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SIR Hercules, (for in that Title I perceiue you glory) in your Epistle to the Universities, you tell us that you never feared any Adversary, for his supposed strength and if any one inquire Who, or What you are, you tell him, that you are neither Prelaticall, Presbyterian, nor Independent. But what shall we then call you? if any one
aske, tell him (say you) that Hercules is easily known by his foot, and the Lyon by his paw, &c. We see then who you are, viz. an Herculean-Leveller, a Fa∣malisticall Lion,* 1.1 a dissembling Fryar, a Profane Stage-Player, and professed friend to Judicial Astrology and A••••ro∣logers, such as lying Ly-ly, Booker, Cul∣pepper, &c. A great stickler for the fire and Furnace of Chymestry, for Magick and Physiognomy, &c. I must confesse I never ••et saw your person; but let me tell you, I have seen your Lions paw, and Levelling club, wherewith you think to beat down Universities, Humane Lear∣ning, &c. and in their stead, to set up your owne Idle and Addle conceits. What spirit leads you, appeares [page 8 of your book] where you tell us, Ar∣rius is called a Heretick, but you questi∣on how justly [a tender conscienced n••an indeed] but as for the Orthodox, Wo to ••hem! for you tell us they all wrest the Scriptures to make good their Tenents [a heavy charge, could you make it good]
The Proverb saies, Ne Hercules con∣tra duos sed t•••• contra ducentos, imo 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. If Hercules may not ••ight against
two, what an Hercules are you, that dare oppose more then two thousand, and Goliath-like, bid defiance to all the Academies and Armies of the living God: you tel us plainly, that in your ••igh flowne conceit, Homo is a common name to all men. All those viri Dei, those holy-learned men of God, which are in the Land, if they be not of your Familisticall-Levelling-Magicall tem∣per; they are all in your eye, but h••mi∣nes, plebeian, low and common men, &c. How much better had it become you, like Hercules, to have endeavoured the cleansing of that Augaean stable of er∣rours, Heresies and blasphemies, which like a Morphew, have over-spread the face of the Church; to have cut off those Hydra's heads, and helpt our Atlasses to hold up the Heaven of the Church. It had been more for your credit and comfort to have imployed your time and Talent in defence of Languages, Arts and Sciences, (especially in such a season as this, when so many decry them) then thus to weave the Spiders Web, which may peradventure catch some feeble flies, when stronger ones break thorough.
* 1.2'Tis true, sometimes you gild over your errors with golden words, and set a glosse upon your false wares: but poy∣son is never the better for being drunke out of a golden cup, the whore of Baby∣lon deales so with her guests, Rev. 17.4. and the Apostle tels us, that false Tea∣chers, with faire words and fine spee∣ches, do deceive the simple, with plai∣stred words, they parget over the mat∣ter. Rom. 16.18. 2 Pet. 2.3. * 1.3 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, fictitiis verbis quia more plastis ac figuli multa confingunt, ut haeresis suae idolum velent, vestiant & ornent.
But that you may see your folly the better. 1. I shall begin with your contradictions. Sometimes you plead for Academicall learning, and anon you cry it downe; like a Thiefe, we some∣times find you in the way, and present∣ly you are crossing it againe. Thus [page 3.] you cry up Humane Learning as good, excellent, and of manifold transcendent use; whilest moving in its owne Orbe, it enables men for all kind of undertakings, Military and Ci∣vill, without which, men doe not dif∣fer much from beasts, &c. [So page 8, 9.] yet as if you had forgot what you had
said, in the same page you tell us (how truly let the world judge) that this hu∣mane learning, disables men for the Ministry, is a vaine Tradition, and makes men uncapable of Gospell mysteries, &c.
Quo teneam vultus mutantem protea nodo?
So, one while you plead for tea∣ching children without the Grammar Rules [page 22] yet page 24. you cry up Mr Brinslyes way of teaching, which every one knowes (who knowes the Method of that Godly man) hath refe∣rence to Rules.
2. Your sophistry, and fallacious ar∣guing is very frequent, to give you a taste onely,* 1.4 (for as you desire to stirre up some to plead your cause, so I doubt not but some of the Lords Worthies, who have more time and Talents for such worke, will arise and plead his cause more fully.)
1.1 1.5 You tell us, that humane learning puffs men up, makes men selfe-confi∣dent and proud; that it is but a carnall thing, a fleshly power, (just so say your brethren, the Familists, and Anabap∣tists) that the * 1.6 Apostles never taught
or practised any such matter, but bad us beware of Philosophy, Col. 2.8. for it is a fleshly weapon, earthly, sensuall, dive∣lish, an Idoll of mans inventing, spiri∣tuall sorcery or inchantment, yea Rea∣son is a Monster, and the very root and ground of all Infidelity, &c.
Answ. Behold here that Damask-Web, (as his verifying friend cals it) which Mr Webster weaves. 1. He Ar∣gues from the abuse of a thing, to the taking away its use; because some men abuse humane learning to pride, and selfe-conceitednesse, therefore away with humane learning, Non sequitur; for then, because some men abuse, meat, drinke, cloaths and riches; wee must throw away meat, drinke, cloaths and riches.
2. It is not Philosophy simply, that the Apostle condemnes, Col. 2.8. but vaine,* 1.7 spoyling, abusive Philosophy; as you may see more fully in my vindicati∣on of that place.
3. Neither is humane learning a car∣nall, fleshly, sensuall Idoll of mans in∣venting; but the good gift of God, com∣ming from the Father of lights, who is purity it selfe: As I have proved at large,
in my Vindiciae Literarum.
