam relatio 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad rationes fundandi; ut non sit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is necesse, vel unum aliquem habitum, vel plures quaerere, qui propriè sint, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 constituant justitiam originalem, sed sufficiat intelli∣gere quò d homo secundùm partes, & potentias suas it a fuerit ordinatus, ut absolutè rectus, ac justus 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ut pote nihil habens in se inordi∣natum, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vitiosum.

Thirdly, what was the subject of originall righteousnesse in which it was seated? Scotus placeth it only in the will: because upon that depends the rectitude of humane actions: Durand restraines it unto the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 faculties of the soule:

because they only are regulated, and made subject unto reason: But(p) 1.3 Estius, in the place but now quoted, with better reason maketh the subject of it to be all the parts or powers of the soule; for rectitude (saith he) whether we understand it to be in corpo∣rals, or spirituals, existeth in the parts, having that order betwixt themselves, whence the whole that consists of them is denominated to be right, or strait: that was the subject of this originall 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which was the subject of those habits, that were the foun∣dation thereof: now those habits were placed in all the powers of the soule, some (as temperance, fortitude, and the like) were seated even in the sensitive appetites: for these lower, and sensitive pow∣ers are capable of habits in man; because in him rationall, though not formally, yet by participation, as obedient unto reason.

As for the body, this righteousnesse was not in it, as a subject, but only reached it as an instrument: its members were weapons of righteousnesse: To make the sensitive powers obedient unto the rationall, habits were requisite to be in them for determination of them hereunto: tis true, habits were requisite to be in the sensi∣tive powers, to make them obedient unto the rationall; and, with∣out inherence of such habits, they could not be determined here∣unto; but now, there's no necessity for assigning any such habits in the body, to render that readily subordinate unto reason; be∣cause, 'tis sufficiently determined hereunto by those habits, that are in the faculties of the soule, directing, and commanding its actions.

A fourth thing is the causation, or production of this originall righteousnesse: seeing it is a relation it cannot be created, or produced per se, but ratione fundamenti, in its foundation, for neque datur motus neque mutatio ad relationem per se spectatam; relations are all produced by the same action, that their foundations are; and not by any new, proper, superadded, predicamentall action: Thus, the likenesse betwixt two white wals is produced by no other acti∣on, then the whitening of them; and thus God made the first man upright, or righteous only by the infusion of those habits, gifts, graces, vertues, that were the foundation of this uprightnesse, or righteousnesse; for man was denominated fundamentally upright, or righteous by them; though formally by the relation of righte∣ousnesse.

A fist thing is the effects of originall righteousnesse: and these the Schoolmen generally make to be three.

First, A subordination of the upper faculties of the soule, the under∣standing, and will unto God: In his understanding there was no pri∣vative, or blameable ignorance, but a cleare, and full knowledg of God, and his law: his will was cloathed with grace, and holinesse; it was created holy though mutable; so that, though there was in him a possibility of sin, yet not the least tendency, or inclination unto sinne; as long as he stood, he adhered allwaies unto God, and said, as the Psalmist, It is good for to draw neare unto the Lord, Psal. 73. last.

A second is a subjection of the inferiour faculties of the soule unto the superiour; of the phantasy unto the understanding, of the sen∣sitive appetite unto the will: so that, in those inferiour powers. there was no motion unsuitable unto, either the dignity, or duty of man: The Centurion, Matth. 8. 9. tels our Saviour of the for∣ward obsequiousnesse of his souldiers and servants: for I am a man under authority, having souldiers under me: and I say to this man goe, and he goeth, and to another come, and he cometh: and to my servant, do this, and he doth it. Such was the ready and cheerfull o∣bedience of Adams lower faculties unto his superiour: His 〈◊〉〈◊〉 were most likely to be unruly, and yet they all, went, and came; were let out, and chained up; intended, and heightned; slackned, or remitted; lengthned, or broken off according to the directions of his understanding, and commands of his will.

A third effect of Originall righteousnesse in Adam, was a regular subjection of his body unto his soule: in regard whereof, it was an helpefull, and serviceable instrument thereunto, as in all, so especially in its gracious operations, those of piety towards God, and those of charity and justice towards man: all the members of his body were weapons, armes, or instruments of righteousnesse unto God, Rom. 6. 13. servants to righteousnesse unto 〈◊〉〈◊〉, vers. 19. His eyes were as windows to let in good, and profitable observa∣tions, from the creation of the world, concerning the invisible things of the Creator his eternall power and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Rom. 1. 20. 21. His eares were as the gate of life, which, if he would, might have been shut, and lockt against all evill, and open unto all good: his tongue was as the pen of a ready writer, Psal. 45. 1. ready to utter those things

which a good heart had indited: his hands on every occasion were apt to be lifted up to God in prayer, and devotion, and stretched out to man in actions of charity, and compassion: his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 were ready to be imployed in any good errand, swift to run the waies of Gods commandments.

The sixth thing I propounded concerning Originall righteous∣nesse, was, the difference of it from sanctifying grace: This is to be understood concerning the Materiale, or foundation of Originall righteousnesse: Some distinguish it wholy, and altogether from the sanctifying grace of Adam: But such are by(q) 1.4 Becanus thus refuted: Originall righteousnesse rendred our first Parents righteous, and holy: But they, having no forreigne righteous∣nesse to be iustified by, could not be righteous and holy without sanctifying grace; Originall righteousnesse therefore in them didin∣clude sanctifying grace: But, though it did include Habituall Holi∣nesse, or sanctifying grace, yet Becanus with others thinke, that it superadded something thereunto, and was not that alone: so that it was distinguish't therefrom distinctione includentis ab incluso. It included sanctifying grace, and signified further such Habits in the inferior faculties, as made them obedient unto the superior, and repressed and prevented in them all Rebellion, and disorder, all irregular and disorderly Motions. Becanus loc: praedict. for this produceth an Argument, which stands thus: Originall righ∣teousnesse had three effects, by the common 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Schoolmen, upon the soules of our first Parents. 1. Subjection of the superior part of the soule, the understanding, and will 〈◊〉〈◊〉 God. 2. Subjection of the inferior and sensitive part of the soule unto the higher, and rationall part. 3. The Ready Subjection of the Body unto the Soule; But now grace alone, single, by it selfe had not these three effects, and therefore Ori∣ginall righteousnesse was not only grace: but implied something else: The Minor he goeth about thus to prove; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sanctifying grace, in the state of innocency, was of the same nature, and kind with our grace: But our grace hath not these three effects, but only the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and this he exemplifieth by Paul's complaint of a law in his Members warring against the law of his mind, Rom. 7. 23. that is; of Rebellion in his body, and sensitive faculties against the higher, and rationall faculties of his soule: Paul's grace was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to re∣presse this rebellion; therefore we may conclude the same of Adam's too;

and therefore (Besides sanctifying grace,) there were (to this purpose, and intent,) further requisite some gifts, or habits distinct from it.

For Answer: These two last effects of Originall righteous∣nesse may be produced two manner of waies, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

The grace of Paul, (and we may say the same of all regenerate Persons,) did produce these two 〈◊〉〈◊〉, but not in the same de∣gree that Originall righteousnesse did in Adam; for it was imper∣fect, defiled by the coexistence of sinfull corruptions: and here∣upon, it could beget in his materiall part, and powers only an im∣perfect obedience unto his immateriall and spiritua'l powers; But this obedience, though imperfect, is yet true and sincere. Grace wheresoever it is can lay commands, and impose lawes upon the senses, and sensitive passions, as also upon all the members of the body: and can make these lawes, and commands to be obeyed in some measure. Job could make a Covenant with his eyes. Da∣vid could put a bridle into his lips: All the regenerate 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their Members instruments of righteousnesse unto God, servants to righte∣ousnesse, unto 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Rom. 6. 13, 19. Therefore their inherent righteousnesse, and holinesse hath some domination, and rule over their members; All rebellions and mutinies (such is its weaknesse and imperfection 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in this life,) it cannot possibly prevent; yet, when these flames breake out, it doth what it can to allay, and compose them; it quencheth them with the waters of repentance, and so farre prevaileth over them, as that it never suffers them to enjoy a totall, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 victory.

Indeed the grace of Adam preserved in the soule a full, and un∣disturbed tranquillity, and gave reason, and the rationall Appe∣tite such a perfect regiment over the body, and the inferior fa∣culties, as that there was not in them the least disobedience, or so much as reluctancy unto the dictates of the understanding, and motions of the will; and the Reason hereof was, because in the grace of Adam, there was all requisite perfection 〈◊〉〈◊〉 And, whereas Becanus objecteth, that grace in the state of innocency was of the same nature, and kind with that of ours: this is nothing unto the purpose: for, allthough it be the same in point of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, yet it falls farre short of it in degree and measure: and therefore is un∣able for the perfect causation of that, for which, in the full, and persect grace of Adam, there was an ample sufficiency.

The seaventh and last thing I proposed, concerning Originall Righteousnesse, was a question concerning the manner of its 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unto the first man: whether it were naturall or supernaturall to him in his state of innocency? some may looke upon it as an unnecessa∣ry nicety: but the Papists make it the foundation of many dan∣gerous opinions: for grant that originall righteousnesse was su∣pernaturall before the fall, they will hence inserre, that its con∣trary concupiscence was naturall: and from this againe, they will conclude, that in the regenerate 'tis not properly a sinne, and consequently, that 'tis no barre unto the absolute persection of their good works, and their justification by them: and divers other the like unsound, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 tenents: By a right stating then of this question these errours will be forestalled: and yet 'tis strange, what confusion, and mistakes there are in the stating of it, amongst both Protestants, and Papists: Amesius (I confesse) hath, in a very short passage, given me herein greater satisfaction, then I could find in the larger discourses of others: His words are these Neque dicimus nos justitiam fuisse, vel 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 naturae physicè, aut physico modo ex 〈◊〉〈◊〉 principiis 〈◊〉〈◊〉, sed conditio∣nem esse moralem, naturae illi debitam, quae ad justè operandum fuit creata. But this may be looked upon, rather as a generall, and an obscure hint, than a just determination of the question: and there∣sore I shall addresse my selfe unto a more full handling of it: and in order hereunto shall premise an Explication of these two terms in it, naturall and supernaturall.

