The common-wealth of Oceana

Oceana.

• 1. The Preliminaries, shewing the Principles of Government.
• 2. The Councill of Legislators, shewing the Art of making a Common-Wealth.
• 3. The Modell of the Common-Wealth of Oceana, shewing the effect of such Art.
• 4. The Corollary, shewing some consequences of such a Govern∣ment.

The Preliminaries, shewing the Principles of Government.

JAnotti, the most excellent describer of the Common-wealth of Venice, divideth the whole Series of Government into two Times or Periods. The one ending with the liberty of Rome, which was the course or Empire, as I may call it, of antient prudence, first discovered unto mankind by God him∣self, in the fabrick of the Common-Wealth of Israel, and after∣ward picked out of his footsteps in nature, and unanimously followed by the Greeks and Romans. The other beginning with the Arms of Caesar; which extinguishing liberty were the Translation of ancient into modern prudence, introduced by those inundations of Huns, Goths, Vandalls, Lombards, Saxons, which breaking the Roman Empire, deformed the whole face of the world, with those ill features of Government, which at this time are become far worse in these Western parts, except Venice, (which escaping the hands of the Barbarians, by vertue of her impregnable situation, hath had her eye fixed upon an∣cient Prudence: and is attained to a perfection even beyond her Copy.)

* 1.1Relation being had unto these two Times, Government (to define it (de jure) or according to ancient Prudence) is an Art whereby a Civil Society of men is instituted and preserved upon the foundation of common right or interest, or (to fol∣low Aristotle and Livy) it is the Empire of Lawes and not of Men.

And Government (to define it (de facto) or according unto modern Prudence) is an Art whereby some man, or some few men, subject a City or a Nation, and rule it according unto his or their private interest▪ which, because the Lawes in such cases are made according to the interest of a man, or of some few Families, may be said to be the Empire of Men, and not of Lawes.

The former kind is that which Machiavill (whose Books are neglected) is the onely Politician that hath gone about to re∣treive:* 1.2 and that, Leviathan (who would have his Book imposed upon the Universities) goes about to destroy. For, It is (saith he) another errour of Aristotle's Politicks,* 1.3 that in a well ordered Com∣mon-Wealth, not Men should govern, but the Lawes: What man that hath his natural Senses, though he can neither write nor read, does not find himself governed by them he fears, and believes can kill or hurt him when he obeyeth not? or, who believes that the Law can hurt him, which is but words and paper, without the hands and swords of men? I confesse, that (Magistratus est lex armata) the Magistrate upon his Bench, is that unto the Law, which a Gunner upon his Platform is unto his Cannon. Neverthelesse I should not dare to argue with a man of any ingenuity, after this manner: An whole Army, though they can neither write nor read, are not afraid of a Platform, which they know is but Earth or Stone▪ nor of a Cannon, which without a hand to give fire unto it, is but cold Iron; therefore a whole Army is afraid of one man. But of this kind is the ratiocination of Leviathan (as I shall shew in divers places that come in my way) throughout his whole Politicks, or worse; as where he saith of Aristotle and of Cicero,* 1.4 of the Greeks and of the Romans, who lived under popu∣lar States, that they derived those rights not from the principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of the practice of their own Common-Wealths, as Grammarians describe the rules of Language out of Poets. Which is as if a man should tell famous Hervey, that he transcribed his Circulation of the bloud, not out of the Principles of Nature, but out of the Anatomy of this or that body.

To go on therefore with this Preliminary Discourse: I shall divide it according unto the two definitions of Government relating unto Janotty's two Times), into two parts: the first treating of the Principles of Government in general, and ac∣cording to the Ancients; the second treating of the late Go∣vernments

of Oceana in particular, and in that of Modern Pru∣dence,

Government, according to the Antients, and their learned Disciple Machiavill,* 1.5 (the onely Polititian of later Ages) is of three kinds; The Government of One man, or of the better sort, or of the whole people: which by their more learned names are called Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy; these they hold, through their pronenesse to degenerate, to be all evill. For whereas they that govern, should govern according to reason; if they govern according unto passion, they do that which they should not do: Wherefore as reason and passion are two things, so Government by Reason is one thing, and the cor∣ruption of Government by Passion is another thing, but not al∣waies another Government: as a body that is alive is one thing, and a body that is dead is another thing, but not alwaies an∣other Creature, though the corruption of one come at length unto the generation of another. The corruption then of Mo∣narchy is called Tyranny; that of Aristocracy, Oligarchy; and that of Democracy, Anarchy. But Legislators having found these three Governments at the best to be naught, have invented an∣other consisting of a mixture of them all, which onely is good; this is the doctrine of the Ancients.

But Leviathan is positive, that they are all deceived, and that there is no other Government in Nature then one of the three; as also that the flesh of them cannot stink, the names of their corruptions being but the names of mens phansies; which will be understood when we are shown which of them was Senatus Populus{que} Romanus.

To go mine own way, and yet to follow the Ancients: The Principles of Governments are twofold, Internal, or the goods of the Mind; and External, or the goods of Fortune.* 1.6 The goods of the mind are natural or acquired virtues, as Wisdom, Pru∣dence and Courage, &c. The goods of Fortune are Riches. There be goods also of the Body, as Health, Beauty, Strength, but these are not to be brought unto account upon this score, be∣cause if a man or an Army acquire Victory or Empire, it is more from their Discipline, Arms, and Courage, then from their natural health, beauty, or strength, in regard that a peo∣ple conquered may have more of natural strength, beauty and health, and yet find little remedy. The Principles of Govern∣ment then are in the goods of the mind, or in the goods of for∣tune. To the goods of the mind, answers Authority; to the goods of fortune, Power or Empire. Wherefore Leviathan,* 1.7 though he be right where he saith, that Riches are Power; is mistaken where he saith, that Prudence, or the reputation of Pru∣dence is power: for the learning or prudence of a man is no more power, then the learning or prudence of a book or Authour,

which is properly Authority; a learned Writer may have authority though he have no power; and a foolish Magistrate may have power, though he have otherwise no esteem or au∣thority; the difference of these two is observed by Livy in Evander, of whom saith he, (regebat magis Authoritate quàm Im∣perio) he ruled rather by authority then power.

To begin with Riches, in regard that men are hung upon these,* 1.8 not of choice as upon the other, but of necessity and by the teeth: for as much as he who wanteth bread, is his ser∣vant that will feed him: if a man thus feed an whole people, they are under his Empire.

* 1.9Empire is of two kinds, Domestick and National, or Forrain and Provinciall.

Domestick Empire is founded upon Dominion.

Dominion is Propriety reall or personall, that is to say, in Lands, or in money and goods.

Lands, or the parts and parcels of a Territory, are held by the Proprietor or Proprietors,* 1.10 Lord or Lords of it, in some pro∣portion; and such (except it be in a City that hath little or no Land, and whose revenue is in Trade) as is the proportion or ballance of dominion or property in Land, such is the nature of the Empire.

* 1.11If one man be sole Landlord of a Territory, or overballance the people, for example, three parts in four, he is Grand Sig∣nior: for so the Turk is called from his Property; and his Empire is absolute Monarchy.

* 1.12If the Few or a Nobility, or a Nobility with the Clergy be Landlords, or overballance the people unto the like propor∣tion, it makes the Gothick ballance (to be shewn at large, in the second part of this Discourse) and the Empire is mixed Monar∣chy, as that of Spain, Poland, and late of Oceana.

* 1.13And if the whole people be Landlords, or hold the Lands so divided among them, that no one man, or number of men, with∣in the compasse of the Few or Aristocracy, overballance them, the Empire (without the interposition of foree) is a Common-Wealth.

* 1.14If force be interposed in any of these three cases, it must ei∣ther frame the Government unto the foundation, or the foun∣dation unto the Government; or holding the Government not according unto the ballance, it is not natural, but violent: and therefore if it be at the devotion of a Prince, it is Tyranny; if at the devotion of the Few, Oligarchy; or if in the power of the People, Anarchy: each of which confusions, the ballance standing otherwise, is but of short continuance; because against the nature of the ballance, which not destroyed, destroyeth that which opposeth it.

But there be certain other confusions, which being rooted in

the ballance are of longer continuance, and of greater horror; as first, where a Nobility holdeth half the Property, or about that proportion, and the people the other half; in which case with∣out altering the ballance, there is no remedy but the one must eat out the other: as the people did the Nobility in Athens, and the Nobility the people in Rome. Secondly, when a Prince holdeth about half the Dominion, and the people the other half, which was the case of the Roman Emperours, planted part∣ly upon their military Colonies, and partly upon the Senate and the people, the Government becometh a very shambles both of the Princes and the people. Somewhat of this nature are certain Governments at this day; which are said to sub∣sist by confusion. In this case to fix the ballance is, to entail misery: But in the three former not to fix it is, to loose the Government. Wherefore it being unlawfull in Turky, that any should possesse Land but the Grand Signior, the ballance is fixed by the Law, and that Empire firm. Nor, though the Kings often fell, was the Throne of Oceana known to shake, un∣till the Statute of Alienations broke the pillars, by giving way unto the Nobility to sell their Estates, (Si terra recedat, Jonium Aegaeo frangat mare.) Lacedemon while she held unto her di∣vision of Land made by Lycurgus, was immoveable, but break∣ing that, could stand no longer. This kind of Law fixing the ballance in Lands is called Agrarian, and was first introduced by God himself, who divided the Land of Canaan unto his peo∣ple by Lots, and is of such virtue, that where ever it hath held, that Government hath not alter'd, except by consent: as in that unparallell'd example of the people of Israel, when be∣ing in liberty they would needs choose a King. But without an Agrarian, Government whether Monarchical, Aristocrati∣call, or Popular, hath no long Lease.

For Dominion personal or in money, it may now and then stir up a Metius or a Manlius, which if the Common-wealth be not provided with some kind of Dictatorian power, may be dangerous, though it have been seldom or never successefull: because unto propriety producing Empire, it is required that it should have some certain root or foot-hold, which, except in Land, it cannot have, being otherwise as it were upon the wing.

Neverthelesse, in such Cities as subsist most by Trade,* 1.15 and have little or no Land as Holland and Genoa; the ballance of Treasure may be equal unto that of Land in the cases men∣tioned.

But Leviathan, though he seem to scew at Antiquity, fol∣lowing his furious Master Carneades, hath caught hold of the publick sword, unto which he reduceth all manner and mat∣ter of Government; as, where he affirms, this opinion,* 1.16 (that

any Monarch receiveth his power by Covenant, that is to say, upon conditions) to proceed from the not understanding the easie truth, That covenants being but words and breath, have no power to oblige, con∣tain, constrain or protect any man, but what they have from the pub∣lick sword. But as he said of the Law, that without this sword it is but paper; so he might have thought of this sword, that without an hand it is but cold iron. The hand which hold∣eth this sword is the Militia of a Nation; and the Militia of a Nation, is either an Army in the field, or ready for the field upon occasion. But an Army is a beast that hath a great bel∣ly and must be fed; wherefore this will come unto what pa∣stures you have, and what pastures you have will come unto the ballance of propriety, without which the publick sword is but a name or meer spit-frog. Wherefore to set that which Leviathan saith of Arms and of Contracts a little streighter;* 1.17 he that can graze this beast with the great belly, as the Turk doth his Timariots, may well deride him that imagines he received his power by covenant, or is obliged unto any such toy: it being in this case onely that covenants are but words and breath. But if the propriety of the Nobility stocked with their Tenants and retainers be the pasture of that beast, the Ox knowes his Masters Crib; and it is impossible for a King in such a constitution, to raign otherwise then by Covenant; or if he break it, it is words that comes to blowes.

But, sairh he, when an Assembly of men is made Soveraign, then no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past in the Institution▪* 1.18 but what was that by Publicola, of appeal unto the people, or that whereby the people had their Tribunes? Fy, saith he, No body is so dull as to say, that the People of Rome made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might depose the Roman people. In which there be remarkable things; for first, he holdeth the Common-wealth of Rome to have consisted of one assembly, whereas it consisted of the Senate and the People; That they were not upon covenant, whereas every Law enacted by them was a covenant between them. That the one Assembly was made Soveraign, whereas the people who onely were Sove∣raign, were such from the beginning, as appears by the ancient style of their Covenants or Laws (censuere Patres, jussit Populus): That a Councill being made Soveraign, cannot be made such upon conditions; whereas▪ the Decemviri being a Council that was made Soveraign, was made such upon conditions. That all conditions or covenants making a Soveraign, the Soveraign being made,* 1.19 are void; whence it must follow, that the Decem∣virs being made, were ever after the lawful Government of Rome, and that it was unlawful for the Common-wealth of Rome to depose the Decemvirs: as also that Cicero, if he writ otherwise out of his Common-wealth, did not write out of

Nature. But to come unto others that see more of this bal∣lance.

You have Aristotle full of it in divers places,* 1.20 especially where he saith, that Immoderate Wealth, as where One man or the Few have greater possessions than equality or the frame of the Com∣mon-wealth will bear, is an occasion of Sedition, which ends for the greater part in Monarchy; and that for this cause the Ostracisme hath been received in divers places, as in Argos and Athens. But that it were better to prevent the growth in the beginning, then, when it hath gotten head, to seek the remedy of such an evil.

Machiavill hath missed it very narrowly and more dange∣rously, for not fully perceiving,* 1.21 that if a Common-wealth be galled by the Gentry, it is by their overballance; he speaks of the Gentry as hostile to popular Governments, and of popular Governments as hostile unto the Gentry; and makes us be∣lieve, that the people in such are so enraged against them, that where they meet a Gentleman they kill him; which can never be proved by any one example, unlesse in civill Warr; seeing that even in Switz the Gentry are not onely safe, but in honour. But the ballance as I have laid it down, though un∣seen by Machiavill, is that which interpreteth him, and that which he confirmeth by his Judgment in many other as well as in this place, where he concludes, That he who will go about to make a Common-Wealth where there be many Gentlemen, unlesse he first destroy them, undertakes an impossibility: and that he who goes about to introduce Monarchy where the condition of the people is equal, shall never bring it to passe, unlesse he cull out such of them as are the most turbulent and ambitious, and make them Gentlemen or Noble∣men, not in name but in effect, that is, by enriching them with Lands, Castles, and Treasures, that may gain them power amongst the rest, and bring in the rest unto dependence upon themselves, to the end that they maintaining their ambition by the Prince, the Prince may main∣tain his power by them.

Wherefore as in this place I agree with Machiavill, that a Nobility or Gentry overballancing a popular Government, is the utter bane and destruction of it; so I shall shew in an∣other, that a Nobility or Gentry in a popular Government not overballancing it, is the very life and soul of it.

By what hath been said, it should seem that we may lay aside farther disputes of the publick Sword,* 1.22 or of the right of the Militia; which, be the Government what it will, or let it change how it can, is inseparable from the overballance in do∣minion: nor, if otherwise stated by the Law or Custome as in the Common-wealth of Rome (Consules sine lège Curiata rem mi∣litarem attingere non potuerunt) where the people having the sword, the Nobility came to have the overballance; availeth it unto other end than destruction: for as a building swaying

from the foundation must fall, so the Law swaying from rea∣son, and the Militia from the ballance of Dominion. And so much for the ballance of Nationall or Domestick Empire which is in Dominion.

The ballance of Forraign or Provincial Empire is of a con∣trary nature.* 1.23 A man may as well say that it is unlawfull for him who hath made a fair and honest purchase to have tenants, as for a Government that hath made a just progresse, and in∣largement of it self, to have Provinces. But how a Province may be justly acquired, appertaineth to another place; in this I am to shew no more, then how or upon what kind of ballance it is to be held; in order whereunto, I shall first shew upon what kind of ballance it is not to be held. It hath been said, that National or Independent Empire, of what kind soever, is to be exercised by them that have the proper ballance of Dominion in the Nation; wherefore Provincial or dependent Empire is not to be exercised by them that have the ballance of Dominion in the Province, because that would bring the Government from Provinciall and dependent, to National and independent. Absolute Monarchy, as that of the Turks, neither planteth her people at home nor abroad, otherwise then as Tenants for life or at will; wherefore her National and her provincial Govern∣ment is all one. But in Governments that admit the Citizen or Subject unto dominion in Lands, the richest are they that share most of the power at home: whereas the richest among the Provincials, though native Subjects, or Citizens that have been transplanted, are least admitted to the Government abroad: for men like flowers or roots being transplanted take after the soyl wherein they grow. Wherefore the Common-wealth of Rome, by planting Colonies of her Citizens within the bound of Italy, took the best way of propagating her self, and naturalizing the Country; whereas if she had planted such Colonies without the bounds of Italy, it would have alien'd the Citizens, and given a root unto liberty abroad, that might have sprung up forraign or savage and hostile to her; where∣fore she never made any such dispersion of her self and her strength, till she was under the yoke of her Emperours, who disburdening themselves of the people, as having lesse appre∣hension of what they could do abroad then at home, took a contrary course.

The Mamaluc's, (which till any man shew me the contrary, I shall presume to have been a Common-wealth consisting of an Army, whereof the common Souldier was the People, the Commission-Officer the Senate, and the General the Prince) were forraigners, and by Nation Circussians, that govern'd Aegypt; wherefore these never durst plant themselves upon Dominion, which growing naturally up into the National in∣terest

must have dissolved the forraign yoke in that Province.

The like in some sort may be said of Venice, the Government whereof is usually mistaken: for Venice, though she do not take in the people, never excluded them. This Common-wealth, the Orders whereof are the most Democratical or Popular of all others, in regard of the exquisite Rotation of the Senate, at the first institution took in the whole people; they that now live un∣der the Governments without participation of it, are such as have since either voluntarily chosen so to do, or were subdued by Arms. Wherefore the Subject of Venice is governed by Provinces, and the ballance of Dominion not standing, as hath been said, with Provincial Government: as the Mamaluc's durst not cast their Government upon this ballance in their Provinces, lest the National interest should have rooted out the forraign; so neither dare the Venetians take in their Sub∣jects upon this ballance, lest the forraign interest should root out the Nationall, which is that of the 3000 now governing; and by diffusing the Common-Wealth throughout her Terri∣tories, lose the advantage of her situation, by which in a great part she subsisteth. And such also is the Government of the Spaniard in the Indies, unto which he deputeth Natives of his own Country, not admitting the Creolios unto the Government of those Provinces; though descended from Spaniards.

But if a Prince or a Common-wealth may hold a Territory that is forraign in this, it may be asked, why he may not hold one that is Native in like manner? To which I answer, because he can hold a forreign by a Native territory, but not a Native by a For∣reign; and as hitherto I have shewn what is not the Provinciall ballance, so by this answer it may appear what it is, namely the overballance of a native Territory to a forraign; for as one Coun∣try ballanceth it self by the distribution of propriety according unto the proportion of the same, so one Country over ballanceth another, by advantage of divers kinds. For example, the Common-wealth of Rome overballanced her provinces by the vigour of a more excellent Government opposite unto a crazier, or by a more ex∣quisite Militia opposed unto one inferiour in Courage or discipline: The like was that of the Mamaluc's being an hardy, unto the Ae∣pgytians that were a soft people. And the ballance of a situation is in this kind, of wonderfull effect; seeing the King of Denmark, being none of the most potent Princes, is able at the Sound to take Tole of the greatest: and as this King by the advantage of the Land can make the Sea tributary; so Venice; by the advantage of the Sea, in whose arms she is impregnable, can make the Land to feed her Gulph. For the Colonies in the Indies, they are yet babes that cannot live without sucking the breasts of their mother-Cities, but such as, I mistake, if when they come of age they do not wean themselves: which causeth me to won∣der at Princes that delight to be exhausted in that way. And

so much for the principles of power whether National or Pro∣vinciall, Domestick or Forraign; being such as are External, and founded in the goods of Fortune.

* 1.24I come unto the principles of Authority, which are Inter∣nall, and founded upon the goods of the Mind; These the Le∣gislator that can unite in his Government with those of fortune, cometh nearest unto the work of God, whose Government consisteth of Heaven and Earth: which was said by Plato, though in different words, as, when Princes should be Philoso∣phers, or Philosophers Princes, the world would be happy; and saith Solomon,* 1.25 There is an evil which I have seen under the Sun, which proceedeth from the Ruler, (enimvero ne{que} nobilem, ne{que} in∣genuum, nec libertinum quidem armis praeponere, regia utilitas est,) folly is set in great dignity, and the rich (either in vertue and wis∣dome, in the goods of the mind, or those of fortune upon that ballance which giveth them a sense of the Nationall interest) sit in low places. I have seen servants upon horses, and Princes walking as servants upon the earth. Sad complaints, that the principles of Power and of Authority, the goods of the mind, and of fortune, do not meet and twine in the wreathe or Crown of Empire! Wherefore if we have any thing of Piety or of prudence, let us raise our selves out of the mire of private in∣terest, unto the contemplation of Virtue, and put an hand un∣to the removal of this Evil from under the Sun; this evil against which no Government that is not secured, can be good; this evill from which the Government that is secure, must be per∣fect. Solomon tells us, that the cause of it is from the Ruler, from those principles of power which ballanced upon earthly trash, exclude the heavenly treasures of Virtue, and that in∣fluence of it upon Government, which is Authority. We have wandered the Earth to find out the ballance of power: but to find out that of Authority, we must ascend, as I said, nearer Heaven, or to the Image of God, which is the Soul of man.

The Soul of man (whose life or motion is perpetual contempla∣tion or thought) is the Mistris of two potent rivalls, the one Reason, the other Passion, that are in continuall suit; and ac∣cording as she gives up her will to these or either of them, is the felicity or misery which man partakes in this mortall life.

For as what ever was passion in the contemplation of a man, being brought forth by his will into action, is vice and the bon∣dage of Sin; so what ever was reason in the contemplation of a man, being brought forth by his will into action, is virtue and the freedome of Soul.

Again, as those actions of a man that were sin, acquire unto himself repentance or shame, and affect others with scorn or pity;

so those actions of a man that are virtue, acquire unto himself Honour, and upon others Authority.

Now Government is no other then the Soul of a Nation or City: wherefore that which was reason in the debate of a Com∣mon-wealth, being brought forth by the result, must be virtue; and for as much as the Soul of a City or Nation is the Soveraign power, her virtue must be Law. But the Government whose Law is virtue, and whose virtue is law, is the same, whose Empire is Authority, and whose Authority is Empire.

Again, if the liberty of a man consist in the Empire of his reason, the absence whereof would betray him unto the bondage of his passions: Then the liberty of a Common-wealth consisteth in the Empire of her Lawes, the absence whereof would betray her unto the lasts of Tyrants: and these I conceive to be the principles, upon which Aristotle and Livy (injuriously accused by Leviathan for not writing out of nature) have grounded their assertion, that a Common-wealth is an Empire of Lawes and not of Men. But they must not carry it so. For, saith he,* 1.26 The liberty, whereof there is so frequent and honourable mention in the Histories and Philosophy of the ancient Greeks and Romans, and the Writings and Discourses of those that from them have received All their Learning in the Politicks, is not the liberty of particular men, but the liberty of the Common-wealth. He might as well have said, that the Estates of particular men in a Common-wealth, are not the riches of particular men, but the riches of the Com∣mon-wealth; for equality of estates causeth equality of power, and equality of power is the liberty not onely of the Common-wealth, but of every man. But sure a man would never be thus irreverent with the greatest Authors, and positive against all Antiquity, without some certain demonstration of truth; and, what is it? Why, there is written on the Turrets of the City of Luca in great Characters at this day the word LIBERTAS, yet no man can thence infer, that a particular man hath more liberty or immunity from the service of the Common-wealth there, then in Con∣stantinople. Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchical or Popu∣lar, the freedom is the same. The Mountain hath brought forth, and we have a little equivocation! For to say, that a Luchese hath no more liberty or immunity from the Laws of Luca; then a Turk hath from those of Constantinople; and to say that a Luchese hath no more liberty or immunity by the Lawes of Luca, then a Turk hath by those of Constantinople, are pretty dif∣ferent speeches: the first may be said of all Governments alike; the second scarse of any two; much lesse of these, seeing it is known, that whereas the greatest Bashaw is a Tenant as well of his head, as of his estate, at the will of his Lord; the meanest Luchese that hath Land, is a freeholder of both, and not to be controlled but by the Law, and that framed by every private

man unto no other end, (or they may thank themselves) then to protect the liberty of every private man, which by that means comes to be the liberty of the Common-wealth.

But seeing they that make the Lawes in Common-wealths are but men, the main question seems to be, how a Common-wealth comes to be an Empire of Lawes, and not of Men? or how the debate or result of a Common-wealth is so sure to be according un∣to reason; seeing they who debate, and they who resolve be but men. And as often as reason is against a man, so often will a man be against reason.

This is thought to be a shrewd saying, but will do no harm; for be it so, that reason is nothing but interest, there be divers interests, and so divers reasons.

As first, there is Private Reason, which is the interest of a pri∣vate man.

Secondly, there is Reason of State, which is the interest (or errour as was said by Solomon) of the Ruler or Rulers, that is to say, of the Prince, of the Nobility, or of the People.

Thirdly, there is that Reason which is the interest of mankind, or of the whole.* 1.27 Now if we see even in those natural agents that want sense, that as in themselves they have a Law which directeth them, in the means whereby they tend to their own perfection, so likewise that another Law there is, which toucheth them as they are so∣ciable parts united into one body, a Law which bindeth them each to serve unto others good, and all to prefer the good of the whole, before whatsoever their own particular; as when stones or heavy things for∣sake their ordinary wont or center, and fly upwards, as if they heard themselves commanded to let go the good they privately wish, and to relieve the present distresse of Nature in common. There is a com∣mon right, Law of Nature, or interest of the whole; which is more excellent, and so acknowledged to be by the agents them∣selves,* 1.28 then the right or interest of the parts onely. Wherefore though it may be truly said, that the creatures are naturally carried forth, unto their proper utility or profit: that ought not to be taken in too general a sense; seeing divers of them abstain from their own profit, either in regard of those of the same kind, or at the least of their young.

Mankind then must either be lesse just then the creature, or acknowledge also his common interest to be common right. And if reason be nothing else but interest, and the interest of mankind be the right interest, then the reason of mankind must be right reason. Now compute well, for if the interest of popular Govern∣ment come the nearest unto the interest of mankind, then the reason of popular Government must come the nearest unto right reason.

But it may be said, that the difficulty remains yet; for be the interest of popular Government right reason, a man doth not

look upon reason as it is right or wrong in it self, but as it makes for him or against him: wherefore unlesse you can shew such orders of a Government, as like those of God in nature shall be able to constrain this or that creature to shake off that inclina∣tion which is more peculiar unto it, and take up that which regards the common good or interest; all this is to no more end, then to perswade every man in a popular Government, not to carve himself of that which he desires most, but to be manner∣ly at the publick Table, and give the best from himself unto decency and the common interest. But that such orders may be established, as may, nay must give the upper hand in all cases unto common right or interest, notwithstanding the nearnesse of that which sticks unto every man in private, and this in a way of equal certainty and facility, is known even unto girles, be∣ing no other then those that are of common practice with them in divers cases. For example, two of them have a Cake yet undivided, which was given between them, that each of them therefore may have that which is due: Divide, sayes one unto the other, and I will choose; or let me divide, and you shall choose: if this be but once agreed upon, it is enough: for the divident, dividing unequally loses, in regard that the other takes the better half; wherefore she divides equally, and so both have right. O the depth of the wisdom of God! and yet by the mouthes of babes and sucklings hath he set forth his strength; that which great Philosophers are disputing upon in vain, is brought unto light by two silly girles, even the whole mystery of a Common-Wealth: which lyes only in dividing and choosing: nor hath God (if his works in nature be understood) left so much unto mankind to dispute upon, as who shall divide, and who choose, but distributed them for ever into two orders, whereof the one hath the naturall right of dividing, and the other of choosing. For Example:

A Common-wealth is but a civill Society of men: let us take any number of men (as twenty),* 1.29 and forthwith make a Com∣mon-wealth: twenty men (if they be not all ideots, perhaps if they be) can never come so together, but there will be such diffe∣rence in them, that about a third will be wiser, or at least lesse foolish then all the rest; these upon acquaintance though it be but small, will be discovered, and (as Stags that have the largest heads) lead the herd; for while the six discoursing and arguing one with another, shew the eminence of their parts, the fourteen discover things that they never thought on; or are cleared in divers truths which had formerly perplexed them: wherefore in matter of common concernment, diffi∣culty or danger, they hang upon their lips as children upon their fathers, and the influence thus acquired by the six, the eminence of whose parts, is found to be a stay and comfort to

the fourteen, is (AUTHORITAS PATRUM) the authority of the Fathers. Wherefore this can be no other then a naturall Aristocracy diffused by God throughout the whole body of man∣kind, to this end and purpose; and therefore such, as the people, have not only a natural, but a positive obligation to make use of as their guides; as where the people of Israel are commanded to take wise men and understanding and known among their Tribes,* 1.30 to be made Rulers over them; the six then approved of, as in the present case, are the Senate, not by hereditary right, or in re∣gard of the greatnesse of their estates onely, which would tend unto such power as might force or draw the people; but by electi∣on for their excellent parts, which tendeth unto the advance∣ment of the influence of their virtue or authority that leads the people. Wherefore the office of the Senate, is not to be Comman∣ders but Counsellors of the people; and that which is proper unto Counsellors, is first to debate the businesse whereupon they are to give advice, and afterward to give Advice in the business where∣upon they have debated; whence the Decrees of the Senate are never Lawes, nor so called, but SENATUS CONSULTA, and these being naturally framed, it is their duty (FERRE AD POPULUM) to propose in the case unto the people. Where∣fore the Senate is no more then the debate of the Common-Wealth: But to debate is to discern or put a difference between things that being alike are not the same, or it is separating and weigh∣ing this reason against that, and that reason against this, which is dividing.

* 1.31The Senate then having divided, who shall choose? Ask the girles; for if she that divided must have chosen also, it had been little worse for the other, in case she had not divided at all, but kept the whole Cake unto her self, in regard that being to choose too, she divided accordingly. Wherefore if the Senate have any farther power than to divide, the Common-wealth can never be equall. But in a Common-wealth consisting of a single Councill, there is no other to choose then that which divided; whence it is, that such a Councill faileth not to scram∣ble, that is, to be factious; there being no other dividing of the cake in that case but among themselves.

Nor is there any remedy but to have another Councill to choose. The wisdom of the Few may be the light of Mankind; but the interest of the Few is not the profit of Mankind, nor of a Common-wealth; wherefore seeing we have granted interest to be reason, they must not choose, lest it put out their light; but as the Council dividing consisteth of the Wisdom of the Common-wealth, so the Assembly or Councill choosing, should consist of the interest of the Common-wealth: as the wisdom of the Common-wealth is in the Aristocracy, so the interest of the Common-wealth is in the whole body of the People: and whereas this, in case the

Common-wealth consist of an whole Nation, is too unweildy a body to be assembled, this Councill is to consist of such a Repre∣sentative as may be equall, and so constituted, as can never contract any other interest then that of the whole people; the manner whereof being such as is best shewn by exemplifica∣tion, I remit unto the Modell. But in the present case, the six dividing, and the fourteen choosing, must of necessity take in the whole interest of the twenty.

Dividing and choosing in the language of a Common-wealth is debating and resolving; and whatsoever upon debate of the Se∣nate is proposed unto the people, and resolved by them is enacted (AUTHORITATE PATRUM ET JUSSU POPULI) by the authority of the Fathers, and the power of the people, which concurring make a Law.

But the Law being made, saith Leviathan,* 1.32 is but words and paper without the hands and swords of men; wherefore as those two orders of a Common-wealth, namely the Senate and the people are Legislative, so of necessity there must be a third to be exe∣cutive of the Lawes made, and this is the Magistracy; in which order with the rest being wrought up by art, the Common-wealth consisteth of the Senate proposing, the People resolving, and the Magistracy executing: whereby partaking of the Aristocracy as in the Senate, of the Democracy as in the People, and of Mo∣narchy as in the Magistracy, it is compleat. Now there being no other Common-wealth but this in Art or Nature, it is no wonder if Machiavill have shew'd us, that the Ancients held this onely to be good; but it seemeth strange to me, that they should hold, that there could be any other: for if there be such a thing as pure Monarchy, yet that there should be such an one as pure Aristocracy, or pure Democracy, is not in my understanding. But the Magistracy both in number and function is different in dif∣ferent Common-wealths: neverthelesse there is one condition of it, that must be the same in Every one, or it dissolves the Common-wealth where it is wanting: And this is no lesse then that as the hand of the Magistrate is the executive power of the Law, so the head of the Magistrate is answerable unto the people, that his execution be according unto the Law, by which Leviathan may see, that the hand or sword that executeth the Law is in it, and not above it.

Now whether I have rightly transcribed these Principles of a Common-wealth out of Nature,* 1.33 I shall appeal unto God and to the World. Unto God in the Fabrick of the Common-wealth of Israel: and unto the World in the universal Series of ancient pru∣dence. But in regard the same Common-wealths will be open'd at large in the Council of Legislators, I shall touch them for the present, but sleightly; beginning with that of Israel.

The Common-wealth of Israel consisted of the Senate, the People,* 1.34 and the Magistracy.

The People by their first division, which was genealogicall, were contained under their ten Tribes, houses or families; whereof the first born in each was Prince of his Tribe, and had the leading of it (Numb. 1.) the Tribe of Levi onely being set a part to serve at the Altar, had no other Prince but the High Priest. In their second division they were divided locally by their Agrarian, (Jos. c. 13. to c. 42.). or the distribution of the Land of Canaan unto them by Lot, the tythe of all remaining unto Levi; whence according unto their locall division, the Tribes are reckon'd but twelve.

* 1.35The Assemblies of the people thus divided were methodically gathered by Trumpets (Num. 10.7.) unto the Congregation; which was it should seem of two sorts. For if it were called by one trumpet onely, the Princes of the Tribes and the Elders onely assembled, (Numb. 10.4.) but if it were called with two, the whole people gathered themselves unto the Congregation, Num. 10.3.) for so it is rendred by the English: but in the Greek it is called Ecclesia, or the Church of God, (Judg. 20.2.) and by the Talmudist, Synagoga magna. The word Ecclesia was also anciently and properly used for the Civil Congregations or Assemblies of the people in Athens, Lacedemon, and Ephesus, where it is so called in Scripture, (Acts 19.23.) though it be otherwise rendred by the Translators, not much as I conceive to their commendations; seeing by that means they have lost us a good lesson, the Apostles borrowing that name for their spiritual Congregations, to the end that we might see they in∣tended the Government of the Church to be Democratical or Popu∣lar, as is also plain in the rest of their constitutions.

The Church or Congregation of the people of Israel, assembled in a Military manner, (Judg. 20.2.) and had the result of the Common-wealth, or the power of confirming all their Lawes, though proposed even by God himself, as where they make him King, (Exod. 19.) And where they reject or depose him as Civil Magistrate, and elect Saul, (1 Sam. 8.7.) it is manifest that he giveth no such example unto a Legislator in a popular Government, as to deny or evade the power of the people, which were a contradiction: but, though he deservedly blame the in∣gratitude of the people in that action, commandeth Samuel, being next under himself Supream Magistrate, to hearken unto their voyce, (for where the suffrage of the people goes for no∣thing, it is no Common-wealth) and comforteth him, saying, They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them. But to reject him that he should not reign over them, was as Civill Magistrate to depose him. The pow∣er therefore which the people had to depose even God himself as he was Civil Magistrate, leaveth little doubt, but that they had power to have rejected any of those Lawes confirmed by

them throughout the Scripture, which (to omit the severall parcels) are generally contained (Deut. 29.) under two heads, those that were made by Covenant with the people in the Land of Moab, and those which were made by Covenant with the people in Horeb: which two, I think, amount unto the whole body of the Israelitish Lawes: but if all and every one of the Lawes of Israel being proposed by God, were no otherwise enacted than by Covenant with the people, then that onely which was resolved by the people of Israel, was their Law; and so the result of that Common-wealth was in the people. Nor had the people the result only in matter of Law: but the power in some cases of Judicature, (Jos. 7.16. Judg. 20.8, 9, 10.) as also the right of le∣vying War, (Judg. 20.8, 9, 10. 1 Sam. 7.6, 7, 8.) cognizance in matter of Religion, (1 Chron. 13.2. 2 Chron. 30.4.) and the election of their Magistrates, as the Judge or Dictator, (Judg. 11.11.) The King, (1 Sam. 10.17.) The Prince, (1 Machab. 14.) which functions were exercised by the Synagoga magna, or Congregation of Israel not alwayes in one manner: for some∣times they were performed by the suffrage of the people, viva voce, (Ex. 9.3, 4, 5.) sometimes by the Lot onely, (Jos. 7. 1 Sam. 10.) and of others by the Ballot or by a mixture of the lot with the suffrage, as in the case of Eldad and Medad, which I shall open with the Senate.

The Senate of Israel called in the Old Testament the seventy Elders: and in the New the Sanhedrim;* 1.36 which word is usual∣ly translated the Council: was appointed by God, and consisted of Seventy Elders besides Moses, (Num. 11.) which were at the first elected by the people, (Deut. 1.) but in what manner, is ra∣ther intimated (Numb. 11.) then shewn: neverthelesse, because I cannot otherwise understand the passage concerning Eldad and Medad, of whom it is said, that they were of them that were written, but went not up unto the Tabernacle; then with the Tal∣mudists, I conceive that Eldad and Medad had the suffrage of the Tribes, and so were written as competitors for Magistracy; but coming afterwards unto the Lot, failed of it, and therefore went not up unto the Tabernacle, or place of confirmation by God, or to the Session-house of the Senate with the Seventy upon whom the lot fell to be Senators: for the Session house of the Sanhedrim was first in the Court of the Tabernacle, and after∣wards in that of the Temple, where it came to be called th•• Stone Chamber or Pavement, (John) If this were the Ballot of Israel, that of Venice is the same transposed: for in Venice the competitor is chosen as it were by the lot, in regard that the Electors are so made, and the Magistrate is chosen by the Suffrage of the great Council or Assembly of the people. But the Sanhedrim of Israel being thus constituted, Moses for his time, and after him his successour, sate in the midst of it as Prince or Archon,

and at his left hand the Orator or Father of the Senate, the rest of the bench coming round with either horn like a Crescent, had a Scribe attending upon the tip of it.

The Senate in regard that the Legislator of Israel was infalli∣ble, and the Lawes given by God, such as were not fit to be al∣ter'd by men, is much different in the exercise of their power from all other Senates, except that of the Areopagites in Athens, which also was little more then a Supream Judicatory; for it will hardly, as I conceive, be found that the Sanhedrim pro∣posed unto the people, till the return of the Children of Israel out of Captivity under Esdras, at which time there was a new Law made, namely, for a kind of excommunication, or rather banishment, which had never been before in Israel: never∣thelesse it is not to be thought that the Sanhedrim had not al∣waies that right, which from the time of Esdras it more fre∣quently exercised, of proposing unto the people, but that they forbare it in regard of the fulnesse and infallibility of the Law already made, whereby it was needlesse. Wherefore the function of this Council,* 1.37 which is very rare in a Senate, was executive, and consisted in the administration of the Law made (Deut. 17.9, 10, 11.); and whereas the Council it self, is often understood in Scripture by the Priest and the Levite: there is no more in that, save onely that the Priests and the Levites, who otherwise had no power at all, being in the younger years of this Common-wealth, those that were best studied in the Lawes were the most frequently elected into the Sanhedrim. For the Courts consisting of three and twenty Elders sitting in the gates of every City, and the Triumvirates of Judges, constituted almost in every village, which were parts of the executive Magistracy subordinate unto rhe Sanhedrim, I shall take them at better leisure, and in the larger Discourse; but these being that part of this Common-Wealth which was instituted by Moses upon the advice of Jethro the Priest of Midian, (Exo. 18.) as I conceive an Heathen; are unto me a sufficient war∣rant even from God himself who confirmed them, to make farther use of humane prudence where ever I find it, bearing a testimony unto it self, whether in Heathen Common-Wealths or others. And the rather, because so it is, that we who have the holy Scriptures, and in them the Original of a Common-Wealth made by the same hand that made the World, are either alto∣gether blind or negligent of it, while the Heathens have all written theirs, as if they had had no other Copy. As, to be more brief in the present account of that which you shall have more at large hereafter,

Athens consisted of the Senate of the Bean proposing, of the Church or Assembly of the people resolving and too often deba∣ting, which was the ruine of it, as also of the Senate of the

Areopagites, the 9. Archons, with divers other Magistrates Executing.

Lacedemon consisted of the Senate proposing,* 1.38 of the Church or Congregation of the people resolving onely, and never debating; which was the long life of it; and of the two Kings, the Court of the Effors, with divers other Magistrates executing.

Carthage consisted of the Senate proposing and sometimes re∣solving too, of the people resolving and sometimes debating too,* 1.39 for which fault she was reprehended by Aristotle, and she had her Suffetes, and her hundred men with other Magistrates exe∣cuting.

Rome consisted of the Senate proposing,* 1.40 the Concio or people resolving and too often debating, which caused her storms; as also of the Consuls, Censors, Aediles, Tribunes, Praetors, Quae∣stors, and other Magistrates executing.

Venice consisteth of the Senate or Pregati proposing,* 1.41 and some∣times resolving too, of the great Council or Assembly of the peo∣ple, in whom the result is constitutively; as also of the Doge, the Signory, the Censors, the Dieci, the Quazancies, and other Magi∣strates executing.

The proceeding of the Common-wealths of Switzerland and Holland is of a like nature,* 1.42 though after a more obscure man∣ner; for the Soveraignties, whether Cantons Provinces or Ci∣ties, which are the people, send their Deputies Commissioned and instructed by themselves (wherein they reserve the result in their own power) unto the Provincial or general Convention or Senate, where the Deputies debate, but have no other power of result then what was conferred upon them by the people, or is farther conferred by the same upon farther occasion. And for the executive part they have Magistrates or Judges in every Canton Province or City; besides those which are more pub∣lick, and relate unto the league, as for controversies between one Canton, Province or City, and another, or the like between such persons as are not of the same Canton Province or City.

But that we may observe a little farther how the Heathen Polititians have written, not onely out of nature, but as it were out of Scripture: As in the Common-wealth of Israel, God is said to have been King; so the Common-wealth where the Law is King, is said by Aristotle to be Kingdom of God. And where by the lusts or passions of men, a power is set above that of the Law de∣riving from reason, which is the dictate of God; God in that sense is rejected or deposed that he should not reign over them, as he was in Israel. And yet Leviathan will have it, that by reading of these Greek and Latine (he might as well in this sense have said, Hebrew) Authors,* 1.43 young men and all others that are unprovi∣ded of the antidote of solid reason, receiving a strong and delightfull impression of the great exploits of War, atchieved by the Conductors of

their Armies, receive withall a pleasing Idea of all they have done be∣sides: and imagine their great prosperity, not to have proceeded from the emulation of particular men, but from the virtue of their popular form of Government: not considering the frequent seditions and Civil Wars produced by the imperfection of their Policy. Where first the blame he layes to the Heathen Authors, is in his sense laid unto the Scripture; and whereas he holds them to be young men, or men of no antidote that are of like opinions, it should seem that Machiavill the sole retreiver of this ancient Prudence, is to his solid reason a beardlesse boy that hath new∣ly read Livy: and how solid his reason is, may appear; Where he grants the great prosperity of ancient Common-wealths: which is to give up the controversie: For such an effect must have some adequate cause; which to evade, he insinuates, that it was nothing else but the emulation of particular men; as if so great an emulation could have been generated without as great virtue; so great virtue without the best education; the best education without the best Lawes; or the best Lawes any otherwise then by the excellency of their policy.

But if some of these Common-Wealths as being lesse perfect in their policy then others, have been more seditious, it is not more an argument of the infirmity of this or that Common-wealth in particular, then of the excellency of that kind of Policy in generall, which if they that have not altogether reached, have neverthelesse had greater prosperity; what would befall them that should reach?

In answer to which question, let me invite Leviathan, who of all other Governments giveth the advantage unto Monar∣chy for perfection, to a better disquisition of it, by these three assertions:

The first, That the perfection of Government lyeth upon such a libration in the frame of it, that no man or men, in or under it, can have the interest; or having the interest, can have the power to disturb it with sedition.

The second, That Monarchy reaching the perfection of the kind, reacheth not unto the perfection of Government, but must have some dangerous flaw in it.

The third, That Popular Government reaching the per∣fection of the kind, reacheth the perfection of Government; and hath no flaw in it.

The first assertion requireth no proof.

For the proof of the second; Monarchy, as hath been shewn, is of two kinds, the one by Arms, the other by a Nobility; and there is no other kind in art or nature: for if there have been anciently some Governments called Kingdoms, as one of the Gothes in Spain, and another of the Vandals in Africa, where the King ruled without a Nobility, and by a Council of the peo∣ple

only; it is expresly said by the Authors that mention them, that the Kings were but the Captains, and that the people not onely gave them Lawes, but deposed them as often as they pleased; nor is it possible in reason that it should be other∣wise in like cases: wherefore these were either no Monarchies, or had greater flawes in them then any other.

But for a Monarchy by Arms as that of the Turk, (which of all models that ever were cometh up unto the perfection of the kind) it is not in the wit or power of man to cure it of this dangerous flaw, That the Janizaries have frequent interest and perpetual power to raise sedition, and to tear the Magistrate, even the Prince himself, in pieces. Therefore the Monarchy of Turky is no perfect Government.

And for a Monarchy by a Nobility as of late in Oceana (which of all other models before the declination of it came up to the perfection in that kind) it was not in the power or wit of man to cure it of that dangerous flaw; That the Nobility had fre∣quent interest and perpetuall power by their retainers and tenants to raise sedition, and (whereas the Janizaries occasion this kind of calamity, no sooner then they make an end of it) to levy a lasting War, unto the vast effusion of blood, and that even upon occasions wherein the people, but for their dependance upon their Lords had no concernment, as in the Fewd of the Red and White. The like hath been frequent in Spain, France, Germany, and other Monarchies of this kind; wherefore Mo∣narchy by a Nobility is no perfect Government.

For the proof of the third Assertion, Leviathan yieldeth it unto me, that there is no other Common-wealth but Monarchical or Popular: wherefore if no Monarchy be a perfect Government, then either there is no perfect Government, or it must be popular; for which kind of constitution I have something more to say, then Leviathan hath said, or ever will be able to say for Monar∣chy; as,

1. That it is the Government that was never conquered by any Monarch, from the beginning of the World unto this day: for if the Common-wealth of Greece came under the yoke of the Kings of Macedon, they were first broken by themselves.

2. That it is the Government that hath frequently led migh∣ty Monarchs in Triumph.

3. That it is the Government, which if it have been Seditious, it hath not been from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular constitution; which where ever the like hath hap∣pened, must have been unequall.

4. That it is the Government, which if it have been any thing near equall, was never seditious; or let him shew me what sedition hath happened in Lacedemon or Venice.

5. That it is the Government, which attaining unto perfect

equality, hath such a libration in the frame of it, that no man living can shew which way any man or men in or under it, can contract any such interest or power as should be able to disturb the Common-wealth with sedition; wherefore an equal Common-wealth is that onely which is without flaw, and containeth in it the full perfection of Government. But to return.

By what hath been shewn in reason and experience it may appear, that though Common-Wealths in generall be Governments of the Senate proposing, the people resolving, and the Magistracy executing; yet some are not so good at these orders as others, through some impediment or defect in the frame, ballance, or capacity of them, according unto which they are of divers kinds.

The first division of them is into such as are single as Israel, Athens,* 1.44 Laecedemon, &c. and such as are by leagues, as those of the Achaeans, Aetolians, Lyceans, Switz and Hollanders.

The second (being Machiavil's) is into such as are for pre∣servation, as Lacedemon and Venice, and such as are for encrease, as Athens and Rome, in which I can see no more, then that the former taketh in no more Citizens then are necessary for defence, and the latter so many as are capable of encrease.

The third division (unseen hitherto) is into equall and un∣equall, and this is the main point especially as to domestick peace and tranquillity; for to make a Common-wealth unequall, is to divide it into parties, which setteth them at perpetuall variance, the one party endeavouring to preserve their emi∣nence and inequality, and the other to attain unto equality; whence the people of Rome derived their perpetuall strife with the Nobility or Senate: but in an equal Common-wealth, there can be no more strife then there can be over-ballance in equall weights; wherefore the Common-wealth of Venice, being that which of all others is the most equal in the constitution, is that wherein there never happen'd any strife between the Senate and the people.

An equall Common-wealth is such an one, as is equall both in the ballance and foundation, and in the superstructions, that is to say, in her Agrarian Law, and in her Rotation.

* 1.45An equal Agrarian is a perpetuall Law establishing and preserving the ballance of dominion, by such a distribution, that no one man or number of men within the compasse of the Few or Aristocracy, can come to overpower the whole people by their possessions in Lands.

As the Agrarian answereth unto the Foundation, so doth Rotation unto the Superstructures.

* 1.46Equal Rotation is equall vicissitude in Government, or Suc∣cession unto Magistracy conferred for such convenient terms, en∣joying equall vacations, as take in the whole body by parts, suc∣ceeding

others through the free election or suffrage of the Peo∣ple.

The contrary whereunto is Prolongation of Magistracy,* 1.47 which trashing the wheel of Rotation, destroyes the life or natural motion of a Common-wealth.

The election or suffrage of the people, is freest,* 1.48 where it is made or given in such a manner, that it can neither oblige (qui beneficium accepit libertatem vendidit) nor disoblige another; or through fear of an enemy, or bashfulnesse towards a friend, im∣pair a mans liberty.

Wherefore saith Cicero, (Grata populo est tabella quae frontes aperit hominum, mentes tegit, dat{que} eam libertatem ut quod velint faciant) the Tablet (or Ballot of the people of Rome, who gave their votes by throwing tablets or little pieces of wood se∣cretly into Urns marked for the negative or affirmative) was a welcome constitution, unto the people, as that which not impairing the assurance of their browes, encreased the free∣dom of their Judgment. I have not stood upon a more par∣ticular description of this Ballot, because that of Venice exem∣plify'd in the modell is of all others the most perfect.

An equal Common-wealth (by that which hath been said) is a Go∣vernment established upon an equall Agrarian,* 1.49 arising into the su∣perstructures or three orders, the Senate debating and proposing, the people resolving, and the Magistracy executing by an equal Rotation through the suffrage of the people given by the Ballot. For though Rotation may be without the Ballot, and the Ballot without Ro∣tation, yet the Ballot not onely as to the ensuing Modell inclu∣deth both, but is by far the most equal way; for which cause under the name of the Ballot I shall hereafter understand both that and Rotation too.

Now having reason'd the principles of an equall Common-wealth, I should come to give an instance of such an one in ex∣perience, if I could find it; but if this work be of any value, it lyeth in that it is the first example of a Common-wealth that is perfectly equall. For Venice though she come the nearest, yet is a Common-wealth for preservation; and such an one, consi∣dering the paucity of Citizens taken in, and the number not ta∣ken in, is externally unequal: and though every Common-wealth that holdeth Provinces must in that regard be such; yet not unto that degree. Neverthelesse Venice internally and for her capacity is by far the most equall; though she hath not in my judgment arrived at the full perfection of equality; both because her Lawes supplying the defect of an Agrarian, are not so clear nor effectual at the foundation, nor her superstructures by the ver∣tue of her Ballot or Rotation exactly librated, in regard that through the paucity of her Citizens, her greater Magistracies are continually wheeled through a few hands. As is confessed

by Janotti, where he saith, that if a Gentleman come once to be Savio di terra ferma, it seldom happens that he faileth from thenceforward to be adorned with some one of the greater Magistracies, as Savi di mare, Savi di terra ferma, Savi Grandi, Counsellors, those of the Decemvirate or Dictatorian Council, the Aurogatori or Censors which require no vacation or inter∣val: wherefore if this in Venice, or that in Lacedemon, where the Kings were hereditary, and the Senators (though elected by the people) for life, cause no inequality (which is hard to be conceived) in a Common-wealth for preservation, or such an one as consisteth of a few Citizens; yet is it manifest, that it would cause a very great one in a Common-wealth for encrease, or con∣sisting of the Many, which by the engrossing the Magistracies in a few hands, would be obstructed in their Rotation.

But there be that say, (and think it a strong Objection) let a Common-wealth be as equal as you can imagine, two or three men when all is done will govern it: and there is that in it, which notwithstanding the pretended sufficiency of a popular State, amounteth unto a plain confession of the imbecillity of that Policy, and of the prerogative of Monarchy; for as much as popular Governments in difficult cases have had recourse un∣to Dictatorian power, as in Rome.

To which I answer, That as truth is a Spark whereunto ob∣jections are like bellowes; so, in this, our Common-wealth shines: for the eminence acquired by suffrage of the people in a Common-wealth, especially if it be popular and equall, can be ascended by no other steps then the universall acknowledgment of virtue; and where men excell in Virtue, the Common-wealth is stupid and unjust, if accordingly they do not excell in Authority: where∣fore this is both the advantage of Virtue, which hath her due encouragement, and the Common-wealth which hath her due ser∣vices. These are the Philosophers which Plato would have to be Princes, the Princes which Solomon would have to be mount∣ed, and their Steeds are those of Authority not Empire; or, if they be buckled to the Chariot of Empire, as that of the Dictatorian power, like the Chariot of the Sun it is glorious for terms and vacations or intervals. And as a Common-wealth is a Govern∣ment of Lawes and not of Men; so is this the Principality of the Virtue, and not of the Man; if that fail or set in one, it ri∣seth in another, which is created his immediate Successour.

(— Uno avulso non deficit alter, Aureus, et simili frondescit virga metallo.)

And this taketh away that vanity from under the Sun, which is an errour proceeding more or lesse from all other Rulers under heaven but an equal Common-w••alth.

These things considered, it will b•• convenient in this place to speak a word unto such as go about to insinuate to the Nobi∣lity

or Gentry a fear of the people; or into the people a fear of the Nobility or Gentry, as if their interests were each destructive unto other, when in truth an Army may as well consist of Soul∣diers without Officers, or of Officers without Souldiers, as a Common-wealth, especially such an one as is capable of greatness, of a people without a Gentry, or of a Gentry without a people. Wherefore this (though not alwaies so intended, as may appear by Machiavill, who else would be guilty) is a pernicious errour. There is something first in the making of a Common-wealth,* 1.50 then in the governing of her, and last of all in the leading of her Ar∣mies; which, though there be great Divines, great Lawyers, great men in all professions, seems to be peculiar unto the Genius of a Gentleman. For so it is in the universall series of Story, that if any man have founded a Common-wealth, he was first a Gentle∣man. Moses had his education by the daughter of Pharaoh; Theseus and Solon of noble birth, were held by the Athenians worthy to be Kings; Lycurgus was of the blood-Royal, Romu∣lus and Numa Princes, Brutus and Publicola Patricians, the Gracchi that lost their lives for the people of Rome, and the restitution of that Common-wealth, were the sonnes of a Father adorned with two Triumphs; and of Cornelia the daughter of Scipio, who being sought in marriage by King Ptolomy, dis∣dained to be the Queen of Aegypt. And the most renowned Olphaus Megaletor; sole Legislator (as you will see) of the Com∣mon-wealth of Oceana, was derived from a noble Family: nor will it be any occasion of scruple in this case, that Leviathan affirms the Politicks to be no ancienter then his Book De Cive. Such also as have gotten any fame in the Civill Government of a Common-wealth, or by the leading of her Armies, have been Gentlemen; for so in all other respects were those plebeian Magistrates elected by the people of Rome, being of known de∣scents, and of equall virtues, save onely that they were exclu∣ded from the name by the usurpation of the Patricians. Holland, through this defect at home, hath borrowed Princes for her Generals, and Gentlemen for her Commanders, of divers Na∣tions: And Switz, if she have defect in this kind, rather lend∣eth her people unto the Colours of other Princes, then maketh that noble use of them her self; which should assert the liber∣ty of mankind. For where there is not a Nobility to bolt out the people, they are slothfull, regardlesse of the world and the publick interest of liberty, as even that of Rome had been with∣out her Gentry: wherefore let the people embrace the Gentry in peace, as the light of their eyes, and in War as the trophy of their Arms. And if Cornelia disdained to be Queen of Egypt, if a Roman Consul looked down from his Tribunall upon the greatest King; Let the Nobility love and cherish the people that afford them a Throne so much higher in a Common-wealth,

and in the acknowledgment of their Virtue, than the Crowns of Monarchs.

* 1.51But if the equality of a Common-wealth consist in the equality first of the Agrarian, and next of the Rotation; then the inequa∣lity of a Common-wealth must consist in the absence or inequality of the Agrarian, or of the Rotation, or of both.

Israel and Lacedemon, which Common-wealths (as the people of this in, Josephus, claims kindred of that) have great resem∣blance, were each of them equall in their Agrarian, and un∣equall in their Rotation, especially Israel, where the Sanhedrim or Senate first elected by the people, as appeareth by the words of Moses,* 1.52 took upon them thenceforth without any precept of God to substitute their Successors by Ordination; which ha∣ving been there of Civil use, as excommunication, community of goods, and other customes of the Esseans, who were many of them converted, came afterwards to be introduced into the Christian Church. And the election of the Judge, Suffes, or Dictator was irregular, both for the occasion, the term, and the vacation of that Magistracy; as you find in the Book of Judges, where it is often repeated, that in those dayes there was no King in Is∣rael, that is, no Judge: and in the first of Samuel, where Ely judged Israel fourty years, and Samuel all his life: In Lacede∣mon the election of the Senate being by suffrage of the People; though for life was not altogether so unequal, but the heredita∣ry right of Kings, but for the Agrarian, had ruin'd her.

Athens and Rome were unequall as to their Agrarian, that of Athens being infirm, and that of Rome none at all; for if it were more anciently carried, it was never kept. Whence by the time of Tyberius Gracchus the Nobility had almost eaten the people quite out of their Lands, which they held in the occu∣pation of Tenants and servants: Whereupon the remedy be∣ing too late, and too vehemently applyed, that Common-wealth was ruin'd.

These also were unequal in their Rotation, but in a contrary manner: Athens, in regard that the Senate chosen at once by Lot, not by suffrage, and changed every year not in part, but the whole, consisted not of the naturall Aristocracy, nor sitting long enough to understand, or be perfect in their office, had no sufficient Authority to withhold the people from that perpetual turbulence in the way which was ruine in the end, in despight of Nicias, who did what a man could do to help it. But as Athens by the headinesse of the people, so Rome fell by the ambition of the Nobility, through the want of an equall Rota∣tion, which if the people had had into the Senate, and timely into the Magistracies; whereof the former was alwaies usur∣ped by the Patricians, and the latter for the most part; they had both carried and held their Agrarian, and that had ren∣dred that Common-wealth immoveable.

But let a Common-wealth be equal or unequal, it must consist as hath been shewn by reason and all experience, of the three ge∣neral Orders, that is to say, of the Senate debating and proposing, of the People resolving, and of the Magistracy executing; where∣fore I can never wonder enough at Leviathan, who without any reason or example will have it, that a Common-wealth con∣sisteth of a single person, or of a single assembly; nor sufficiently pity that thousand Gentlemen, whose minds which otherwise would have waver'd, he hath framed, as is affirmed by himself, unto a con∣scientious obedience (for so he is pleased to call it) of such a Go∣vernment.

But to finish this part of the Discourse, which I intend for as compleat an Epitome of ancient Prudence, and in that of the whole Art of the Politicks, as I am able to frame in so short a time.