4. Neither is Reason a Monster▪ (as you Monster-like affirme) but being rightly improved, is a great helpe in Religion; as is excellently proved, by the learned Culverwell in his profound discourse, of the light of Nature: fit it is fit we should give unto Reason, the things which are Reasons, and to Faith, the things which are Faiths.
Ob. But 'tis the spirit (saies Master Webster) that must teach us, and the spi∣rit that must unlock the Scriptures, and the spirit that must inlighten us, &c.
Answ. True, but yet the spirit of God works by meanes (as I have pro∣ved before in my Vindiciae.) Who ever expects helpe from God,* 1.8 must not sit still and dreame the spirit will help him; but he must arise, and serve Providence in the use of meanes; for the spirits Teaching doth not exclude, but include the use of all good meanes, &c.
Yet that you see Mr Webster's Her∣culean strength, he comes now to grapple even with Aristotle himselfe [c. 6.] this Chapter he spends wholly,2 1.9 in combating with him; no lesse Adver∣sary then the Prince of Philosophers
can try his strength. 1. He tels us, that Aristotle was but a man, and so might erre; and is not Mr Webster a ma••? and doth he not erre with a witnesse? 2 He tels us, that what Aristotle hath writ∣ten, was rather by a Diabolicall, then a Divine instinct [I rather suspect that he is led by a Diabolicall instinct, that speaks it.] 3 His Principles are false, his Manners corrupt, many of his books spurious; besides, hee is ambiguous, briefe, ••ame intricate, erroneous &c. In a word, a blind Pagan, the proud Stag••∣rite. I wish he were not more blind, corrupt and proud that speaks it]
Qu. But since Aristotelicall Philo∣sophy wil not downe with Mr Webster, what new-light shorter cut, and easier way hath this Hercules found out: for like another Caesar, Viam aut invenie••▪ aut faciet. He'll ••ither find a way, or fra••••e you one out of his empty sconce?
Ans. Why, 'tis Magick [page 68, &c.] that noble,* 1.10 and almost divine sci∣ence (as he cals it) of naturall Magick. This key (if you will believe him) will better unlock natures Cabinet, then syl∣logismes; yet he co••plaines, that this is neglected by the Schools, yea hated
and abhorred, and the very name seems nauseous and execrable to them. [and that very justly considering whether your Magick leads men] But O Magick, Magick, where hast thou ••ame hid so long, that Mr Webster is faine to con∣jure thee up againe, and none but he and his associates, could find out this short cut before? 'Tis true, there is Astronomy, which is an Art that consi∣ders the divers aspects, and naturall pro∣perties of the Starres, and this is law∣full. But then there is * 1.11 Magia Diabo∣lica, a Divelish Magick, when men take upon them, to foretell things con∣tingent, by the Stars, those are called ju∣dicial Astrologers, and in Scripture they are oft joyned with Witches, wizards, and Sorcerers, Deu. 18 10, 11. Dan. 2.2, &c. yet this Devilish Art, doth Mr Web∣ster plead for [page 51] and spends wel∣nigh a page, in the commendation of Astrology and Astrologers, such as Lil∣ly, Booker, Culpepper, &c. 1. He cals it a Science or Art. The learned * 1.12 Weem∣se hath proved the contrary; yea, the Lord Verulam (whom he cites so oft) is here against him.* 1.13 Astrology (saith he) is corrupted with so much superstition,
that there is hardly to bee found, any sound part in it.* 1.14 S. Austin that had stu∣died this way, yet concludes, Astrolo∣gia est magnus error, & magna demen∣tia, &c. 'tis a great errour, a great mad∣nesse, and superstition easily refelled.
2. Yet he cals this a high, a noble, an excellent * 1.15 Science, and usefull to all mankinde; a study, not unbeseeming the best wits, and greatest Schollars, no way offensive to God or true Religi∣on, &c.
A dangerous and false assertion, the contrary whereof, is most true in the judgement and experience,* 1.16 of all godly learned men such as Calvin Beza, Per∣kins, Weemes, Gataker, Geree Vicars &c. they all condemne it, as a most ignoble, dangerous study, unbesee••ing choice wits, offensive both to God, and all good men. Hence these judiciall Astrologers were formerly excommunicated, and cast out of the Church; and by the De∣crees of Emperours, banisht out of the Common-wealth. Never more need of punishing such offenders, when they are grown so bold, and brazen-faced, as to publish their lies and abominations in Print to the world, and so provoke God
to forsake us, Isaiah 2.6. Therefore thou hast forsaken thy people, because they be replenished from the East, and are South∣sayers, like the Philistines. 'Tis an Art that leads men to the Devil, I have con∣ferred with some, and read as much of others, who have gone about to study this Art (as Webster cals it) they have been faine to throw away their books, for feare of Satans appearing; so readie is he to step in, when once he finds us out of Gods way Usuallie, such are Wi∣sards, and therefore I cannot but won∣der how Mr Webster durst be so impu∣dent, as to commend the worth, vertue, and learning, not onely of these lying, de∣luding Prognosticators, Booker and Cul∣pepper, but he also extols that lying, ray∣ling, ignorant Wizard, Ly-ly, who hath not onely reviled the most learned and Reverend Mr Gataker, with the Ortho∣dox Ministry of the Land; but with his lies, hath abused both Church and State, to the great dishonour of the Nation: as appeares by the pious and judicious Mr Gataker's Vindication of his Anno∣tations, on Ier. 10.2.
