Of government and obedience as they stand directed and determined by Scripture and reason four books / by John Hall of Richmond.

THE FOURTH BOOK OF GOVERNMENT and OBEDIENCE, AS They stand grounded on, and relating to each ones natural inclination and affection. (Book 4)

The Introduction.

AS that general good to arise by publike Peace and Agreement was the end of this whole undertaking, so were those many and sad examples of Civil distur∣bance every day set on foot upon the score of Religion, the cause also why, in the passed Book, I made such particular discourses on that subject; that upon a short view of Religion, as in it self, and a more strict enquiry into such Texts as did look most directly that way, it might be found whether these Wars and Fightings could be rightly attributed to that faith which we profess; or were not rather to be imputed to our lusts which war in our members. By the which, suffering our selves to be too impetuously swayed, it doth thereupon come to pass, that when Authority doth oppose us in any thing of our desired enjoyments, we do presently cast about how our cause may be made Gods, that so, under colour of more near relation and subjection unto him, we may shake off all that our bounden duty which by the Laws we owe to our Prince, his Vice-gerent.

That Pride and Interest, and not desire of any Self-Refor∣mation, is the usual cause of mens extraordinary search of the Scriptures, may appear from the manner of choice therein made; even for that no places are so much quoted and insist∣ed upon, as those that are Prophetique and most Mysterious; such as are those texts of the Revelation: a Book the most con∣troverted of any other, as being the greatest stranger to the Apostles times (which some would seem wholly to relic upon) and having in it least instructions of any how to steer our selves in the course of our lives. But because the understand∣ing

hereof is generally acknowledged most difficult, and be∣cause again, by reason of this mysteriousness, no good agree∣ment can be yet found where justly and precisely to fix those descriptions of the Beast, The Whore of Babylon, Antichrist, and the like, therefore, as well for renown and glory sake in the discovery, as for anger and revenge against those they most hate, shall we find some so resolute and peremptory in their expositions, as if they would have us believe that these Pro∣phesies were but respective to their interests, not only to bring them honor by interpretation, but thereby prove thems••lves the Saints and People of God there spoken of.

In these following Discourses, I shall therefore let men see how our natural and proper constitutions, educations, customs, &c. nay our own interests also, do inter-weave themselves in all we do; and that as w••ll our Opinions and Tenets in Religion, as those in Polity and Government do take tincture from these. So that, as in my second Book, I took that Political body a∣gain into pieces, which I had reared up in the first, to handle and examine its grounds according to such notions and par∣cels of policy, as were vulgarly entertained and insisted upon; so now, in further proof of this third Book, I shall take man himself into pieces, and search him in his very first principles, and the natural rise and cause of both his appetites and affecti∣ons and of his dislike & aversions; to the end that each one dis∣cerning how these things come to be framed in us, and how, all along, they receive such influence from our breeding and man∣ner of life, a•• easily to pre-occupate and mislead us, he may be the sooner induced to an ingenuous review of his own opini∣ons, and before he grow too magistral in any thing, be careful he is not overtaken by any of these prejudices.

But then, as in this Tract, I bring in these more Philoso∣phical Speculations, but by way of illustration, and farther proof of what was formerly handled in the d••scourses of Reli∣gion and Polity, so is it not to be expected, that I should here deliver any thing of this kind as in an entire Treatise; or make any such long stay, as generally to accommodate them with a proper method or demonstration, or with definition of terms, since they are now only to be Probationers and Remonstrants themselves; and, in that kinde, to be attendant on that which all this while hath been our main Argument.

BOOK IV. Of the Causes of LIKE and DISLIKE OF CONTENT & DISCONTENT; AND Whether it be possible to frame a Government in it self pleasing and durable, without Force and Constraint.

IN many of the Discourses hitherto, Government hath been treated of, as having its rise, and also its effica∣cy and support, from constraint and force; that is, from the exer∣cise of the power of the Gover∣nor upon the Governed; which being the occasion of that continu∣al reluctance and resistance in the Subjects, and consequently the au∣thor of all Civil broils; it will not be amiss to enquire what remedy may be herein found, or whether any may be found or no? It may therefore be doubted, since (as before shewed) the love of our selves was only purely natural, how those forraign affections come to hav•• their rise and being.

Whereupon, we must again consider, that as Gods praise and glory was the end of all things, and accordingly (as heretofore shewed) the reason why things naturally done should be pleasurable also, to wit, that the Creature thereby exulting as in a benefit received, God might be honored, as having performed the work he intended, even the ex∣pression

of his power goodness; so now, men being to live in So∣ciety (that the honor and praise of all, as his onely due, might therein be increased also, it was expedient that our content should by natural instincts and rules be affixed most to what was most usual amongst us, and our discontent upon such things only as were but few, and of rare event.

All things do hereupon come to be loved by custom and acquain∣tance: For so, I love an English face better then another, and think that worst that most differs. Out of which custom also, doth the Blackmore prefer his colour, flat nose, great lips, &c. to that which is contrary in us. From this reason also, we come to set particular affecti∣on upon some faces; and (although we have forgotten it) to place most affection, and to be soonest taken with the like face unto that of Nurse, Mother, or such we conversed with in our youth. Which inclination and strength of appetite, being by custom made familiar (although by such various and insensible degrees as we did neither heretofore consi∣der, nor do now remember) comes for want of farther knowledge of its original, to be stiled sympathy; and that which is hateful upon con∣trary reason of disaquaintance, or from some extraordinary composure of our fancy to dislike at the time of its first impression, to be called Antipathy.

For we must not say, that God made any thing ill favoured or mis∣shapen; but our oftner sight of the same, then other Creatures, makes us even love their shape better, then of such things as be hiders, and do seldom appear. Not, but that the shapes of Rats, Hedge-hogs, Snakes, Frogs, Owls, Bats, &c. are as good as those of Horses or Dogs; or that the braying of an Ass, is a worse noise then the crowing of a Cock; but the new and unusual presentation of these things to our senses, puts our already settled and composed fancies, to a sudden startle and new la∣bour.

Therefore, when we will paint a Devil, or set forth any thing as ug∣ly, the usual way to do it is by most unusal shapes. But, because nothing can come from the pencil, but what was before in the fancy; nor from fancy, but what came in by sense, we are constrained to make up this deformity by misapplication of members in the intire constitution of a body, together with some unusal figure or colour; all which apart, and in their proper creatures or posture, had been nothing terrible or strange. So that, to put wings to a Beast, or four feet to a Bird, a mans head to a Beasts body, or a Beasts head to a mans, cannot but disaffect. And if any shape hath in it self priority, then mans would have it; and thereupon, the Ape, a creature most like him, would be handsomest, which now, with us, not used to such a shape, is esteemed ugly, upon the same reason that Devils are painted white by Blackmores.

And as several Species and Shapes come to affect by their own oft∣ner appearances one above another, so do they by common resemblance one to another; whereby things most like come by this means to be oftner in presence then things of more proper shapes. Thus Hogs, though we may be more used to the sight of them then Deer, are yet from their different shapes and qualities to that of other four foot∣ed creatures in general, esteemed less lovely; upon which ground, Bears appear more ugly then Lyons or Leopards.

So again, though those women, &c. that are accounted most beauti∣ful, are more rare and few then the ill-favoured; it is to be conceived that they are so only as to the general and whole number of them; but, divide the ill favoured ones into sorts (according to their likeness to one another) and you shall find fewer of any sort of the ill favoured, and greater difference between those sorts (compared one to another) then between handsome faces compared one to another. And with us that use not to go naked, a man is not so comely naked, as adorned with cloathes; which also by custom of wearing, is distinguished into fashi∣ons; and so made pleasant. And those people that cloath not them∣selves, have their accustomed decorums of painting, or the like, for set∣ting forth of their shapes and bodies; shewing that custom, and not natural shapes of themselves please us.

And so farther, although there be more ill then good hands written, yet the best hands are those that come nearest that copy which is in each Country esteemed most perfect of the kind; which must there∣upon be more like one another then bad ones; because they maintain method, through evenness of line, and equality of distance and pro∣portion in the letters; which bad ones do not; and so come, more or less to disaffect. As we see that those coloured horses which we call pye-bald, are because of strangeness, called and counted ugly: For first, few horses are of these so different colours in their bodies, in such sort placed and mingled, but are usually of one and the same colour, and with like marks. And then again, these Pye balds have as great difference amongst themselves, as they have to the rest. Whereas Spaniels, that are not usually of an entire or like colour and mark, do please in this varity.

A Tune takes above other confused noises, for that because of the method therein used, we are able to remember and conceive it: But an Outlandish Tune is unpleasant at first to us, and ours to them, as they differ from the usual ayrs of each other. Nor are they, nor any new Tune made pleasant, until by our fancy they are apprehended and made familliar, in such degree, as we are able to conceive the cadences thereof before they are founded. And those fashions and tunes which we ordinarily call new, are but small variations from those generals formerly entertained; and yet please us not at first sight or hearing, so well as afterwards.

So that Custom frames appetites; and appetite provokes the will to particular applications of good and bad, of like and dislike. Be∣sides our wills, there is nothing that can be properly called ours; for the desire of property and enjoyment of others things is but in order to that; nay, my very body and the parts thereof, are valued as they are useful to the reaching and fruition of such content as fancy offer∣eth not to be enjoyed without them. So that, should I want arms, legs, or any or more parts (not depriving me of life, and so of will) I should yet be I; and those parts reckoned as additional, not essential; even as they are my arms, my legs, &c. and we may properly enough say, my body, my soul; because the will arising from the harmony of both, is not either of them; but the individual is there only, where the unity of direction and application is; whereas in separated

parts, the general Laws of Nature (in corruption, alteration, &c.) take place, and local motion ceaseth, as to proper and intern di∣rection.

And from the usefulness of members and organs, comes their num∣ber, posture, and symetry to be such and such, each creature and thing being handsomest, that hath that shape which is most usual: Whereas all distortions, pluralities, and defects carry (by their strangeness to us, and difference amongst themselves) a loathing with them.