The two first orders, that is to say, the Senate and the People are Legislative, whereunto answers that part of this Science which by Politicians is intituled DE LEGIBUS, or of Lawes; and the third order is executive, to which answers that part of the same Science which is styled DE JUDICIIS, or of the frame, and course of Courts or Judicatories; a word unto each of these will be necessary.

And first for Lawes, they are either Ecclesiastical or Civill,* 1.53 such as concern Religion or Government. (Some body blushes, but I will do no harm.)

Lawes Ecclesiastical or such as concern Religion, according un∣to t••e universal course of ancient prudence, are in the power of the Magistrate, but according unto the common practice of modern prudence, since the Papacy, torn out of his hands.

But as a Government pretending unto Liberty, and suppressing the liberty of conscience, which (because Religion not according to a mans conscience, can as to him be none at all) is the main, must be a contradiction; so a man that pleading for the liber∣ty of private conscience, refuseth liberty unto the National con∣science, must be absurd.

Now a Common-wealth is nothing else but the national con∣science. And if the conviction of a mans private conscience, pro∣duceth his private Religion: the conviction of the national conscience, must produce a national Religion. Whether this be well reason'd, as also whether these two may stand toge∣ther, will best be shewn by the examples of the ancient Com∣mon-wealths taken in their order.

In that of Israel the Government of the National Religion ap∣pertained not unto the Priests and Levites, otherwise then as to the Sanhedrim or Senate, to which they had no right at all but by election. It is in this capacity therefore that the people are commanded under pain of death, to hearken unto them,* 1.54 and to do

according to the sentence of the Law which they should teach; but in Israel the Law Ecclesiastical and Civill was the same, therefore the Sanhedrim having the power of one, had the power of both. But as the National Religion appertained unto the Jurisdiction of the Sanhedrim, so the liberty of conscience appertained from the same date and by the same right, unto the Prophets and their disciples;* 1.55 as where it is said, I will raise up a Prophet — and whosoever will not hearken unto my words which he shall speak in my Name, I will require it of him; which words relate unto prophe∣tick right, which was above all the orders of this Common-wealth; whence Elijah not only refused to obey the King,* 1.56 but destroyed his messengers with fire: And whereas it was not lawful by the National Religion to sacrifice in any other place then the Temple,* 1.57 a Prophet was his own Temple, and might sacrifice where he would, as Elijah did in Mount Carmel. By this right John the Baptist and our Saviour, unto whom it more particularly rela∣ted, had their disciples, and taught the people; whence is deri∣ved our present right of GATHERED CONGREGATIONS: Wherefore the Christian Religion grew up according unto the orders of the Common-wealth of Israel, and not against them. Nor was the liberty of conscience infringed by this Government, till the civil liberty of the same was lost, as under Herod, Pilate, and Tiberius, a three pild Tyranny.

To proceed, Athens preserved her Religion, by the testimony of Paul, with great superstition: If Alcibiades that Atheistical fellow had not shew'd them a fair pair of heeles, they had sha∣ven off his head for shaving their Mercuries, and making their Gods look ridiculously upon them without beards. Neverthe∣lesse, if Paul reasoned with them, they loved news, for which he was the more welcome; and if he converted Dionysius the Areopagite, that is, one of the Senators, there followed neither any hurt unto him, nor losse of honour to Dionysius. And for Rome, if Cicero in his most excellent book, De natura Deorum, overthrew the National Religion of that Common-wealth, he was never the farther from being Consul. But there is a meannesse and poornesse in modern prudence, not only unto the damage of Civil Government, but of Religion it self: for whereas Christian Religion is the farthest of any from countenancing War, there never was a War of Religion but since Christianity. For which we are beholding unto the POPE; for the Pope not giving liberty of conscience unto Princes and Common-wealths, they cannot give that unto their Subjects which they have not: whence both Princes and Subjects either through his instigation, or disputes among themselves, have introduced that execrable custome, never known in the world before, of fighting for Reli∣gion, and denying the Magistrate to have any Jurisdiction of it; whereas the Magistrates losing the power of Religion, loseth the

liberty of conscience which hath nothing to protect it. Where∣fore if the people be otherwise taught, it concerns them to look about them, and to distinguish between the shreeking of the Lapwing, and the voice of the Turtle.

To come unto Civil Lawes, if they stand one way, and the ballance another, it is the case of a Government which of neces∣sity must be new modell'd; wherefore the Lawyers advising you upon like occasions to fit the Government unto their Lawes, are no more to be regarded, then your Taylor if he should de∣sire you to fit your body unto his doublet; there is also danger in the plausible pretence of reforming the Law except the Go∣vernment be good, in which case it is a good tree, and bringeth not forth evil fruit; otherwise, if the Tree be evill, you can never reform the fruit; begin with reformation of the Govern∣ment by the Lawes, but first begin with reformation of the Lawes by the Government. The best rule as to the Lawes in general, is, that they be few. Rome by the testimony of Cicero was best gover∣ned under those of the twelve Tables; and by the testimony of Tacitus, Plurimae leges, corruptissima respublica. You will be told, That where the Lawes be few, they leave much unto arbitrary power; but where they be many, they leave more; the Lawes in that case according to Justinian and the best Lawyers, being as litigious as the Suitors. Solon made few; Lycurgus fewer Laws: Common-wealths have fewest at this day of all other Govern∣ments. And to conclude this part with a word de Judiciis,* 1.58 or the constitution or course of Courts; it is such in Venice, as the arbitrary power of them can never retard or do hurt unto busi∣nesse, but produceth the quickest dispatch, and the most righteous dictates of Justice that are perhaps in humane nature. The man∣ner of them I shall not stand in this place to describe, because it is exemplify'd at large in the Judicature of the people of Oceana. And thus much of ancient Prudence, and the first branch of this Preliminary Discourse.

The Second Part of the Pre∣liminaries.

IN the Second Part I shall endeavour to shew the Rise, Progresse, and Declination of Modern Prudence.

The date of this kind of Policy is to be computed, as was shewn, from those Inundations of Goths, Vandals, Hunnes, and Lombards that overwhelmed the Roman Empire. But as there is no appearance in the bulk or constitution of Modern Prudence, that she should ever have been able to come up and Grapple with the Ancient, so something of necessity must have interposed, whereby This came to be enervated, and That to receive strength and encouragement: And this was, the execrable raign of the Roman Emperours taking rise from (that foelix scelus) the Arms of Caesar, in which storm the ship of the Roman Common-wealth was forced to disburthen her self of that precious fraight, which never since could emerge or raise the head but in the Gulph of Venice.

* 1.59It is said in Scripture; Thy evil is of thy self, O Israel! to which answers that of the Moralists, Nemo nocetur nisi ex se, as also the whole matter of the Politicks; at present this Example of the Romans, who, through a negligence committed in their Agra∣rian Lawes, let in the sink of Luxury, and forfeited the inesti∣mable treasure of Liberty for themselves and posterity.

* 1.60Their Agrarian Lawes were such, whereby their Lands ought to have been divided among the people, either without men∣tion of a Colony, in which case they were not obliged to change their abode; or with mention and upon condition of a Colony, in which case they were to change their abode, and leaving the City to plant themselves upon the Lands so assigned. The Lands assigned, or that ought to have been assigned in either of these wayes, were of three kinds. Such as were taken from the enemy and distributed unto the people; or such as were taken from the enemy, and under colour of being reserved un∣to the publick use, were by stealth possessed by the Nobility; or such as were bought with the publick Money to be distribu∣ted. Of the Lawes offer'd in these cases, those which divided the Lands taken from the Enemy, or purchased with the pub∣lick money, never occasioned any dispute; but such as drove at dispossessing the Nobility of their Usurpations, and dividing the common purchase of the sword among the people, were never touched but they caused Earthquakes, nor could ever be ob∣tained by the people; or being obtained, be observed by the Nobility, who not onely preserved their prey, but growing

vastly rich upon it, bought the people by degrees quite out of those shares that had been conferred upon them. This the Gracchi coming too late to perceive, found the Ballance of the Common-wealth to be lost; but putting the people (when they had least force) by forcible means unto the recovery of it, did ill, seeing it neither could, nor did tend unto any more then to shew them by worse effects, that what the Wisdome of their Leaders had discovered was true: for (quite contrary unto what hath happened in Oceana, where, the ballance falling unto the people, they have overthrown the Nobility) the Nobility of Rome under the conduct of Sylla, overthrew the people and the Common-wealth: seeing Scylla first introduced that new ballance, which was the Foundation of the succeeding Monarchy in the plantation of Military Colonies;* 1.61 instituted by his distribution of the conquered Lands not now of Enemies, but of Citizens unto fourty seven Legions of his Souldiers; so that how he came to be DICTATOR PERPETUUS, or other Magistrates to succeed him in like power, is no Miracle.

These Military Colonies,* 1.62 in which manner succeeding Empe∣rours continued (as Augustus by the distribution of the Vete∣rans, whereby he had overcome Brutus and Cassius) to plant their Souldiery, consisted of such as I conceive were they that are called Milites beneficiarii; in regard that the Tenure of their Lands was by way of Benefices, that is for life, and upon con∣dition of duty or service in the War upon their own charge. These Benefices Alexander Severus granted unto the Heirs of the Incumbents, but upon the same conditions: And such was the Dominion by which the Roman Emperours gave their Ballance. But to the Beneficiaries, as was no lesse than necessa∣ry, for the safety of the Prince, a matter of eight thousand, by the Example of Augustus, were added, which departed not from his sides, but were his perpetuall guard, called Pretorian Bands; though these, according to the incurable flaw already observed in this kind of Government, became the most frequent Butchers of their Lords that are to be found in Story. Thus far the Roman Monarchy is so much the same with that at this day in Turky consisting of a Camp, and an Horse-quarter; a Camp in regard of her Spahies and Janizaries, the perpetuall Guard of the Prince, except they also chance to be Liquorish after his blood; and an Horse-quarter in regard of the distribu∣tion of his whole Land unto Tenants for life upon condition of continuall service, or as often as they shall be commanded at their own charge by Timars, being a word which they say signifies Benefices, that it shall save me a labour of opening the Government.

But the Fame of Mahomet and his Prudence is especially foun∣ded in this, That whereas the Roman Monarchy (except that

of Israel) was the most imperfect, the Turkish is the most per∣fect that ever was. Which happened in that the Roman (as the Israelitish of the Sanhedrim and the Congregation) had a mixture of the Senate and the people; and the Turkish is pure: and that this was pure, and the other mixed, happened not through the wisdome of the Legislators, but the different Ge∣nius of the Nations; the people of the Eastern parts, except the Israelites, (which is to be attributed to their Agrarian) having been such as scarce ever knew any other condition than that of Slavery. And these of the Western having ever ••ad such a Relish of liberty, as through what despair soever could never be brought to stand still, while the Yoke was putting on their Necks, but by being fed with some hopes of reserving unto themselves some part of their Freedome.

Wherefore Julius Caesar (saith Suetonius, comitia cum populo sortitus est) contented himself, in naming half the Magistrates, to leave the rest unto the Suffrage of the people. And Moecenas, though he would not have Augustus to give the people their liberty,* 1.63 would not have him take it away; (for saith he, Ne{que} id existimare debes autorem me tibi esse, ut tyrannidem in S.P. Q.R. in servitutem redactum teneas: quod ne{que} dicere meum, ne{que} facere tuum est) whence this Empire being neither Hawk nor Buzzard, made a flight accordingly; and having the avarice of the Souldiery on this hand to satisfie upon the people; and the Senate and the people on the other to be defended from the Soul∣diery; the Prince being perpetually tossed, seldom dy'd any other death than by one Horn of this Dilemma,* 1.64 as is noted more at large by Machiavill. But the Pretorian Bands, those Bestiall executioners of their Captains Tyranny upon others, and of their own upon him; having continued from the time of Augustus; were by Constantine the Great (incensed against them for taking part with his Adversary Maxentius) remo∣ved from their strong Garrison which they held in Rome, and distributed them into divers Provinces. The Benefices of the Souldiers that were hitherto held for life, and upon duty, were by this Prince made Hereditary, so that the whole Foundation whereupon this Empire was first built, being now removed, sheweth plainly, that the Emperours must long before this have found out some other way of support; and this was by Stipendiating the Gothes, a people that deriving their Roots from the Northern parts of Germany, or out of Sweden, had (through their Victories obtained against Domitian) long since spread their branches unto so near Neighbourhood with the Roman Territories, that they began to Overshade them; for the Em∣perours making use of them in their Arms (as the French do at this day of the Switz) gave them that, under the notion of sti∣pend, which they received as Tribute, coming (if there were

any default in the payment) so often to distrein for it, that in the time of Honorius they sacked Rome, and possessed themselves of Italy. And such was the transition of Ancient into Modern prudence; or that breach which being followed in every part of the Roman Empire with inundations of Vandals, Huns, Lom∣bards, Franks, Saxons, have overwhelmed ancient Languages, Learning, Prudence, Manners, Cities,* 1.65 changing the Names of Rivers, Countries, Seas, Mountains and Men; Camillus, Caesar and Pompey, being come to Edmund, Richard, and Geoffrey.

To open the ground-work or ballance of these new Polititians.* 1.66 Feudum, saith Calvine the Lawyer, is a Gothick word of divers significations; for it is taken either for War, or for a possession of conquered Lands, distributed by the Victor unto such of his Cap∣tains and Souldiers as had merited in his Wars, upon condition to ac∣knowledge him to be their perpetuall Lord, and themselves to be his Subjects.

Of these there were three kinds or orders: The first,* 1.67 of Nobility, distinguished by the Titles of Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, and these being gratify'd with Cities, Castles, and Villages, of the Conquered Italians, their Feuds participated of Royall dignity, and were called Regalia, by which they had right to coyn Mony, create Magistrates, take Tole, Customs, Confiscations, and the like.

Feuds of the second order were such as with the consent of the King were bestowed by these Feudatory Princes upon men of inferiour Quality called their Barons, on condition that next unto the King they should defend the Dignities and Fortunes of their Lords in Arms.

The lowest order of Feuds were such as being confer'd by those of the second Order upon private men, whether Noble, or not Noble, obliged them in the like duty unto their Superiors, these were called Vauosors: And this is the Gothick Ballance, by which all the Kingdoms this day in Christendome were at first erected; for which cause if I had time, I should open in this place the Empire of Germany, and the Kingdomes of France, Spain, and Poland; but so much as hath been said being sufficient for the discovery of the principles of Modern Prudence in general; I shall divide the remainder of my Discourse, which is more particular, into three parts.

The first, shewing the Constitution of the late Monarchy of Oceana.

The second, the Dissolution of the same.

And the third, the Generation of the present Common-wealth.

The Constitution of the late Monarchy of Oceana, is to be con∣sidered in relation unto the different Nations, by whom it hath been successively subdu'd and govern'd. The first of these were

the Romans, the second the Teutons, the third the Scandians, and the fourth the Neustrians.

The Government of the Romans, who held it as a Province, I shall omit, because I am to speak of their Provincial Govern∣ment in another place, onely it is to be remembred in this, that if we have given over running up and down naked and with dappled hides, learn't to write and read, to be instructed with good Arts, for all these we are beholding to the Romans either immediately, or mediately the Teutons; for that the Teutons had the Arts from no other hand, is plain enough by their language, which hath yet no word to signifie either writing or reading, but what is derived from the Latine. Furthermore, by the help of these arts so learn't, we have been capable of that Religion which we have long since received; wherefore it seemeth unto me, that we ought not to detract from the Me∣mory of the Romans, by whose means we are as it were of Beasts become Men, and by whose means we might yet of obscure and Ignorant men (if we thought not too well of our selves) become a wise and a great People.

* 1.68The Romans having govern'd Oceana, Provincially, the Teutons were the first that introduced the form of the late Monarchy: to these succeeded the Scandians, of whom (because their Raign was short, as also because they made little alteration in the Government as to the Form) I shall take no notice. But the Teutons going to work upon the Gothick Ballance, divided the whole Nation into three sorts of Feuds; that of Ealdorman, that of Kings-Thane, and that of Middle-Thane.

* 1.69When the Kingdom was first divided into Precincts, will be as hard to shew, as when it began first to be governed; it be∣ing impossible that there should be any Government without some Division. The Division that was in use with the Teutons, was by Counties, and every County had either his Ealdorman, or high Reeve. The title of Ealdorman came in time to Eorl, or Erle, and that of high Reeve to high Sheriff.

* 1.70Earl of the Shire or County denoted the Kings Thane, or Te∣nant by Grand Serjeantry or Knights Service in chief or in Capite, his possessions were sometimes the whole Territory, from whence he had his Denomination, that is, the whole County, sometimes more then one County, and sometimes lesse, the remaining part being in the Crown. He had also sometimes a third, or some other Customary part of the profits of certain Cities, Boroughs, or other places within his Earldom. For an Example of the possessions of Earls in ancient times, Ethelred had unto him and his Heirs the whole Kingdom of Mercia, containing three or four Counties; and there were others that had little lesse.

* 1.71Kings Thane was also an honorary Title, unto which he was

qualify'd that had five Hides of Land held immediately of the King by service of personal attendance; insomuch that if a Churle or Country Man had thriven unto this proportion, ha∣ving a Church, a Kitchin, a Bell-house, (that is, an Hall with a Bell in it to call his Family to Dinner) a Borough-gate with a seat (that is, a Porch) of his own; and any distinct office in the Kings Court, then was he the Kings Thane. But the proportion of an Hide-Land, otherwise called Caruca, or a Plough-land, is diffi∣cult to be understood, because it was not certain, neverthelesse it is generally conceived to be so much as may be managed with one Plough, and would yield the Maintenance of the same, with the appurtenances in all kinds.

The Middle-Thane was feudall, but not honorary;* 1.72 he was al∣so call'd a Vavosor, and his Lands a Vavosory, which held of some Mesne Lord, and not immediately of the King.

Possessions and their tenures being of this Nature, shew the Ballance of the Teuton Monarchy; wherein the riches of Earles was so vast, that to arise from the Ballance of their Dominion unto their power, they were not onely called Reguli or little Kings, but were such indeed; their jurisdiction being of two sorts, either that which was exercised by them in the Court of their Counties, or in the high Court of the Kingdom.

In the Territory denominating an Earl, if it were all his own, the Courts held,* 1.73 and the profits of that Jurisdiction were to his own use and benefit. But if he had but some part of his County, then his Jurisdiction and Courts (saving perhaps in those possessions that were his own) were held by him to the Kings use and benefit; that is, he commnoly supply'd the Of∣fice which the Sheriffs regularly executed in Counties that had no Earls; and whence they came to be called Vice-comites. The Court of the County that had an Earl, was held by the Earl and the Bishop of the Diocesse, after the manner of the Sheriffs Turns unto this Day; by which means both the Ecclesiasticall and Temporal Lawes were given in charge together unto the Country: the causes of Vavosors or Vavosories appertained to the Cognizance of this Court, where Wills were proved, Judg∣ment and Execution given; cases criminall and civill deter∣mined.

The Kings Thanes had like jurisdiction in their Thain-Lands as Lords in their Manours, where they also kept Courts.* 1.74

Besides these in particular, both the Earls and Kings-Thanes, together with the Bishops, Abbots, and Vavosors, or Middle-Thanes had in the High Court or Parliament of the King∣dome a more publick jurisdiction; consisting, first,* 1.75 of Delibe∣rative power for advising upon, and assenting unto new Lawes. Secondly, of giving Counsel in matters of State; and thirdly, of Judicature upon Suits, and Complaints. I shall not omit to en∣lighten

the obscurity of these times, in which there is little to be found of a Methodical constitution of this High Court; by the addition of an Argument, which I conceive to bear a strong testimony unto it self, though taken out of a late Writing that conceals the Authour.

It is well known (saith he) that in every quarter of the Realm a great many Boroughs do yet send Burgesses unto the Parliament, which neverthelesse be so anciently and so long since decayed and gone to naught, that they cannot be shew'd to have been of any reputation since the Conquest, much lesse to have obtained any such priviledge by the grant of any succeeding King; wherefore these must have had this right by more ancient usuage, and before the Conquest; they being unable now to shew whence they derived it.

This Argument (though there be more) I shall pitch upon, as sufficient to prove; First, that the lower sort of the people had right unto Session in Parliament during the time of the Teu∣tons. Secondly, that they were qualify'd unto the same by election in their Boroughs; and (if Knights of the Shire (as no doubt they are) be as ancient) in the Countries: Thirdly, if it be a good Argument to say, that the Commons during the raign of the Teutons were elected into Parliament, because they are so now, and no man can shew when this custom began; I see not which way it should be an ill one to say, that the Commons during the reign of the Teutons constituted also a distinct house, because they do so now; unlesse any man can shew that they did ever sit in the same House with the Lords. Wherefore to conclude this part, I conceive for these, and other reasons to be mentioned hereafter, that the Parliament of the Teutons con∣sisted of the King, the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons of the Nation, notwithstanding the style of divers Acts of Parliament,* 1.76 which runs as that of Magna Charta in the Kings name only, seeing the same was neverthelesse enacted by the King, Peers, and Commons of the Land, as is testified in those words by a subsequent Act.

The Monarchy of the Teutons had stood in this posture about two hundred and twenty years;* 1.77 when Turbo Duke of Neustria making his claim to the Crown of one of their Kings that dyed Childlesse, followed it with successeful Arms; and being pos∣sessed of the Kingdom, used it as conquered; distributing the Earldomes, Thane Lands, Bishopricks and Prelacies of the whole Realm amongst his Neustrians. From this time the Earl came to be called Comes, Consul, & Dux; (though Consul & Dux grew afterward out of use) The Kings Thanes came to be called Ba∣rons, and their Lands Baronies; the Middle-Thane holding still of a mean Lord, retained the name of Vavosor.

* 1.78The Earl or Comes continued to have the third part of the

pleas of the County paid unto him by the Sheriff or Vice-comes, now a distinct Officer in every County depending upon the King; saving that such Earls as had their Counties to their own use, were now Counts-Palatine, and had under the King Regal Jurisdiction; insomuch that they constituted their own Sheriffs, granted Pardons, and issued Writs in their own names; nor did Kings Writ of ordinary Justice run in their Dominions,* 1.79 till a late Statute whereby much of this priviledge was taken away.

For Barons,* 1.80 they came from henceforth to be in different times of three kinds. Barons by their estates and Tenures, Barons by writ, and Barons created by Letters Pattents. From Turbo the first to Adoxus the seventh King from the Conquest, Barons had their Denomination from their Possessions and Tenures: and these were either Spiritual or Temporal; for not onely the Thane Lands, but the possessions of Bishops, as also of some twenty six Abbots,* 1.81 and two Priors were now erected into Baro∣nies, whence the Lords Spiritual that had Suffrage in the Teuton Parliament, as Spiritual Lords came to have it in the Neustrian Parliament as Barons: and were made subject (which they had not formerly been) unto Knights service in chief. Barony com∣ming henceforth to signifie all honorary possessions, as well of Earls as Barons and Baronage, to denote all kinds of Lords as well Spiritual as Temporal, having right to sit in Parliament, the Baronies in this sense were sometimes more, and sometimes fewer, but commonly about 200, or 250, containing in them a matter of sixty thousand feuda militum, or Knights fees, where∣of some twenty eight thousand were in the Clergy. It is ill luck that no man can tell what the land of a Knights fee (recko∣ned in some Writs at 40 l. a year, and in others at 10.) was certainly worth; for by such an help we might have exactly demonstrated the Ballance of this Government: But sayes Cook,* 1.82 it contained twelve plough lands, and that was thought to be the most certain account: but this again is extreamly uncertain, for one Plough out of some Land that was fruitfull might work more than ten out of some other that was barren. Neverthelesse, seeing it appeareth by Bracton,* 1.83 that of Earldoms and Baronies it was wont to be said, that the whole Kingdome was composed: as also, that these consisting of 60000 Knights fees, furnisht 60000 men for the Kings service, being the whole Militia of this Monarchy, it cannot be imagined, that the Va∣vosories, or Freeholds in the people amounted to any considera∣ble proportion. Wherefore the Ballance and Foundation of this Government was in the 60000 Knights fees, and these being possest by the 250 Lords, it was a Government of the Few, or of the Nobility; wherein the people might also assemble, but could have no more than a meer name. And the Clergy hold∣ing

a third to the whole Nation as is plaine by the Parliament Rolle; it is an absurdity (seeing the Clergy of France came first through their riches to be a state of that Kingdome) to acknow∣ledge the people to have beene a state of this Realme, and not to allow it unto the Clergy, who were so much more weighty in the Ballance,* 1.84 which is that of all other whence a state or order in a Government is denominated: wherefore this Monarchy con∣sisted of the King, and of the three (Ordines Regni, or) Estates, the Lords spirituall and temporall, and the Commons: It consist∣ed of these I say as to the ballance, though during the raigne of some of these Kings, not as to the administration.

* 1.85For the ambition of Turbo, and some of those that more im∣mediately succeeded him to be absolute Princes, strove against the nature of their Foundation, and in as much as he had di∣vided almost the whole Realme among his Newstrians with some incouragement for a while. But the Neustrians while they were but forraigne Plants, having no security against the Natives, but in growing up by their Princes sides, were no soo∣ner well rooted in their vast Dominions, than they came up ac∣cording to the infallible consequence of the Ballance Domesticke, and contracting the Nationall interest of the Baronage grew as fierce in the Vindication of the Auncient rights and liberties of the same, as if they had beene alwaies Natives: Whence the Kings being as obstinate on the one side for their absolute power, as these on the other for their immunities, grew certaine Wars which tooke their Denomination from the Barons.

This fire about the middle of the raigne of Adoxus began to break out; And whereas the predecessors of this King, had diverse times beene forced to summon Councills; resembling those of the Teutons,* 1.86 unto which the Lords only that were Ba∣rons by Dominion and Tenure had hitherto repaired; Adoxus see∣ing the effects of such Dominion, began first (not to call such as were Barons by Writs, for that was according to the practice of antient times, but) to call such by Writes as were otherwise no Barons, by which meanes striving to avoid the consequence of the Ballance, in coming unwillingly to set the Government streight, he was the first that set it awry. For the Barons in his raigne, and his successours, having vindicated their anti∣ent Authority, restored the Parliament with all the rights and Priviledges of the same, saving that from thenceforth, the Kings had found out a way whereby to help themselves against the mighty creatures of their own, and such as had no other support but by their favour. By which meanes this Govern∣ment being indeed the Master-piece of Moderne Prudence hath beene cry'd up to the Skyes, as the only invention, whereby at once to maintaine the soveraignty of a Prince, and the liberty of the people: whereas indeed it hath beene no other than

a wrestling match, wherein the Nobility, as they have been stronger have thrown the King; or the King if he have been stronger, hath thrown the Nobility: or the King where he hath had a Nobility, and could bring them to his party, hath thrown the people, as in France and Spain: or the people where they have had no Nobility, or could get them to be of their party, have thrown the King, as in Holland, and of latter times in Oceana.* 1.87 But they came not to this strength but by such ap∣proaches and degrees, as remain to be further opened. For whereas the Barons by Writs (as the sixty four Abbots, and thirty six Priors that were so called) were but pro tempore. Dicotome being the twelfth King from the Conquest, began to make Barons by Letters Patents:* 1.88 with the Addition of honorary Pensions for the Maintenance of their Dignities to them, and their Heirs; so that they were hands in the Kings Purse, and had no shoulders for his Throne. Of these when the house of Peers came once to be full, as will be seen hereafter, there was nothing more empty. But for the present, the Throne having other supports, they did not hurt that so much as they did the King: For the old Barons taking Dicotome's prodigality to such creatures so ill, that they deposed him; got the trick of it, and never gave over setting up, and pulling down of their Kings according to their various interests, and that faction of the White and Red into which they had been thenceforth divi∣ded,* 1.89 till Panurgus the eighteenth King from the Conquest was more by their favour than his right advanced unto the Crown. This King through his naturall subtilty reflecting at once up∣on the greatnesse of their power, and the inconstancy of their favour, began to find another flaw in this kind of Government, which is also noted by Machiavill; namely, that a Throne suppor∣ted by a Nobility, is not so hard to be ascended, as kept warm. Wherefore his secret jealousie lest the Dissention of the Nobi∣lity, as it brought him in, might throw him out, travelled in wayes undiscover'd by them, unto ends as little foreseen by himself: while to establish his own safety, he by mixing wa∣ter with their Wine, first began to open those Sluces that have since overwhelmed not the King onely, but the Throne: For whereas a Nobility striketh not at the Throne without which they cannot subsist, but at some King that they do not like; Popular power striketh through the King at the Throne, as that which is incompatible with it. Now that Panurgus in abating the power of the Nobility, was the cause whence it came to fall into the hands of the people, appears by those severall Statutes that were made in his raign; as that for Population; those against Retainers; and that for Alienations.

By the Statute of Population, All houses of husbandry that were used with twenty Acres of ground and upwards, were

to be maintained, and kept up for ever with a competent pro∣portion of Land laid to them, and in no wise, as appears by a subsequent Statute to be severed. By which means the houses being kept up, did of necessity inforce dwellers; and the pro∣portion of Land to be tilled being kept up, did of necessity in∣force the dweller not to be a beggar or Cottager, but a man of some substance that might keep friends and servants, and set the Plough on going: this did mightily concern (saith the Hi∣storian of that Prince) the might and manhood of the Kingdom, and in effect amortize a great part of the Lands unto the hold and possession of the Yeomanry, or middle people, who living not in a servile or indigent fashion, were much unlinked from de∣pendance upon their Lords, and living in a free and plentifull manner, became a more excellent Infantry; but such an one upon which the Lords had so little power, that from henceforth they may be computed to have been disarmed.

And as they lost their Infantry after this manner, so their Cavalry and Commanders were cut off by the Statute of Retai∣ners; for whereas it was the Custome of the Nobility to have younger Brothers of good houses, metall'd fellows, and such as were knowing in the feats of Arms about them; they who were longer followed with so dangerous a train, escaped not such punishments, as made them take up.

Henceforth the Country-lives, and great tables of the Nobi∣lity, which no longer nourished veins that would bleed for them, were fruitlesse and loathsome till they changed the Air, and of Princes became Courtiers, where their Revenues, never to have been exhausted by Beef and Mutton, were found nar∣row, whence followed wracking of Rents, and at length sale of Lands; the riddance through the Statute of Alienations being rendred far more quick and facile, than formerly it had been through the new invention of intails.

To this it happened, that Coraunus the Successour of that King dissolving the Abbeys, brought with the declining estate of the Nobility so vast a prey unto the Industry of the people, that the Ballance of the Common-wealth was too apparently in the Popular party, to be unseen by the wise Councel of Queen Parthenia, who converting her reign through the perpetuall Love-tricks that passed between her and her people into a kind of Romanze; wholly neglected the Nobility. And by these de∣grees came the House of Commons to raise that head, which since hath been so high and formidable unto their Princes; that they have looked pale upon those assemblies. Nor was there any thing now wanting unto the destruction of the Throne, but that the people not apt to see their own strength, should be put to feel it; when a Prince, as stiffe in disputes as the nerve of Monarchy was grown slack, received that unhappy encourage∣ment

from his Clergy, which became his utter Ruine, while trusting more unto their Logick, than the rough Philosophy of his Parliament, it came unto an irreparable breach; for the house of Peers which alone had stood in this Gap, now sinking down between the King and the Commons, shewed that Crassus was dead, and Isthmus broken. But a Monarchy divested of her Nobility, hath no refuge under Heaven, but an Army. Where∣fore the dissolution of this Government caused the War, not the War the dissolution of this Government.

Of the Kings successe with his Arms it is not necessary to give any further account, than that they proved as ineffectuall as his Nobility; But without a Nobility or an Army (as hath been shew'd) there can be no Monarchy. Wherefore what is there in Nature, that can arise out of these ashes; but a Popular Government, or a new Monarchy to be erected by the victorious Army?

To erect a Monarchy be it never so new, unlesse like Levia∣than you can hang it (as the Country fellow speaks) by Geometry, (for what else is it to say, that every other man must give up his will unto the will of this one man without any other Foundation?) it must stand upon old principles, that is, upon Nobility or an Army planted upon a due Ballance of Dominion. Aut viam inveniam aut faciam, was an Adage of Caesars; and there is no standing for a Monarchy unlesse she find this Ballance or make it. If she find it, her work's done unto her hand; for, where there is inequality of Estates, there must be inequality of Power; and where there is inequality of Power, there can be no Common-wealth. To make it, her sword must extirpate out of Dominion all other roots of power, and plant her Army upon that ground: an Ar∣my may be planted Nationally or Provincially. To plant it Na∣tionally, it must be in one of the four wayes mentioned, that is, either Monarchically in part, as the Roman Beneficiarii; or Mo∣narchically in the whole as the Turkish Timariot; Aristocratically, that is, by Earls and Barons, as the Neustrians were planted by Turbo: or Democratically, that is, by equall lots, as the Israelitish Army in the Land of Canaan by Joshuah; in every one of these wayes there must not only be confiscations, but confiscations unto such a proportion as may answer to the work inten∣ded.

Confiscation of a people that never fought against you, but whose Arms you have born, and in which you have been victo∣rious, and this upon premeditation, and in cool blood, I should have thought to be against any example in humane Nature, but for those alledged by Machiavill of Agathocles, and Oliverteto da Fermo: The former whereof being Captain General of the Syra∣cusans, upon a day assembled the Senate and the people, as if he had something to communicate with them, when at a sign gi∣ven

he cut the Senators in pieces to a man, and all the richest of the people, by which means he came to be King. The pro∣ceedings of Oliveretto in making himself Prince of Fermo, was somewhat different in circumstances, but of the same Nature. Neverthelesse Catiline, who had a spirit equall to any of these in his intended mischief, could never bring the like to passe in Rome. The head of a small Common-wealth, such an one as was that of Syracusa or Fermo, is easily brought unto the Block; but that a populous Nation such as Rome, had not such an one, was the grief of Nero. If Sylla or Caesar attained to be Princes, it was by Civill War, and such civil War as yielded rich spoils; there being a vast Nobility to be confiscated; which also was the case in Oceana, when it yielded earth by Earldoms and Ba∣ronies to the Neustrian, for the plantation of his new Potentates. Where a Conquerour finds the riches of a Land in the hands of the Few, the forfeitures are easie, and amount to vast advan∣tage; but where the people have equall shares, the confiscation of many comes to little; and is not only dangerous, but fruit∣lesse.

The Romans in one of their defeats of the Volsci found among the captives certain Tusculans, who upon examination confest, that the Arms they bore, were by command of their State: whereupon information being given to the Senate by the Ge∣nerall Camillus, he was forthwith commanded to march against Tusculum; which doing accordingly, he found the Tusculane fields full of Husbandmen, that stirred not otherwise from the Plough, than to furnish his Army with all kind of accommoda∣tions and Victualls; drawing near to the City, he saw the Gates wide open, the Magistrates coming out in their Gowns to sa∣lute and bid him welcome: entring, the Shops were all at work, and open: the streets sounded with the noise of School-boyes at their books, there was no face of War. Whereupon Camillus causing the Senate to assemble, told them, That though the Art was understood, yet had they at length found out the true Arms whereby the Romans were most undoubtedly to be conquered, for which cause he would not anticipate the Se∣nate, unto which he desired them forthwith to send, which they did accordingly; and their Dictator with the rest of their Ambassadours being found by the Roman Senators as they went into the house standing sadly at the Door, were sent for in as friends, and not as Enemies. Where the Dictator having said, If we have offended, the fault was not so great as is our peni∣tence, and your virtue. The Senate gave them peace forthwith, and soon after made the Tusculanes Citizens of Rome.

But putting the case, of which the World is not able to shew an Example, that the forfeiture of a populous Nation, not conquer'd, but friends, and in cool blood, might be taken;

Your Army must be planted in one of the wayes mentioned: To plant it in the way of absolute Monarchy that is upon feuds for life, such as the Timars, a Country as large and fruitfull as that of Greece, would afford you but sixteen thousand Tima∣riots, for that is the most the Turk (being the best husband that ever was of this kind) that makes of it at this day: and if Oceana, which is lesse in fruitfulnesse by one half, and in ex∣tent by three parts, should have no greater a force, whoever breaketh her in one battle, may be sure she shall never rise; for such (as was noted by Machiavill) is the Nature of the Turkish Monarchy, if you break her in two battles, you have destroyed her whole Militia; and the rest being all slaves, you hold her without any further resistance: Wherefore the erection of an absolute Monarchy in Oceana, or in any other Country that is no larger, without making it a certain prey unto the first invader, is altogether impossible.

To plant by halves as the Roman Emperours did their Benefi∣ciaries, or military Colonies, it must be either for life; and this an Army of Oceaners in their own Country, (especially having states of inheritance) will never bear, because such an Army so planted is as well confiscated as the people, nor had the Ma∣malines been contented with such usage in Aegypt, but that they were Forraigners, and daring nor to mix with the Na∣tives, it was of absolute necessity to their Being.

Or planting them upon inheritance, whether Aristocratically as the Neustrians, or Democratically, as the Israelites, they grow up by certaine consequence into the Nationall interest, and this if they be planted popularly comes unto a Common-wealth; if by way of Nobility unto a mixed Monarchy, which of all other will be found to be the only kind of Monarchy, whereof this Nation or any other that is of no greater extent hath beene or can be capable: for if the Israelites (through their Democraticall Bal∣lance being fixed by their Agrarian stood firme,) be yet found to have elected Kings, it was because their Territory lying open they were perpetually invaded, and being perpetually inva∣ded turned themselves to any thing, which through the want of experience they thought might be a remedy; whence their mistake in election of their Kings, (under whom they gain'd nothing, but to the contrary lost all they had acquired by their Common-wealth, both Estates and Liberties;) is not only apparent, but without parallell. And if there have beene (as was shewne) a Kingdom of the Goths in Spain, and of the Van∣dalls in Asia, consisting of a single person, and a Parliament, (tak∣ing a Parliament to be a Councill of the people only, without a Nobili∣ty) it is expressely said of those Councills, that they deposed their Kings as often as them pleased: nor can there be other consequence of such a Government, seeing where there is a

Councill of the people, they do never receive Lawes, but give them; and a Councill giving Lawes unto a single person, he hath no meanes in the World, whereby to be any more than a subordinate Magistrate, but force: in which case, he is not a single person and a Parliament, but a single person and an Army, which Army again must be planted as hath been shewn, or can be of no long Continuance.

It is true, that the Provincial Ballance being in Nature quite contrary unto the National, you are no wayes to plant a Provin∣ciall Army upon Dominion. But then you must have a native Territory in strength, Situation, or Government able to overbal∣lance the forreign, or you can never hold it. That an Army should in any other case be long supported by a meer Tax, is a meer Phansie as void of all reason and Experience, as if a man should think to maintain such an one by robbing of Or∣chards: for a meer Tax is but pulling of Plumbtrees, the roots where∣of are in other mens grounds, who suffering perpetuall violence, come to hate the Author of it: And it is a Maxime, that no Prince that is hated by his people can be safe. Arms planted upon Dominion extirpate enemies, and make friends; but main∣tained by a meer Tax, have enemies that have roots, and friends that have none.

To conclude, Oceana, or any other Nation of no greater ex∣tent must have a competent Nobility, or is altogether incapa∣ble of Monarchy: for where there is equality of estates, there must be equality of power; and where there is equality of power, there can be no Monarchy.

* 1.90To come then to the generation of the Common-wealth; it hath been shewn how through the wayes and means used by Panur∣gus to abase the Nobility, and so to mend that flaw which we have asserted to be incurable in this kind of Constitution, he suf∣fered the Ballance to fall into the power of the people, and so broke the Government: but the Ballance being in the people, the Common-wealth (though they do not see it) is already in the Na∣ture of them: (Cornua nota prius Vitulo, quàm frontibus extant) there wanteth nothing else but time, (which is slow and dan∣gerous) or art, (which would be more quick and secure) for the bringing those native Arms (wherewithall they are found already) to resist they know not how every thing that opposeth them, unto such maturity as may fix them upon their own strength and Bottom.

* 1.91But whereas this Art is Prudence; and that part of Prudence, which regards the present work, is nothing else but the skill of raising such Superstructures of Government, as are natural to the known Foundations: they never mind the Foundation, but through certain animosities, (wherewith by striving one against another they are infected) or through freaks by which not re∣garding

the course of things, nor how they conduce unto their purpose, they are given to building in the Air, come to be di∣vided and subdivided into endlesse parties and factions, both Civill, and Ecclesiastical: which briefly to open, I shall first speak of the people in generall, and then of their divisions.

A people (saith Machiavill) that is corrupt, is not capable of a Common-wealth: but in shewing what a corrupt people is, he hath either involved himself or me; nor can I otherwise come out of the Labyrinth, than by saying, that the Ballance altering a people as to the foregoing Government, must of necessity be corrupt; but corruption in this sense signifieth no more then that the corruption of one Government (as in natural bodies) is the genera∣tion of another: wherefore if the Ballance alter from Monar∣chy, the corruption of the people in this case is that which maketh them capable of a Common-wealth: But whereas I am not igno∣rant, that the corruption which he meaneth is in Manners, this also is from the Ballance. For the Ballance swaying from Mo∣narchical into Popular, abateth the Luxury of the Nobility, and inriching the people, bringeth the Government from a more pri∣vate unto a more publick interest, which coming nearer, as hath been shewn, unto Justice and right Reason, the people up∣on a like alteration is so far from such corruption of Manners, as should render them uncapable of a Common-wealth, that of ne∣cessity they must thereby contract such reformation of manners as will bear no other kind of Government. On the other side, where the Ballance changeth from Popular to Oligarchical, or Monarchical; the publick interest with the reason and justice included in the same, becometh more private, Luxury is intro∣duced in the place of Temperance and Servitude in that of Free∣dome; which causeth such a corruption of manners both in the Nobility and the people, as by the Example of Rome in the time of the Triumvirs, is more at large discovered by the Author to have been altogether incapable of a Common-wealth.

But the Ballance of Oceana changing quite contrary to that of Rome, the manners of the people were not thereby corrupted, but on the contrary fitted for a Common-wealth. For differences of opinion in a people (not rightly informed of their Ballance,) or division into parties, while there is not any common liga∣ment of power sufficient to reconcile or hold them, is no suffi∣cient proof of corruption in a people: Neverthelesse, seeing this must needs be matter of Scandall and danger, it will not be amisse in shewing what were the parties, to shew what were their errours.

The parties into which this Nation was divided, were Tem∣poral or Spiritual; and the Temporal parties were especially two, the one the Royalists, the other Common-wealths-men; each of which asserted their different Causes, either out of Prudence or Ignorance; out of interest or Conscience.

For Prudence, either that of the Ancients is inferiour unto the Modern, (which we have hitherto been setting face to face,* 1.92 that any one may judge) or that of the Royalists must be inferiour unto that prudence of the Common-wealths-man: and for interest, taking the Common-Wealths-man to have really intended the publick (for otherwise he is an hypocrite, and the worst of men) that of the Royalist must of necessity have been more private: wherefore the whole dispute will come upon matter of Conscience; and this, whether it be urged by the right of Kings, the obligation of former Lawes, or of the Oath of Allegiance, is absolved by the Ballance.

For if the right of Kings were as immediately derived from the breath of God, as the life of man; yet this excludeth not death and dissolution. But, that the dissolution of the late Monar∣chy was as natural as the death of a man, hath been already shewn: wherefore it remains with the Royalists to discover by what reason or experience it is possible for a Monarchy to stand upon a popular Ballance; or, the Ballance being popular as well the Oath of Allegiance, as all other Monarchical Lawes, imply an impos∣sibility, and are therefore void.

To the Common-wealths-man I have no more to say, but that if he exclude any party,* 1.93 he is not truly such; nor shall ever found a Common-wealth upon the natural principle of the same, which is Justice: and the Royalist for having opposed a Common-wealth in Oceana (where the Lawes were so ambiguous, that they might be eternally disputed, and never reconciled) can neither be justly, for that cause, excluded from his full and equall share in the Government; nor prudently, for this, that a Common-wealth consisting of a party will be in perpetuall la∣bour of her own destruction: whence it was, that the Romans having conquered the Albans incorporated them with equall right into the Common-wealth: and if the Royalists be flesh of your flesh, and nearer of blood then were the Albans to the Romans, you are also Christians: neverthelesse there is no rea∣son that a Common-Wealth should any more favour a party re∣maining in fixed opposition against her, then Brutus did his sons. But if she fix them upon that opposition, it is her fault, not theirs, and this is done by excluding them. Men that have equall possessions, and the same security of their estates and of their liberties that you have, have the same cause with you to defend; but if you will be trampling, they fight for liberty, though for Monarchy; and you for Tyranny, though un∣der the name of a Common-wealth; the nature of orders in a Common-wealth rightly instituted being void of all Jealousie, because let the parties which she imbraceth be what they will, her orders are such, as they neither would resist if they could, nor could if they would, as hath in part been already

shewn, and will appear more at large by the ensuing Mo∣dell.

The parties that are Spiritual are of more kinds then I need mention; some for a National Religion,* 1.94 and others for liberty of Conscience, with such animosity on both sides, as if these two did not consist, of which I have already sufficiently spoken, to shew, that the one cannot well consist without the other. But they of all the rest are the most dangerous, who holding that the Saints must govern, go about to reduce the Common-wealth unto a party, as well for the reasons already shewn, as that their pretences are against Scripture, where the Saints are commanded to submit unto the higher powers, and be sub∣ject unto the Ordinance of man. And, that men pretending under the notion of Saints or Religion, unto Civil Power, have hitherto never failed to dishonour that profession; the World is full of Examples, whereof I shall confine my self at the present unto two, the one of old, the other of new Rome.

In old Rome the Patricians or Nobility,* 1.95 pretending to be the Godly party, were questioned by the People for ingrossing all the Magistracies of that Common-wealth, had nothing to say why they did so, but (Quòd nemo plebeius auspicia haberet) that Ma∣gistracy required a kind of holinesse which was not in the people. (Plebs ad id maximâ indignatione exarsit,* 1.96 quod auspicari tanquam invisi Diis immortalibus negarentur posse) at which the people were filled with such indignation, as had come to cutting of throats, if the Nobility had not forthwith laid by the insolency of that plea: which neverthelesse when they had done, the people for a long time after continued to elect none other than Patrician Magistrates.

The Example of new Rome in the rise and practice of the Hie∣rarchy, (too well known to require any further illustration) is far more immodest.

This hath been the course of Nature: and when it hath plea∣sed, or shall please God to introduce any thing that is above the course of Nature, he will as he hath alwayes done, confirm it by miracle; for so in his Prophesie of the raign of Christ upon earth, he expresly promiseth; seeing that the soules of them that were beheaded for Jesus, shall be seen to live and raign with him, which will be an object of sense; the rather, because the rest of the dead are not to live again untill the Thousand years be finish∣ed. And it is not lawfull for men to perswade us that a thing is, though there be no such object of our sence, which God hath told us shall not be, untill it be an object of our sence.

The Saintship of a people as to Government consisteth in the election of Magistrates fearing God, and hating covetuousnesse, and not in their confining themselves, or being confined unto men of this, or that party or profession. It consisteth in ma∣ing

the most prudent and religious choyce that they can, but not in trusting unto men, but, next God, in their orders. Give us good men and they will make us good Lawes, is the Maxime of a Demagogue, and (through the alteration which is commonly perceivable in men, when they have power to work their own wills) exceeding fallible. But give us good orders, and they will make us good men, is the Maxime of a Legislator, and the most infallible in the Politickes.

But these divisions, (however there be some good men, that looke sadly on them) are triviall things; first (as to the civill concernment) because the Government whereof this Nation is ca∣paple * 1.97 once seene taketh in all interests. And secondly, (as to the spirituall) because as pretence of Religion hath alwaies beene turbulent in broken Governments, so where the Govern∣ment hath beene sound and steddy, Religion hath never shew'd her selfe with any other face than that of her naturall sweetnesse, and tranquillity: nor is there any reason why she should; Wherefore the errours of the people are occasioned by their Governours. If they be doubtfull of the way, or wander from it, it is because their guides misled them; and the guides of the people are never so well qualified for leading by any vertue of their own, as by that of the Government.

The Government of Oceana, (as it stood at the time whereof we discourse consisting of one single Councill of the people, to the exclusion of the King, and of the Lords,) was called a Par∣liament; how be it the Parliaments of the Teutons and of the Neustrians consisted as hath beene shew'd of the King, Lords and Commons; wherefore this under an old name was a new thing. A Parliament consisting of a single assembly elected by the people and invested with the whole power of the Govern∣ment, without any Covenants, Conditions, or orders whatsoever. So new a thing that neither auncient nor moderne Prudence can shew any avow'd example of the like: And there is scarce any thing that seemeth unto me so strange as that (whereas there was nothing more familiar with these Counsellors than to bring the Scrip∣ture to the House) there should not be a man of them, that so much as offerd to bring the house unto the Scripture, wherein as hath beene shewne is contained that Originall, whereof all the rest of the Common-wealths seeme to be copies. Certainly if Leviathan (who is surer of nothing than that a popular Common-wealth consisteth, but of one Councill) transcribed his doctrine out of this Assembly, for him to except against Aristotle and Ci∣cero for writing out of their own Common-wealths, was not so fair play; or if the Parliament transcribed out of him, it had beene an honour better due unto Moses. But where one of them should have an Example, but from the other, I cannot imagine; there being nothing of this kind that I can find in story but the

Oligarthy of Athens, the thirty Tyrants of the same, and the Ro∣man Decemvirs.

For the Oligarchy, Thucidides tells us that it was a Senate or Councill of foure hundred,* 1.98 pretending to a Ballancing Councill of the people consisting of five thousand but not producing them, wherein you have the definition of an Oligarchy, which is a single Councill both debating and resolving, dividing and choosing; and what that must come to, was shewne by the Example of the Girles, and is apparent throughout all experience; wherefore the thirty set up by the Lacedemonians, (when they had con∣quered Athens) are called Tyrants by all Authors; Leviathan only excepted, who will have them against all the World to have been an Aristocracy; but for what reason I cannot ima∣gine, these also as voyd of any Ballance having been void of that which is essentiall to every Common-wealth, whether A∣ristocraticall or Popular; except he be pleased with them in that, by the Testimony of Xenophon, they killed more men in eight Moneths, then the Lacedemonians had done in ten yeares: oppressing the people (to use Sir. Wa: Raleighs words) with all base and intolerable slavery.

The usurped Government of the Decemvirs in Rome was of the same kind. Wherefore in the feare of God let Christian Legisla∣tors, (setting the patterne, given in the Mount on the one side, and these execrable Examples on the other) know the right hand from the left; and so much the rather because those things, which do not conduce to the good of the Governed, are fallaci∣ous, if they appeare to be good for the Governours. God in chasti∣zing a people is accustomed to burne his Rod. The Empire of these Oligarchies was not so violent as short, nor did they fall upon the people but in their own immediate ruine. A Councill without a Ballance is not a Common-wealth, but an Oligarchy; & every O∣ligarchy, except she be put to the defence of her wickedness, or power, against some outward danger, is factious: Wherfore the errours of the people being from their Governours (which Maxim in the Politicks bearing a sufficient testimony unto it selfe, is al∣so proved by Machiavill) if the people of Oceana have beene facti∣ous, the cause is apparent; But what remedy?

In answer to this question, I come now to the Army:* 1.99 of which the most victorious Captaine and incomparable patriot Olphaus Megaletor was now Generall: Who being a much grea∣ter master of that art, whereof I have made a rough draught in these Preliminaries, had so sad reflections upon the waies and proceedings of the Parliament, as cast him upon books, and all other meanes of diversion, among which he happened upon this place of Machiavill.

Thrice happy is that people which chances to have a man able to give them such a Government at once, as with∣out

alteration may secure them of their liberties: Seeing it is cer∣taine, that Lacedemon in observing the Lawes of Lycurgus, conti∣nued about eight hundred yeares without any dangerous tumult or corruption.

My Lord Generall (as it is said of Themistocles, that he could not sleepe for the glory obteined by Miltiades at the battle of Maratho) took so new, and deepe impression at these words of the much greater glory of Lycurgus, that being on this side assaulted with the emulation of his illustrious object, on the other with the misery of the Nation, which seemed, (as it were ruined by his Victory) to cast her selfe at his feete, he was almost wholly deprived of his naturall rest, untill the de∣bate he had within himselfe▪ came to a firme resolution, that the greatest advantages of a Common-wealth are, first that the Legislator should be one man: and secondly that the Government should be made altogether, or at once. For the first it is cer∣taine saith Machiavill,* 1.100 that a Common-wealth is seldome or never well turned or constituted, except it have been the work of one man: for which cause a wise Legislator, and one whose mind is firmely set,* 1.101 not upon private but the publick interest, not upon his posterity but upon his Country, may justly endeavour to get the soveraigne power into his own hands; nor shall any man that is master of reason blame such extraordinary meanes as in that case shall be necessary, the end proving no other, than the constitution of a well ordered Common-wealth. The reason of this is demonstrable; for the ordinary meanes not failing, the Common-wealth hath no need of a Legislator;* 1.102 but the ordinary meanes failing, there is no recourse to be had but to such as are extraordinary. And, whereas a Book or a Building hath not been known to attaine to perfection, if it have not had a sole Author, or Architect: a Common-wealth, as to the Fabrick of it, is of the like nature. And thus it may be made at once; in which, there be great advantages: for a Common-wealth made at once, taketh her Security at the same time she lendeth her Money; trusteth not her selfe to the faith of men, but lancheth imme∣diately forth into the Empire of Lawes: and being set streight bringeth the manners of her Citizens unto her rule: whence fol∣lowed that uprightnesse which was in Lacedemon. But man∣ners that are rooted in men, bow the tendernesse of a Common-wealth coming up by twigs unto their bent; whence followed the obliquity that was in Rome, and those perpetuall repaires by the Consuls Axes and Tribunes Hammers, which could never finish that Common-wealth but in destruction.

My Lord Generall being clear in these points, and the neces∣sity of some other course than would be thought upon by the Parliament, appointed a Randezvous of the Army, where he spoke his sense agreeable to these Preliminaries with such suc∣cesse

unto the Souldiery, that the Parliament was soon after deposed; and himself (in the great Hall of the Pantheon or Palace of Justice, scituated in Emporium the Capital City) created by the universall suffrage of the Army; Lord Archon, or sole Legislator of Oceana; upon which Theater you have, to con∣clude this piece, a Person introduced, whose Fame shall ne∣ver draw his Curtain.

The Lord Archon being created, fifty select persons to assist him (by labouring in the Mines of ancient Prudence, and bring∣ing her hidden Treasures unto new light) were added, with the style also of Legislators, and sate as a Council whereof he was the sole Director and President.

The Councill of Legislators.

OF this Piece, being the greater half of the whole Work, I shall be able at this time to give no farther Account, then very briefly to shew at what it aymes.

My Lord Archon in opening the Councill of Legislators, made it appear how unsafe a thing it is to follow Phansie in the Fabrick of a Common-wealth; and how necessary that the Ar∣chives of ancient prudence should be ransackt, before any Coun∣sellour should presume to offer any other matter in order to the Work in hand, or towards the consideration to be had by the Councill upon a Modell of Government. Wherefore he caused an Urn to be brought, and every one of the Counsellours to draw a Lot: by the Lots as they were drawn.

• The Common-wealth of Israel, fell unto Phosphorus de Auge.
• The Common-wealth of Athens, fell unto Navarchus de Paralo.
• The Common-wealth of Lacedemon, fell unto Laco de Scytale.
• The Common-wealth of Carthage, fell unto Mago de Syrtibus.
• The Common-wealth of the Achaeans, Aetolians, & Lycians, fell unto Aratus de Isthmo.
• The Common-wealth of the Switz, fell unto Alpester de Fulmine.
• The Common-wealth of Holland, & the United Pro∣vinces, fell unto Glaucus de Ulna.
• The Common-wealth of Rome, fell unto Dolabella de Enyo.
• The Common-wealth of Venice, fell unto Lynceus de Stella.

These containing in them all those excellencies whereof a Common-wealth is capable; so that to have added more, had been to no purpose; upon time given unto the Counsellours by their own studies, and those of their friends to prepare them∣selves, were opened in the Order, and by the persons men∣tioned at the Council of Legislators; and afterwards by order of the same were repeated at the Council of the Prytans unto the people; for in drawing of the Lots, there were a matter of a Dozen of them inscribed with the letter P. which the Coun∣sellours that drew became Prytans.

The Prytans were a Committee or Councill sitting in the great Hall of Pantheon, to whom it was lawfull for any man to offer any thing in order to the Fabrick of the Common-wealth: for which cause, that they might not be oppressed by the throng, there was a Rail about the Table where they sate, and on each side of the same a Pulpit; that on the right hand for any man that would propose any thing; and that on the left for any other that would oppose him; and all parties (being indemnify'd by Proclamation of the Archon) were invited to dispute their own interests, or propose whatever they thought fit (in order to the future Government) to the Council of the Prytans, who (having a guard of a matter of two or three hun∣dred men, lest the heat of the dispute might break the peace) had the right of Moderators, and were to report from time to time such Propositions or Occurrences as they thought fit, to the Council of Legislators sitting more privately in the Pallace called Alma.

This was that which made the people (who were neither safely to be admitted unto, nor conveniently to be excluded from the framing of their Common-wealth) verily believe when it came forth, that it was no other than that, whereof they themselves had been the makers.

Moreover, this Council sate divers Months after the publish∣ing, and during the promulgation of the Modell unto the peo∣ple, by which means there is scarce any thing was said or writ∣ten for or against the said Modell, but you shall have it with the next impression of this Work by way of Oration addressed unto, and moderated by the Prytans.

By this means the Council of Legislators had their ne∣cessary solitude and due aym in their greater Work, as be∣ing acquainted from time to time with the pulse of the peo∣ple, and yet without any manner of interruption or distur∣bance.

Wherefore every Common-wealth in her place having been opened by her due Method; that is, first, by the people; se∣condly, by the Senate; and thirdly, by the Magistracy; The Council upon mature debate took such results or orders, out of each one, and out of each part of each one of them, as upon opening the same they thought fit; which being put from time to time in writing by the Clerk or Secretary, there remained no more in the conclusion, than putting the Orders so taken to∣gether, to view and examine them with a diligent Eye, to the end that it might be clearly discovered whether they did en∣terfere, or could any wise come to interfere or jostle one the other; for as such orders jostling, or coming to jostle one ano∣ther, are the certain dissolution of the Common-wealth; so taken

upon the proof of like experience, and neither jostling, nor shewing which way they can possibly come to jostle one ano∣ther, make a perfect, and (for ought that in humane prudence can be foreseen) an immortal Common-wealth.

And such was the Art whereby my Lord Archon (taking Counsel of the Common-wealth of Israel as of Moses; and of the rest of the Common-wealths, as of Jethro) framed the Modell of the Common-wealth of Oceana.

THE MODELL OF The Common-Wealth OF Oceana.