And since Mr Webster talks so much of this noble Science, and what suffici∣ent
Reasons he could give in defence of Mr Lillie's Astrology, he may doe well in his next Pamphlet, to prove it a sci∣ence, and to bring forth his strong Rea∣sons. In the meane time I shall love humane learning the better, whilest I live, because 'tis opposed by Star-gazers, and judiciall Astrologers: as David lo∣ved Gods Law the more, because wic∣ked men sought to destroy it, Psal. 119.126, 127. the Father tels us, Nil nisi grande aliquod bonum quod à Nerone damnat••m, It must needs bee good, which wicked Nero hates. So humane learning must needs bee good, which Astrologers and Wizards hate and op∣pose. And that you may see the same spirit which breaths in Lilly, dwels in Webster, he useth the lying, railing lan∣guage of Lilly. Shall the thundring Pul∣pit-men (saies Lillian Webster) who would have all mens faith pinned upon their sleeves [this is as true as all the rest] and usually condemne all things they understand not [it seems Mr Web∣ster knowes more in this Art, then ho∣nester men doe,] make mee silent in so just a cause? [Oh no, tis a ••ime of li∣berty, and you think you may be bold,
but such as you must know, that though you may for a time, escape the punish∣ment of men, yet you cannot escape the revenging hand of the Almighty, but as you have sinned against the Lord, so be sure first or last, your sinne will finde you out. And yet that all the world may see what spirit leads this man, tis worth observing, whom he commends, not only Lilly and Booker, but also Fryar Bacon [sic mulus mulum, it becomes one Fryar to claw another] and Para∣celsus, a Libertine, a Drunkard, a man of little learning, and lesse Latine; he was not only skilled in naturall Magick, (the utmost bounds whereof, border'd on the suburbs of Hell) but is charged to converse constantly with Familiars,* 1.17 and to have the Devill for his Purse∣bearer, yet this is one of Mr Websters society. Noscitur ex comite, &c. Like Lettice, like Lips; such as his company is, such is he.
Add to this, his praising the study of Physiognomy, as an excellent, laudable, and profitable Science; [which yet the Learned judge vaine and foolish] also his extolling of Chymistry, and prefer∣ring it before Aristotelian Philosophy,
and advising schollars to leave their Li∣braries, and fall to Laboratories, putting their hands to the coales and Furnace. [So they may quickly find pro thesauro carbones, beggary instead of Learning, and walking thus in the sparks of their owne fire, lie down in sorrow, Isaiah 50.••••.] this is Mr Webster's short cut, a quick way to bring men to the De∣vill or the Devill to them.
2. Mr Webster having sufficiently railed on Aristotle, the Prince of Philo∣sophers, next he fals foule on Galen,* 1.18 the Father of Physitians, onely for building on Aristotles Principles; out of his ig∣norance, hee cals him an ignorant Pa∣gan, an Idoll, a blinde guide, &c. and at last fals foully on the Physitians them∣selves [page 107.]
* 1.193. He comes now to Ministers, and railes on them, for suffering themselves to be stiled by that blasphemous title of Divines; this the Priests (that Title to shew his contempt of the Ministry, hee puts on the Ministers of the Gospell, though that Title be never given them, quà Ministers in al the New Testament) blasphemously assume to themselves.
Ans. 1. 'Tis false, the Title is not
blasphemous, for 'tis given to S. Iohn, who is called by way of eminency, and distinction, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The Divine. As Theology and Divinity are termes con∣vertible in our language, so is a Theo∣logue and a Divine, the same in sense, though it differ in sound: and therefore if the Scots do well (as you say they do) in calling their Ministers Theologues; then ours do not ill, in speaking plaine English, and calling them onely for di∣stinction sake, Divines (i) men set a∣part for the study of Theology or Divi∣nity. Now see the wit, or if you will the malice of this Magus, this Magitian (for hee pleads for the lawfulnesse of such Titles.) The Scots (saith he) may call their Ministers Theologues; but our peo∣ple, may not call their Ministers Di∣vines. This distinction is like the mans, that said, Pepper was hot in operation, but cold in working.
2. 'Tis false that we assume it, much more that we blasphemouslie assume it to our selves▪ if people will give us that Title, onely for distinction sake, who can hinder him?
3. The ground hee builds on, is rot∣ten. viz. 1. Because holinesse is essen∣tiallie
proper to God. 2. Be cause wee are Holy and Divine by participation onely, therefore wee may not be called Holy and Divine.
Ans. The answer is easie. Though to be holy and Divine, be essentially proper unto God, yet by way of Ana∣logie and resemblance, it is also given to Angels and men. Hence the godly in this life, are called Saints, holy, and in the very letter, partakers of the Divine Nature, [2 Pet. 1.4.] not essentiallie, but Analogicallie, partaking of those graces whereby we resemble God.
* 1.204. He fals foule on Magistrates, and te••s them plain••ie [page 98.] that they must not at all intermeddle with the things of God, lest miser••e and destru∣ction follow them to the grave, &c.
Ans. What is this but to destroy the Magistracie? to rob them of their coer∣cive power, and make them like Saint George, that sits with a drawn sword, but never strikes (a sit emblem of Mr Websters Magistrates.)
Ob. But Mr Webster would have them punish Theeves, Murtherers, A∣dulterers and Drunkards, onely they must not punish the Saints, lest God re∣quire
the blood of his Saints at their hands. [page 98.]