But if that will which ariseth from collections in our selves, may be called ours, what shall we think of those affections which we call Innate, as almost all so••ts of Creatures to fear Men, Lyons, &c. and Birds to fear Hawks? this only proceeds from the like grounds, namely, from unusualness of shape, deportment, and countenance; and is pro∣portionably entertained according to our conceits of that their sup∣posed power to harm us (appearing in those individuals we now see) and not from innate knowledge of any thing truly formidable in the species feared. And hence our first fears are usually bigger or lesser, as the size of the feared thing is. For a Bird in the nest, or which ne∣ver yet saw Bird but its dam, will be then more afraid of a Goose, then of a Hawk. But after it hath observed its dam or others to be scared with the last, and not with the first, it is otherwise. But if a Hawk be brought to hatch a Pidgeon, or harmlesly associate another Bird, these Birds fear not Hawks afterwards. And so, we see creatures that are not used to the sight, nor are able to know that a Wheel-barrow, or other such engines, are not living creatures, stand more scared because of the bigness and strange appearance of these things (which they could not so much as fancy before) then of other living creatures which they are used unto, and which may indeed, and do sometimes really hurt them

And Creatures fly us not after they have been sometimes conver∣sant amongst us, which we call made tame, even as upon trial of in∣demnity, Birds and Beasts come to relish the company of Haws, Lyons, Bears, &c. well enough; but if the first sight or usage of any thing, or if formidable and strange report hath made an extraordinary a version in our fancy, then we carry to that thing a particular hatred a••d dread. And although all sorts of things are at first equally feared, because new born creatures (till they have observed so far as to make difference) must fear and trust every thing alike; yet when experience of securi∣ty hath once passed under the power of any thing, we thereby come to fear other things as they do there-from differ; nor can we forbid our selves (out of natural desire of Safety) to fear all strange things, ac∣counting a stranger and an enemy the same.

And however the passion of fear be natural and common to all, as tending to each sensitives preservation; yet, as touching the choice of the particular objects of its dread, custom and prejudice, and not nature nor reason do usually bear sway: for we find that weakest crea∣tures, and women, and children, are most subject to these antipathies and aversions; for as they have least knowledge and observation else∣where, so as from sense of security from other inductions, to stop them∣selves in this particular fear, so they may be observed to be so over∣mastered

by extreamity of this sudden fear even of that very object now be∣fore them as not at any time too look wistly upon it, or to acquaint their sense therewith; but they still flying it, it must thereupon be kept from ever be∣ing familiar; for else we find they are, and may be won by degrees, if they will intend it.

And, that fear is the beginner of all dislike (and attendant to the first sense of new differing objects) we may conclude from our proneness to star∣tle upon sudden occurences; and then most especially, when least resolved against it, or apprehending our selves least secure; and although (in strong and confirmed impressions) the name of hatred and dislike be drowned in the passion of fear: yet these always follow and are where fear is.

For so experience tells us, that subjects do at first ordinarily contract greater dread and dislike against the Goverment of Kings and Monarchs, then against Polarchies, even because of their greater distance from them, where∣as the more near familiarity and converse with the other is a means to abate of their dread. And generally those Laws and Governments are by subjects most disliked, that carry greater strictness against offences: and anger is dislike with courage, as fear is dislike without courage.

And as this fear may keep us from seeing or conversing with any thing (and so from loving it) so, after things have been loved, a violent or unex∣pected strangeness may dilete (by its difference) all former conception; and consequently induce loathing of the thing; which usually we see come to pass in meats, after surfeits and sickness gotten by them, or in them, or other things upon occasional discourses. And yet have we our proper tastes, where∣by (according to our accustomed feedings) we are able to like and relish such things as are of neerness of savour, above what is otherwise. Upon which score again, such subjects that have lived under Monarchy, and upon some insinuation of Tyranny, Oppression, or the like, have been induced to a change thereof, are afterwards, by experience of the benefits and enjoy∣ments received under that Regiment, brought the more strongly to affect it again, and all things that lead, and are like thereunto.

But some affections seem altogether hereditary, especially such as are proper to the species or sex: in which we must look for custom farther off, to wit, that those portions of the Parents spirits, that now find in the womb fit matter and temperament for action, put themselves into the same me∣thod of operation, they were before habituated unto: and so producing a like creature, produce also those stronger affections and impressions. Where∣upon all creatures have like natural voyces and gate to the rest of their spe∣cies: for as the like motion of the generative spirit produceth like shape and posture of parts, so doth the same again continue and adapt them to like motions of limbs and instruments of voyce, they having nothing ob∣jected to their appetites to introduce forraign imitation, as men do in their language and gate.

When Birds build nests, it taketh its first instigation from hence: and also the young ones lying therein till they can fly, learn by sense to do the like for their own broods afterwards: and therefore we may observe, that those birds that soon run when they are hatched, build no nests, or such as have little workmanship. And all birds of a kind build nests alike, whose artifice, and the webs of Spiders, Silk-worms, &c. in all things, beyond necessity, is the procession of custom and fancy. For fancy, to its utmost ability, pro∣duceth

method; and as long as it can be able to hold on in that (as a thing comprizable) it proceeds with eagerness and delight; but where it cannot be master of method, it undertakes nothing.

The Pye, Crow, Cucko, and such Birds as have differing noats from the ordinary, have not in our ears the same pleasure as the Nightingal; who re∣sembling in her several Noats, that which is usual in other particular Birds, differs only in generality of perfection and imitation; and though the pro∣per voyces of Pyes, Crows, &c. are as usual to us as those of the Nightin∣gal, separately and apart considered, yet are they not equally usual to those of the Nightingal, and all other Birds besides of like tone. And Parrats displease in their own singular and unusual tones, but please us when they speak and resemble ours: and then most, when most imitating.

As for musick, we see little children, not yet acquainted or used to one voyce or tone more then another, as soon stilled and pleased with any other noise, as that which we have reduced into a method, and call harmony: discords and concords take them alike, and a sixth is as pleasant as an eight.

But now, as pleasure ariseth from custom, so pleasure from continuance and custom, may again decrease, as to the present sense thereof, and become that which we call nature, which is nothing else but custom upon custom: as we find it come to pass in matter of food, aswel in choice of quantity as kind, where custom manytimes so prevails upon appetite, through frequency of admittance, that from thence, more then from sense it self, now decayed, it covets still to acts as formerly, to the great prejudice of health: For al∣though the direct profluence and evaporation of the Spirit is its most natu∣ral way and means of release, and thereupon yields greatest ease and delight: yet is there a delight also arising from that freedom and exitation in motion which they are put into by means of those vapors that arise from the stomack, whereupon it will come to pass, that through custom of being so moved, at such time as the stomack is so filled, they wil be prompting him to the like de∣gree of feeding through memory & the former pleasures thence arising, until by degrees it pass into such an habitual affection to delight, that the thought of insufficiency, or subsequent harms come to be unconsidered. No otherwise then in Kingdoms, where the benefits arising from Peace and Government it self, or the particular indulgences of Princes, are for the time our sense of want is fresh, and our only guide taken with gratitude and true delight, which when use and necessity are satisfied, and coming to be desired by custom on∣ly, do afterwards in our desires, both exceed use, and ungratefully and covetously are entertained, as well to our own, as that Kingdoms ruine: Like as rich and great men also, who, from the custom of their vo∣luptuousness and freedom of life, are still impetuously pressing to fresh or like enjoyments, even after the loss of their wealth or honor.

And the like may be also affirmed of pain, grown otherwise by custom of indurance: Prisoners, Millers, and Musicians, distinguish little of dislike or content, in those sents and noises they are habituated unto. And so comes the motion of heart, brain, and bowels to be undiscerned, and the touch of one finger or limb against another, to pass without notice. And yet is cu∣stom the relisher of new objects; those smells and those colours, that have greatest affinity to ayr and light, do most please, because these things are perpetually objected to the sense (when any thing is) and are the conveyers of other objects to the senses; but yet the excess and quickness of pleasure and displeasure, arising from particular smells and colours, encreaseth or di∣minisheth

by usuage and continuance: For children we find at first little af∣fected with any particular sort of them; and Dogs, which are creatures of quickest sent, and can best make distinction, do not yet choose or avoid any object or place for the smells sake only, the smels of Roses, Violets, and o∣ther sweet flowers, pleasing them no better then the various and more dif∣fering smells of those scarcer plants which we call weeds: And this, for want of customary usage sufficient, whereby to make some sents affect above o∣thers: for they stand not affected or dis-affected to any smell, as of it self, but as it came into notice, or hath usually accompanied the prevalent appe∣tites of food, or resentment of the kind.

Which hath also great prevalence in men (and things of longer life) both to provoke to particular like and dislike of many objects out of no other rule but what ariseth from these or like customs and inducements; for good smells and tastes in plants, is the resemblance to what we use, and therefore call esculent: but Wormwood, Rue, &c. cannot otherwise affect them, through particular custom as Tobacco doth. In which cases forestalled prejudice prevails no otherwise towards like and dislike, then when by reason other in∣terest, we are wont to rate or set forth the praise or dispraise of any person, calling him honest or vertuous whom we love most, and who, by relation or benefit, are nearest unto us, and rating otherwise again, all such as dis∣oblige us, proceeding therein according to proportions and rules of self-con∣sideration and charity only; whereby, out of private regard we impose up∣on persons the names of those vertues, which have their true worth only by generallity of performance.

For so we are wont to find out abatements, or denials of vertues them∣selves, or to impose or insinuate what odiums or scandals we can on our ene∣mies and competitioners against the first, because we would give reason and satisfaction why we hate them, against the latter, because we would satis∣fie why we should be preferred before them, in each condition striving to make publique good and concern to cover, and be the same with ours.