WHereas my Lord Archon, being, from Moses and Lycurgus, the first Legislator that hither∣to is found in Story to have introduced or Erected an Entire Common-wealth at once, happened, like them also, to be more intent upon putting the same into Execution or Action, then into Writing; by which means the Modell came to be promulgated or published with more Brevity and lesse illustration then is necessary for their understanding who have not been acquainted with the whole proceedings of the Council of Legislators, & of the Prytans, where it was asserted and cleared from all objections and doubts: Unto the end that I may supply what was wanting in the pro∣mulgated Epitome, unto a more full and perfect Narrative of the whole, I shall rather take the Common-wealth practically, and as she hath now given Account of her self in some years Revolutions, (as Dicaearchus is said to have done that of Lacede∣mon,* 1.103 first transcrib'd by his hand some three or four hundred years after the Institution) yet not omitting to adde for proof, unto every order such Debates and Speeches of the Legislators in their Councill, or at least such parts of them as may best disco∣ver the reason of the Government, nor such wayes and means as were used in the Institution or Rise of the Building, not to be so well Conceived, without some knowledge given of the Engines wherewithall the mighty Weight was moved. But through the intire omission of the Councel of Legislators or Work∣men that squared Every stone unto this Structure in the quar∣ries of Ancient Prudence, the proof of the first part of this Discourse will be lame, except I insert as well for illustration, as to avoid frequent Repetition, three remarkable Testimonies in this place.

* 1.104The first is taken out of the Common-wealth of Israel; So Mo∣ses hearkened unto the voice of (Jethro) his Father in Law, and did all that he had said. And Moses chose able men out of all Israel, and made them heads over the people, (Tribunes as it is in the vulgar Latine; or Phylarches, that is) Princes of the Tribes, sitting (Sellis Curulibus, saith Grotius) upon twelve Thrones, and judging the twelve Tribes of Israel; and next unto these he chose Rulers of Thousands, Rulers of Hundreds, Rulers of Fif∣ties, and Rulers of Tens, which were the steps or rise of this Common-wealth, from her foundation or root, unto her proper Elevation, or accomplishment in the Sanhedrim, and the Con∣gregation, already opened in the Preliminaries.

The Second is taken out of Lacedemon, as Lycurgus (for the greater impression of his Institutions upon the minds of his Citizens) pretended to have received the Modell of that Common-wealth from the Oracle of Apollo at Delphos, the words whereof are thus recorded by Plutarch in the Life of that famous Legislator, [When thou shalt have divided the Peo∣ple into Tribes,* 1.105 (which were six) and Oba's, (which were five in every Tribe) thou shalt Constitute the Senate, consisting with the two Kings of thirty Counsellours, who according as occasion requireth, shall cause the Congregation to be Assem∣bled between the Bridge and the River Gnavon, where the Senate shall propose unto the People, and dismisse them with∣out suffering them to debate. The Obae were linages into which every Tribe was divided, and in each Tribe there was one other Division containing all those of the same that were of military Age; which being called the Mora, was subdivi∣ded into Troops and Companies that were held in perpetuall discipline under the Command of a Magistrate called the Polemarche.

The Third is taken out of the Common-wealth of Rome, or those parts of it which are comprized in the first and second book of Livy, where the people according to the Institution by Romu∣lus, are first divided into Thirty Curia's or Parishes, whereof he Elected (by three out of each Curia) the Senate, which from his Reign unto that of Servius Tullius proposed unto the Parishes or Parochial Congregations,* 1.106 and these being called the Comi∣tia Curiata, had the Election of the Kings, (Quirites, Regem create; ita patrilus visum est. Again, Tullium Hostilium Regem Populus Jussit, Patres authores facti) the Confirmation of their Lawes (Ut ab Romulo traditum, suffragium viritim eadem vi, eo∣dem{que} jure omnibus Datum est); and the last appeal in matters of Judicature, as appears in the Case of Horatius that killed his Sister; Till in the Raign of Servius (non enim ut ab Romulo

traditum caeteri servaverunt reges) the people being grown some∣what, either the power of the Curiata was for the greater part translated unto the Centuriata Comitia instituted by this King, which distributed the people according to the sense or valua∣tion of their Estates unto six Classes, every one containing about fourty Centuries, divided into Youth and Elders; the Youth for field-service, the Elders for the defence of their Ter∣ritory, all armed and under continual Discipline, in which they assembled both upon Military and Civill occasions. But when the Senate proposed unto the People, the horse onely whereof there were twelve Centuries, consisting of the Richest sort over and above those of the foot enumerated, were called with the first Classis of the foot unto the suffrage; or if these accorded not, then the second Classis was called to them, but seldom or never any of the rest. Wherefore the people after the expulsion of the Kings, growing impatient of this inequa∣lity, rested not till they had reduced the Suffrage as it had been in the Comitia Curiata to the whole People again; But in another way, that is to say, by the Comitia Tributa, which thereupon were instituted, being a Council where the People in Exigencies made Lawes without the Senate; which Lawes were called Plebiscita. This Councill is that in regard where∣of Cicero and other great Wits so frequently inveigh against the People, and sometimes even Livy, as at the Institution: (Hunc Annum insignem maximè Comitia Tributa efficiunt; res major victoriâ suscepti certaminis quam usu, plus enim dignitatis Comi∣tiis ipsis detractum est, patribus ex Concilio submovendis, quam Virium aut plebi additum aut demptum patribus) To say truth, it was a kind of Anarchy, whereof the people could not be ex∣cusable, if there had not, through the Courses taken by the Senate, been otherwise a necessity that they must have seen the Common-wealth run into Oligarchy.

The Manner how the Comitia Curiata, Centuriata, or Tributa were called, (during the time of the Common-wealth to the Suf∣frage,* 1.107 was by lot: the Curia, Century or Tribe whereon the first lot fell, being styled Principium, or the prerogative; and the other Curiae, Centuries, or Tribes, whereon the second, third, fourth Lots, &c. fell, the Jure vocatae; from henceforth not the first Classis, as in the times of Servius; but the Preroga∣tive, whether Curia, Century or Tribe, came first to the Suf∣frage, whose Vote was called omen Praerogativum, and seldom failed to be leading unto the rest of the Tribes: The Jure vo∣catae in the order of their Lots came next: the Manner of giving suffrage was, by casting woodden Tablets marked for the affirmative, or the Negative, into certain Urns standing up∣on a Scaffold as they marched over it in files; which for the Resemblance it bore, was called the Bridge; the Candidate

or Competitor who had most Suffrages in a Curia, Century or Tribe, was said to have that Curia Century or Tribe; and he who had most of the Curiae Centuries or Tribes, carried the Magistracy.

These three places being premised as such upon which there will be frequent Reflexion, I come unto the Narrative, divi∣ded into two parts, the first containing the Institution, the se∣cond the Constitution of the Common-wealth; in each whereof I shall distinguish the Orders, as those which contain the whole Modell, from the rest of the Discourse, which tendeth onely unto the Explanation or proof of them.

* 1.108In the Institution or building of a Common-wealth, the first Work (as that of builders) can be no other then fitting and distributing the Materials.

The materials of a Common-wealth are the people; And the People of Oceana were distributed by casting them into certain Divisions,* 1.109 regarding their Quality, their Ages, their Wealth, and the Places of their residence or habitation, which was done by the ensuing Orders.

[order 1] The first Distributing the people into Freemen or Citizens, and Servants,* 1.110 while such; for if they attain unto Liberty, that is, to live of themselves, they are Freemen or Citizens.

This Order needeth no proof, in regard of the nature of servitude, which is inconsistent with Freedom or Participation of Government in a Common-wealth.

[order 2] The second Order distributeth Citizens into Youth and Elders (such as are from 18. years of Age to 30,* 1.111 being accounted Youth and such as are of 30. and upwards Elders) and establisheth that the Youth shall be the marching Armies, and the Elders the standing Garrisons of this Nation.

A Common-wealth whose Arms are in the hands of her ser∣vants, had need be scituated (as is elegantly said of Venice by Contarini Lontana, dalia ••ede degli huomini) out of the reach of such Clutches; witnesse the danger run by that of Carthage in the Rebellion of Spendius and Matho. But though a City (if one swallow make a Summer) may thus chance to be safe, yet shall she never be great; for if Carthage or Venice acquired any fame in their Arms, it is known to have happened through the meer virtue of their Captains, and not of their Orders: wherefore Israel, Lacedemon, and Rome intailed their Arms upon the prime of their Citizens, divided (at least in Lacede∣mon

and Rome) into Youth and Elders; the Youth for the Field, and the Elders for defence of the Territory.

[order 3] The third Order distributeth the Citizens into Horse and Foot by the Cense or valuation of their Estates;* 1.112 they who have above one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods, or Moneys, being obliged to be of the Horse; and they who have under, to be of the Foot. But if a man have prodigally wasted and spent his Patrimony, he is neither capable of Magistracy, Office, nor Suffrage in the Common-wealth.

Citizens are not onely to defend the Common-wealth, but according to their Abilities, as the Romans, under Servius Tul∣lius (regard had unto their Estates) were some inrolled in the Horse Centuries, and other of the Foot, with Arms enjoyned accordingly; nor could it be otherwise in the rest of the Com∣mon-wealths; though out of Remains that are so much darker it be not so clearly proveable. And the necessary prerogative to be given by a Common-wealth unto Estates in some mea∣sure is in the nature of industry, and the use of it to the Pub∣lick, (Populus Romanus, (saith Julius Exuperantius) per Classes Divisus erat, et pro Patrimonii facultate censebantur; exiis, omnes quibus res erat, ad militiam Ducebantur: diligenter enim pro victo∣ria laborabant qui ex libertate bonâ patriam defendebant: Illi autem quibus nullae opes erant, Caput suum, quod solum possidebant, cense∣bantur et bel••i tempore in moenibus residebant; facilè enim poterant existere proditores, quia egestas haud facilè habetur sine Damno. Hos igitur Marius, quibus non fuerat Resp. committenda, duxit ad bellum: and his successe was accordingly): There is a mean in things; as exorbitant riches overthrow the ballance of a Common-wealth, so Extream poverty cannot hold it, nor is by any means to be trusted with it. The clause in the Order concerning the Prodigall is Athenian, and a very Laudable one; for he that could not live upon his patrimony, if he come to touch the publick money, makes a Common-wealth Bank-rupt.

[order 4] The Fourth Order distributeth the People according unto the places of their habitation, into Parishes, Hundreds and Tribes. * 1.113

For except the People be methodically distributed, they cannot be methodically Collected: but the being of a Com∣mon-wealth consisteth in the methodicall collection of the people; wherefore you have the Israelitish Divisions into Ru∣lers of Thousands, of Hundreds, of Fifties, and of Tens; and of the whole Common-wealth, into Tribes. The Laconick into

Oba's, Mora's and Tribes; the Roman into Tribes, Centuries, and Classes; and something there must of necessity be in eve∣ry Government of like nature; as that in the late Monarchy, by Counties: But this being the onely Institution in Oceana, (except that of the Agrarian) which required any charge, or included any difficulty, engageth me unto a more particular description of the manner how it was performed, as follow∣eth.

* 1.114One thousand Surveyors Commissionated and instructed by the Lord Archon and the Councill, being divided into two equal numbers, each under the inspection of two Surveyors general were distributed into the Northern and Southern parts of the Territory, divided by the River Hemisua, the whole whereof containeth about Ten thousand Parishes, some ten of those be∣ing assigned unto each Surveyor; For as to this matter there needed no great exactnesse, it tending onely, by shewing whi∣ther every one was to repair, and where about to begin; un∣to the more orderly carrying on of the work: The nature of their Instructions otherwise regarding rather the number of the Inhabitants, then of the Parishes. The Surveyors there∣fore being every one furnished with a proportion convenient of Urns, Balls and Ballotting Boxes, (in the use whereof they had been formerly exercised) and now arriving each at his respe∣ctive Parishes, began with the People by teaching them their first lesson, which was the Ballot; and albeit they found them in the beginning somewhat Froward as at toyes, with which, while they were in Expectation of greater matters from a Councill of Legislators, they conceived themselves to be abused, they came within a while to think them pretty sport, and at length such as might very soberly be used in good Earnest; whereupon the Surveyors began the Institution inclu∣ded in

[order 5]

The Fifth Order requiring, That upon the first Munday next en∣suing the last of December,* 1.115 the bigger Bell in every Parish through∣out the Nation, be rang at eight of the Clock in the morning, and continue Ringing for the space of one Hour; and that all the Elders of the Parish respectively repair unto the Church before the Bell have done ringing; where dividing themselves into two equall Numbers, or as near Equall as may be, they shall take their places according to their Dignities if they be of divers qualities, and according to their seniority, if they be of the same, the one half on the one side, and the other half on the other, in the body of the Church; which done, they shall make oath unto the Overséers of the Parish for the time being, (instead of these the Surveyors was to officiate at the Institution or

first Assembly) by holding up their hands, to make a fair Election ac∣cording unto the Lawes of the Ballot, as they be hereafter Explained, of such persons amounting unto a Fifth part of their whole number to be their Deputies, and to exercise their power in manner hereafter explained, as they shall think in their Consciences to be fittest for that trust, and will acquit themselves of it to the best advantage of the Common-wealth. And, oath being thus made, they shall proceed unto Election, if the Elders of the Parish amount unto one Thou∣sand by the Ballot of the Tribe (as it is in due place Explained): And if the Elders of the Parish amount unto Fifty or upwards, but with∣in the Number of one Thousand, by the Ballot of the Hundred (as it is in the due place explained); But if the Elders amount not unto Fifty, then they shall procéed unto the Ballot of the Parish as it is in this place, and after this manner explained. The two Overséers for the time being, shall seat themselves at the upper end of the middle Alley, with a Table before them, their faces being towards the Con∣gregation: And the Constable for the time being shall set an Urn before the Table, into which he shall put so many Balls as there ve Elders present, whereof there shall be one that is gilded, the rest be∣ing white; and when the Constable hath shaken the Urn sufficiently to mix the Balls, tbe Overséers shall call the Elders unto the Urn, who from each side of the Church, shall come up the middle Alley in two files, every man passing by the Urn, and drawing one Ball, which if it be silver, he shall cast into a Bowl standing at the foot of the Urn, and return by the outward Alley on his side unto his place. But he who draweth the gold-Ball is the proposer, and shall be seated betwéen the Overséers, where he shall begin in what order he pleaseth, and name such as (upon his oath already taken) he conceiveth fittest to be cho∣sen, one by one unto the Elders; and the party named shall withdraw while the Congregation is in Ballotting of his name by the double Box or Boxes appointed and marked on the outward part, to shew which side is Affirmative, and which Negative, being carried by a Boy or Boyes appointed by the Overséers, unto every one of the El∣ders, who shall hold up a pellet made of linnen rags, betwéen his finger and his thumb, and put it after such a manner into the box, as though no man can see into which side he putteth it; yet any man may sée that he puts in but one pellet, or suffrage; and the suffrage of the Congregation being thus given, shall be returned with the Box or Boxes unto the Overséers, who opening the same shall pour the affirmative Balls into a white Bowl standing upon the Table on the

right hand, to be numbred by the first Overséer; and the Negative in∣to a Gréen Bowl standing on the left hand, to be numbred by the se∣cond Overséer: and the suffrages being numbred, he who hath the major part in the Affirmative, is one of the Deputies of the Parish; and when so many Deputies are chosen as amounts unto a full fifth part of the whole number of the Elders the Ballot for that time shall cease. The Deputies being chosen are to be listed by the Overséers in order as they were Chosen, save only that such as are Horse are to be listed in the first place with the rest proportionably to the number of the Congregation, after this Manner:

Anno Dom. The List of the first Mover.

A. A. ord. eq.

1. Dep.

B. B.

2. Dep.

C C.

3. Dep.

D.D.

4. Dep.

E. E.

5. Dep.

of the Parish of—in the Hun∣dred of—and the Tribe of—which Parish at the present Election containeth 20 Elders, whereof one of the Horse or Equestrian Order.

The first and second in the List are Overséers by Consequence: the third is the Constable, and the fourth and fifth are Church-Wardens; the persons so chosen are Deputies of the Parish for the space of one year from their Election, and no longer, nor may they be Elected two years together. This List, being the Primum Mobile, or first mover of the Common-wealth, is to be Registred in a Book, diligently kept and preserved by the Overséers, who are Responsible in their places for these and other Duties to be hereafter mentioned, unto the Cen∣sors of the Tribe, and the Congregation is to observe the present Order, as they will Answer the contrary unto the Phylarch, or Pre∣rogative Troop of the Tribe; which, in case of failure in the whole or any part of it, have power to Fine them or any of them, at discre∣tion, but under an Appeal unto the Parliament.

For proof of this Order, in Reason: it is with all Polititians past dispute, that paternal power is in the right of nature; and this is no other then the derivation of power from Fathers of Families, as the naturall Root of a Common-wealth; and for Experience, if it be otherwise in that of Holland, I know

no other Example of like kind. In Israel, the Soveraign power came clearly from the natural root, the Elders of the whole people, and Rome was born Comitiis Curiatis in her Parochial Congregations, out of which Romulus first raised her Senate, then all the rest of the Orders of that Common-wealth, which rose so high:* 2.1 For the depth of a Common-wealth is the just height of it.

Ipsa haeret Scopulis et tantum vertice ad auras Aethereas, quantum Radice ad Tartara, tendit.

She raises up her head unto the Skies, Neer as her Root unto the center lies.

And if the Common-wealth of Rome were born of thirty Parishes, this of Oceana was born of Ten thousand. But whereas mention in the Birth of this is made of an Equestrian Order, it may startle such as know that the division of the people of Rome at the Institution of that Common-wealth into Orders, was the occasion of her ruine. The distinction of the Patrician as an hereditary order from the very Institution, en∣grossing all the Magistracies, was indeed the destruction of Rome; but to a Knight or one of the Equestrian Order, saith Horace.

Si quadringentis sex, septem millia desunt Plebs eris.

By which it should seem that this order was no otherwise hereditary then a man's Estate, nor gave it any Claim to Ma∣gistracy; wherefore you shall never find that it disquieted the Common-wealth; nor doth the name denote any more in Oceana, then the Duty of such a mans Estate unto the Pub∣lique.

But the Surveyors both in this place and in others, for as much as they could not observe all the circumstances of this Order, especially that of the time of Election, did for the first as well as they could; and the Elections being made and Registred, took each of them Copies of those Lists which were within their allotments; which done, they produced,

The Sixth Order, directing, in case a Parson or Uicar of a Parish come to be removed by death, or by the Censors, that the Congregati∣on of the Parish Assemble and depute one or two Elders of the Bal∣lot, who upon the charge of the Parish shall repair unto one of the Universities of this Nation with a Certificate signed by the Over∣séers, and addressed unto the Uice-Chancellor; which Certificate gi∣ving

notice of the death or Removall of the Parson or Uicar, of the value of the Parsonage or Uicaridge, and of the desire of the Con∣gregation to receive a Probationer from that University; the Uice-Chancellor upon the Receipt thereof shall call a Convocation, and having made choyce of a fit person, shall return him in due time unto the Parish, where the person so returned shall receive the full fruits of the Benefice or Uicaridge, and do the duty of the Parson or Uicar, for the space of one year, as Probationer; and the space of one year being expired, the Congregation of the Elders shall put their Proba∣tioner to the Ballot; and if he attain not unto two parts in thrée of the Suffrage affirmative, he shall take his leave of the Parish, and they shall send in like manner for another Probationer: but if their Probationer attain unto two parts in thrée of the Suffrage affirma∣tive, he is the Pastor of that Parish. And the Pastour of the Parish shall pray with the Congregation, preach the Word, and administer the Sacraments unto the same, according unto the Directory to be hereafter appointed by, the Parliament. Neverthelesse such as are of gather'd Congregations, or from time to time shall joyn with any of them, are in no wise obliged to this way of Electing their Teachers, or to give their Uotes in this Case, but wholly left unto the liberty of their Conscience, and unto that way of worship which they shall choose, being not Popish, Iewish, nor Idolatrous and to the end that they may be the better protected by the State in the Frée Exercise of the same, they are desired to make choyce in such manner as they best like, of certain Magistra••es in every one of their Congregations, which we could wish might be Four in each of them▪ to be Auditors in Cases of differences, or distaste if any through variety of opinions, that may be grievous, or injurious unto them should fall out. And such Auditors or Magistrates shall have power to examine the matter and inform themselves to the end that if they think it of sufficient weight they may acquaint the Phylarch, or introduce it into the Councill of Religion; where all such Causes as such Magistrates shall introduce, shall from time to time be heard and determined ac∣cording unto such Lawes as are or shall hereafter be provided by the Parliament for the just defence of the Liberty of Conscience.

This Order consisteth of three parts, the first restoring the power of Ordination unto the people, which that it origi∣nally appertaineth unto them, is clear (though not in English, yet) in Scripture,* 2.2 where the Apostles ordained Elders by the holding up of hands in every Congregation, that is, by the suffrage

of the people which was also given in some of those Cities by the Ballot; and though it may be shewn that the Apostles ordained some by the Laying on of hands, it will not be shew∣en that they did so in every congregation.

Excommunication as not clearly proveable out of Scripture being omitted. The second part of the order implyes and e∣stablisheth a nationall Religion; for there be degrees of know∣ledge in Divine things, true Religion is not to be attained un∣to without searching the Scriptures; the Scripture cannot be searched by us unlesse we have them to search; and if we have nothing else or (which is all one) understand nothing else but a translation we may be (as in the place alleadged, we have been) beguiled or misled by the translation, while we should be searching the true sence of the Scripture, which can∣not be attained unto in a naturall way (and a Common-wealth is not to presume upon that which is supernaturall) but by the knowledge of the originall, and of Antiquity acquired by our own studies, or those of some other, for even Faith cometh by hearing. Wherefore a Common-wealth not making provision of men from time to time, knowing in the originall languages wherein the Scriptures were written and versed in those Anti∣quities whereunto they so frequently relate, that the true sense of them dependeth in a great part upon that knowledge, can never be secure that she shall not lose the Scripture, and by consequence her Religion, which to preserve she must institute some method of this knowledge, and some use of such as have acquired it, which amounteth unto a Nationall Religion.

The Common-wealth having thus performed her duty towards God, as a rational Creature by the best Application of her rea∣son unto Scripture, for the preservation of Religion in the purity of the same, yet pretendeth not unto infallibility, but comes in the third part of the order, establishing Liberty of Conscience according to the instructions given unto her Councell of Re∣ligion, to raise up her hands to Heaven, for further light, in which proceeding she followeth that (as was shewen in the preliminaries) of Israel who though her Nationall Religion were evermore a part of her Civil Law gave unto her Pro∣phets the upper hand of all her Orders.

But the Surveyours having now done with the Parishes, tooke their Leaves so, A parish is the first division of Land occasi∣oned by the first Collection of the people of Oceana,* 2.3 whose function pro∣per unto that place is comprised in the six foregoing Orders.

The next step in the progresse of the surveyours was to a meeting of the neerest of them, as their work lay, by twenties where conferring their lists and computing the Deputies con∣tained therein, as the number of them in Parishes,* 2.4 being neer∣est

neighbours, amounted unto one hundred, or as eaven as might conveniently be brought with that account, they cast them and those Parishes into the precinct which (be the Depu∣ties ever since more or fewer) is still called the hundred and un∣to every one of these Precincts they appointed a certaine place being the most convenient Towne within the same for the Annuall Randezvouz: which done, each Surveyour re∣turning unto his hundred and summoning the Deputies con∣tained in his lists unto the Randezvouz, they appeared and re∣ceived,

[order 7]

The Seventh Order, requiring, That upon the first Munday next ensuing the last of Ianuary, the Deputies of every Parish Annually assemble in Arms at the Randevouz of the Hundred, and there Elect out of their number one Iustice of the Peace, one Iury-man, one Captain one Ensign of their Troop or Century, each of these out of the Horse; and one Iury-man, one Crowner one High Constable out of the Foot; the Election to be made by the Ballot in this man∣ner the Iury-men for the time being are to be Overséers of the Bal∣lot, (instead of these, the Surveyors are to officiate at the first Assembly) and to look unto the performance of the same according to what was directed in the Ballot of the Parishes, save that the High Constable setting forth the Urn, shall have five severall suites of gold-Balls, and one Dosen of every suite whereof the first shall be marked with the letter A. the second with the letter B. the third with C. the fourth with D. and the fifth with E. And of each of these suits he shall cast one Ball into his hat or into a little Urn, and shaking the Balls to∣gether present them unto the first Overséer, who shall draw one, and the suit which is so drawn by the Overséer shall be of use for that day, and none other: for Example, if the Overséer drew an A. the High Constable shall put seven gold Balls marked with the letter A. into the Urn, with so many silver ones as shall bring them eaven with the number of the Deputies, who being sworn as before, at the Ballot of the Parish to make a fair Election, shall be called unto the Urn; and every man coming in manner as was there shewed, shall Draw one Ball, which if it be silver, he shall cast it into a Bowl standing at the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Urn, and return unto his place; but the first that draweth a gold Ball (shewing it unto the Overséers who if it have not the letter of the present Ballot hath power to apprehend and punish him), is the first Elector: the second the second Elector▪ and so to the se∣venth, which Order they are to observe in their function. The Electors as they are drawn shall be placed upon the Bench by the

Overséers, till the whole number be Compleat, and then be Conduct∣ed with the List of the Officers to be chosen, into a place apart, where being private, the first Elector shall name a person unto the first office in the List; and if the person so named being Ballotted by the rest of the Electors▪ attain not unto the better half of the Suffrages in the affirmative, the first Elector shall continue nominating others, untill one of them so nominated by him attain unto the plurality of the Suf∣frages in the affirmative, and be written first Competitor to the first office. This done, the second Elector shall observe in his turn the like order; and so the rest of the Electors naming Competitors each unto his respective office in the List, till one Competitor be chosen unto every office: and when one Competitor is chosen unto every office, the first Elector shall begin again to name a second competitor unto the first office, and the rest successively shall name unto the rest of the Offices till two Competitors be chosen unto every office, the like shall be repeated till thrée Competitors be chosen to every office: And when thrée Competitors be chosen to every office, the List shall be returned unto the Overséers, or such as the Overséers, in case they or either of them happened, be Electors, have substituted in his or their place or places: and the Overséers or Substitutes having cau∣sed the List to be read unto the Congregation, shall put the Competi∣tors in order as they are written, unto the Ballot of the Congrega∣tion; and the rest of the procéedings being carried on in the manner directed in the Fifth Order, that Competitor of the thrée written unto each office, who hath most of the Suffrages above half in the affirmative, is the Officer. The List being after this manner Com∣pleated, shall be entred into a Register, to be kept at the Randevouz of the Hundred, under inspection of the Magistrates of the same, after this manner:

Anno Domini. The List of the Nebulosa.

A.A. ord. eq.

Justice of the peace

B. B. ord. eq.

First Jury-man

C.C. ord. eq.

Captain of the Hundred

D.D. ord. eq.

Ensign

E. E.

Second Jury-man

F. F.

High Constable

G.G.

Crowner

of the Hundred of— in the Tribe of— which Hundred con∣sisteth at this Election of 105 Deputies.

The List being entred, the High Constable shall take thrée Copies of the same, whereof he shall forthwith Return one unto the Lord high Sheriffe of the Tribe; a second unto the Lord Curios Rotulorum, and a third unto the Censors (or these through the want of such Ma∣gistrates at the first muster, may be returned unto the Orator, to be ap∣pointed for that Tribe.) To the observation of all and every part of this Order, the Officers and Deputies of the Hundred are all and every of them obliged, as they will Answer it to the Phylarch, who hath power in case of failure in the whole or any part, to Fine all or any of them so failing at discretion, or according unto such Lawes as shall hereafter be provided in that Case; but under an Appeal unto the Parliament.

There is little in this order worthy of any further account, then that it answers unto the rulers of hundreds in Israel, to the Mora or Military part of the Tribe in Lacedemon, and to the Century in Rome. The Jury-men, being two in a hundred, and so forty in a Tribe, give the Latitude allowed by the Law for exceptions. And whereas the gold-balls at this Ballot be∣gin to be marked with Letters, whereof one is to be drawn immediately before it begin: This is to the end that the let∣ter being unknown, men may be frustrated of Tricks, or foul play, whereas otherwise a man might bring a gold ball with him and make as if he had drawn it out of the Urn. The Sur∣veyors when they had taken Copies of these lists, had accom∣plished their worke in the Hundreds.

* 3.1So, An Hundred is the second division of Land occasioned by the se∣cond Collection of the people, whose Civill and Military functions proper

unto this place are comprised in the foregoing order. Having stated the hundreds, they met once againe by twenties, where there was nothing more easy then to cast every twenty hundreds, as they lay most conveniently together into one Tribe,* 3.2 so the whole Territory of Oceana, consisting of about ten thousand, Parishes, came to be cast into one thousand hundreds, and in∣to fifty tribes. In every Tribe at the place appointed for the Annuall Randevouze of the same, were then, or soone after, put in hand, those buildings which are now called Pavilions,* 3.3 each of them standing with one open side, upon fair Columnes like the porch of some ancient Temple, and looking into a field, capable of the muster of some foure-thousand men: be∣fore each Pavilion, stand three pillars sustaining urnes for the Ballot, that on the right hand equall in height to the brow of an Horse-man, being called the Horse urn, that on the left hand, with Bridges on either side to bring it Equall in height with the brow of a foot-man, being called the Foot-urn; and the middle urne▪ with a bridge on the side towards the Foot-urn, the other side, as left for the horse, being without one: and here ended the whole worke of the Surveyours who returned unto the Lord Archon with this

Accompt of the Charge.

Imprimis, Urns, Balls, and Ballotting Boxes for ten thousand Parishes, the same being woodden ware,	l. 20000.	s. 0* 3.4
Item, Provisions of like kind for a thou∣sand Hundreds	3000	0
Item, Urns and Balls of Metall, with Bal∣lotting Boxes for Fifty Tribes	2000	0
Item, for erecting of Fifty Pavilions,	60000	0
Item, Wages for Four Surveyors General at 1000 l. a man	4000	0
Item, Wages for the rest of the Surveyors, being 1000, at 250 l. a man	250000	0
Sum Totall,	339000	0

No great matter of charge for the building of a Common-wealth, in regard that it hath cost (which was pleaded by the

Surveyors) as much to rigg a few ships, neverthelesse that proveth not them to be honest, nor their accompt to be just; but they had their money for once, though their reckoning be plainly guilty of a Crime, to cost him his neck that Commits it another time, it being impossible for a Common-wealth, with∣out an exact provision, that she be not abused in this kind, to subsist, if it were not in regard of the charge (though that may goe deepe) yet in regard of the debauchery and corruption, whereunto, by negligence in her accounts, she infallibly ex∣poseth her Citizens, and thereby slakeneth the publique Faith, which is the Nerve and ligament of Government. But the Surveyors being dispatched, the Lord Archon was very curi∣ous in giving names unto his Tribes, which having caused to be written in scroles cast unto an urne, and presented unto the Councellours, each of them drew one, and was accordingly sent unto the Tribe in his Lot, as Orators of the same, a magi∣stracy no otherwise instituted, then for once and Protempore, to the end that the Councill upon so great an occasion might both Congralute with the Tribes, and assiist at the first muster in some things of necessity to be differently carried from the established administration and future course of the Com∣mon-wealth.

The Orators being arrived, every one as soone as might be, at the Randevouze of his Tribe, gave notice to the hundreds, and summoned the muster, which appeared for the most part upon good horses, and already indifferently well Armed; as to instance in one for all, the Tribe of Nubia where Hermes de Caducea, Lord Orator of the same, after a short salutation and an hearty wellcome, applyed himself unto his businesse, which began with

[order 8] The Eighth Order; requiring, That the Lord High Sheriffe as Commander in Chief, and the Lord Custos Rotulorum as Muster-master of the Tribe, (or the Orator for the first Muster) upon Recep∣tion of the Lists of their Hundreds, returned unto them by the High Constables of the same, forthwith cause them to be cast up, dividing the Horse from the Foot, and listing the Horse by their names in Troops, each Troop containing about a hundred in number, to be in∣scribed first, second, or third Troop, &c. according to the Order Agréed upon by the said Magistrates: which done, they shall list the Foot in like manner, and inscribe the Companies in like order. These Lists upon the Eve of the Muster shall be delivered unto certain Trumpe∣tors and Drummers, whereof there shall be Fiftéen of each sort (as well for the present as other uses to be hereafter mentioned) stipen∣diated

by the Tribe: and the Trumpeters and Drummers shall be in the Field before the Pavilion, upon the day of the muster, so soon as it is light, where they shall stand every one with his List in his hand, at a due distance, placed according unto the order of the List; the Trumpeters with the Lists of the Horse on the right hand, and the Drummers with the lists of the Foot on the left hand: where ha∣ving sounded a while, each of them shall begin to call, and continue calling the names of the Deputies, as they come into the Field, till both the Horse and Foot be gathered by that means into their due or∣der. The Horse and Foot being in order, the Lord Lievtenant of the Tribe shall cast so many Gold Balls marked with the figures 1.2.3.4. &c. as there be Troops of Horse in the Field, together with so many silver Balls as there be Companies, marked in the same man∣ner, into a little Urn, whereunto he shall call the Captains; and the Captains drawing the Gold Balls shall command the Horse; and those that draw the Silver the Foot, each in the order of his Lot. The like shall be done by the Conductor at the same time for the Ensigns, at another Urn; and they that draw the Gold Balls shall be Cornets, the rest Ensigns.

This order may Trash the reader, but tends unto a wonder∣full speed of the Muster, to which it would be a great matter, to lose a day in ranging and martialling, whereas by vertue of this the Tribe is no sooner in the feild then in Battalia, nor sooner in Battalia then called unto the Urns or the Ballot by vertue of

[order 9] The Ninth Order; whereby the Censors (or the Orator for the first Muster) upon Reception of the Lists of the Hundreds from the High Constables, according as is directed by the Seventh Order, are to make their notes for the Urns before-hand, with regard had unto the Lists of the Magistrates, to be elected by the ensuing Orders; that is to say, by the first List called the Prime Magnitude, six; and by the second called the Gallaxy, nine. Wherefore the Censors are to put into the middle Urn for the Election of the first List twenty four Gold Balls, with twenty six blanks or silver Balls, in all sixty; and into the side Urns sixty gold-balls divided unto each according unto the different number of the Horse and the Foot; that is to say, if the Horse and the Foot be equall, equally; and if the Horse and the Foot be unequall, unequally, by an Arithmeticall proportion: The like shall be done the second day of the Muster, for the second List, save

that the Censors shall put into the middle Urn 36. Gold-Balls with 24. Blanks, in all sixty; and sixty Gold-Balls into the side Urns, divided respectively unto the number of the Horse and the Foot: and the gold-Balls in the side Urns at either Ballot are by the addition of Blanks to be brought eaven with the number of the Ballottants at either Urn respectively. The Censors having prepared their Notes, as hath béen shewn, and being come at the day into the Field, shall present a Little Urn unto the Lord High Sheriff, who is to draw twice for the Letters to be used that day, the one at the side Urns, and the other at the middle. And the Censors having fitted the Urns accordingly, shall place themselves in certain moveable Seats or Pul∣pits, (to be kept for that use in the Pavilion) the first Censor before the Horse Urn, the second before the Foot Urn, the Lord Lievte∣nant doing the office of Censor pro tempore at the middle Urn; where all and every one of them shall cause the Lawes of the Ballot to be diligently observed, taking a speciall care, that no man be suffe∣red to come above once unto the Urn (whereof it more particularly concerns the Sub-Censors, that is to say, the Overséers of every Parish, to be carefull, they being each in this regard responsible for their respective Parishes), or to draw above one Ball, which if it be Gold, he is to present unto the Censor, who shall look upon the Let∣ter; and if it be not that of the Day, and of the respective Urn, appre∣hend the party, who for this or any other like disorder, is obnoxious unto the Phylarch.

This order being observed by the Censors it is not possible for the People, if they can but draw the Balls, though they understand nothing at all of the Ballot to be out. To Philoso∣phize further upon this Art, though there be nothing more ra∣tionall, were not worth the while, because in writing it will be perplext, and the first practise of it gives the demonstrati∣on, whence it came to passe, that the Orators after some need∣lesse paines in the explanation of the two foregoing Orders, betaking himselfe to exemplify the same, found the work done unto his hand; for the Tribe as eager upon a businesse of this nature, had retained one of the Surveyors, out of whom (before the Orator arrived) they had gotten the whole mystery by a stolen muster, at which in order unto the Ballot, they had made certaine Magistrates pro tempore, wherefore he found not onely the Pavilion, (for this time a Tent) erected with three posts supplying the place of Pillars unto the urnes, but the urnes, being prepared with a just number of Balls for the

first Ballot, to become the field, and the occasion very gallant∣ly, with their covers made in the manner of Helmets, open at either Eare to give passage unto the Hands of the Ballottants, and flanting with noble Plumes to direct the March of the peo∣ple; wherefore he proceeded to

[order 10]

The Tenth Order, requiring of the Deputies of the Parishes, That upon every Munday next ensuing the last of February, they make their personall appearance, Horse and Foot in Arms accordingly, at the Randevouz of the Tribe, where being in discipline▪ the Horse upon the right and the Foot upon the left, before the Pavilion; and having made Oath by holding up their hands, upon the tender of it by the Lord High Sheriffe▪ to make Election without favour, and of such onely as they shall judge fittest for the Common-wealth; the Con∣ductor shall take 3. Balls; the one inscribed with these words [outward files,] another with these words [inward files,] and the third with these [middle files;] which Balls he shall cast into a little Urn, and present it to the Lord high Sheriff, who drawing one, shall give the words of Command, as they are thereupon inscribed, and the Ballot shall begin accordingly: For example, if the Ball be inscribed mid∣dle-files▪ the Ballot shall begin by the middle; that is, the two files that are middle to the Horse, shall draw out first to the Horse Urn, and the two files that are middle to the Foot, shall draw out first to the Foot Urn and be followed by all the rest of the Files as they are next unto them in order. The like shall be done by the inward, or by the outward Files, in case they be first called. And the Files, as every man hath drawn his Ball, if it be silver, shall begin at the Urn to Countermarch unto their places; but he that hath drawn a gold-Ball at a side Urn, shall procéed unto the middle Urn; where if the Ball he draweth be silver, he also shall Countermarch; But if it be gold, he shall take his place upon a form set crosse the Pavilion, with his face toward the Lord High Sheriff, who shall be seated in the middle of the Pavilion, with certain Clerks by him, one of which shall write down the names of every Elector, that is, of every one that drew a gold Ball at the middle Urn, and in the Order, his Ball was drawn, till the Electors amount unto six in number; and the first six Electors Horse and Foot promiscuously, are the first order of Electors; the se∣cond six (still accompting them as they are drawn) the second Order; the third six, the third Order; and the fourth six, the fourth Order of Electors: every Elector having place in his order, according unto the

order wherein he was drawn: But so soon as the first order of Electors is compleat, the Lord High Sheriff shall send them with a Copy of the following List▪ and a Clerk that understands the Ballot, forth∣with unto a little Tent standing before the Pavilion, in his eye, whereunto no other person but themselves during the Election shall approach: the List shall be written in this manner:

ANNO DOMINI, The List of the prime Magnitude or first dayes Election of Magistrates.

• * 4.11. The Lord High Sheriff, Commander in Chief
• 2. Lord Lievtenant
• 3. Lord Custos Rotullorum, Muster-master-Generall
• 4. The Conductor, being Quartermaster-Generall
• 5. The first Censor
• 6. The second Censor

of the Tribe of Nubia, containing at this pre∣sent Muster, 700 Horse, and 1500 Foot, in all 2200 Deputies.

And the Electors of the first hand or order being six, shall each of them name unto his respective Magistracy in the left, such as are not already elected in the Hundreds, till one Competitor be chosen unto every Magistracy in the List by the Ballot of the Electors of the first Order, which done, the List with the Competitors thereunto an∣nexed shall be returned unto the Lord High Mheriff, by the Clerk at∣tending that order, but the Electors shall kéep their places, for they have already given their Suffrage, and may not enter into the Ballot of Tribe. If there arise any dispute in an order of Electors, one of the Censors or sub-Censors appointed by them, in case they be Electors, shall enter into the Tent of that Order; and that Order shall stand unto his Iudgment in the decision of the Controversie. The like shall be done exactly by each other, order of Electors, being sent as they are drawn; each with another Copy of the same List, into a distinct Tent, till there he returned unto the Lord High Sheriff four Competitors unto every Magistracy in the List; that is to say,

One Competitor Elected unto every office in every one of the four Orders; which Competitors the Lord High Sheriff shall cause to be pronounced or read by a Cryer unto the Congregation, and the Con∣gregation having heard the whole Lists repeated, the names shall be put by the Lord High Sheriff unto the Tribe, one by one, beginning with the first Competitor in the first Order, thence proceeding to the first Competitor in the second Order, and so to the first in the third and fourth Orders: and the Suffrages being taken in boxes (by boyes as hath béen already shewn) shall be poured into the Bowles standing before the Censors, who shall be seated at each end of the Table in the Pavilion, the one numbring the Affirmatives, and the other the Negative; and he, of the four Competitors to the first Magistracy, that hath most above half the Suffrages of the Tribe in the Affirma∣tive, is the first Magistrate; The like is to be done successively by the rest of the Competitors in their order. But because soon after the Boxes are sent out for the first name, there be others sent out for the second, and so for the third, &c. by which means divers names are suc∣cessively at one and the same time in ballotting; the Boy that carries a Box shall sing or repeat Continually the name of the Competitor for whom that Box is carrying, with that also of the Magistracy unto which he is proposed. A Magistrate of the Tribe happening to be an Elector, may substitute any one of his own Order to execute his other Function: the Magistrates of the Prime Magnitude being thus elected, shall receive the present charge of the Tribe.

If it be objected against this order, that the Magistrates to be elected by it, will be men of more inferior rank then those of the hundreds, in regard that those are chosen first; It may be re∣membred, that so were the Burgesses in the former Govern∣ment, neverthelesse the Knights of the Shire were men of grea∣ter quality: And the election at the Hundred is made by a Coun∣cel of Electors, of whom less cannot be expected then the discre∣tion of naming persons fittest for those capacities, with an eye upon these to be elected at the Tribe. For what may be ob∣jected in the point of difficulty, it is demonstrable by the fore∣going orders, that a man might bring ten thousand men (if there were occasion) with as much ease, and as suddainly to performe the ballot, as he can make five thousand men (draw∣ing them out by double files) to march a quarter of a mile: but because at this Ballot, to go up and down the field, distri∣buting the Linnen pellets unto every Man, with which he is to ballot or give suffrage would lose a great deale of time, there∣fore

a Mans wife, his daughters or others make him his pro∣vision of pellets before the ballot; and he cometh into the field with a matter of a score of them in his pocket. And now I have as good as done with the sport. The next is,

[order 11]

The Eleventh Order, Explaining the duties and Functions of the Magistrates,* 4.2 contained in the List of the prime Magnitude: And those of the Hundreds, beginning with the Lord High Sheriff, who over and above his more ancient Offices and those added by the for∣mer Order is the first Magistrate of the Phylarch, or prerogative Troop: the Lord Lievtenant over and above his Duty mentioned, is Commander in Chief of the musters of the Youth, and second Magi∣strate of the Phylarch; the Custos Rotulorum is to return the yearly Muster-Rolles of the Tribe, as well that of the Youth as of the El∣ders unto the Rolls in Emporium, and is the third Magistrate of the Phylarch: the Censors by themselves, and their sub-Censors, that is, the Overséers of the Parishes, are to sée that the respective Lawes of the Ballot be observed in all the popular Assemblies of the Tribe: they have power also to put such Nationall Ministers, as in preaching shall intermeddle with the matter of Government, out of their livings; Except the party appeal unto the Phylarch, or unto the Councill of Religion where in that case the Censors shall prosecute All and every one of these Magistrates together with the Iustices of Peace: and the Iury-men of the Hundreds amounting in the whole number un∣to thréescore and six, are the Prerogative Troop or Phylarch of the Tribe.

[ 1] The function of the Phylarch or Prerogative Troop is five-fold; First,* 4.3 they are the Councill of the Tribe, and as such to Govern the Musters of the same according to the foregoing Orders, having Cog∣nizance of what hath passed in the Congregations, or Elections made in the Parishes or the Hundreds, with power to punish any undue practises or variation from their respective Rules and Orders, un∣der an Appeal to the Parliament. A marriage legitimately is to be pronounced by the Parochiall Congregation, the Muster of the Hun∣dred, or the Phylarch; and if a Tribe have a desire (which they are to expresse at the Muster by their Captains, every Troop by his own) to petition the Parliament, the Phylarch as the Counsell shall frame the Petition in the Pavilion, and propose it by Clauses, unto the Ballot of the whole Tribe, and the Clauses that shall be affirmed by the Bal∣lot

of the Tribe; and be signed by the hands of the six Magistrates of the Prime Magnitude, shall be received and estéemed by the Parlia∣ment as the Petition of the Tribe, and no other.

[ 2] Secondly, the Phylarch hath power to call unto their assistance what other Troops of the Tribe they please (be they Elders or Youth, whose discipline will be hereafter directed) and with these to receive the Iudges Itinerant in their Circuits, whom the Magistrates of the Phylarch shall assist upon the Bench, and the Iuries elsewhere in their proper Functions according unto the more Ancient Lawes and Cu∣stoms of this Nation.

[ 3] Thirdly, the Phylarch shall hold the Court called the Quarter-Ses∣sions according unto the Ancient Custom, and therein shall also hear Causes in order unto the Protection of Liberty of Conscience, by such Rules as are or shall hereafter be appointed by the Parliament.

[ 4] Fourthly, all Commissions, issued into the Tribes by the Parlia∣ment, or by the Chancery, are to be directed unto the Phylarch, or some of that Troop, and executed by the same respectively.

[ 5] Fifthly, In the Case of Levies of money the Parliament shall tax the Phylarchs, the Phylarchs shall tax the Hundreds, the Hundreds the Parishes, and the Parishes shall Levy it upon themselves: the Parishes having Levied the Tax money, accordingly shall return it unto the Officers of the Hundreds, the Hundreds unto the Phylarchs, and the Phylarchs unto the Exche∣quer: but if a man have ten Children living, he shall pay no taxes; if he have five living, he shall pay but half Taxes; if he have béen Mar∣ried thrée years, or be above twenty five years of age, and have no Child or Children Lawfully begotten, he shall pay double taxes: and if there happen to grow any dispute vpon these or such other Orders as shall or may hereunto be added hereafter, the Phylarch▪ shall judge the Tribes, and the Parliament shall judge the Phylarchs; for the rest, if any man shall go about to introduce the right or power of debate into any Popular Council or Congregation of this Nation, the Phylarch or any Magistrate of the Hundred or of the Tribe, shall cause him forthwith to be sent in Custody unto the Councill of War.

The part of the Order relating unto the Rolls in Emporium,* 4.4 being of singular use, is not unworthy to be somewhat better

opened; In what manner the lists of the Parishes, Hundreds and Tribes are made, hath been shewen in their respective or∣ders; whereafter the parties elected, they give account of the whole number of the Elders or Deputies in their respective assemblies or musters; the like for this part exactly, is done by the youth in their discipline (to be hereafter shewen): wherefore the lists of the Parishes Youth and Elders being summed up, give the whole number of the people able to beare Armes; and the lists of the Tribes Youth and Elders be∣ing summed up, give the whole number of the people, bear∣ing Armes. This account being annually recorded by the Ma∣ster of the Rolls is called the Pillar of Nilus, because the peo∣ple being the riches of the Common-wealth, as they are found to rise or fall by the degrees of this Pillar like that River, give account of the publique Harvest.

Thus much for the description of the first daies work at the Muster, which happened, as hath been shewen, to be done as soone as said: for as in practise it is of small dificulty, so re∣quires it not much time, seeing the great Councill of Venice consisting of a like number, begins at 12. of the Clock, and E∣lects nine Magistrates in one afternoon: But the Tribe being dismissed for this night, repaired unto their quarters, under the conduct of their new Magistrates. The next morning return∣ing into the field very early, the Orator proceeded to

[order 12]

The Twelfth Order; directing the Muster of the Tribe in the se∣cond dayes Election,* 4.5 being that of the List called the Gallaxy, in which the Censors shall prepare the Urns according to the directions given in the Ninth Order for the second Ballot, that is to say, with 36. gold-Balls in the middle Urn, making four Orders, and nine Electors in every Order according unto the number of the Magistrates in the List of the Gallaxy, which is as followeth:

• 1. Knight, To be chosen out of the Horse.
• 2. Knight To be chosen out of the Horse.
• 3. Deputy To be chosen out of the Horse.
• 4. Deputy To be chosen out of the Horse.
• 5. Deputy To be chosen out of the Horse.
• 6. Deputy To be chosen out of the Foot.
• 7. Deputy To be chosen out of the Foot.
• 8. Deputy To be chosen out of the Foot.
• 9. Deputy To be chosen out of the Foot.

The rest of the Ballot shall procéed Exactly according unto that of the first day: But for as much as the Common-wealth Demandeth as well the Fruits of a mans body as of his mind, he that hath not béen married shall not be Capable of these Magistracies untill he be mar∣ried; if a Deputy already chosen to be an Officer in the Parish in the Hundred or in the Tribe, be afterwards chosen of the Gallaxy, it shall be lawfull for him to Delegate his Office in the Parish, in the Hun∣dred, or in the Tribe, unto any one of his own order, being not al∣ready chosen into office. The Knights and Deputies being chosen, shall be brought unto the head of the Tribe by the Lord High Sheriff, who shall administer unto them this Oath, [Ye shall well and truly observe and keep the Orders and Customs of this Common-wealth which the People have Chosen.] And if any of them shall refuse the Oath, he shall be rejected; and that Competitor which had the most voices next shall be called in his place; who if he take the Oath, shall be entred in the List; But if he also refuse the Oath, he who had most voices next shall be called, and so untill the number of nine out of those Competitors which had most voices be sworn Knights and Depu∣ties of the Gallaxy: (This Clause, in regard of the late divisions, and to the end that no violence be offered unto any mans Conscience, to be of force but for the first three years only:) The Knights of the Gallaxy being elected and sworn are to repair by the Munday next ensuing the last of March unto the Pantheon or Pallace of Iustice scituate in the Metropolis of this Common-wealth, (except the Parliament through Sicknesse, or some other occasion, have adjourned unto some other part of the Nation) where they are to take their Places in the Se∣nate, and continue in full Power and Commission as Senators for the full term of thrée years next ensuing the date of their Election. The Deputies of the Gallaxy are to repair by the same day (except as before excepted) unto the Hall situated in Emporium, where they are to be listed of the Prerogative Tribe or equall Representative of the people; and to continue in full power and Commission as their Deputies for the full term of thrée years, next ensuing their Election. But for as much as the term of every Magistracy, or office in this Common-wealth requireth an equall vacation, a Knight, a Deputy of the Gallaxy having fulfilled his term of thrée years, shall not be re-elected unto the same or any other Tribe, till he have also fulfilled his thrée years vacation.

Who ever shall rightly consider the foregoing orders, will be as little able to find how it is possible, that a worshipfull Knight should declare himselfe in Ale and Biefe, worthy to serve his Country, as how my Lord High Sheriff's honour, in case he were protected from the Law, could play the Knave. But though the forgoing Orders so far as they reguard the con∣stitution of the Senate and the people, requireing no more as to an ordinary election then is therein explained, that is but one third part of their Knights and Deputies, are perfect; yet must wee in this place, and as to the Institution, of necessity erect a scaffold: For the Common-wealth to the first Creati∣on other Councills in full number, required thrice as many as are eligible by the foregoing Orders; wherefore the Gratour whose ayd in this place was most necessary, rightly informing the people of the reason, staid them two daies longer at the Muster, and tooke this course. One list containing two Knights and seven Deputies, he caused to be chosen upon the second day, which list being called the first Gallaxy, qualified the parties elected of it, with power for the Terme of one yeare and no longer; another list containing two Knights and seven Deputies more, he caused to be chosen the third day, which list being called the second Gallaxy, qualified the parties e∣lected of it with power, for the terme of two yeares and no longer. And upon the fourth day he chose the third Gallaxy according as it is directed by the Order, impowered for three yeares, which Lists successively falling (like the signes or con∣stellations of one Hemisphere, that setting cause those of the other to rise) cast the great Orbs of this Common-wealth into an Annuall Trienial and Perpetual Revolution.

The businesse of the Muster being thus happily finisht, Hermes de Caduceo, Lord Orator of the Tribe of Nubia, being now put into her first Rapture, caused one of the censors Pul∣pits to be planted in front of the squadron, and ascending into the same, spake after this manner:

My Lords the Magistrates, and the People of the Tribe of NUBIA,

WE have this day solemnized the happy Nuptialls of the two greatest Princes that are upon the Earth, or in Nature; Arms and Coun∣cills: in the Mutual Embraces whereof consisteth your whole Common-wealth: whose Councills upon their perpetuall Wheelings, Marches, and Counter-marches, create her Armies; and whose Armies with the golden Vollies of the Ballot, at once create and Salute her Councills. There be (such is the World now adaies) that think it ridiculous to see a Nation exercising her Civill fun∣ctions in military Discipline; while they committing their Buffe unto their Ser∣vants, come themselves to hold Tren∣chards: For what availeth it such as are unarmed, (or, which is all one, whose Education acquainteth them not with the proper use of their Swords) to be cal∣led Citizens? What were two or three thousand of you, well affected to your Country, but naked, unto one Troop of Mercenary Souldiers? If they should

come upon the Field and say, Gentle∣men, It is thought fit that such and such men should be chosen by you; where were your Liberty? Or, Gentlemen, Parliaments are exceeding good, but you are to have a little patience, these Times are not so fit for them; where were your Common-wealth? What causeth the Monarchy of the Turks but Servants in Arms? What was it that begot the glorious Common-wealth of Rome, but the Sword in the hands of her Citizens? wherefore my glad Eyes salute the Serenity and brightnesse of this day with a showr that shall not cloud it. Behold, the Army of Israel become a Common-wealth, and the Common-wealth of Israel remaining an Army! with her Rulers of Tens and of Fifties, her Rulers of Hundreds, and her Rulers of Thousands, drawing near, (as this day throughout our happy Fields) unto the Lot by her Tribes, encreased above threefold, and led up by her Phylarchs, or Princes, to sit (Sellis Curulibus) upon Fifty Thrones, judging the Fifty Tribes of Oceana. Or, Is it Athens, breaking from her Iron Sepulchre; where she hath been so long Trampled upon by Hosts of Janizaries? For certainly

that (nec vox hominem sonat) is the voice of Theseus, having gathered his scattered Athenians into one City.

—Haec juris sui Parere Domino Civitas vni negat: Rex ipse Populus annuas mandat vices Honoris huic, illive.—

This Free-born Nation liveth not upon the Dole or Bounty of one Man, but distributing her Annuall Magistracies and Honours with her own hand, is her self King People— (At which the Orator was a while interrupted with shouts, but at length proceeded)

— Is it grave Lacedemon in her Armed Tribe divided by her Obae and her Mora, which appears to chide me that I teach the people to talk, or con∣ceive such Language as is drest like a woman, to be a fit Usher of the Joyes of Liberty into the hearts of men? Is it Rome in her Victorious Arms (for so she held her Concio or Congregation) that Congratulateth with us, for finding out that which she could not hit on, and binding up her Comitia Curiata, Cen∣turiata, and Tributa in one inviolable League of Union? Or is it the Great

Councill of incomparable Venice, bowling forth by the self-same Ballot her immor∣tall Common-wealth? For, neither by Reason nor by her Experience is it impos∣sible that a Common-wealth should be immortall; seeing the people being the materials never dyes, and the form which is motion must without opposition, be end∣lesse: The Bowl which is thrown from your hand, if there be no rub, no impedi∣ment, shall never cease: for which cause the glorious Luminaries that are the Bowles of God, were once thrown for ever; and next these, those of Venice. But certainly, my Lords, what ever these great Examples may have shewn us, we are the first that have shewn unto the World a Common-wealth Established in her rise upon Fifty such Towers, and so Garnizoned as are the Tribes of Oceana, containing one hundred thou∣sand Elders upon the Annuall List, and yet but an out-guard; besides her march∣ing Armies to be equall in the discipline, and in the number of her Youth.

And for as much as Soveraign pow∣ers is a necessary, but a formidable crea∣ture, not unlike the Powder, which (as you are Souldiers) is at once your safety, and your danger, being subject to take

fire against you as for you; how well and securely is She by your Gallaxy's, so col∣lected as to be in full force and vigour, and yet so distributed, that it is impossi∣ble you should be blown up by your own Magazeen. Let them who will have it, that power if she be confin'd cannot be Soveraign, tell us, whether our Rivers do not enjoy a more secure and fruitfull raign within their proper banks, then if it were lawful for them, in ravishing our harvests, to spill themselves? whether soules not confin'd unto their peculiar bo∣dies do govern them any more, then those of Witches in their Trances? Whether Power not confin'd unto the bounds of Reason and Virtue, have any other bounds then those of Vice and Passion? or if Vice and Passion be boundlesse, and Reason and Virtue have certain Limits, on which of these Thrones holy men should anoint their Soveraign? But to blow away this dust, The Soveraign power of a Common-wealth is no more bounded, that is to say, Streightened, then that of a Monarch, but is Ballanced. The Ea∣gle mounteth not unto her proper pitch, if she be bounded; nor, if she be not ballanced. And lest a Monarch should think that he can reach farther with his Scepter, the

Roman Eagle upon her Ballance spread her wings from the Ocean to Euphrates. Receive the Soveraign Power; you have received her; hold her fast, em∣brace her for ever in your shining Arms: The virtue of the Loadstone is not impaired or Limited, but receiveth strength and nourishment by being bound in Iron. And so giving your Lordships much joy, I take my leave of this Tribe.

The Orator descending, had the period of his speech made with a vast applause, and exultation by the whole Tribe, at∣tending him, for that night unto his quarter, as the Phylarch, with some commanded Troops, did the next day unto the Frontires of the Tribe, where Leave was taken on both sides with more Teares then Grief.

So, A Tribe is the third division of Land occasioned by the third Collection of the People,* 5.1 whose functions proper unto that place are con∣tained in the five foregoing Orders.

The Institution of the Common-wealth was such as needed those props and Scaffolds, which may have troubled the Reader, but I shall here take them away and come unto the Constitution which stands by it selfe and yeelds a clearer prospect.

The Motions by what hath been already shewn, are Spherical,* 5.2 and sphericall motions have their proper Center, for which cause, (ere I proceed further) it will be necessary for the better understanding of the whole, that I discover the Cen∣ter whereupon the motions of this Common-wealth are formed.

The Center or Basis of every Government, is no other then the Fundamentall Lawes of the same.

Fundamentall Lawes are such as state what it is that a man may call his own, that is to say, Proprietie; and what the meanes be whereby a man may enjoy his own, that is to say Protection: the first is also called Dominion, and second Empire or Soveraigne power, whereof this (as hath been shewn) is the naturall product of the former, for such as is the Ballance of of the Dominion in a Nation, such as the nature of her Em∣pire.

Wherefore the Fundamentall Lawes of Oceana, or the Center of this Common-wealth are the Agrarian, and the Ballot. The

Agrarian by the Ballance of dominion preserving equalitie in the Roote, and the Ballot by an equall rotation conveying it into the branch, or exercise of Soveraigne power: as to begin with the former appeareth, by

[order 13]

The Thirtéenth Order, Constituting the Agrarian Lawes of Oceana, Marpesia and Panopea, whereby it is ordained, First, for all such Lands as are lying and being within the proper Tercitories of Oceana, that every man who is at present possessed, or shall hereafter be possessed of an Estate in Land excéeding the Revenue of two thou∣sand pounds a year, and having more then one Son, shall leave his Lands either equally divided among them, in case the Lands amount unto above 2000 l. a year unto each; or so near equally in case they come under, that the greater part or portion of the same remaining unto the eldest, excéed not the value of two thousand pounds Re∣venue. And no man not in present possession of Lands above the value of two thousand pounds by the year, shall receive, enjoy, (ex∣cept by Lawful Inheritance) acquire or purchase unto himself, Lands within the said Territories amounting with those already in his possession, above the said Revenue. And if a man have a daughter, or daughters, except she be an Heir, or they be Heirs he shall not leave or give unto any one of them in Marriage or otherwise for her portion above the value of one thousand five hundred pounds in Lands Gods and Moneys: Nor shall any Friend, Kinsman, or Kinswoman adde unto her or their Portion or Portions that are so provided for, to make any one of them greater: Nor shall any man demand, or have more in marriage, with any woman. Neverthelesse an Heir shall enjoy her Lawfull Inheritance, and a Widow whatsoever the bounty or affection of her husband shall bequeath unto her, to be di∣vided in the first Generation, wherein it is divisible according as hath béen shewn.