Ans. 1. If the Magistrate must punish Theeves, Murtherers, &c. then à forti∣ori he must much more punish spirituall Murtherers, Theeves, &c. for as 'tis a greater sinne to kill the soule, then to kil the body, so they deserve severer punish∣ment. 'Tis no Policy, but cruelty, to suf∣fer Woolves and Foxes to destroy the flock: neither is the coercive power of the Magistracy, under the Law, aboli∣shed by the Gospell, as is excellently cleared by Mr Prin, in a Treatise called the Sword of the Magistrate; and since by Mr Cobbet on the same subject.
2. The Saints must bee considered under a double notion. 1. As Saints walking up to their principles and li∣ving in the feare of God, and hee that abuseth and kils such Saints simply on this account, must look to answer for their blood.
But 2. Consider the Saints, as erring and wandring from their Principles, by Adultery, Murther, Drunkennesse, Here∣sie, &c. and so they may and must be punished, though not as Saints, yet as sinning and transgressing Saints: yea
though they should plead conscience for what they doe, and say, as Mr Bur∣roughs in his Irenicum▪ c. 6. p. 34 proves.
Thus you see, how Mr Webster is a∣gainst learning, against Aristotle, against Magistracie, against Ministrie, against Physitians, and against all that is truly good: like Ismael, his hand is against every man, and therefore it's just that every mans hand should be against him.
Q. But what is the summe of Mr Websters desires, and what would hee have us to studie?
A. Hee tels you. 1. That you must lay aside al your paper Idols, and sleight Aristotle, who hath in him, many things frivolous, vaine, false and need∣lesse.
2. He tels you, that you give up your selfe to Mathematicks, Opticks, Geo∣metry, Geography, Astrology, Arithme∣tick, Physiognomie, Magick, Protechny, Chymistry, Pneumatithmy, Stratarith∣metry, Dactylogy, Stenography, Archi∣tecture; and to the soule ravishing study of Salt, Sulphure & Mercury [a medicine for a Hor••e] These, these, if you will be∣lieve Mr Webster, are the onely excel∣lent studies for Academians.
But Sir, if these inferiour Arts (the alwfulnesse of some of them being just∣lie questionable) be so usefull and excel∣lent as you affirme, then à fortior•• Logi∣que (which you sleight as prejudiciall to Theology) and Physicks, Ethicks, &c. with the superiour Arts and Scien∣ces, must needs be much more excel∣lent, and therefore Mr Webster is much to be blamed, for crying up those low, inferiour, emptie things; and crying downe those choice, ingenious, usefull Arts and Sciences, which doe so much fit and further men in their preparation to Divine studies.
To conclude, the world may here see, what stuffe still comes from Lame Giles Calvers shop, that forge of the De∣vil, from whence so many blasphemous, lying, scandalous Pamphlets, for many yeers past, have spread over the Land, to the great dishonour of the Nation, in the sight of the Nations round about us, and to the provocation of Gods wrath against us, which will certainly breake forth, both upon the actors & tolerators of such intollerable errours, without speedy reformation and amendment.
Since I framed this discourse, there came to my hands, a very accurate and learned Examen, of Mr Websters illogi∣call Logick, which now followes in it's order.
THis Mr Webster (as I suppose) is that Poet, whose Glory was once to be the Author of * 1.21 Stage-plaies, but now the Tutor of U∣niversities. But be∣cause his Stage-Players have been dis∣countenanced by one of the late Par∣liaments; does he•• therefore addresse himselfe to the Army▪ for the like force, and as little favour in behalfe of all Hu∣mane
Learning? for advancement whereof,* 1.22 the best way being already found, he that seeks for another, desires worse (and so none at all) though he pretend to a Reformation. For my own part, I could wish that his Poetry still had flourished upon Mr Iohnson's ac∣count, in his Epistle before one of his Playes (the Fox) to the two most equal Sisters; the Unniversities (a far better ad∣dress, then this here) but it is odious to be like the Fox in the Fable, who having lost his owne Orna••ent, envied his fel∣lows theirs, by pretending burthen or inconvenience. I have neither leisure nor lust, to examine all his Examen; but yet to know Hercules by his foot, I can∣not but observe▪ how in his Chapter of Logick, he Reasons against Reason: and as Diogenes accused Plato, with a worse pride of his owne; so he prosecutes A∣ristotle, under the name of Arch-So∣phister, indeed with his owne sophisms; which what may we call but envy and pride, those two Mothers (saith Aqui∣nas) of discord: whil'st one through en∣vy, recedes from the way and will of another, through pride, to prefer his owne As Quintilian (if that Dialogue
de Oratoribus be his) condemnes the Oratory of his time, as abused to incense the people in Principes viros, ut est na∣tura invidiae: not sparing (not onely Sy••∣la and Pompey, but) even Scipio him∣selfe; or as Livy: Et ante alios in Caemil∣lum.
But what if Oratory be thus abused to calumniating, should there be there∣fore no Oratory at all? or if Logick to cavilling, no right reason at all? as in∣deed there is none such without the orderly use of it, for rationis est ordinare (saith Aquinas) and that is best done, not by the Web which is here woven, to unravell all Humane Sciences, but by the Art of Logick. Such a Master whereof, was Aristotle▪ that of him we may say for knowledge, as for vertue, Valerius Maximus of the said Scipio, Quem Deus immortalis nasci voluit, ut asset in quo se virtus per omnes numeros hominibus efficaciter ostenderet.