After the same manner, may be observed, that the rank of subjects that is most commending and aiming at Democrates, &c. are such as have great∣est hopes and probabilities to be Governors of others therein: In which case, our inbred pride and stubbornness may through the frequent contemplation of benefit therein to arise, provoke to action as the smell or sight of food may excite and awaken the stomack.

And as thus in persons, so in actions and things, we strive always to have the like commended to what we have or do, and so on the contrary. For let a vice be cryed out upon, unto which we are subject, and we cannot for∣bid self-consideration to step in with some excuses and abatements; making it look like vertue, or let any vertue be extolled, of which we are not in practise or ability, we are then as prone with our abatements towards vice.

As for example, when self-consideration and advantage hath caused us in civil factions and disturbances to choose one side before another, we are then become prejudiced and shut up against all arguments to the contrary: for to discommend our cause, is to discommend us, and we can be no more desirous to be satisfied by others whether we do justly or no, then to be sa∣tisfied whether we intend our own benefit or not; for as we are ashmed to

confess to seek the latter without regard to the former: So there is no reme∣dy, but to endeavor so to clear and set forth our practise and intentions to publike utility and justice, that our private aims and endeavors may be there∣in excused or hidden.

And as smells (as aforesaid) do affect from general agreement with ayr, or resemblance to food, or the like: so also do tastes affect from salt, because from salt they have entrance upon the pallat, and yet hath particular custom prevalence herein, so as to make some things more pleasant then others; and those that are most different, are most offensive to such as have been least accustomed unto them.

All which is of as great use for the avoiding of pain, as the satiety of plea∣sure (through long custom) is for procuring new pleasure: For if one thing should have always and alike pleased, we should have had no encouragement to variety, but might have ingratefully past over those many other things by God and Nature afforded for our use: And again, love and hatred, ho∣nor and shame, pleasure and displeasure, being stated and encreased by com∣parison of one another, it is necessary that some things should be occasionally and for a time hateful, dishonorable, and unpleasant; for if all things, as they are alike good in their kinds, were alike lovely and pleasant to us, there would be, for want of choice, want of will; and for want of will, want of action; and such a thing as a rational or sensitive creature there could not be.

Upon which grounds, and from custom of indurance beforementioned, it comes to passe that Patience, Humility, and other hardships accompany∣ing obedience and persecutions, have such efficacy and force; both to the sustaining of afflictions, while present, and also to the relishing of all such enjoyments as the party is possessed of, with higher and more steady delight then those persons can whose custom and expectation hath always run a contrary way: divine providence so guiding these things to general good and content, that since no man could be without crosses, nor the greater part without many of them (through reluctance of the creature, and pride and covetousness of men) therefore it is made come to passe, that all, (at least the greater part of men) are by making a vertuous use of necessity, enabled to raise to themselves pleasure out of what is in it self otherwise, new custom dileting the old.

Now again, to enquire after the pleasingness of Custom and Method, we will make instance in musick. We find the Scale to be reckoned from one to eight, these notes of unison and diapason, including the method of all the other, do come thereupon within most notice: No otherwise, then the turn∣ings and angles of knots and borders in gardens do, which maintaing order and method, come more readily and delightfully to be looked upon, then the streight intermediate lines, or the flowers that are inclosed amongst them. Which flowers have usually greater delight, considered apart, then the herbs or other particulars whereof the knot is made; but because they have neither method amongst themselves, nor do share in the Common method, they must so far be defective of beauty: for they can have none but what must arise from separate consideration of Method in their own leaves and colours. As in the stars of the firmament, in which we can comprehend no order, be∣cause their postures have no affinity with any method usual amongst us: we therefore take in them no delight, but what ariseth from their excellencies

in themselves considered: even so on the contrary, Musick being a thing ab∣stracted, and consisting in Juncture and Method only, must consequently have the first and eight most lovely, as the borders and foundation of this method: for so the unison and diapason falling out to be Terminators, do come to have the same or like sound to one another, as the meeting of two lines make one angle, which no two of the other notes have, and will there∣on (according to equal succession of notes in the same Scale) come to be oftner repeated, and (thereby) win more delight: But the second and se∣venth that are farthest from one another, are the worst in the Scale.

If Musick had gone to ten, as Arithmetick doth, the tenth would then have been a concord to the first, as now the eighth is, and so would also the sixth, if it had ended in that number: Even as a Ring of six or seven bells is as pleasant as that of five or eight, rung either in Peal or Changes: and are more or less delightful, as men are accustomed to hear the like Bells or way of Ringing, which is called understanding them.

And so might Arithmetick have ended in eight, as Musick doth, or in any other number short, or above ten: so that eight times eight, or twelve times twelve might have been called a hundred; and eight or twelve of them again call one thousand, and so on. For ten is but ten units, and one thousand is but ten times ten unites: so that one and ten fall into one ano∣ther, and are the foundation and termination of all number; and come oft∣ner to be repeated, even ten times to one above any other number. For af∣ter you have reckoned from one to ten, you begin from ten again, as you did from one; so that twenty is two times ten, as thirty is three times ten, and so on: Ten still keeping his denomination, not only in order after nine, but in computing of one and thirty, two and thirty, three and thirty, four and thirty, five and thirty, &c.) the number of ten comes to be reckoned ten times to each one of the digits or single number.

So in the scale of musick, you may suppose the same itteration, although not so apparent, because musick is not so far progressive as Arithmecal numera∣tion is. For the cipher put to one, makes it ten, although it be stil but the same figure of one; and we properly call the other a cypher, having no value of it self; but (by its numbers) shewing the numbers of tens. So in Musick (which is but numbers played withal) the diapason is an unison with a sup∣posed cypher, and comes in ascension and descension (according to the usual method of teaching Schollars) to be eight times repeated to any other note. For all Tones are but measures of distance, or difference of rise and fall from the first note: as a third is measured by one between, the fourth by two, and fifth by three notes between the first and him, and so on.

In which doing, the first note being Terminas à quo, and each other note Terminus ad quem, and the Terminus ad quem being not computable (as to Method) but from Terminus à quo, the first or unison comes (as afore∣said) to be reckoned eight times for once of all the other numbers. As for example, in reckoning Sol, la, mi, and then Sol, mi, and, Sol, la, mi, fa, and then Sol, fa, and so on, the first note being itterated severally to each other, comes to be as often mentioned as them all: The like may be observed, on the part of the eight, when you come to descend and go back a∣gain.

Now for the pleasantness of the third and fifth above the fourth and sixth, and for the pleasantness of fourth and sixth above the second and seventh,

we are to consider that as all things please by often presence (where by they become familiar), to this presence and familiarity may be made either by of∣ten repetition and succession in the fancy, or by length of abode there; as for example, by the iteration of four footed beasts in my fancy, I come to esteem those sorts handsomest that come nearest to the most agreeing and usual form: So again, by oftner and longer seeing the shape of a man then them all, it may please better, as more seen then their shapes altogether: and so also the barking of Dogs, though a noise singular to that creature, yet it is tollerable by often hearing it, nay it is Musick to Huntsmen that hear it very much: but the howling of Dogs, being in all kinds rare, is unpleasant to all. And so farther, although handsomness and beauty usually move af∣fection, because it is the most usual and uniform feature, yet through fami∣liarity and often presence, I may come to like better of a face or person dif∣fering from the general rule, and commonly co-habitation proves a match∣maker; and frequent notice is the most effectual means which lovers can use, even as we see other Creatures made friendly and loving hereby: For two Pidgeons, although at first never so disagreeing, will mate and like one another, being a while enclosed.

So now (to return to Musick) the second and seventh are but used as tran∣sient notes, and have not usually above the eight part of time allowed them for their prolation in the ear and fancy, which the other notes have: for pro∣ceeding; from the unison or first term, I cannot make a stop at the next, it be∣ing so near the first as there wants a note to measure the distance between them; for all harmony being made up of proportion, there will want a mid∣dle term to proportionate the extreams. So in Sol, la, mi, la is the measure between Sol and mi, and serves but to number withal: Nor can I make such a stand at la, from Sol, as to make a musical tone, until I come to a note of greater distance: For should I say Sol, la, and stop at la, as I do at mi, when I say, Sol, la, mi; Sol, mi, Musick would not be harmony or proportion, but numeration only. So, in descending the Scale again, the note that was seventh to the first, is now second to the eight.

But then, although in thus scaling of notes, for teaching of young Schol∣lars, we use but one sort of time to all of them, yet when we come to make such Musick as we call Tunes, we must use difference of time, and make the greatest stops at the most methodical and useful notes, which by this means will also farther come to be most pleasant. And as a second is the Nume∣rator between the first and third, so is the fourth between the third and fifth; unto which third, the fifth is a third also, and the fourth is a second, but the fourth is as much a better note then the second, as the unison or diapason are better then the third: for goodness being but by comparison, as the second is more ill then the fourth or sixth, so is the first or eight better then the third or fifth. If a seventh should be a concord, as being a third to the fifth, then would there want a discord to set off other notes, and the eighth would be imperfect by wanting his discord: For these seconds are never used, but (by time and way of quaver) as slides and passes to eights. A fifth hath priority of a third, as having more proportions in it, and (being more distant) hath less debasement from the unison or eight.

All which we have spoken more largely concerning Musick, to shew how (in respect to Method and Harmony) some notes must be oftner used then others; and how in regard of this usuage, and the longer stay upon such

notes) they come to be more pleasant: And again, for that Musick (being a thing disputable how its pleasure should arise, might by being thus dis∣coursed upon) serve to illustrate other things. For from hence we may ground the chief reason why we come to be so wedded unto those customs and opi∣nions we have been bred in and used unto, especially in matters of Religion, which (having little proof from sense) relies chiefly on this course of preva∣lence, namely to affect by inculcation of Doctrines and Tenets, as the ex∣perience of Sermons and Preaching makes good: for thus God himself be∣ing first and last in Religion, is as the unison and diapason, terminating all things; and as in Musick, the sweetness of those notes above others, ariseth from their longer continuance and oftner repetition: So in Religion, the more we press, and oftner we mention Gods Glory, Gods Worship, Gods Commands, &c. that which we utter besides is the more acceptable, even as those things are in value above others, and that especially, if compared to any thing in our selves; whereby God appearing so much above us, our perfections appear so much worse as his is better.