The first terme to be explained is naturall: and this hath ma∣ny acceptions: a thing may be said to be naturall to man five waies; in regard; first, of its 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of his nature: 〈◊〉〈◊〉, consecution, or emanation from it: or thirdly, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unto it: or fourthly, connexion with it: or fiftly, duenesse unto it.

First, a thing may be said to be naturall unto man in regard of the constitution of his nature: to wit: that which is a principle, or essentiall part of his nature: his soule, and body, and all integrall parts of one of his essentiall parts his body.

Secondly, a thing may be said to be naturall to man in regard of consecution, or emanation from his nature, that physically results, and flowes from the principles of his nature: and thus the properties of his nature are said to be naturall unto him, v. g. the faculties of the understanding, and will.

Thirdly, a thing may be said to be naturall to man in regard 〈◊〉〈◊〉 suitablenesse unto his nature: and thus every ornament, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 suitable, and agreeable to his nature: every thing that heales, perfects, adornes, or advanceth his nature: all gracious and glorious endowments may be said to be naturall: for naturall, in this sense, is opposed unto, not supernaturall, but that which is against nature, which is hurtfull unto, or destructive of nature.

Fourthly, a thing may be said to be naturall to man in regard of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with his nature: to wit: that which he hath derived unto him together with his nature, in the same instance of time, though not of nature: and thus originall sin is said to be naturall unto lapsed man, that is, connaturall, connexed with his nature, from the very first receipt thereof: we were (saith Paul) by na∣ture the children of wrath, Eph. 2. 7. that is, we were obnoxious unto wrath, as soone as we received our nature.

Fiftly, a thing may be said to be naturall to man in regard of duenesse to his nature: without which his nature could not be crea∣ted: and thus things due unto man, are said to be naturall unto man: because they doe (in some way) resemble naturall proper∣ties in point of necessity: and are (in some sort) necessary unto man: This acception of the word is found in some of the most learned amongst the Papists, when they speake of other subjects: It is usually said, that habituall grace was connaturall unto Christs soule, as a property consequent unto the personall union, though it did not result theresrom by any physicall dimanation, or reall efficiency, but was immediately given thereunto by Gods power and will: and this(r) 1.5 〈◊〉〈◊〉 justisieth srom the present ac∣ception

of the word naturall: accidents (saith he) may be said to be connaturall: not only, when they flow, and result actively from an intrinsick principle: but also, when by an extrinsick agent they are conferred juxta naturae debitum: so we say, that grace was cald a connaturall property of Christ God-man: because, from the worthinesse of his person, it was due, debito quodam pro∣portionis connaturalis, by a debt or duenesse of connaturall pro∣portion, so that, it would have been a strange, preternaturall, and prodigious thing, to have created the humane nature of Christ, and to have joined it unto the person of the word, and not to have replenished it with all the ornaments of divine grace.

This duenesse of a thing, unto the nature of man, is againe twofold; either of condecency, or of obligation.

First, A duenesse of condecency; and according unto that a thing is only fit, congruent, convenient.

Secondly, A duenesse of obligation: and that againe may be con∣ceived to arise, either from the merit of man, or else from some acts of God preceding, or concomitant: for, though Gods will be most free, yet by one act he may necessitate, and oblige himselfe unto another, either following it, or connexed with it: Deus promit∣tendo se feclt debitorem, is a proverb in Divinity: God by his pro∣mises freely obligeth himselfe: and we may say the same of other acts: this is fully declared (upon another occasion) by Mr Hord, whom I take yet to be our antagonist in this question: I grant (saith he) [in his treatise entituled Gods love unto mankind] that God is simply and absolutely bound unto no man, he is agens liberri∣mum, a most free dispenser of his own favours, both what he will, and to whom he will; but yet he is conditionally: determinavit seipsum: he hath bound himselfe to give supernaturall abilities to men by three things.

First, Decernendo, the Almighty is eternally subject to his own decree, or else he would be mutable, and therefore what gifts soever he hath de∣creed to men, he is bound to give them by virtue of his decree.

Secondly, Promittendo, we use to say promise is debt, it is iustice to performe, what it was free to promise: if therefore God hath made a premise of any gift or grace to men, this promise binds him to performance.

Thirdly, Legem ferendo; by giving men a law to keep, which, without supernaturall power, they cannot keepe any more then they can eat a

rock: by such a law the Allmighty Law-giver binds himselfe to his creatures, to give them such power as may enable them to keepe that law, or else he becomes the true, and proper cause of the transgression of it.

From the first terme, naturall, passe we on to the second, super∣naturall: A thing may be said to be supernaturall to the first man, either in regard of its originall, or else in respect of the man∣ner of its inhesion in, or agreement unto its nature.

First, in regard of its originall and efficient which is produced immediately by God, without the concurrence of any creature.

Secondly, in regard of the manner of its inhesion in, and agree∣ment unto the nature of man: and so, that is said to be supernatu∣rall, which resembled such supernaturals, as were unnecessary unto mans nature, without which his nature might well be created.

Having thus explained the termes, the question may be divided into two parts, according unto the two parts of the predicate.

First, whether or no originall righteousnesse were naturall unto the first man in his state of innocency?

Secondly, whether it were supernaturall?

First, whether it were naturall? and here I shall lay downe

First what is uncontroverted on both sides: Then secondly, what is controverted.

First, what is uncontroverted on both sides:

'Tis granted by Protestants

First, that originall righteousnesse was not naturall unto man constitutivè, it was no principle constituting his nature.

Secondly, that it was not naturall unto man consecutivè, in re∣gard of emanation, or consecution from his nature. It was no property physically resulting from the principles of his nature.

Now, for both these concessions there is usually alledged this one rea∣son, because that, which is naturall in either of these senses, is insepa∣rable: things thus naturall remained even in the Divells, and so also in lapsed man, his fall did not take away, either the principles or pro∣perties of his nature: but originall righteousnesse remaineth not in lapsed man, and therefore it was not naturall, as either a prin∣ciple or property of nature; Bellarmine therefore [De gra: prim: hom. cap. 5.] doth but calumniate, when he makes this acception of naturall to be that, of which the question is to be understood

Quarto naturale vocatur, quod aut est pars naturae, aut fluit à 〈◊〉〈◊〉 naturae. Quâ significatione 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & animus facultates quoque, tum sentiendi, tum intelligendi, & operationes quae ab iisdem faculta∣tibus exercentur, naturalia esse dicuntur. Atque haec est signisicatio, de quâ hoc loco propriè disputamus. And yet here, it cannot be de∣nyed, but that some Protestants have herein expressed themselves very unwarily, rectitudo quam primus homo in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 accepit, was, (saith Maccovius) Naturalis hec significato quo facultas sentiendi, videndi, cap. 44. loc: com: and there is a passage in Tilenus [Syntag: lib. 1. cap. 33. sect. 17] that sounds very harshly this way. Tam na∣tur. lis primo parenti haec justitiae originalis qualitas fuit, quam ipsa natura, & forma substantialis, per creationem accepta: unto these I may joyne also our own Willet, for he makes naturall in the questi∣on, to be that, which was either a part of man's nature, or did a∣rise, or spring out of some naturall beginning, as we say the soule in the body, and the understanding in the soule are naturall.

From the grants of Protestants proceed we unto those of Papists, here

First, they grant, that originall righteousnesse was naturall to man in regard of connexion with his nature, it was concreated with: and this is confessed by Bellarmine, Primum naturale dicitur id omne, quod habetur â nativitate, quâ signisicatione dicimur filii irae, Ephes. 2: & hoc modo justitiam originalem fatemur dici posse naturalem. Sed haec significatio ad quaestionem praesentem non pertinet, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quod na∣turale hoc modo acceptum non opponitur supernaturali, cum tam natu∣ralia, quàm supernaturalia dona possint haberi à nativitate, ut notum est. De gra: prim: hom: cap: 5.

〈◊〉〈◊〉, they grant, that it was naturall unto man in regard of suitablenesse unto his nature, it was a perfection very agreeable unto a reasonable creature.

Nay thirdly they goe further, and seeme (as I thinke) to affirme, that it was naturall in respect of duenesse unto nature, if we speake only of a duenesse of condecency: thus much may be gathered from these following words of Bellarmine [De gra: prim: hom: cap 7.] Respondeo, aequum omnino fuisse, ut Deus homini ad finem tàm subli∣mem ordinato media necessaria non negârit: For he cannot deny, but that originall righteousnesse was a necessary meanes unto man's chiefe end. Now all these three concessions of the Papists are by

Greg: de valentia [tom. 2. disp. 6. 15. punct. 1.] thus briefly summed, Donum originalis justitiae naturale ab extrinseco dici potucrit, quatc∣nus & naturae hominis ab initio ingenitum erat, & ei congruebat, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, atque roborabat ad recte exequendas operationes om∣nes bonas natura humanae à bitas: Or (as he expresseth it in a second assertion) Ad exequendum sine disicultate, &c: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 na∣turale virtutum earum, quarum actiones lege naturae praecipiuntur, & praescribuntur.

There is another grant that I shall premise, which (I believe) is agreed on, both by Papists, and Protestants, and that is; that ori∣ginall righteousnesse was not due unto man's nature in a way of merit, there was nothing in man's nature, that merited it.

The Question then proceeds only concerning a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of obli∣gation arising from some acts of God, and may be thus propounded: whether or no originall righteousnesse were not naturall, that is, necessa∣ry unto the first man, in the state of innocency, necessary though not absolutely, yet, ex hypothesi, upon supposall of some acts of God? or whether God did not by some acts oblige, and necessi∣tate himselfe unto the enduing of the first man with originall righ∣teousnesse?

