Of the reasonableness of Christian religion by H.H. D.D.

CHAP. II. (Book 2)

A Digression concerning the use of Reason in deciding Controversies in Religion.

[Sect. 1] HAving proceeded thus far for the convincing of the gain∣sayer; it may not be amiss to consider the beleiver awhile, and give him the bounds or limits, within which Reason is obliged to contain it self, in matters of Faith, and this even by the ver∣dict of Reason it self. And I shall do it by a brief stating of this Question.

[Sect. 2] Whether Right Reason be appointed the Judge of Controver∣sies? Whether all doubts of all sorts be to be determined by the dictates of Nature, in the Hears of every Man which hath the use of Reason?

To this I shall ground my answer in these two Rules, or Postu∣lations. 1. That

[Sect. 3] The measure of mans natural power of knowing or judging of things, is his participating of those things (in some degree) with God, in whom they are as in the Fountain. So that the man may finde, and behold them in himself as truly, though not as eminently, or in the same degree, as they are in God.

For certainly, if a man denudate of all experimental, acquired, revealed knowledge, of all forain helps, left onely to himself as a man endued with Reason, should be questioned in any thing, and supposed able to express his conceptions, he would be fain to fetch out every word that he said, from within him, say onely what his own heart could discern within himself, otherwise he should be supposed to answer more, then he had means to come to the knowledge of; The work done would be above the proportion of the means to it; the conclusion would have more in it then the premises.

From hence follows this second Rule, That

[Sect. 4] Men are naturally able to judge onely of those things, which by some sure connexion depend on those attributes of God, which are communicated to (and particularly by) men, and are the like (as

far as the adumbration or transcript, is to the exemplar or pattern) for kinde, though not degree, in man as in God.

[Sect. 4] Now all Controversies, (i. e. all things subject to judgement) are reducible to two heads, Goodness or Truth; so that the Question now is, Whether Right Reason can infallibly judg, what is good, or bad, true or false?

And then to this I answer, First, Concerning the first Head.

[Sect. 5] For a thing to be good morally (for Metaphysical goodness is all one with truth) depends, by sure connexion, from that eternal justice which is primarily in God, That being the rule, as it is the Fountain, of all moral goodness in men, or things: Every thing be∣ing good, more or less, as it more or less partakes of that justice, which is in God.

[Sect. 6] Now this being one of the attributes of God, which are called Communicable, it is truly affirmed, That that justice, which is in God, is the very same in substance, communicated to men, though in a lower degree. And therefore it follows by the second rule, that man by the light of nature, and general impressions, i. e. by a power of seeing, whatsoever is within his sphear, is enabled by God to judge what is just, what not, what morally good, what bad. And no man judges amiss in these things, but he that hath his judgement corrupted by some prepossession, or habituall vice, or present prevailing temptation; and therefore of moral Contro∣versies, i. e. whether a thing naturally, or in it self, be good or bad, just, or not, Right Reason is a Judg.

[Sect. 7] Yet this with this Caution, or limitation, that it be not extend∣ed to those things, wherein the Law of Nature hath been eleva∣ted higher by any positive Law of Christ. For as Right Reason: cannot judge what is lawful in any particular Kingdom, because what Nature hath made lawful, the Municipal Laws of that place may have forbidden, and made unlawful, (and that Right Reason cannot take notice of, unless it be told so) so in Christs Kingdom, the Church, when he hath forbidden what Nature had left free and unforbidden, Reason (untaught by Christ) cannot say, that that is unlawful, yet generally will be found to bear that Testimony to Christ, that what Christ hath super-added to the Law of Nature Right Reason will of its own accord commend, as best, or most laudable, and excellent in them that do it, though

not knowing any precept for it, it will not affirm that it is necessa∣ry, so as it cannot be omitted without sin.

Then concerning the second Head, I answer,

[Sect. 8] That for a thing to be true, i. e. to have a Being either potential or actual, depends partly on Gods Power, partly on his Will. In respect of its potential Being, it depends on his Power, in respect of its Actual, on his Will.