And this is wel known to undertakers for Church Reformation, first to cast into Gods Service, Gods Glory, &c. all that they would have acted in pur∣suance of their own designs, then to put such Laws and Customs as oppose them on the score of Humane Inventions, that so by the answerable dispro∣portion in goodness (as between an eight and second) all that they like not may be disliked of others also. But then again, if an eight should be always stricken (without other variety) it would cease to please: So, to say nothing but Gods Service, Gods Glory, &c. would not make a harmony to please above the degree of children: and therefore Faith, Charity, and the like, are taken in, as thirds and fifths; according as their usage and esteem hath made them preferrable in each Country and Sect: For where Solisidians are, there Faith is the fifth, or best note, and Love and Charity is made the worser; and on the other side, where Charity is rightly understood, it is made chief as the end of the other.

And as for the other duties of Humility, Prayer, Repentance, Zeal, &c. they are placed in the composure of the harmony of each Religion, as they have different esteem in the Authors thereof: Whereupon, as the tunes of our Country please us beyond others, so that form of expressing our devo∣tion which custom hath wedded us unto: but as we may fancy other tunes by degrees, so other forms that have their differences at first small: Nay, we ordinarily have a natural itch to variety; and it may be observed, that as the the same tune always played, causeth weariness: so, to such as cannot under∣stand the true reason of things that Religion soonest cloyeth, whose exercise or doctrine hath least variety and most confinement, and therefore set forms displease ordinary capacities, as grave set set musick to those that are unskil∣led in the art, pleaseth not so much as a Jig.

And as Musick being an abstracted Method is not examinable by any thing but the ear it self: So in Religion, the farther you sequester your self from Charity, so much the more you confine its grounds to custom and opi∣nion: for if it be placed all in the ear (as Musick is) then (being only a spiri∣tual method) it will follow, that that method we apprehend best (and con∣sequently that Religion we are most used unto) will without more ado please most; and thereupon each person must be rendred an uncontrollable judge therein: but so far as Love and Charity shall be taken in, this (being opera∣tive)

will make it fall within notice of other senses, and so become exami∣nable by other method: For Charity having its ground in Reason and Na∣ture (as it is made to stand in harmony with them) it may serve to justifie or condemn Religions, as the goodness of the tree may be judged by its fruits.

To enquire into the reason of Comprehension and Method a little farther, we are to conceive that the brain in each man being the common sense to discover what is of benefit or damage, hath the Nerves as so many Scouts and Centinels for information: Now as any thing is by these apprehended, some impression is made in the soft substance of the brain. This at first coming must make an unusal dislocation and posture therein, and so displease within, no otherwise then distortion of any member doth displease without. And knowledge and comprehension is nothing else but the ready turning and cession of the brain to such figures as are offered: and reasoning and discourse is succession of configuration, according to such Concomitants and Ap∣pearances as have accompanied it; which now more or less readily appear∣ing and answering, as they were formerly oftener seen or fancied therewith, come thereupon to be esteemed more or less reason.

But all new ojects must for a time displease, according to their strange∣ness; for that this common sensory, being thus wholly imployed, and as it were, imprisoned and confined in apprehending and configuring this new guest, hath not time to watch and attend other informations, that might be by sense offered to it at the same time. For so we find, that in great agi∣tation of mind, and when our fancies are intent on the contrivance of things more eminently pressing, we are heedless of what else is presented unto us: And hence it is that two things at once cannot be studied on, if they be so dif∣fering as not comprisable in the same method.

Pain is more external, and differs from this inward offence; being the stoppage of Spirits in their methodical motions in the parts of the body; whereby, being hindred from recourse to their fountain the brain, the place that obstructs them will (through their irregular motion therein) find pain; and pleasure is, when these spirits are excited in motion or evacuation with their proper humor.

When any violent or unusal posture is offered to the Nerves, diffused in the senses and exterior parts, the brain is sensible through them, no otherwise then the Spider is of any thing that toucheth any part of her web; in which, every forraign touch makes her sensible, by altering the posture of those threds unto which she is joyned. For as the Spider sitting upon the Center and ••oition of her work with her body, and having her legs extended to the several Angles thereof is hereby made preceptible of those touches and impressions which forraign bodies do make upon it; even so the brain, by those his long legs of nerves, every where dispersed through the body, may be conceived to be much more sensible of those several forms of twitching and convulsion made in its membranes, by the like impression made upon its nerves by any forraign touch. And as by degrees, and many tryals from our infancy, our senses are enabled to conform themselves unto outward fi∣gures and objects: so is the brain also by degrees brought to receive and re∣tain those: and doth as easily fall into the like posture or figure, when those objects shall be raised in the fancy which did usually accompany them.

If there be alteration in the body of the brain it self (without forraign touch of feeling) it is not then called pain, but horror, confusion, amaze∣ment, or the like. For the Spirits (used to watch in the senses themselves without) are now here extraordinarily imployed in putting this new object into method, whereby it may be capable of memory and use, and do thereupon for a time make disturbance, as in a Crowd.

So that Pain and Pleasure are properly only in touch or sense of feeling: the objects of other senses being by them immediately let into the brain (as having the nerves that serve them more contiguous to his substance) they im∣part not pleasure and pain to it, as directly from themselves, nor are capable thereof, as senses, but as outward parts and organs, to be affected by for∣raign touch.

Now health is negative to sickness, as pleasure is (for the most part) but absence of pain; and is when each individual body hath its humours enjoy∣ing their wonted proportion, seats, and motions, according to the proper constitution thereof, so as the spirits may not be inwardly stopped to make us inwardly sensible, as pain makes us outwardly. But sicknesse affects more generally, because the obstruction being in common passages of all parts of the body, the sense thereof must be more universal then in pain, where a sin∣gle nerve it may be, is only affected. But then again, pain is more quick, as more intire and unite. For in sickness (till it be mortal) there is not a total stoppage, because the bowels and other passages have some recourse left them to the stomack, &c. and thereupon those nerves that attend them can be but in part stopped. But usually sicknesse hath some pain, as having some part or passage more obstructed then another.

When I see a heavy thing tend downwards, it is a motion so conformable to all other, that (as a thing whose operation and concernment is al••eady fully known) it is passed over with content of security and mastery: But the operation of the Loadstone, seeming proper to it self, distracts and puzzles us for want of ability to conceive (and consequently) to apply it to know∣ledge and use. For knowledge refers to use, as truth doth to goodness; for from the observation of the motions and operations of Loadstones, men apply them to nautical, and some other uses. And Bonum differs from Verum but in application, things being true as they are real, and good as they are modal: Whereby, that which at first had entity and existence by Creation, in respect of those affections, and that serviceableness it carries to other things, comes afterwards in the rule of Providence to be held as good. And my will differs from my understanding as knowledge abstracted doth, from that which hath reference to me and my use. And it is as natural for the under∣standing to affect truth and enquiry, as it is for the will to affect good, and the exercise thereof. And therefore as I may want personal liberty to per∣form my will, so may I want liberty in my understanding, when I want Me∣thod to conceive, or variety (suitable thereunto) for making farther disco∣very, being then subject to be lead by the judgement of others, which is in∣deed the greatest thraldom of any. But the want of this I cannot know, be∣cause the want and the wanter are all one, but experience will inform in the other.

So now we may call Method an Art proper to every fancy, of registring its own particular observations in a kind of total. For after that I have, from

induction, observed, that every single man is more rational then other creatures, I conclude also; thereby differencing men from other things. And when again, I come to observe that he agrees with them in the search of things pleasurable, I then conclude this done as out of some principle com∣mon to them all, wherein they must agree as Sensitives. For as knowledge or memory precedes, being the observation of things in particular, so method succeeds in collecting these particulars, and placing them in totals with o∣ther things of the same kind, and agreeing in properties. And when fancy hath an object not so placed already, or comprisable in some rank or classis of our entertained method, it is troubled. For if it be a thing altogether un∣known, so as I cannot discover between the homogenial and heterogenial properties thereof, or if those properties are not reducable into some classis of comprehension of that Method I have already framed, what use or plea∣sure can I make thereof? and all those Arts and Sciences we have enter∣tained, are but methodical collections of those distinguishable inclinations, effects and properties of men, creatures and things, which Authors have made and agreed upon, and are true or false as they are more or less compre∣hensive, and exactly discussive of all those particulars they undertake. In which course of proceeding, the subject is usually considered as it hath re∣ference to pleasure and benefit. And those Arts and Sciences that seem most speculative, have yet (through Method) pleasure in speculation: but gene∣rally knowledge and enquiry look to good, as mony doth to commodity; that is, although it be not pleasurable in it self, yet is the general ready thing for procuring what is so, humane benefit being the end of the Art it self, and private gain or honor of the Artist.

Now as all men have aims, and those higher or lower, according to their way of breeding, so have they their proper Method and means for accom∣plishing them answerable to their understandings. And although the true aims of great men, in respect of honor and generosity, may not be discover∣ed by the vulgar, yet the greatness it self, and the advantages thereof be∣ing necessarily always observed by them. Hence it comes to pass that their conceptions are still running along, to fancy their method and aim to be ac∣cording to their own. Thus children that for want of engagement and obser∣vation are not yet able to apprehend the true benefit or value of riches or ho∣nor, or to conceive upon what inducements men are led to most of their actions, must also want method and understanding in themselves to approve and like of what they do, for play and liberty being their end, and having fancied other things as they stood in order thereunto, they cannot be ima∣gined to bend their studies to the attaining of food or apparel: because they always found these things ready; when as being debarred in the other, it caused them to use contrivance therein. And therefore they are not able to conceive that their Parents should be put to such labour and study in get∣ting their maintenance; but do think that in these acquisitions, and in their commerce with other men, they are but following their own liberty and pastimes, as themselves do with their play-fellows.