Secondly, for Lands lying and being within the Territories of Marpesia, the Agrarian shall hold in all parts as it is established in Oceana, save onely in the Standard, or Proportion of Estates in Land, which shall be set for Marpesia at five Hundred pounds.

And thirdly, for Panopea, the Agrarian shall hold in all parts, as in Oceana. And whosoever possessing above the proportion allowed by these Lawes, shall be lawfully convicted of the same, shall forfeit the overplus unto the use of the State.

Agrarian Lawes of all others have ever been the greatest Bugbears, and so in the Institution were these, at which time it was ridiculous to see, how strange a fear appeared in every body of that which, being good for all, could hurt no body. But instead of the proof of this Order, I shall out of those many debates that happened ere it could be past, insert two Speeches that were made at the Councill of Legislators, the first by the Right Honourable Philautus de Garbo, a young man, being Heir apparent unto a very Noble Family, and one of the Counsellours, who expressed himself as followeth:

May it please your Highnesse, My Lord Archon, OF Oceana,

IF I did not (to my Capacity) know from how profound a Counsellor I dis∣sent; it would certainly be no hard task to make it as light as the day; First, that an Agrarian is altogether unneces∣sary: Secondly, that it is dangerous unto a Common-wealth: Thirdly, that it is in∣sufficient to keep out Monarchy: Fourth∣ly, that it destroyes Families: Fifthly, that it destroyes Industry: And last of all, that, though it were indeed of any good use, it will be a matter of such difficulty to introduce in this Nation, and so to settle that it may be lasting, as is altoge∣ther invincible.

[ 1] First, that an Agrarian is unnecessary

unto a Common-wealth, what clearer te∣stimony can there be, than, that the Com∣mon-wealths which are our Contempora∣ries (Venice, whereunto your Highnesse giveth the upper hand of all Antiquity, being one) have no such thing? And there can be no reason why they have it not, seeing it is in the Soveraign Power at any time to establish such an Order, but that they need it not; wherefore no won∣der if Aristotle who pretends to be a good Common-wealths-man, have long since derided Phaleas, to whom it was attributed by the Greeks, for this inven∣tion.

[ 2] Secondly, That an Agrarian is dange∣rous unto a Common-wealth, is affirmed upon no sleight Authority, seeing Ma∣chiavill is positive, that it was the Dis∣sention which happened about the Agra∣rian that caused the Destruction of Rome; Nor do I think that it did much better in Lacedemon, as I shall shew anon.

[ 3] Thirdly, That it is insufficient to keep out Monarchy, cannot without im∣piety be denyed, the holy Scriptures bear∣ing Witnesse, that the Common-wealth of Israel notwithstanding her Agrarian, submitted her neck unto the Arbitrary Yoke of her Princes.

[ 4]

Wherefore to come unto my Fourth Assertion, That it is destructive unto Fa∣milies; this also is so apparent, that it needeth pity rather then proof. Why alas do you bind a Nobility, which no Generation shall deny to have been the first that freely sacrificed her blood unto the ancient Liberties of this People, up-an unholy Altar? VVhy are the People taught, That their Liberty, which except our noble Ancestors had been born, must have long since been buried, cannot now be born except we be buried?. A Com∣mon-wealth should have the innocence of the Dove: Let us leave this purchase of her birth unto the Serpent, which eat∣eth her self out of the womb of her Mo∣ther.

[ 5] But it may be said perhaps, that we are falne from our first Love, become proud and idle. It is certain (My Lords) that the hand of GOD is not upon Us for nothing; but take heed how you admit of such assaults and sallyes upon mens Estates, as may slacken the Nerve of labour, and give others also reason to be∣lieve that their sweat is vain; Or what∣soever be pretended, your Agrarian (which is my Fourth Assertion) must in∣deed destroy Industry: For, that so it

did in Lacedemon, is most apparent, as also that it could do no otherwise, where every man having his 40. Quarters of Barley, with Wine proportionable, sup∣plyed him out of his own Lot by his La∣bourer or Helott; and being confin'd in that unto the scantling above which he might not live, there was not any such thing as a Trade, or other Art, save that of War, in excercise; VVherefore a Spartane, if he were not in Arms, must sit and play with his fingers, whence ensued perpetuall VVar; And, the Estate of the Citizen being as little capable of en∣crease, as that of the Common-wealth, her inevitable Ruine. Now what better ends you can propose unto your selves in like wayes, I do not so well see, as that there may be worse; For Lacedemon yet, was free from civill VVar; but if you imploy your Citizens no better then she did, I cannot promise you that you shall fare so well, because both they are still desirous of VVar that hope it may be pro∣fitable unto them; And the strongest se∣curity you can give of Peace, is to make it gainfull; otherwise men will rather choose that whereby they may break your Lawes, then that whereby your Lawes may break them; which I do not speak so

much in relation unto the Nobility, or such as would be holding, as to the people or them that would be getting; the pas∣sion in these being of so much the more strength, as a mans felicity is weaker in the Fruition of things, then in the Pro∣secution and encrease of them.

Truly (my Lords) it is my fear, that by taking off more hands, and the best from Industry, you will farther indammage it, then can be repaired by laying on a few, and the worst: while the Nobility must be forced to send their Sons unto the Plough; and, as if this were not enough, to Marry their Daughters also unto Farmers.

[ 6] But I do not see (to come unto the last Point) how it is possible that this thing should be brought about, to your good I mean, though it may unto the Destru∣ction of many: For that the Agrarian of Israel, or that of Lacedemon might stand, is no such miracle; the Lands without any Consideration of the former Proprietor, being surveyed and cast in∣to equall Lots, which could neither be bought, nor sold, nor multiplyed; so that they knew whereabout to have a man: but in this Nation no such Division can be introduced, the Lands being already in

the hands of Proprietors, and such whose Estates lye very rarely together, but mixed one with another, being also of Tenures in nature so different; that as there is no experience that an Agrarian was ever introduced in such a case, so there is no appearance how, or reason why, it should: but that which is against Reason and Experience is impossible.

The Case of my Lord Philautus was the most concern'd in the whole Nation; for he had four younger Brothers, his Fa∣ther being yet Living unto whom he was Heir of ten thousand pounds a year: Wherefore being a man both of good parts and esteem, his words wrought both upon Mens Reason, and Passions, and had born a stroke at the head of the businesse, if my Lord Archon had not interposed the Buckler, in this Ora∣tion:

My Lords, the Legislators of Oceana,

MY Lord Philautus hath made a thing which is easie, to seem hard; if he ought the thanks unto his Eloquence, it would be worthy of lesse Praise, then that he oweth it unto his merit, and the Love he hath most deservedly purchased of all men: nor is it rationally to be fear∣ed, that he who is so much before-hand in his Private, should be in Arrear in his Publique capacity. Wherefore my Lords tendernesse throughout his Speech ari∣sing

from no other principle then his soli∣citude, lest the Agrarian should be hurt∣full unto his Country; It is no lesse then my duty to give the best satisfaction I am able unto so good a Patriot, taking every one of his doubts in the Order propo∣sed: And,

[ 1] First, Whereas my Lord, upon Obser∣vation of the Modern Common-wealths, is of opinion, that an Agrarian is not ne∣cessary; It must be confessed, that at the first sight of them there is some appea∣rance favouring his Assertion: but upon Accidents of no presidents unto us. For the Common-wealths of Switz and Holland, I mean of those Leagues, be∣ing situated in Countries not alluring the Inhabitants unto wantonness, but obliging them unto universal Industry, have an implicite Agrarian in the nature of them: and being not obnoxious unto a growing Nobility, which as long as their former Monarchies spread the wing over them, could either not at all be hat∣ched, or was soon broken; are of no Ex∣ample unto us, whose experience in this point hath been unto the Contrary. But what if even in these Governments there be indeed an explicite Agrarian? For when the Law Commands an equall,

or near equall distribution of a mans Estate in Land among his Children, as in those Countries, a Nobility cannot grow, and so there needeth no Agrarian, or is one. And for the growth of the Nobility in Venice, (if so it be, for Machiavill observes in that Republick, as a cause of it, a great mediocrity of Estates) it is not a point that she is to fear, but might study, seeing She consisteth of nothing else but Nobility; by which, what ever their Estates suck from the People, espe∣cially if it come equally, is digested in∣to the better blood of that Common-wealth, which is all, or the greatest be∣nefit they can have by accumulation; for how unequall soever you will have them to be in their Incoms, they have Officers of the Pomp, to bring them equall in ex∣pences, or at least in the ostentation or shew of them: And so unlesse the ad∣vantage of an Estate consist more in the measure then in the use of it, the Autho∣rity of Venice, but enforceth our Agra∣rian; nor shall a man evade or elude the prudence of it, by the authority of any other Common-wealth; For if a Com∣mon-wealth have been introduced at once as those of Israel and Lacedemon, you are certain to find her underlayd

with this as the main foundation; nor if she have owght more unto Fortune then Prudence, hath she raised her head without musing upon this matter, as ap∣peareth by that of Athens, which through her Defect in this point,* 7.1 saith Aristotle, introduced her Ostracisme, as most of the Democraties of Greece. [Ob hanc ita{que} causam civitates quae Democra∣tice administrantur Ostracismum in∣stituunt:] But not to restrain a Funda∣mental of such latitude unto any one kind of Government. Do we not yet see, that if there be a sole Landlord, of a vast Territory, he is the Turk? That if a few Land-Lords overballance a Po∣pulous Countrey, they have store of Ser∣vants? That if a People be in equall ballance, they can have no Lords? That no Government can otherwise be erect∣ed, then upon some one of these Foun∣dations? That no one of these Founda∣tions, (each being else apt to change into some other) can give any security unto the Government, unlesse it be fixed? That through the want of this fixation, potent Monarchies, and Common-wealths have falne upon the heads of the People, and accompanied their own sad Ruines with vast effusions of innocent

Blood? Let the Fame, as was the merit of the ancient Nobility of this Nation, be equall unto, or above what hath been already said, or can be spoken, yet have we seen not only their Glory, but that of a Throne, the most indulgent to, and least invasive for so many Ages upon the Li∣berty of a People that the World hath known, through the meer want of fixing her foot by a proportionable Agrarian up∣on her proper Foundation, to have falne with such horrour, as hath been a Specta∣cle of astonishment unto the whole earth. And were it well argued from one Cala∣mity, that we ought not to prevent ano∣ther? Nor is Aristotle so good a Com∣mon-wealths-man for deriding the inven∣tion of Phaleas, as in recollecting himself, where he saith,* 7.2 That Democraties when a Lesser part of their Citizens overtop the rest in Wealth, degenerate into Oligarchies, and Principalities: And, which comes nearer unto the pre∣sent purpose, that the greater part of the Nobility of Tarantum coming accidentally to be ruin'd, the Govern∣ment of the Few came by consequence to be changed into that of the Ma∣ny.

These things considered, I cannot see

how an Agrarian as to the fixation or se∣curity of a Government can be lesse then necessary. And if a Cure be necessa∣ry, it excuseth not the Patient, his dis∣ease being otherwise desperate, that it is dangerous; which was the Case of Rome, not so stated by Machiavill, where he saith, That the strife about the Agrarian caused the Destruction of that Common-wealth. As if when a Senator was not rich (as Crassus held) except he could pay an Army, that Com∣mon-wealth could have done other then Ruine; whether in strife about the Agra∣rian, or without it: (Nuper divitiae avaritiam & abundantes voluptates desiderium per luxum atq, libidi∣nem pereundi perdendi{que} omnia in∣vexere:* 7.3) If the greatest Security of a Common-wealth consist in being provided with the proper Antidote against this Poison, her greatest Danger must be from the absence of an Agrarian; which is the whole truth of the Roman ex∣ample: For the Laconick, I shall re∣serve the farther explication of it, as my Lord also did to another Place: and first see whether an Agrarian proportioned unto a Popular Government, be suffici∣ent to keep out Monarchy: My Lord

is for the negative, and fortified by the People of Israel electing a King. To which I say, That the Action of the Peo∣ple therein expressed is a full Answer unto the Objection of that example; For the Monarchy neither grew upon them, nor could by reason of the Agrarian pos∣sibly have invaded them, if they had not pull'd it upon themselves by the election of a King; which being an Accident, the like whereof is not to be found in any other People so planted, nor in this, till as it is manifest, they were given up by GOD unto infatuation, (for saith he to Samuel, They have not rejected Thee, but they have rejected▪ Me, that I should not Reign over them) hath something in it which is apparent, by what went before, to have been besides the Course of Nature, and by what fol∣lowed: For the King having no other foundation then the Calamities of the People, so often beaten by their Enemies, that despairing of themselves, they were contented with any Change; If he had Peace as in the dayes of Solomon, left but a slippery Throne unto his Successor, as appeared by Rehoboam. And the Agrarian, notwithstanding the Monar∣chy thus introduced, so faithfully pre∣served

the Root of that Common-wealth, that it shot oftner forth, and by intervals continued longer then any other Govern∣ment, as may be computed from the Insti∣tution of the same by Joshua, 1465. years before Christ, unto the totall Dissoluti∣on of it, which happened in the Raign of the Emperour Adrian 135. years after the Incarnation. A People planted up∣on on an equall Agrarian, and holding to it, if they part with their liberty, must do it upon good will, and make but a bad title of their bounty. As to instance yet far∣ther in that which is proposed by the pre∣sent Order to this Nation, the Standard whereof is at 2000 l. a year. The whole Territory of Oceana being divided by this proportion, amounteth unto 5000. Lots. So the Lands of Oceana being thus distributed, and bound unto this di∣stribution, can never fall unto fewer then Five thousand Proprietors. But Five thousand Proprietors so seased will not agree to break the Agrarian; for that were to agree to rob one another; Nor to bring in a King, because they must maintain him, and can have no benefit by him; Nor to exclude the People, because they can have as little by that, and must spoyl their Militia. So the Common-wealth

continuing upon the ballance pro∣posed, though it should come into Five thousand hands can never alter; And that it should ever come into Five thou∣sand hands, is as improbable as anything in the World that is not altogether im∣possible.

My Lords, other Considerations are more private: As that this Order de∣stroyes Families; which is as if one should lay the ruines of some ancient Castle unto the Herbs which do usually grow out of them; the destruction of those Families being that indeed which naturally pro∣duced this Order. For we do not now argue for that which we would have, but for that which we are already possessed of; as would appear, if a note were but taken of all such as have at this day above Two thousand pounds a year in Oceana. If my Lord should grant (and I will put it with the most) that they who are Pro∣prietors in Land, exceeding the propor∣tion, exceed not Three hundred; with what brow can the Interest of so few be ballanced with that of the whole Na∣tion? Or rather, what Interest have they to put in such a ballance? They would live as they have been accustomed to do: Who hinders them? They would enjoy

their Estates, Who touches them? They would dispose of what they have accord∣ing unto the Interest of their Families; It is that which we desire. A man hath one Son, let him be called; Would he enjoy his Fathers Estate? It is his, and his Sons, and his Sons Sons after him. A man hath five Sons, let them be called, Would they enjoy their Fathers Estate? It is divided among them; for we have four Votes for one in the same Family, and therefore this must be the Interest of the Family; or the Family knoweth not her own Interest. If a man shall dispute otherwise, he must draw his Arguments from Custom, and from Greatnesse, which was the interest of the Monarchy, not of the Family: and we are now a Common-wealth. If the Monarchy could not bear with such divisions because they tended to a Common-wealth; neither can a Common-wealth connive at such accumulations, because they tend to a Monarchy. If the Monarchy might make bold with so many for the good of one; We may make bold with one for the good of so many, nay, for the good of all. My Lords, it cometh into my head, that upon occasion of the variety of Parties enumerated in our late Civill Wars, was

said by a Friend of mine coming home from his Travels, about the latter end of these Troubles; That he admired how it came to passe, that Younger Bro∣thers, especially being so many more in number then their Elder, did not make one against a Tyranny, the like whereof hath not been exercised in any other Nation. And truly, when I consider that our Country-men are none of the worst natur'd, I must confesse I marveil much how it comes to passe, that we should use our Children, as we do our Puppies; take one, lay it in the lap, feed it with every good bit, and drown five. Nay worse; for as much as the Puppies are once drown'd, whereas the Children are left perpetually drowning. Really, my Lords, it is a flinty Custome and all this for his cruell Ambition, that would raise himself a Pillar, a golden Pillar for his Monument, though he have Children, his own reviving Flesh, and a kind of immortality. And this is that In∣terest of a Family, for which we are to think ill of a Government that will not endure it. But quiet your selves. The Land through which the River Nilus wanders in one stream, is barren, but where he parts into Seven, he multiplies

his fertile shores, by distributing, yet keeping and improving such a Proprie∣ty and Nutrition, as is a prudent Agra∣rian unto a well ordered Common-wealth.

Nor (to come unto the fifth Asser∣tion) is a Political body rendred any fit∣ter for Industry, by having one Gowty, and another withered Leg, than a natu∣rall: It tendeth not unto the improve∣ment of Merchandize that there be some who have no need of their Trading, and others that are not able to follow it. If confinement discourage Industry, an Estate in money is not confined; and lest Industry should want whereupon to work, Land is not engrossed, nor entailed upon any man, but remains at her Devo∣tion. I wonder whence the computation can arise, that this should discourage In∣dustry? Two thousand pounds a year a man may enjoy in Oceana, as much in Panopea, Five hundred in Marpesia: there be other Plantations; and the Com∣mon-wealth will have more: Who know∣eth how far the Arms of our Agrarian may extend themselves? and whether he that might have left a Pillar, may not leave a Temple or many Pillars unto his more pious Memory? Where there

is some measure in riches, a man may be rich; but if you will have them to be in∣finite, there will be no end of sterving himself, and wanting what he hath: and what pains does such an one take to be poor! Furthermore if a man shall think, that there may be an Industry lesse grea∣sie, or more noble, and so cast his thoughts upon the Common-wealth, he will have Leisure for her, and she Riches and Honours for him; his sweat shall smell like Alexander's. My Lord Philau∣tus is a young Man, who enjoying his Ten thousand pounds a year, may keep a noble House in the old way, and have homely Guests: and having but Two, by the means proposed, may take the upper hand of his great Ancestors; with reve∣rence unto whom, I may say, there hath not been one of them would have dispu∣ted his place with a Roman Consul. My Lord do not break my heart; the Nobility shall go unto no other Ploughs then those from which we call our Con∣suls. But saith he, it having been so with Lacedemon, that neither the City nor the Citizens was capable of increase, a blow was given by that Agrarian, which Ruined both. And what are we con∣cerned with that Agrarian, or that blow,

while our Citizens and our City (and that by our Agrarian) are both capable of encrease? The Spartane if he made a Conquest had not Citizens to hold it, the Oceaner will have enow: the Spar∣tane could have no Trade, the Oceaner may have all. The Agrarian in Laco∣nia, that it might bind on Knapsacks, forbidding all other Arts but that of War, could not make an Army of above 30000. Citizens. The Agra∣rian in Oceana without interruption of Traffique, provides us in the fifth part of the Youth an annuall source or fresh spring of 100000. besides our Provinciall Auxiliaries; out of which to draw marching Armies; And as many Elders, not feeble, but men most of them in the flowr of their Age, and in Arms for the defence of our Territo∣ries. The Agrarian in Laconia, ba∣nisht money; this, multiplyes it. That, allowed a matter of twenty or thirty Acres to a man; this, two or three thou∣sand: There is no Comparison between them. And yet I differ so much from my Lord, or his opinion, that the Agra∣rian was the Ruine of Lacedemon; that I hold it no lesse then demonstrable to have been her main support; For if

banishing all other diversions it could not make an Army of above 30000; then let∣ting in all other diversions, it must have broken that Army: Wherefore Lysan∣der bringing in the golden spoyles of Athens, irrecoverably ruin'd that Com∣mon-wealth; and is a warning to us, that in giving encouragement unto In∣dustry, we also remember, that Cove∣tousnesse is the root of all Evill. And our Agrarian can never be the cause of those Seditions threatened by my Lord, but is the proper cure of them, as Lucan noteth well in the State of Rome, before the Civil Wars, which happened through the want of such an Antidote;

Hinc usura vorax, rapidum{que} in tempore Foenus, Hinc concussa fides, et multis utile bellum.

Why then are we mistaken, as if we intended not equall advantages in our Common-wealth unto either Sex, because we would not have womens fortunes con∣sist in that metall, which exposeth them unto Cut-purses? If a man cut my purse, I may have him by the heels, or by the neck for it; Whereas a man may cut a

Womans purse and have her for his pains in fetters. How bruitish, and much more then bruitish, is that Common-wealth, which preferreth the Earth before the fruits of her Womb? If the people be her treasure, the staffe by which she is sustai∣ned and comforted, with what Justice can she suffer them, by whom she is most inriched, to be for that cause the most impoverished? and yet we see the gifts of God, and the bounties of Heaven in fruitful Families, through this wretched custome of marrying for money, become their insupportable grief and poverty: nor falleth this so heavy upon the lower sort, being better able to shift for themselves, as upon the Nobility or Gentry: For what availeth it in this case, from whence their veins have derived their blood; while they shall see the Tallow of a Chandler, sooner converted into that beauty which is required in a Bride? I appeal, whe∣ther my Lord Philautus or my self be the Advocate of Nobility; against which in the Case proposed by me, there would be nothing to hold the ballance. And why is a woman, if she may have but fifteen hundred pounds, undone? If she be un∣married, what Nobleman allowes his Daughter in that case a greater Reve∣nue,

then so much mony may command? And if she marry, no Nobleman can give his Daughter a greater portion then she hath. Who is hurt in this case? nay, who is not benefitted? If the Agrarian give us the sweat of our brows without diminution; if it prepare our table, if it make our Cup to over flow; and above all this, in providing for our Children, anoint our heads with that oyl which taketh away the greatest of worldly cares, what man, that is not besotted with a Covetous∣nesse as vain as endlesse, can imagine such a Constitution to be his Poverty, seeing where no woman can be considerable for her portion, no portion will be considera∣ble with a woman; and so their Children will not only find better preferments without their brocage, but more freedom of their own affections. We are wonder∣full severe in Laws, That hey shall not marry without our consent; as if it were care and tendernesse over them: But is it not, lest we should not have the other thousand pound with this Son, or the other hundred pound a year more in Joyn∣ture for that Daughter? These when we are crost in them are the sins for which we water our couch with tears, but not of Penitence; seeing whereas it is a mis∣chief

beyond any that we can do unto our enemies, we persist to make nothing of breaking the affection of our Children. But there is in this Agrarian an homage unto pure and spotlesse Love, the conse∣quence whereof I will not give for all the Romances. An Alderman maketh not his Daughter a Countesse till he have given her 20000 l. nor a Romance a considerable Mistrisse till she be a Princesse; these are characters of ba∣stard Love. But if our Agrarian ex∣clude Ambition and Covetousness, we shall at length have the care of our own breed, in which we have been curious as to that of our Dogs and our Horses. The marriage bed will be truly Legitimate, and the Race of the Common-wealth not spurious.

But (impar magnanimis ausis im∣par{que} dolori) I am hurl'd from all my hopes by my Lords last Assertion of Im∣possibility, that the Root from whence we imagine these fruits, should be plant∣ed or thrive in this soyl. And why? be∣cause of the mixture of Estates, and va∣riety of Tenures. Nevertheless there is yet extant in the Exchequer an old Survey of the whole Nation; Where∣fore such a thing is not impossible: Now

if a new survey were taken at the pre∣sent Rates, and the Law made, that no man should hold hereafter above so much Land as is valued therein at 2000 l, a year; it would amount unto a good and sufficient Agrarian. It is true, that there would remain some difficulty in the different kind of Rents; And that it is a matter requiring not only more leisure then we have; but an Authority which may be better able to bow men unto a more generall Consent, then is to be wrought out of them by such as are in our capacity: Wherefore, as to the Manner, it is necessary that we re∣fer it unto the Parliament; but as to the Matter, they can no otherwise fix their Government upon the right Ballance.

I shall conclude with a few words, to some parts of the Order, which my Lord hath omitted. As first to the Consequen∣ces of the Agrarian to be settled in Mar∣pesia, which irrepairably breaks the Aristocracy of that Nation; being of such a nature, as standing, it is not pos∣sible that you should Govern. For while the People of that Country are little

better then the Cattle of the Nobility, you must not wonder if according as these can make their Markets with Forreign Princes, you find these to be driven upon your Grounds: And if you be so tender now you have it in your Power, as not to hold an hand upon them that may prevent the Slaughter that must other∣wise ensue in like Cases, the bloud will lye at your door. But in holding such an hand upon them, you may settle the Agrarian; and in settling the Agrarian, you give the People not only Liberty, but Lands; which makes your Protecti∣on necessary to their Security; and their Contribution due unto your Protection, as to their own Safety.

For the Agrarian of Panopea, it al∣lowing such Proportions of so good Land, men that conceive themselves streight∣ned by this in Oceana, will begin there to let themselves forth, where every Citi∣zen will in time have his Villa. And there is no question, but the improvement of that Country by this means, must be far greater then it hath been in the best of former times.

I have no more to say, but that in

those ancient and heroicall Ages, when men thought that to be necessary which was virtuous; the Nobility of Athens having the People so much engaged in their Debt, that there remained no other question among these, than, which of those should be King; no sooner heard Solon speak than they quitted their Debts, and restored the Common-wealth: Which ever after held a So∣lemn and Annuall Feast called the Si∣sacthia, or Recision in memory of that Action. Nor is this example the Phoe∣nix; For at the Institution by Lycur∣gus, the Nobility having Estates (as ours here) in the Lands of Laconia, up∣on no other valuable Consideration, than the Common-wealth proposed by him, threw them up to be parcel'd by his Agrarian. But now when no man is de∣sired to throw up a farthing of his money, or a shovell full of his Earth, and that all we can do, is but to make a Virtue of ne∣cessity: We are disputing whether we should have Peace, or War; For Peace, you cannot have without some Govern∣ment, nor any Government without the proper Ballance: Wherefore if you will not fix this which you have, the rest

is blood, for without blood you can bring in no other.

By these Speeches made at the Institution of the Agrarian, you may perceive what were the Grounds of it. The next is

[order 14] The Fourteenth Order, constituting the Ballot of Venice, as it is fitted by severall alterations, and appointed unto every Assembly, to be the constant add only way of giving suffrage in this Common-wealth.

This is the generall Order, whence those branches of the Ballot, some whereof you have allready seen are derived, which with those that follow were all read and debated in this place at the Institution; when my Lord Epimonus de Gar∣rula being one of the Counsellors, and having no farther pa∣tience, (though the Rules were composed by the Agent of this Common-wealth, residing for that purpose at Venice) then to heare the direction for the Parishes, stood up, and made way for himselfe in this manner:

May it please your Highnesse, my Lord Archon,

UNder Correction of Mr. Peregrine Spy our very Learned Agent and Intelligencer; I have seen the World a little Venice, and (as Gentlemen are permitted to do) the Great Councill Ballotting. And truly, I must needs say, that it is for a dumb shew the goodliest that I ever beheld with mine Eyes. You should have some would take it ill, as if the noble Venetians thought themselves too good to speak to Strangers, but they observed them not so narrowly: The truth is, they have nothing to say unto their Acquaintance; or, Men that are in Council sure would have tongues: For, a Council, and not a word spoken in it, is a Contradiction — But there is such a pudder with their Marching and Counter-marching, as, though never a one of them draw a Sword, you would think they were Training; which till I found that they did it onely to entertain strangers, I came from among them as wise as I went thither— But in the Parliament of Oceana you had no Balls, for Dancing, but sober Conversation, a Man might know and be known; shew his parts, and improve 'em. And now if you take the advice of this same Fellow you will spoyl all with his Whimsies.— Mr▪ Speaker,— Cry you mer••y, my Lord Archon I mean; Set the wisest Man of your House in the Great Council of Venice, and you will not know him, from a Fool. Whereas nothing is more certain, then that flat and dull fellowes in the Judgment of all such as used to keep Company with them before, upon Election into our House, ha••e immediately chitted like Barley in the fat, where it acquires a new Spirit, and flow'd forth into Language, that I am as confident as I am here, if there were not such as de∣light to abuse us, is far better then Tu••ly's: Or, let any body but translate one of his Orations, and speak it in the House, and see if every body do not laugh at him. This is a great matter,

Mr. Speaker, they do not cant it with your book-Learning; your Orbs, your Centers, your prime Magnitudes, and your Nebulones, things I professe that would make a sober man run stark mad to hear 'em; while we, who should be considering the Honour of our Country, and that it goes now or never upon our hand, whether it shall be ridiculous to all the world; are going to nine-holes, or trow-Madam for our Businesse, like your dumb Venetian, whom this same Sir Politick your Resident that never saw him do any thing but make faces, would insinuate into you, at this distance, to have the onely knack of State: Whereas if you should take the pains as I have done to look a little nearer, you would find these same wonderful things to be nothing else, but meer naturall Fop∣peries or Capricio's, as they call them in Italien, even of the meanest of that Nation: For, put the Case you be travelling in Italy, ask your Contadino, that is, the next Country-fellow you meet some question, and presently he ballots you an an∣swer with a nod, which is Affirmative; or a shake with his head, which is the Negative box: Or a shrug with his shoul∣der, which is the Bossolo di non sinceri.— Good! You will admire Sandes for telling you, that Grotta di cane is a Miracle: and I shall be laughed at for assuring you, that it is nothing else but such a damp (continued by the neighbourhood of cer∣tain Sulphur-mines) as through accidental heat doth some∣times happen in our Coal-Pits. But ingratitude must not discourage an honest man from doing good. There is not, I say, such a tongue-ty'd Generation under Heaven as your Ita∣lian; that you should not wonder if he make signs. But our People must have something in their Diurnalls, we must ever and anon be telling 'em our minds; or if we be at it when we raise Taxes like those Gentlemen with the finger and the thumb, they will swear that we are Cut-purses. —Come, I know what I have heard 'em say, when some men had mo∣ny that wrought hard enough for it: and do you conceive they will be better pleased when they shall be told, that upon like occasions you are at Mum-chance or Stool-ball? I do not

speak for my self; for though I shall alwaies acknowledge, that I got more by one years sitting in the House, then by my three years Travels; it was not of that kind. But I hate that this same Spy for pretending to have plaid at Billiards with the most Serene Common-Wealth of Venice, should make such fools of us here; when I know that he must have had his intelligence from some Corn-Cutter upon the Rialta; for a noble Venetian would be hang'd if he should keep such a fel∣low Company.— And yet if I do not think he hath made you all dote, never trust me, my Lord Archon is sometimes in such strange Raptures. Why good my Lord let me be heard as well as your Aple Squire, She hath fresh blood in her Cheeks, I must confesse, but she is but an old Lady; nor has he pickt her Cabinet; these he sends you are none of her Re∣ceipts I can assure you, he bought them for a Julio at St. Marks of a Mountebank: She hath no other wash upon my knowledge for that same envy'd Complexion of hers but her Marshes, being a little better sented, saving your presence, then a Chamber-pot.— My Lords, I know what I say, But you will never have done with it, That neither the great Turk, not any of those little Turks her Neighbours have been able to spoyl her! Why you may as well wonder that Wees••ls do not suck Eggs in Swans-Nests. — Do you think that it hath layn in the Devotion of her Beads; which you that have pe••∣ked so much at Popery, are now at length resolv'd, shall Con∣secrate M. Parson, and be dropt by every one of his Congre∣gation, while those same whimsicall Intelligences your Sur∣veyors (you will break my heart) give the turn unto your Pri∣mum Mobile? and so I think they will, for you will find, that Money is the Primum Mobile, and they will turn you thus out of some three or four hundred thousand pounds. A pretty Summe for Urns, and Balls, for Boxes and Pills, which these same quacksalvers are to Administer unto the Parishes, and for what disease I mervail! Or how does it Work? Out comes a Constable, an Overseer, and a Church-warden! Mr. Speaker, I am amaz'd!

Never was there Goose so stuck with Lard as my Lord Epi∣monus's Speech with laughter, The Archon having much ado to recover himself, in such manner as might enable him to re∣turn these thanks:

IN your whole lives (my Lords) were you never entertained with so much Ingenuity; my Lord Epimonus having at once mended all the faults of Travel∣lers. For first, whereas they are abomin∣able Liars, he hath not told you (except some malicious body have mis-informed him, concerning poor Spy) one syllable of falsehood. And Secondly, whereas they never fail to give the upper hand in all their Discourses unto Forraign Nations, still justling their own into the Kennell; he bears an Honour unto his Country that will not dissolve in Cephalonia, nor be corrupted with Figs, and Melons, which I can assure you is no ordinary Obligation: and therefore hold it a matter of publick concernment, that we be no occasion of quenching my Lords Affections; nor is there any such great matter between us, but might me thinks be easily reconciled: for though that which my Lord gained by sitting in the House, I stedfastly believe, as he can affirm, was gotten fairly; yet dare I not, nor do I think, that upon consideration, he will promise so much

for other Gamesters, especially when they were at it so high, as he intimates not only to have been in use, but to be like enough to come about again. Wherefore (say I) let them throw with boxes; for un∣lesse we will be below the Politicks of an ordinary, there is no such barre unto Cog∣ing. It is known unto his Lordship, that our Game is, Most at a throw, and that every cast of our Dice is, in our Suffra∣ges; nor will be deny, that partiality in a Suffrage is downright Cogging. Now if the Venetian boxes be the most sove∣raign of all Remedies against this same Cogging: Is it not a strange thing that they should be thrown first into the fire by a fair Gamester? Men are naturally subject unto all kinds of Passion; Some you have that are not able to withstand the brow of an Enemy; And, others that make nothing of this, are lesse of proof against that of a Friend; So that if your Suffrage be bare-faced, I dare say you shall not have one fair cast in twenty. But what ever a mans fortune be at the box, he neither knoweth whom to thank, nor whom to Challenge. Wherefore (that my Lord may have a Charitable opinion of the choice Affection which I confesse to have above all other beauties, for that

of incomparable Venice) there is in this way of Suffrage no lesse then a demon∣stration that it is the most pure; and the purity of the Suffrage in a popular Go∣vernment is the health, if not the life of it; seeing the Soul is no otherwise brea∣thed into the Soveraign Power, then by the Suffrage of the People. Wherefore no wonder if Postellus be of opinion, that this use of the Ball is the very same with that which was of the Bean in Athens; or, that others, by the Text concerning Eldad and Medad, derive it from the Common-wealth of Israel. There is another thing, though not so materiall unto us, that my Lord will excuse Me, if I be not willing to yield, which is that Venice subsisteth only by her Situation; It is true, that a man in time of Warre, may be more secure from his Enemies, by being in a Citadell; but not from his Diseases; wherefore the first cause, if he live long, is his good Constitution, with∣out which his Citadell were to little pur∣pose; and it is no otherwise with Ve∣nice.

With this speech of the Archon, I conclude, the proofe of the Agrarian; and of the Ballot, being the Fundamentall Lawes of this Common-wealth: and come now from the Center to the circumferences or Orbes, whereof some have been already shewn; As how the Parishes annually poure themselves into

the Hundreds, the Hundreds into the Tribes, and the Tribes into the Gallaxy's, the Annuall Gallaxy of every Tribe consisting of two Knights, and seaven Deputies, whereof the Knights constitute the Senate; the Deputies, the Prerogative Tribe commonly called the people: and the Senate and the people constitute the Soveraigne Power, or Parliament of Oceana. Wherefore to shew what the Parliament is, I must first open the Senate, and then the people, or Prerogative Tribe.

To begin with the Senate, of which (as a man is differently represented by a Picture drawer, and by an Anatomist) I shall first discover the face or aspect, and then the parts,* 8.1 with the use of them. Every Munday-Morning in the Summer, at seaven, and in the Winter at eight, the great Bell in the Clockhouse at the Pantheon beginneth, and continueth Ringing for the space of one houre, in which time the Magistrates of the Senate, be∣ing attended according to their quality, with a respective number of the Balotines, Doore-keepers, and Messengers, and having the Ensignes of their Magistracies borne before them, as the Sword before the Strategus, the Mace before the Orator, a Mace with the Seale before the Commissioners of the Chancery, the like with the Purse before the Commissioners of the Teasury; and a Silver wand, like those in use with the Uni∣versities, before each of the Censors being Chancellors of the same. These with the Knights, in all Three hundred, Assem∣ble in the House or Hall of the Senate.

The House or Hall of the Senate, being scituated in the Pantheon or Pallace of Justice, is a roome consisting of a Square and a halfe: in the middle of the lower end is the doore, at the upper end hangeth a rich State overshaddowing the greater part of a large Throne, or halfe pace of two Stages, the first ascended by two steps from the floore, and the second about the middle, rising two steps higher. Upon this stand two Chaires, in that on the right hand sits the Strategus, in the other th•• Orator, adorned with Scarlet Robes, after the fashion that was used by the Dukes in the Aristocracy. At the right end of the upper Stage, stand three Chaires, in which the three Commissioners of the Seale are placed, and at the other end sit the three Commissioners of the Treasury, every one in a Robe, or habit like that of the Earls, of these Magistrates of this upper Stage consisteth the Signory. At either end of the lower Stage stands a little Table, to which the Sacreteries of the Senate are set with their tufted sleeves in the habit of ci∣vill Lawyers. Unto the foure-stepps, whereby the two Stages of the Throne are ascended, answer foure-long Benches, which successively deriving from every one of the stepps con∣taine their respective height, and extend themselves by the side Walls towards the lower end of the house, every bench

being divided by numerall Characters into the Thirty seaven parts or places. Upon the upper benches sit the Censors in the Robes of Barons; the first in the middle of the right hand bench, and the second directly opposite unto him on the other side. Upon the rest of the Benches sit the Knights, who if they be called unto the Urnes distributing themselves by the fiugres come in equall files, either by the first seale which con∣sisteth of the two upper benches on either side; or by the se∣cond seale consisting of the two lower benches on either side; beginning also at the upper, or at the lower ends of the same according to the Lot whereby they are called for which end the benches are open, and ascended at either end with easy staires, and large passages. The rest of the ballot is conformable unto that of the Tribe; the Censors of the house sitting at the side Urnes, and the youngest Magistrate of the Signory, at the middle; the Urnes being placed before the Throne, and prepared according unto the number of the Ma∣gistrates to be at that time chosen by the rules already given unto the Censors of the Tribes. But before the benches of the Knights on either side stands one being shorter; and at the up∣per end of this, sit the two Tribunes of the Horse; at the upper end of the other, the two Tribunes of the foot in their Armes; the rest of the benches being covered by the Judges of the Land in their Robes; but these Magistrates have no suffrage, neither the Tribunes, though they derive their presence in the Senate, from the Romans; nor the Judges, though they derive theirs, from the ancient Senate of Oceana. Every Monday, this assembly sits of course; at other times, if there be occasi∣on, any Magistrate of the House by giving order for the Bell or by his lictor, or ensigne-bearer calls a Senate; And every Magistrate or Knight during his session hath the Title, Place, and Honour of a Duke, Earle, Baron or Knight respectively. And every one that hath borne the same Magistracy (tertiò) by his third session, hath his respective place, and Ti••e during the terme of his Life, which is all the Honour conferr'd by this Common-wealth, except upon the Master of the Ceremonies, the Master of the Horse, and the King of the Heraulds, who are Knights by their Places. And thus you have the Face of the Senate, in which there is scarce any feature that is not Roman or Venetian; nor do the Hornes of this Crescent extend them∣selves much unlike those of the Sanhedrim, on either hand of the Prince, and of the Father of that Senate. But upon Beauty in which every Man hath his phansy, we will not otherwise Phylosophize then to remember that there is somthing more then decency in the Robe of a Judge, that would not be well spared from the Bench; and that the gravest Magistrate unto

whom you can commit the Sword of Justice, will find a quick∣nesse in the spurrs of Honour, which if they be not laid unto virtue, will lay themselves unto that which may rout a Com∣mon-wealth.

To come from the Face of the Senate, unto the Constitution and use of the parts: It is contained in the peculiar Orders.* 8.2 And the Orders which are peculiar unto the Senate, are either of Election, or Instruction.

Elections in the Senate are of three sorts, Annuall, Bienni∣all, and Extraordinary.

Annuall Elections are performed by the Schedule called the Tropick: and the Tropick, consisteth of two parts; the one containing the Magistrates; and the other the Councells, to be yearly elected. The Schedule or Tropick of the Magi∣strates, is as followeth in

[order 15]

The Fiftéenth Order, requiring, That upon every Munday next ensuing the last of March,* 8.3 the Knights of the Annuall Gallaxy's ta∣king their places in the Senate, be called the first Region of the same; and that the House having dismissed the third Region, and received the first, procéed unto Election of the Magistrates contained in the first part of the Tropick, bp the ensuing Schedule,

• ...The Lord Strategus. Annuall Magistrates.
• ...The Lord Orator. Annuall Magistrates.
• ...The first Censor. Annuall Magistrates.
• ...The second Censor. Annuall Magistrates.
• ...The third Commissioner of the Seal. Trienniall Magistrates.
• ...The third Commissioner of the Treasury. Trienniall Magistrates.

The Annuall Magistrates (provided that no one Man bear above one of those Honours during the term of one Session) may be elected out of any Region. But the Trienniall Magistrates may not be elected out of any other, then the third Region only, lest the term of their Session expire before that of their Honour; and (it being un∣lawful for any man to bear Magistracy any longer then he is thereun∣to qualified by the Election of the People) cause a fraction in the Ro∣tation of this Common-wealth.

The Stratêgus is first President of the Senate, and Generall of the Army,* 8.4 if it be commanded to March; in which case there shall be a second Strategus elected to be first President of the Senate, and Ge∣nerall of the second Army: and if this also be Commanded to March, a third Stratêgus shall be chosen; and so as long as the Commonwealth sendeth forth Armies.

The Lord Orator is second and more peculiar President of the Se∣nate,* 8.5 unto whom it appertaineth to keep the House unto Orders.

* 8.6The Censors, whereof the first by consequence of his Election is Chancellor of the University of Clio, and the second of that of Calli∣ope; are Presidents of the Council for Religion and Magistrates, un∣to whom it belongeth to keep the House unto the order of the Ballot. They are also Inquisi••tors into the wayes and meanes of acquiring Magistracy; and have power to punish indirect procéeding in the same, by removing a Knight or Magistrate out of the House, under ap∣peale unto the Senate.

* 8.7The Commissioners of the Seale being thrée, whereof the third is annually chosen out of the third Region, are Iudges in Chancery.

* 8.8The Commissioners of the Treasury being thrée, whereof the third is annually chosen out of the third Region, are Iudges in the Exche∣quer; and every Magistrate of this Schedule, hath right to propose unto the Senate.

* 8.9But the Strategus with the six Commissioners are the Signory of this Common-wealth having right of Session and Suffrage in every Council of the Senate, and power either joyntly or severally, to pro∣pose in all or any of them,

I have little in this Order to observe or prove, but that the Stratêgus is the same honour both in name and thing that was borne, among others, by Philopaenen and Aratus in the Common-wealth of the Achaeans; the like having been in use also with the Aetolians (Quem ut Achaei Strategon nominabant, saith Emmi∣us). The Orator, called otherwise the Speaker, is with small al∣teration the same that had been of former use in this Nation. These two, if you will, may be compared unto the Consules in Rome, or the Suffetes in Carthage, for their Magistracy is scarce different.

The Censors derive their power of removing a Senator, from those of Rome; the Government of the Ballot, from those of

Venice; and that of animadversion upon the Ambitus, or can∣vace for Magistracy, from both.

The Signory with the whole right and use of that Magistracy, to be hereafter more fully explained, is almost purely Venetian.

The second part of the Tropick is directed by

[order 16] The Sixtéenth Order, whereby the constitution of the Councils, being foure, that is to say, the Council of State, the Council of Warre, the Council of Religion, and the Council of Trade;* 8.10 is ren∣dred conformable in their Revolutions unto that of the Senate. As first, by the annuall election of five Knights, out of the third Region of the Senate, into the Council of State, consisting of fiftéene Knights, five in every Region. Secondly by the annuall election of thrée Knights out of the third Region of the Council of State, to be proposed by the Provosts and elected by that Council, into the Council of Warr, consisting of nine Knights,* 8.11 thrée in every Region not excluded by this election from remaining members also, of the Council of State: the foure Tribunes of the people have right of Session and Suffrage in the Councill of Warr. Thirdly by the an∣nuall election of foure Knights out of the third Region of the Se∣nate into the Council of Religion, consisting of twelve Knights,* 8.12 foure in every Region: of this Council, the Censors are Presidents. Fourhly by the annuall election of foure Knights out of the third Re∣gion of the Senate, into the Council of Trade, consisting of twelve Knights, four in every Region. And each Region in every one of these Councils thus constituted,* 8.13 shall wéekly and interchangeably elect one Provost, whose Magistracy shall continue for one wéeke, nor shall he be re-elected into the same till every Knight of that Regi∣on in the same Council have once borne the same Magistracy. And the Provosts being▪ one in every Region, thrée in every Councill, and twelve in all, besides their other Capacities,* 8.14 shall assemble and be a Council or rather an Academy apart; to certaine ends and pur∣poses to be hereafter farther explained with those of the rest of the Councils.

This Order is of no other use then for the frame and turne of the Councils, and yet of no small one: for in motion consist∣eth Life, and the motion of a Common-wealth will never be currant, unlesse it be circular. Men that, like my Lord Epimo∣nus, not induring the resemblance of this kind of Govern∣ment unto Orbes and Spheres, fall on Physicking and purging of it, do no more then is necessary; for if it be not in Rotati∣on

both as to Persons and Things, it will be very sick▪ The People of Rome, as to Persons, if they had not been taken up by the wheele of Magistracy, had overturned the Charriot of the Senate. And those of Lacedemon as to Things, had not been so quiet when the Senate trasht their businesse, by incroaching upon the result, if by the institution of the Ephors they had not brought it about againe. So that if you allow not a Com∣mon-wealth, her Rotation, in which consists her equality, you reduce her to a party, and then it is necessary that you be Phy∣sitians indeed, or rather Farriers; for you will have strong Pa∣tients, and such as must be halterd and cast, or your selves may need bone-setters. Wherefore the Councils of this Com∣mon-wealth, both in regard of their Elections, and, as will be shewn, of their Affaires, are uniforme with the Senate in their Revolutions, not as Whirle-pits, to swallow, but to bite, and with the scrues of their Rotation, hold and turne a businesse like the Vice of a Smith, unto the hand of the Work-man; Without Engines of which nature it is not possible for the Se∣nate, much lesse for the people, to be perfect Artificers in a Politicall capacity. But I shall not hold you longer from

[order 17] The Seaventéenth Order, directing Bienniall elections or the con∣stitution of the Orbe of Embassadours in Ordinary,* 8.15 consisting of foure Residences, the Revolution whereof is performed in eight yeares, and preserved through the election of one Ambassadour in two yeares by the ballot of the Senate to repaire unto the Court of France and re∣side there for the terme of two yeares; and the terme of two yeares being expired, to remove from thence unto the Court of Spaine, there to continue for the space of two yeares; and thence to remove unto the State of Venice; And after two yeares residence in that Citty▪ to conclude with his residence at Constantinople, for a like terme of time, and so to returne. A Knight of the Senate or a Deputy of the Prerogative may not be Elected Ambassadour in Ordinary, because a Knight or Deputy so chosen, must either lose his Session, which would cause an unevennesse in the motion of this Common-wealth, or accumulate Magistracy, which agréeth not with the equality of the same. Nor may any man be elected into this Capacity that is above five and thirty yeares of age, lest the Common-wealth lose the Charge of his education, by being deprived at his returne of the fruit of it, or else enjoy it not long▪ through the defects of nature.

This Order is the perspective of the Common-wealth whereby she foreseeth danger; or the Traffick, whereby she

receiveth every two yeares the returne of a States-man enrich∣ed with eight years experience, from the prime Martes of Ne∣gotiation in Europe. And so much for the Elections in the Senate that are ordinary, such as are extraordinary follow in

[order 18] The Eighteenth Order, appointing all Elections upon emergent occasions except that of the dictator to be made by the Scrutiny,* 8.16 or that kind of Election, whereby a Council comes to be a fifth Order of Electors. For example, if there be occasion of an Embassador Ex∣traordinary, the Provosts of the Council of State, or any two of them shall propose unto the same, till one Competitor be chosen by that Council: and the Council having chosen a Competitor shall bring his name into the Senate, which in the usuall way shall choose foure more Competitors unto the same Magistracy; and put them with the Competitor of the Council, unto the Ballot of the House, by which he of the five that is chosen, is said to be elected by the Scru∣teny of the Council of State. A Uice-Admiral, a Polemarch, or of the Council of War. A Iudge or Serjeant at Law by the Scruteny Field-Officer shall be elected after the same manner, by the Scruteny of the Commissioners of the Seale. A Baron, or considerable Officer of the Exchequer by the Scruteny of the Commissioners of the Treasury. Men in Magistracy, or out of it are equally capable of e∣lection by the Scruteny; But a Magistrate or Officer elected by the Scruteny unto a Military imployment; if he be neither a Knight of the Senate, nor a Deputy of the Prerogative ought to have his Office confirmed by the Prerogative, because the Militia in a Common-wealth▪ where the people are Soveraign, is not lawfull to be touch∣ed injussù Populi.

The Romans were so curious that though their Consuls were elected Centuriatis, they might not touch the Militia, except they were confirmed Curiatis Comitiis: for a Magistrate not receiving his power from the People, takes it from them; and to take away their Power is to take away their Liberty. As to the Election by the Scruteny it may be easily perceived to be Venetian, there being no such way to take in the knowledge, which in all reason must be best in every Council of such men as are most fit for their turnes, and yet to keepe them from the bias of particular affection or interest under that pretence: For the cause why the great Council, in Venice scarce ever e∣lects any other then the Name that is brought in by the Scrute∣ny, is very probable to be; that they may. This election is the last of those appertayning unto the Senate, the Coun∣cils

being chosen by the Orders already shewn; It remaineth that we come unto those whereby they are instructed; and the Orders of Instruction unto the Councils are two; The first for the subject Matter, whereupon they are to proceed; and the second, for the Manner of their proceeding. The subject matter of the Councils, is distributed unto them by

[order 19]

The Nineteenth Order, distributing unto every Council such busi∣nesses as are properly to belong unto their Cognizance,* 8.17 whereof some they shall receive and determine; And others they shall receive, pre∣pare and introduce into the House, as first,

The Council of State is to receive all Addresses, Intelligences and Letters of Negotiation;* 8.18 to give audience to Embassadors sent un∣to, and to draw up Instructions for such as shall be sent by this Com∣mon-wealth; to receive propositions from, and hold intelligence with the Proviniall Councils; to consider upon all Laws to be Enact∣ed, amended, or Repealed; and upon all Leavies of men, or money, Warr, or Peace, Leagues or Associations to be made by this Com∣mon-wealth, so farre forth as is conducible unto the orderly prepara∣tion of the same to be introduced by them into the Senate. Provid∣ed that all such affaires,* 8.19 as, otherwise appertayning unto the Council of State are, for the good of the Common-wealth, to be carryed with greater Secresy, be mannaged by the Council of Warr, with power to receive and send forth Agents, Spys, Emissarys, Intelligeneers, Frigots; And to mannage affaires of that nature, if it be necessary without communication unto the Senate, till such time as it may be had without detriment unto the businesse. But they shall have no power to engage the Common-wealth in a Warr, without the con∣sent of the Senate and the People. It appertaineth also unto this Council to take Charge of the Fleet as Admiral; and of all Store-Houses, Armourys, Arsenalls, and Magazines appertayning unto this Common-wealth. They shall keep a diligent record of the Mi∣litary expeditions from time to time reported by him that was Stra∣tegus or Generall, or one of the Polemarchs in that action; or at least so farr forth as the experience of such Commanders may tend un∣to the improvement of the Military discipline, which they shall di∣gest, and introduce into the Senate: and if the Senate shall thereup∣on frame any Article, they shall see that it be observed in the Musters or education of the Youth. And whereas the Council of Warr is the Centinel or Scout of this Common-wealth, if any Person or Per∣sons

shall goe about to introduce▪ Debate, into any Popular assembly of the same; or otherwise to alter the present Government, or strike at the root of it, they shall apprehend, or cause to be apprehended, seized, imprisoned; and examine, arraigne, acquit, or condemne, and cause to be executed any such Person, or Persons, of their proper Po∣wer and Authority, and without appeale.

The Council of Religion;* 8.20 as the Arbiter of this Common-wealth in cases of conscience more peculiarly appertayning unto Religion, Christian Charity, and a pious Life; shall have the care of the natio∣nall Religion, and the protection of the Liberty of Conscience, with the Cagnizance of all causes relating unto either of them. And first as to the Nationall Religion; They shall cause all places or prefer∣ments of the best Revenue in either of the Universities to be conferred upon none other then such of the most learned and pious men, as have dedicated themselves unto the study of Theology. They shall also take an especiall care that by such Augmentations as be, or shall here∣after be appointed by the Senate, every Benefice in this Nation be improved at the least unto the value of One hundred pounds a year. And to the end that there be no interest at all, whereby the Divines or Teachers of the National Religion, may be corrupted, or corrupt Religion, they shall be capable of no other kind of Imployment or Preferment in this Common-Wealth. And whereas a Directory for the administration of the Nationall Religion, is to be prepared by this Council, they shall in this and other Debates of this nature pro∣céed in manner following: A question arising in matter of Religion shall be put and stated by the Council in writing; which Writing the Censors shall send by their Beadles (being Proctors chosen to attend them) each unto the University whereof he is Chancellor; and the Uice-Chancellor of the same receiving the writing, shall call a Con∣vocation of all the Divines of that University being above fourty years of age; And the Universities upon a Point so proposed, shall have no manner of Intelligence or Correspondence one with another, untill their Debates be ended, and they have made return of their Answers unto the Council of Religion by two or thrée of their own Members, that may clear their sense if any doubt should arise, unto the Council; which done, they shall return, and the Council having received such information, shall procéed according unto their own Iudgments, in the Preparation of the whole matter for the Senate. That so the interest of the Learned being removed, there may be a

right Application of Reason into Scripture, which is the Foundation of the National Religion.

Secondly, this Council as to the Protection of the liberty of Con∣science, shall suffer no coercive Power in the matter of Religion to be exercises in this Nation. The Teachers of the National Reli∣gion being no other then such as voluntarily undertake that calling; and their Auditors or Hearers, no other then are also voluntary. Nor shall any gathered Congregation be molested or interrupted in their way of Worship (being neither Iewish nor Idolatrous) but vigi∣lantly, and vigorously protected and defended in the enjoyment pra∣ctice and profession of the same. And if there be Officers, or Audi∣tors appointed by any such Congregation, for the introduction of Causes into the Council of Religion, all such Causes so introduced shall be received, heard and determined by the same, (with recourse had if néed be unto the Senate.)

Thirdly, every Petition addressed unto the Senate, except that of a Tribe, shall be received, examined, and debated by this Council; and such only as they upon such examination and debate had shall think fit may be introduced into the Senate.

The Council of Trade being the Vena Porta of this Nation shall hereafter receive Instructions more at large:* 8.21 For the present, their experience attaining unto a right Understanding of those Trades, and Mysteries that féed the veins of this Common-wealth, and a true distinction of them from those that suck, or exhaust the same; they shall acquaint the Senate with the Conveniencies, and Inconvenien∣cies, to the end that encouragement may be applyed unto the one, and remedy to the other.

* 8.22The Academy of the Provosts being the affability of the Common-wealth, shall assemble every day towards the evening in a fair Room, having certain withdrawing Rooms thereunto belonging. And all sorts of Company that will repair thither for Conversation or dis∣course, so it be upon the matter of Government, News▪ or Intelli∣gence, or to propose any thing unto the Councils, shall be fréely and affably received in the Outer Chamber, and heard in the way of civil Conversation, which is to be managed without any other Awe or Ceremony, then thereunto is usually appertaining; to the end that

every man may be frée; and that what is proposed by one, may be ar∣gued or discourses upon by the test, except the mat••et herof secresie; in which Case the Provosts, or some of them shall take such as desi•••• Audience into one of the withdrawing Rooms; And the Provosts are to give their minds, that this Academy be so governed, adorned, and preserved, as may be most attractive unto men of parts, and good Affections unto the Common-wealth, for the excellency of the Con∣versation.

Furthermore, If any man not being able or willing to come in Person, have any advice to give which he iudgeth may be for the good of the Common-wealth, he may write his mind unto the Academy of the Provosts, in a Letter signed or not signed; which Letter shall be left with the door-kéeper of the Academy: Nor shall any Person delivering such a Letter be seized, molessed, or detained, though it should prove to be a Libell: But the Letters so delivered shall be presented unto the Provosts; and in case they be so many that they cannot well be examined by the Provosts themselves, they shall distri¦bute them as they please to be read by the Gentlemen of the Academy, who finding any thing in them materiall, will find matter of Dis∣course: Or if they happen upon a businesse that requires privacy, re∣turn it with a note upon it unto a Provost. And the Provosts by the Secretaries attending shall cause such notes out of Discourses or Letters to be taken as they please, to the end that they may propose as occasion serveth what any two of them shall think fit, out of their notes so taken unto their respective Councils: to the end that not only the Ear of the Common-wealth be open unto all, but that men of such Education being in her Eye, She may upon emergent Electi∣ons or occasions, be alwaies provided of her Choice of fit Persons.

Every Council being adorned with a State for the Signory shall be attended by two Secretaries, * 8.23 two Door-kéepers, and two Messen∣gers in ordinary, and have Power to Command more upon emergen∣cies, as occasion requireth. And the Academy shall be attended with two Secretaries, two Messengers, and two Door-kéepers; this with the other Councils being provided with their farther Conveni∣encies at the charge of the State.

But whereas it is incident unto Common-wealths upon Emer∣gences, requiring extraordinary spéed, or secresie,* 8.24 either through

their natural delayes, or unnatural haste to incur equal danger while holding unto the slow pace of their Orders they come not in time to defend themselves from some suddain blow, or breaking them for the greater spéed; they but haste unto their own Destruction: If the Senate shall at any time make Election of nine Knights extraordinary to be added unto the Council of War, as a Juncta for the term of thrée moneths. The Council of War, with the Juncta so added▪ is for the term of the same; Dictator of Oceana having power to levy men and money, to make War and Peace, as also to enact Lawes, which shall be good for the space of one year, (if they be not sooner repealed by the Senate and the People) and for no longer time, except they be con∣firmed by the Senate and the People. And the whole Administra∣tion of the Common-wealth for the term of the said thrée Moneths shall be in the Dictator; Provided, that the Dictator shall have no power to do any thing that tendeth not unto his proper end and insti∣tution; but all unto the Preservation of the Common-wealth as it is established; And, for the suddain restitution of the same unto the natural channel, and common course of Government. And all Acts, Orders, Decrées or Lawes of the Council of War with the Juncta, being thus created, shall be signed,

Dictator Oceanae.