But let us see, what against so glori∣a light, and to falsifie the sight or sense of all ages hitherto, is here produced by him, who hoc tantùm rectum quod sap••t ipse pu••at.
Chap. 4. §. 1. What here he saith, is
no more then may be objected against any Science or Art (though never so much by himselfe approved) e. g. his owne late Poetry, and now beloved Astrology (yea the Gospell of Peace it selfe may bee abused for war and dis∣cord:) but whatsoever * 1.23 the aim of the Logitian is, the * 1.24 end of the Art is truth.
As to that of Aristotle, for which so vehemently he inveighs against, or ra∣ther proudly insults over him; the more strongly the opponent maintaines his part (for which purpose in his Topicks, he supplies him with store of Argu∣ments) the respondent his, the more effectuall is their disputation, for the end thereof, viz. the di••covery of truth: as Scaliger saith, ut ex silice & ferro elicitur ignis, it•• conflictu ingeniorum veritas. And besides, in his Politicks also, he observes the rules to be kept for upholding Tyranny: but will Mr Web∣ster therefore conclude, that he allows of that way of Government?
Sect. 2. Or is truth his owne end, in accusing whole Universities of most rationall men, and even Logick it selfe, as proceeding very preposterously, whereas, Logick is indeed the Mistriss
of all due method to all Sciences, and to himselfe if methodicall. As if the Prince in whom as supream consists the Order of the whole community, should be ac∣cused himselfe for breaking it, which as such, whether good or evil, he keeps, though if evill, not so well as he might; and by keeping his subjects in it, pre∣serves them by it: for all things consist in order, which confounded, they come to naught. Logick, as such, proceeds or∣derly, directing the minde in the know∣ledge of truth, as first in the apprehen∣sion of simple Termes, and then in the composition and division of the same, and last of all in Discourse, without confusion, falshood, or fallacy. In which last, it proceeds as well à posteriori, by induction, to find out the truth, or to know that such an affection is the true property of such a subject: as à priori, by demonstration, to perfect the know∣ledge of it: for then is the knowledge distinct and perfect, when the thing is known as it is, as the effect by the cause, as it is by its cause, which is the order of Nature: and not the cause by its ef∣fect, which is our Method, through the imperfection of our Intellect, deriving
its notions from sense, and so beginning à posteriori, but à parte rei, indeed pre∣posterous. First, then doth Logick pro∣ceed preposterously, because to advance our Reason as neer as may bee, to the Angelicall manner of understanding, by knowing things (as they are di∣stinctly and perfectly) it teacheth us to proceed in the order of Nature, or to begin à priori? 2. As to say that induction hath altogether been layed a∣side, is most false, and against sense: So Reason requires that syllogismes (wherein we prove and demonstrate the effect by the cause) be preferred be∣fore it. So that whilest he extols (and for a new method of his own, against all establisht and approved order) so highly cries up induction before syllo∣gismes, his owne is the errour which he condemnes, and therein hee proceeds preposterously.
Sect. 3. Here also the defect pre∣tended, is his owne; in not acknowled∣ging, both how fit are the denomina∣tions of Genus, Sp••cies, &c. to the No∣tions thereby exprest, and these Notions adequate to the things we conceive by them. For gathering of which Notions,
the certaine Rules which he seems to desire, but indeed rejects them, are these two. Comparison of things, as to that wherein all agree, for the community, and abstraction thereof, from differen∣ces, whether essentiall or accidentall, for the unity of the simple essence, which hath thus the generall denomi∣nation of an universall, and is either of one kind comprehending infinite sin∣gulars, accidentally onely different, as Homo, and so is fitly exprest by the word species: or generally comprehen∣sive of divers kinds, both constituted in themselves, and distinct one from ano∣ther, by their proper essentiall differen∣ces, as Animal, Animatum, Composi∣tum, Corpus, Substantia, and so as fitly is called Genus; which is either summum, and so is not at all; as a species it selfe subordinate, as substantia, or subalter∣num, which in re••pect of a superiour, Genus it selfe is a Species, and to alter∣no respectu both, as Corpus, compositum, Animatum, Animal.
The Genus then is divided into se∣verall species, which are either subal∣ternae, as having under them other Spe∣cies, in respect whereof they are also
Genera: or infimae, as superiour to no species at all, but onely to its owne singulars; in which the division rests, as in so many Individuals.
Now, have we not here, both noti∣ons adequate to the things, and words as fit to expresse these Notions? or in all this excellent order, can Mr Webster invent confusion?
But he would shew, that hee hath read, and seems to understand the Lord Bacon, in his Novum Organon, though his testimony be nothing for him, * 1.25 as Hypotheticall, and so not * 1.26 Positiv••ly true, till the condition be first proved: but without any proofe thereof Mr Websters Thesis is absolute, and so false.
Sect. 4. The said Notions, and de∣terminations, concerning which, there, are given a few, plaine, ca••e, necessary and usefu••l Precepts, are some of the hardest passages wherein are exercised the unski••full and tender wits of young men: and so far are the Questions and Disputes, which are agitated by riper judgements, from derogating from their Art, that rather they add to it, &c.
Ans. Whereas here he objects that they do not see that they act as foolishly
(even those of the best judgements) while they dispute of the very Art of Disputing, as he that endeavours to see the proper vision of his owne eye: his owne is indeed the blindnesse, in not seeing the difference of Understanding and sense.
Turpe est doctori, cum culpa redar∣guit ipsum.