Where the assirmative, which is our conclusion shall be made good, by instancing in three decrees of God, by which he had bound himselfe to give the first man, in the state of innocency, originall righteousnesse. First, his decree 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the goodnesse with which hee intended to invest him. Secondly, his decree concerning the end unto which he designed him. Thirdly, his decree concerning the Laws unto which he intended to oblige him.

First, his decree concerning the goodnesse with which hee invested him: man, as the rest of the creatures, was created very good, Gen. c. 1. v. 31: and consequently, God decreed to create him very good; for he worketh all things after the counsell of his own will, Ephes. 1. 11. But now he could not be made good, much lesse very good, unlesse he had been created with originall righteousnesse; for morall good∣nesse is that, which is proper and agreeable unto a reasonable crea∣ture, and therefore, without this righteousnesse, man could not be morally good: presupposing therefore God's decree to make man very good, it was impossible to create him without originall righ∣teousnesse.

Secondly, his decree concerning the end which he prescribed, and designed unto him: for the utmost end, unto which man was appoin∣ted, was the glory of God, Prov. 16. 4: and his owne eternall hap∣pinesse, consisting in the beatificall vision of God's essence, and the eternall fruition of his glory, even the light of reason dictated this only to be the supreme end of man and all other ends to be un∣satisfactory, below the nature of his spirituall, and immortall soule: God's giving man a capacity of this end was a sufficient intimati∣on that it was to be the chief end, which he was to aime at; here∣upon also was it, that there was naturally in man a desire of this end and no other end could give satisfaction unto his infinite, and boundlesse desires; so that Bellarmine himselfe sticks not to affirme that it was naturall unto man, Quoad appetitum, though not, Quoad consecutionem. Now God by thus designing man unto this end, and placing in him a naturall appetite thereunto, engag'd himselfe to furnish him with all necessary meanes, abilities, and qualifications for the compassing of it; for, qui destinat ad sinem, destinat ad me∣dia; and originall righteousnesse was (undoubtedly) a qualifica∣tion absolutely necessary for such a purpose; and, if he bad been created without it, he had been made, not only, a little lower than the Angels, but beneath the very beasts that perish; below the most contemptible wormes, that crawle upon the face of the earth, for there is none of them destitute of such furniture, as is requisite, for the reaching of their respective ends.

Thirdly, his decree concerning the Lawes unto which he intended to oblige him: he intended to write the Law of nature in his heart assoone as he was created; and accordingly it was written; so that, from his creation, he was obliged unto severall duties, but it was impossible for man to performe acceptably these duties without o∣riginall righteousnesse, and therefore, God by his purpose to im∣pose these duties upon man, determined himselfe to enable him for them, by making him habitually upright, and holy: for if he should have enjoined, impossible commandements where there was no a∣bility for obedience, he had been a very unjust Law-giver, like Pharoah, that exacted bricke, and would not allow straw: God's purpose to create such a creature as man, with the rational faculties of understanding, and will, imply'd a purpose, to oblige him to serve, obey, and glorify him as his Creator; and this againe imply'd

a purpose to enable, and qualify him for such service, and obedi∣ence: and was not originall righteousnesse a necessary qualification: for this. Man no sooner knew, that he was a poore creature, de∣pendant upon the All-mighty maker of Heaven, and Earth; but he forthwith understood, that he was, by the Law of creation, without any positive superadded Law bound, to love this his Maker above all things with all his soule, heart, might, and strength; to love himselfe, and all other things in reference unto him, to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all his voluntary, and rationall actions unto his Glory, at least virtu∣ally: but now all these duties were unfeasible without the virtue, or grace of the love of God, and therefore, from God's purpose to to oblige man unto these duties, we may conclude, his purpose to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 into him the habit of love: and what we say of the acts, and habits of love may be applied unto the acts, and habits of other graces.(s) 1.6 This Medium the Arminians generally make use of to prove, the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of universall grace: Because God hath comman∣ded all men to believe, and obey, therefore he hath bound him∣selfe to give every man power to believe, and obey: Their abuse of this argument it is not now pertinent to examine, only, I can∣not but observe, the inconsistency of it with their opinion in the now controverted question: for Arminius, and his followers generally hold, that originall righteousnesse was not naturall, that is, due, and necessary unto man in his innocency: But for resuta∣tion of this their deniall wee need no other medium, but that now mentioned, which they bring for universall grace: for that with due change will sufficiently serve our turne: God commanded man in the state of innocency actuall righteousnesse, therefore he had bound himselfe to furnish him with originall righteousnesse, there∣fore originall righteousnesse was necessary and due unto man in that

state, and that is all we meane by the word naturall.

There be diverse other arguments, usually alleadged by Prote∣stants, which I shall for the present wholy wave; only, I cannot but take notice of one, (that is urged by Macovius, and others) from the remainders of this original righteousnesse in man since the fall: these are now naturall unto man; therefore originall righte∣ousnesse it selfe was naturall to man before the fall; but this argu∣ment hath a tang of Pelagianisme: there be reliques of Gods image in man in his corrupt, and unregenerate condition; but none of o∣riginall righteousnesse; for this was wholy lost, and extinct; superna∣turalia erepta, naturalia corrupta: however then, there be left some shadowes, and resemblances of it, yet not any true remnants of it: e∣ven Arminius himselfe in his conference with Junius confesseth, that there be not left in us so much as any principles, or seed of spi∣ritual virtues. Dico agnition millam quae est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pietatem, justitiam illam, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉, de quâ Apostolus non corruptas sed sublatas es∣se, null áque earundem in nobis post lapsum manere principia. Fateor principia & semina virtutum moralium, quae anologiam quandam & similitudinem habent ad istas spirituales virtutes in nobis manere post la∣psum, quin & ipsas morales virtutes; licet per 〈◊〉〈◊〉 corruptas. Haec similitudo fallere potest non accuratè inter hasce & illas spirituales vir∣tutes discriminantem. In hâc sententiâ mea, qua statuo illa bona esse ablata, habeo praeeuntem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nostrum questione. 9: his verbis: Homo se & omnem posteritatem divinis illis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 orbavit: Quae autem sint illa divina 〈◊〉〈◊〉, explicatum est quaestione sexta praecedente, nempe, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & sanctitas.

But what congruence this hath with other principles of Armi∣nius I leave to be determined by his disciples.

Before I take my leave of this part of the question I shall desire the Reader to take notice that, besides Henricus de Gandavo, there have been many learned Papists of the opinion, that originall righ∣teousnesse was naturall to man in his state of integrity: so much you may see at large in Estius: [in l. 2. sent: dist. 26. sect. 6.] who reckons up distinctly seventeene of their arguments: indeed they take originall righteousnesse (in a stricter sense than we) only for the subjection of the inferiour faculties unto reason; but yet e∣ven herein, they are opposite unto the generality of Papists, as well, as we.

But proceed we unto the second part of the question: whether or no originall righteousnesse were 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unto man in his state of innocency?

And here we readily grant, that it was supernaturall to man, in regard of originall or 〈◊〉〈◊〉, for God immediately produced it, and it did not, could not flow from any principle of nature: this conces∣sion is made by Dr. Twisse in his animadversions upon the confe∣rence of Arminius with 〈◊〉〈◊〉, pag. 36. 37, &c: and there justified by him at large against Junius, but though this be a very plaine, and evident truth, yet Arminius doth very weakly confirme it, as appeares by Dr. Twisse his examination of all his arguments.

But there is one argument of(t) 1.7 his, which he urgeth, not on∣ly in the place cited, but also in his Examen of Perkins, pag. 587: that merits in a speciall manner to be remarked, not so much for the strength, and solidity of it, as for the facetiousnesse of Dr. Twisse his answer to it: Arminius his argument stands thus: that which is restored unto man by the supernaturall action of regeneration, was at first supernaturall, and bestowed upon man by a supernaturall a∣ction; but holinesse, and righteousnesse is restored unto man by a supernaturall act, to wit, regeneration, therefore it was at first su∣pernaturall in it selfe, and bestowed upon man by a supernaturall a∣ction.

We shall passe over the greatest part of(v) 1.8 Dr. Twisse his answer, and only pitch upon what he saith unto the major, which he inva∣lidates by two instances. Christ restored unto many health of bo∣dy, by a supernaturall action, it doth not therefore follow, that

health of body was not naturall unto Adam before his fall: it was by a supernaturall action, that he restored unto Malchus that eare, which Peter with his sword had cut off, but it doth not there∣fore follow that this eare was at first supernaturall unto Malchus.

But leaving Arminius his argument, we confesse that originall righteousnesse was supernaturall unto Adam, if you respect the principle of it, and thus it was supernaturall unto Adam, not only per accidens, but also per se, it neither did, nor could flow from the principles of nature.

That then, which alone isw 1.9 controverted, is, whither or no originall righteousnesse was supernaturall unto Adam in his state of innocency in respect of the manner of it's inhaesion in, and agree∣ment unto the nature of man? whether the nature of man, could have been created without it?