This Order of Instructions unto the Councils, being (as in a matter of that nature is requisite) very large, I have used my best skill to abbreviate, in such manner as might shew no more of it then is necessary unto the understanding of the whole; though as to the parts, or further duties of the Councils; I have omitted many things of singular use in a Common-wealth. But it was spoken to at the Council by the Archon in this manner:

My Lords, the Legislators,

YOur Councils (except the Dicta∣tor only are proper and native Springs and Sources you see, which (hanging a few sticks and strawes, that, as lesse considerable, would otherwise be more troublesome, upon the banks of their peculiar channels) derive the full stream of businesse into the Senate, so pure, and so far from the possibility of being trou∣bled, or steined (as will undeniably ap∣pear by the Course contained in the en∣suing Order) with any kind of private interest or partiality, that it shall never be possible for any. Assemblie hearkening unto the advice or information of this or that worthy Member, either instructed upon his Pillow, or while he was making himself ready, or by the Petition or Ticket which he received at the Door; to have half the Security in his Faith, or advantage by his Wisdome: Such a Se∣nate, or Council being through the in∣certainty of the Winds, like a wave of the Sea; nor shall it otherwise mend the matter by flowing up into dry ditches, or referring Businesses to be better exa∣mined by Committees, then to go farther

about with it to lesse purpose; if it do not ebb back again with the more mudd in it. For in a Case referred to an occasi∣onall Committee, of which any Member that is desirous may get himself named, and to which nobody will come, but either for the sake of his Friend, or his own In∣terest; It fareth little better as to the Information of the Senate, then if it had been referred unto the Parties. Where∣fore the Athenians being distributed in∣to four Tribes, out of which by equall numbers they Annually chose Four hun∣dred men, called the Senate of the Bean, (because the ballot at their Election was performed by the use of Beans) divided them by Fifties, into eight parts. And every Fifty in their turn; for one eight part of the year was a Council apart called the Prytans: the Prytans in their distinct Council receiving all Com∣mers, and giving ear unto every Man that had any thing to propose concerning the Common-wealth, had power to de∣bate and prepare all the Businesses that were to be introduced into the Senate. The Achaeans had ten selected Magi∣strates called the Demiurgs, constitu∣ting a Council apart called the Synar∣chy, which with the Strategus prepared

all the Business that was introduced in∣to their Senate: But neither the Se∣nate of the Athenians, nor of the Achae∣ans, but would have wondred if a man should have told them, that they had been to receive all Comers, and Discour∣ses to the end that they might refer them afterwards unto the Prytans or the Sy∣narchy: much lesse unto an occasionall Committee, exposed unto the catch that catch may, of the parties interested. And yet Venice in this (as in most of her Or∣ders,) excells them all by the constitution of her Councils, that of the Colledge, and the other of the Dieci. The course of the Colledge is exactly described in the ensuing Order: And for that of the Dieci it so little differs from what it hath be∣stowed upon our Dictator, that I need not to make any particular description of it. But to Dictatorian power in general, and the use of it, because it must needs be of difficult digestion unto such as, peu∣king still at ancient Prudence, shew themselves to be in the Nursery of Mother-wit; it is no less then necessa∣ry to say something. And first, in a Common-wealth that is not wrought up, nor perfected, this Power will be of very frequent, if not continual use;

Wherefore it is said more then once upon defects of the Government in the Book of Judges, That, in those dayes there was no King in Israel; Nor hath the Translator (though for no King, he should have said no Judge) abused you so much; seeing that the Dictator, (and such was the Judge of Israel) or the Dictatorian Power being in a single Person, so little differs from Monar∣chy, which followed in that, that from the same cause there hath been no other effect in any Common-wealth, as in Rome was manifest by Scylla and Cae∣sar, who to make themselves Absolute or Soveraign, had no more to do, then to pro∣long their Magistracy; for Dictatoris imperium quasi Numen.* 9.1 Never∣theless, so it is, that without this Power which is so dangerous, and subject to in∣troduce Monarchy, a Common-wealth cannot be safe from falling into the like Dissolution; For unless you have an Expedient in this Case of your own, and bound up by your providence from recoyl∣ing; Expedients in some Cases you must not only have, but be beholding for them unto such whom you must trust at a pinch, when you have not leisure to stand with them for Security; which will be a thou∣sand

times more dangerous. And there can never be a Common-wealth otherwise then by the Order in debate wrought up unto that perfection; but this necessity must sometimes happen in regard of her natural slownesse and openness, and the suddainess of Assaults that may be made upon her, as also the secresie which in some cases may be of absolute necessity unto her affairs. Whence Machiavil con∣cludes it positively, That a Commonwealth unprovided of such a Refuge, must ruine; for her course is either broken by the blow, in one of those cases; or by her self, while it startles her out of her Orders. And indeed a Common-wealth is like a Grey-hound, which having once coast∣ed, will never after run fair, but grow sloathful; and when she comes to make a common practice of taking nearer wayes then her orders, she is dissolved; for the being of a Common-wealth consists in her Orders. Wherefore at this lift, you will be exposed unto danger, if you have not provided before-hand for the safety of your resort in like cases: nor is it suffi∣cient that your resort be safe, unless it be as secret, and quick; for if it be slow or open, your former inconveniences are not remedied. Now for our imitation

in this part, there is nothing in experi∣ence like that of the Council of Ten in Venice; the benefit whereof would be too long to be shewn in the whole Piece, and therefore I shall take but a pattern out of Janotti: In the War (saith he) which the Venetians had with Florence in Casentine, the Florentines finding a necessity in their affairs far from any other inclination in themselves to ask their Peace, sent Ambassadours about it unto Venice, where they were no sooner heard, then the bargain was struck up by the Council of Ten; and every body ad∣miring (seeing this Common-wealth stood upon the higher ground) what should be the reason of such haste; the Council up∣on the return of the Embassadours im∣parted Letters unto the Senate, where∣by it appeared, that the Turk had newly launched a formidable Fleet against their State; which had it been known to the Florentines, it was well enough known they would have made no Peace: Wherefore the service of the Ten was highly applauded by the Se∣nate, and celebrated by the Venetians. Whereby may appear, not only in part what use there is of Dictatorian Power in that Government, but that it is as∣sumed

at the discretion of that Council; Whereas in this of Oceana it is no other∣wise intrusted then when the Senate, in the Election of nine Knights extraordi∣nary, giveth at once the Commission, and taketh security in a ballance added unto the Council of War, though securer be∣fore by the Tribunes of the People, then that of Venice; which yet never incurr'd Jealousie: For if the younger Nobi∣lity have been often girding at it, that happened not so much through the ap∣prehension of danger in it unto the Com∣mon-wealth, as through the Awe of it upon themselves: Wherefore the Gra∣ver have doubtlesly shewn their Pru∣dence in the Law: Whereby the Ma∣gistracy of these Counsellors being to last untill their Successours be created, the Council is established.

The Instructions of the Councils for their Subject matter being shewn, it remaineth that I shew the Instructions for the manner of their proceeding, as they follow in

[order 20]

The Twentieth Order, Containing the Method of Debate, to be observed by the Magistrates, and the Councils, successively,* 9.2 in order to a Decree of the Senate.

The Magistrates of the Signory as Counsellors of this Common-wealth, shall take into their Consideration all matter of State, or of Government; and having right to propose in any Council May any one or more of them propose what Businesse he or they please in that Council whereunto it most properly belongeth: And that the Coun∣cils may be held unto their duty, the said Magistrates are super-inten∣dents,

and inspectors of the same, with right to propose unto the Se∣nate.

The Censors have equall power with these Magistrates, but in re∣lation unto the Council of Religion only.

Any two of the thrée Provosts in every Council may propose to and are the more peculiar Proposers of, the same Council; to the end that there be not only an inspection and super-intendency of Businesse in general, but that every work be also committed unto a peculiar hand.

Any one or more of the Magistrates, or any two of the Provosts respectively having proposed; the Council shall debate the businesse so proposed, to which they of the third Region that are willing shall speak first in their order; they of the second, next; and they of the third, last; and the opinions of those that proposed or spoke as they shall be thought the most considerable by the Council, shall be taken by the Secretary of the same in writing, and each of them signed with the name of the Authour.

The opinions being thus prepared, any Magistrate of the Signory, Censor, or any two of the Provosts of that Council, upon this occa∣sion may assemble the Senate.

The Senate being assembled, the Opinions (for example, if they be four) shall be read in their Order, that is, according unto the order or dignity of the Magistrates or Counsellors by which they were signed. And being read, if any of the Council introducing them will speak, they as best acquainted with the Businesse, shall have precedence, and after them the Senators shall speak according unto their Regions, be∣ginning by the third first, and so continuing till every man that will, have spoken: and when the opinions have béen sufficiently debated, they shall be put altogether unto the Ballot after this manner.

Four Secretaries carrying each of them one of the opinions in one hand, with a white box in the other, and each following another, (ac∣cording unto the order of the opinions) shall present his Box, naming the Author of his opinion unto every Senator; and one Secretary or Ballotine with a gréen Box shall follow the four white ones; and one Secretary of Ballotine with a red Box shall follow the gréen one: and every Senator shall put one Ball into some one of these six boxes. The Suffrage being gathered and opened before the Signory: If the red box or Non-sincer had above half the Suffrages, the opinions shall be all cast out, for the Major part of the House is not clear in the bu∣sinesse.

If no one of the four opinions had above half the Suffrages in the Affirmative, that which had fewest shall be cast out, and the other thrée shall be Ballotted again. If no one of the thrée had above half, that which had fewest shall be cast out, and the other two shall Ballotted again. If neither of the two had above half, that which had fewest shall be cast out, and the remaining opinion shall be Bal∣lotted again. And if the remaining opinion have not above half, it shall also be cast out. But the first of the opinions that arrives at most above half in the Affirmative is the Decrée of the Senate. The opinions being all of them cast out by the Non-cincer, may be review'd (if occasion permit) by the Council, and brought in again. If they be cast out by the Negative, the Case being of Advice only, the House approveth not, and there is an end of it: the Case being necessary, and admitting delay, the Council is to think again upon the Businesse, and to bring in new opinions, but the Case being necessary, and not ad∣mitting delay; the Senate forthwith electing the Juncta shall create the Dictator. (Et videat Dictator ne quid Resp. detrimenti capiat.)

This in case the Debate conclude not in a Decrée: but if a De∣crée be past, it is either in matter of State, or Government according to Law enacted already, and then it is good without going any far∣ther: or it is in matter of Law to be enacted, repealed, or amended, and then the Decrée of the Senate, especially if it be for a War, or for a Levy of Men or Money, is invalid, without the result of the Com∣mon-wealth, which is in the Prerogative Tribe, or Representative of the People.

The Senate having prepared a Decrée to be proposed unto the Peo∣ple, shall appoint their Proposers: and no other may propose for the Senate unto the People but the Magistrates of the House; that is to say, the thrée Commissioners of the Seal, or any two of them; the thrée of the Treasury, or any two of them; or the two Censors.

The Senate having appointed their Proposers, shall require of the Tribunes a muster of the People at a set time and place: and the Tribunes, or any two of them having muster'd the People accord∣ingly; the Proposers shall propose the sense or Decrée of the Se∣nate by Clauses unto the People. And that which is proposed by the Authority of the Senate, and resolved by the Command of the Peo∣ple, is the Law of Oceana.

To this Order, implicitely containing the sum very near of the whole civil part of the Common-wealth: My Lord Archon spoke thus in Councill:

My Dear Lords,

THere is a saying, That a man must cut his Coat ac∣cording to his Cloth. When I consider what God hath allow'd or furnished unto our present Work, I am amazed. You would have a Popular Government, He hath weighed it unto you in the present ballance as I may say to a drag me; you have no more to do, but to fix it. For the Superstructures of such a Government, they require a good Aristocracy: You have, or have had a Nobility or a Gentry the best studied, and the best Writers, at least next that of Italy, in the whole World; nor have they been inferiour when so exercised, in the leading of Armies. But the people are the main body of a Common-wealth; shew me (à Gadibus us{que} Auroram et Gangem) from the treasuries of Snow (as it is in Job) unto the burning Zone, a people whose shoulders so uni∣versally and so exactly fit the Corselet. Neverthelesse it were convenient, to be well provided with Auxiliaries: There is Marpesia through her fruitfulnesse inexhaustible, of men, and men through her barrennesse not only inured unto hardship, but bucked in your Arms. It may be said that Venice, save only that she taketh not in the People, is the most incompara∣ble Situation of a Common-wealth. You are Venice taking in your People and your Auxiliaries too. My Lords, the chil∣dren of Israel were makers of brick, before they were builders of a Common-wealth: But our brick is made, our morter temper'd, the Cedars of Lebanon are hew'd and squared unto our hands. Hath this been the work of man? or is it in man to withstand this work? Shall he that contendeth with the Almighty instruct him? He that reproveth God, let him answer it. For our parts, every thing is so laid, that when we come to have use of it, it is the next at hand; and unlesse we can con∣ceive that God and Nature do any thing in vain, there is no

more for us to do, but to dispatch. The Piece which we have reached to us in the foregoing Orders, is the Aristocracy. Athens, as hath been shewn, was plainly lost through the want of a good Aristocracy: but the sufficiency of an Aristocracy goes demonstrably upon the hand of the Nobility or Gentry: for that the Politicks can be master'd without study, or that the people can have leisure to study, is a vain imagination; and what kind of Aristocracy, Divines and Lawyers would make, let their incurable run upon their own narrow bias; and their perpetuall invectives against Machiavill (though in some pla∣ces justly reproveable, yet the only Polititian, and incompa∣rable Patron of the people) serve for instruction. I will stand no more unto the Judgment of Lawyers and Divines in this work, then unto that of so many other Tradesmen; but if the Modell chance to wander abroad, I recommend it unto the Roman Speculativi; (Garbatissimi Signori) the most Com∣pleat Gentleman of This Age; for their censure; or, with my Lord Epimonus's his leave, send three or four hundred Co∣pies unto the Agent at Venice, to be presented unto the Magi∣strates there; and when they have considered them, to be pro∣posed unto the debate of the Senate, the most competent Jud∣ges under Heaven; who though they have great Affairs, will not refuse to return you the Oracle of their Ballot. The Coun∣sellours of Princes I will not trust, they are but Journy-men. The wisdom of these later times in Princes Affairs (saith Verulamius) is rather fine deliveries and shiftings off dangers when they be near, then solid and grounded courses to keep them aloof. Their Coun∣sellours do not derive their proceedings from any sound root of Government, that may contain the demonstration, and assure the successe of them, but are expedient-mongers, givers of themselves to help a lame dog over a stile; else how com∣meth it to passe, that the same of Cardinal Richelieu hath been like thunder, whereof we hear the noise, but can make no demonstration of the reason? But to return, if neither the People, nor Divines and Lawyers can be the Aristocracy of a Nation, there remains only the Nobility, in which style,

to avoid farther repetition, I shall understand the Gentry also; as the French do by the word Noblisse.

Now to treat of the Nobility, in such sort as may be lesse ob∣noxious unto mistake; it will be convenient, and responsible unto the present occasion, that I divide my discourse into four Parts.

• The first treating of Nobility, and the kinds of it.
• The second, of their capacity of the Senate.
• The third, of the divers kinds of Se∣nates.
• The fourth, of the Senate, according unto the foregoing Orders.

Nobility may be defined divers wayes, for it is either an∣cient riches, or ancient virtue, or title confer'd by a Prince or a Common-wealth.

Nobility of the first kind may be subdivided into two other, such as hold an over-ballance in Dominion or Propriety unto the whole People: or such as hold not an over-ballance. In the former Case a Nobility (such was the Gothicks, of which sufficient hath been spoken) is incompatible with popular Government; for unto popular Government it is essential, that power should be in the people, but the overballance of a Nobility in Dominion, draweth the power unto themselves; wherefore in this sense it is that Machiavill is to be under∣stood, where he saith, (Questi tali sono pernitiosi in ogni Repub∣lica, & in ogni Provincia); that these are pernicious in a Com∣mon-wealth; and of France, Spain, and Italy, that they are Nations (lequali tutte inscieme sono la corruttela del mondo) which for this cause are the corruption of the world: for otherwise

Nobility may according unto his definition, which is, That they are such as live upon their own revenues in plenty, without en∣gagement either unto the tilling of their Lands, or other work for their livelihood; hold an underballance unto the people: In which case they are not onely safe, but necessary unto the naturall mixture of a well-ordered Common-wealth. For how else can you have a Common-wealth that is not altogether Me∣chanick? or what comparison is there of such Common-wealths, as are or come nearest to Mechanick; for example, Athens, Switz, Holland, unto Lacedemon, Rome, and Venice, plu∣med with their Aristocracies. Your mechanicks, till they have first feather'd their nests, like the Fowles of the Ayr, whose whole imployment is to seek their food, are so busied in their private concernments, that they have neither leisure to study the publick, nor are safely to be trusted with it, (quia egestas haud facile habetur sine damno) because a man is not faithfully imbarqued in this kind of ship, if he have no share in the freight. But if his share be such as gives him leisure by his private advantage, to reflect upon that of the Publick: what other name is there for this sort of men (being à leur ayte) but (as Machiavill you see calls them) Nobility? especially when their families come to be such as are noted, for their services done unto the Common-wealth, and so take into their ancient riches ancient virtue, which is the second definition of No∣bility, but such an one as is scarce possible in nature without the former. For as the Baggage (saith Verulamius) is to an Army; so are riches to Virtue; they cannot be spared nor left behind, though they be impedimenta, such as not onely hinder the march, but some∣times through the care of them lose or disturb the Victory. Of this later sort is the Nobility of Oceana; the best of all other, be∣cause they having no stamp whence to derive their price, can have it no otherwise then by their intrinsick value. The third definition of Nobility, is Title, Honour, or Distinction from the people, conferr'd or allow'd by the Prince, or the Common-wealth; and this may be in two wayes, either without any stamp or priviledge as in Oceana, or with such priviledges as

are inconsiderable, as in Athens after the battel of Plateae, whence the Nobility had no right, as such, but unto religious offices, or inspection of the publick games, whereunto they were also to be elected by the people: or with priviledges, and those considerable ones▪ as the Nobility in Athens before the battel of Plateae, and the Patricians in Rome, each of which had right, or claimed it, unto the Senate and all the Magistra∣cies; wherein for some time they only by their stamp were current.

But to begin higher, and speak more at large of Nobility in their several capacities of the Senate; (à Jove Principium) The Phylarchs or Princes of the Tribes of Israel, were the most renowned; or, as the Latine, the most noble of the Congrega∣tion, (Numb. 1.16.) whereof by hereditary right they had the leading, and judging. The Patriarchs or Princes of Fa∣milies according as they declared their pedigrees, (Numb. 1.18.) had the like right as to their Families; but neither in these nor the former was there any hereditary right unto the Sanhedrim; though there be little question but the wise men, and understanding and known among their Tribes which the people took or elected into those or other Magistracies, and Moses made Rulers over them, (Deut. 1.13.) must have been of these, seeing these could not choose but be the most known among the Tribes, and were likeliest by the advantages of education to be the most wise and understanding.

Solon having found the Athenians neither Locally nor Ge∣nealogically, but by their different wayes of life, divided in∣to four Tribes, that is, into the Souldiery, the Tradesmen, the Husbandmen, and the Goat-herds, instituted a new distribu∣tion of them, according unto the Cense or valuation of their Estates into four Classes; the first, second, and third consisting of such as were Proprietors in Land, distinguished by the rate of their free-holds, with that stamp upon them, which ma∣king them capable of honour unto their riches, that is to say, of the Senate and all the Magistracies, excluded the fourth, being the body of the people, and far greater in number then

the former three, from other right as to those capacities, then the election of these, who by this means became an hereditary Aristocracy or Senatorian Order of Nobility. This was that course which came afterwards to be the destruction of Rome, and had now ruin'd Athens; the Nobility, according to the in∣evitable nature of such an one, having laid the plot how to de∣vert the people of the result, and so to draw the whole power of the Common-wealth unto themselves; which in all like∣lihood they had done: if the people, coming by meer chance to be victorious in the battel of Plateae, and famous for defend∣ing Greece against the Persian, had not returned with such cou∣rage, as irresistibly brake the Classes, unto which of old they had born a white tooth, brought the Nobility unto equall terms, and the Senate with the Magistracies to be common unto both; the Magistracies by Suffrage, and the Senate which was the mischief of it, as I shall shew anon in that constitu∣tion, by lot only.

The Lacedemonians were in the manner, and for the same cause with the Venetians at this day, no other than Nobility▪ even according to the definition given of Nobility by Machiavill; for they neither exercised any Trade, nor labour'd their Lands or Lots, which was done by their Helots; wherefore some Nobility may be far from pernicious in a Common-wealth, by Machiavill's own testimony, who is an admirer of this; though the servants thereof were more then the Citizens. To these servants, I hold the answer of Lycurgus, when he bad him who asked, why he did not admit the people unto the Go∣vernment of his Common-wealth, go home and admit his servants unto the government of his Family, to relate; for neither were the Lacedemonians servants, nor farther capable of the Government, unlesse, whereas the Congregation had the result, he should have given them the debate also; every one of these that attained unto sixty years of age, and the ma∣jor vote of the Congregation, being equally capable of the Senate.

The Nobility of Rome and their capacity of the Senate, I have already described by that of Athens, before the battaile of Plateae, save only that the Athenian was never eligible into the Senate without the suffrage of the people, till the intro∣duction of the lot, but the Roman Nobility ever; for the patri∣Patricians were elected into the Senate by the Kings, by the Consuls, or the Censors; or if a plebeian happened to be con∣scribed, he and is posterity became patrician: nor, though the people had many disputes with the Nobility, did this ever come in controversy, which if there had been nothing else might in my judgment have been enough to overturne that Commonwealth.

The Venetian Nobility, but that they are richer, and not mi∣litary, resemble at all other points the Lacedemonian, as I have already shewn; these, Machiavill excepts from his rule, by saying, that their Estates are rather personal then real, or of any great revenue in Land: which comes unto our account, and shews, that a Nobility or party of the Nobility not over∣ballancing in Dominion, is not dangerous, but of necessary use in every Common-wealth, provided that it be rightly order∣ed; for if it be so ordered as was that of Rome, though they do not overballance in the beginning, as they did not there, it will not be long ere they do, as is clear both in reason, and that experience towards the later end. That the Nobility be capable of the Senate, is there only not dangerous, where there be no other Citizens; as in this Government, and that of Lacedemon.

The Nobility of Holland and Switz though but few, have pri∣viledges not only distinct from the people, but so great, that in some Soveraignties they have a Negative voice; an exam∣ple which I am far from commending, being such as if those Governments were not Cantonized, divided and subdivided into many petty Soveraignties that ballance one another, and in which the Nobility except they had a Prince at the head of them, can never joyn to make work, would be the most dan∣gerous

that ever was; but the Gothick, of which it savours. For in ancient Common-wealths you shall never find a Nobility to have had a negative but by the pole, which, the people be∣ing far more in number, came to nothing; whereas these have it, be they never so few, by their stamp or order.

Ours of Oceana, have nothing else but their education and their leisure for the publick, furnished by their ease and com∣petent riches; and their intrinsick value, which according as it comes to hold weight in the Judgment or Suffrage of the People, is their only way unto honour and preferment: where∣fore I would have your Lordships to look upon your Children as such, who if they come to shake off some part of their baggage, shall make the more quick and glorious march: for it was nothing else but the baggage sordidly plunder'd by the Nobility of Rome, that lost the victory of the whole World in the midst of her Triumph.

Having follow'd the Nobility thus close, they bring us, ac∣cording unto their natural course and divers kinds, unto the divers Constitutions of the Senate.

That of Israel (as was shew'd by my right noble Lord Pho∣sphorus de Auge in the opening of the Common-wealth) consist∣ed of seventy Elders, elected at the first by the people; but whereas they were for life, they ever after (though without any Divine precept for it) substituted their Successours by Ordination, which ceremony was most usually performed by imposition of hands, and by this means a Common-wealth of as popular institution as can be found, became, as it is ac∣counted by Josephus, Aristocratical. From this ordination, de∣riveth that which was introduced by the Apostles into the Christian Church; for which cause I think it is, that the Presbyterians would have the Government of the Church to be Aristocraticall; albeit the Apostles, to the end, as I conceive, that they might give no occasion unto such a mistake, but shew, that they intended the Government of the Church to be popular, Ordained Elders (as hath been shewn) by the hold∣ing

up of hands (or free Suffrage of the people) in every Congre∣gation, or Ecclesia; for that is the word in the Original, being borrow'd from the civil Congregations of the people in Athens and Lacedemon, which were so called; and the word for hold∣ing up of hands in the Text, is also the very same, which signi∣fied the Suffrage of the people in Athens, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; and the Suffrage of the Athenians was given per 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Emmius.

The Council of the Bean (as was shewn by my Lord Navarchus de Paralo, in his full discourse) being the proposing Senate of Athens (for that of the Areopagites was a Judicatory) consist∣ed of four, some say five hundred Senators, elected annually, all at once, and by a meer lot without suffrage; wherefore al∣beit the Senate, to correct the temerity of the lot, had power to cast out-such as they should judge unworthy of that honour; this related to manners only, and was not sufficient to repair the Common-wealth, which by such means became impo∣tent; and for as much as her Senate consisted not of the natu∣ral Aristocracy, which in a Common-wealth is the onely spur and rein of the people, was cast headlong by the rashnesse of her Demagogs or Grandees into ruine; while her Senate, like the Roman Tribunes, (qui ferè semper regebantur à multitudine magis quam regebant) proposed not unto the Result only,* 10.1 but unto the Debate also of the people, who were therefore called unto the Pulpits, where some vomited, and others drunk poi∣son.

The Senate of Lacedemon (most truly discover'd by my Lord Laco de Scytale) consisted but of 30 for life, whereof the two Kings having but single votes, were hereditary, the rest ele∣ctive by the free Suffrage of the people, but out of such as were sixty years of age; these had the whole debate of the Common-wealth in themselves, and proposed unto the result only of the people: and now the riddle which I have hereto∣fore found troublesome to unfold, is out; that is to say, why Athens and Lacedemon consisting each of the Senate and the People, the one should be held a Democracy, and the other an

Aristocracy, or laudable Oligarchy, as it is termed by Isocrates; (for that word is not, where ever you meet it, to be branded, seeing it is used also by Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, some∣times in a good sense)▪ The main difference was, that the peo∣ple in this had the result only, and in that the debate and re∣sult too. But for my part, where the people have the election of the Senate, not bound unto a distinct order, and the result which is the Soveraign power, I hold them to have that share in the Government, (the Senate being not for life) whereof, with the safety of the Common-wealth, they are capable in nature, and such a Government for that cause to be Democracy; though I do not deny, but in Lacedemon the paucity of the Se∣nators considered, it might be called Oligarchy, in comparison of Athens; or, ••f we look upon their continuance for life, though they had been more, Aristocracy.

The Senate of Rome (whose fame hath been heard to thunder in the Eloquence of my Lord Stolo de Enyo) consisting of 300, was in regard of the number, lesse Oligarchicall then that of La∣cedemon, but more in regard of the Patrician, who having an hereditary capacity of the same were not elected unto that honour by the people: but being Conscribed by the Censors, enjoy'd it for life: wherefore these if they had had their wills, would have resolv'd as well as debated; which set the people at such variance with them, as dissolv'd the Common-wealth: whereas if the people had enjoy'd the result, as well that about the Agrarian, as all other strife, must of necessity have cea∣sed.

The Senates of Switzs and Holland (as I have learnt of my Lords Alpester, and Glaucus) being bound up, like the sheaf of Arrowes which this gives, by leagues, lie like those in their quivers; But Arrowes when they come to be drawn, fly some this way, and some that: and I am contented that these concern us not.

That of Venice (by the faithful testimony of my most excel∣lent

Lord Linceus de Stella) hath obliged a world, sufficiently punisht by its own blindnesse or ingratitude, to repent and be wiser: for whereas a Common-wealth in which there is no Senate, or where the Senate is corrupt, cannot stand: the Great Council of Venice like the Statua of Nilus, leans upon an Urn or Water-pot, which poureth forth the Senate in so pure and perpetual a stream, as being unable to instagnate, is for ever uncapable of corruption. The fuller description of this Senate is contained in that of Oceana; and that of Oceana in the foregoing Orders. Unto every one of which, because something hath been already said, I shall not speak in parti∣cular. But in general, your Senate (and the other Assembly, or the Prerogative, as I shall shew in due place) are perpe∣tuall, not as Lakes or Puddles, but as the Rivers of Eden; and are beds made, as you have seen, to receive the whole people, by a due and faithful Vicissitude into their current. They are not, as in the later way, alternate. Alternate life in Government, is the alternate death of it.

Ut fratrem Pollux alternâ morte redemit.

This was the Gothick Work, whereby the former Govern∣ment was not only a ship, but a gust too; could never open her sailes, but in danger to overset her self: neither make any Voyage, nor lye safe in her own Harbour. The Wars of later Ages (saith Verulamius) seem to be made in the dark, in respect of the glory and honour, which reflected upon men from the Wars in ancient times. Their shipping of this sort was for Voyages, ours dare not launch: nor lye they safe at home. Your Gothick Polititians seem unto me rather to have invent∣ed some new ammunition▪ or Gunpowder, in their King and Parliament (duo fulmina belli) then Government. For what is become of the Princes (a kind of people) in Germany? blown up. Where are the Estates, or the Power of the people in France? blown up. Where is that of the people in Aragon, and the rest of the Spanish Kingdoms? blown up. On the

other side, where is the King of Spain's power in Holland? blown up. Where is that of the Austrian Princes in Switz? blown up. This perpetual peevishnesse and jealousie, under the alternate Empire of the Prince and of the People, is ob∣noxious unto every Spark. Nor shall any man shew a reason that will be holding in prudence, why the people of Oceana have blown up their King, but that their Kings did not first blow up them: The rest is discourse for Ladies. Wherefore your Parliaments are not henceforth to come out of the bag of Aeolus, but by the Gallaxy's, to be the perpetual food of the fire of Vesta.

Your Gallaxy's which divide the House into so many Re∣gions are three, one of which constituting the third region is annually chosen, but for the term of three years; which cau∣seth the house having blooms, fruit half ripe, and others drop∣ing off in full maturity, to resemble an Orange-Tree: such as is at the same time an education or spring, and an harvest too; for the people have made a very ill choice in the man, who is not easily capable of the perfect knowledge in one year of the Senatorian Orders; which knowledge allowing him for the first to have been a Novice, brings him the second year unto practice, and time enough; for at this rate you must alwaies have two hundred knowing men in the Government: and thus the vicissitude of your Senators is not perceiveable in the sted∣dinesse and perpetuity of your Senate, which, like that of Ve∣nice, being alwaies changing, is for ever the same: and though other Polititians have not so well imitated their pat∣tern, there is nothing more obvious in nature, seeing a man who wears the same flesh but a short time, is neverthelesse the same man, and of the same Genius; and whence is this but from the constancy of nature in holding a man unto her Orders? Wherefore hold also unto your Orders; but this is a mean request, your Orders will be worth little, if they do not hold you unto them: wherefore imbarque. They are like a ship, if you be once aboard, you do not carry them, but they you;

and see how Venice stands unto her tacklin, you will no more forsake them, then you will leap into the Sea.

But they are very many, and difficult. O my Lords, what Seaman casts away his Carde because it hath four and twenty points of Compasse? and yet those are very near as many, and as difficult as the Orders in the whole Circumference of your Common-wealth. Consider; how have we been tossed with every wind of Doctrine, lost by the glib tongues of your Dema∣gogs and Grandees in our own Havens? A Company of Fid∣lers that have disturbed your rest for your groat; two to one, three thousand pounds a year to another, hath been nothing: and for what? is there one of them that yet knowes what a Common-wealth is? And are you yet afraid of such a Govern∣ment in which these shall not dare to scrape, for fear of the Sta∣tute? Themistocles could not fiddle, but could make of a small City a great Common-wealth: these have fiddled, and for your money, till they have brought a great Common-wealth to a small City.

It grieves me, while I consider how, and from what causes, imaginary difficulties will be aggravated, that the foregoing Orders are not capable of any greater clearnesse in discourse or writing: But if a man should make a book, describing every trick or passage, it would fare no otherwise with a game at Cards; and this is no more, if a man play upon the square. There is a great difference (saith Verulamius) between a cunning man and a wise man, (between a Demagog and a Legislator) not onely in point of honesty, but in point of ability: As there be that can pack the Cards, and yet cannot play well; so there be some that are good in canvasses and factions, that are otherwise weak men. Allow me but these Orders, and let them come with their Cards in their sleeves, or pack if they can. Again, (saith he) it is one thing to understand persons, and another to understand mat∣ters; for many are perfect in mens humours, that are not greatly ca∣pable of the reall part of businesse: which is the constitution of one that hath studied men, more then books: but there is nothing more

hurtfull in a State, than that cunning men passe for wise. His words are an Oracle. As Dionysius, when he could no longer exer∣cise his tyranny among men, turned School-master, that he might exercise it among boyes: Allow me but these Orders, and your Grandees so well skilled in the baites and palates of men, shall turn Rat-catchers.

And whereas Councils (as is discreetly observed by the same Authour in his time) are at this day, in most places but familiar meetings, (somewhat like the Academy of Provosts) where mat∣ters are rather talked on then debated; and run too swift to order an Act of Council: Give me my Orders, and see if I have not trash∣ed your Demagogs.

It is not so much my desire to return upon haunts, as theirs that will not be satisfied; wherefore if notwithstanding what was said of dividing and choosing in our Preliminary discour∣ses, men will yet be returning unto the question, Why the Se∣nate must be a Council apart; though even in Athens, where it was of no other constitution then the Popular Assembly, the distinction of it, from the other, was never held lesse then ne∣cessary: this may be added unto the former reasons, that if the Aristocracy be not for the Debate, it is for nothing; but if it be for the Debate, it must have convenience for it: and what convenience is there for debate in a crowd, where there is nothing but jostling, treading upon one another, and stir∣ring of blood, than which in this case there is nothing more dangerous? Truly, it was not ill said of my Lord Epimonus, That Venice playes her Game as it were at billiards or nine-holes; and so may your Lordships, unlesse your ribs be so strong, that you think better of football; for such sport is de∣bate in a Popular Assembly, as, notwithstanding the distincti∣on of the Senate, was the destruction of Athens.

This Speech concluded the Debate which happened at the Institution of the Senate: the next Assembly is that of the Peo∣ple, or Prerogative Tribe.

The Face, or nime of the Prerogative Tribe for the Arms,* 10.2 the Horses, and the Discipline, but more especially for the se∣lect

Men, is that of a very noble Regiment, or rather of two; the One of Horse, divided into three Troops, (besides that of the Provinces, which will be shewn hereafter) with their Captains, Cornets, and two Tribunes of the Horse at the head of them. The other of Foot in three Companies (besides that of the Provinces) with their Captains, Ensigns, and two Tri∣bunes of the Foot at the head of them. The first Troop is cal∣led the Phoenix; the second the Pelican; and the third the Swallow. The first Company the Cypresse; the second, the Mir∣tle; and the third the Spray. Of these again, (not without a near resemblance of the Roman Division of a Tribe) the Phoe∣nix and the Cypresse constitute the first Classis; the Pelican and the Myrtle, the second; and the Swallow with the Spray the third, renewed every Spring by

[order 21] The One and Twentieth Order, Directing, that upon every Mon∣day next ensuing the last of March,* 10.3 the Deputies of the annuall Gal∣laxy arriving at the Pavilion in the Halo, and electing one Captain and one Cornet of the Swallow (Trienniall Officers) by and out of the Cavalry at the Horse Urn, according unto the Rules contained in the Ballot of the Hundred: And one Captain with one Ensign of the Spray (Trienniall Officers) by and out of the Infantry at the Foot Urn, after the same way of ballotting: Constitute and become the third Classis of the Prerogative Tribe.

Seven Deputies are annually returned by every Tribe, whereof three are Horse, and four are Foot; and there be fifty Tribes, so the Swallow must consist of 150 Horse, the Spray of 200 Foot; and the rest of the Classes being two, each of them in number equal••; the whole Prerogative (besides the Provinces, that is, the Knights and Deputies of Marpesia and Panopea,) must consist of 1050 Deputies, It is right. And these Troops and Companies may as well be called Centuries as those of the Romans; for the Romans related not, in so naming theirs, unto the number: And whereas they were distributed according unto the valuation of their Estates, so are these; which by virtue of the last Order, are now accommodated with their Triennial Officers; but there be others appertain∣ing unto this Tribe, whose Election being of far greater Im∣portance is Annual, as followeth in

[order 22] * 10.4The Twenty second Order; Whereby the first Classis having Elected their Trienniall Officers, and made Oath unto the Old Tri∣bunes, That they will neither introduce, cause nor to their power suffer debate to be introduced into any popular Assembly of this Go∣vernment,

but to their utmost be ayding and assisting to seize and de∣liver any Person or Persons in that way offending and striking at the Root of this Common-wealth unto the Councill of War; are to pro∣céed with the other two Classes of the Prerogative Tribe to Election of the New Tribunes, being four Annual Magistrates, whereof two are to be elected out of the Cavalry at the Horse-Urn, and two out of the Infantry at the Foot-Urn, according unto the Common ballot of the Tribes: And they may be promiscuously Chosen out of any Classis, provided that the same Person shall not be capable of beating the Tribunitian Honour twice in the term of one Gallaxy. The Tribunes thus chosen shall receive the Tribe (in reference to the pow∣er of Mustering and Disciplining the same) as Commanders in Chief: and for the rest as Magistrates, whose proper function is pre∣scribed by the next Order. The Tribunes may give leave unto any number of the Prerogative not excéeding one hundred at a time, to be absent, so they be not Magistrates, nor Officers, and return within thrée moneths; If a Magistrate or Officer, have necessary occasion, he may also be absent for the space of one moneth; provided, that there be not above thrée Cornets or Ensigns, two Captains or one Tribune so absent at one time.

To this the Archon spoke at the Institution, after this man∣ner▪

My Lords,

It is affirmed by Cicero in his Oration for Flaccus, That the Common-wealths of Greece were all shaken or ruined▪ by the intemperance of their Comitia, or Assemblies of the People. The truth is, if good heed in this point be not taken, a Common-wealth will have bad Leggs. But all the World knowes he should have excepted Lacedemon, where the People (as hath been shewn by the Oracle) had no power at all of De∣bate, nor (till after Lysander, whose Avarice opened a Gulph▪ that was not long ere it swallowed up his Country) came it ever to be exercised by them: Whence that Common-wealth stood longest and firmest of any other, but this, in our dayes, of Venice; which having underlaid her Self with the like In∣stitution,

owes a great, if not the greatest part of her steadi∣nesse unto the same principle; the great Council, which is with her the People, by the Authority of my Lord Epimonus, never speaking a word. Nor shall any Common-wealth where the People in their political capacity is talkative, ever see half the dayes of one of these: But being carried away by Vain-glorious Men (that, as Overbury sayes, Pisse more then they drink) Swim down the sink; as did Athens, the most prating of these Dames, when that same ranting fellow Alci∣biades fell on Demagoging for the Sicilian War. But where∣as Debate by the Authority and experience of Lacedemon and Venice, is not to be committed unto the People in a well orde∣red Government; It may be said, That the Order specify'd is but a slight barre in a matter of like danger; For so much as an Oath, if there be no recourse upon the breach of it, is a weak tye for such hands as have the Sword in them. Where∣fore what should hinder the People of Oceana if they happen not to regard an Oath, from assuming Debate, and making themselves as much an Anarchy as those of Athens? To which I answer, Take the Common sort in a private Capacity, and except they be injured, you shall find them to have (Verecun∣diam Patrum) a bashfulnesse in the presence of the better sort, or wiser Men; acknowledging their abilities by attention; and accounting it no mean Honour to receive respect from them. But if they be injured by them, they hate them, and the more for being wise, or great, because that makes it the greater injury. Nor refrain they in this Case from any kind of intemperance of speech, if of Action. It is no otherwise with a People in their political Capacity; You shall never find that they have assum'd Debate for it self, but for some∣thing else: Wherefore in Lacedemon where there was, and in Venice where there is, nothing else for which they should as∣sume it, they have never shewn, so much as an inclination to it. Nor was there any appearance of such a desire in the Peo∣ple of Rome, (who from the time of Romulus had been very

well contented with the Power of Result either Comitiis Curia∣tis, as it was settled upon them by him; or Centuriatis, as it was alter'd in their regard for the worse by Servius Tullius) till news was brought some fifteen years after the exile of Tarquine their late King (during which time, the Senate had governed passing well) that he was dead at the Court of Aristodemus the Tyrant of Cumae. (Eo nuncio erecti patres, erecta Plebs. Sed Patribus nimis luxuriosa ea fuit laetitia: Plebi,* 11.1 cui ad eam diem sum∣mâ ope inservitum erat, injuriae à Primoribus fieri coepêre) Where∣upon the Patricians, or Nobility began to let out the hitherto dissembled Venom, which is inherent in the root of Oligarchy, and fell immediately upon injuring the People beyond all mo∣deration: For whereas the People had served both gallantly and contentedly in Arms, upon their own Charges, and though joynt Purchasers by their Swords of the conquer'd Lands, had not participated in the same, to above two Acres a man, the rest being secretly usurped by the Patricians: they through the meannesse of their support, and the greatnesse of their ex∣pence, being generally indebted, no sooner returned home with Victory to lay down their Arms, then they were snatcht up by their Creditors the Nobility, to cram Goales: Where∣upon (but with the greatest modesty that was ever known in the like case) they first fell upon debate (Se foris pro libertate & imperio dimicantes, domi à civibus captos & oppressos esse: tu∣tiorem{que} in bello quam in pace, inter hostes quam inter cives, liberta∣tem plebis esse): It is true, that when they could not get the Se∣nate (through fear, as was pretended by the Patricians) to as∣semble and take their grievances into Consideration, they grew so much warmer, that it was glad to meet: Where Ap. Claudius, a fierce Spirit, was of opinion, That recourse should be had unto Consular power, whereby some of the brands of Sedition being taken off, the flame might be extin∣guisht: Servilius being of another temper, thought it better and safer to try if the People might be bow'd, than broken. But this debate was interrupted by tumultuous news of the near

approach of the Volsci, a case in which the Senate had no re∣course but to the People, who contrary unto their former custom upon like occasions would not stir afoot, but fell on laughing, and saying, (Patres militarent patres arma caperent, ut penes eosdem pericula belli, penes quos praemia, essent) Let them fight that have something to fight for. The Senate that had purses, and could not sing so well before the Thief, being in great perplexity, found no possible way out of it, but to be∣seech Servilius, one of a Genius well known to be Popular, That he would accept of the Consulship, and make some such use of it as might be helpful to the Patrician interest. Servilius accepting of the offer, and making use of his Interest with the people, perswaded them to hope well of the good intention of the Fathers, whom it would little beseem to be forced unto those things which would lose their Grace, and that in view of the enemy, if they came not freely; and withall published an Edict, That no man should with-hold a Citizen of Rome by Imprisonment from giving his Name (for that was the way, as I shall have opportunity hereafter to shew more at large, whereby they drew out their Armies) nor seize, nor sell any Mans Goods or Children that was in the Camp; Whereupon the people with a mighty Concourse immediate∣ly took Arms, marched forth, and (which to them was as easie as to be put into the humour, and that as appears in this place was not hard) totally defeated the Volsci first, then the Sabines, (for the neighbour Nations, hoping to have had a good bargain of the Discord in Rome were up on all sides) and after the Sabines, the Aurunci. Whence returning victorious in three Battels, they expected no lesse then that the Senate would have made good their Words. When Appius Clau∣dius the other Consul of his innate Pride, and that he might frustrate the faith of his Collegue, caused the Souldiers (who being set at liberty had behaved themselves with such valour) to be restored at their return unto their Creditors, and their Gaoles. Great resort upon this was made by the People un∣to Servilius, shewing him their Wounds, calling him to wit∣witnesse

how they had behaved themselves, and minding him of his promise. Poor Servilius was sorry, but so over aw'd with the headinesse of his Collegve, and the obstinacy of the whole faction of the Nobility; that not daring to do any thing either way, he lost both Parties: the Fathers conceiving that he was Ambitious, and the People that he was False: while the Consul Claudius continuing to countenance such as daily seized and imprisoned some of the indebted People, had still new, and dangerous Controversies with them, insomuch that the Common-wealth was torn with horrid Division, and the Peo∣ple (because they found it not so safe, or so effectual in Pub∣lique) minded nothing but laying their heads together in pri∣vate Conventicles. For this A. Virginius, and Titus Vetusius the new Consuls were reproved by the Senate as slothfull, and upbraided with the Virtue of Ap. Claudius. Whereupon the Consuls having desired the Senate, that they might know their pleasure, shewed afterwards their readinesse to obey it, by summoning the People according unto command, and requi∣ring Names whereby to draw forth an Army for diversion, but no man would answer. Report hereof being made unto the Senate, the younger sort of the Fathers grew so hot with the Consuls, that they desired them to abdicate the Magistra∣cy, which they had not the courage to defend.

The Consuls, though they conceived themselves to be rough∣ly handled, made this soft Answer: Fathers Conscript, that you may please to take notice it was foretold, some horrid Sedition is at hand: We shall onely desire, that they whose valour in this place is so great, may stand by us to see how we behave our Selves, and then be as resolute in your Commands as you Will: Your Fatherhoods may know if we be wanting in the performance.

At this, some of the hot bloods returned with the Consuls unto the Tribunal, before which the People were yet stand∣ing, and the Consuls having generally required Names, in vain, (to put it unto something) required the name of one that was in their eye particularly; on whom, when he moved not,

they commanded a Lictor to lay hands; but the People throng∣ing about the party summon'd, forbad the Lictor who durst not touch him; at which the Hot-spurs that came with the Consuls, enraged by the affront, descended from the Throne to the ayd of the Lictor; from whom in so doing they turned the indignation of the People upon themselves with such heat, that the Consuls interposing, thought fit by remitting the As∣sembly, to appease the Tumult; in which neverthelesse there had been nothing but noise. Nor was there lesse in the Se∣nate, being suddainly rally'd upon this occasion, where they that received the Repulse, with others, whose heads were as addle as their own, fell upon the businesse as if it had been to be determined by Clamour, till the Consuls, upbraiding the Senate, that it differ'd not from the Market-place, reduced the House unto Orders: And the Fathers having been con∣sulted accordingly, there were three Opinions. P. Virginius conceived, that the Consideration to be had upon the matter in question, (or ayd of the indebted and imprison'd people) was not to be farther extended then unto such as had engaged upon the promise made by Servilius: T. Largius, that it was no time to think it enough, if mens merits were acknowledged, while the whole People, sunk under the weight of their debts, could not emerge without some commmon ayd; which to restrain by putting some into a better Condition then others, would rather more inflame the Discord then extinguish it▪ Ap. Claudius (still upon the old haunt) would have it, That the People were rather wanton then fierce: It was not oppres∣sion that necessitated, but their Power that invited them unto these Freaks; the Empire of the Consuls since the Appeal un∣to the People (whereby a plebeian might ask his Fellowes if he were a Thief) being but a meer Scar-crow. Go to, (sayes he) Let us create the Dictator, from whom there is no appeal, and then let me see more of this Work; or him that shall forbid my Lictor. The advice of Appius was abhorr'd by many, and to introduce a general Recision of Debts with Largius, was to

violate all Faith: That of Virginius as the most moderate would have past best, but that there were private Interests (that same bane of the Publique) which withstood it; So they con∣cluded with Appius; who also had been Dictator, if the Con∣suls and some of the graver sort had not thought it altogether unseasonable, at a time when the Volsci and the Sabins were up again, to venture so far upon Alienation of the People; for which cause Valerius, being descended from the Publicola's, the most Popular Family, as also in his own person of a mild nature, was rather trusted with so rigid a Magistracy. Whence it happened, that the People, though they knew well enough against whom the Dictator was created, feared nothing from Valerius; But upon a new promise made to the same ef∣fect with that of Servilius, hoped better another time, and throwing away all Disputes, gave their Names roundly, went out, and (to be brief) came home again as Victorious as in the former Action, the Dictator entring the City in Triumph. Ne∣verthelesse when he came to presse the Senate, to make good his promise, and do something for the ease of the People, they regarded him no more as to that point then they had done Ser∣vilius. Whereupon the Dictator, in disdain to be made a stale, abdicated his Magistracy, and went home. Here then was a Victorious Army without a Captain, and a Senate pulling it by the beard in their Gowns. What is it (if You have read the Story, for there is not such another) that must follow? Can any Man imagine, that such only should be the opportu∣nity upon which this People could run away! Alas, poor men, the Aequi and the Volsci, and the Sabines were nothing, but the Fathers invincible! There they sate some three hun∣dred of them armed all in Robes, and thundring with their Tongues; no hopes in the earth to reduce them unto any to∣lerable Conditions: Wherefore, no thinking to abide long so near them; away marches the Army, and encamps in the Fields. This Retreat of the People is called the Secession of Mount Aventine, where they lodged, very sad at their Condi∣tion,

but not letting fall so much as a word of Murmur against the Fathers. The Senate by this time were great Lords, had the whole City unto themselves; but certain Neighbours were upon the way that might come to speak with them, not asking leave of the Porter. Wherefore their minds became troubled, and an Orator was posted unto the People to make as good Conditions with them as he could; but, whatever the terms were, to bring them home, & with all speed: And here it was covenanted between the Senate, and the People, That these should have the Magistrates of their own Election, cal∣led the Tribunes; upon which they returned.

To hold you no longer, the Senate having done this upon necessity, made frequent attempts to retract it again; while the Tribunes on the other side, to defend what they had gotten, instituted their Tributa Comitia, or Councill of the People; where they came in time, and as disputes increased, to make Lawes without the Authority of the Senate, called Plebiscita: Now to conclude in the Point at which I drive; such were the steps whereby the People of Rome came to assume Debate: nor is it in Art or Nature to debarre a People of the like effect, where there is the like cause: For Romulus having in the Election of his Senate squared out a Nobility for the sup∣port of a Throne, by making that of the Patricians a distinct and hereditary Order, planted the Common-wealth upon two contrary Interests, or Roots, which shooting forth in time produced two Common-wealths, the one Oligarchical in the No∣bility, and the other a meer Anarchy of the People, which thenceforth caused a perpetual feud and enmity between the Senate and the People, even to death.

There is not a more noble, or usefull question in the Poli∣ticks, then that which is started by Machiavil, Whether means were to be found whereby the Enmity that was between the Senate and the people of Rome, might have been removed. Nor is there any other in which we, or the present occasion, are so much concerned, particularly in relation unto this Au∣thor; For as much as his Judgment in the determination of

the question standing, our Common-wealth falleth. And he that will erect a Common-wealth against the Judgment of Machiavill, is obliged to give such reasons for his enterprize as must not go on begging. Wherefore to repeat the Polititian very honestly, but somewhat more briefly: He disputes thus;

There be two sorts of Common-wealths,* 11.2 the one for Preserva∣tion, as Lacedemon and Venice. The other for Encrease, as Rome.

Lacedemon being governed by a King and a small Senate, could maintain it self a long time in that Condition, because the Inhabi∣tants, being few, having put a bar upon the reception of Strangers, and living in strict observation of the Lawes of Lycurgus, which now had gotten reputation, and taken away all occasion of Tumults, might well continue long in Tranquillity: For the Lawes of Ly∣curgus introduced a greater equality in Estates, and a less equality in Honours; whence there was equall Poverty, and the Plebeians were lesse Ambitious, because the Honours, or Magistracies of the City could extend but unto a few; and were not communicable unto the People; nor did the Nobility by using them ill, ever give them a desire to participate of the same: This proceeded from the Kings, whose Principality being placed in the midst of the Nobility, had no greater means whereby to support it self, then to shield the People from all Injury; Whence the People not fearing Empire, desired it not. And so all occasion of enmity between the Senate and the People was barr'd. But this union happened especially from two causes, the one, that the Inhabitants of Lacedemon being few, could be govern'd by the Few. The other, that not receiving Strangers into their Common-wealth, they did not corrupt it, nor increase it, unto such a Proportion as was not governable by the Few.

Venice hath not divided with her Plebeians, but all are called Gentlemen that be in administration of the Government; for which Government She is more beholding unto Chance, then the Wisdome of her Law-makers; For many retiring unto those Islands, where that City is now built from the inundations of Barba∣rians

that overwhelm'd the Roman Empire, when they were encrea∣sed unto such a number, that to live together it was necessary to have Lawes: They Ordained a form of Government, whereby assembling often in Council upon Affairs, and finding their number sufficient for Government, they put a barre upon all such as repairing afterwards unto their City should become Inhabitants, excluding them from parti∣cipation of Power. Whence they that were included in the Administrati∣on had right; and they that were excluded, coming afterwards, and be∣ing received upon no other Conditions to be Inhabitants, had no wrong, and therefore had no occasion; nor were they trusted with Arms, and therefore had no means to be tumultuous. Wherefore this Common-Wealth might very well maintain her Self in Tranquillity.

These things considered, it is plain, that the Roman Legislators to have introduced a quiet State, must have done one of these two things; Either shut out Strangers, as the Lacedemonians; Or, as the Venetians, not allow'd the People to bear Arms. But they did neither. By which means the People having power and encrease, were in perpetual Tumult. Nor is this to be helped in a Common-Wealth for Increase, seeing if Rome had cut off the occasion of her Tumults, She must have cut off the means of her Increase, and by consequence of her Greatnesse.

Wherefore let a Legislator consider with himself, whether he would make his Common-wealth for Preservation, in which Case She may be free from Tumults; or for Increase, in which case she must be infested with them.

If he make her for Preservation she may be quiet at home; but will be in danger abroad. First, because her foundation must be narrow, and therefore weak; as that of Lacedemon, which lay but upon 30000 Citizens; or that of Venice, which lyes but upon three Thousand. Secondly, such a Common-wealth must either be in Peace, or in War; If She be in Peace, the Few are soonest effeminated and corrupted, and so obnoxious also unto Faction: If in War, suc∣ceeding ill, she is an easie prey; or succeeding well, ruined by In∣crease▪ a Weight which her Foundation is not able to bear. For La∣cedemon when she had made her self Mistris, upon the matter, of

all Greece, through a slight accident, the rebellion of Thebes, occa∣sioned by the Conspiracy of Pelopidas discovering this infirmity of her nature, the rest of her conquer'd Cities immediately knocked off, and in the turn as it were of an hand reduced her from the fullest Tide, unto the lowest Ebb of her fortune. And Venice having possessed Her self of a great part of Italy by her Purse, was no sooner, in de∣fence of it, put unto the tryall of her Arms, then She lost all in one Battail.

Whence I conclude, That in the Ordination of a Common-wealth, a Legislator is to think upon that which is most honourable; and lay∣ing aside the Modells for Preservation, to follow the example of Rome conniving at, and temporizing with the enmity between the Senate and the People, as a necessary step unto the Roman Greatnesse. For that any man should find out a ballance that may take in the Conve∣niencies, and shut out the inconveniencies of both, I do not think it possible. These are the words of the Author, though the Me∣thod be somewhat alter'd, to the end that I may the better turn them unto my hand.

My Lords, I do not know how you hearken unto this sound, but to hear the greatest Artist in the modern World, giving Sentence against our Common-wealth; is that, with which I am nearly concerned. Wherefore, with the honour due unto the Prince of Polititians, let us examine his ratioci∣nation, with the liberty which he hath asserted to be the right of a free people. But we shall never come up to him, except by taking the Businesse a little lower, we descend from effects to their causes. The Causes of Commotion in a Common-wealth are either external or internal. External are from Enemies, from Subjects, or from Servants. To dispute then what was the Cause why Rome was infested by the Italian, or by the Servile Wars, why the Slaves took the Capitol: why the Lacedemonians were near as frequently troubled with their Helots, as Rome with all those? Or why Venice, whose Situa∣tion is not trusted unto the faith of Men, hath as good or better quarter with them whom She Governeth, then Rome had with

the Latines; were to dispute upon external Causes: the que∣stion put by Machiavill, is of internal Causes; Whether the enmity that was between the Senate and the People of Rome might have been removed; And to determine otherwise of this question then he doth, I must lay down other Principles then he hath. To which end I affirm, that a Common-wealth internally considered is either equall, or unequall. A Com∣monwealth that is internally equall hath no internall cause of Commo∣tion, and therefore can have no such effect, but from without. A Commonwealth internally unequall hath no internall cause of quiet, and therefore can have no such effect, but by diversion.

To prove my Assertions, I shall at this time make use of no other then his examples. Lacedemon was externally unquiet, because She was externally unequall, that is as to her Helots; and she was internally at rest, because she was equall in her Self, both in root and branch; In the root by her Agrarian, and in branch by the Senate, in as much as no man was there∣unto qualified, but by election of the People: Which In∣stitution of Lycurgus is mention'd by Aristotle, where he saith, That rendring his Citizens aemulous (not carelesse) of that Honour,* 11.3 he designed unto the People the Election of the Se∣nate. Wherefore Machiavill in this, as in other places, ha∣ving his eye upon the Division of Patrician and Plebeian Families as they were in Rome, hath quite mistaken the Or∣ders of this Common-wealth, where there was no such thing. Nor did the Quiet of it derive from the Power of the Kings, who were so far from shielding the People from injury, of the Nobility, of which there was none in his sense, but the Senate, that one declared end of the Senate at the Institution, was to shield the people from the Kings, who thenceforth had but single Votes: Neither did it proceed from the streight∣nesse of the Senate, or their keeping the People aloof from the Government, that they were quiet, but from the equality of their administrations, seeing the Senate (as is plain by the Oracle, their fundamental Law) had no more then the De∣bate,

and the Result of the Common-wealth belonged unto the People. Wherefore when Theopomp and Polydore Kings of Lacedemon, would have kept the people aloof from the Go∣vernment,* 11.4 by adding unto the ancient Law this Clause (Si pravè populus rogassit, Senatui Regibús{que} retractandi jus esto), If the determination of the People be faulty, it shall be lawfull for the Senate to resume the Debate; the people immediately be∣came unquiet, and resumed that Debate, which ended not till they had set up their Ephors, and caused that Magistracy to be confirmed by their Kings.* 11.5 (Theopompo Spartanorum regi moderationis testimonium reddamus. Nam cum primus instituisset ut Ephori Lacedemone crearentur, ita futuri regiae potestati oppo∣siti, quemadmodum Romae Tribuni Plebis consulari imperio sunt ob∣jecti: at{que} illi uxor dixisset, id egisse illum ut filiis minorem pote∣statem relinqueret: Relinquam, inquit, sed diuturniorem. Optimē quidem. Ea enim demum tuta est potentia, quae viribus suis modum imponit. Theopompus igitur legitimis regnum vinculis constrin∣gendo, quo longius à licentia retraxit, hoc propius ad benevolentiam civium admovit). By which it may appear, that a Common-wealth for Preservation if she come to be unequal, is as ob∣noxious unto enmity between the Senate and the People, as a Common-wealth for Encrease: and that the Tranquillity of Lacedemon derived from no other Cause then her Equality.