And so again, the vulgar sort of men, having only riches and some other more sensual enjoyments in their aims, and having also another and more short way of getting those things amongst themselves, must needs be as much at a loss and mistake in their censures, when they come to look into the act∣ings of great men or their Governors. For being themselves neither able to

fancy the way and difficulty of getting this greatness, or of protecting them therewith; nor the true end and use of this power (more then children do apprehend the difficulty and cost of their breeding and maintenance) they are ready, according to those conceits within themselves, to think that these things came by their good fortune, and were accordingly no otherwise use∣ful then to enable them to live splendidly and deliciously, and to exercise arbitrary power in extolling or abasing some few as they saw good: because, if themselves were in like condition, their aims should not be other then the reward or punishment of friends or enemies. And if at any time they be brought into some speculation of the means of entrance, & end of this power; this, as being a thing altogether beyond their own comprehension, they must be supposed as well implicitely following those methods which ambi∣tious heads have put upon them herein, as also delightfully and eagerly do∣ing it; even for that the method and satisfaction which they now find there∣in, must needs fill them with the belief of so much knowledge, as to think they have arrived at the top thereof. And therefore being not able, for want of sufficient observation and insight into Divine or Political matters, to dis∣cover the true ground and reason of things, they presently judge all those acti∣ons which are not agreeable to those rules of scripture, of pacton, of consent, or the like, which they find interpreted and scholied by their guides, to be su∣perstitious and unjust. The which also is much helped on, aswell out of desire to avoid the shame of being ignorant, as out of vain-glory to appear wise and knowing in things of such difficulty.

And this peremptoriness of opinion and judgement is most incident to our first inlet into these discoveries. For then it is to be supposed that we are most swayed with delight of these new speculations, and do also most want time to examine whether the particulars we now apprehend are every way agree∣able and comprehensive of those things we undertake to judge, or no: or else that we are not carried on by our own partialities and interests, so as to judge that Person a Tyrant, an Usurper, or the like, whom we have no interest in, nor hope of: but by our partial (that is to say, our short and weak Methods and Collections) we are subject to proceed too hastily to the liking or con∣demning of a Government or Governor, upon the like sudden apprehension as the Barbarians did of S. Paul: who must one while be no better then a Murtherer, & presently again concluded for no less then a god, from single in∣dications and accidents, and such as had no coherence with that which they would apply them unto. Upon which ground it may be observed, that Princes and great men are by vulgar judgements never permitted to go un∣der a middle censure: they are still extreamly good, or extreamly bad. For being by some sudden accident brought to alter that conceit they had be∣fore entertained as suddenly and ungroundedly of his vertues or vices, it is no wonder if they hereupon become as hasty and extream in their censures of him this way, as they did the other way. For it being to be supposed natu∣ral unto man to affect farther discovery and knowledge, it comes therefore to pass that the delight in contemplation and prosecution of what is now in view, keeps him for the time inconsiderate of what more may be had, and so it must consequently leave the weak and empty comprehension as full and peremptory (as to its self and its own satisfaction) as he that hath more and better ground to go upon.

The which we find verified upon mens first undertaking to read and ex∣pound the Scripture: the many examples there found of Gods miraculous

attestation and reward of some such as have been eminent for goodness and piety, presently raises in us a conceit of our own deserts herein also; and men are usually thereupon ready to fancy and expect (even to a degree of temptation) that God should in some like manner appear in the honoring and acknowledging of them. And, upon a contrary rule again, finding many examples therein of Gods displeasure and punishment of men for op∣pression, injustice, and other notorious wickedness, they are as ready, out of the conceit of their own wrong suffering and subjection at the hand of their own Enemies or Superiors, to make a paralel of the one with the o∣ther; and think that neither Patience nor Obedience is on their part due, to these so apparent enemies to God and goodness, as their prejudice and igno∣rance doth now judge to these so apparent enemies to God and goodness, as their prejudice and ignorance doth now judge them to be.

The which is most especially instigated from the example and insinuations of persons of greater repute for learning or judgement then themselves; who having many times ambitious or factious aims, are ready (as we said) to cast before them such forms of examination as shall be sure to leave a dislike in them towards the actions and commands of their Superiors, and consequent∣ly intice them to siding with them: which must prevail, because they are so far defective of observation and experience of their own, and consequently entice them to siding with them, which must prevail, because they are so far defective of observation and experience of their own, as to find and frame just Methods to themselves, and so to examine how far these and other particulars are, or are not agreeable and comprisable within the true rules and limits of Religion and Polity.

And of these kinds of deceits, taken up upon too easie examination and credulity, I can speak more confidently, having had so great experience of them in my self, and that in both kinds. For I believe that no man was more averse to Episcopacy, and Church Orders and Ceremonies, and such like, then my self in my youth, and while I continued to converse with such only as had these things in detestation; and all because the method of examinati∣on which was then put into me for to try cases of this kind by, (as to their approach to evil) was to search whether Papist used them or no. So that I, not having then knowledge or experience enough to examine how those things stood grounded in themselves, or to understand that Papists, even as they were Christians, could not choose but be in the right in somethings, was thereupon in danger to abandon some Christian truths and duties, because I found them within my rule of dislike, as being acted and believed by Papists.

Being once prepossessed with these and such like short Rules and Methods of distinction and adjudication, I was quickly tainted also with the Phari∣saical humour of judging for my self, and those of my belief, against such as differed, thinking that all that were not as invective against the thing called Popery (which truly for a good while I understood not) and as conversant in Sermons, and some select phrases and demeanors, were (notwithstanding their unblamable lives otherwise, and that according to Christian faith) to be esteemed but bare moral men. Their outstripping me in the real duties of general love and beneficence to men, and in the rendring God more ho∣norable by their publike and more solemn adoration and acknowledgement of him before men, were not, as I thought arguments comparable to prove them of the number of the godly and Saints, as were those Rules of distincti∣on which I had framed to my self.

And so again, in matter of Government and Political speculation, none more pleased and taken then my self, with all those fine Maxims and Rules of Examination, which, in the beginning of our unhappy troubles, were set on foot for tryal and control of the actions of Princes. My thought I was now much elevated in my rank and ability, being enabled to give a just censure of all that was done by one so much above me, and whom I had ignorantly hi∣therto thought should have guided me. When he acted in Civil matters, the Law of the Land was to be his bound and director; and when in affairs of Religion, the Scripture. If I had staid there it had been well. No, as I was told that it was not fit that Kings should be unlimitted and arbitrary in their rule; So also, that his single judgement or conscience were not to be trusted herein neither, therefore I did next fancy, that the Judges were to determine the meaning of the Law, and the Divines of Scriptures. In which I was not yet so far out of the way, but what a few caveats might set right. But I proceeded farther still in pressing onwards, that I at last thought none to be trusted in these high powers but the people themselves: The Judges and Divines, alas, they might be corrupted, but a community could not wrong it self. And therefore, over all, as the Paramont Power, I conceived there was to be a Parliament, to give final determination, and see execution done.

This at first I thought to import the King in Parliament; afterwards I was lead to believe it was the King and Parliament; afterwards it came to be the two houses of Parliament which were apprehended to be the Supreme Authority. And as the pleasing speculations of paction and derived power from the people did generally take & encrease, so came the lower house to be the upper house, & afterwards the sole house of Parliament; as being thought the peoples only true Representors. So that, at last, a King beset with all these limitations, did look like a Duck in a Garden, brought to eat up the Snailes and Worms, and then tied up by the leg, for fear of trampling over the flowers, or meuting in the Walks. But the examples of inconveniences arising from Kings exorbitant use of Power (by their strong and fresh im∣pression) making me on the sudden heedless, how by bridling his Power to do ill, I did also take away the power of doing good: and then also there having been no president in stories of a perpetual or unlimitted Parliament, and consequently of any evil thence arising, I came to be so taken up with the apprehension of the good they might do, according to that power they had anciently practised, that I did not then consider withal (I mean for a great while I did not) that if one man, that did acknowledge himself subject to Law, could by his power do so much mischief, what then might be feared where a multitude shall joyn in a mischief, who shall say they are above Law.

But it fareth with men in entertaining those narrow Schems for compre∣hension of any thing, as it doth in making knots and plats for Gardens or Building, which each one at the time of doing, will think done after the best manner, because done according to advisement of workmen or the like, and according to that stock of materials he then knew of, or stood furnished with: But when he shall make observation farther, and find both other ma∣terials and other methods more fit and capable of their receit, he will then alter his own method of adjudication also: For it is to be conceived that in this course of methodising, our fancy carrieth the form of a Pyramid,

wherein the particulars observable in nature make the Basis; which lessens towards the top, as the particulars unite and agree in such generals as we may call notions. But then, as these notions come to be imployed and to re∣ceive approbation from experience, they are again, for ready ease and use, collected into other totals called affections; which, having obtained settle∣ment from the harmony of experiments, come to guide us in what we do without reference back to particulars, more then he that can now read should be put to make use of spelling.

For so, Beauty, Honor, &c. have place in my desire, but the particu∣lars out of which I did at first come to the general liking of them, are out of my memory; nor indeed could their variety and repetition be remembred, being the observation of my whole life, of the common rate and esteem of these things by others; which could never serve us for use and proficience in knowledge, unless we did proceed to this way of abreviation. For particulars, whilst they are remarkable, are the objects of memory, but after they are made familiar by instances of the like kind, they are amassed altogether, and pass into notions and affections. Unto the constitution of which notions, as each sense carrieth his part, so are they soveraigns in their own order; that is, where they are not in particular objects dependent upon one another, there their inductions pass as peremptorily and uncontroulably into affections one as another.