Here the Papists generally averre that man might have been crea∣ted in his pure naturals without originall righteousnesse, nay that the contrary of originall righteousnesse, concupiscense would natural∣ly have flowne, and resulted from the codition, and very constitu∣tion, or composition of his nature, and such resultancy was preven∣ted, and stayed by the supernaturall gift, or grace of originall righ∣teousnesse: to illustrate this their opinion, they use diverse 〈◊〉〈◊〉,

they compare originall righteousnesse unto a rich robe, or garment, which God threw upon man, to cover his naturall na∣kednesse; so that the state of man, after the fall of Adam, differeth no more from the state of Adam, in his pure naturals, than a man that is spoiled differeth from a naked man; they farther resemble it unto a garland, set on the head of a Virgin; as also unto Sam∣psons locks; for looke as a garland is not necessary required unto virginity, nor the strength that lay in Sampsons locks unto huma∣nity, so originall righteousnesse (say they) was no necessary re∣quisite unto the integrity of man's nature: a Virgin may be a Vir∣gin, though no garland be put upon her head, and when the gar∣and is taken away her virginity remaines untouched, and unble∣mished; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 had been a man, though no supernaturall strength had layne in his locks, and he remained a man still, when that strength was departed from him: thus (say they) man might have been created in his pure naturals, without the addition of o∣riginall righteousnesse, because it was not required nececessarily sor the perfecting of his natures integrity; and therefore, when this originall righteousnesse was taken from him he was only redu∣ced unto the condition of pure, and sole nature, and his naturals were no wayes vitiated: originall righteousnesse was (say they) as a soveraigne antedote against concupiscence, which would have been a naturall disease unto man; as a golden bridle to restraine, and keep in that feircenesse, rebellion, and unrulinesse of the in∣feriour faculties, which otherwise would naturally have been un∣avoidable; it was (say they) as a precious 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that made bright the nature of man, and kept it from that rust, which necessarily would have growne upon a nature, so framed, and compounded, as ours was: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 [in lib. 2. sent. 32. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 1.] out of Anselme lik∣neth originall righteousnesse unto the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of a ship, when the rud∣der of a ship is wanting, or broken, how can the Pilot guide it? will be in perpetuall perill of being dashed, or split upon rockes, and quicksands: thus, if man had been created in his pure naturals without originall righteousnesse, he had been as a ship without a rudder; so that he could never have steered the vessell of his soule unto it's wished end, the haven of heaven; for it would have been, in continuall danger of shipwracke, by the wind of every sensuall passion, and desire: thus you see how dishonourably they

speake of the nature of man, which yet was the master-peice of the creation, and made (as it were) by the consultation of the whole Trinity; God said, let us make man in our image after our likenesse, Gen. 1. 26.

In opposition unto this doctrine of the Papists, I shall lay down 〈◊〉〈◊〉 conclusions; wherein I shall wholy lay aside the terme super∣naturall, and speake only to the thing and matter: and indeed it were heartily to be wished, that the termes naturall and super∣naturall had never been used in this controversy: for they have brought no light unto it, but occasioned only a strife of words.

The first 〈◊〉〈◊〉 shall be: It was hypothetically impossible for man in the state of innocency to be created with the contradictory of Ori∣ginall righteousnesse, to wit, the negation and absence of it.

The second conclusion: It was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 impossible for man to be created with the contrary of originall righteousnesse, concupiscence and inclination 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sin.

To begin with the first conclusion: It was hypothetically impossible for man in the state of innocency to be created with the contra∣dictory of originall righteousnesse, to wit, the negation, and absence of it: of more briefly: It was hypothetically impossible for man to be created without originall righteousnesse; I say hypothetically, in respect of Gods ordinate power, presupposing those decrees of God mentioned in the first part of the question: First, his de∣cree to make man very good: Secondly, his decree to prescribe him so high and glorious an end, as the glorifying, and enjoyment of himselfe, an infinite good: Thirdly, his decree to impose upon him severall lawes, obedience to which might bring him unto the said end. for, without originall righteousnesse, it was impossible for any of these decrees to be put in execution: without it impossi∣ble, that he should be made 〈◊〉〈◊〉 good: for what goodnesse is cor∣respondent unto a rationall creature, but a morall goodnesse, righteousnesse and true holinesse? without it impossible, that man should obtaine the end prescribed unto him. that he should performe the duties injoined him: and it was against the justice and goodnesse of God, and so a grosse contradiction to appoint unto man an impossible end, to impose upon man impossible command∣ments: Gods chalking out such an end for man to seek, implieth, that he supplyed him with meanes for assecution hereof: his in∣junction

of lawes argueth, that he gave power and ability to yeeld obedience unto them: but of this allready more fully, and distinctly in the first part of the question.

Unto what is there said, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 me adde what Dr Feild [in his lear∣ned booke of the Church pag. 251, 252, 253.] hath, in resutation of this fiction of the Papists, that man might have been created in his pure naturals, in a state of neutrality and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 grace or sin; his argument may briefly be thus summ'd up.

It was impossible for the nature of man, without grace, to per∣forme its principall actions, about its principall objects, the sirst truth, and the chiefest good; without grace 'twas impossible for man to know God as he ought, to love him as he should, amore amicitiae, with a love of friendship, for himselfe, and his own sake, and without such a love all a mans actions would have bin sins; for they could not have been done unto the glory of God; be∣cause tis such a love only, that referreth mans actions unto Gods glory; and that state cannot, but be a sinfull state, wherein all that a man doth is sin: breifly thus, without the grace of God 'tis impossible to love God; and without the love of God all our acti∣ons will be evill and sin, and therefore à primo ad ultimum without grace all our actions will be sin; and hereupon 'twill follow, that there can be no state of nature sinlesse without grace; and conse∣quently that there can be noe state of pure or meere nature.

For the surther clearing of this I shall lay downe two 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which cannot reasonably be denied.

First, that God decreed, that man should act rationally, that he should performe rationall actions.

Secondly, that all his rationall actions were under the law of na∣ture; some for their substance, as to love, seare, prayse and glori∣fy God; and others for their 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and other the like 〈◊〉〈◊〉: whether a man did eate or drinke, whatsoever he did, he was to doe all unto the glory of God: to deny this were to uncreature man, take away his dependance upon, and relation unto God: and from this grant, (it undeniably followes that) all a man's ratio∣nall, or voluntary actions were capable of morall goodnesse, or badnesse, and consequently, that, how ever some of them might be indifferent in their generall, and abstract 〈◊〉〈◊〉, yet consi∣dered

actu exercito, as singularized, and cloathed with circumstan∣ces, they were all either morally good, or evill; for morall good∣nesse and badnesse are privatively opposite, and 'tis an unquestio∣ned rule in Logick, inter privativè opposita non datur medium in subjecto capaci; Between privative opposites there can be no middle, ei∣ther of abnegatien, or participation in a capable subject; every sub∣ject capable of privative opposites must necessarily have one, or the other: thus a sensitive creature must be either seeing, or blind; the aire must be either lightsome, or darke: now if there could be no indifferency, or neutrality in the rationall actions of man, but that they must all necessarily be, either good, or bad; then it was impos∣sible there could be any such state of indifferency, and neutrality in the rationall faculties of man; they must also be morally either good, or bad, holy, or sinfull; and therefore the possibility of man's existence in a state of pure naturals, without grace, or sinne, hath no foundation in sound reason.

The second conclusion: It was absolutely impossible for man to be created with the contrary of originall righteousnesse, concupiscence, a pronenesse, or inclination of all the faculties of man unto sin.

This conclusion is thus confirmed: if man had been created with this concupiscence, God had been the author of it; but 'twas im∣possible for God to be the author of it; the Apostle John saith, it is not from the Father, but is of the world, 1 John 2. 16: we may goe farther and say, it could not bee from the Father, and therefore it was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for man to be created with it.

The Minor is thus prov'd it was impossible for God to be the au∣thor of sin, but concupiscence is sin, and therefore God could not be the author of it.

Unto this argument we find in Bellarmine two answers.

First, that God would not have been the author of this concu∣piscence, though man had been created with it.

Secondly, that this concupiscence is not sinne, and therefore, though God had been the cause of it, yet it would not have there∣fore followed, that hee had been the cause of sinne.

First, that God would not have been the author of concupiscence, though man had been created with it, but it would have been be∣sides his purpose and intention: for it would (saith he) have flowne naturally from the condition of the matter of man, and so it would have

been naturall unto man, not as a good, gift, or ornament, of nature, but as a defect, disease, or infirmity of nature: he endeavoureth to illustrate this by the similitude of a Smith: though a Smith frame a sword of Iron, and the sword grow rusty, yet the rust is not cau∣sed by the Smith, but proceedeth, as a sequele, from the nature, or quality of the Iron, that is the matter of the sword.

But this answer is, first, dissonant from the truth: secondly, re∣pugnant unto Bellarmines owne principles.

First, dissonant from the truth, and that I shall cleare by three ar∣guments.

The first argument: Causa causae est causa causati in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 subordinatis, the cause of a cause is the cause of its effects in things essentially subordinate, but God is the cause of the nature, and mat∣ter of a man, and (by the opinion of Bellarmine) concupiscence is essentiall to the nature, and matter of man 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and a 〈◊〉〈◊〉, for it would naturally, and necessarily (thinks he) have resulted from the nature, and matter of man, but that it was super∣naturally prevented by the gift of originall righteousnesse, and con∣sequently God must needs be the cause, and author of it.

A second argument is: because, this concupiscence is not only in the sensitive, and inferiour, but also in the rationall, and superiour facul∣ties, in the understanding and will: St. Paul Coll. 2. 15: speakes of a fleshly mind, vainly puft up by his fleshly mind, so then there is flesh in the very mind of man: the carnall mind (or the minding of the flesh) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is enmity against God, Rom. 8. 7: remarka∣ble is that saying of Augustine, voluntas sine charitate est tota vitiosa cupiditas, without love, the will is as it were wholy turned into lust, that is, wholly depraved and defiled with lust: he thinkes then, that lust might be seated in the will, nay(x) 1.10 〈◊〉〈◊〉 himselfe

though he thinke that concupiscence hath it's chiefe residence in the flesh, (by which he meanes the body, and the sensuall powers of man) yet he withall 〈◊〉〈◊〉, that there is something like unto it in the superiour part of the soule; for even that is prone immoderately to desire honours, vaine glory, and the like vanities; and therefore Paul Gal. 5: having said; that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 lusteth against 〈◊〉〈◊〉 spirit; he nameth, not only fornication, drunkennesse, and the like carnall sinnes; but also idolatry, heresies, envyings, &c: which were spirituall sinnes, sinnes of the upper region of the soule: thus you see, that a great part of concupiscence is placed in the supreme, the rationall faculties of man; and extended unto spirituall, and immateriall objects: and hereupon it will follow, that (at least) this part of concupiscence cannot 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from the condition 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the matter.