For Venice, to say, that she is quiet because she disarms her Subjects, is to forget, that Lacedemon disarmed her Helots, and yet could not in their regard be quiet; wherefore if Venice be defended from external causes of commotion, it is first, through her situation, in which respect her Subjects have no hope, (and this indeed may be attributed unto her fortune) and secondly, through her exquisite Justice, whence they have no will to invade her: but this can be attributed to no other cause then her prudence: which will appear to be grea∣ter, as we look nearer; for the effects that proceed from for∣tune (if there be any such thing) are like their cause, uncon∣stant; but there never happened unto any other Common-wealth,

so undisturbed and constant a tranquillity and peace in her self, as is that of Venice; wherefore this must proceed from some other cause then Chance. And we see that as she is of all others the most quiet, so the most equal, Common-wealth. Her body consists of one Order, and her Senate is like a rolling stone (as was said) which never did, nor, while it continues upon that rotation, ever shall gather the mosse of a divided or ambitious interest; much lesse such an one as that which grasped the people of Rome in the talons of their own Eagles. And if Machiavill, a verse from doing this Common-wealth right, had consider'd her Orders, (as his reader shall easily perceive he never did) he must have been so far from attributing the prudence of them unto Chance, that he would have touched up his admirable work unto that perfection, which, as to the civil part, hath no pattern in the universall World, but this of Venice.

Rome, secure by her Potent and Victorious Arms from all external causes of commotion, was either beholding for her peace at home, unto her Enemies abroad, or could never rest her head. My Lords, you that are Parents of a Common-wealth, and so freer Agents then such as are meer natural, have a care. Fo, ras no man shall shew me a Commonwealth born streight, that ever became crooked; so, no man shall shew me a Common-wealth born crooked, that ever became streight: Rome was crooked in her birth, or rather prodigious, her twins the Patricians and Plebeian Orders came, as was shewn by the foregoing story, into the world, one body, but two heads, or rather two bellies; for, notwithstanding the Fable out of Aesop, whereby Menenius Agrippa the Orator that was sent from the Senate unto the People at Mount Aventine; shew'd the Fathers to be the belly, and the people to be the Arms and the Legs; which except that, how sloathful soever it might seem, were nourished, not these but the whole body must languish and be dissolved; it is plain, that the Fathers were a distinct belly, such an one as took the meat indeed out

of the peoples mouthes; but abhorring the Agrarian, return∣ed it not, in the due and necessary nutrition of a Common-wealth. Neverthelesse, as the people that live about the Cataracts of Nilus are said not to hear the noise; so neither the Roman Writers, nor Machiavill the most conversant with them, seem among so many of the Tribunitian storms, to hear their natural voice: for though they could not misse of it, so far as to attribute them unto the strife of the People for parti∣cipation in Magistracy; or, in which Machiavill more parti∣cularly joyns, unto that about the Agrarian; this was to take the businesse short, and the remedy for the disease.

(Cujus levamen mali, Plebes, nisi suis in summo imperio locatis,* 11.6 nullum speraret.)

A People when they are reduced unto misery and despair, become their own Polititians, as certain beasts when they are sick become their own Physitians, and are carried by a natu∣ral instinct unto the desire of such herbs, as are their proper cure; but the people, for the greater part, are beneath the beasts in the use of them: Thus the people of Rome, though in their misery, they had recourse by instinct as it were unto the two main Fundamentals of a Common-wealth, Partici∣pation of Magistracy, and the Agrarian; did but taste, and spet at them, not (which is necessary in Physick) drink down the potion, and in that their healths. For when they had ob∣tained participation of Magistracy, it was but lamely, not to a full and equall rotation in all elections; nor did they greatly regard it in so much as they had gotten: And when they had attained unto the Agrarian, they neglected it so far as to suffer the Law to grow obsolete; but if you do not take the due dose of your Medicines, (as there be slight tasts which a man may have of Philosophy that incline unto Atheisme) it may chance be poyson, there being a like taste of the Politiques that in∣clines to Confusion, as appears in the Institution of the Roman Tribunes, by which Magistracy, and no more, the people were so far from attaining unto peace, that they in getting but so

much, got but heads for eternal feud; whereas if they had attained in perfection either unto the Agrarian, they had in∣troduced the equality and calm of Lacedemon; or unto Rota∣tion, they had introduced that of Venice: And so there could have been no more Enmity between the Senate and the People of Rome, then there was between those Orders in Lacedemon, or is in Venice. Wherefore Machiavill seemeth unto me, in at∣tributing the peace of Venice more unto her luck then her pru∣dence; of the whole stable to have saddled the wrong horse, for though Rome,

(quae non imitabile fulmen Aere, et cornupedum cursu simulârat Equorum)

in her Military part could beat it better, beyond all compari∣son, upon the sounding hoof; Venice for the Civil, hath plainly had the wings of Pegasus.

The whole Question then will come upon this Point, Whe∣ther the People of Rome could have obtained these Orders: And first, to say, that they could not have obtained them without altering the Common-wealth, is no argument; seeing, neither could they, without altering the Common-wealth, have ob∣tained their Tribunes; which neverthelesse were obtained: And if a man consider the posture that the people were in when they obtained their Tribunes, they might as well, and with as great ease, (for as much as the reason why the Nobility yielded unto the Tribunes, was no other, then that there was no remedy) have obtained any thing else. And for experience, it was in the like case, that the Lacedemonians set up their Ephors, and the Athenians after the battel of Plateae, bowed the Senate (so hard a thing it is for a Commonwealth that was born crooked to become streight) as much the other way. Nor, if it be objected, that this must have ruin'd the Nobility, and in that deprived the Common-wealth of the Greatnesse which she acquired by them; is this opinion hol∣ding, but confuted by the sequell of the story, shewing

plainly, that the Nobility through the defect of such Orders, that is to say, of Rotation and the Agrarian) came to eat up the people; and battening themselves in Luxury, (to be as Salust speaketh of them, Inertissumi nobiles, in quibus sicut in statua, prae∣ter nomen, nihil erat additamenti) to bring so mighty a Common-wealth, so huge a glory, unto so deplorable an end. Where∣fore, means might have been found, whereby the enmity that was between the Senate and the People of Rome might have been removed. My Lords,—

If I have argued well, I have given you the comfort and assu∣rance, that notwithstanding the judgment of Machiavill, your Common-wealth is both safe and sound: but if I have not argued well, then take the comfort and assurance which he gives you, while he is firm, That a Legislator is to lay aside all other examples, and follow that of Rome only, conniving and temporizing with the enmity between the Senate and the People, as a necessary step unto the Roman Greatnesse. Whence it followes, that your Common-wealth at the worst, is that which he hath given you his word is the best.

I have held your Lordships long, but upon an account of no small importance, which I can now sum up in these few words: Where there is a lickerrishnesse in a popular Assem∣bly to Debate, it proceedeth not from the constitution of the People, but of the Common-wealth: Now that the Com∣mon-wealth is of such Constitution as is naturally free from this kind of intemperance, is that which to make good, I must divide the remainder of my Discourse into two Parts.

• ...The First, shewing the several Con∣stitutions of the Assemblies of the People in other Common-wealths.
• ...The Second, comparing of Our As∣sembly of the People with Theirs; and shewing how it excludeth the inconveniences, and embraceth the conveniencies of them all.

IN the beginning of the first Part I must take notice, that among the Popular error of our dayes it is no small one, That men imagines the ancient Governments of this kind to have consisted for the most part of one City, that is, of one Town; whereas by what we have learnt of my Lords that open'd them, it appears that there was not any considerable one of such a constitution but Carthage, till this in our dayes of Venice.

For to begin with Israel, it consisted of the twelve Tribes; locally spread or quartered throughout the whole Territory; these being called together by Trumpets, constituted the Church or Assembly of the people. The vastnesse of this weight, as also the slownesse, thence inavoidable, became a great cause (as hath been shewn at large by my Lord Phospho∣rus) of the breaking that Common-wealth; notwithstanding that the Temple, and those religious Ceremonies for which the people were at least annually obliged to repair thither; were no small ligament of the Tribes; otherwise but slightly tack'd together.

Athens consisted of four Tribes, taking in the whole People both of the City, and of the Territory; not so gather'd by Theseus into one Town, as to exclude the Country, but to the

end that there might be some Capital of the Commonwealth: though true it be, that the Congregation consisting of the In∣habitants within the Walls, was sufficient to all intents and purposes, without those of the Country; these also being ex∣ceeding numerous, became burdensome unto themselves; and dangerous unto the Common-wealth: the more for their ill education, as is observed by Xenophon and Polybius, who compare them unto Marriners, that in a calm are perpetually disputing and swaggering one with another, and never lay their hands unto the Common tackling or safety, till they be all indangered by some storm: Which caused Thucydides, when he saw this people through the purchase of their misery, become so much wiser, as to reduce their Comitia or Assemblies unto five thousand, to say, (as in his eighth Book) And now (at least in my time) the Athenians seem to have ordered their State aright; consisting of a moderate temper both of the Few (by which he means the Senate of the Bean) and of the Many, or the five thousand; and he doth not only give you his judgment, but the best proof of it; for this (saith he) was the first thing, that after so many misfortunes past, made the City again to raise her head. The place I would desire your Lordships to note, as the first example, that I find, or think is to be found, of a popular Assem∣bly by way of Representative.

Lacedemon consisted of thirty thousand Citizens dispersed throughout Laconia, one of the greatest Provinces in all Greece, and divided (as by some Authors is probable) into six Tribes; of the whole Body of these being gather'd, con∣sisted the great Church or Assembly, which had the Legisla∣tive power; the little Church, gather'd sometimes for mat∣ters of concernment, within the City, consisted of the Spar∣tans only: these happened like that of Venice to be good con∣stitutions of a Congregation, but from an ill cause the infirmity of a Common-wealth which through her Paucity was Oligar∣chical.

Wherefore, go which way you will, it should seem, that

without a Representative of the people, your Commonwealth consisting of an whole Nation, can never avoid falling either into Oligarchy or confusion.

This was seen by the Romans, whose rustick Tribes extend∣ing themselves from the river Arno, unto the Vulturnus, that is, from Fesulae or Florence unto Capua, invented a way of Re∣presentative by Lots; the Tribe upon which the first fell, be∣ing the prerogative, and some two or three more that had the rest, the Jure-vocatae: These gave the Suffrage of the Com∣mon-wealth (binis Comitiis); the Prerogative at the first Assem∣bly, and the Jure vocatae at a second.

Now to make the paralel, All the inconveniences that you have observed in these Assemblies are shut out, and all the conveniences taken in, to your prerogative; for first it is that for which Athens, shaking off the blame of Xenophon and Poly∣bius, came to deserve the praise of Thucydides, a Representative; and secondly, not as I suspect in that of Athens, and is past suspition in this of Rome, by lot, but by suffrage, as was also the late House of Commons, by which means in the preroga∣tives, all the Tribes of Oceana are Jure Vocatae; and if a man shall except against the paucity of the standing number, it is a wheel, which in the revolution of a few years turneth every hand that is fit, or fitteth every hand that it turns, unto the publick work: Moreover, I am deceived, if upon due consi∣deration, it do not fetch your Tribes with greater equality and ease unto themselves, and unto the Government, from the frontiers of Marpesia; than Rome ever brought any one of hers out of her Pomaeria, or the nearest parts of her adjoyning Ter∣ritories. To this you may adde, That whereas a Common-wealth, which in regard of the People is not of facility in execution, were sure enough in this Nation to be cast off through impatience; Your Musters and Gallaxy's are given unto the people, as milk unto babes, whereby when they are brought up through four dayes election in an whole year, (one at the Parish, one at the Hundred, and two at the Tribe) unto their strongest meat, it is of no harder digestion, then to give

their Negative or Affirmative as they see cause. There be gallant men among us that laugh at such an appeal or umpire; but I refer it, whether you be more inclining to pardon them or me, who I confesse have been this day laughing at a sober man, but without meaning him any harm, and that is Petrus Cunaeus, where speaking of the nature of the people, he saith, that taking them apart, they are very simple, but yet in their As∣semblies they see and know something, and so runs away without troubling himself with what that something is. Whereas the people taken apart, are but so many private interests, but if you take them together, they are the publick interest; the publick interest of a Common-wealth (as hath been shewn) is nearest that of mankind, and that of mankind is right reason; but with the Aristocracy, whose reason or interest when they are all together, as appear'd by the Patricians, is but that of a party, it is quite contrary; for, as taken apart they are far wi∣ser then the people, considered in that manner; so being put together, they are such fooles, that by deposing the people, as did those of Rome, they will saw off the branch whereupon they sit, or rather destroy the root of their own greatnesse: Wherefore Machiavill following Aristotle, and yet going be∣fore him, may well assert (Che la multitudine è piu savia et piu costunte che vn Prencipe) the Prerogative of Popular Govern∣ment for wisdome. And hence it is, that the Prerogative of your Common-wealth, as for Wisdom, so for Power, is in the People: which (albeit I am not ignorant, that the Roman Prerogative was so called a Praerogando, because their Suffrage was first asked) gives the denomination unto your Preroga∣tive Tribe.

The Elections whether Annual or Triennial, being shewn by the Twenty second, that which comes in the next place to be considered, is

[order 23] The Twenty third Order, shewing the Power, function, and manner of Proceeding of the Prerogative Tribe.* 11.7

The Power or function of the Prerogative is of two parts, the one of Result, in which it is the Legislative Power, the other of Iudicature, in which regard it is the highest Court, and the last ap∣peale in this Common-wealth.

For the former part, the people by this Constitution, being not obliged by any Law, that is not of their own making; or Confir∣mation by the Result of the Prerogative, their equall Represen∣tative: It shall not be lawfull for the Senate to require Obedience, from the people, nor for the people to give obe obedience unto the Senate in or by any Law that hath not been promulgated or printed & publisht for the space of six wéeks▪ & afterwards porposed by the Au∣thority of the Senate unto the Prerogative Tribe, and resolved by the Major Uote of the same in the affirmative. Nor shall the Senate have any power to levy War, Men, or Money, otherwise then by the consent of the People so given, or by a Law so Enacted, except in cases of exigence, in which it is agreed, thar the Power both of the Senate, and the People shall be in the Dictator, so qualified, and for such a terme of time as is according unto that Constitution already pre∣scribed. While a Law is in Promulgation the Censors shall ani∣madvert upon the Senate; and the Tribunes upon the People, that there he no laying of heads together; Conventicles, or Canvassing to carry on, or oppose any thing; but that all my be done in a frée and open way.

For the latter part of the Power of the Prerogative or that whereby they are the Supream Iudicatory of this Nation, and of the Provinces of the same, the Cognizance of Crimes against the Majesty of the People, as high Treason, as also of Peculate that is robery, of the Treasury, or Defraudation of the Common-wealth appertaineth unto this Tribe, and if any Person or Persons, Pro∣vincialls or Citizens shall appeale unto the people, it belongerh unto the Prerogative to Iudge and determine the Case, Provided that if the Appeale be from any Court of justice in this Nation or the Pro∣vinces, the Appellant shall first deposite one hundred pounds in the Court from which he appealeth, to be forfeited unto the same, if he be cast in his Suite by the people. But the Power of the Council of War being the expedition of this Common-wealth, and the Martiall

Law of the Strategus in the Field, are those onely from which there shall lye no Appeale unto the People.

The Proceeding of the Prerogative in case of a Proposition, is to be thus Ordered: The Magistrates proposing by Authority of the Senate, shall rehearse the whole Matter, and expound it unto the People, which done, they shall put the whole together unto the Suf∣frage▪ with three Boxes, the Negative, the Affirmative, and the Non-sincere: and the Suffrage being returned unto the Tribunes, and numbred in the presence of the Proposers, if the Major Uote be in the Non-sincere, the Proposers shall desist, and the Senate shall re∣sume the Debate. If the Major Uote be in the Negative, the Proposers shall desist, and the Senate too. But if the Major Uote be in the Affirmative, then the Tribe is clear, and the Proposers shall begin and put the whole matter, with the Negative and the Affir∣mative, (leaving out the Non-sincere) by Clauses; and the Suffra∣ges being taken and numbred by the Tribunes in the presence of the proposers, shall be written and reported by the Tribunes unto the Senate, and that which is proposed by the authority of the Senate, and confirmed by the Command of the People, is the Law of Oceana.

The Proceeding of the Prerogative in a case of Iudicature is to be thus ordered. The Tribunes being Auditors of all Causes appertaining unto the Cognizance of the people, shall have notice of the Sute or Tryall, whether of appeale or otherwise, that is to be Commenced, and if any one of them shall accept of the same, it appertaineth unto him to introduce it. A Cause being introduced, and the people Mustered or Assembled for the Decision of the same, the Tribunes are Presidents of the Court, having power to keep it: unto Orders, and shall be seated upon a Scaffold erected in the mid∣dle of the Tribe: upon the right hand shall stand a seat, or large Pulpit assigned unto the Plaintiffe, or the Accuser; and, upon the left, another for the Defendant, each if they splease with his Counsel. And the Tribunes being attended upon such occations with so many Ballotines, Secretaryes, Door-keekers, and Messengers of the Senate as shall be requisite; One of them shall turn up a Glasse of the nature of an hour-glasse, but such an one as is to be of an houre and a halfe's running; which being turned up, the party, or Counsell on the right hand may begin to speak to the People; if there be Papers to be read, or witnesses to be examined, the Officer shall lay the Glasse side∣wayes untill the Papers be read, and the Witnesses examined, and then turn it up again; and so long as the Glasse is running the Par∣ty on the right hand hath liberty to speak, and no longer. The

Party on the right hand having had his time, the like shall be done in every respect, for the Party on the left. And the Cause being thus heard, the Tribunes shall put the question unto rhe Tribe with a white, a black, and a red Box (or non-sincere), Whether Guilty, or not Guilty? And if, the Suffrage being taken, the Major Uote be in the Non-sincere, the Cause shall be re-heard upon the next juridicall day following; and put unto the question in the same manner. If the Major Uote come the second time in the Non-sincere, the Cause shall be heard again upon the third day: but at the third hearing the questi∣on shall be put without the Non-sincere. Upon the first of the three dayes in which the Major Uote comes in the white box, the party accused is absolv'd; and upon the first of them in which it comes in the black box, the party accused is condemned. The Party accused being condemned, the Tribunes shall put with the white and the black Box, these questions, or such of them, as, regard had unto the Case, they shall conceive most proper.

• 1. Whether he shall have a writt of ease.
• 2. Whether he shall be fined so much, or so much.
• 3. Whether he shall be Confiscated.
• 4. Whether he shall be rendred incapable of Magistracy.
• 5. Whether he shall be banished.
• 6. Whether he shall be put to Death.

These or any three of these questions whether simple or such as shall be thought fitly mixed, being put by the Tribunes, that which hath most above half the Uotes in the black Box is the sentence of the people, which the Troop of the third Classis is to see executed accordingly.

But whereas by the Constitution of this Common-wealth it may appear that neither the Propositions of the Senate, nor the Iudicature of the people, will be so frequent as to hold the Prerogative in con∣tinuall imployment; the Senate, a maine part of whose Office it is to teach and instruct the people, shall duly (if they have no greater affairs to divert them,) cause an oration to be made unto the Prero∣gative by some Knight or Magistrate of the Senate, to be chosen out of the ablest men, and from time to time, appointed by the Orator of the House; in the great Hall of the Pantheon, while the Parlia∣ment resideth in the town; or in some Grove or sweet place in the field, while the Parliament for the heat of the year shall reside in the country; upon every Tuesday, morning or afternoon.

And the Orator appointed pro tempore unto this office shall first repeat the orders of the Common-wealth with all possible brevity; and then making choice of one, or some part of it, discourse thereof unto the people. An Oration or discourse of this nature being afterward perused by the councill of State, may as they see cause be printed and published.

The Archon's Comment upon the Order, I find to have been of this sense:

My Lords,

TO crave pardon for a word or two in farther explanation of what was read; I shall briefly shew how the Consti∣tution of this Tribe or Assembly answers unto their Function; and how their fun∣ction, which is of two parts, the former in the Result or Legislative Power; the later in the Supream Judicature of the Common-wealth, answers unto their Constitution. Machiavill hath a Dis∣course, where he puts the question, Whe∣ther the guard of liberty be with more security to be committed unto the Nobility, or to the People. Which doubt of his ariseth through the want of explaining his term; for the guard of li∣berty can signifie nothing else but the re∣sult of the Common-wealth▪ so that to say, that the guard of liberty may be committed unto the Nobility, is to say, that the result may be committed unto the

Senate, in which case the People signifie nothing: Now to shew it was a mistake, to affirm it to have been thus in Lacede∣mon, sufficient hath been spoken; and whereas he will have it to be so in Venice also; (Quello, saith Contarini, appres∣so il quale e la somma autorita di tutta la citt••, el dalle leggi, et decreti de i quali pende l'autoritatâ cosi del Senato come ancora di tutti i Magistrati, e il Consiglio Grande.) it is institutively in the great Council by the Judgment of all that know that Common-wealth; though for the reasons shewn it be sometimes ex∣ercised by the Senate. Nor need I run over the Common-wealths in this place for the proof of a thing so doubtlesse, and such as hath been already made so appa∣rent, as that the result of each was in the Popular part of it. The Popular part of yours, or the Prerogative Tribe, con∣sisteth of seven Deputies (whereof three are of the Horse) annually elected out of every Tribe of Oceana, which being fif∣ty, amounteth unto one hundred and fifty Horse, and two hundred Foot; and the Prerogative consisting of three of these Lists, consisteth of four hundred and fifty Horse, and six hundred Foot, (besides those of the Provinces to be hereafter

mentioned) by which means the over-bal∣lance in the Suffrage remaining unto the Foot by one hundred and fifty Votes, you have unto the support of a true and natu∣ral Aristocracy, the deepest root of a De∣mocracy that hath been planted. Where∣fore there is nothing in Art or Nature better qualify'd for the result then this Assembly.— It is noted out of Cicero by Machiavill, That the People, albeit they are not so prone to find out truth of themselves, as to follow Custome, or run into errour; yet if they be shew••d truth, they not only acknowledge and embrace it very suddenly, but are the most constant and faithful Guardians and Conservators of it. It is your Duty and Office, where∣unto you are also qualify'd by the Orders of this Common-wealth, to have the Peo∣ple as you have your Hawks and Grey∣hounds, in leases and slips, to range the fields, and beat the bushes for them; for they are of a nature that is never good at this sport, but when you spring or start their proper quarry: think not that they will stand to ask you what it is, or lesse know it then the Hawks and Greyhounds do theirs; but forthwith make such a flight or course, that a Huntsman may as well undertake to run with his dogs, or a

Faulkoner to fly with his Hawk, as an Aristocracy at this game to compare with the People. The People of Rome were seized upon no less prey then the Empire of the World, when the Nobility turned tailes and pearched among Dawes upon the Tower of Monarchy. For though they did not all of them intend the thing, they would none of them indure the re∣medy, which was the Agrarian.

But the Prerogative Tribe hath not only the Result, but is the Supream Ju∣dicature, and the ultimate Appeal in this Common-wealth. For the Popular Government that makes account to be of any standing, must make sure in the first place of the Appeal unto the People. (Ante omnes de provocatione adver∣sus Magistratus ad Populum, sacran∣do{que} cum bonis capite ejus, qui regni occupandi concilia inesset.) As an Estate in trust becomes a mans own, if he be not answerable for it, so the Power of a Ma∣gistracy not accomptable unto the People from whom it was received becoming of private use, the Common-wealth loses her Liberty; Wherefore the right of Su∣pream Judicature in the People (with∣out which there can be no such thing as Popular Government) is confirmed by the

constant Practice of all Common-wealths; as that of Israel in the Cases of Achan, and of the Tribe of Benjamin, adjudged by the Congregation. The Dicasterion or Court called the Heliaia in Athens, which (the Comitia of that Common-wealth consisting of the whole People, and so being too numerous to be a Judi∣catory) was constituted sometimes of Five hundred, at others of One thousand, or, according to the greatnesse of the Cause, of Fifteen hundred, elected by the Lot out of the whole body of the People, had with the nine Archons, that were Pre∣sidents, the Cognizance of such Causes as were of highest importance in that State. The Five Ephors in Lacede∣mon, which were Popular Magistrates, might question their Kings, as appears by the Cases of Pausanias and of Agis, who being upon his Tryall in this Court, was cryed unto by his Mother, to appeal unto the People, as Plutarch hath it in his Life. The Tribunes of the People of Rome, like in the nature of their Ma∣gistracy, and for sometime in number, unto the Ephors; as being according unto Ha∣licarnasseus and Plutarch, instituted in imitation of them; had power (diem di∣cere) to Summon any Man, his Magi∣stracy

at least being expired, (for from the Dictator there lay no Appeal) to an∣swer for himself unto the People. As in the case of Coriolanus, which was go∣ing about to force the People by with∣holding Corn from them in a famine, to re∣linquish the Magistracy of the Tribunes. In that of. Sp. Cassius for affecting Tyran∣ny. Of M. Sergius for running away at Veii. Of C. Lucretius for spoyling his Province. Of Junius Silanus for making War against the Cimberi, in jussu Po∣puli; with divers others. And the Crimes of this nature were call'd Laesae Maje∣statis. Examples of such as were arraign∣ed, or tryed for Peculate, or Defrauda∣tion of the Common-wealth, were, M. Cu∣rius, for intercepting the money of the Samnites. Salinator, for the unequal di∣vision of Spoyles unto his Souldiers. M. Posthumius, for Cheating the Common-wealth by a feigned Shipwrack; Causes of these two kinds were of more Publique nature; but the like Power upon Appeals was also exercised by the People in pri∣vate Matters, even during the time of the Kings; As in the Case of Horatius. Nor is it otherwise with Venice, where Doge Loridano was Sentenced by the great Council; and Antonio Grimani;

afterwards Doge, questioned, for that he being Admiral, had suffered the Turk to take Lepanto in view of his Fleet.

Neverthelesse, there lay no Appeal from the Roman Dictator unto the Peo∣ple; which if there had, might have cost the Common-wealth dear, when Sp. Moe∣lius affecting Empire, circumvented and debauched the Tribunes; whereup∣on T. Quintius Cinninatus was created Dictator. Who having chosen Servilius Alaha to be his Lievtenant or Magister Equitum, sent him to apprehend Moe∣lius, whom while he disputed the Com∣mands of the Dictator, and implored the ayd of the People, Alaha cut off upon the place: By which example you may see in what cases the Dictator may prevent the blow, which is ready sometimes to fall ere the People be aware of the danger. Wherefore there lyes no Appeal from the Dieii in Venice unto the Great Coun∣cil nor from our Council of War to the People. For the way of proceeding of this Tribe, or the Ballot, it is, as was once said for all, Venetian.

This Discourse (de Judiciis) where∣upon we are fallen, bringeth us rather naturally then of design from the two ge∣neral Orders of every Common-wealth;

that is to say, from the Debating part, or the Senate; and the Resolving part, or the People; to the third, which is the Exe∣cutive part, or the Magistracy; where∣upon I shall have no need to dwell: For, the Executive Magistrates of this Com∣mon-wealth are the Strategus in Arms, the Signory in their several Courts; (as the Chancery, the Exchequer) as also the Councils in divers Cases within their In∣structions, the Censors as well in their proper Magistracy, as in the Council of Religion: the Tribunes in the Govern∣ment of the Prerogative, and that Judi∣catory: And the Judges with their Courts; Of all which so much is already said or known as may suffice.

The Tuesday-Lectures or Orations unto the People, will be of great benefit unto the Senate, the Prerogative, and the whole Nation. Unto the Senate, because they will not only teach your Se∣nators Elocution, but keep the Systeme of the Government in their memories. Elo∣cution is of great use unto your Senators; for if they do not understand Rhetorick, (giving it at this time for granted, that the Art were not otherwise good) and come to treat with, or vindicate the cause of the Common-wealth against some

other Nation, that is good at it; the ad∣vantage will be subject to remain upon the merit of the Art, and not upon the me∣rit of the Cause. Furthermore, the Ge∣nius or Soul of this Government, being in the whole and in every part; they will never be of ability in determination upon any particular, unlesse at the same time they have an Idea of the whole. That this therefore must be, in that regard, of equal benefit unto the Prerogative, is plain; though these have a greater con∣cernment in it. For this Common-wealth is the Estate of the People: and a man (you know) though he be virtuous, yet if he do not understand his Estate, may run out or be cheated of it. Last of all, the treasures of the Politicks will by this means be so opened, rifled, and dispersed, that this Nation will as soon dote, like the Indians, upon glasse Beads, as di∣sturb your Government with whimsies, and freaks of mother-wit; or suffer themselves to be stutter'd out of their Li∣berties. There is not any reason why your Grandees, your wise men of this Age, that laugh out, and openly, at a Com∣mon-wealth, as the most ridiculous thing, do not appear to be, as in this regard they are, meer Ideots; but that the People have not Eyes.

There remaineth no more appertaining unto the Senate and the People, than

[order 24] The Twenty fourth Order, Whereby it is lawfull for the Pro∣vince of Marpesia to have 30. Knights of their own election continu∣ally present in the Senate of Oceana together with 60. Deputies of Horse,* 12.1 and 120. of Foot in the Prerogative Tribe, indued with equall power (respect had unto their quality and number,) in the Debate and result of this Common-wealth: Provided that they Observe the Course or Rotation of the same by the Annuall Return of 10. Knights, 20. Deputyes of the Horse, and 40. of the Foot The like in all respects is lawfull for Panopea and the Horse of both the Provinces amounting unto one Troop, and the Foot unto one Company; one Captain, and one Cornet of the Horse shall be an∣nually chosen by Marpesia; and one Captain and one Ensigne of the Foot shall be annually chosen by Panopea.

The Orb of the Prerogative being thus Compleat is not unnaturally compar'd unto that of the Moon, either in con∣sideration of the Light, borrowed from the Senate as from the Sun; or of the ebbs and floods of the People, which are marked by the Negative or Affirmative of this Tribe, And the Con∣stitution of the Senate and the People being shewn,* 12.2 You have that of the Parliament of Oceana, Consisting of the Senate proposing, and of the People resolving; which amounts unto an Act of Parliament. So the Parliament is the Heart, which consisting of two Ventricles; the one greater and replenished with a grosser store; the other lesse and full of a purer; sucketh in, and gusheth forth the life blood of Oceana by a perpetuall Circulation. Wherefore the life of this Government is no more unnaturall or obnoxious for this, unto dissolution, then that of a Man; Nor unto giddinesse then the World, (seeing the Earth whether it be it self, or the Hea∣vens that are in Rotation, is so farr from being giddy that it could not subsist without the motion.) But why should not this Government be much rather capable of duration and steddi∣nesse by a motion? than which GOD hath ordained no other unto the universall Common-wealth of Mankind: seeing one Generation cometh, & another goeth, but the Earth remaineth firme for ever; that is in her proper Situation or Place, whether shee be moved or not moved upon her proper Center. The Se∣nate the People and the Magistracy, or the Parliament so Con∣stituted (as you have seen) is the Guardian of this Common-wealth,

and the Husband of such a Wife as is elegantly de∣scribed by Solomon. Shee is like the Merchants Ship,* 12.3 Shee bring∣eth her food from farre. She considereth a Field and buyeth it: With the fruit of her hands Shee Planteth a Vineyard: Shee concei∣ved that her Merchandize is good: She stretcheth forth her hands to the poor: Shee is not affraid of the Snow for her Houshold, for all her houshold are clothed with Scarlet: Shee maketh her self Coverings of her Tapestry; Her cloathing is Silke and Purple; Her Husband is known (by his Robes) in the Gates, when he sitteth amongst the Sena∣tors of the Land. The Gates, or inferiour Courts were branches as it were of the Sanhedrim or Senate of Israel. Nor is our Common-wealth a worse houswife, or hath shee lesse regard unto her Magistrates; as may appear by,

[order 25]

The Twenty fifth Order. That, whereas the Publique Revenue is through the late Civill Wars dilapidated; the Excize, being improv∣ed or improveable to the Revenue of One Million, be applyed for the space of Eleaven years to come, unto the reparation of the same, and the present Maintenance of the Magistrates, Knights, Deputies, and other Officers, who according unto their severall Dignities and Functions shall annually receive towards the Support of the same, as followeth:

The Lord Stratêgus Marching, is upon another accompt to have Field Pay as Generall.

The Lord Strategus sitting

002000. li. per Annum.

The Lord Orator

002000. li. per Annum.

The three Commissioners of the Seal

004500. li. per Annum.

The three Commissioners of the Treasury

004500. li. per Annum.

The two Censors

003000. li. per Annum.

The 290. Knights, at 500 l. a Man

145000. li. per Annum.

The 4. Embassadors in Ordinary

012000. li. per Annum.

The Council of War for Intelligence

003000. li. per Annum.

The Master of the Ceremonies

000500. li. per Annum.

The Master of the Horse

000500. li. per Annum.

His Substitute

000150. li. per Annum.

The 12. Ballotines for their winter Liveries

000240. li. per Annum.

For their Summer Liveries

000120. li. per Annum.

For their board-Wages

000480. li. per Annum.

For the keeping of three Coaches of State, 24 Coach-horses with Coach∣men, and Postilions

001500. li. per Annum.

For the Grooms, and keeping of 16. great Horses for the Master of the Horse, and for the Ballotines whom he is to govern and instruct in the Art of Riding,

000480. li. per Annum.

The 20. Secretaries of the Parliament

002000. li. per Annum.

The 20. Door-keepers who are to attend with Pole-axes; For their Coats,

000200. li. per Annum.

For their Board-wages

001000. li. per Annum.

The 20. Messengers, which are Trumpeters; For their Coats,

000200. li. per Annum.

For their Board-wages,

001000. li. per Annum.

For Ornament of the Masters of the Youth

005000. li. per Annum.

Sum,

189370. li. per Annum.

Out of the Personall Estates of every man who at his death be∣queatheth nof above Forty shillings unto the Master of that Hundred wherein it lyes, shall be levied one per Cent, untill the solid Revenue of the Muster of the Hundred amount unto 50. l. per annum; for the Prizes of the Youth.

The twelve Ballotines are to be divided into three Regions accor∣ding unto the Course of the Senate, the four of the first Region to be elected at the Tropick out of such Children as the Knights of the same shall offer, not being under Eleven yeers of age, nor above 13. And their Election thall be made by the Lot at an Urn set by the Serjant of the house for that purpose in the Hall of the Pantheon. The Livery of the Common-wealth for the fashion or the colour may be changed at the Election of the Strategus according unto his phan∣tasy.

But every Knight during his Session shall be bound to give unto his Foot-man or some one of his Foot-men, the Livery of the Common-wealth.

The Prerogative Tribe shall receive as followeth:

The 2. Tribunes of the Horse

000014 li. by the Week.

The 2. Tribunes of the Foot

000012 li. by the Week.

The 3. Captains of Horse

000015 li. by the Week.

The 3. Cornets

000009 li. by the Week.

The 3. Captains of Foot

000012 li. by the Week.

The 3. Ensigns

000007 li. by the Week.

The 442 Horse at 2 l. a man

000884 li. by the Week.

The 592 Foot at 1 l. 10 s. a man

000888 li. by the Week.

The 6. Trumpeters

000007 li. 10 s. by the Week.

The three Drummers

000002 li. 5 s. by the Week.

Summ, by the Week

001850 li. 15. s.

Summ, by the Year

096239 li.

The Totall of the Senate, the People, and the Magistracy,

287459 l. 15. s.

The dignity of the Common-wealth, and ayds of the severall Magistracies and Offices thereunto belonging being provided for as aforesaid, the Overplus of the Excize with the Product of the Summe rising shall be carefully mannaged by the Senate and the Peo∣ple through the diligence of the Officers of the Exchequer; till it amount unto Eight Millions, or to the purchase of about four hun∣dred thousand Pounds solid Revenue. At which time, the terme of eleven yeers being expired, the Excize, (except if be otherwise ordered by the Senate and the people) shall be totally remitted, and abolished for ever.

At this Institution the Taxes (as will better appear in the Corollary) were abated about one half, which made the Order when it came to be tasted, to be of good relish with the People in the very beginning; though the Advantages then were no-wise comparable unto the Consequences to be hereafter shewn. Neverthelesse, my Lord Epimonus, who with much ado had been held till now, found it Midsummer Moon, and broke out of Bedlam in this mood,

My Lord Archon,

I Have a singing in my head like that of a Cart wheel, my brains are upon a rotation; and some are so merry, that a man cannot speak his griefs; but if your high-shod Prerogative, and those same slouching Fellowes your Tribunes, do not take my Lord Strategus's, and my Lord Orator's heads, and jole them together under the Canopy, then let me be ridicu∣lous unto all Posterity: For here is a Common-wealth, to which if a man should take that of the Prentices in their ancient administration of Justice at Shrove-tide, it were an Aristocratie. You have set the very Rabble with Tron∣cheons in their hands, and the Gentry of this Nation like Cocks with scarlet gills, and the golden combs of their Salaries to boot, lest they should not be thrown at.

Not a Night can I sleep for some horrid Apparition or other; One while these Myrmidons are measuring silks

by their quarter-Staves; another stuf∣fing their greasie Poutches with my Lord High-Treasurer's Jacobus's: For they are above a thousand in Arms to three hundred, which, their Gowns being pull'd over their ears, are but in their doublets and hose. But what do I speak of a Thousand? there be two thousand in every Tribe, that is an hundred thousand in the whole Nation, not only in the Po∣sture of an Army, but in a Civill capaci∣ty sufficient to give us what Lawes they please: Now every body knowes, that the lower sort of People regard nothing but money; and you say it is the duty of a Legislator to presume all men to be wicked, wherefore they must fall upon the richer, as they are an Army; or lest their minds should misgive them in such a villany, you have given them encou∣ragement that they have a nearer way, seeing it may be done every whit as well by the overballancing Power which they have in Elections. There is a Fair which is annually kept in the Center of these Territories at Kiberton, a Town famous for Ale, and frequented by Good-Fel∣lowes; where there is a solemnity of the Pipers, and Fidlers of this Nation, (I know not whether Lacedemon, where

the Senate kept accompt of the stops of the Flutes and of the Fiddlestrings of that Common-wealth, had any such Custom) call'd the Bull-running, and he that catcheth and holdeth the Bull, is the annuall and Supream Magistrate of that Comitia, or Congregation, called King-Piper; without whose Licence it is not lawfull for any of those Citizens to enjoy the liberty of his Calling; nor is he other∣wise legitimately qualify'd (or civitate donatus) to lead Apes, or Bears in any Perambulation of the same. Mine Host of the Bear, in Kiberton, the father of Ale, and Patron of good Foot-ball and Cudgel-players hath any time since I can remember been Grand-Chancellor of this Order. Now say I, seeing great things arise from small beginnings, what should hinder the People prone to their own ad∣vantage, and loving money, from having Intelligence conveyed unto them by this same King-Piper & his Chancellor, with their Loyall Subjects the Minstrills and Bear-wards: Masters of Ceremonies, unto which there is great recourse in their respective Perambulations, and which they will Commission and instruct, with directions unto all the Tribes, wil∣ling and commanding them, That as they

wish their own goods, they choose none other into the next Primum Mobile, but of the ablest Cudgell and Foot-ball Players: which done as soon as said, your Primum mobile consisting of no other stuffe, must of necessity be drawn forth into your Nebulones, and your Galimo∣frys, and so the silken Purses of your Senate and Prerogative being made of Sowes-ears, most of them Black-Smiths, they will strike while the Iron is hot, and beat your Estates into Hob-nailes; Mine Host of the Bear being Strategus, and King-Piper Lord Orator. Well, my Lords, it might have been otherwise, ex∣prest, but this is well enough a consci∣ence. In your way, the wit of Man shall not prevent this or the like Inconve∣nience; but if this, (for I have conferr'd with Artists) be a Mathematical de∣monstration; I could kneel to you, that ere it be too late we might return unto some kind of Sobriety.

If we empty our Purses with these Pomps, Salaries, Coaches, Lacquays, and Pages, what can the people say lesse, then that we have drest a Senate and a Prerogative to nothing, but to go unto the Park with the Ladies?

My Lord Archon, whose meeknesse resembled that of Mo∣ses, vouchsafed this Answer:

My Lords,

FOr all this, I can see my Lord Epimonus every night in the Park, and with Ladies; nor do I blame this in a young man, or the respect which is and ought to be given unto a Sex that is one half of the Common-wealth of mankind, and with∣out which the other would be none; howbeit our Magistrates I doubt may be somewhat with the oldest to perform this part with much acceptation: (and, Servire et non gradire, è cosa da morire) Wherefore we will lay no certain obligation upon them in this point, but leave them (if it please you) unto their own fate or discretion. But this, for I know my Lord Epimonus loves me, and though I can never get his esteem, I will say, If he had a Mistresse should use him so, he would find it a sad life: or I appeal unto your Lordships, how I can resent it from such a friend, that he puts King Piper's Politicks in the ballance with mine. King Piper, I deny not, may teach his Bears to dance, but they have the worst ear of all creatures; now how he should make them keep time in fifty severall Tribes, and that two years together, for else it will be to no purpose, may be a small matter with my Lord to promise; but it seemeth unto me of impossible performance: first, through the nature of the Bean; and secondly, through that of the Ballot; or what he hath hath hitherto thought so hard, is now come to be easie: but he may think, that for expedi∣tion they will eat up these Balls like Apples; however, there is so much more in their way, by the constitution of this, than is to be found in that of any other Common-wealth, that I am reconciled; it now appearing plainly, that the points of my Lords arrowes are directed at no other white then to shew the excellency of our Government above others; which as he proceeds farther, is yet plainer: while he makes it appear,

that there can be no other elected by the people but Smiths,

(Brontes{que} Steropes{que} et nudus membra Pyracmon.)

Othoniel, Aod, Gideon, Jephtha, Samson, as in Israel. Miltiades, Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, as in Athens. Papyrius, Cincinnatus, Camillus, Fabius, Scipio, as in Rome. Smiths of the fortune of the Common-wealth, not such as forg'd hobnails, but Thunder-bolts. Popular Elections are of that kind, that all the rest of the world is not able either in number or glory to equal those of these three Common-wealths. These indeed were the ablest Cudgel and Foot-ball players; bright Armes were their Cudgels, and the World was the Ball that lay at their Feet. Wherefore we are not so to understand the Maxime of Legislators, which holdeth all men to be wicked, as if it related to mankind or a Common-wealth, the interests where∣of are the only streight lines that they have whereby to reform the crooked, but as it relates unto every man or party under what colour soever he or they pretend to be trusted apart, with or by the whole. Hence then it is derived, which is made good in all experience, that the Aristocracy is ravenous, and not the People: Your high-way-men are not such as have Trades, or have been brought up unto industry; but such whose education hath pretended unto that of Gentlemen. My Lord is so honest, he doth not know the Maxims that are of abso∣lute necessity unto the arts of wickednesse; for it is most cer∣tain, if there be not more purses then Thieves, that the thieves themselves must be forced to turn honest, because they cannot thrive of their Trade: but now if the people should turn thieves, who sees not that there would be more theeves then purses; wherefore that an whole People should turn robbers or Levellers is as impossible in the end as in the means. But that I do not think your Artist mention'd, Astronomer or Arithme∣tician which he be, can tell me how many barly corns would reach unto the Sun, I could be content he were called unto the account, with which I shall conclude this Point: when by the way I have chidden my Lords the Legislators, who as

if they doubted my tackling would not hold, leave me to flag in a perpetual calm; but for my Lord Epimonus, who breathes now and then into my sayles and stirs the waters. A Ship maketh not her way so briskly, as when she is hand∣somely brushed by the waves, and tumbles over those that seem to tumble against her; in which case I have perceived in the dark, that light hath been stricken even out of the Sea, as in this place, where my Lord Epimonus faining to give us a demonstration of one thing, hath given it of another, and of a better. For the people of this Nation, if they amount in each Tribe unto two thousand Elders, and two thousand Youth upon the annual Roll, holding a fifth unto the whole Tribe; then the whole of a Tribe (not accounting women and children) must amount unto twenty thousand; and so the whole of all the Tribes, being fifty, unto one million. Now you have ten thousand Parishes, and reckoning these one with another, each at one thousand pounds a year dry rent; the Rent or Revenue of the Nation as it is or might be let to farm, amounteth unto ten millions; and ten millions in revenue di∣vided equally unto one million of men, comes but to ten pounds a year unto each whereupon to maintain himself, his Wife and Children. But he that hath a Cow upon the Com∣mon, and ernes his shilling by the day at his labour, hath twice as much already as this would come unto for his share; be∣cause if the Land were thus divided, there would be no body to set him on work: my Lord Epimonus's Footman, who costs him thrice as much as one of these could thus get, would lose by this bargain. What should we speak of those innumerable Trades whereupon men live not only better then others upon good shares of Lands, but become also purchasers of greater Estates? Is not this the demonstration which my Lord meant, that the Revenue of Industry in a Nation, at the least in this, is three or four-fold greater then that of the meer rent? If the people then obstruct Industry, they obstruct their own live∣lihood; but if they make a War, they obstruct Industry.

Take the bread out of the peoples mouthes, as did the Roman Patricians, and you are sure enough of a War, in which case they may be Levellers; but our Agrarian causeth their In∣dustry to flow with milk and honey. It may be answer'd,

(O fortunati nimiùm, bona si sua nôrint Agricolae)

That this is true, if the people were given to understand their own happinesse; but where do they that? Let me answer with the like question, Where do they not? They do not know their happinesse it should seem in France, Spain, and Italy: teach them what it is, and try whose sense is the truer. But as to the late Wars in Germany, it hath been affirmed unto me there, that the Princes could never make the people to take Arms while they had bread, and have therefore suffer'd Countreys now and then to be wasted, that they might get Souldiers: This you will find to be the certain pulse and temper of the people; and if they have been already proved to be the most wise and constant order of a Government; why should we think, when no man can produce one example of the common Souldiery in an Army, mutinying because they had not Captains pay; that the Prerogative should jole the heads of the Senate together, in regard that these have the better Salaries, while it must be as obnoxious unto the People in a Nation, as to the Souldiery in an Army, that it is no more possible, their emoluments of this kind should be af∣forded by any Common-wealth in the world to be made equal with those of the Senate, then that the Common Souldiers should be equall with the Captains: it is enough to the common Souldier that his virtue may bring him to be a Captain, and more unto the Prerogative, that each of them is nearer to be a Senator.

If my Lord think our Salaries too great, and that the Com∣mon-wealth is not Houswife enough; whether is it better huswifery that she should keep her family from the snow, or

suffer them to burn her house that they may warm themselves▪ for one of these wil be; do you think that she came off at a chea∣per rate, when men had their rewards by a thousand, two thou∣sand pounds a year in Land of Inheritance? If you say, that they will be more godly then they have been, it may be ill taken; and if you cannot promise that, it is time we find out some way of stinting at least, if not curing them of that same Sacra Fames. On the other side, if a poor man (as such an one may save a City) give his sweat unto the publick, with what con∣science can you suffer his Family in the mean time to sterve. But he that layes his hand unto this plough, shall not lose by taking it off from his own▪ and a Common-wealth that will mend this, shall be penny-wise. The Sanhedrim of Israel be∣ing the Supream, and a constant Court of Judicature could not choose but be exceeding gainful. The Senate of the Bean in Athens, because it was but annual, was moderately sala∣riated, but that of the Areopagites being for life bountifully; which advantages the Senators of Lacedemon had, where there was little mony or use of it, was in honour for life. The Pa∣tricians having no profit took all; Venice being a situation, where a man goes but to the door for his imployment, the ho∣nour is great, and the reward very little: but in Holland a Counsellour of State hath fifteen hundred Flemish pounds a year, besides other accommodations. The States General have more. And that Common-wealth looketh nearer her penny, then ours need to do.

For the Revenue of this Nation, besides that of her indu∣stry, amounts, as hath been shewn, unto ten millions, and the Salaries in the whole, come not unto three hundred thou∣sand pounds a pear; the beauty they will adde unto the Com∣mon-wealth will be exceeding great, and the people delight in the beauty of their Common-wealth, the encouragement they will give unto the study of the publick very profitable, the accommodation they will afford unto your Magistrates, very honourable and easie. And the sum, when it or twice as

much was spent in hunting and house-keeping, was never any grievance unto the people. I am ashamed, to stand huck∣ling upon this point; it is sordid. Your Magistrates are rather to be provided with farther accommodations. For what if there should be sicknesse? whither will you have them to re∣move? and this City in the soundest times, for the heat of the year, is no wholsome aboad: have a care of their healths un∣to whom you commit your own. I would have the Senate and the People, except they see cause to the contrary; every first of June, to remove into the Country ayr, for the space of three moneths: you are better fitted with Summer houses for them, then if you had built them to that purpose; there is some twelve miles distant the Convallium upon the River Hal∣cionia, for the Tribunes and the Prerogative, a Pallace capa∣ble of a thousand men; and at twenty miles distant you have Mount Celia, reverend as well for the antiquity as state of a Castle, compleatly capable of the Senate, the Proposers ha∣ving lodgings in the Convallium, and the Tribunes in Celia; it holds the correspondence between the Senate and the People exactly. And it is a small matter for the Proposers, being at∣tended with the Coaches and Officers of State, besides other conveniences of their own, to go a matter of five or ten miles (those Seats are not much farther distant) to meet the people upon any Heath or Field that shall be pointed: where having dispatched their businesse, they may hunt their own Venizon, (for I would have the great walled Park upon the Halcionia to belong to the Signory, and those about the Convallium unto the Tribunes) and so go to supper. Pray my Lords, see that they do not pull down these houses to sell the lead of them; for when you have consider'd on it, they cannot be spared. The founders of the School in Hiera, provided that the boyes should have a Summer seat. You should have as much care of these Magistrates. But there is such a selling, such a Jewish humour in our Republicans, that I cannot tell what to say to it; onely this, any man that knowes what belongs to a Com∣mon-wealth,

or how diligent every Nation in that case hath been, to preserve her ornaments, and shall see waste lately made, the Woods adjoyning unto this City which served for the delight and health of it, cut down to be sold for three pence; will tell you, that they who did such things would never have made a Common-wealth: The like may be said of the ruine or damage done upon our Cathedrals, ornaments in which this Nation excels all others: nor shall this ever be ex∣cused upon the score of Religion; for though true it be, that God dwelleth not in houses made with hands, yet you can∣not hold your Assemblies but in such houses, and these are of the best that have been made with hands. Nor is it well ar∣gued that they are pompous, and therefore prophane, or lesse proper for Divine service, seeing that the Christians in the Primitive Church chose to meet with one accord in the Temple; so far were they from any inclination to pull it down.

The Orders of this Common-wealth, so far, or near so far forth, as they concern the Elders, together with the severall Speeches at the Institution, which may serve unto the better understanding of them as so many Commentaries, being shewn; I should now come from the Elders unto the Youth, or from the Civil Constitution of this Government unto the Military, but that I judge this the fittest place; where into by the way to insert the Government of the City, though for the present but perfunctorily.

THe Metropolis or Capitall Citty of Oceana is commonly called Emporium,* 15.1 though it consist of two Cities distinct, as well in name as in Government, whereof the other is called Hiera: For which cause I shall treat of each apart, beginning with Em∣porium.

Emporium with the Libertyes, is under a twofold division,* 15.2 the one regarding the Nationall and the other, Urbane or City Govern∣ment; it is divided in regard of the Nationall Government into three Tribes, and in respect of the Urbane into Twenty six, which for di∣stinction sake are called Wards, being contained under the three Tribes but unequally, wherefore the first Tribe containing ten Wards is called Scazon, the second containing eight Metoche, and the third containing as many, Telicouta: the bearing of which names in mind concernes the better understanding of the Government.

Every Ward, hath her Wardmot, Court or Inquest,* 15.3 consisting of all that are of the clothing or Liveries of Companies, residing within the same.

Such are of the Livery or Clothing as have obtained unto the dig∣nity to we are Gowns and Particolour'd Hoods or Tipets according unto the Rules, and ancient Customes of their respective Companies.* 15.4

A Company is a Brotherhood of Tradesmen,* 15.5 professing the same Art, governed, according unto their Charter, by a Master and Wardens: Of these there be a matter of sixty, whereof twelve are of greater dignity then the rest, that is to say the Mercers, Grocers, Dra∣pers, Fishmongers, Gold-Smiths, Skinners, Merchant-Taylors, Haberdashers, Saliers, Ironmongers, Vinters, Cloth-workers, which with most of the rest have common Halls,* 15.6 divers of them being of antient and magnificent Structure, wherein they have frequent meetings at the summons of their Masters, or Wardens, for the ma∣naging and regulation of their respective Trades and Mysteries. These Companies; as I shall shew, are the roots of the whole Govern∣ment of the City: for the Liveries that reside in the same Ward, meet∣ing at the Wardmot inquest, unto which it belongeth to take cog∣nizance of all sorts of moysances, and violations of the customs and Or∣ders of the City, and to present them unto the Court of Aldermen; have also power to make election of two sorts of Magistrates or Offi∣cers; the first of Elders or Aldermen of the Ward; the second of De∣puties of the same, otherwise called Common-Council men.

The Wards in these Elections, because they do not elect all at once,* 15.7 but some one yeare, and some another, observe the distinction of the three Tribes; for example, the Scazon consisting of ten Tribes,

maketh election the first yeare of ten Aldermen, one in each Ward, and of one hundred and fifty Deputies, fifteene in each Ward: all which are Trienniall Magistrates or Officers, that is to say, are to beare their dignity for the space of three years.

The second year, the Metoche, consisting of eight Wards electeth eight Aldermen, one in each Ward; and an hundred and twenty De∣puties, fifteen in each Ward; being also Trienniall Magistrates.

The third yeare Telicouta, consisting of a like number of Wards, electeth an equall number of like Magistrates for a like terme: So that the whole number of the Aldermen, according unto that of the Wards, amounteth unto twenty-six; and the whole number of the Deputies, unto three hundred and ninety.

* 15.8The Aldermen thus elected have divers capacities; for first, they are Justices of the Peace, for the term, and by consequence of their election; secondly, they are Presidents of the Wardmot, and Go∣vernours, each of that Ward; whereby he was elected; and last of all these Magistrates being assembled together, constitute the Senate of the Citty, otherwise called the Court of Aldermen: but no man is ca∣pable of this election, that is not worth ten thousand pounds: this Court upon every new Election maketh choice of censors out of their own number.

* 15.9The Deputies in like manner being assembled together, constitute the Prerogative Tribe of the City; otherwise called, the Common-Councill: by which meanes the Senate and the People of the City were caught in as it were by the rapture of the Nationall Government, to the same wheele of annuall, trienniall, and perpetuall revolution.

* 15.10But the Liveries over and above the right of these elections by their divisions mentioned; being assembled alltogether at the Guild of the City, constitute an other Assembly called the Common-Hall.

* 15.11The Common-Hall hath right of two other elections; the one of the Lord Mayor, and the other of the two Sheriffs being annuall Magi∣strates. The Lord Major can be elected out of no other then one of the twelve Companies of the first ranks, and the Common Hal agree∣eth by the plurality of Suffrages upon two names; which being prefer∣red unto the Lord Mayor, for the time being, and the Court of Alder∣men: they elect one by their scruteny, for so they call it, though it differ from that of the Common-wealth: The Orator or Assistant unto the Lord Major in the holding of his Courts is some able Lawyer elect∣ed by the Court of Aldermen, and called the Recorder of Empo∣rium.

The Lord Major being thus elected, hath two capacities; the one regarding the Nation, the other the City: in that which regards the City, he is President of the Court of Aldermen, having power to assemble the same, or any other Council of the City, as the Common-Councill or Common-Hall, at his will and pleasure; and in that which regards the Nation, he is Commander in Cheif, of the three Tribes, whereinto the City is divided; one of which he is to bring up in person at the Nationall Muster unto the Ballot; as his Vice Co∣mites, or High-Sheriffs, are to do by the other two, each at their di∣stinct pavilion, where the nine Aldermen elected Censors, are to officiate by three in each Tribe, according unto the Rules and Orders already given unto the Censors, of the rustick Tribes: And the Tribes of the City have no other then one common Phylarch, which is the Court of Aldermen, and the Common-Councill; for which cause they elect not at their muster the first Liste called the Prime Magnitude.

The Conveniences of this alteration of the City Government, besides the bent of it unto conformity with that of the Nation, were many;* 15.12 whereof I shall mention but a few, as first, whereas men under the former administration, when the burden of some of these Magistra∣cyes, lay for life, were oftentimes chosen not for their fitnesse, but ra∣ther unfitnesse, or at least unwillingnesse to undergo such a weight, whereby they were put at great rates to fine for their ease; a man might now take his share in Magistracy, with that equity which is due unto the publick, and without any great inconvenience unto his private affaires. Secondly, whereas the City, in as much as the Acts, of the Aristocracy or Court of Aldermen in their former way of proceed∣ing, were rather Impositions, then Propositions, was frequently dis∣quieted, with the inevitable consequence, in the power of debate exercised by the popular part or Common Councill; the right of de∣bate being hence forth established in the Court of Aldermen and that of result in the Common Councill, killed the branches of division in the root, which for the present may suffice to have been said of the City of Emporium.

That of Hiera consisteth as to the Nationall Government of two Tribes, the first called Agoraea, the second Propola:* 15.13 but as to the pe∣culiar Policy of twelve Maniples, or Wards divided into three cohorts each cohort containing four Wards, whereof the Wards of the first co∣hort elect for the first yeare four Burgesses, one in each ward; the Wards of the second cohort, for the second yeare four Burgesses, one in each Ward; and the wards of the third cohort for the third yeare foure Burgesses, one in each Ward; all trienniall Magistrates: by which the twelve Burgesses, making one Court for the Government of this City, according unto their instructions by act of Parliament,* 15.14 fall likewise into an annual, triennial, and perpetuall revolution.

* 15.15This Court being thus constituted, maketh election of diverse Magi∣strates; as first of an High Steward, who is commonly some person of quality, and this Magistracy is elected in the Senate by the scruteny of this Court; unto him they choose some able Lawyer to be his Deputy, and to hold the Court; and last of all they elect out of their own num∣ber six Censors.

The High Steward is Commander in Chief, of the two Tribes, whereof he in person bringeth up the one at the Nationall Muster unto the Ballot, and his Deputy the other, at a distinct pavilion; the six Censors chosen by the Court officiating by three in each Tribe at the Urnes, and these Tribes, have no other Phylarch, but this Court.

As for the manner of elections, and suffrage both in Emporium and Hiera, it may be said once for all, that they are performed by the Ballott, and according unto the respective rules already given.

There be other Cities and Corporations throughout the territory, whose Policy being much of this kind, would be tedious and not worth the labour to insert, nor dare I stay. Juvenum manus emicat ardens.

I returne with the method of the Common-wealth, unto the remaining part of her Orbes which are military and provinciall, the military except the Strategus, and the Polemarchs or feild Officers consisting of the youth only, and the Provinciall consisting of a mixture, both of the Elders and of the Youth.