Even as we formerly noted in Religion, and the Opinions and Doctrines thence derived, which (having not Charity for their object, but depending on the ear only) come (through often repetition and commendation) to pre∣vail and pass into affections and sciences, upon the same grounds that (by sight) this or that Figure, Fashion or Face comes to please. And so it is in the particular smells and tastes we are accustomed unto; wherein (former re∣petitions growing too numerous for memory of particulars) custom is (then) uncontrolable, and begets affections and science in inductions proceeding from them, as observations from sight breed affections in things objected unto it.

In this way of discovering causes by various coincidence of effects, and of common causes to them again, according to their concurrence, until we come to the prime cause of all things, Gods glory, we seem to reintegrate our know∣ledge and comprehension, as if received from the fountain by intuition. For hereby, if rightly proceeded in, we are able to judge of all things within the verge of humane sense, even as taught by themselves. And as we learn up∣wards, so we judge and discourse downwards; that is, from general notions to particulars.

We will (for better instance and application in these things) look more near∣ly into our learning it self, and the labour therein used. We that read now (having forgot the difficulties that attended us in our learning thereof) do wonder at the backwardness of others: First, in distinguishing letters one from another, then in knowing and distinguishing their several values and pronounciations: then, having understood their agreements and disagree∣ments amongst themselves, how to collect, apply, and place them in sylla∣bles: Then how (in like manner) to make of these syllables, words; and of these words again, to frame sentences or notions. And lastly, how to ap∣ply and judge of these sentences, as they shall seem consonant and proper to those several artificial methods by me entertained already, which we call

Affections; which having good for their object, do accordingly relish and transmit things to the common affection, the will, to determine how it stands in interest with other affections, and also to have the approbation of the understanding whether it be attainable or no, For will disputes not whether the affections propound what is good (that is to say, pleasant) or no, but whether this pleasure be so continuing and attainable as to make it good.

But it is to be considered, that the fancy doth differently imploy itself in the methodising of particulars towards the constitution of affections and pas∣sions, over it doth in methodising and retaining such other particulars which are to be imployed by way of Discourse and Reason. In the first way, par∣ticulars are amassed according to their genus, and so, from a broad foot or basis (as we said) do agree and point in streight lines towards the constitution of some affection in us. The which affection, being that which provokes us to delight and action, doth, as the end, by degrees instigate the fancy, and fit it self therein with a proper method of comprehension, how, amongst all the other observations made and collected, things may be so chosen and so ordered and placed, as to be instrumental and serviceable to the furthe∣rance of this end. So far as impressions are topically, figurately and parti∣cularly retained, they have still reference to the objects, and do penetrate the brain only, being used but as instruments and servants to the attaining of that which each affection doth prompt to the enjoyment of: For each af∣fection and appetite hath its proper method of judication and acquisition, as it had its own method and way of amassing from particulars, whilst it was making its inward impression and resentment in the heart; which is now its seat, from whence the brain is set on work as a Minister to produce figures conformable when an object of import is presented. Each affection rangeth particular objects in her method, as the Gardener doth flowers in his knots and borders, even as they are accounted prisable and delightful.

However, we have used the terms of fancy and method severally, yet they are the same; being the orderly collection and configurations of particulars in the brain, contrived for the use of each affection. And so again, we may conceive memory and imagination to be the same, being the impresses and representations of particular objects and figures, whereby the often or seri∣ous observation of them, as presented to the sense from without, doth cause us to imagine we still see, hear, &c. them in the same manner and form within.

And as affections did at first arise from particular outward objects, re∣lishing them according to experience of the pleasure accompanying them: so also do they take encrease from the methodical application of objects as a means to this end. And thereupon also, as figures were first impressed from particular and more distinct objects, and did thereupon by degrees come to the comprised in Methods and Configurations amongst themselves: so like∣wise do they unite and become serviceable towards the constitution of other, or new Methods: Even as the several persons, ranged in a Scene or Anti∣mask, may be comprehended under one figure: or as the several hounds in hunting may be considered as one pack, or their several barkings taken as one cry. Whereby also, through use, that which was at first cast into this method for the use of other affections, may become an affection by it self. For it is to be supposed that the same figures & impressions of the brain may stand diversely considerable and affecting us, as they have already passed into

affections by their use, or else are no farther pleasurable, then what the now use and application of them in some methodical course must afford, towards the service of some affection. In one sort they are considered as true; in the other as good. The figure of a letter is a different thing from its value, the which continues the same as to its use in making of words, although the letter it self may be figured in a di∣verse character, and those words and sentences made of them, are diffe∣rently considered in the spelling and pronounciation, over they are in their signification and import.

As affections do come to be thus bred in us from outward objects, and also by degrees to encrease in strength, so there is more reason for will to follow the guidance of affections, so bred in estimating good and bad, then is for it to follow authority; for the inductions framed by my self are the observations of mine own sense; but my grounding on the discourses of others, is grounding on their senses, which is not farther prevalent, then corresponding with mine own. And inductions from Authority, move as other inductions by uniformity and consent, and that according to such paterns of truth as are fore-conceived; else a single Authority, by joynture of my former affections and inductions may prevail in my acceptance, as over-numbring the contradictors. Like as we may find in particular it fareth with the weaker and more credulous sort in matters of belief; unto whom (as not able to contra∣dict from contrary collection and experience in themselves, or to ap∣prehend their Reasons and Arguments) those few Authorities they imbrace, come to be followed as of unquestionable power and force. For these sort of people being not able to apprehend many things of Divinity in general, or indeed any principle on its true ground and foun∣dation, have their hopes and fears (for the most part) terminated in certain select phrases and expressions of Scripture, which (themselves not well understanding) they are (through their ambiguity) brought to fancy them in all uses, as carrying the sense of the whole Scriptures themselves; and thereupon to make use of them in judging of what is fi•• and lawful for themselves or others, in all kinds of actions and de∣portments, as though they had been the very particular directions which were proper thereunto. Insomuch, as where the translator is at a loss for rendring the genuine and true sense of an Hebraism, or the like; they are wont to take up those phrases and expressions so affected∣ly, as to f••ame, in a manner, a new Religion to themselves out of their customary use and approbation of them.

In which case it fareth with them, as it doth with children who are by way of sport, turning themselves often round, not only for pride and affectation sake, to see who can turn oftenest, but on purpose also, that they may then stand delighted with those transient and giddy figures and apprehensions which are then made in their brain. Even so it be∣falleth those sorts of men in these vertigoes and intoxications made in them by their affected use of unintelligible and insignificant forms and phrases. When as, out of pride to excel others in degree of speculati∣on, whom they see already so much before them in the ordinary and in∣telligible course, they are thereupon lead to fancy this course. Which having in it no correspondence or ground-work in Nature or Reason,

both because the terms themselves are destitute of Figure and Compre∣hension, and because they cannot be configurated by other real bodies and figures neither, they must consequently remain like men in a Maze, without a clew of Method to direct them. But they become hereup∣on so wedded, that whosoever, in offering to convert or farther instruct these people, shall not, for admission into their conceits, hide his mean∣ing under these their familiar expressions, shall lose his labour, and that not only as being unconceived by them for want of sufficient pre∣notion, but as contradicting, as they conceive, such plain truths, as (by the customary use of these phrases) they conceive their opinions as to be.

And as observation and practise of particulars become at last affecti∣ons in such things as are performed and fancied in our selves, so also the the often sight and notice of the signs and figures of these affections in others come by degrees to affect also so far as to promote and induce the same in us; even as yawning affects to imitation both of that action and of the drowsiness it denotes, and the signs and attendants of the lust and fear of others affects thereunto also. No otherwise then the ••xamples of success and impunity of persons in their courses of stub∣bornness, or the conversation and discourses of them, are strong mo∣tives for other children and subjects to do the like.

But then this works not in children and creatures very yong, until practise and contemplation, hath so rooted and conformed these af∣fections in our selves as they have strength to take rebound from others, which in them cannot be, as also they must want observation of the signs themselves, and motives unto them; both for want of time, and for want of that affection that should spur thereunto. Nor can these signs be of much force again on men or creatures very ancient; where want of spirits in the brain must leave the appetite and affection to these very dull and almost delete, and leave also the nerves and organs of the body so empty and hollow, that they represent not with any steadiness or strength, as also the experience of danger to arise, must make them slow in new undertakings.

But to return to enquiry, after the rise of knowledge and reason, from instance in reading and learning. At first every letter must by its often admission through the vissual nerve, receive an answerable impression and figure in the brain, before any difference can be esti∣mated and valued between it and another letter by comparison; for else could there be no difference put between any thing but what the ey•• could see at once. And this comprehension cannot be well made at first sight, but according to appliableness of the organ, and intention of mind in the learner; and therefore in teaching of Birds and Beasts, we use watchings, corrections and rewards to make them attend. In children, that have their brain of a more tender substance, and less distorted by former figures, and have also (according to their bigness) more store of it then men, we find how easie its to teach them to read over older folks; notwithstanding they have not usually the like desire and intention of mind. So that the first step to knowledge is to feel and see well, and to have good senses; the next is to compare and make differences.

Younglings coming first to see, look upon every thing with like amaze∣ment: but, because the light is the most usual thing they behold (for the va∣rious session thereof makes colours) they therefore, after they have by custom past over its first dislike (caused through strangeness first like the bright∣est, and such colours as shew it most lively. And hence they come to be pleased with glasses, candles, &c. before shapes and figures; and Babies come to be but after-plays to toys of shew, for they see nothing without light, but many shapes and figures besides those of men and women; which shape again, as being oftenest notified in comparison of all others, comes to be most fami∣liar & pleasing. And upon like reason, come yonglings to like of that particu∣lar party that is most present to their sense, it being much encreased by experi∣ence of indemnity: So Ducks will follow the Hen that hatched them; and so children that Nurse, or other body that is most conversant, familiar, and kind unto them: and they like and dislike others of the same kind, as they resemble or differ most from these.