A third argument is, because this assertion (that the resultancy of this concupiscence from the nature, and matter of man would have been besides the intention of God) strikes against, either the omniscience, or omnipotency of God: for, either God foresaw this resultancy, or not? to say, that he did not foresee it, takes away the infinitenesse of his knowledge; if he foresaw it, then I demand whether he could not? or would not prevent it? to say, that he could not prevent it, denieth the infinitenesse of his power; if he could, but would not prevent or stay it, then it followeth, that this resul∣tancy was not besides, but agreeable unto his purpose, and intention.

Secondly, this answer is repugnant unto Bellarmine his own prin∣ciples: I shall instance in two.

First, it is apparent; that he maketh this concupiscence, to be chiefly, the naturall, and necessary propension of the sensitive facul∣ties, unto their proper, and naturall object: and from this I thus argue.

Naturall,(y) 1.11 and necessary propensions of the naturall facul∣ties of any thing, unto their naturall, and proper object, cannot

be besides the intention of God, the creatour; for such propensi∣ons must needs be positive qualities; and of every positive being, God is the cause, and author.

But now concupiscence is (by Bellarmines discourse) the natu∣rall, and necessary propension of the sensitive faculties of man un∣to their proper, and naturall objects: And consequently, tis not besides the intention of the Creatour, flowing as a naturall defect, or disease, only from the condition of the mould, or matter of man.

A second thing in Bellarmine, with which this his answer clasheth, is his confession; that concupiscence is contrary to the nature of man [de gratiâ primi hominis cap. 7.]

From hence I thus argue.(z) 1.12

Nothing, that is against the nature of man can 〈◊〉〈◊〉 naturally, and necessarily from the principles of his nature.

But Bellarmine confesseth that this concupiscence is against the nature of man; And therefore he contradicts himselfe, when he affirmeth, that it results from the principles of man's nature, the condition of his matter.

As for the similitude (of the Smith, and the Iron sword) that will be nothing unto the purpose: for

First, no Smith whatsoever can make Iron, that is the matter of a sword, but God alone is the author of the matter of man, and con∣sequently is the cause of all the naturall sequels thereof.

Secondly, a Smith, if he could, would frame such a sword as might not be subject or inclined unto rust, but it is not a thing in his power, for he cannot alter the nature of Iron, so that, if he will produce an Iron sword, it will be lyable unto rust: The Papists seeme to a∣scribe such an impotency unto God himselfe; for they suppose all a∣long, that God cannot make man to be compounded of a reaso∣nable

soule, and sensible matter, but that, (besides the intention of God) the naturall, and necessary result of such a composition will, (without supernaturall prevention,) be a headlong inclina∣tion unto sensible objects, against the dictates of right reason: but the falshood of this supposition I shall anon at large detect.

A second answer of Bellarmin's (which we frequently sind also in Dr. Taylor,) is, that this concupiscence is not a sinne, but only a disease, languer, infirmity, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of nature, and therefore, though God had been the cause of it, it would not yet have fol∣lowed, that God was the author of sinne.

Unto this I shall oppose the cleare testimony of Paul, who (in 6, 7, 8. chapters of his Epistle unto the Roman's) cal's it sinne four∣teene times, as Bishop Davenant, and Dr. Francis White (after Bishop of Ely) calculate the places.

But unto all these places Bellarmine replyeth, (in which reply he is seconded by Dr. Taylor) that concupiscence is called sinne, by the Apostle, not properly and formally, but 〈◊〉〈◊〉, because it is the effect, and cause of sinne, the effect of Adam's first sinne, and the cause of our sinne.

But, that concupiscence is properly and formally a sinne, I shall prove against both Bellarmine, (and his confident second Dr. Tay∣lor) from it's influence, subject, adjuncts, opposites.

First, from it's influence, mediate, and immediate.

First, from it's mediate influence: it is the cause of all actuall sin whatsoever, whensoever we are tempted to any sinne, we are en∣ticed, and drawne away by our own lust, this is the mother that con∣ceiveth and bringeth forth all sinne, Jam. 1. 14, 15: and doubtlesse the daughter resembleth the mother, the cause and the effect have the same nature: that which as a habit or quality is the cause of sinne, must needs be sinne too; but concupiscence, or the originall pronesse of our natures unto sinne is the roote of all sinne; and therefore (to use the Apostles expression) 'tis excee∣ding sinfull, Rom. 7. 13: for, nil dat, quod non habet vel formalitèr vel eminenter: But, for confirmation of this argument, we have the testimony of him, who is the truth it selfe, Mat. 7. 17, 18. A cor∣rupt tree bringeth forth evill fruit, a good tree cannot bring forth evill fruit; now concupiscence, or an inclination unto sinne, bringeth no fruit, but that which is morally evill, and corrupt; and there∣fore

'tis a tree morally evill, and corrupt: but this argument I shall insist on more fully hereafter in opening, Jam. 1. 14, 15.

Secondly, from it's immediate influence: it naturally, and dire∣ctly produceth, as it's immediate effects, those first motions unto sinne, which are without consent; and therefore, if we can prove these first motions unto sinne to be sinne, our adversaries will con∣fesse, that concupiscence is sinne also: now, that they are sinne, may be concluded from the Apostles description of sinne, 1 〈◊〉〈◊〉 3. 4. Sinne is the transgression of the law; for the first motions unto sinne trespasse against that, which our Saviour cal's the first, and great commandement, thou shalt love the Lord with all thy soule, might, mind and strength; for if sinne, God's greatest enemy, hath, any motions, or inclinations of the soule, any thoughts of the mind, God is not loved with all our soule, and mind; and the soule is faulty, when 'tis divided betwixt God, and sinne: their heart is di∣vided (saith the Prophet) now shall they be found faulty, Hosea 10. 2. This argument Dr. Abbot Bishop of Salisbary (brings in his defence of Mr. Perkins his reformed Catholique against Dr. Bishop, pag. 187. 188.) He erreth (saith he) in that be maketh Originall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 only in the integrity of the will, and the forme of sin to stand only in the a∣version of the will from God, by the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the same originall justice, where∣as originall justice was in truth the integrity of all the parts of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, not subjecting the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to the mind, and the mind to God, but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 whole man to God, the image whereof is set forth unto us in the commandment,(a) 1.13 Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy mind, with all thy soule, with all thy thoughts and strength. The forme of sinne therefore, is not only in the aversion of the will, but in the aversion of any part, or power, or faculty of the soule: if in any of these there be a declining from the law of God, it is the sinne of man. Now(b) 1.14 〈◊〉〈◊〉 so long as there is any matter of concupiscence to be yet 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and restrained, God cannot be loved with all the soule (for how can 〈◊〉〈◊〉 have all the soule, so long as concupiscence hath any part?) therefore in the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of any matter of concupiscence, there is sinne; because it is sinne, when either there is not love at all, or it is lesse than it should be, when it is not with all the soule.

But further; as these first motions, and agitations of concupi∣scence are virtually, and implyedly contrary unto our Saviour's summary, of all the commandements, of the first table: so they

are particularly and, expressely forbidden by the last commande∣ment of the second table, the tenth commandement that God here dealeth with the first motions, and thoughts of the heart is the sense of Bishop Andrewes upon the commandements: and Dr. Tay∣lor cannot say, that he was a Calvinist, or Presbyterian. But this his exposition hath for it very good 〈◊〉〈◊〉; because those motions unto sinne, which are consented to, are forbidden in the severall commandments, as appeareth by our Saviour's glosse upon the se∣venth commandment, Matth. 5. 28. Now, if they be forbidden in the severall commandments, 'tis unlikely, that there should be al∣loted, for the prohibition of them, a distinct commandment, consi∣dering how short a breviary of man's duty the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is: In∣deed Ames rightly holdeth, that the first motions unto unjustice are here only expressely forbidden; but, from the forbidding of them, we may conclude, by way of proportion, the prohibition also of the first motions, which are against the duties of religion, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 commanded in the first table.

But, though the first motions of concupiscence had not been for∣bidden by any written law, yet 'tis sufficient to make them sinne, that they are repugnant unto the light of right reason, for this is truly, properly, and univocally the law of God, the law of nature written in the hearts of all men, and, as for the repugnancy of the first motions of concupiscence unto right reason, it cannot be de∣nyed, if we instance in those, which are in the sensitive powers of man against the dominion of his mind: and so much may be ga∣thered from what Aquinas acknowledgeth concerning concupi∣scence it selfe [part. 3. quaest. 15. art. 2.] Ad rationem fomitis, in∣quit, pertinet inclinatio sensualis appetitus, in id 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est contra ratio∣nem, and againe afterwards [ad 1m] ratio somitis consistit in re∣sistentiâ sensualis appetitus ad rationem; and [ad 2m] fomes peccati importat concupiscentiam delectabilium praeter ordinem rationis. This reason is urged by Augustine, to prove concupiscence to be, not only a punishment and cause of sinne, but also sinne it selfe: the concu∣piscence of the flesh, against which the good spirit striveth, is a sin (saith he) quia inest illi inobedientia contra dominatum mentis, by reason ther's in it disobedience against the dominion of the mind.

A second argument, to prove that concupiscence is a sinne, and

not a sinlesse infirmity, is taken from the subject of it: It is only found in sinfull men, such as are descended from Adam in an or∣dinary way of naturall generation: Hence now I thus reason.

All sinlesse infirmities, so they were generall unto our nature, and not personall, were found in the humanity of Christ, for he was made like unto us in all things, sinne alone accepted.