For the eye, or the outward sense, apprehends not its own Act, being nei∣ther colour, nor light, nor the difference of its owne, from the proper objects of other senses. e. g. that which pronoun∣ceth White to differ from sweet, is nei∣ther the sight nor tast, whereof each apprehend but one of them, and so can∣not judge of both 3. but the inward or common sense, as judge of the Acts and Objects of all the outward: where∣as the Understanding, whose object is universall, or all things knowable, is re••∣flexive to know it selfe, its owne Acts and Objects▪ and then▪ as the soule of man is both the Object, Subject, and Author of its owne disputes, while by reflexion, it knows it selfe. So the Lo∣gician reflecting upon his owne facul∣ty, may dispute of what sort it is, whe∣ther
Science or Art, which, as directing the mind by its denominations, propo∣sitions, syllogismes, where the end is to act accordingly, is an Art; and yet as reflecting upon it selfe, its owne Acts and Objects, where the end is know∣ledge, may be called a Science too.
Sect. 5. How can hee blame the Stagirite, for not defining or dispu∣ting, what Logick is, what a Catego∣ry is, what substance or quantity is; if herein hee should act as foolishly, as he that endeavours to see the proper vision of his owne eye. But ad rem. Neither is he indeed, nor his Interpre∣ters, guilty of such defects, as here he fancies, and fastens on him, whose end is contention, to make the contention endlesse. But for the proposition and distribution, two of his subjects.
Magnus Aristoteles trutinando ca∣cumina rerum▪
In duo divisit quicquid in orbe fuit.
The members of which two heads, he handles in their order: Nor is there∣fore his Organon, so organized, a confu∣sed headlesse piece.
But such is his owne objection a∣gainst his booke de Interpretatione,
where the Moods of Propositions, are made neither more nor fewer then four, viz. necessary, impossible, possible, and contingent. For what is so plaine, as that the matter of all discourse, is either necessary, or impossible, or possible, or contingent; and so may well be redu∣ced to these foure. Manners or Moods, so called, because they specifie, how the predicate belongs, or not, to the subject of the proposition; For all that we can conceive or expresse, is either necessary, if it cannot but bee, or impossible if it cannot bee, or possible, if it may be, though it be not yet, nor ever shall bee; or contingent, if it be or shall be, though it might not have been, or may never be.
But see here, how Mr Webster, so sub∣tle and quick-sighted in seeing the De∣fects of Aristotle, is blind in his owne. See it in his owne instances. Having pr••mised the definition of a Mood, that it doth modificate the proposition (i) in∣dicate how the predicate is in the sub∣ject, he infers, and insults, may not all Adjectives by the like right be Moods? No, because they are all reduced to those foure before mentioned: but hee
saith, if this be a Modall proposition, it is a necessary thing, that man is a living Creature, these also are Modall; it is an honest thing, that a man should be stu∣dious of virtue; it's a just thing, a sonne should obey his Father; it's a gallant thing to dye for ones Country. Where, if his propositions be these, man is stu∣dious of virtue, the sonne obedient to his Father, one dyes for his Country, their matter is all contingent. Or if these; man to be studious of virtue, is an honest thing, a sonne to obey his Fa∣ther, a just thing, one to dye for his Country, a gallant thing; so his Adje∣ctives are no Moods at all (to shew how the Predicate is in the subject) but themselves the Predicates, and in all his propositions, the matter is onely necessary.
So that his errour is, as if Aristotle had designed to assigne the Modall, as a distinct species of proposition, and not onely to give one generall Rule, for all the species before enumerated, as that their matter is either necessary, or im∣possible, or possible, or contingent.
Sect. 6. Nor is he more Orthodox or busie, to better purpose, in the matter
of definition, where the office of Lo∣gick is, onely to give the Precept or Rule, how it ought to be made, which to explaine by example, it takes the instance from other Sciences: Nor is Logick to define what Homo or Ani∣mal is, this being the part of Naturall Philosophy, as to treat of it's proper subject. Now the precept which Lo∣gick gives for the definition of things in actu signato, as that it ought to consist of the next Genus, and a constitutive difference, is ••ost true, exact, and infal∣lible: and therefore i•• in actu exercito, animal rationale, be not indeed the true definition of man, the errour is the Phi∣losophers, who must find out for his owne subject, the next Genus, and con∣stitutive difference (as religiosum, or the like, i•• not rational••) according to the Rules and Precepts, which in Lo∣gick he hath for both; to make (by the Rules for that too) the definition ex∣act and perfect: So that the same which Mr Webster before objected against Lo∣gicians, as that they seem to make Lo∣gick a part of Physicks, hee is guilty of here himselfe.
But because as an open enemy to
our Physicks, as well as our Logick, he would equally glory in the defects and errours of both; the truth is that the errour is all his owne: for that bruit beasts are irrationall creatures, and so rationall the proper difference of man, it appeares. 1. By comparing, as man with Angels, so the said bruits with man: For Angels are intuitive, meere or simple intelligences, as seeing both in the sight of the subject, what is attribu∣ted or denyed to it without compositi∣on or division: and in the sight of the Principle, what flowes from it without discourse•• and so we men also are intel∣ligent creatures, but not as Angels, the operation of whose Intellect, is onely the apprehension of simple termes, and not lyable to falshood; for besides that we have two other, to compound or divide, and to discourse, and so are ra∣tionall too; which being thus our essen∣tiall difference, little lower then the Angels, is yet common to us with bruit beasts.