The pleasure of motion which young ones have in being rocked, or in playing one with another, seems to affect from that accustomed tumbling they had in the womb; for feeling is the first of senses, coming with life it self, if not the same. But then, as the brain and animal spirit of each creature stands chiefly imployed in the womb in the motion and sense of feeling of the limbs and outward parts, and doth thereupon prompt to exercise and delight in like agitation and motion afterwards, yet, when objects from the senses do afterwards come to imploy the brain and spirits inwardly, and when sense from the inward parts do draw the fancy and intention that way, then by degrees doth the exercise and delight in the motion of the limbs cease, and men become not only sedentary and studious, as in relation to figures entertained in the brain, but also to be strongly affected with the pleasures of eating and drinking, and such other enjoyments as may be performed with least shaking and dislocation of the stomack and other in∣ward parts.

Those loud and harsher noises that prevail in quieting of children, that cannot please from custom, do take their effect from diversion; that is, by recalling their imagination from the sense of some other suffering, to attend this strange noise now in their ears, and not from pleasure of the noise it self; which can please but by comparison of a less affliction to a greater. But all our delights, while very young, are most corporal, and have, like to other Sensitives, reference to our own sensible Customs: But when we come to observe what rate the sense and custom of others put upon things, persons or actions, we then, according to our own particular sense of the ability of the persons so rating them, judge and conclude of their worth, or otherwise, which we call honour and disho∣nor.

And hence it comes that bigger Childrens most eager sports are usually made in imitation of what they see men do; and the end of them to aim at victory and pre-excellence one above another. And as we come to be in liking of persons, and then of actions, so children, at first, are imitating the actions of such they most converse with, and take notice of: so that sometimes they are washing, sweeping, making fires, or the like (from their converse and familiari∣ty amongst servants: but, when they come abroad into the world, persons of greatest honor, come, through the observation of the respect by others given

that way, to be most observed by them, and consequently, those actions that are performed by and to them, to please above other actions: For these having uniformity, as being regulated by Law and Custom, must affect above the lose, incoherent, and disorderly actions of others, as hand∣some faces and good hands do above those that are common: For it is not the persons, but the dignity we affect. And all actions and things, that re∣fer not to sensible good, refer to honor▪ and things come to have esteem as attendants and causes of honor: For as honorable actions draw on our observation and esteem, so self-respect leads us to affect and pursue the causes of them: But, unto the observation of the causes of honor children sel∣dom reach, for the effect must first so highly please as to provoke to ambi∣tion.

And therefore with them, and the more ordinary sort of people, flattery is apprehended to be the same with honor: And, for want of observatoin and intelligence wherein true honor doth consist, they take all kind of praises and commendations to be the same with it. And, upon this score, they may well indeed conclude that honor is in the honoring first, and not in the honored: for that there being no true cause or reason in the party this way honored, why this praise or honor should be given, but the cause and design of it taking issue from the flatterer, it must thence follow, that as honor is in the honored first, so flattery in the flattered first.

From the custom of feeling (before spoken of) it is that very young in∣fants or creatures, finding nothing under them for support as they had in the womb, do, when we would make shew of letting them fall, put their bodies and parts into posture of resistance and aversion: not against falling it self, as knowing the danger or damage to follow thereupon; but because they find their present posture strange and uneasie: And there∣fore for want of the like sustentation to be left under them, they are tea∣dy to catch at new hold and support. For to a childe new born, that hath not apprehended the difference of sights, the fright of falling from a precipice will be but equal to that of falling out of its Nourses lap: And children receive displeasure at first from lying on any thing that makes them not sensible of a like general and equal sopport they had in the womb. And therefore we find them laid on beds and laps made even, and yet hardly enduring the unequal application of arms or legs under them, until they are so swadled up that these partial supports seem thereby to be equal and even. For the motion of gravity or propriety of place, being a necessary property of all bodies and their parts, it will follow to be soonest, and so consequently, most universally known: There∣fore this strugling of children is caused through sense of feeling to avoid a present injury it now feels through uneasiness, and not out of innate conception of danger, as some do think. For if such instincts and know∣ledge were, then would children be afraid of drowning, or burning, or the like?

This instance hath been prosecuted, to give occasion to discover how we may come to be habituated and affected to certain postures in the ex∣ercise and enjoyment of our minde and will, as well as of our bodies; and how that thereupon, those restraints which Government imposeth upon

our liberties in the one, most cause reluctance and desire of release, as well as in the other; and that sense and experience of alteration and discompo∣sure is the cause of dislike in our wills aswel as our bodies. When there∣fore these things are ascribed to nature, it must be understood of secondary or acquired nature. For children or creatures new born, for want of ex∣perience and observation, stand affected from no sense but that of feeling. Nor do the objects of other senses please or displease at first, unless they imprint and move so violently as to induce feeling, by affecting the heart and other parts and habits of the body, by means of those inward pares of nerves. Whereupon the humors and parts within do heighten (as it were, by their proper experience) the relish of that figure or object in the brain, to like or dislike, after the rate they stood themselves formerly made sensible thereof from it.

And therefore time and experience being required to make fear or other passions strong, we find that mandkind till they come to ripeness and tryal, stand not apprehensive or averse to Government. After which, sense and knowledge of its use and benefit, and also of his own suffering thereun∣der, makes him (proportionably) contented or reluctant. Proportiona∣bly (I say) for that as Reason and Religion do out of sense of duty more or less bear sway over the more natural and bodily sense of suffering, and re∣straint of will, so will Government be to each one more or less offensive: there being but these two great motives for children and subjects obedi∣ence, sense of benefit and interest, and sense of conscience and duty. For want of true experience and knowledge whereof, the family as well as the Kingdom comes to be troubled with mutinies and insurrections, even for that ignorance and incogitancy of the benefit or harm to arise to them∣selves by obedience, or the contrary, leaves them to be lead by the pre∣sent sense of trouble in being guided by the direction of another, which must thereupon come to be by them that are not able to apprehend their own advantages by peace and submission, nor that their benefits are reci∣procal, interpreted as done out of private interest and design of their Prince and father only.

Nor need we wonder, that, in the course of our lives, Custom should bear such sway, since life it self is but custom; that is, a Methodical and Custo∣mary motion of an active spirit, which by means of his circular and regu∣lar course, is diverted from eager pursuit of penitration and ascension. For the heat of the Sun or parental body, by degrees turning into spirit or ayr, such portion of seed or first matter as is apt to sublime, this spirit (accord∣ing to its lighter nature) grows presently motive and restless, as seeking a more high and open habitation: but partly out of similitude of the matter whereof it was bred, and the similitude and constancy of the same degree of heat it now hath to that which begot it; and partly through the present suc∣cession of skinny enclosure, arising from the slymy nature of the matter it self: and partly through those other inclosures of skins and shels, in Wombs, Eggs, &c. it is invited and contented, at length to satisfie its proneness to direct upward motion, with this circular passage: as being from habit cozened to take and choose this easier way, rather then to press earnestly any more to that direct course, in which it had been so often di∣verted by such high difficulties. And as this Spirit is by reason of its tenuity made motive and naturally desirous of enlargement and aire, so

again, by reason of its smaller and more indifferent degree of sublimation, as being generated by that moderate heat of the body, of a substance which is neither suffered to addle through cold, nor harden through heat, it is therefore kept so well allayed, as to be retarded both in ability and desire of penetration. Which is also holpen on by the closeness of those vessels and cells where it is contained, and by the likeness and proximity of that mat∣ter whereof it is generated, and wherewith it is accompanied: which is not only the same with that whereof it was begotten, but also is but one degree beneath it in thinness.

For it is to be supposed, that the Chylus being turned into blood, as it doth attain some degree towards sublimation it self: So also that most attenuated and concocted spirit which is in the cells of the brain, doth like∣wise still retain a good degree towards condensation: even so, as, accord∣ing to course and vicissitude, to be again apt to be turned back into s••eam, and so into blood. Like as also the blood, on the contrary, stands ready and affected to turn into steam, and so into spirit, in their circulation and passage up and down the body. In which course of Version and Transmu∣tation they are holpen by the mediation of the humour remaining in the ar∣teries, being as it were a mixture of spirit and blood, caused through the re∣finement of the blood in its passage through the heart: Whereupon we find that nature hath provided a thicker coat for them then for that thicker blood which is contained in the veins, even as the finer animal spirit in the brain, hath its whole substance, besides its two coats, for inclosure. And therefore it is to be considered, that as the first spirit generated of the egg, or the like, was homogenious unto it; so, by degrees, as bodies, and the humours in them do receive mixture and alteration, the spirit thereof ge∣nerated doth suffer change also, until, in age, the one do become as heavy and indigested as the other: and the spirit to be wholly suffocated and lost in the humours.

But the first quickning spirit being by the means aforesaid raised up and invited unto a regular motion, doth then, through habit of so moving, make it self the organical continents and enclosures of heart, arteries, brain, nerves, &c. serving as well for methodical motion, as for places of test and Rendezvouz to the spirits and humours, being then called life.

And it is to be supposed that this confinement and imprisonment of spi∣rits in bodies, is in it self unnatural, and at first a causer of pain: and living Creatures are by degrees only released of the sense thereof, through custom of indurance and diversion; by the means of maintenance of this metho∣dical inward motion: So that so long as this is kept orderly and free pain is avoided: but if it be excited through too great and unusual proportion of spirits, as we find after drinking, where the strength of the liquor doth excessively turn into spirit, then the membranes of the b••ain being extraordinarily pressed, the party grows, from their restlesness, to be restless also, and prone to ways of evacuation, as to venery and moti∣on; the one causing greater delight, because it affords a more free and methodical delivery, the other less and more insensible, because more slow and difficult: as forcing through the substance and coats of the nerves themselves.