But concupiscence was not in the humanity of Christ, (as is con∣fessed by the generality of Papists.)

And therefore 'tis not a sinlesse, and naturall, but a morall, and sinfull infirmity.

Unto the Major the Papists give an answer (I confesse) which I have upon another occasion, replyed unto in my treatise of the incarnation, pag. 103. 104.

The Minor Dr. Taylor seemes to deny [in his further explication of originall sinne, pag. 494.] his words I shall transcribe, and then give what reason I have for my suspicion: If concupiscence, which is in every man's nature, be a sinne, it is certaine Christ had no con∣cupiscence or naturall desires, for he had no sinne. But if he had no concupiscence, or naturall desires how he should be a man, or how capa∣ble of law, or how he should serve God with choice, where there could be no potentia ad oppositum, I thinke will be very hrd to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 understood: Christ felt all our infirmities, yet without sinne: All our infirmities are the effects of the sinne of Adam, and part of that which we call originall sinne, therefore all these our infirmities which Christ felt, as in him they were for ever without sinne, so long as they are only naturall, and un∣consented to, must be in us without sinne: for whatsoever is naturally in us is naturally in him; but a man is not a man without naturall de∣sires, therefore these were in him, in him without sinne: and therefore so in us, without sinne I meane, properly, really, and formally.

Here, I expect to be cold, that the Dr hath explicated concupi∣scence by naturall desires: But now I demand, whether, by natu∣rall desires, he understand the desires of the sensitive appetite after meat, drinke, and and the like? if he doth, then, he speakes no∣thing to the purpose, but fights with his own shadow; for those whom he opposeth, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Calvinists hold such desires to be lawfull, and indifferent, and never affirme, that they were in themselves sinne, unlesse vitiated by circumstances: but, to prevent his shifting, and to sift out his meaning, I shall propound unto

him this following Dilemma: either he speakes of concupiscence in that sense it is understood by Protestants and Papists in this con∣troversy, or not.

If not; then he playeth the egregious 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and runnes away 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the question; and whither such a trifler be meet to reforme the Divinity of Christendome, let any man judge.

If he say, that he takes concupiscence in such a sense as Papists and Protestants understand it in the controversy, then I shall as∣sume the boldnesse to tell him, that to say, that it was in Christ, is an assertion guilty of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 falshood, and palpable blasphemy; for both sides take this concupiscence to be a pronenesse, or inclination unto sinne, (as will be confessed by every one that knowes any thing in the controversy:) and that a pronenesse, or inclination unto sinne was in Christ's humanity is a proposition apparently, not only false, but also blasphemous against the purity, and perse∣ction of that holy one of God: this I shall evince by two argu∣ments.

First, an inclination unto sinne could not be where there was not so much as a possibility of sinning.

But, in Christ's humanity, there was not so much as a possibility of sinning.

Therefore much lesse an inclination unto sinne.

This is one of the arguments reckoned up by Estius,(c) 1.15 which those dissenters from the usuall, and generall opinion, of Papists, and School-men, which he speakes of, doe alleadge.

A second argument, an inclination unto sinne in any degree could not be in that wherein there was a totall and utter aversen sse from sinne in the highest degree, (for of contraries, if one be in the highest and most intense degree, it is not consistent in the same subject with it's fellow contrary, so much as in a remisse degree:) But, in Christ's humanity, there was an utter and totall aversenesse from sinne in the highest degree, for there dwelled in him an all∣fullnesse of grace, Col. 1. 19. Joh. 1. 14.

And therefore there could not be in Christ's humanity an inclnati∣nation unto sinne in any the least degree, much lesse such an impe∣tuous inclination unto sinne, as Papists affirme concupiscence to be.

A third principall argument is taken from the adjuncts of concu∣piscence, ab adjunctis occupatis: it is to be crucified, destroyed, and

mortified, Gal. 5. 24. Rom. 6. 6. to be hated, as being hatefull, not only unto good men, butunto God himselfe.

But, nothing is to be thus dealt with, but sinne, Concupiscence therefore is sinne.

The fourth principall argument is drawne from the opposites of concupiscence: First, the Law of God: Secondly, the grace of God in generall: Thirdly, the love of God in particu∣lar.

First, the Law of God: it warreth against the law of the mind, Rom. 7. 23: that is, (as Estius upon the place) adversus legem Dei, a∣gainst the Law of God in which Paul 〈◊〉〈◊〉 after the inward man, vers. 22. Est enim (inquit) eadem lex Dei & lex mentis, sicut è di∣verso eadem est lex peccati & membrorum. Ex his verbis rectè colli∣gitur concupiscentiam etiam quae in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est, repugnare & contrari∣am esse legi Dei, quia ad instar legis ad ea quae legi divinae contraria sunt, impellit: the law of God, and the law of the mind are one, and the same thing: as one the other side the law of sinne, and the law of the members: from these words then it may rightly be gathered, that even that concupiscence, which is in the regenerate, is repug∣nant, and contrary to the law of God, because, as a law, it impel∣leth unto those things, which are contrary unto the divine law.

Unto this place let me adde also Ro: 8. 7: the carnal mind, or the minding of the flesh, or the wisdome of the flesh, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be: the putting of the abstract for the concrete, enmity for ene∣my signifieth, that 'tis a very grand enemy unto God; and 'tis an enemy unto God only, because it is opposed unto his law, and re∣vealed will: suppose, it be not a branch of concupiscence, or the flesh, but only an affect or fruit thereof, an actuall sinne (as Bel∣larmine determineth) yet; first no probable reason can be given, why 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the minding of the flesh should be so restrained as to exclude the first motions of the flesh, or concupiscence; and if they be enmity against God, then so also is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 originall, the flesh or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 too.

Secondly, whatsoever is meant by this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it procee∣deth from the flesh, & it deriveth from the flesh, as it's being, so it's enmity against God, ti fighteth against God under the colours of the flesh, which (in this war against God) heads all actuall sins what∣soever

as their General: now from the enmity of the flesh (or concu∣piscence) unto God, we may inferre it's opposition unto the law of God, and the law of God is holy, just, and good. Rom. 7. 12: and therefore, that which is opposed unto it, must needs be naught, bad, and sinfull.

Unto this Gregory de Valentia [comment. theol: disp. 6. quaest. 12. punct. 1.] answereth, by distinguishing concerning a twofold re∣pugnancy unto the law of God, one effective, and another formal concupiscence (saith he) is repugnant unto, the divine law effective∣ly, as it inclineth unto sinne, not 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as if that perfection of which it is a privation, were commanded in the law of God.

But, this is refuted by the tenth commandement, wherein, the first motions unto sinne are prohibited, and consequently concu∣piscence, the roote of them: unto this I might adde in the next place, that, this answer may be retorted in an argument, thus: that, which is repugnant unto God's law effectively, is also repugnant thereunto formally, that, which inclineth to disobey the law of God, is formally opposite thereunto (as I shall hereafter at large manifest:) But thus doth concupiscence (by even the confession of our adversaries,) and therefore 'tis opposed thereunto formally, as a deviation therefrom, and a transgression thereof.

A second opposite of it is the grace of God in generall: the flesh and the spirit (saith the Apostle) are contrary the one unto the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Gal: 5. 17: where, by spirit, is understood the inherent and habi∣tuall grace, and by flesh, the concupiscence of a regenerate man, the corruption of his nature: the contrariety, of these two principles, is especially manifested by their actings one against another in the regenerate, for in them, and in them only, the flesh lusteth against the spirit,. and the spirit against the flesh, Gal. 5. 17: now nothing can be contrary to the spirit, and grace, but that which is properly, really, and formally a sinne.

Lastly, 'tis contrary unto the grace, or virtue of the love of God in particular.

That, which inclineth the soule unto inordinate, and immoderate love of the creature, is contrary unto the love of God: (for where the creature is loved inordinately, God is not loved with all the soule, heart, mind, and strength.)

But now, concupiscence inclineth, and disposeth the soule unto

an(d) 1.16 inordinate, and immoderate love of the creature, to wit, as it's soveraigne end: (for what is it, but an habituall conversion of the soule from the injoyment of an immutable God, unto the fruition of mutable goods? what is it, but an unbridled lust of committing fornication with the creature? which is done, when the creature is idolized, and placed in God's roome, as it is, when∣soever it is loved, either above God, or in an equality with him.)

By this then it undeniably followeth, that concupiscence is con∣trary unto the grace, and virtue of the love of God; and abateth, and diminisheth of it's strength, and vigour; and consequently is sinne.

That, which hath hither-to been said against the Popish opinion, concerning the possibility of man's creation with concupiscence, will serve à fortiori, for resutation of the Socinians, and Dr Taylor, who, outstripping the generality of the Papists, maintaine; that con∣cupiscence was actually in Adam before his fall by the creation, and as naturall unto him, as the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of hunger and thirst: concupiscence, you have heard, is sinne; and therefore this is a downeright bla∣sphemy, making God to be the author of sinne; and besides, it apert∣ly contradicts what Moses speaketh of God's complacnecy in all the workes of his creation, Gen 1. 31: and God saw every thing, that he had made, and behold it was very good, for, if man was created with concupiscence, he was made very defective, imperfect, and misera∣ble; indeed the most miserable of all creatures, unable to reach his naturall end; to discharge acceptably any part of that duty, which even the law of nature exacted of him; and to answer (in any mea∣sure) chose great, and high relations, which God had put upon him: he had a law in his members warring against the law of his mind; so that he might with a great deal of justice, powre out the piti∣full complaint of Paul, Rom. 7. 24: oh wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?

If Dr Taylor shall, in the behalfe of himselfe, stoop so low, as to make any reply unto what I have said, I shall not decline him, and doe assure him that he shall have very faire play from me, as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 words, and as hard arguments as I can possibly give him; only one thing I shall intreat of him, that he would dispute, and not declare against my opinion; and this request will not be thought unreaso∣nable, if it be considered, that, in his controversiall writings, his

florid, and Rhetoricall language doth disguise, and hide, the see∣blenesse of his argumentation, with his ordinary readers.