[Sect. 9] Now Gods Power, though it may in some sense be said commu∣nicable to the Creature, because all ability in the Creature is a gleam of infinite ability in God, yet is not this so communicated, as his Justice or Goodnesse was said to be. For Goodnesse in the crea∣ture is a kinde of image truly resembling the goodnesse in God, and that a kinde of natural image, as is the face in the Glasse, not a voluntary one, which hath its Being from the variable Will of the Artificer. But power, or ability in the Creature, is not thus a natural image of Gods power, but as a reflection of a thing, which voluntarily, and variously casts its beams. Voluntarily, I say, be∣cause the dispensing of his Power, either in manner, or measure, is a free act of his Will; and variously, because he doth it, first, un∣equally; and secondly, not so to any, but that he can (and some∣times doth) withdraw or suspend it, when it is bestowed; so that I cannot say, that as that which is just in God to be done, is just to be done by the Creature, so what is possible to be done by God, is possible to be done by the Creature.

[Sect. 10] The reason of the not communicating of Gods Power to the Creature, as well as his Justice, may be this, because it conduced not to the end of the Creatures Creation, as the other did: For though God intended to make a Creature truly good, and just, yet he did not truly powerful. Power indeed being in it self not a ver∣tue, as justice is, nor in it self morally good, or evil, and therefore not so agreeable to the condition of a Creature, but rather indeed peculiar to the Majesty of a Creator.

[Sect. 11] From all this it follows by the said second rule, that man is not able to fathom Potentiall truths, because Power is not the same in substance in God, and in the Creature, and therefore by what is in the Creature, he is no way enabled to conceive what is in God, and so consequently to define of any Potentiall truth, be∣cause though it may not be wrought by any thing that is in

the Creature, or within his sphere of knowledge, yet it may be by God.

[Sect. 12] All the natural impression, or light, that in this behalf a rational Creature hath, is that two contradictories cannot be true at once, and therefore I think, all Principles that are not thought fit to be proved in any naturall science, (if they be truly so) may easily be resolved into this one, A thing cannot at once be, and not be. And this natural impression rises not from any observation of the power communicated to the creature, (for then still it would hold, that though man cannot do contradictories at once, yet God may) but from a sight, that this would be an effect of extreme impotency, more then is conceiveable in any Creature, and therefore cannot be imputed to God, who is conceived Omni∣potent, nor consequently to man, unlesse God should take away all degrees of power quite from him, and then he should be an∣nihilated.

[Sect. 13] Now for actual truths already in Being, which are works either mediately, or immediately of Gods Will, our Reason is no farther judg of them, then as Gods Will is communicated to us by some Images, or Pictures of it, either substantiall and reall, as when a thing done, is presented to the faculty, to which it is objicible, there a real image of Gods Wil is imprest in me, (& by that I may judg distinctly) or when it is revealed to me either from God, or from any other witnesse, of which in this matter I am convinced, that he partakes of Gods veracity, i. e. would not lie to me, and this may be called an intentionall Image of Gods Will imprest in me.

[Sect. 14] Thus may Right Reason judg of things in Being, either because it is so really represented to the senses, and that is evidence; or because is either revealed, or else attested by God, which Rea∣son knows can neither erre, nor deceive, and this is adherence; or because such a concurrence of testimonies agrees to tell me so, as I have no Motive or Reason to disbeleive, and this is humane Faith, (which may reasonably take place, untill I either see some∣what, or receive somewhat by an higher testimony revealed to the contrary) which also is weaker, or stronger, according to the im∣portance of the matter, authority of the testifiers, my particular dan∣ger, if I be deceived in it, &c.