2. That Rationale is not a graduall onely, but our essentiall difference, it is evident at least by this, that whereas Gradus ••on variat speciem, in us specifi∣cally
distinct, is the principle of reason, from any in bruit beasts, as appeares * 1.27 à posteriori, by the properties of it, as ap∣titude to speak, &c. which we have as rationall.
And whereas further he saith, that irrationall is negative, and so can posi∣tively prove nothing. This his sequell were true, if it were negative secundum rem and not onely se••undum ••ocem. e.g. immortall is also negative, and yet if St Pauls Argument from the word mortall, be of force, when he saith, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not sinne raign•• in your mortall bodi••s; how much more is that of St Peter▪ abstaine from fleshly lusts, which warre against your [immortall] soules.
Now as immortall (applyed to God, Angels, and the reasonable souls of men) implyes more then a meere negation of dying, for otherwise, all things but li∣ving creatures, should be imortall. So irrationall, speaks the positive and spe∣cificall nature of a bruit beast, as rati∣onall, that of man, though in so great a scarcity and inequality of words to things we bee destitute of a better way to expresse the same: for why doe wee say, that the Ox•• is irrationall, and not
as well that the stone is so, since the negative of reason in both is alike, and the habit undue to both; but that irrati∣onall▪ implyes▪ that positive Nature, whereof the one is partaker, and not the other.
2. I should wonder that one who is so contentious, seeking all occasions to cavill, should omit division; were it not hereby evident, that hee hath no∣thing to say against it.
But why doth hee make such hast in his wrath against Reason, to come to Argumentation? or what can be made more absolute (without addition or alteration by some curious wits, in so many ages of men) or so exact as our Art of syllogizing. But Novelists moved with the spirit of pride and envy, are out of love as with all that others have invented, and not themselves, so even most with the best, for the greater glo∣ry of reformation. Yea whereas other inventions are concerning such out∣ward things▪ as we use more seldome, wee have continuall use of our owne Reason▪ and yet still is our Art of syllo∣gizing, so imperfect a thing, that now one should presume to abrogate it? He
mislikes, that so many sorts of our syllo∣gismes conclude negatively, since it is sufficiently known, that de negativis non da••••r scientia▪ but doth he not know as well, that por negativa datur? yea, himselfe saith, and alledgeth his Au∣thor for it, that humane Science doth consist in a certaine negation of falsity, rather then in the affirmation of veri∣ty.
It is undenyably true (saith he) that the knowledge of the premises is more certaine, then the knowledge of the conclusion, and therefore undoubtedly certaine, that the knowledge of the conformity, betwixt the premises and the conclusion, doth praeexist in us; where both the consequent may bee true, and the antecedent; but how doe they hang together? Grammatically indeed in the Copulative words, and therefore: but hee defies all Logicall wayes of Arguing. Or how is it that the said knowledge before, and without the syllogisme, may bee said to be, or praeexist in us? not in Act, but onely in aptitude (as * 1.28 one saith, that aptitudo ad rem est aliquid ipsius rei;) which aptitude is reduced to Act (without
which it should bee in vaine) or the knowledge (saith Mr Webster himselfe) excited by syllogizing; and yet is syl∣logizing also in vaine? or in procuring that act, uselesse? else why doth he say, and therefore why dost thou torment and macerate thy selfe in that question, which is more subtile to despise then to dissolve? which (since nothing can bee inferred from a thing wherein it is not contained) is another therefore without inference▪ subtilty beyond sense, and a sleighting or despising (not of some vaine questi∣on, but) of so useful a thing, as the best of Logick it selfe, against reason.
Ob. And so is that which here hee objects, saying, that sometimes from false premises, there doth follow a true conclusion, as in this syllogisme,
Nullum adorabile est Creator, Omne simulacrum est adcrabile, Ergo, Nullum simulacrum est Creator.
Nor can it therefore be judged, that the conclusion of syllogismes, doth of necessity compell Assent, or that the
conclusion doth necessarily depend up∣on the premises, as the truth is not con∣tained in a lye, nor the knowledge of it.
Ans. 1. We say not that that in syllo∣gisms, which of necessity compels, assent is the conclusion it selfe, but the premi∣ses, when out of them it is rightly pro∣ved (i) when the premises both are true and well ordered in Mood and fi∣gure, Assent to the conclusion is made necessary; for ex veris nil nisi verum, and that by vertue of the right order and disposition in Mood and Figure, for otherwise out of true premises, there may follow a false conclusion: as
Omnis asinus est animal, Omnis homo est animal, Ergo, Omnis homo est asinus.
So then we are taught in the first and second part of our Logick, to make the premises true, and in the third, so to dis∣pose and order them, as to necessitate Assent to that, which we make our con∣clusion from; and yet is all this so despi∣cable, that Mr Webster extolling his owne subtlety, and the force of his Un∣derstanding,
should not onely, not seek, but reject it's true helpes?
2. The conclusion indeed doth ne∣cessarily depend upon the premises, in respect of the forme at least, as the con∣clusion of a true syllogisme, and so doth that of his syllogisme before mentio∣ned: or in respect of the matter too, as a true conclusion▪ and so not.
3. Whereas it is objected, that as the truth is not contained in a lye, so no more is that true conclusion in the false premises.