To begin with the Youth, or the military Orbes, they are Circles unto which the Common-wealth must have a Care to keep close; A man is a Spirit raised up by the Magick of Nature; if she doe not stand safe, and so that she may set him to some good and usefull work, he spets fire, and blowes up Castles; for where there is life, there must be motion or work and the work of idlenesse is mischiefe, (Non omnibus dormit) But the work of industry is health. To set men unto this, the Common-wealth must begin early with them, or it will be too late: and the meanes whereby she sets them unto it, is e∣ducation; the Plastick art of government. But it is as fre∣quent as sad in experience, whether through negligence, or which in the consequence is all one, or worse, overfondnesse in domestick performance of this Duty, that innumerable Children come to owe their utter Perdition unto their own Parents; in each of which, the Commonwealth loseth a Ci∣tizen; Wherefore the Lawes of a Government how wholesome∣soever in themselves, being such as if men by a congruity in their Education be not brought up to find a relish in them,

they will spit at: The education of a mans Children is not wholly to be committed or trusted unto himself. You find in Livy the Children of Brutus, having been bred under Mo∣narchy, make faces at the Common-wealth of Rome, A King (say they) is a Man, you may prevaile with him when you have need there should be Law, or when you have need there should be no Law. He hath favours in the right, and he frowns not in the wrong place; he knowes his friends from his Enemies. But Lawes are deafe inexo∣rable things, such as make no difference between a Gentlemen and an ordinary fellow: a Man can never be merry for them, for to trust altogether to his own innocence is a sad Life: unhappy wantons! Scipio (on the other side) when he was but a Boy (some two or three and twenty) being informed that certaine Patricians, or Roman Gentlemen, through a qualme upon the defeate which Haniball had given them at Cannae, were laying their heads together and contriving their Flight with the transportation of their goods out of Rome; drew his sword and setting him∣self at the doore of the Chamber where they were at Council, protested, That who did not immediately sweare, not to desert the Common-wealth he would make his Soul to desert his Body, Let men argue as they please for Monarchy, or against a Common-wealth, the world shall never see any man so sottish or wick∣ed as (in cool blood) to preferre the education of the Sons of Brutus, before that of Scipio; and of this mould, except a Melius or a Manlius was the whole youth of that Common-wealth though not ordinarily so well cast. Now the health of a Government, and the education of the youth being of the same pulse, no wonder if it have been the constant practize of well order'd Commonwealths to commit the Care and feeling of it unto publique Magistrates. A duty that was performed in such manner by the Areopagites, as is elegantly praised by Isocrates. The Athenians, saith he, write not their Lawes up∣on dead Walls, nor content themselves with having ordained punishments for Crimes, but provide in such manner by the e∣ducation of their youth, that there be no Crimes for puni∣shment: he speakes of those Lawes which reguarded man∣ners, not of those orders which concerned the administration of the Commonwealth, least you should think he contradicts Xenophon and Polibius. The Children of Laetdemon, at the seaventh yeare of their Age, were delivered unto the paedono∣mi, School-Masters, not Mercenary but Magistrates of the Commonwealth, unto which they were accomptable for their charge: by these at the age of fourteen they were preferr'd un∣to other Magistrates called the Beidiaei, having the inspection of the Games, and exercises, among which that of the Pla∣tanista was famous, a kind of Fight in squadrons, but some∣what

too fierce; when they came to be of military age, they were listed of the Mora, and so continued in readinesse for publique Service under the Discipline of the Polemarches. But the Roman Education and Discipline by the Centurys and Classes is that unto which the Commonwealth of Oceana hath had a more concerned eye in her three Essays, being cer∣tain degrees by which the youth commence as it were in Armes for Magistracy, as appeares by

[order 26]

The Twenty Sixth Order, instituting that if a Parent have but one Sonne, the Education of that one Sonne shall be wholly at the disposing of that Parent, but (whereas there be Free-Schools erected and indow'd, or to be erected and indow'd in every Tribe of this Na∣tion, to a sufficient proportion for the Education of the Children of the same; which Schooles, to the end that shere be no detriment or hindrance unto the Schollers upon case of removeing from one unto another, are every of them to be Governed by the strict inspection of the Censors of the Tribes, both upon the School-Masters their man∣ner of life and teaching, and the Proficiency of the Children; after the Rules and method of that in Hiera). If a Parent have more Sons then one, the Censors of the Tribes shall animadvert upon and pun∣nish him that sendeth not his Sons within the ninth yeare of their age unto some one of the Schooles of a Tribe, there to be kept and taught if he be able at his Charges, and if he be not able, Gratis till they ar∣rive at the age of fifteen yeares. And a Parent may dispose of his Sons at the fifteenth yeare of their age, according unto his choice or ability, whether it be unto Service in the way of Apprentices unto some Trade, or otherwise, or unto farther study, as by sending them unto the Inns of Court, of Chancery, or unto one of the Universities of this Nation; but he that taketh not upon him some one of the Pro∣fessions proper unto some one of those places, shall not continue lon∣ger in any of them till they have attained unto the age of eighteen yeares; and every man having not at that age of 18. yeares taken upon him, or addicted himselfe unto the profession of the Law, Theolo∣gy, or Physick; and being no Servant, shall be capable of the Essay of the youth, and no other Person whatsoever; except a man have∣ing taken upon him such a Profession, happen to lay it by, ere he ar∣rive at three or four and twenty yeares of age, and be admitted unto this Capacity by the respective Phylarch, being satisfyed that he kept

not out so long with any designe to evade the service of the Common-wealth, but that being no sooner at his own disposing it was no sooner at his own choice to come in. And if any Youth or other Person of this Nation have a desire to travell into Forraigne Countries upon occasi∣on of businesse, delight, or farther improvement of his Education; the same shall be lawfull for him upon a passe obtained from the Cen∣sors in Parliament, putting a convenient limit unto the time, and recommending him unto the Embassadours by whom he shall be assist∣ed and unto whom he shall yield honour and obedience in their re∣spective residences. Every Youth at his returne from his travell, is to present the Censors with a Paper, of his own writing, contayn∣ing the interest of State or forme of Government of the Countries or some one of the Countries where he hath been; and if it be good, the Censors shall cause it to be printed and published, prefixing a Line in Commendation of the Author.

Every Wednesday, next ensuing the last of December, the whole Youth of every Parish, that is to say every man (not excepted by the foregoing part of the Order) being from eighteen yeares of age to 30. shall repaire at the found of the Bell unto the respective Church, and being there assembled in presence of the overseers, who are to governe the Ballot, and the Constable who is to officiate at the Urne, shall after the manner of the Elders, elect every fifth man of their whole number, (provided that they choose not above one of two Brothers at one Election, nor above halfe if they be foure or upward) to be a Stratiot or Deputy of the Youth; And the list of the Stratiots so e∣lected being taken by the overseers shall be entred in the Parish Book, and diligently preserved as a record, called the first Essay. They whose estates by the Law are able, or whose Friends are willing to mount them, shall be of the Horse, the rest are of the Foot. And he who hath been one yeare of this list is not capable of being re-elected till after one years intervall.

Every Wednesday, next ensuing the last of Ianuary, the Stratiots being Mustred at the Rendevouz of their respective hundred, shall in the presence of the Iury-men, who are overseers of that Ballot, and of the High-Constable who is to officiate at the Urne, elect out of the Horse of their Troop, or Company one Captain, and one Ensigne or Cornet, unto the Command of the same; And the Iury-men having entered the List of the Hundred into a Record to be dili∣gently

kept at the Rendevouz of the same; the first publique Game of this Commonwealth shall begin and be performed in this manner. Whereas there is to be at every Rendevouz of an Hundred, one Cannon, Culverin, or Sakre; The prize Armes, being forged by sworne Armorours of this Common-wealth, and for their proof, besides their beauty, viewd and tryed at the Tower of Emporium, shall be exposed, by the Iustice of Peace appertayning unto that Hundred; the said Iustice, with the Iury-men being Iudge of the Game: And the Iudges shall deliver unto the Horse-man that gaines the Prize at the carrier, one sute of Armes being of the value of twenty pounds: Unto the Pikeman that gaines the Prize at throwing the Bullet, one suit of Armes of the value of ten-pounds: Unto the M••squetier that gaines the Prize at the Mark with his M••squet, one sute of Armes of the value of ten pounds; And unto the Canoneer that gaines the Prize at the Marke with the Cannon, Culverin, or Sakre, one Chaine of Silver being of the value of ten pounds. Provided, that no one Man at the same Muster play above one of the Prizes. Whosoever gaineth a Prize is bound to weare it (if it be his lot) upon Service; and no man shall sell, or give away an Armour thus won, except he have lawfully attained unto two or more of them, at the Games.

The Games being ended, and the Master dismist, the Captaine of the Troop or Company shall repaire with a Copy of the List unto the Lord Lievtenant of the Tribe, and he High-Constable with a Du∣plicate of the same unto the Custos Rotulorum, or M••ster-Master-Ge∣nerall, to be also communicated with the Censors; in each of which the Iury-men giving a note upon every name of an only Son shall certify that the List is without subterfuge or evasion; or, if it be not, upon whom the evasion or subterfuge lyeth, unto the end that the Phylarch or the Censors may animadvert accordingly.

And every Wednesday next ensuing the last of February, the Lord Lievtenant, Custos Rotulorum, the Censors and the Conductor shall receive the whole M••ster of the Youth of that Tribe at the Ren∣devouz of the same, distributing the Horse and Foot with their Offi∣cers, according unto the directions given in the like case for the di∣stribution of the Elders, and the whole squadron being put by that meanes in Batalia; the second Game of this Commonwealth shall begin, by the exercise of the Youth in all the parts of their military discipline according unto the Orders of Parliament, or direction of the Council of Warr in that Case: And the hundred pounds allowed by the Parliament for the ornament of the Muster in every Tribe,

shall be expended by the Phylarch, upon such artificiall Castles, Cita∣dels, or like devices, as may make the best and most profitable sport for the Youth and their spectators. Which being ended, the Censors having prepared the Urnes by putting into the Horse Urne, 220. Gold Balls, whereof ten are to be marked with the Letter M. and o∣ther ten with the Letter P. Into the Foot Urne, 700. Gold Balls, whereof; 50. are to be marked with the Letter M. and 50. with the Letter P. and made up the Gold Balls in each Urne by the addition of Silver Balls unto the same, in number equall with the Horse and Foot of the Stratiots: the Lord Lievtenant shall call the Stratiots unto the Urnes, where they that draw the Silver Balls shall returne unto their Places; and they that draw the Gold Balls shall fall off to the pavilion, where, for the space of one houre they may chopp and change their Balls according as one can agree with another, whose Lot he likes better▪ but the houre being out the conductor seperat∣ing them, whose Gold Balls have no letter, from those whose Balls are marked; shall cause the Cryer to call the Alphabet, as first A. whereupon all they whose Gold Balls are not marked, and whose sir∣names begin with the Letter A. shall repaire unto a Clerk appertayn∣ing unto the Custos Rotulorum, who shall first take the names of that Letter: then those of B. and so forth; till all the names be Alphabeti∣cally enrolled; and the Youth of this List being six hundred in a Tribe Foot, that is 30000 Foot in all the Tribes; and two hundred in a Tribe Horse, that is 10000. Horse in all the Tribes, are the second Essay of the Stratiots, and the standing Army of this Commonwealth to be alwaies ready upon Command to march. They whose Balls are marked with M. amounting by 20 Horse, and 50. Foot in a Tribe unto 2500 Foot and 500. Horse in all the Tribes; And they whose Balls are marked with P. in every point correspondent are parts of the third Essay; they of M. bring forthwith to march for Marpesia and they of P. for Panopea, to the ends and according to the further directions following in the order for the Provinciall Orbs.

If the Polemarchs, or Field Officers be elected by the Scruteny of the Council of Warr, and the Strategus Commanded by the Par∣liament or the dictator to march, the Lords Lievtenants (who have power to Muster and Discipline the Youth so often as they receive Orders for the same from the Council of Warr) are to deliver the second Essay, or so many of them as shall be Commanded unto the Conductors, who shall present them unto the Lord Strategus at the fime and place appointed by his Excellency to be the Generall Ren∣devouze

of Oceana where the Council of Warr shall have the accom∣modation of Horses and Armes for his men in readinesse, and the Lord Strategus, having armed, mounted, and distributed them, whether according unto the recommendation of their Prize Armes, or otherwise; shall lead them away unto his Shipping, being also rea∣dy, and provided with Uictualls Ammunition, Artigliery, and all other necessarys, commanding them, and disposing of the whole con∣duct of the Warr by his sole power and authority: and this is the third Essay of the Stratiots, which being Shipp'd, or march'd out of their Tribes, the Lords Lievtenants shall re-elect the second Essay out of the remaining part of the first; and the Senate another Strategus.

If any veterane or veteranes of this Narion, the terme of whose Youth, or militia is expired, having a desire to be entertained in the further Service of the Commonwealth shall present him or them∣selves at the Rendevouz of Oceana, unto the Strategus, it is in his power to take on such and so many of them as shall be consenfed unto by the Polemarchs, and to send back an equall number of the Stratiots.

And for the better managing of the proper Forces of this Nation the Lord Strategus by appointment of the Council of Warr, and out of such Levies as they shall have made in either or both of the Pro∣vinces, unto that end, shall receive Auxiliarys at Sea, or elsewhere at some certaine place, not exceeding his proper Armes, in num∣ber.

And whosoever shall refuse any one of his three Essays, except up∣on cause shewn he be dispensed withall by the Phylarch, or if the Phy∣larch be not assembled, by the Censors of his Tribe, shall be deemed an Helot or publique Servant, pay one fifth of his yearely revenue be∣sides all other Taxes unto the Commonwealth for his Protection, and be incapable of bearing Magistracy except such as is proper to the Law. Neverthelesse if a man have but two Sons, the Lord Liev∣tenant shall not suffer above one of them to come unto the Urne at one election of the second Essay: and though he have above two Sons, there shall not come above halfe the Brothers at one Election; and if a man have but one Son, he shall not come unto the Urne at all without the consent of his Parents, or his Guardians nor shall it be any reproach unto him, or impediment unto his bearing of Magistracy.

This for Expoditions that are Forraigne will be proved, and explained together with

[order 27]

The Twenty Seaventh Order, Providing in case of invasion ap∣prehended, that the Lords High-Sheriffs of the Tribes upon Com∣mands received from the Parliament, or the Dictator, distribute the bands of the Elders into divisions after the nature of the Essayes of the Youth, and that the second division or Essay of the Elders being made and consisting of 30000 Foot, and 10000 Horse be ready to march with the second Essay of the Youth, and be brought also by the Conductors unto the Strategus.

The second Essay of the Elders and Youth being marcht out of their Tribes, the Lords High-Sheriffs and Lievtenants shall have the re∣mayning part of the annuall Bands; both of Elders and Youth in readinesse, which if the Beacons be fired, shall march unto the Ren∣devouz to be in that case appointed by the Parliament or the Dictator, and the Beacons being fired, the Curiata Comitia or Parochiall Congregations shall elect a fourth, both of Elders and Youth to be immediately upon the Guard of the Tribes, and dividing themselves as aforesaid to march also in their divisions according unto Orders, which method in case of extremity shall proceed unto the election of a third, or the leavy of a second, or of the last man in the Nation, by the power of the Lords High-Sheriffs▪ to the end that the Common-wealth in her utmost pressure may shew her trust that God in his justice will remember mercy; by humbling her selfe, and yet pre∣serving her courage, discipline and constancy, even unto the last drop of her blood, and the utmost farthing.

The Services performed by the youth, or by the Elders in case of Invasion, and according unto this Order, shall be at their proper cost and charges that are any wayes able to indure it, but if there be such as are known in their Parishes to be so indigent that they cannot march out of their Tribes, nor undergoe the burden, in this case in∣cumbent, the Congregations of their Parishes shall furnish them with sufficient summes of money to be repay'd upon the Certificate of the same by the Parliament when the action shall be over. And of that which is respectively enjoyn'd by this Order, any Tribe, Parish▪ Magistrate, or Person that shall faile, is to answer for it at the Council of Warr, as a Desertor of his Country.

The Archon being the greatest Captain of his, (if not of any) Age, added much unto the Glory of this Common-wealth, by interweaving the Militia with more Art and Lustre then any Legislator from, or before, the time of Servius Tullius. But as the bones or Skeleton of a man, though the greatest part of his beauty be contained in their proportion or Symmetry, yet shewn without flesh, are a spectacle that is ra∣ther horrid; so without Discourses, the Orders of a Com∣mon-wealth: which if she go forth in that manner, may com∣plain of her friends that they stand mute, and staring upon her: Wherefore this Order was thus fleshed by the Ar∣chon:

My Lords,

DIogenes, seeing a young Fellow drunk, told him that his Father was drunk when he begot him: For this in na∣tural, I must confesse I see no reason; but in Political Gene∣ration, it is right: The Vices of the People are from their Go∣vernours. Those of their Governours, from their Lawes or Orders; and those of their Lawes or Orders, from their Le∣gislators. (Ut malè posuimus initia, sic caetera sequuntur;) What ever was in the womb imperfect as to her proper work,* 16.1 comes very rarely, or not at all to perfection: And the formation of a Citizen in the Womb of the Common-wealth, is his Edu∣cation.

Education by the first of the foregoing Orders is of Six kinds; At the School, in the Mechannicks, at the Universi∣ties, at the Innes of Court or Chancery, in Travels, and in Military Discipline: Some of which I shall touch, and some I shall handle.

That which is proposed for the erecting, and endowing of Schools throughout the Tribes capable of all the Children of the same, and able to give unto the Poor the Education of theirs Gratis, is only matter of direction in a case of very great Charity, as easing the needy of the Charge of their Children from the Ninth to the Fifteenth year of their Age; during which time their work cannot be profitable, and restoring

them when they may be of use, furnished with tooles, where∣of there be advantages to be made in every work, seeing he that can read, and use his pen, hath some convenience by it in the meanest Vocation; and it cannot be conceived, but that which comes (though in small parcels) to the advantage of every Man in his Vocation, must amount unto the advantage of every Vocation; and so unto that of the Common-wealth: Wherefore this is commended unto the Charity of every wise-hearted, and well-minded man to be done in time; and as GOD shall stir him up or inable him: there being such pro∣vision already in the Case, as may give us leave to proceed without obstruction.

Parents (under animadversion of the Censors) are to dispose of their Children at the fifteenth year of their Age unto some∣thing; but what, is left, according to their abilities or incli∣nation, in their own Choice: This, with the Many, must be un∣to the Mechanicks, that is to say, unto Agriculture or Hus∣bandry; unto Manufactures; or unto Merchandize.

Agriculture is the Bread of the Nation, we are hung upon it by the teeth; it is a mighty Nursery of Strength, the best Ar∣my, and the most assured Knapsack; it is managed with the least turbulent or ambitious, and the most innocent hands of all other Arts. Wherefore I am of Aristotle's opinion, That a Common-wealth of Husband-men (and such is ours) must be the best of all others. Certainly, my Lords, you have no measure of what ought to be, but what can be done for the encouragement of this Profession: I could wish I were Hus∣band good enough to direct something to this end; but rack∣ing of Rents is a vile thing in the richer sort, an uncharitable one to the poorer; a mark of slavery, and nips your Com∣mon-wealth in the fairest Blossom: On the other side, if there should be too much ease given in this kind, it would occasion Sloath, and so destroy Industry the nerve of a Commonwealth▪ But if ought might be done to hold the ballance eeven be∣tween these two, it would be a Work in this Nation equall

unto that for which Fabius was call'd Maximus by the Ro∣mans.

In Manufactures and Merchandize the Hollander hath gotten the start of us; but at the long-run it will be found, that a People Working upon a Forraign Commodity, doth but f••rm the Manufacture, and that it is entailed upon them only, where the growth of it is native: As also that it is one thing to have the Carriage of other mens Goods, and another for a man to bring his own unto the best market. Wherefore Nature having provided encouragement for these Arts in this Nation above others, where the people growing, they of ne∣cessity must also increase, it cannot but establish them upon a far more sure and effectual Foundation then that of the Hol∣landers. But their Educations are in order unto the first things or necessities of nature;* 16.2 as Husbandry unto the Food; Ma∣nufacture unto the Clothing; and Merchandize unto the Purse of the Common-wealth.

There be other things in Nature, which being second as to their Order, for their dignity and value are first, and such to which the other are but Accommodations; of this sort are especially these, Religion, Justice, Courage, Wisdome.

The Education that answers unto Religion in our Govern∣ment is that of the Universities. Moses the Divine Legislator was not only learned in all the Learning of the Egyptians, but took into the Fabrick of his Common-wealth the Learning of the Midianites in the advice of Jethro: and his Foundation of an University laid in the Tabernacle, and finisht in the Temple, became that Pinacle from whence all the Learning in the World hath taken wing; as the Philosophy of the Stoicks, from the Phariseet; that of the Epicureans, from the Sadduces; and from the Learning of the Jews, so often quoted by our SAVIOUR,* 16.3 and fulfilled in Him, the Christian Religion Athens was the most famous University in her dayes and her Senators, that is to say, the Areopagites were all Philosophers.

Lacedemon (to speak truth) though she could write and read, was not very bookish. But who disputeth hence against Uni∣versities, disputeth in the same Argument against Agriculture, Manufacture, and Merchandize, every one of these having been equally forbidden by Lycurgus, not for it self, (for if he had not been Learned in all the Learning of Crete, and well tra∣vell'd in the knowledge of other Governments, he had never made his Common-wealth) but for the diversion which they must have given his Citizens from their Arms, who being but few, if they had minded any thing else, must have deserted the Common-wealth. For Rome, she (had ingenium par impe∣rio) was as Learned as Great, and held her Colledge of Argurs in much reverence. Venice hath taken her Religion upon trust: Holland, cannot tend it to be very studious: Nor doth Switz mind it much; yet are they all addicted unto their Universities. We cut down Trees to build Houses, but I would have some body shew me, by what reason or experi∣ence, the cutting down of an University, should tend unto the setting up of a Common-wealth. Of this I am sure; the per∣fection of a Common-wealth is not to be attained unto with∣out the knowledge of ancient Prudence; nor the knowledge of ancient prudence without Learning; nor Learning with∣out Schools of good Literature; and these are such as we call Universities. Now though meer University-Learning of it self, be that which (to speak the words of Verulamius) Crafty men contemn, and simple men onely admire, yet is it such as wise men have use of; for Studies do not teach their own use, but that is a wis∣dome without, and above them, won by observation. Expert men may execute, and perhaps judge of particulars one by one; but the general Counsels and the plots, and the marshalling of affairs, come best from those that are learned. Wherefore if you would have your children to be Statesmen, let them drink by all means of these Fountains, where perhaps there was never any. But what though the water a man drinks be not nourishment? it is the vehiculum without which he cannot be nourished. Nor is Religion lesse concerned in this point than Government; For

take away your Universities, and in a few years you lose it.

The Holy Scriptures are written in Hebrew and in Greek, they that have neither of these Languages may think leight of both; But find me a man that hath one in perfection, the study of whose whole Life it hath not been. Again, this is apparent to us in daily Conversation, that if four or five Per∣sons that have lived together be talking, another speaking the same Language may come in, and yet understand very little of their Discourse: in that it relateth unto Circumstances, Persons, Things, Times and Places which he knoweth not. It is no otherwise with a Man, having no insight of the times in which they were written, and the Circumstances unto which they relate, in the reading of ancient Books, whether they be Divine or humane. For example, when we fall up∣on the discourse about Baptisme and Regeneration, that was between our Saviour and Nicodemus where Christ reproacheth him of his Ignorance in this manner: Art thou a Doctor in Is∣rael, and understandest not these things? What shall we think of it? or, Wherefore should a Doctor in Israel have under∣stood these things more then another, but that both Baptisme and Regeneration (as was shewed at large by my Lord Phospho∣rus) were Doctrines held in Israel? Instance in one place of a hundred, which he that hath not mastered the circumstances unto which they relate, cannot understand. Wherefore to the understanding of the Scripture, it is necessary to have ancient Languages, and the knowledge of ancient times, or the ayd of them who have such knowledg: and to have such as may be al∣waies able and ready to give such ayd, (unlesse you would bor∣row it of another Nation, which would not only be base, but deceitful) it is necessary unto a Common-wealth that She have Schools of good Literature, or Universities of her own. We are Commanded (as hath been said more then once) to search the Scriptures; And whether do they search the Scriptures that take this pains in ancient Languages and Learning? or they that will not, but trusting unto Translations onely, and to words as they sound unto present Circumstances? than which

nothing is more fallible, Or certain to lose the true sense of Scriptures, pretend to be above humane understanding, for no other cause then that they are below it? But in searching the Scriptures by the proper use of our Universities, we have been heretofore blessed with greater Victories and Trophies against the purple Hosts, and golden Standards of the Romish Hierarchy, than any Nation; and therefore, why we should relinquish this upon the presumption of some, that because there is a greater Light they have it, I do not know. There is a greater Light then the Sun, but it doth not extin∣guish the Sun, nor doth any Light of GOD's giving ex∣tinguish that of Nature, but encrease and Sanctifie it. Wherefore, neither the honour borne by the Israelitish, Ro∣man, nor any other Commonwealth that I have shewn, unto their Eclesiasticks consisted in being governed by them, but in consulting them in matter of Religion; upon whose respon∣sa, or Oracles, they did afterwards as they thought fit. Nor would I be mistaken, as if by affrming the Universities, to be in order both unto Religion and Government, of absolute necessity, I declared them or the Ministry in any wise fit to be trusted so far as to exercise any power not derived from the ci∣vill Magistrate, in the administration of either. If the Jewish Religion were directed and established by Moses, it was directed and established by the civill Magistrate; or if Moses exercised this administration as a Prophet, the same Prophet did invest with the same administration, the Sanhedrim, and not the Priests; and so doth our Commonwealth, the Senate and not the Clergy. They who had the supreme Administra∣tion or Government of the Nationall Religion in Athens, were the first Archon, the (Rex Sacrificus, or) High Priest, and Pole∣march; which Magistrates were ordained or elected, (per 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) by the holding up of Hands, in the Church, Con∣gregation, or Comitia of the People. The Religion of Lacede∣mon was governed by the Kings, who were also high Priests, and officiated at the sacrifice, these had power to substitute

their Pythii, Embassadors or Nuncios by which not without concurrence of the Senate they held intelligence with the Ora∣cle of Apollo at Delphos. And the Ecclesiasticall part of the Commonwealth of Rome was governed by the Pontifex Maxi∣mas, the Rex Sacrificulus, and the Elaminus, all ordained or elected by the people, the Pontifex, Tributis; the King, Centuri∣atis; and the Flamines or Parish Preists, Curiatis Comitiis. I do not mind you of these things, as if for the matter there were any parallel to be drawn out of their superstitions to our Reli∣gion; but to shew that for the manner, ancient prudence is as well a rule in divine as humane things; nay, and such an one as the Apostles themselves, ordaining Elders by the hold∣ing up of hands in every Congregation, have exactly follow'd; for some of the Congregations where they thus ordeined Elders were those of Antioch, Iconium, Lystra, Derbe, the Country of Lycaonia, Pisidia, Pamphylia, Perga, with Attalia. Now that these Cittys and Countrys when the Romans propagated their Empire into Asia, were found most of them Commonwealths, and that many of the rest were indued with like power, so that the people living under the protection of the Romane Empe∣rors, continued to the elect their own Magistrates, is so known a thing; that I wonder whence it is, men quite contrary unto the universall proof of these examples, will have Ecclesiasti∣call Government to be necessarily distinct from civill power; when the right of the Elders ordained by the holding up of hands in every Congregation, to teach the people, was plain∣ly derived from the same civill power by which they ordained the rest of their Magistrates. And it is no otherwise in our Commonwealth; where the Parochiall Congregation electeth or ordaineth her Pastor. To object the Commonwealth of Venice in this place were to shew us that it hath been no other∣wise, but where the civill power, hath lost the liberty of her Conscience by embracing of Popery: as also that to take away the liberty of conscience in this administration from the civill power, were a proceeding which hath no other president, than

such as is Popish. Wherefore your Religion is thus settled; the Universities are the seminaries of that part which is nationall, by which meanes others withall safely may be permitted to fol∣low the liberty of their consciences, in reguard that however they behave themselves, the ignorance of the unlearned in this case cannot lose the religion, nor disturb the Government; which otherwise it would most certainely do, and the univer∣sities with their Emoluments, as also the Benefices of the whole Nation are to be improoved by such Augmentations, as may make a very decent and comfortable subsistance for the Mini∣stry, which is neither to be allow'd Synods nor Assemblies, (but upon the occasion shewn in the Universities, they are consulted by the Councill for Religion, suffred to meddle with affaires of State) nor to be capable of any other publick pre∣ferment whatsoever; by which means the interest of the lear∣ned can never come to corrupt your Religion, nor disturb your Government; which otherwise it would most certainly do. Venice, though she do not see, or cannot help the cor∣ruption of her Religion, is yet so circumspect to avoid distur∣bance in this kind of her Government, that her Council pro∣ceeds not unto election of Magistrates, till it be proclaimed, Fora Papalini, by which words such as have consanguinity with red hats, or relation unto the Court of Rome, are warned to withdraw. If a Minister in Holland meddle with matter of State, the Magistrate sendeth him a pair of shooes, where∣upon if he do not go, he is driven away from his charge. I wonder why Ministers of all men should be perpetually tam∣pering with Government, first because they as well as others have it in expresse charge to submit themselves unto the Or∣dinances of men; and secondly, because these Ordinances of men must go upon such Politicall Principles; as they of all others (by any thing that can be found in their writings or actions) least understand: whence you have the suffrage of all Nations unto this sense: An ounce of wisdom is worth a pound of Clergy: Your greatest Clerks are not your wisest men: and when some foul absurdity in State is committed, it

is common with the French, and even the Italians, to call it Pas de Clerc, or, Governo du Prete. They may bear with men that will be preaching without study, while they will be go∣verning without Prudence. My Lords, if you know not how to rule the Clergy, you will most certainly be like a man that cannot rule his Wife; have neither quiet at home, nor ho∣nour abroad. Their honest Vocation is to teach your Chil∣dren at the Schools and the Universities, and the people in the Parishes; and Yours is concern'd to see that they do not play the shrewes: of which parts consists the Education of your Common-wealth, so far forth as it regards Religion.

To Justice, or that part of it which is commonly executive, answers the Education of the Inns of Court, or Chancery. Upon which (to Philosophize) requires a peculiar kind of Learn∣ing that I have not. But they who take upon them any Pro∣fession proper unto the Educations mentioned, that is, Theology, Physick, Law, are not at leisure for the Essayes: Wherefore the Essays being Degrees, whereby the Youth Commence for all Magistracies, Offices and Honours in the Parish, Hundred, Tribe, Senate, or Prerogative; Divines, Physicians, and Law∣yers, not taking these Degrees, exclude themselves from all such Magistracies, Offices, and Honours. And whereas Law∣yers are likest to exact farther reason for this: They growing up from the most gainful Art at the Barr, unto those Magistracies upon the Bench, which are continually appropriated to them∣selves; and not onely endowed with the greatest Revenues, but held for life; have the least reason of all the rest to pre∣tend unto any other; Especially in an equal Commonwealth, where Accumulation of Magistracy, or to take a Person en∣gaged by his Profit unto the Lawes as they stand, into the Power which is Legislative, and should keep them unto what they were, or ought to be, were a Soloecisme in Prudence. It is true, that the Legislative power may have need of Advice and Assistance from the executive Magistracy, or such as are learned in the Law; for which Cause the Judges are, (as they

have heretofore been) Assistants in the Senate. Nor, however it came about, can I see any reason why a Judge, being but an Assistant, a Lawyer, should be a member of a Legislative Council.

I deny not, that the Roman Patricians were all Patrons, and that the whole People were Clients, some unto one family, and some unto another, by which means they had their Causes pleaded and defended in some appearance gratis; for the Pa∣tron took no money; though if he had a daughter to marry, his Clients were to pay her portion: nor was this so much. But if the Client accused his Patron, gave testimony or Suf∣frage against him, it was a crime of such nature, that any man might lawfully kill him as a Traytor: and this, as being the nerve of the Optimacy, was a great cause of ruine unto that Common-wealth: for when the people would carry any thing that pleased not the Senate, the Senators were ill provi∣ded if they could not intercede, that is, oppose it by their Clients; with whom, to vote otherwise then they pleased, was so high a Crime. The observation of this bond till the time of the Gracchi (that is to say, till it was too late, or to no purpose, to break it) was the cause, why in all the former heats and disputes that had happened between the Senate and the Peo∣ple, it never came to blowes; which was good: but withall, the people could have no remedy, which was Evil: Where∣fore I am of opinion, that a Senator ought not to be a Patron or Advocate; nor a Patron or Advocate to be a Senator; for if his practice be gratis, it debaucheth the people; and if it be mercenary, it debaucheth himself: take it which way you will, when he should be making of Lawes, he will be knitting of Nets.

Lycurgus, as I said, by being a Traveller, became a Legisla∣tor; but, in times, when Prudence was another thing: Ne∣verthelesse we may not shut out this part of Education, in a Common-wealth which will be her Self a Traveller; for those of this make, have seen the World; especially, because this

(though it be not regarded in our times, when things being left to take their chance, it fares with us accordingly) is cer∣tain; No man can be a Polititian, except he be first an Hi∣storian or a Traveller; for except he can see what Must be, o•• what May be, he is no Polititian: Now if he have no know∣ledge in story, he cannot tell what hath been; and if he hath not been a Traveller, he cannot tell what is: but he that neither knoweth what hath been, nor what is; can never tell what must be, or what may be. Furthermore, the Embassies in ordinary by our constitution, are the Prizes of young men, more especially such as have been Travellers. Wherefore they of these inclinations, having leave of the Censors, owe them accompt of their time, and cannot choose but lay it out with some ambition of Praise, or Reward, where both are open: whence you will have eyes abroad, and better choice of Pub∣lique Ministers: your Gallants shewing themselves not more unto the Ladies at their balls, than unto your Commonwealth at her Academy, when they return from their Travels.

But this Common-wealth being constituted more especi∣ally of two Elements, Arms, and Councils, driveth by a natural instinct, at Courage and Wisdome, which he who hath attained, is arriv'd at the perfection of humane nature. It is true, that these Virtues must have some naturall root in him that is ca∣pable of them; but this amounteth not unto so great a matter as some will have it. For if Poverty make an industrious; a moderate Estate, a temperate; and a Lavish fortune, a Wan∣ton Man; and this be the common course of things; Wisdom is rather of necessity, than Inclination. And that an Army which was meditating upon Flight, hath been brought by Despair to win the Field, is so far from being strange, that like Causes will evermore produce like Effects. Wherefore this Common-wealth driveth her Citizens like Wedges, there is no way with them but through; nor end, but that Glory whereof Man, is capable by Art or Nature. That the Genius of the Roman Families preserved it self throughout the line: as to instance in some, that the Manlii were still severe; the

Publicolae lovers; and the Appi•• haters of the people, is attri∣buted by Marchiavill unto their Education: nor, if interest might adde unto the reason, why the Genius of a Patrician was one thing, and that of a Plebeian another▪ is the like so apparent between different Nations, who according unto their different Educations have yet as different manners. It was anciently noted, and long confirmed by the French, that in their first assaults their courage was more then that of men; and for the rest lesse then that of women: which neverthe∣lesse through the amendment of their discipline, we see to be otherwise. I will not say, but that some Man or Nation up∣on equall improvement of this kind may be lighter then some other; but certainly, Education is the scale without which no Man or Nation can truly know his or her own weight or value. By our Histories we can tell when one Marpesian would have beaten ten Oceaners; and when one Oceaner would have beaten ten Marpesians. Marc Anthony was a Roman, but how did that appear in the embraces of Cleopatra? You must have some other Education for your Youth; or they, like that passage, will shew better in Romance, then true Story.

The Custom of the Common-wealth of Rome in distribu∣ting her Magistracies without respect of age, happened to do well in Corvinus and Scipio; for which cause Machiavill (with whom that which was done by Rome, and that which is well done, is for the most part all one) commendeth this course. Yet how much it did work at other times, is obvious in Pompey & Caesar; examples by which Bocalini illustrateth the Prudence of Venice in her contrary practice, affirming it to have been no small step unto the ruine of the Roman Liberty, that these having tasted in their Youth of the Supream Honours; had no greater in their age to hope for, but by perpetuating of the same in themselves, which came to Blood, and ended in Tyranny. The opinion of Verulamius is safe, The Errours (saith he) of Young Men are the ruine of Businesse; whereas the errours of aged men amount but to this, that more might have been

done or sooner. But though their Wisdome be little, their Courage is great. Wherefore (to come unto the main Edu∣cation of this Common-wealth) the Militia of Oceana is the Pro∣vince of Youth.

The distribution of this Province by the Essays is so fully described in the Order, that I need repeat nothing. The Or∣der it self being but a Repetition or Copy of that Originall, which in ancient Prudence is, of all other, the fairest; as that from whence the Commonwealth of Rome, more especially de∣rived the Empire of the World; And there is much more rea∣son in this age, when Governments are universally broken, or swerved from their Foundations, and the People groan under Tyranny, that the same causes (which could not be withstood when the World was full of Popular Governments) should have the like effect.

The Causes in the Common-wealth of Rome, whereof the Em∣pire of the World was not any miraculous, but a naturall (nay I may safely say necessary) consequence are contained in that part of her discipline which was domestick, and in that which shee exercised in her provinces or conquest. Of the latter I shall have better occasion to speak when we come unto our Provinciall Orbes; the former divided the whole Peo∣ple by Tribes, amounting, as Livy shewes, at their full growth unto thirty five; and every Tribe by the Cense or va∣luation of Estates into five Classes, for the sixth being Proletary that is, the Nursery, or such as through their Poverty contri∣buted nothing to the Commonwealth but Children, was not reckoned nor used in Armes: And this is the first point of the Militia; in which Moderne Prudence is quite contrary unto the Ancient; for where as we excusing the rich, and arming the Poore, become the vassalls of our Servants, they by ex∣cusing the Poor and Arming such as were rich enough to be Freemen, became Lords of the Earth. (The Nobility and Gentry of this Nation, who understand so little what it is to be Lords

of the Earth, that they have not been able to keep their Lands; will think it a strange education for their Children to be com∣mon Souldiers, and obliged unto all the duties of Armes; neverthelesse it is not for 4, s. a week, but to be capable of being the best man in the Feild or in the City: the latter part of which consideration makes the Common Souldier in this, a better man then the Generall of any Monarchicall Army. And whereas it may be thought, that this would drink deep of Noble Blood; I dare boldly say, take the Roman Nobility in the heat of their fiercest Warrs, and you shall not find such a shambles of them as hath been made of ours by meer luxury and slothfullnesse; which killing the body;

(Animals{que} in vulnere ponunt.)

kill the Soul also; whereas Common right is that which who stands in the vindication of, hath used that Sword of Justice for which he receiveth the purple of Magistra∣cy: the glory of a man on Earth can go no higher, and if he fall he riseth, and comes sooner unto that reward which is so much higher as Heaven is above Earth. To return unto the Ro∣man example.) Every Classis was divided (as hath been more then once shewn) into Centurys, and every Century was e∣qually divided into Youth and Elders; the Youth for For∣raigne Service, and the Elders for the Guard of the Territo∣ry. In the first Classis were a matter of eighteene Centurys of Horse being those which by the Justitution of Servius were first called unto the suffrage (Centuri••tis.) But the delectus, o•• Levy of an Army (which is the present businesse) proceeded according to Polybius in this manner.

Upon a Warr decreed, the Consuls elected four and twen∣ty military Tribunes or Colonels; whereof ten, being such as had merited their tenth Stipend, were younger Officers. The Tribunes being chosen, the Consuls appointed the day unto the Tribes, when those in them of military Age were to ap∣pear at the Capitol; The day being come, and the Youth Assembled accordingly, the Consuls ascended their Tribunal,

and the younger Tribunes were forthwith divided into four parts after this manner: foure were assigned unto the first Legion, (a Legion at the most consisted of 6000 Foot, and 300 Horse) three unto the second, four unto the third, and three unto the fourth; the younger Tribunes being thus di∣stributed, two of the Elder were assigned unto the first Legion, three unto the second, two unto the third, and three unto the fourth. And the Officers of each Legion thus assigned, having drawn the Tribes by Lots, and being seated according unto their divisions at a convenient distance from each other; the Tribe of the first Lot was called: whereupon they that were of it knowing the businesse, and being prepared, presently bolted out four of their Number, in the choice whereof such care was taken, that they offered none that was not a Citizen; no Citizen that was not of the Youth; no Youth that was not of some one of the five Classes, nor any one of the five Classes that was not expert at his Exercizes. Moreover, they used such diligence in matching them for age and stature, that the Officers of the Legions, except they happened to be acquaint∣ed with the Youths so bolted, were forced to put themselves upon fortune, while they of the first Legion chose one; they of the second, the next; they of the third, another; and the fourth Youth fell to the last Legion, and thus was the election (the Legions and the Tribs varying according unto their Lots) carryed on till the Foot were compleat. The like Course with little alteration was taken by Horse Officers till the Horse also were compleat. This was called giving of Names (which the Children of Israel did also by Lot) and if any Man refused to give his Name,* 16.4 he was sold for a slave, or his Estate confis∣cated to the Commonwealth (Marcus Curius Consul cum sùbitum delectum edicere coactus esset & juniorum nemo respondisset conjectis in sortem omnibus,* 16.5 Polliae (it is the name of a Tribe) quae proxima exierat, primum nomen urnâ extractum citari jussit, ne{que} eo respon∣dente, bona Adolescentis has••â subjecit, which was conformable unto the Law in Israel, according whereunto Saul took a yoak of Oxen, and hewed them in pieces, and sent them throughout

the Tribes, saying, Whosoever cometh not forth (unto battel) after Saul and Samuel, so shall it be done unto his Oxen.* 16.6 By which you may observe also, that they who had no cattle were not of the Militia in Israel. But the age of the Roman Youth (Lege Tulliâ) determined at 30. and by the Law (though it should seem by Machiavill and others, that this was not well observ∣ed) a Man could not stand for Magistracy till he (was miles emeritus) had fulfill'd the full term of his Militia; which was compleat in his tenth stipend or Service: nor was he thence forth obliged under any penalty to give his name, except the Commonwealth were invaded, in which case the Elders were as well obliged as the Youth,* 16.7 (Quod per magnos tumultus fieri solitum erat, justitio indicto, delectus sine vacationibus habitus est) The Consul might also Levy (Milites evocatos) commanded-Men out of such as had served their terme, and this at his Discretion. The Legions being thus compleat, were divi∣ded by two unto each Consul; and in these no man had right to serve, but a Roman Citizen; Now because two Legions made but a small Army, the Romans added unto every one of their Armies an equall number of Foot, and a double number of Horse Levied among their Latine or Italian Associates; so a Consular Army with the Legions and Auxiliaries, amount∣ed to about Thirty thousand: and whereas they commonly levy'd two such Armies together, these being joyned made a matter of 60 thousand.

The Steps whereby our Militia followes the greatest Cap∣tain, are the three Essays; the first elected by a fifth man (Cu∣riatis) in the Parishes, amounting in the whole unto One hun∣dred thousand, choosing their Officers (Centuriatis) at the Hundreds, where they fall also unto their Games, or Exerci∣ses, invited by handsome Prizes, such as for themselves and the honour of them will be coveted; such as will render the Hundred a place of Sports, and exercise of Arms all the year long; such as in the space of ten years will harnoyse you 30000 Men Horse and Foot, with such Arms for their Forge,

proof, and beauty, as (notwithstanding the Argyraspides, or sil∣ver shields of Alexanders guard) were never worn by so ma∣ny; such as will present marks of Virtue and direction unto your General or Strategus in the distribution of his Army, which doubles the value of them, unto the Proprietors, who are bound to wear them, and easeth the Common-wealth of so much Charge, so many being Armed already. But here will be the Objection, now. How shall such a Revenue be compassed? Fifty pounds a year in every Hundred is a great deal, not so easily raised: men will not part with their mo∣ney; nor would the sum as it is proposed by the Order of Pompe, rise in many years. These are difficulties that fit our Genius exactly: And yet a Thousand pounds in each Hundred once levied, establisheth the Revenue for ever. Now the Hundreds one with another are worth ten thousand pounds a year dry rent, over and above Personal Estates, which bring it unto twice the value. So a twentieth part of one years Re∣venue of the Hundred, does it. If you cannot afford this while you pay Taxes, though from henceforth they will be but small ones, do it when you pay none: If it be then too much for one year, do it in two: If it be too much for two years, do it in four. What Husbands have we hitherto been? What is become of greater Summes? My Lords, if you should thus cast your bread upon the waters, after many daies you would find it: stand not huckling, when you are offer'd Corn and your money again in the mouth of the Sack.

But to proceed: The first Essay being Officer'd at the Hun∣dreds, and mustred (Tributis) at the Tribes, where they are entertain'd with other Sports, which will be very fine ones; Proceed unto the Election of the second Essay, or standing Army of this Nation consisting of thirty thousand Foot, and ten thousand Horse; and these (upon a War decreed) being delivered at the Rendezvouz of Oceana unto the Strategus, are the third Essay, which answereth unto the Roman Legions. But you may observe, that whereas the Consuls elected the

Military Tribunes, and raised Commanded men out of the Veteranes at their own discretion: Our Polemarchs or Field-Officers are elected by the Scruteny of the Council of Warre; and our Veteranes not otherwise taken on, than as Voluntiers, and with the consent of the Polemarchs, which may serve for the removall of certain Scruples which might otherwise be in∣cident in this place, though without encouragement by the Roman way of proceeding, much lesse that which is proposed. But whereas the Roman Legions in all amounted not in one Army to above 30000 Men, or little more, you have here Fourty thousand; and whereas they added Auxiliaries, in this regard it is that Marpesia will be of greater Revenue unto you, then if you had the Indies; for whereas heretofore She hath brought you forth nothing but her native Thistle: plough∣ing out the ranknesse of her Aristocracy by your Agrarian, you will find her an inexhaustible Magazine of Men, and to her own advantage, who will make a far better Accompt by the Arms, then by the Pins of Poland: Wherefore as a Consu∣lar Army consisted of about an equall number of Auxiliaries added unto their Legions by their Latine or Italian Associates, you may adde unto a Parliamentary Army an equall number of Marpesians, or Panopeans, as that Colony shall hereafter be able to supply you. By which means the Common-wealth will be able to go forth to Battail with Fourscore thousand Men. To make Wars with small Forces is no Husbandry, but a waste, a disease, a lingring and painful Consumption of Men and Money; the Romans making theirs thick, made them short, and had little regard unto money, as that which they who have men enow, can command where it is fittest that it should be Levied. All the ancient Monarchies by this means got on wing, and attain'd unto vast Riches. Whereas your Modern Princes being dear Purchasers of small parcels, have but empty Pockets. But it may be that some will accuse the Order, of rashnesse; in that it committeth the sole Conduct of the War unto the General; and the Custom of Venice by her Proveditori, or Checks upon her Commanders in Chief, may

seem to be of greater Prudence; but in this part of our Go∣vernment neither Venice, nor any Nation that maketh use of mercenary Forces, is for our Instruction. A mercenary Army, with a standing Generall, is like the fatall Sister that Spins: But proper Forces, with an annuall Magistrate, are like Her that cuts the thread. Their Interests are quite contrary, and yet you have a better Proveditor then the Venetian, another Strategus sitting with an Army standing by him; whereupon that which is marching, if there were any probability it should, would find as little possibility that it could recoyl, as a Forraign Enemy to invade you. These things considered, a War will appear to be of a contrary nature unto that of all other reckonings, in as much as of this, you must never look to have a good accompt if you be strict in imposing Checks. Let a Council of Hunts-men assembled before-hand, tell you which way the Stagg shall run, where you shall cast about at the fault, and how you shall ride to be in at the Chase all the day: but these may as well do that, as a Council of War direct a General. The hours that have painted wings, and of different colours, are his Counsel: he must be like the eye that maketh not the scene, but hath it so soon as it changes. That in many Counsellors there is strength, is spoken of civill Administrations; As to those that are Military, there is nothing more certain, then that in many Counsellors there is weaknesse. Joynt Commissions in Military affairs are like hunting your Hounds in their Couples: In the Attick War, Cleomenes and Demaratus, Kings of Lacedemon, being thus coupled, tugg'd one against another; and while they should have joyn'd against the Persian, were the Cause of the calamity: whereupon that Common-wealth took better Counsel, and made a Law, whereby from thenceforth there went at once but one of her Kings unto Battail.

The Fidenati being in rebellion, and having slain the Colony of the Romans; four Tribunes with Consular power were created by the people of Rome, whereof one being left for the guard of the City,

the other three were sent against the Fidenati, who through the di∣vision that happened among them, brought nothing home but disho∣nour: whereupon the Romans created the Dictator; (and Livy gives his judgment in these words: Tres Tribuni, potestate Consu∣lari, documento fuêre, quàm plurimum imperium bello inutile esset; tendendo ad sua quis{que} consilia, cum alii aliud videretur, aperuerunt ad occasionem, locum hosti) When the Consuls, Quictius and Agrippa, were sent against the Aequi, Agrippa for this reason re∣fused to go forth with his Colleague, (saying; Saluberrimum in ad∣ministratione magnarum rerum, summam imperii apud unum esse) And if the ruine of Modern Armies were well considered, most of it would be found to have fallen upon this Point: it being in this case far safer to trust unto any one Man of common Prudence, then to any two or more together of the greatest Parts. The Consuls indeed being equal in Power, while one was present with the Senate, and the other in the Field with the Army, made a good Bal∣lance; and this with us is exactly follow'd by the Election of a new Strategus upon the march of the old one.

The Seven and twentieth Order, Whereby the Elders in case of Invasion are obliged unto equall duty with the Youth, and each upon their own Charge, is suitable unto reason; (for every Man defends his own Estate); and unto our Copy, as in the War with the Samnites and Tuscans. (Senatus justitium indici, delectum omnis generis hominum haberi jussit: nec ingenui modo, et juniores Sacramento adacti sunt, sed seniorum etiam co∣hortes factae.) This Nation of all others is the least obnoxious unto Invasion. Oceana (saith a French Polititian) is a Beast that cannot be devoured but by her Self; Neverthelesse, that Government is not perfect which is not provided at all points; and in this (ad Triarios res rediit) the Elders being such as in a martial State must be Veterans; the Common-wealth invaded gathers strength (like Antaeus) by her fall, whilst the whole number of the Elders consisting of five hundred thousand, and the Youth of as many (being brought up according unto the Order) give twelve Successive Battels, each Battel consist∣ing

of Eighty thousand Men, half Elders, and half Youth: And the Common-wealth whose Constitution can be no stranger unto any of those virtues which are to be acquired in humane life, growes familiar with Death ere She dye. If the hand of God be upon her for her transgressions, She shall mourn for her sins, and lye in the dust for her iniquities, without losing of her manhood.

(Si fractus illabatur orbis Impavidam ferient ruinae.)

The remaining part being the Constitution of the Provin∣ciall Orbe is partly Civill, or consisting of the Elders; and partly Military, or consisting of the Youth. The Civil part of the Provincial Orbe is directed by

[order 28]

The Twenty-Eighth Order; Whereby the Council of a Province being constituted of twelve Knights,* 16.8 divided by four into thrée Re∣gions (for their terme and revolution conformable unto the Parlia∣ment) is perpetuated by the annuall election at the Tropick of four Knights (being trienniall Magistrates) out of the Region of the Se∣nate whose terme expireth; and of one Knight out of the same Region to be Strategus, or Generall of the Province, which Magistracy is annuall. The Strategus or Magistrate thus chosen, shall be as well President of the Provinciall Council with power to propose unto the same, as Generall of the Army. The Council for the rest shall elect weekly Provosts, having any two of them also right to propose, af∣ter the manner of the Senatorian Councils of Oceana. And whereas all Provinciall Councils are members of the Council of State, they may and ought to keep diligent correspondence with the same; which is to be done after this manner; Any opinion or opinions Legiti∣mately proposed and debated at a Provinciall Council; being there upon signed by the Strategus, or any two of the Provosts, may be transmitted unto the Council of State in Oceana: and the Council of State proceeding upon the same in their naturall Course (whether by their own Power if it be a matter within their instructions, or by authority of the Senate, thereupon consulted, if it be a matter of State which is not in their instructions or by authority of the Senate and Command of the People, if it be a matter of Law, as for the

Levys of Men or Money upon common use and safety) shall returne such answers, advice, or Orders, as in any of the ways mentioned shall be determined upon the Case. The Provinciall Councils of Marpesia and Panopea respectively shall take especiall care that the Agrarian Laws, as also all other Laws that be or shall from time to time be enacted by the Parliament of Oceana, for either of them, be duely put in execution; They shall mannage and receive the Customs of either Nation for the Shipping of Oceana being the Common Guard; they shall have a care that moderate and sufficient pay upon the respective Province be duely raysed for the support and maintenance of the Officers and Souldiers, or Army of the same in the most effectuall constant and convenient way. They shall receive the Re∣galia, or publique Revenues of those Nations, out of which every Counsellor shall have for his terme, and unto his proper use, the Summe of 500 l. per annum; and the Strategus 500. l. as President, besides his pay as Generall, which shall be 1000 pounds: the remain∣der to go unto the use of the Knights and Deputies of the respective Provinces; to be paid if it will reach, according unto the rates of Oceana; if not, by an equall distribution, respectively; or the over∣plus, if there be any, to be returned unto the Treasury of Oceana. They shall mannage the Lands (if there be any such holden in either of the Provinces by the Common-wealth of Oceana, in Dominion) and return the Rents into the Exchequer. If the Commonwealth come to be possessed of richer provinces, the pay of the Generall or Strategus, and of the Council is may be respectively encreased. The People for the rest shall elect their own Magistrates, and be govern∣ed by their own Lawes having power also to appeale from their Na∣tive, or Provinciall Magistrates if they please unto the People of Oceana. And whereas there may be such as receiving Injury are not able to prosecute their appeales at so great a distance: Eight Serjants at Law being sworne by the Commissioners of the Seale shall be sent by foure into each Province once in two yeares, who dividing the same by Circuits, shall heare such Causes, and having gathered and introduced them shall returne unto the severall Appellants, Gratis, the Determinations and Decrees of the People in their severall Cases.

The terms of a Knight in a Provinciall Orbe as to domestick Ma∣gistracies shall be esteemed a Uacation and no barr unto present

Election into any other Honour, his Provinciall Magistracy being expired.

The Quorum of a Provinciall Council, as also of every other Coun∣cil or Assembly in Oceana, shall in time of health consist of two parts in thrée, of the whole number proper unto that Council or Assembly; and, in a time of Sicknesse, of one part in three; But of the Senate there can be no Quorum without thrée of the Signory: nor of a Coun∣cill without two of the Provosts.

The Civil part of the Provinciall Orbe being declared by the foregoing Order; The military part of the same is constitu∣ted by

[order 29] The Twenty Ninth Order; Whereby the Stratiots of the third Essay,* 16.9 having drawn the Gold Balls marked with the Letter M. and being ten Horse & fifty Foot in a Tribe, that is to say, five hundred Horse, and two thousand five hundred Foot in all, the Tribes shall be delivered by the respective Conductors unto the Provinciall Strate∣gus, or Generall, at such a time and place or Rendevouz as he shall appoint by Order and Certificate of his Election; and the Strategus having received the Horse and Foot mentioned, which are the third Classis of his Provinciall Guard, or Army, shall forthwith lead them away unto Marpesia, where the Army consisting of thrée Classes each Classis containing thrée thousand Men, whereof five hundred are Horse; and receiving the new Strategus with the third Classis; the old Strategus with the first Classis shall be dismist by the Provinciall Council. The same method with the Stratiots of the Letter P. is to be observed for the Provinciall Orbe of Panopea: and the Common-wealth coming to acquire new Provinces, the Senate and the Peo∣ple may erect new Orbs in like manner consisting of greater or lesse numbers according as is required by the respective occasion. If a Stratiot have once served his terme in a Provinciall Orbe, and hap∣pen afterwards to draw the Letter of a Province at the Election of the second Essay; he may refuse his Lot, and if he refuse it, the Cen∣sor of that Urn shall cause the files balloting at the same to make an hault; and if the Stratiot produce the Certificate of his Strategus or Generall, that he hath served his time accordingly; the Censor throwing the Ball that he drew into the Urn againe, and taking out a blank, shall dismisse the Youth, and cause the Ballot to procéed.

To perfect the whole structure of this Common-wealth: some drections are given unto the third Essay, or Army marching, in

[order 30] The Thirtieth Order; When thou goest to battel against thine enemies and seest Horses and Chariots, and a people more then thou; be not affraid of them,* 16.10 for the Lord thy God is he that goeth with thee to fight for thee a∣gainst thine enemies: And when thou dividest the spoile, it shall be as a sta∣tute and an Ordinance unto thee, that as his part is that goeth down to the battle, so shall his part be that tarryeth by the Stuffe: that is, as to the Commonwealth of Oceana; The spoile taken of the enemy (except Clothes, Armes, Horses, Ammunition and Uictuall, to be divided unto the Souldiery by the Strategus and the Polemarchs vpon the place according unto their Discretion) shall be delivered unto four Commissaries of the Spoiles elected and sworn by the Councill of War, which Commissaries shall be allowd shipping by the State and convoyes according as occasion shall require by the Strategus; to the end that having a bill of lading signed by thrée or more of the Pole∣marchs they may Ship and bring or cause such spoiles to be brought unto the Prize Office in Oceana, where they shall be sold, and the profit arising by such spoiles shall be divided into thrée parts whereof one shall go unto the Treasury, another shall be paid to the Souldiery of this Nation, a third unto the Auxiliaries, at their return from their service, provided that the said Auxiliaries be equall in number unto the proper forces of this Nation, otherwise their share shall be so much lesse as they are fewer in number: the rest of the two thirds to go unto the Officers and Souldiers of the proper forces; and the spoiles so divided unto the proper forces shall be subdivided into thrée equall parts, whereof one shall go unto the Officers, and two unto the common Souldiers, the like for the Auxiliaries: and the share allotted unto the Officers, shall be divided into foure equall parts whereof one shall go to the Strategus, another unto the Polemarchs, a third unto the Colonels, and a fourth unto the Captaines, Cornets, Ensignes and under Officers, receiving their share of the spoile as com∣mon Souldiers. The like for the Auxiliaries: and this upon paine in the case of failure, of what the people of Oceana, unto whom the Cognizance of Peculate or Crimes of this nature is properly apper∣taining, shall adjudge or decrée.

Upon these three last orders the Archon seemed to bee ha∣ranging at the head of his Army, in this manner.

My dear Lords and Excellent Patriots

A Government of this make, is a Cōmonwealth for increase. Of those for preservation, the inconveniences, and frailties have been shewn: their rootes are narrow, such as do not runne, have no fivers, their tops weak and dangerously expo∣sed unto the weather; except you chance to finde one (as Ve∣nice) planted in a flowerpot, and if shee grow, shee grows top-heavy, and falls too. But you cannot plant an Oak in a flowerpot: She must have earth for her root, and heaven for her branches.

Imperium Oceano famam quae terminet astris.