But to returne unto Bellarmine: the most considerable argument that he hath, to prove that concupiscence was naturall, and would have been in man, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 he had been created in his pure naturals, is ta∣ken from the composition of man's nature; for hence (he thinks) it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 loweth, that naturally there would have been a rebellion, and a repugnancy of the sensitive faculties against the rationall: but let us heare his own words. Naturale est corpori animali sensu, & appetitu praedito concupiscere bonum sensibile: naturale est spiritui rationali, con∣cupiscere bonum spirituale, quare si siat una natura ex spiritu rationali, & corpore animali conflata, naturale erit illi habere diveras, & inter se pugnantes propensiones. Quod igitur primi parentes nostri ante pecca∣tum pugnâ ist â diversarum appetitionum carerent, domum erat superna∣turale, non conditio naturalis. [de grat: prim: hom: cap 6.] it is na∣turall unto a sensible body endued with sense, and a sensitive appe∣tite to covet a sensuall good; and 'tis as naturall unto a rationall spirit to desire a spirituall good; therefore if one nature be com∣pounded of a reasonable soule, a spirit, and a sensitive body, it will be naturall unto it to have different, and repugnant propensions, the sensuall appetite naturally would have rebelled against the ra∣tionall.

The usuall answer to this objection is very solid, and rationall, unto which I shall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 this one thing, that the sensitive facul∣ties in man are rationall, though not formally yet by participation, as being capable of the conduct, and government of reason.

This being premised, the answer is, that, before the fall, all the motions of the sensitive faculties were subordinate, obedient, and agreeable unto reason. there might then be a diversity, but there could be no contrariety, or repugnancy betwixt the rationall and sensitive appetites, for, all desires against reason are unnaturall, against the very law of nature. Whereupon(c) 1.17 Aquinas [12 ae. q. 82 a. 3 ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉.] confesseth, that concupiscence is against the nature of man, so far as tis against the reason of man, such a concupiscence there∣fore cannot be the sequele of man's nature, as it came first out of God's hands. Suarez in his Metaphysicks [disp. 44. sect. 1. n. 13.] hath a dictinction concerning the sensitive appetite, that will be a full and formall answer unto the present objection, Appetitus sen∣sitivus

hominis ex vi sui generis naturaliter inclinatur ad sensibilia, & delictabilia, tamen ex vj conjunctionis & emanationis ex animâ ratio∣nali habet inclinationem ad obediendum rationi, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 appetendum i∣psamet bona sensibilia, non tantum quatenus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aut 〈◊〉〈◊〉 commoda, sed maximè quatonus simpliciter bona homini existiman∣tur: to make application of this unto our present purpose; the sen∣sitive appetite in man might be considered ex vi gen ris, or ex vi conjunctionis & emanationis ex animâ rationali; in regard of it's kind; or in regard of it's conjunction with, or emanation from the reasonable soule: wee are here to speake of the sensitive appetite, in the first man, not as it is considered only in regard of it's kind, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nature; for so it was common unto beasts, as well as man, and so inclined unto a most intense desire of things sensuall; be∣cause as Scotus [lib. 2. sent. dist. 29. q. 1.) naturale est unicuique ap∣petitui 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in suum appetibile, & si est appetitus non liber, naturale est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 summe ferri quantum potest: quia sicut talis appetitus secundum Damas. 24. ducitur & non est in potestate suaejus actus, quin 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quantum potest; as it is naturall unto every appetite to be carried unto it's object; so 'tis, unto that appetite, which is not free, to be carried as highly, and intensely as it is possible; so that, as it's act, an lusting is not in it's power, so neither is the intension there∣of.

But we are to consider it in regard of it's conjunction with and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from the reasonable soule; and 'twas rationall, and free (as is noted before) though not formally, yet participative, as being under the guidance of reason; and so, in the first man before his fall, it was inclined only regularly, and orderly unto the desire of things sensuall with subordination unto the dictates of right rea∣son, and such motions of the will, as were suitable unto right rea∣son: now this I shall not magisterially dictate, but make good by two reasons.

The first reason I have 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Ames (Bellarm. enerv. l. 4. pag. 8. Cum unio inquit naturae, ex spiritu rationali & corpore naturali, facta sit modo perfecto subordinationem infert unius propensionis ad alteram, quae pugnam omnem excludit. The union, betwixt the body, and the soule of man, was perfect; and therefore inferred a subordi∣nation of the propensions, and operations of the body unto the soule; and subordinatorum nulla est pugna, subordination excludes

all opposition: this argument strikes chiefly against such as make the body to be the proper subject of the sensitive powers. But there be some (as you may see 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Metaphys. lib. 2. cap. 5. tit. 6. art. 1.] who in man make all sensitive powers to be seated in the soule; and unto them too this argument may be applied; the conjunction betwixt the sensitive, and rationall faculties in the same soule? supposing them to be both there (which now it is not pertinent to dispute) was a most perfect, and orderly conjunction, made by God, the author of all good order, who abhorreth all ataxy, and confusion; and order still requireth a subjection of those things, or persons, that are inferiour unto those, which are their superi∣ours, the sensitive faculties therefore being the more ignoble, were, by God, who made man, subjected unto the rationall; and they never had rebelled, if man by his fall had not perturbed this order: indeed we may now apply, unto the powers of lapsed man, that of Solomon, Eccles. 10. 7. I have 〈◊〉〈◊〉 servants upon horses, and Prin∣ces walking as servants upon the earth: those powers, which by the law of creation were servants, made to serve, and obey, have the throne, and supremacy in the soule; and those, unto which God gave the regency, are dethroned, and become servile; but it was impossible for any such disorder or confusion to be in the soule of man by creation; there could not then but bee a most perfect. sweet, and blessed harmony betwixt all man's parts, and powers; without any the least clashing, or disagreement; for othewise how could man be made, as Solomon saith he was, straite, or upright, Eccles. 7. 29.

A second reason I have borrowed of Tilenus(f) 1.18 [syntag. pag. 1. cap. 33. s. 40.] the specificall forme of man, his reasonable soule, doth so limit, determine, and restraine his generall formes, vegetative,

and sensitive, as that it makes their operations, not only agreeable, but proper unto man; it maketh the operations of the vegetative soule, which of themselves are common unto men with plants, and beasts so proper unto man, as that they are in man after a sort only humane; and therefore man groweth, and encreaseth, not as a tree or beast, but after a humane way; even so also it maketh the operations of the sensitive soule, which are common unto men with beasts, proper and peculiar unto man; so that, whilst man's nature was uncorrupted, he naturally coveted sensuall, and cor∣poreall things, not after a bruitish, but humane manner; that is conformably unto right reason: his nature then, as 'twas created by God, (for so you must still understand me) was without any repugnancy between his sensuall; and rationall appetites.

As for the other objections of Bellarmine I shall wholy passe them over; because, some of them come not nigh the question as stated by me; others of them are triviall, and receive an easy solution, and unto all of them the Reader may find sufficient an∣swers in Ames, Rivet, Gerard, Maccovius, and other writers upon popish controversies.

It may now be expected, that I should make some application of this point, and in particular, that I should shew how far we are to be humbled for Originall sin, whose formale is the privation or want of o∣riginall Righteousnesse; and I had prepared a great deale of matter upon this subject, but shall now wholy lay it aside; because I am happily prevented by the learned, and elaborate work of Mr. An∣thony Burgesse concerning originall sinne, whither I shall referre the Reader, and all that I shall doe more, shall be to annexe a briefe exposition, and application of some few scriptures, that conduce to this purpose.

Notes

• (n) 1.1

  Est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 arti∣cuius, ut sit 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 quam ob cau∣sam sic malui interpretari, quam ad ver∣bum. secundum 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• (o) 1.2

  Bellarm: tom: 4 〈◊〉〈◊〉. grat: & stat: 〈◊〉〈◊〉: lib. 3. cap. 5. versus finem.
• (p) 1.3

  Illud 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ex dictis colli∣gi potest, quod 〈◊〉〈◊〉 solet de subjecto 〈◊〉〈◊〉 originalis, de quo quidem, varie docti 〈◊〉〈◊〉 putant. Sed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & per se 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, id est, re∣lationem quan∣dam, ut dixi, mus, consequi∣tur subject um originalis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 esse 〈◊〉〈◊〉 seu potentias inter se coordi∣natas. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 enim sive in corporalibus, si∣ve in spirituali∣busintelligatur; existit in par∣tibus eum inter se ordinem ha∣bentibus, à quo totum quod ex illis constat, re∣ctum dicatur.
• (q) 1.4

  Sum. The. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Tom. 1. Tract. 5. de homine in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Innocentiae Cap. 3. Qu. 2.
• (r) 1.5

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 cur 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 haec 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & proprie∣tas consequens unionem, sinon result at ab illa, sed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est nova Dei actio libera ab actione incar∣nationis 〈◊〉〈◊〉, per quam haec gratia conferatur. Et 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nam operatio consequitur esse. Sed per unionem communicarur 〈◊〉〈◊〉 divinum 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Ergo, Ex illo resultat in humanitate d vina operatio: Ergo & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quae est talis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 principium. Respondetur etiam in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, aliqua esse 〈◊〉〈◊〉 connaturalia ab 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a∣gente juxta naturae debitum collata, & non ab intrinseco principio activè manantia. Sic multi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 de quantitate respectu 〈◊〉〈◊〉 primae, de motu circulari respectu 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & de 〈◊〉〈◊〉: bus infusis angelorum. Sic ergo in praesenti dicimus vocari gratiam connaturalem proprietatem Christi Dei hominis, quia 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dignitate talis personae dcbita est, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quodam proportionis connaturalis, ratione cuius praeternaturale ac prodigiosum 〈◊〉〈◊〉, unam actionem ab alterâ separa∣ri, & naturam humanam sine ornamentis gratiae verbo coniungere. Quomodo dici etiam po∣test, corporis 〈◊〉〈◊〉, optimamque dispositionem suisse 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & connatura∣lem ratione unionis, ita ut miraculum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 carere corporis immortalitate, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quamvis hae corporis proprietates non manant ab unione per physicam resultantiam, sed debeantur solum de∣bito proportionis.
• (s) 1.6