Hence the Conclusion is, That

[Sect. 15] Right Reason is able to judge of all meerly Moral objects, whe∣ther any thing be good or bad morally; of Naturall objects in matter of fact, whether such a thing be done or no, by the help of the means specified, and by discourse, and analogy from things that we see are done, to judg that such another thing is possible: But of supernatural truths, such things as it never discerned in Nature, either in the kinde, or the like, it cannot judg any far∣ther then thus. Either first, that though we cannot do it, yet for ought we know it is possible, (nay it hath a Being) with God; or secondly, that God hath affirmed it so, therefore I am sure it is; or thirdly, that comes to me from authority, that I have no reason to suspect, but on the contrary concurrence of all Reasons to be perswaded by it; nay, there are some inward Characters in the thing it self, that makes me cast off all jealousie or doubt of such affirmations, and therefore I believe it is so. But generally, and in thesi, it is no way Judge of these last kind of Contro∣versies.

[Sect. 16] And therefore though God, in moral actions, even in himself, submits and appeals to mans reason, Isa. 5. 3. Ezek. 18. 25. yet in these latter he derides all those, that goe about to judge of them by reason, 1 Cor. 1. 20. And agreeably Saint Paul in his Preaching the Gospel, for the proving the truth of Christianity, was fain, saith a 1.1 Origen, to use a peculiar way of demonstration. First, by comparing of Prophecies in the Old Testament, concerning Christ: Secondly, by Miracles; but in practical matters he appeals to that which was written in every ones heart, Rom. 2. 15.

[Sect. 17] To this purpose hath Eulogius an Oration against those, who think to be able to comprehend the true Theology of Christians (i. e. Christians discourses concerning the Persons of the Deity) b 1.2 by the Wit, or Reason of Man; and Photius hath approved of that discourse of his, that he doth c 1.3 talk of God Piously, and devoutly, and set Christian divinity a pitch beyond humane wisdom, d 1.4 superior to all other e 1.5 artificial method, or rules of Art.

[Sect. 18] In sum, it is observable in the writing of the Scripture, that generally in defining these last sorts of Truths, Gods authority is set down, as the onely proof of what is said, without using any o∣ther way of arguing, or secular demonstration: All that is indulged to mens Reason, being onely this; First, to consider, whether it be not very equal, and reasonable to believe God, without any other motive, or topick of proof, even in those things, which are above, or beside Right Reason, nay, against the proposals of corrupt; and secondly, to search (by what helps soever a reasonable mans prudence and diligence can suggest, or furnish him with) which is that Word of God, which contains these revelations, which Reason tells them, they must believe without farther reason∣ing.

[Sect. 19] But not to suffer my self to believe any thing (though reveal∣ed by the Scriptures) but what Reason otherwise would lead me to, is the same that Celsus perswaded the Heathens (of his side) to, against Christ, to f 1.6 follow Reason, and the rational guide in all the doctrines, we receive, all error and deceit being, saith he, brought into the world by Faith; and that they that believed any thing without Reason for it, are like them that delight in Jug∣lers, &c. and therefore he laughs at all those who requiring not Reason for what they believe, use this phrase, g 1.7 Doe not examine but beleive, thy Faith shall save thee, as men that are displeased with wisdom, and in love with folly. To all which Origen, as acute a Reasoner as any, opposes nothing, but the Evidence of Prophecies, and the Word of God for this rule of Faith. Which if it be not simply beleived without any Philosophical rational enquiry, con∣cerning the things affirmed in it, many will of necessity still wal∣low in infidelity after all that God hath done for the rescuing them out of it, and only a few find that by rational search, which before they beleived by simple Faith.

Notes

• a 1.1

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Cont. Cels. p. 4.
• b 1.2

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, p. 862.
• c 1.3

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• d 1.4

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• e 1.5

  Vid. Just. Mart. p. 5. & 6. A & 8. C. 9. A. So Just. Mart. p. 375. A. & for the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, p. 379, So for the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the union of Christs na∣tures, 382. B. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 386. B. 387. D. 388. A.
• f 1.6

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Orig. cont. Cels. p. 8.
• g 1.7

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.