Rome was said (Mole sua ruere) to bee broken by her own weight, but Poetically. For that weight by which she was pretended to bee ruined, was supported in her Emperors, by a farre slighter foundation. And in the Common experience of good Architecture, there is nothing more known, than that buildings, stand the firmer and the longer for their own weight; nor ever swerve through any other internal cause, than that their materials are corruptible; but the people ne∣ver dyes, nor, as a Political Body, are subject unto any other corruption than that which deriveth from their Government. Unlesse a man will deny the chain of causes in which hee de∣nies God, hee must also acknowledge the chain of effects; wherefore there can bee no effect in Nature, that is not from the first Cause, and those successive lincks of the chain, with∣out which it could not have been. Now except a man can shew the contrary in a Commonwealth, if there bee no cause of cor∣ruption in the first make of it, there can never bee any such effect. Let no mans superstition, impose prophanenesse up∣on this assertion; for as Man is sinful, and yet the world is per∣fect, so may the Citizen bee sinfull, and yet the Commonwealth bee perfect. And as man seeing the World is perfect, can

never commit any such sin as can render it imperfect, or bring it unto a natural dissolution; so the Citizen, where the common Wealth is perfect can never commit any such crime, as can ren∣der it imperfect; or bring it unto a natural dissolution. To come unto experience, Venice, notwithstanding that wee have found some flaws in it, is the only Cōmonwealth, in the make wher∣of, no man can find a cause of dissolution; for which reason wee behold her (albeit she consist of men that are not without sin) at this day with one thousand years upon her back, for any internal cause, as young, as fresh, and free from decay, or any appea∣rance of it, as shee was born, but what ever in nature, is not sensible of decay by the course of a thousand years, is capable of the whole age of nature: by which calculation for any check that I am able to give my self; a Commonwealth rightly or∣dered, may for any internal causes be as immortal, or long-lived as the World. But if this be true, those Commonwealths that are naturally fallen, must have derived their ruine from the rise of them. Israel and Athens, died not naturall, but vio∣lent deaths, in this manner the World is to dye; wee are speaking of those causes of dissolution which are naturall unto government; and they are but two, either Contradiction or Inequality, if a Common-wealth be a contradiction she must needs destroy her self; and if she be unequal, it tends to strife, and strife to ruine. By the former of these fell Lacedemon, by the latter Rome. Lacedemon being made altogether for war, and yet not for increase, her natural progresse, became her natural dissolution, and the building of her own victori∣ous hand, too heavy for her foundation; so shee indeed fell by her own weight.

But Rome through her native Inequality, which how it inv••terated the bosomes of the Senate and the people each a∣gainst other, and even unto death hath been shewn at large.

Look well unto it my Lords, for if there be a contradiction or inequality in your Commonwealth it must fall; but if it have neither of these, it hath no principle of mortality, do not think mee impudent; if this be truth, I should commit a

grosse indiscretion, in concealing it. Sure I am that Machiavil, is for the immortality of a Commonwealth upon far weaker principles.* 17.1 If a Commonwealth (saith he) were so happy as to be pro∣vided often with men, that when she is swarving from her principles should reduce her unto her institution, shee would be immortall. But a Common-wealth, as we have demonstrated, swarveth not from her Principles, but by and through her institution, if she brought no byasse into the World with her, her course for any internal cause, must be streight forward, as we see is that of Venice, she cannot turn unto the right hand, nor to the left, but by some rubs, which is not an internal but an external cause, a∣gainst such she can be no way fortifyed, but through her situa∣tion as is Venice, or through her Militia as was Rome; by which examples a Common-wealth may be secure, or those also; Think me not vain, for I cannot hold; a Common-wealth that is rightly instituted can never swarve, nor one that is not rightly instituted be secured from swarving by reduction unto her prin∣ciples, wherefore it is no less apparent in this place, that Machi∣avil understood not a Common-wealth as to the whole peice. As where having told you,* 17.2 That a Tribune or any other Citizen of Rome, might propose a Law unto the people, and debate it with them, he adds this order was good while the people were good, but when the people became evil, it became most pernicious; as if this Order, through which with the like, the people most appa∣rently became evil, could ever have been good; or that the people, or the Commonwealth could ever have become good, by being reduced unto such principles as were the Original of their evil. The disease of Rome was, as hath been shewn, from the native inequality of her ballance, and no otherwise from the Empire of the World, which then as this falling into one scale, that of the Nobility (an evil in such a Fabrick inevitable) kickt out the People, wherefore a man that could have made her to throw away the Empire of the World, might in that have reduced her unto her principles, and yet have been so far from rendering her immortal, that going no farther hee should ne∣ver have cured her. But your C. W. is founded upon an equal Agrarian; and if the earth be given unto the Sonnes of men, this bal∣lance,

is the ballance of justice,* 17.3 such an one as in having due regard unto the different industry, of different men, yet faithfully judgeth the poor. And the King that faithfully judgeth the poor, his Throne shall be established for ever, much more the Com∣monwealth; seeing that equality which is the necessary dissolu∣tion of Monarchy, is the generation, the very life and soul of a Commonwealth; And now, if ever, I may be excusable, seeing that the Throne of a Commonwealth may be established for ever, is consonant unto the holy Scriptures.

The ballance of a Commonwealth that is equal, is of such nature, that what ever falleth into her Empire, must fall equally, and if the whole earth fall into your scales, it must fall equally, & so you may be a greater people, and yet not swerve from your principles one hair. Nay you will be so far from that, that you must bring the world in such a case, unto your ballance, even unto the ballance of Justice. But hearken, My Lords, Are we on earth? Do we see the Sun? or are we visiting those shady places which are fained by the Poets?

(Continuò audita voces, vagitus & ingens.)

These Gothick Empires that are yet in the world, were at the first, though they had legs of their own, but an heavy and un∣weildy burden, but their foundations being now broken, the Iron of them entereth even into the souls of the oppressed, and hear the voice of their Comforters. My father hath chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions. Hearken, I say, if thy brother cry unto thee in affliction, wilt thou not hear him? This is a Commonwealth of the fabrick, that hath an open ear, and a publick concernment, she is not made for her self only, but given as a Magistrate of God unto mankinde, for the vindica∣tion of common Right, and the law of Nature. Wherefore saith Cicero of the like, that of the Romans (Nos magis patrona∣tum orbis terrarum suscepimus, quam Imperium) we have rather undertaken the Patronage than the Empire of the world. If you, not regarding this example, like some other Nations that are upon the point to smart for it, shall, having attained unto your own liberty, bear the sword of your common Magistracy, in vain, sit still; and fold your arms, or which is worse, let out the

blood of your people unto Tyrants to be shed in the defence of their yoaks, like water, and so not only turn the grace of God into wantonness, but his justice into wormwood.

You are not now making a Commonwealth, but heaping coals of fire upon your own heads. A Commonwealth, I say, of this make is a Minister of God upon earth, to the end that the world may be governed with righteousness. For which cause (that I may come at length unto our present business) the orders last rehearsed are buds of Empire, such as with the blessing of God, may spread the arms of your Commonwealth, like an holy Asylum unto the distressed world, and give the earth her Sab∣bath of years, or rest from her labours under the shadow of your wings. It is upon this point where the writings of Ma∣chiavil having for the rest excelled all other Authors, come as far to excel themselves.

(Commonwealths, saith he, have had three wayes of propagating themselves, One after the manner of Monarchies,* 17.4 by imposing the yoak, which was the way of Athens, and towards the latter times of Lacedemon; Another by equal leagues, which is the way of Switz (I shall adde of Holland though since his time) A third by un∣equal leagues, which to the shame of the world, was never practised; nay nor so much as seen, or minded by any other Commonwealth, but that only of Rome. They will each of them either for caution, or imitation, be worthy to be well weighed, which is the proper work of this place. Athens and Lacedemon, have been the oc∣casion of great scandal to the world, in two, or at least one of two regards. The first their emulation, which involved Greece in perpetual wars, the second their way of propagation, which by imposing yoaks upon others, was plainly contradicto∣ry to their own principles.

For the first, Governments bee they of what kinde soe∣ver, if they bee planted too close, are like trees, that impa∣tient in their growth to have it hindred, eat out one another. It was not unknown unto these, in contemplation, or (if you read the story of Agesilaus) in action, that either of them with thirty thousand men might have mastered the East,

and certainly, if the one had not stood in the others light, Alex∣ander had come too late to that end, which was the means (and would be if they were to live again) of ruine, at the least unto one of them: wherefore with any man that understandeth the nature of Government, this is excusable; so it was between Oceana and Marpesia; so it is between France and Spain (though lesse excusable) and so it ever will bee in like cases. But to come unto the second occasion of scandal by them gi∣ven, which was in the way of their propagation, it is not ex∣cusable: for they brought their confederates under bondage; by which means Athens gave occasion of the Peloponesian warre, the wound of which shee dy'd stinking, when Lacede∣mon, taking the same infection from her carkasses, soon fol∣lowed.

Wherefore my Lords, let these bee warnings unto you, not to make that liberty which God hath given you, a snare un∣to others, in using this kind of inlargement of your selves.

The Second way of Propagation or inlargement used by Common-wealths, is that of Switz and Holland, equal leagues; this, though it be not otherwise mischievous, is uselesse to the world, and dangerous unto themselves; uselesse unto the world, for as the former governments were Storks, these are blocks, have no sense of honour, or concernment in the sufferings of others. But as the Aetolians a state of the like fabrick, were reproached by Phillip of Macedon, prostrate themselves, by letting out their arms unto the lusts of o∣thers: while they have their own liberty barren, and with∣out legitimate issue. I do not defame the people, the Switz for valour have no superior, the Hollander for industry no e∣qual: but themselves in the mean time shall so much the less excuse their Governments, seeing that unto the Switz it is well enough known, that the Ensigns of his Common-wealth have no other Motto then (in te converte manus) and that of the Hol∣lander, though hee swear more gold than the Spaniard digs, let's him languish in debt, for shee her self lives upon chari∣ty, these are dangerous unto themselves, precarious govern∣ments,

such as do not command, but beg their bread from Province to Province; in Coats that being patched up of all colours are of none. That their Cantons and Provinces are so many arrows, is good; but they are so many bows too, which is naught.

Like unto these was the Commonwealth of the ancient Tus∣cans, hung together like Bobbins, without an hand to weave with them, therefore easily overcome by the Romans, though at that time; for number, a far lesse considerable people. If your liberty be not a root that grows, it will be a branch that wi∣thers, which consideration brings mee unto the Paragon, the Common-wealth of Rome.

The ways and means whereby the Romans acquired the Pa∣tronage, and in that the Empire of the world, were different, ac∣cording unto the different Condition of their Commonwealth in her rise, and in her growth; in her rise shee proceeded ra∣ther by Colonies, in her growth by unequal Leagues. Co∣lonies without the bounds of Italy shee planted none (such dis∣persion of the Roman Citizen, as to plant him in forreign parts, til the contrary interest of the Emperors brought in that pra∣ctice, was unlawful) nor did shee ever demolish any City with∣in that Compass; or divest it of liberty, but whereas the most of them were Commonwealths, stirred up by emulation of her great felicity, to war against her, if shee overcame any she con∣fiscated some part of their Lands that were the greatest incendiaries, or causes of the trouble, upon which shee plant∣ed Colonies of her own people, preserving the Lands and Li∣berties for the rest, unto the natives or inhabitants. By this way of proceeding, (that I may bee brief as is possible) she did many and great things. For in confirming of Liberty, shee propagated her Empire, in holding the inhabitants from rebellion, shee put a curb upon the incursion of Enemies; in exonerating her self of the poorer sort, shee multiplied her Citizens, in rewarding her veterans, shee rendered the rest lesse seditious, and in acquiring unto her self the reverence of the Common parent, shee from time to time became the

Mother of New-born Cities.

In her farther growth the way of her propagation, went more upon Leagues, which for the first division were of two kindes, Social and Provincial.

Again, Social Leagues, or Leagues of Society, were of two kindes.

The first called, Latinity or Latine; The second Italian Right.

The League between the Romans and the Latins, or Latine Right, approached nearest unto (Jus Quiritium) the right of a native Roman, The Man or the City that was honoured with this Right was (Civitate donatus cum suffragio) adopted a Citizen of Rome, with the right of giving suffrage with the people in some cases, as those of Confirmation, of Law, or Determina∣tion in Judicature, if both the Consuls were agreed, not other∣wise; wherefore that coming to little, the greatest and most peculiar part of this Priviledge was, that who had born Magi∣stracy (at least that of Aedile or Quaestor) in any Latine City, was by consequence of the same a Citizen of Rome at all points.

Italian Right was also donation of the City, but with∣out Suffrage; they who were in either of these Leagues, were governed by their own Laws and Magistrates, having all the Rights, as to liberty of Citizens of Rome, yeelding and pay∣ing to the Commonwealth as head of the League, and having the Conduct of all Affairs appertaining to the Common Cause, such aid of Men and Monies as were particularly agreed upon the merit of the cause, and specified in their respective Leagues, whence such Leagues came to be called equal or un∣equal accordingly.

Provincial Leagues were of different extention, according unto the Merit and Capacity of a conquered people, but of one kinde, for every Province was governed by Roman Magi∣strates, as a Praetor or a Consul, according to the dignity of the Province, for the Civil Administration, and conduct of the Provincial Army: And a Quaestor for the gathering of the

publick Revenue, from which Magistrates, a Province might appeal unto Rome.

For the better understanding of these particulars, I shall exem∣plifie in as many of them as is needful: And first, in Macedon.

The Macedonians were thrice conquered by the Romans, first under the conduct of T. Quintus Flaminius, secondly un∣der that of L. Aemilius Paulus; and thirdly, under that of Q. Caecilius Metellus, thence called Macedonicus.

For the first time (Pax petenti Philippo data, Graeciae libertas) Philip of Macedon, who (possessed of Acro Corinthus) boasted no less than was true, that he had Greece in fetters, being over∣come by Flaminius, had his Kingdome restored unto him, up∣on condition that he should forthwith set all the Cities which he held in Greece, and in Asia at liberty; and that he should not make war out of Macedon, but by leave of the Senate of Rome, which Philip (having no other way to save any thing) agreed should be done accordingly.

The Grecians being at this time assembled at the Istmian Games, where the concourse was mighty great, a Cryer, ap∣pointed unto the office by Flaminius, was heard among them proclaiming all Greece to be free; to which the people being amazed, at so hopeless a thing, gave little credit, till they re∣ceived such testimony of the truth as put it past all doubt, whereupon they fell immediately on running unto the Pro∣consul, with Flowers and Garlands, and such violent expressi∣ons of their admiration and joy, as if Flaminius a young man (about some thirty three) had not also been very strong, hee must have dyed of no other death then their kindness, while every one striving to touch his hand, they bore him up and down the field with an unruly throng, full of such Ejaculations as these; How! Is there a people in the world, that at their own Charge, at their own Peril, will fight for the liberty of another! Did they live at the next door unto this fire! Or what kinde of men are these, whose business it is to pass Seas, that the World may be governed with righteousness! The Cities of Greece and of Asia shake off their Iron fetters at the

voyce of a Cryer! Was it madness to imagine such a thing, and is it done! O Vertue! O Felicity! O Fame!

In this example your Lordships have a Donation of Liberty, or of Italian Right unto a people, by restitution to what they had formerly enjoyed, and some particular Men, Families, or Cities, according unto their merit of the Romans, if not upon this, upon like occasions were gratified with Latinity.

But Philips share by this means did not please him, where∣fore the League was broken by his son Perseus. And the Ma∣cedonians thereupon for the second time conquered by Aemi∣lius Paulus, their King taken, and they sometime after the Victory, summoned unto the Tribunal of the General; where remembring how little hope they ought to have of par∣don, they expected some dreadful sentence. When Aemilius in the first place declared the Macedonians to be free, in the full possession of their Lands, Goods, and Laws, with right to elect annual Magistrates, yeelding and paying unto the people of Rome one half of the Tribute which they were ac∣customed to pay unto their own Kings. This done he went on, making so skilful a division of the Country, in order to the me∣thodizing of the people, and casting them into a form of po∣pular Government. That the Macedonians being first surprized with the vertue of the Romans, began now to alter the scene of their Admiration, that a stranger to them should do such things for them in their own Country, and with such facility, as they had never so much as once imagined to be possible. Nor was this all, for Aemilius, as if not dictating to conquered Enemies, but to some well-deserving friends, gave them in the last place Laws, so suitable, and contrived with such care and prudence, that long use and experience (the only Correctress of works of this nature) could never finde a fault in them.

In this Example you have a Donation of Liberty, or of Italian Right, unto a people that had not tasted of it before, but were now taught how to use it.

My Lords, The Royallists should compare what we are do∣ing, and we what hitherto we have done for them, vvith this

example. It is a shame that while wee are boasting up our selves above all, we should be so far from imitating such examples as these, that we do not so much as understand, that if Go∣vernment be the parent of manners, where there be no Heroi∣cal Vertues, there is no Heroical Government.

But the Macedonians rebelling (at the name of a false Philip) the third time against the Romans, were by them judged incapable of Liberty, and reduced by Metellus unto a Province.

Now whereas it remains, that I explain the nature of a Pro∣vince, I shall rather choose that of Sicely, because having been the first that the Romans made, the descriptions of the rest re∣late to it.

We have so received the Sicilian Cities into amity (saith Cicero) that they enjoy their ancient Laws, and upon no other condition than of the same obedience unto the people of Rome, which they formerly yeelded unto their own Princes or Superiors. So the Sicilians, whereas they had been parcelled forth unto divers Princes, and into divers States, the cause of perpetual Wars, whereby hewing one another down, they became Sacrifices unto the ambition of their Neighbours, or of some Invader, were now received at the old rate into a new Protection, which could hold them, and in which no Enemy durst touch them; nor was it possible (as the case stood with such) for the Sicilians to re∣ceive, or for the Romans to give more.

A Roman Province is defined by Sigonius, a Region having Provinciall Right. Provinciall Right in general, was to bee Governed by a Roman Praetor, or Consull, in matter, at lest, of State, and of the Militia. And by a Quaestor, whose Office it was to receive the Publicks Revenue. Provinciall Right in particular, was different, according unto the different Leagues, or Agreements between the Common-wealth, and the Peo∣ple reduced unto a Province. (Siculi hoc jure sunt, ut quod civis cum cive agat, domi certet suis legibus,* 17.5 quod Siculus cum Siculo non ejusdem Civitatis, ut de eo Praetor Judices, ex P: Rupilii De∣creto, Sortiatur. Quod privatus a Populo petit, aut populus a pri∣vato,

Senatus ex aliqua Civitate, qui judicet, datur, cui alterna Civitates rejectae sunt. Quod civis Romanus a Siculo petit, Sicu∣lus Judex datur; quod Siculus a cive Romano; civis Romanus datur. Ceterarum rerum selecti Judices. ex civium Romanorum conventu proponi solent. Inter aratores & decumanos lege fru∣mentaria, quam Hieronicam appellant, judicia fiunt.) Because the rest would oblige mee unto a discourse too large for this place, it shall suffice that I have shewed you how it was in Sicely.

My Lords, Upon the Fabrick of your Provinciall Orbe I shall not hold you; because it is sufficiently described in the Or∣der, and I cannot beleeve that you think it inferiour to the way of a Praetor and a Quastor. But whereas the Provinciall way of the Roman Common-wealths was that whereby shee held the Empire of the World, and your Orbes are intend∣ed to bee capable at the least of the like use; there may arise many Controversies. As whether such a course bee lawfull, whether it bee feizable? and seeing that the Romans ruined upon that point, whether it would not bee unto the destructi∣on of the Common-wealth?

For the first, If the Empire of a Common-wealth bee a Patronage, to ask whether it bee lawfull for a Commonwealth to aspire unto the Empire of the World, is to ask whether it bee lawfull for her to do her duty, or to put the World into a better condition than it was before.

And to ask whether this bee feizable, is to ask why the O∣ceanar, being under the like administration of Government, may not do as much with two hundred men as the Roman did with one hundred, for comparing their Commonwealths in their rise, the difference is yet greater. Now that Rome (se∣ris Avaritia Luxuriaque) through the naturall thirst of her constitution, came at length with the fulnesse of her Provin∣ces, to burst her self, this is no otherwise to bee understood, than as when a man that from his owne evill constitution, had contracted the Dropsie, dyes with drinking: It being apparent that in case her Agrarian had held, shee could never have been

thus ruined; And I have already demonstrated that your A∣grarian being once poysed, can never break or swarve.

Wherefore to draw towards some Conclusion of this Dis∣course, let mee inculcate the use, by selecting a few conside∣rations out of many. The regard had in this place unto the Empire of the World, appertaineth to a well-ordered Com∣monwealth, more especially for two Reasons.

• 1 The facility of this great enterprize, by a Government of the Modell proposed.
• 2 The danger that you would run, in the omission of such a Government.

The facility of this enterprize, upon the grounds already laid, must needs bee great, forasmuch as the Empire of the World hath been, both in reason and experience, the neces∣sary consequence of a Common-wealth of this nature only, for though it have been given unto all kinds to drive at it, in∣asmuch as that of Athens, or Lacedemon, if the one had not hung in the others light; might have gained it, yet could neither of them have held it; not Athens, through the manner of her propagation, which being by down-right Tyranny, could not preserve what shee had; nor Lacedemon, because shee was o∣verthrown by the weight of a less Conquest. The facility then of this great Enterprize, being peculiar unto that popular Government; I shall consider it, First, In gaining; And secondly, In holding.

For the former (Volenti non fit injuria) it is said of the people under Eumenes, that they would not have changed their subjection for liberty, wherefore the Romans gave them no disturbance.

If a people be contented with their Government, it is a certain sign that it is good, and much good do them with it. The sword of the Magistracy is for a terror unto them that do evil.

Eumenes had the fear of God, or of the Romans before his eyes, concerning such hee hath given you no Commissi∣on.

But till wee can say here are the Romans, where is Eumenes? Do not think that the late appearances of God unto you, have been altogether for your selves; he hath surely seen the afflicti∣on of your Brethren, and heard their cry, by reason of their task-masters. For to believe otherwise, is not only to be mind∣lesse of his wayes, but altogether deaf. If you have ears to hear, this is the way in which you will assuredly bee called upon: for if while there is no Stock of Liberty, no sanctua∣ry of the afflicted, it bee a common object, to behold a peo∣ple casting themselves out of the pan of one Prince, into the fire of another: what can you think, but if the world should see the Roman Eagle again, shee would renew her age, and her flight? nor ever did shee spread her wing with better Omen, then will be read in your Ensigns, which if called in by an oppressed people, they interpose between them and their Yoak; the people themselves must either do no∣thing in the mean time, or have no more pains to take for their wished fruit than to gather it, if that bee not done for them. Wherefore this must needs bee easy, and yet you have a greater facility, than is in the arm of flesh; for if the cause of mankind, bee the cause of God; the Lord of Hosts will bee your Captain, and you shall bee a praise unto the Earth.

The facility of holding, is in the way of your Propagation; if you take that of Athens and Lacedemon; you shall rain snares, but either catch or hold nothing. Lying lips are an abomina∣tion unto the Lord, if setting up for liberty you impose yoaks, hee will assuredly destroy you; On the other side, to go about a work of this nature, by a League without an head, is to abdicate that Magistracy, wherewithall hee hath not only indued you, but whereof hee will require an account of you; for cursed is hee that doth the work of the Lord negli∣gently. Wherefore you are to take the course of Rome: if you have subdued a Nation that is capable of liberty, you shall make them a present of it, as did Flaminius unto Greece, and Aemilius unto Macedon; reserving unto your selves some

part of that revenue, which was legally paid unto the for∣mer Government, together with the right of being head of the League, which includeth such Levyes of men and mony as shall bee necessary for the carrying on of the publick work, for if a people have by your means attained unto freedom, they owe both unto the cause and you, such aid as may propagate the like fruit unto the rest of the world. But whereas every Nation is not capable of her liberty unto this degree, lest you be put, to doing and undoing of things, as the Romans were in Macedon, you shall diligently observe what Nation is fit for her liberty unto this degree, and what not; which is to be done by two marks, the first if shee bee willing to help the Lord against the mighty; for if shee have no care of the Liberty of mankind, shee deserveth not her own; but because in this you may be deceived by pre∣tences, which continuing for a while specious, may afterwards vanish; the other is more certain, and that is, if shee bee capa∣ble of an equal Agrarian; which that it was not observed by excellent Aemilius, in his Donation of Liberty, and intro∣duction of a Popular State among the Macedonians, I am more then moved to believe, for two reasons, the first because at the same time the Agrarian was odious unto the Roman Patrici∣ans; the second, that the Pseudo-Phillip could afterwards so easily recover Macedon, which could not have happened, but by the Nobility, and their impatience having great estates, to bee equalled with the people, for that the people should otherwise, at the meer sound of a name, have thrown away their liberty, is incredible; Wherefore bee assured▪ that the Nation where you cannot establish an equal Agrarian, is incapable of her liberty, as to this kinde of Donation. For example, except the Aristocracy in Marpesia, bee dissolved, neither can that people, have their liberty there, nor you govern at home, for they continuing still liable to bee sold by their Lords, unto forrain Princes, there will never (es∣pecially in a Country of which there is no other profit to be made) bee want of such Merchants and drovers, while you

must be the market where they are to receive their second payment.

Nor can the Aristocracy there be dissolved but by your means, in relation whereunto, you are provided with your Pro∣vincial Orb, which being proportioned unto the measure of the Nation that you have vindicated or conquered, will easily hold it; for there is not a people in the world more difficult to be held than the Marpesians, which though by themselves it be given unto their own nature, is truly to be attributed unto that of their Country: Nevertheless you having nine thou∣sand men upon the continual guard of it, that threatned by any sudden insurrection, have places of retreat; and an Army of forty thousand men upon a dayes warning ready to march unto their rescue, it is not to be rationally shewn, which way they can possibly slip out of your hands; and if a man shall think, that upon a Province more remote, and divided by Sea, you have not the like hold; he hath not so well considered your wings, as your talons, your shipping being of such nature, as maketh the descent of your Armies almost of equal faci∣lity in any Country, so that what you take, you hold, both because your Militia being already populous, will bee of great growth in it self, and through the confederates, by whom in taking and holding, you are still more inabled to take and hold.

Nor shall you easilier hold, then the people under your Em∣pire or Patronage be held (My Lords, I would not go unto the door; to see whether it be (rimarum plena) close shut, this is no under-board dealing, nor game, at which he shall have any advantage against you that sees your Cards, but to the con∣trary the advantage shall be your own) for with eighteen thousand men (which number I put, because it circulates your Orb by the annual charge of six thousand) having set the mat∣ters in the order shewn, you will be able to hold the greatest Province, and eighteen thousand men, allowing them greater pay than any Prince ever gave, will not stand the Province in one Million revenue; * 17.6 In consideration whereof, they shall

have their own estates free unto themselves, be governed by their own Laws and Magistrates; which if the Revenue of the Province be in dry rent (as there may be some that are four times as big as Oceana) forty millions, will bring it with that of industry (to speak with the least) unto twice the value, so that the people there, who at this day are so oppressed, that they have nothing at all whereupon to live, shall for one Mil∣lion paid unto you, receive at the least seventy nine unto their proper use, in which place I appeal unto any man, whether the Empire described, can be other than the Patronage of the world.

Now if you adde unto the propagation of Civil Liberty, (what is so natural unto this Commonwealth that it cannot bee omitted) the Propagation of the Liberty of Conscience, this Empire, this Patronage of the world, is the Kingdome of Christ. For as the Kingdome of God the Father, was a Commonwealth, so shall be the Kingdome of God the Son; The people shall be willing in the day of his power, Psal. 110.3.

Having shewed you in this, and other places some of those inestimable benefits of this kinde of Government, together with the natural and facile emanation of them from their foun∣tain. I come (lest God, who hath appeared unto you, for hee is the God of Nature, in the glorious Constellation of these subordinate causes, whereof wee have hitherto been taking the true elevation, should shake off the dust of his feet against you) to warn you of your dangers, which you, not taking the opportunity, will run by omission.

Machiavil speaking of the defect of Venice, through her want of proper Arms, cryes out (Questo tagliogli le gambe da montar in cielo) this cut her wings, and spoyled her mount un∣to heaven. If you lay your Commonwealth upon any other foundation, then the people, you frustrate your self of proper Arms, and so lose the Empire of the World; nor is this all, but some other Nation will have it.

Columbus offered gold unto one of your Kings, through whose happy incredulity, another Prince hath drunk the poyson,

even unto the consumption of his people; but I do not offer you a nerve of war that is made of purs-strings, such an one as hath drawn the face of the earth into convulsions, but such an one as is natural unto her health and beauty. Look you to it, where there is tumbling and tossing upon the bed of sickness, it must end in death, or recovery. Though the people of the world in the dregs of Gothick Empire, bee yet tumbling and tossing upon the bed of sickness, they cannot dye, nor is there any means of recovery for them, but by ancient prudence, whence of necessity it must come to pass, that this drug bee better known. If France, Italy and Spain, were not all sick, all corrupted together, there would bee none of them so, for the sick would not bee able to withstand the sound, nor the sound to preserve her health without curing of the sick. The first of these Nations (which if you stay her leasure, will in my minde bee France) that recovers the health of ancient Pru∣dence, shall assuredly govern the world; for what did Italy when shee had it? And as you were in that, so shall you in the like case bee reduced unto a Province, I do not speak at ran∣dome. Italy, (L. Aemilio Papo. C. Atilio Regulo Cos.) armed upon the Gallick Tumult that then happened of her self, and without the aid of forreign Auxiliaries, Seventy thousand Horse, and Seven hundred thousand Foot; but as Italy is the least of those three Countries in extent, so is France the greatest in Population.

I, decus, I nostrum, melioribus utere fatis.

My dear Lords, Oceana is as the Rose of Sharon, and the Lilly of the Valley. As the Lilly among thorns, such is my Love among the Daughters. She is comely as the Tents of Kedar, and terrible as an Army with Banners. Her neck is as the Tower of David, builded for an Armory, whereon there hang a thousand Bucklers, and Shields of mighty men. Let me hear thy voyce in the morning, whom my soul loveth. The South hath dropped, and the West is breathing upon thy Garden of Spices. Arise Queen of the earth; Arise holy Spouse of Jesus, For lo the Winter is past, the Rain is over and gone. The Flowers appear on the earth, the

time of singing of birds is come, and the voyce of the Turtle is heard in our Land. Arise I say, come forth, and do not tarry; ah! wherefore should mine eyes behold thee by the rivers of Babylon, hanging thy harpes upon the willows, thou fairest among wo∣men?

Excellent Patriots. If the people bee soveraign, here is that which establisheth their Praerogative. If wee be sincere, here is that which disburdeneth our souls, maketh good all our in∣gagements. If we be charitable, here is that which imbraceth all Partyes. If wee would bee setled, here is that which will stand.

If our Religion bee any thing else but a vain boast, scratching and defacing humane nature or reason, which be∣ing the image of God, makes it a kinde of murther, here is that Empire, whence Justice shall runne down like a river, and judgement like a mighty stream, Amos 5.24. who is it then that calls us? or what is in our way? a Lyon, is it not the Dragon that old Serpent? for what wretched shifts are these? Here is a great deal, might wee not have some of this at one time, and some at another?

My Lords, permit me to give you the sum or brief

Epitome of the whole Common-Wealth.

THe Center or Fundamental Laws are first the Agrarian proportioned at two thousand pounds a year in Land,* 18.1 lying and being with∣in the proper territory of Oceana, and so state∣ing Propriety in Land at such a ballance, that the

Power can never swarve out of the hands of the ma∣ny.

Secondly, The Ballot conveying this equal sap, from the root by an equal election or rotation, into the branches of Magistracy or Soveraign power.

The Orbes of this Common-wealth being Civil, Military, or Provincial, are as it were cast upon this Mold or Center, by the Divisions of the People; first into Citizens and Servants: Secondly, Into Youth and Elders: Thirdly, Into such as have one hundred pound a year in Lands, Goods, or Monies, who are of the Horse, and such as have under, who are of the Foot. Fourthly, by their usual residence into Parishes, hundreds, and Tribes.

The Civil Orbs consist of the Elders, and are thus Created, every Monday next ensuing the last of Decem∣ber, the Elders in every Parish, elect the fifth man to be a Deputy, half a days work, every Monday next en∣suing the last of Ianuary, the Deputies meet at their re∣spective hundred, and elect out of their number one Iu∣stice of the Peace, one Iury-man, one Coroner, and one High-Constable of the Foot; one days work.

Every Monday next ensuing the last of February, the Hundreds meet at their respective Tribe, and there e∣lect the Lords High-Sheriffe, Lieutenant, Gustos Ro∣tulorum, the Conductor, the two Censors out of the Horse, the Magistrates of the Tribe, and of the hun∣dreds, with the Iury-men constituting the Phylarch, assist in their respective Offices at the Assizes, hold the Quarter Sessions, &c. The day following the Tribe elects, the annual Galaxy, consisting of two Knights, and three Deputies out of the Horse, with four Deputies of the Foot, thereby indued with Power, as Magistrates of the whose Nation for the term of three years: an Offi∣cer chosen at the Hundred, may not bee elected a Magi∣strate of the Tribe, but a Magistrate or Officer, either of

the Hundred or of the Tribe, being elected into the Gala∣ry may substitute any one of his own Order, unto his Magistracy or Office in the Hundred, or in the Tribe; This of the Muster is two days work, so the body of the People is annually at the charge of three days work, and an half, in their own Tribes, for the perpetuation of their power, receiving over and above the Magistra∣cies so divided among them.

Every Monday next ensuing the last of March; The Knights being an Hundred in all the Tribes, take their places in the Senate; The Knights having taken their Places in the Senate, make the third Region of the same; and the house proceeds unto the Senatorian E∣lections. Senatorian Elections are annual, biennial, or emergent.

The Annual are performed by the Tropick.

The Tropick is a Scedule consisting of two parts, the first by which the Senatorian Magistrates are elected, the second, by which the Senatorian Councils are perpe∣tuated.

The first part is of this Tenor.

• The Lord Strategus.
• The Lord Orator.
• The first Censor.
• The second Censor.

Annual Magistrates, and therfore such as may bee elected out of any Region; the term of every region, having at the Tropick one year at the least unexpired.

• The third Cōmissioner of the Seal.
• The third Cōmissioner of the Treasury.

Triennial Magistrates, and there∣fore such as can bee chosen out of the third Region only, as that a∣lone, which hath the term of three years unexpired.

The Strategus and the Orator sitting are Consuls, or Presidents of the Senate.

The Strategus marching is General of the Army, in which case a new Strategus is elected to sit in his room.

The Strategus sitting with the six Commissioners be∣ing Counsellors of the Nation, are the Signory of the Commonwealth.

The Censors are Magistrates of the Ballot, Presidents of the Council for Religion, and Chancellors of the Uni∣versities.

The second part of the Tropick, perpetuateth the Coun∣cil of State, by the election of five Knights, out of the first Region of the Senate, to be the first Region of that Coun∣cil, consisting of fifteen Knights, five in every Regi∣on.

The like is done by the election of four into the Council of Religion, and four into the Council of Trade, out of the same Region in the Senate, each of these Councils consisting of twelve Knights, four in every Regi∣on.

But the Council of Warre consisting of nine Knights, three in every Region, is elected by and out of the Coun∣cil of State, as the other Councils are elected by and out of the Senate; And if the Senate add a Iuncta of nine Knights more, elected out of their own number, for the term of three months, the Council of Warre by vertue of that addition, is Dictator of Oceana for the said term.

The Signory ioyntly or severally hath right of Sessi∣on, and Suffrage in every Senatorian Council, and to propose either unto the Senate, or any of them. And every Region in a Council electing one weekly Provost; any two of those Provosts, have power also to propose unto their respective Council, as the proper and peculiar proposers of the same: for which cause they hold an Aca∣demy, where any man either by word of mouth, or write∣ing, may propose unto the Proposers.

Next unto the elections of the Tropick, is the Bienni∣al Election of one Embassadour in ordinary, by the Ballot

of the House, unto the Residence of France, at which time the Resident of France, removes to Spain, he of Spain, to Venice, hee of Venice, to Constantinople, and hee of Con∣stantinople returns. So the Orbe of the Residents, is wheeled about in eight years, by the Biennial election of one Embassadour in Ordinary.

The last kind of Election is emergent. Emergent Elec∣tions are made by the Scruteny. Election by Scruteny, is when a Competitor being made by a Council, and brought into the Senate: The Senate chooseth four more Competitors unto him, and putting all the five unto the Ballot, hee who hath most above half the Suf∣frages is the Magistrate. The Polemarches, or Field Officers, are chosen by the Scruteny of the Council of Warre: An Embassadour extraordinary by the Scru∣teny of the Council of State: the Iudges and Serieants at Law by the Scruteny of the Seal, and the Barons, and prime Officers of the Exchequer, by the Scruteny of the Treasury.

The opinion, or opinions that are legitimately propo∣sed unto any Council must bee debated by the same, and so many as are resolved upon the debate, are introduced into the Senate, where they are debated and resolved, or reiected by the whole house: that which is resolved by the Senate is a Decree, which is good in matter of State, but no law except it bee proposed unto, and resolved by the prerogative.

The Deputies of the Galaxy being three horse and four foot in a Tribe, amount in all the Tribes unto one hun∣dred and fifty horse, and two hundred foot, which hav∣ing entred the Prerogative▪ and chosen their Captains, Gornet and Ensign (triential Officers,) make the third Classis consisting of one Troop, and one Company, and so ioyning with the whole Prerogative, elect four an∣nual Magistrates, called Tribunes, whereof two are of the Horse, and two of the foot, these have the command

of the Prerogative Sessions and Suffrage in the Coun∣cil of war, and Sessions without Suffrage in the Se∣nate.

The Senate having past a Decree which they would propose unto the people, cause it to be printed and publish∣ed, or promulgated for the space of six weeks, which be∣ing Ordered, they choose their Proposers, The Pro∣posers must bee Magistrates, that is, the Commissioners of the Seal, those of the Treasury, or the Censors. These being chosen, desire the Muster of the Tribunes, and ap∣point the day. The people being assembled at the day ap∣pointed, and the Decree proposed, that which is pro∣posed by authority of the Senate, and commanded by the People is the Law of Oceana, or an Act of Parlia∣ment.

So the Parliament of Oceana consisteth of the Senate proposing, and the People resolving.

The People, or Prerogative are also the Supream Iudi∣catory of this Nation, having power of hearing and de∣termining all Causes of appeal from all Magistrates, or Courts Provinciall, or Domestick, as also to question any Magistrate, the term of his Magistracy being expir∣ed: if the Case be introduced by the Tribunes or any one of them.

The Military Orbs consist of the Youth, that is, such as are from eighteen to thirty years of age: and are thus created.

Every Wednesday next ensuing the last of December, the Youth of every Parish assembling, elect the fifth of their number to be their Deputies, the Deputies of the Youth, are called Stratiots, and this is the first Essay.

Every Wednesday next ensuing the last of Ianuary, the Stratiots assembling at the hundred, elect their Captain and their Ensign, and fall to their game.

Every Wednesday next ensuing the last of February, the Stratiots are received by the Lord Lieutenant their Com∣mander

in Chief, with the Conductors and the Censors, and having been disciplin'd and entertained with other Games, are called unto the Urnes, where they elect the second Essay, consisting of two hundred horse and six hundred foot in a Tribe, that is, often thousand Horse, and thirty thousand foot in all the Tribes, which is the standing Army of this Nation, to march at any warning; they also elect at the same time, a part of the third Essay, by the mixture of balls marked with the letter M. and the letter P. for Marpesia and Panopea, they of either mark being ten Horse and fifty foot in a Tribe, that is, five hundred horse and two thousand foot in all the Tribes, which are forthwith to march to their respective Pro∣vinces.

But the third Essay of this Nation more properly so called, is when the Strategus with the Polemarches (the Senate and the People, or the Dictator having Decreed a Warre) receive in return of his Warrants the second Essay from the hands of the Conductors at the Randezvouz of Oceana, which Army marching with all Accommodations, Provided by the Council of Warre, the Senate elects a new Strategus, and the Lords Lieutenants, a new second Essay.

A Youth except he bee an onely sonne, refusing any one of his three Essays without sufficient cause, shewn unto the Phylarch, or the Censors, is uncapable of Magistra∣cy, and is fined a fift part of his yearly rent, or of his Estate for Protection. In case of Invasion the Elders are obliged unto like duty with the Youth, and upon their own Charge.

The Provincial Orbe consisting in part of the Elders, and in part of the Youth, is thus created.

Four Knights out of the first Region falling, are elect∣ed in the Senate, to bee the first Region of the Provin∣cial Orbe of Marpesia, these being triennial Magistrates, take their places in the Provincial Council, consisting

of twelve Knights, for in every Region, each Regi∣on choosing there weekly Provosts, of the Council thus constituted, one Knight more chosen out of the same Region in the Senate, being an annual Magistrate is President, with power to propose, and the opinions proposed by the President, or any two of the Provosts are Debated by the Council, and if occasion bee of farther power or instruction, than they yet have transmitted unto the Council of State, with which the Provincial is to hold Intelligence.

The President of this Councill is also Strategus, or General of the Provincial Army, wherefore the Con∣ductors upon notice of his Election, and appointment of his Randezvous, deliver unto him the Stratiots of his Letter, which hee takes with him into his Province: and the Provincial Army having received the new Strate∣gus, with the third Classis, the Council dismisseth the old Strategus with the first Classis. The like is done for Panopea, or any other Province.

But whereas the term of every other Magistracy or e∣lection in this Common-wealth, whether annual or trien∣nial, requireth an equal Uacation, the term of a Provin∣cial Counsellor or Magistrate, requireth no vacation at all. The Coram of a Provincial, as also that of every other Council and assembly, requireth two thirds in a time of health, and one third in a time of sickness.

— (Insula Portum Efficit objectu laterum, geminique minantur In coelum scopuli, quorum suo vertice latè Aequora tuta silent)

I think I have omitted nothing, but the Props and Scaffolds which are not of use but in building. And how much is here? Shew me another Commonwealth in this compass? How ma∣ny things? Shew me another intire Government consisting

but of thirty Orders. If you go to suit there lye unto some of your Courts two hundred original Writs; If you stir your hand, there go more nerves and bones unto the motion; If you play, you have more Cards in the pack; nay you could not sit with your ease in that chair, if it consisted not of more parts, will you not allow unto your Legislator, what you can afford your Upholdster; unto the Throne, what is necessary to a Chair?

My Lords, If you will have fewer Orders in a Common-wealth you will have more, for where she is not perfect at first, every day, every houre will produce a new Order, the end whereof is to have no Order at all, but to grinde with the clack of some Demagoge; Is hee providing already for his golden Thumb? Lift up your heads; Away with Ambition, that fulsome complexion of a States-man, tempered like Sylla's (Luto cum sanguine) with blood and muck. And the Lord give unto his Senators wisdome, and make our faces to shine, that we may be a light unto them that sit in darkness, and the shadow of death, to guide their feet in the way of peace. —In the Name of God, What's the matter! —

Philadelphus the Secretary of the Council, having per∣formed his task in reading the several Orders, as you have seen, upon the receit of a Packet, it should seem from his cor∣respondent Boccalini, Secretary of Parnassus, in reading one of the letters, burst forth into such a violent passion of weeping, and down-right howling, that your Legislators being startled with the apprehension of some horrid news; one of them had no sooner snatched the letter out of his hand, then the rest crying Read, Read, he obeyed in this manner.

The third instant, his Phaebean Majesty, having taken the nature of free States into his Royal consideration, and being steadily perswaded, that the Laws in such Governments are incomparably better, and more assuredly directed unto the good of mankinde, than in any other,* 18.2 that the courage of such a people is the aptest tindar, unto noble fire, that the genius of such a soyl is that wherein the roots of good literature are least

worm-eaten with Pedantisme, and where their fruits have ever come unto the greatest maturity, and highest relish, conceived such a loathing of their Ambition and Tyranny, who usurping the liberty of their native Countries, become slaves to them∣selves, in as much as be it never so contrary unto their own na∣ture or consciences, they have taken the earnest of sin, and are ingaged to persecute all men that are good. (For, Nemo un∣quam imperium flagitio quaesitum bonis artibus exercuit) with the same or greater rigor, than is ordained by Laws for the wicked, assembled all the Senators residing in the learned Court at the Theater of Melpomene, where he caused Caesar the Dictator to come upon the Stage, and his Sister Actia; his Nephew Au∣gustus, Julia his Daughter, with the children which she had by Marcus Agrippa, Lucius, and Cajus Caesars, Agrippa Posthumus, Julia, and Agrippina, with the numerous Progeny which she bare unto her renowned husband Germanicus, to en∣ter. A miserable Scene in any, but most deplorable in the eies of Caesar, thus beholding what havock his prodigious ambi∣tion, not satisfied with his own bloody ghost, had made upon his more innocent Remains, even unto the total extinction of his Family. For it is (seeing where there is any humanity, there must be some compassion) not to be spoken without tears, that of the full branches deriving from Octavia, the elder sister, and Julia the Daughter of Augustus, there should not be one fruit or blossome that was not cut off, or blasted, by the Sword, Famine, or Poyson. Now might the great soul of Caesar have been full; and yet that which powred in as much or more, was to behold that execrable race of the Claudii, ha∣ving hunted, and sucked his blood with the thirst of Tygars, to be rewarded with the Roman Empire, and remain in full possession of the famous Patrimony: A spectacle to pollute the light of heaven. Nevertheless as if Caesar had not yet enough, his Phaebean Majesty caused to be introduced on the other side of the Theater, the most illustrious and happy Prince Andrea Doria, with his dear posterity, imbraced by the soft and constant arms of the City Genoa, into whose bosome, ever

fruitful in her gratitude, he had dropp'd her fair liberty like the dew of heaven, which when the Roman Tyrant beheld, and how much more fresh that Lawrel was worn with a root in the hearts of the people, than that which hee had torn off; he fell into such horrid distortion of limbs and countenance; that the Senators who had thought themselves steel and flint at such an object, having hitherto stood in their reverent snow like thawing Alpes, now covered their faces with their large sleeves.

My Lords (said the Archon rising) witty Philadelphus, hath given us a grave admonition in a dreadful Tragedy (Discite justitiam moniti, & non temnere divos) Great and glorious Caesar, the highest character of flesh, yet could not rule but by that part of man, which is the beast, but a Common-wealth is a Monarchy, to hear God is King, in as much as reason his dictate, is her Soveraign Power.

Which said, he adjourned the Council. And the Model being soon after promulgated (Quod bonum foelix, faustumque sit huic Reipub, Agite quirites, censuere patres, jubeat populus) The Sea roared, and the Flouds clapt their hands.

LIBERTAS The Proclamation of his Highnesse the Lord Archon of Oceana, upon Promulgation of the Model.

WHereas his Highness and the Council, in the framing of the modell promulgated,* 19.1 have not had any private interest, or ambition, but the fear of God, and the good of this people before their eyes, and it remains their desire, that this great work may bee carried on accor∣dingly, this present greeting is to inform the good people of this Land, that as the Coun∣cil of Prytans sate, during the framing of the model, to receive from time to time, such pro∣positions as should be offered, by any wise hearted or publick spirited man, towards the institution of a well ordered Common-wealth, so the said Council is to sit as formerly in the great Hall of the Pantheon, during Promul∣gation,

which is to continue for the space of three months, to receive, weigh, and as there shall bee occasion, transmit, unto the council of Legislators, all such objections as shall be made against the said Model, whether in the whole, or in any part. Wherefore that no∣thing bee done rashly, or without consent of the people, such of what party soever, with whom there may remain any doubts or diffi∣culties, are desired with all convenient speed to address themselves unto the said Prytans, where if such objections, doubts, or difficul∣ties receive solution unto the satisfaction of the auditory, they shall have publick thanks, but if the said objections, doubts, or difficulties, receive no solution unto the satisfaction, of the auditory, then the model promulgated shall bee reviewed, and the party that was the oc∣casion of the review, shall receive publick thanks, together with the best horse in his Highnesses Stable, and bee one of the Coun∣cil of Legislators. And so God have you in his keeping.

I should now write the same Council of the Prytans, but for two reasons, the one, that having had but a small time for that which is already done, I am over-laboured; The other, that there may be new objections: Wherefore if my Reader have any such as to the Model, I intreat him to address himself by way of Oration, as it were unto the Prytans that when this rough

draught comes to be a work, his speech being faithfully inserted in this place, may give, or receive correction unto amendment. For what is written will be weighed but conversation, in these dayes is a game, at which they are best provided that have light Gold

It is like the sport of women that make flowers of straws, which must be stuck up, but may not be touched? Nor, which is worse,* 19.2 is this the fault of conversation onely. But to the Examiner, I say, If to invent method, and to teach an art, be all one, Let him shew that this Method is not truly invented, or this Art is faithfully taught.

I cannot conclude a Circle, (and such is this Common-wealth) without turning the end into the beginning. The time of Promulgation being expired, the Surveyors were sent down, who having in due season made report that their work was perfect, the Orators followed, under the administration of which officers, & Magistrates the Commonwealth was ratified and established by the whole body of the people, Curiatis, Cen∣turiatis, and Tributis Comitiis. And the Orators being by vertue of their Scroles or lots, members of their respective Tribes, were elected each first Knight of the third List, or Galaxy: Wherefore having at their return, assisted the Archon in put∣ting the Senate, and the People or Prerogative into motion, they abdicated the Magistracy both of Orators and Legis∣lators.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Definitions of Government.
• * 1.2

  Page 180.
• * 1.3

  Page 377.
• * 1.4

  Page 111.
• * 1.5

  Division of Government▪
• * 1.6

  Goods of the Mind and of Fortune.
• * 1.7

  Empire and Authority.
• * 1.8

  Empire.
• * 1.9

  Division of Empire. Dominion. Domestick Empire.
• * 1.10

  Ballance in Lands.
• * 1.11

  Absolute Monarchy.
• * 1.12

  Mixed Mo∣narchy.
• * 1.13

  Popular Go∣vernment.
• * 1.14

  Tyranny. Oligarchy. Anarchy.
• * 1.15

  Ballance in money.
• * 1.16

  Page 89.
• * 1.17

  Arms and Contracts.
• * 1.18

  Page 90.
• * 1.19

  Page. 89.
• * 1.20

  B. 5.3.3.9.
• * 1.21

  D. B. 1. C. 55.
• * 1.22

  The right of the Militia stated.
• * 1.23

  Ballance of forraign Empire.
• * 1.24

  Authority.
• * 1.25

  Eccl. 10.15. Tacit. Grot.
• * 1.26

  Page 110.
• * 1.27

  Hooker. B. 1.
• * 1.28

  Grot.
• * 1.29

  The orders of popular Go∣vernment in Nature.
• * 1.30

  Deut. 1.13.
• * 1.31

  The People.
• * 1.32

  The Magi∣stracy.
• * 1.33

  The Orders of a Com∣mon-wealth in experi∣ence, as that
• * 1.34

  Of Israel.
• * 1.35

  The People.
• * 1.36

  The Senate.
• * 1.37

  The Magi∣stracy.
• * 1.38

  Of Lacede∣mon.
• * 1.39

  Of Carthage
• * 1.40

  Of Rome.
• * 1.41

  Of Venice.
• * 1.42

  Of Switz & Holland.
• * 1.43

  Page 170.
• * 1.44

  Division of Common-Wealths.
• * 1.45

  Equal Agra∣rian.
• * 1.46

  Rotation.
• * 1.47

  Prolongati∣on of Magi∣stracy.
• * 1.48

  Ballot.
• * 1.49

  Definition of an equall Common-wealth.
• * 1.50

  Disc. B. 1. C. 55.
• * 1.51

  Unequall Common-wealth.
• * 1.52

  Deut. 1.
• * 1.53

  De Legibus.
• * 1.54

  Deut. 17.
• * 1.55

  Deut. 18.10.
• * 1.56

  2 Kings 1.
• * 1.57

  1 King. 18.19.
• * 1.58

  De Judiciis.
• * 1.59

  The transiti∣on of Ancient into Modern Prudence.
• * 1.60

  The Agra∣rian Lawes of the Ro∣mans. Sigonius de Ant. Ro.
• * 1.61

  Military Colonies.
• * 1.62

  The Ballance of the Roman Empire.
• * 1.63

  Dion.
• * 1.64

  Prince, cap. 19.
• * 1.65

  Machiavil.
• * 1.66

  The Gothick Ballance.
• * 1.67

  Institution of Feudato∣ry Princi∣palities.
• * 1.68

  For the proof of the ensuing discourse out of Records and Antiquities. See Selden's Titles of Ho∣nour, from page 593. to pag. 837.
• * 1.69

  The Teuton Monarchy.
• * 1.70

  Earles.
• * 1.71

  Kings Thane
• * 1.72

  Middle-Thane.
• * 1.73

  Shiremoot.
• * 1.74

  Halymoot.
• * 1.75

  Weidena∣gamoots.
• * 1.76

  25 Edw. 3. Cap. 1.
• * 1.77

  Monarchy of the Neu∣strians.
• * 1.78

  Their Earls.
• * 1.79

  27 H. 8.
• * 1.80

  Their Ba∣rons.
• * 1.81

  Barons by their posses∣sions.
• * 1.82

  Cook. 11. Inst. pag. 596.
• * 1.83

  Ballance of the Neu∣strian Mo∣narchy.
• * 1.84

  4 Rich. 2. Num. 13.
• * 1.85

  Administration of the Neu∣strian Monar∣chy during the raigne of the first kings
• * 1.86

  Barons by Writ.
• * 1.87

  49 H. 3.
• * 1.88

  Barons by Letters Pa∣tents.
• * 1.89

  Dissolution of the late Monarchy of Oceana.
• * 1.90

  The genera∣tion of the Common-wealth.
• * 1.91

  What Pru∣dence is.
• * 1.92

  The Royalist.
• * 1.93

  The Com∣monwealths man.
• * 1.94

  Religious parties.
• * 1.95

  Saints.
• * 1.96

  Livy, 4.8.
• * 1.97

  the Errors of the people are from their Gover∣nours.
• * 1.98

  Lib. 8.
• * 1.99

  The Gene∣ral.
• * 1.100

  Des. B. 1. c 9.
• * 1.101

  That a Le∣gislator is to be one.
• * 1.102

  That a Com∣mon-wealth is to be made at once.
• * 1.103

  Suidas.
• * 1.104

  Exo. 18.24. Numb. 1.16. Math.
• * 1.105

  Crag. de Rep. Lac. Lib. 1. Cap. 6.
• * 1.106

  Halicar.
• * 1.107

  Sigonius.
• * 1.108

  Institution of the Com∣mon-wealth.
• * 1.109

  Divisions of the People.
• * 1.110

  Into Free∣men, and Servants.
• * 1.111

  Into Youth and Elders.
• * 1.112

  Into Horse and Foot.
• * 1.113

  into Pari∣shes, Hun∣dreds, and Tribes.
• * 1.114

  The use and method of the Survey∣ors.
• * 1.115

  Institution of the Pa∣rishes of the Ballot and of the De∣puties.
• * 2.1

  Jos. 24.1.
• * 2.2

  Act. 14.23.
• * 2.3

  Definition of a Parish.
• * 2.4

  Institution of the Hundred
• * 3.1

  Definition of the Hundred
• * 3.2

  Institution of the Tribe.
• * 3.3

  of the Pavi∣lion.
• * 3.4

  The whole Charge of the Institution▪
• * 4.1

  Institution of the Prime Magnitude.
• * 4.2

  Functions of the Magi∣strates of the Prime Magnitude.
• * 4.3

  Functions of the Phy∣larch.
• * 4.4

  Institution of the Roll cal∣led the Pillar of Nilus.
• * 4.5

  Institution of the Gal∣laxy.
• * 5.1

  Definition of the Tribe.
• * 5.2

  Constitution of the Com∣mon-wealth.
• * 7.1

  Arist. Pol. 1.3. c. 9.
• * 7.2

  Pol. l. 5. c. 3.
• * 7.3

  Liv. in praef.
• * 8.1

  The face of the Senate.
• * 8.2

  Constitution of the Senate.
• * 8.3

  Tropick of the Magi∣strates:
• * 8.4

  Of the Stra∣tegus.
• * 8.5

  Of the Ora∣tor.
• * 8.6

  Of the Cen∣sors.
• * 8.7

  Of the Com∣missioners. of the Seal.
• * 8.8

  Of the Com∣missioners of the Trea∣sury.
• * 8.9

  Of the Sig∣nory.
• * 8.10

  Constitution of the Coun∣cils. Of the Council of State.
• * 8.11

  Of the Council of Warr.
• * 8.12

  Of the Coun∣cil of Reli∣gion.
• * 8.13

  Of the Coun∣cil of Trade. Of the Pro∣vosts.
• * 8.14

  Of the Coun∣cill of the Provosts:
• * 8.15

  Constitution of the Bien∣nial Election or Orbe of Embassa∣dors in or∣dinary.
• * 8.16

  Constitution of Election Extraordi∣nary, or by the Scrute∣ny.
• * 8.17

  Instructions for the Councils as to their Sub∣ject Matter.
• * 8.18

  For the Council of State.
• * 8.19

  For the Council of War.
• * 8.20

  For the Council of Religion.
• * 8.21

  For the Council of Trade.
• * 8.22

  For the Academy of the Pro∣vosts.
• * 8.23

  For the At∣tendance of the Coun∣cils.
• * 8.24

  For the Dictator.
• * 9.1

  Livy.
• * 9.2

  Instructions for the Coun∣cils as to their Man∣ner of Pro∣ceeding.
• * 10.1

  Livy.
• * 10.2

  The Face of the Preroga∣tive Tribe.
• * 10.3

  The change, or Election of the Trien∣nial Officers of the Pre∣rogative.
• * 10.4

  The Change, or Election of the Annual Magistrates of the Pre∣rogative.
• * 11.1

  Liv. l. 2.
• * 11.2

  Mach. disc▪ B. 1. C. 6.
• * 11.3

  Arist. Pol. B. 2▪
• * 11.4

  Plutarch in the Life of Lycurgus.
• * 11.5

  Val. Max. l. 4.
• * 11.6

  Liv.
• * 11.7

  The Consti∣tution Fun∣ction and Manner of Proceeding of the Prae∣rogative.
• * 12.1

  Constitution of the Pro∣vincial part of the Se∣nate, and the People.
• * 12.2

  Constitution of the Parli∣ament.
• * 12.3

  Prov. 31.
• * 15.1

  The Go∣vernment of Empori∣um.
• * 15.2

  The City Tribes and Wards.
• * 15.3

  Wardmot▪
• * 15.4

  The Live∣ries.
• * 15.5

  The Com∣panies.
• * 15.6

  Common-Halls.
• * 15.7

  Election of Aldermen and of the Common Councill men.
• * 15.8

  The Court of Alder∣men.
• * 15.9

  The Com∣mon-Coun∣cill.
• * 15.10

  The Com∣mon-Hall.
• * 15.11

  The Electi∣on of the Lord Maior and Sheriffs.
• * 15.12

  Some con∣veniences in this alte∣ration.
• * 15.13

  The Go∣vernment of Hiera.
• * 15.14

  The Court.
• * 15.15

  The High Steward.
• * 16.1

  Cicero.
• * 16.2

  Cicero.
• * 16.3

  Acts 17..18.
• * 16.4

  Judg. 20.9.
• * 16.5

  Valerius.
• * 16.6

  1 Sam. 11.7.
• * 16.7

  Livy.
• * 16.8

  Constitution of the Civill part of the Provinciall Orbe.
• * 16.9

  Constitution of the Mili∣tary part of the Provin∣ciall Orbe.
• * 16.10

  Deut. 20 2 Sam: 30.24.
• * 17.1

  Dis. B. 3. C. 22. B. 3 C. 29.
• * 17.2

  Dis. B. 1. C. 18
• * 17.3

  Prov. 20.14
• * 17.4

  Disc. B. 2. C. 4.
• * 17.5

  Cicero.
• * 17.6

  This by the pay of a Par∣liamentary Army, is de∣monstrated in the Cor∣rollary.
• * 18.1

  Epitome of the whole Com∣mon wealth.
• * 18.2

  Trajno, a Boccalini, Centuria 1. Ragnal. 21.
• * 19.1

  See the course of the Decemvirs in the pro∣mulgation of the first ten of their twelve Tables in Livy.
• * 19.2

  Arist. Rhet.