  Si quis per debitam in∣telligat 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ex hypothesi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & vo∣luntatis divinae, de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 crea∣tura, à qua 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 o∣bedientiam persectam, negare non possunt adversarii, tali sensu, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 primaevae na∣turae, qui gratiam universalem eamque sufficientem, debitam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 homini in statu lapsus consti∣tuto, ex hypothesi, non verentur 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Certè legem quandam naturalen: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in∣ditam ab initio, fatentur nobiscum adversarii. Si data 〈◊〉〈◊〉 homini 〈◊〉〈◊〉 naturae, cur 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non dicendum erit, debitam fuisse homini creando 〈◊〉〈◊〉 qua ad legem unplendam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 erat? debita ergo fuit, per intentionem, & voluntatem divinam, quia voluntas sinis, ne∣cessariam, & quasi debitam facit voluntatem mediorum ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Rivet. in Genes. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 7. pag. 34. 35.
• (t) 1.7

  Videris mihi non recte imaginem Dei confistentem in justitia, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 à su∣pernaturali gra∣tiâ excludere. Licet enim il∣lud donum ho∣mini collatum sit in creatione, & simul cum ipsa natura, ita enim 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pono, tamen superna∣turale est, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hominis naturam excedens: quod probo ab actu regenerationis, qui est gratiae supernaturalis. Quum enim regeneratione opus sit ad illam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & sanctitatem re∣cuperandam, quae 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est actio supernaturalis: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 homini initio collatam fuisse 〈◊〉〈◊〉 supernaturali. Armin:
• (v) 1.8

  Sin Perkinsius 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non modo hac ratione naturalem esse, sed & alla, nempè tan∣quam ex 〈◊〉〈◊〉 naturae profluentem, prorsus nihil obfuisset haec ratio 〈◊〉〈◊〉 à regeneratione sum∣pta. Neque enim sequitur, quia qualitas aliqua producitur actione supernaturali in statu natu∣rae corruptae, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fuisse etiam supernaturalem in statu naturae integrae. Etenim non pau∣cis restituit Christus sanitatem corporis actione supernaturali, nec tamen 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, sanita∣tem corporis non fuisse Adamo naturalem; Actione supernaturali restituebat aurem 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quam Petrus praeciderat, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 tamen 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aurem illam sive dextram, sive sinistram, non fuisse Malcho naturalem.
• w 1.9

  Id ta∣men mone∣mus nostros non negare ab∣solutè, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fuis∣se justitiam o∣riginalem; non solum, compa∣ratè ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 praesentis naturae, sed etiam ratione prioris status, quia etsi natutalis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quo∣modo diximus, supernaturalls etiam sult ratione objecti. Tendebat enim 〈◊〉〈◊〉 illa ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 supernaturalem, quâ ratione si eam supernaturalem diceret Bellarm: non contenderemus. Sed id quod in controverliam vocatur, melius ex contrario 〈◊〉〈◊〉 potest; quia il'e cum suis, hoc mo∣litur, ut obtineat, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in natura primum creata, fuisse vitlosum & inordinatum, quod per a∣liam rem, quae supra naturam data 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in ordinem cogi, & quasi fraeno coerceri. Hic est praesertim controversiae 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quia alioquin in multis aliis, in verbis potius quam in rebus, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & controversias multiplicat. Rivet. in Genes. exerc. 7. p. 35.

  Wee say that this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 essentially required to the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of nature. So that there is no state of sole and pure nature, without addition of sin or grace, as the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fondly imagine, for that the nature or man is such, as must 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be lified above it selfe by grace, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 below it selfe and be in a state of sinne. Field of the Church pag. 137.

  We say that originall righteousnesse is said to be a supernaturall quality, because it groweth not out of nature, and because it raiseth nature above it selfe, but that it is naturall, that is, required to the inte∣grity of nature. Neither should it seeme strange to any man, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a quality not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 out of nature, should be required necessarily for the perfecting of natures integrity, seeing the end and object of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 desires, knowledge, and action, is an 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thing and without the compasse and bouuds of nature, ibid.
• (x) 1.10

  Caeterum negandum non est, etiam in parte superiore simile vitium 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Nam ea quoque ani∣mi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 prona est ad concupi∣scendos 〈◊〉〈◊〉, inanem 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vanitates, &, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nolimus, interdum parit ejusmodi desidetia. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 B. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in 〈◊〉〈◊〉. ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉. cap. 5. cum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 carnem concupiscere adversus spiritum, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 enumerans o∣pera 〈◊〉〈◊〉, non solum nominavit fornicationem, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & alia id 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sed etiam 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, &c: quod diligenter notavit S. Augustinus lib. 14. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 civ. cap. 2. 3. & 4: ubid. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 carnem interdum accipi pro toto homine, qualis est, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Dei, post la∣psum Adami, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dici carnalem, qui secundum seipsum, non lecundum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quo in explicatione Psal. 79: dicit, omne 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ex cupiditate malè inflammante, vel ex 〈◊〉〈◊〉 malè humiliante. Itaque concupiscentiae vitium licet praecipuè in 〈◊〉〈◊〉, tamen e∣tiam in mente sedem habet. de amiss. grat. & stat. pecc. l. 5. cap. 15.
• (y) 1.11

  Concu∣piscentia voca∣tur à Bellarm. cap. 5. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 carnis ad bonum corpo∣rale, & sensibi∣le, in quod fertur per sensum & appetitum, propensio autem rei ad suum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 naturale, est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 naturae, non desectus, non morbus, nec ex materia pendens, sed ex illa causa, quae singu∣lis facultatibus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 indidit propensiones. 2. Praeter intentionem Dei non factus est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mo animal vivens, cum omnibus illis propensionibus quae animalis naturae conveniunt. Ames. Bell. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. tom. 4. pag. 11.
• (z) 1.12

  Adver∣sarius expressis verbis cogitur 〈◊〉〈◊〉 concupi. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 illam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 naturae contrariam. Ex quo sequitur, id quod est purae naturae contra∣rium, idem si∣mul secundum puram natu∣ram naturale esse non posse, nisi quis velit, lucem & tene∣bras simul in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ponere, & aliquid esse, & non esse contra 〈◊〉〈◊〉 notiones asserere. Qui ergo concessit, cum natura pura concupiscentiam carnis & sen∣suum 〈◊〉〈◊〉, necessario 〈◊〉〈◊〉 debet, si sibi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 velit, concupiscentiam naturalem esse, seu ex puris naturae principiis emanantem, & contra concedere, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 illam naturae congruam, quae rebellionem tollendo, naturam perfecit, naturalem 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quod nos asserimus. Est ergo in ver∣bis Bellarmini foeda contradictio, dum unam & eandem concupiscentiam, ratione unius & ejus∣dem naturae, naturalem simul & naturae contrariam dicit. Omne enim 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, vel quod 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ex naturae principiis, naturae non contrarium, sed consentaneum est; vicissim autem, quod con∣trarium, hoc naturale non est. Rivet. in Genes. Exerc. 7. pag. 35.
• (a) 1.13

  Mar. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 30. Luk. 10. 27.
• (b) 1.14

  Cum est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 concu∣piscentiae car∣nalis quod vel continen∣do 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 tota ani∣ma diligitur Deus. August. de perfect. ju∣stit. Rat. 17.
• (c) 1.15

  Christus potuit assume∣re naturam hu∣manam in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 naturalibus; non potuit au∣tem assumere concupiscen∣tiam, rebellio∣nem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 contra spiri∣tum, pronita∣tem peccandi, difficultatem bonae volunta∣tis. Sic enim sequeretur eum peccare 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pro∣nitas 〈◊〉〈◊〉 suppoint posse peccare, in lib. 2. sent. dist. 25.
• (d) 1.16

  Inordi∣natio 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 virium 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mordinatio 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 potest di∣ci 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Aquinas. 1 2 ae. q. 8 2. a. 3.
• (c) 1.17

  Quia in∣quit in homi∣ne concupisci∣bilis naturali∣ter regitur ra∣tione, in tan∣tum concupi∣scere est homi ni naturale, in quantum est secundum ra∣tionis ordi∣nem: concupi∣scentia autem quae transcen∣dit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ra∣tionis, inest ho∣mini 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• (f) 1.18

  Atqui cogitari debebant, for∣mae specificae, cujusmodi est anima ratio∣nalis in ho∣mine, duplices esse operatio∣nes, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 tum proprias, ipsa habet, & exerit 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quas non habet 〈◊〉〈◊〉 generalis, cujusmodi in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mine est 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vegitans, & sentiens: tum etiam coarctat, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 modum revocat, & re∣string it operationes formae generalis, suaeque 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non modo congruentes, sed edam propias 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Sicut igitur anima vegetans, quae 〈◊〉〈◊〉, & bestiis & hominibus est communis, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 coar∣ctatur in homine, ut ejus operatio non nisi humana sit, ac propterea homo non instar 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vel pecudiscreseat, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, gignat: sed humano 〈◊〉〈◊〉 agat. Ita & 〈◊〉〈◊〉, quae 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & homi∣nibus est 〈◊〉〈◊〉, per rationalem, quae specifica est in homine, ita coarctatur & 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ut. ex natura humana, quamdiu illa incorrupta, non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 secundum rationem, qui 〈◊〉〈◊〉 humanus est modus, appetat & concupiscat.