The premises both are true (i) they are true propositions for the substance, categoricall, for the quantity univer∣sall, for the quality, vocis; the one Ne∣gative, the other Affirmative; and re••, both false; yea even because false, they are therefore true propositions. For in simple termes, and in speeches not e∣nuntiative, there is neither ••alshood nor Truth; but if you make Homo, or homo albus, either true or false, you make a true proposition of it; and if to one such, you add another in Mood, and Figure, there is true disposition too, for a true syllogisme. So that even the true conclusion of false premises is
contained in and deduced out of them, in respect of the forme, for so are they also true▪ though not in respect of the matter, since that is false.
Lastly, To all that in the residue of the Chapter, he objects or cavils against Lo∣gick, may that serve, which before was answered? as that by direction thereof wee doe defend the truth, as the true definitions of things, and infer out of true premises, rightly ordered, undeni∣able conclusions, whereby wee have not onely bare Opinations, Putations, or probable Conjectures; but infallible Science, and Apodicticall to informe and satisfie the Intellect, by evidentiall demonstration.
Whereas Mr Webster cavilling a∣gainst all reason, contradicts and con∣founds his owne. As first, when he saith [Numb. 4.] a Chymist when he shews me the preparation of the Sulphur of Acrimony, the Salt of Tartar, the Spirit of Vitrioll and the uses of them, he tea∣cheth me that knowledge, which I was ignorant of before, the like of which no Logick ever performed: having said immediately before, that demonstrati∣on, and the knowledge of it, is in the
Teacher, in whom it serves to demon∣strate and to shew it others, who learn it of him. Againe [Num. 5.] he con∣demnes all Logick, as conducing to no other knowledge, then such as is duely probable and conjecturall; as if that were not more then such, which is ac∣quired by demonstration.
Besides, he most highly extols Astro∣logy, and the now Professors thereof, his friends, as common enemies with him, as well even to Divinity it selfe, as to Logick and humane learning; who presume by their Art, to foretell * 1.29 such future contingencies, as depending on mans free will, are not known to An∣gels themselves, unlesse by * 1.30 conjecture onely, or revelation. And have any the best Astrologers, so cleare a Light, as to see by the Heavens more, then these Heavenly lights themselves, or as Mr Webster, then all wise men? Yea how grossely have they failed in things even meerly naturall, conjecturing at * 1.31 raine and showers, during all the late winter drought; but not at all of the later rain, as if God had provided both to disco∣ver their grand Imposturage and pre∣sumption, if not impiety, in taking men
off from himselfe the first, to ascribe all or too much to Nature, and second causes.
All which is to me, a sufficient evi∣dence, that this great Examiner, not∣withstanding his faire pretences of Re∣formation and truth, might, if thorough∣ly examined himself, be found not stee∣ring his course indeed by right zeale to these,* 1.32 but by that which he also seems to disclaime, even selfe-interest.
However, certaine it is, that truth or reformation, cannot be truly sought in a way against Nature as is here Mr Web∣sters in preferring himselfe, before all the wisest and best in all Ages, to inform and Reforme his Mothers, the Univer∣sities; for * 1.33
Nunquam aliud Natura, aliud sapi∣entia dicit.Nature Gods owne true wisedome is, and then, Is never tharted by the truth of men.
Truth and truth can never jarr••. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
Aristot.
Iesuita est om∣nis homo. Our Webster is some kin to them, for he can change with every time, &c.
Bibitur auro venenum.
Alludit ad Mercatores qui verb••s fictis & arte compositis, supra veritatem laudant & ex∣tollunt suas merces, ut faci∣•• ùs cas extru∣dant, & cariùs vendant. Sic Haeretici ut suam haeresim divendant, & spargant, ••am blandis & ele∣gantibus v••••bis adornant, & quasimeretricem sermonis lenoci∣nio fucant, ut videatur pul∣chra & elegans inslar Helenae. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Lapide in locum.
I find it done already, very acurately, by Dr Ward in his Vindiciae Academiarum.
He's against Learning.
I have pro∣ved the contra∣ry in my Vindi∣ciae Literarum▪
V. Vindiciae Literarum. c. 2. page 30.
V. Vindiciae Li∣terarum, Prefu.
He's against Aristotle.
No••e, 'tis Dia∣bolicall Ma∣gick, which Webster pleads for, as appea••s by his com¦mending Lilly the Wizard.
See Perkins 1 Vol. p. 39▪ and 43, 44.
Weemse 4. Tom. on the Magitian. page 62.
Lord Verulam's Advancement of Learning. p. 147.
Aug. de doct. Christian l. 2. chap. 21.
Astrologia ju∣diciaria non est Scientia. Thes. Cantab. 1654.
See Wendelius Physic. c. 27, 28. page 620.630. and Weems Magitian. sect. 7.
See more, Ful∣lers Ho••y state, lib. 2. cap. 3.
3. He's against Galen, and Physitians.
4. He'•• against Ministers.
He's against Magistrates
As the D••vils Law-Case.
Reperto quod est optimum, qui aliud quaerit, pejus vult. Quintil.
Finis operantis
Finis operis.
Sin••tiones ip∣sae confusae sin••, &c.
Propositio hy∣pothetica nibil ponit in esse.
As Mr Webster saith, that wee know nothing in nature, but à posteriore, and from the affe∣ctions and properties of things must seek for their causes.
Alex. Alens•• Metaphys.
As the fall of Law and Di∣vinity.
Durand and others.
As Mr San∣ders, one of the most learned of them.
In his Epistle Dedie.
Quicquid ex∣primitur in na∣tura, imprimi∣tur ab intelli∣gentia, scil▪ ex∣plicante, medi∣ante natur••. Alex. Alcus•• &c:
Opus naturae est opus intelligen∣tiae.