In like manner as a Commonwealth is enlivened and preserved, by having the natural vigour and spirit of the people kept in a regular and methodical motion, by the due observation of such regular Customes and Laws as shall be by the Prince thereof established; when as the intemperate use of things, accordding to their own several and occasi∣onal likings, would be subject to bring on change and alteration, to the destruction of the Body Politique, as well as the Natu∣ral.

And, in the Kingdom, we may account the Nobility and Gentry as answering the humour in the Arteries; and, by their middle temper and condition, carrying great force to unite the other extreams; that is, that more sublime spirit remaining in the head thereof, the Prince, (which is chiefly swayed by sense of honor) and those more gross hu∣mors of the ordinary sort, swayed by more earthly and sensual de∣lights. When as they, being participant of both, may attemperate the Prince against so great sublination in attempts of ambition and vain glory, whereby to put his people into too violent heat and feverish motion; And also raise up and quicken the more slow sense of the peo∣ple, from their aguish dulness in matters of obedience, to be more ap∣prehensive and respectful of their Princes commands, even as the na∣tural members are to the directions of their head. Like as also doth the degree of Yeomanry unite the Gentry with the Peasant; and thereby impart some influence of courage and civility into those of the low∣est rank, who else become heartless and unserviceable, as experience tells us of those Countreys where they are not.

Through custom of Walking we make it so familiar, that the fancy need not alwayes intend that action by expresse direction, as in the extraordinary running it must: But custome of so doing, having made a fit collocation in the brain, it is able, while it continues that posture which is unto this notion requisite, to intend other objects also.

But in this faculty of going, we may, from the daily observa∣tion of the practise of children herein, be put in minde with what trouble we are at first reduced from our natural proneness to be leaping with both feet at once, and from thence to be taught to set down one foot after another, after the manner of going. The which whilst it was in doing as a matter of great difficulty, did (although we have now quite forgot it) take up the whole imployment of our fan∣cy; the trouble thereof abating by degreees, as custom and practice made it easie, and secured us against fear of falling, incident to that first trust to a new support, as well as fear generally is to all new ob∣jects: But these things now over, the custom of walking keepeth my brain from trouble, as it doth my limbs from weariness. For it is not any naturalness in this motion of walking, that makes it thus easily in∣dured.

Nay, it seems that only Birds, that have indeed but two legs, are inartificial and upright walkers; and that this posture in mankinde is at first forced. For the infant comes from the womb with the knees up;

and what pains with swadling do we take to stretch his body in length, and kept it so? With what aversion doth every one of them submit to this in∣forcement, and how pleased are they when released, so as the knees may be gotten up again? When we come afterwards to teach them to go, how ready are they to lean forward, and set their hands to the ground? What strange footing do they at last make in this uncoth motion?

And after we are men we may finde the naturalness of four-footed goings still pointed at. Inasmuch as the Arms, when they are at liberty and not o∣therwise imployed, do in our several gates keep pace with our legs, especially in fast walking; wherein, greater strength being required, we may observe men moving their Arms answerable to their Legs, and that cross ways, af∣ter the fashion of a trot. And so again, when they are to run, the arms are gathered up close, as ready to move in an exilient or leaping manner: which is the usual way of procession of such things as have their hinde legs long. In swiming also man imploys all four, like other things: especially like such as have broad forefeet and the hindparts long; as Frogs and such like.

And as for any difference that is in the joynts, between men and Apes, &c. they may well proceed but from custom, as crookedness doth: in which case, experience tells us how that continuance and usage of any po∣sture, whilst the bones and gristles are yet tender, will cause the same so to fix afterwards, that unto that party, it will be as it were natural, and so en∣crease by traduction also. And we may further observe, that the legs and thighs of infants are so bent, as not to be too long for the Armes: the trunks of their bodies being then also proportionably much longer; and the plants of the feet so turned, as to be accommodated to a four-footed motion well enough, especially after a leaping fashion. And therefore mankinde seems only incident to crookedness, in the distortion of the joynts of the back-bone: for although shortness of the trunk follow this peculier erected posture, yet for further ease of the weight thereof (wanting support like other Creatures that use four feet), some way of leaning and standing comes to be affected, bringing on crookedness; and so farther shortning the trunk also. Upon which consideration we may suppose mens Limbs fitted for upright going e∣ven as Parats have one claw turned backward: that is, because the whole race of them, feeding out of their feet, and not being able to hold their meat to their mouths without turning their claws, it came at last so to settle: although the distortion be still apparent.

And yet why may not men naturally enough go on their hinde feet onely, as we see some horses born amblers? for as in them custom and habit do often pass by traduction, so, all men being goers, why should not children be naturally walkers? and since it may be presumed that Adam and Eve were set upright, why not their posterity, insomuch as there should be no sort of people without this posture? It may be so, if we could have spoken with∣out teaching; but as Adam was to have his knowledge infused, and not acqui∣red from childhood, so the faculty of upright going also if he had it; other∣wise it is like he would not have so gone, more then spoken.

But this gate (no doubt) is of great advantage to mans use in some things: and that even in the exercise of the faculties of his minde and judgement, because he is hereby able to carry his head and neck more steadily then when they should be prominent, and hang out fore-right; whereupon the senses

Nerves, and parts of the body may have a more direct and steady enter∣course with the brain, so as to hold on, and keep fresh such objects and figures as shall be entertained therein; that so, by summoning all its concomitant impressions, after each parties artificial way of topical method and adjudica∣tion, a full discovery may be made to serve for instruction or use, against ano∣ther time, before that figure be parted with.

And therefore we may observe that while we are in great inquiry and stu∣dy concerning any thing, we hold our heads very steady: whereas those that have a loose carriage of their necks, are proportionably weak in their intelle∣ctuals: And truly, to be a good Peripatetick is a great step to be a good Phi∣losopher: because, in this erect gate, the bones being in a straight line, do bear the weight of the body; so as the brain may not be diverted from its inward work and agitation, to any great supply of the Nerves and Muscles without. And besides this, we have some advantage to knowledge by keep∣ing our hands by this means more tender, whereby to imprint more exactly by feeling with them.

But then again, there is no doubt but in many bodily exercises, the other motion and gate would be advantageous; as in leaping, running, climbing, and all sorts of nimbleness. And for tryal sake hereof it were not amiss that some children were so brought up and nourished, as to be without sight of company, that they might take their natural course herein, until some de∣gree of years, at least those that come to them, to feed or teach them to speak, should come upon all four, and then sit, after the eastern fashion; but the greatest and best advantage would be, if men could conveniently be brought to use both ways of gate upon occasion; but this by the way.

Now as there is an creation of body, so is there an erection of minde; wherein (indeed) the pourtrait and image of God is to be sought. And unto this estate of upright walking and looking towards heaven, we are by more slow and difficult degrees reduced, in our souls, then we are in our bodies: even because of those natural and inbred affections of Pride, Co∣vetousness, Sensuality, Stubbornness, and the like, whereby we are carryed with a perpetual delight to lye groveling on the things of this world.

The first great help to this straightness of minde are those swathings of Precepts and discipline, wherewith and whereby, from our infancy, and from the same time we begin to go, we have the Rebellion and irregularities of our nature rectifyed by the Laws and Rules of our Parents; by the due applicati∣on and exercise whereof, while our affections (as well as our limbs) are yet pliant and tender, we come to be well fitted and prepared to undergo and act, as Christians and subjects in our political relation, that measure of duty and submission which, in our Oeconomical relation, we had been habituated unto as children; when either our heavenly Father, or the Father of our Country shall have farther occasion to make tryal of our growth and steadiness in per∣fection, by those afflictions and hardships which through humility and obe∣dience to them, we shall be put unto.

So that there will be these differences between the erection of the body, and that of the soul. All the difficulty of upright going, in the first sort, rests in our infancy, even in keeping the limbs of our body straight; where∣as the difficulty of upright walking, in the other sort, is chiefly afterwards; when, by reason of obdurate natural stubborness and crookedness of dispo∣sition, we stand in more need of the ligaments and tyes of Laws and Disci∣pline then before.

After we come to growth, the elevation of our minde is helping to the body, in continuance of this his elevation, even through pride and affection, as striving to excel in that which we see to be so generally practised; whereas to the true elevation and upright walking of the inward man, the pride and haughtiness of the outward man is altogether averse, and there is no surer way to the true raising and dignifying of our mindes, then by the depres∣sing and keeping under of our bodies: when as by due applycation and use of afflictions and Patience, we may make those true Christian graces of hu∣mility and lowliness of minde, in our own and worldly esteem, to become our true glory and exaltation in the sight of God. For it is to be considered that there are ghostly and gracious habits, as well as bodily and natural ones: and that these, as the more worthy, ought to take up our chief endeavour.

To proceed farther into search of the degrees of knowledge and com∣prehension, we may observe, that those that can perfectly read are past the trouble of spelling: and those that can do that well, do it so without di∣sturbance to their fancy, that they can intend the matter treated of; without distraction, (through notice of the words) more then the action of walking doth disturb the party, from entertaining other objects and thoughts.

As for the usual tryal and difficulty of rubbing with one hand, and patting with another both at once, it proceeds from want of custom, whereby the brain cannot accommodate it self to both actions at the same instant: but through practice and custom both may be done, and yet the fancy have ability and leisure to intend something else; even as Turners and Spinsters can use hands and feet in different motions, and yet think on other things at the same time. For those different motions come at last to be but one, be∣cause the Brain (by little and little) findes a posture accommodated equally to supply those Nerves that serve the Muscles in both motions, and that at once, as he that hath been sufficiently enured to the shapes of a, and b, can be brought to make one syllable of them, and as well say ab, as a first, and then b; so, another syllable may be added to that; and yet (making but one word) the Brayn may joyntly intend them as one work. And farther, if it have more to do, that, or more words, may, through habit in reading, be so kept from disturbing the fancy, that the sense of them, and not the particular words, shall occupy the minde. Even as in Arithmetick, which is learned for things sake, and not for pleasure of seeing the figures of 3, 4, 5, 6, &c. the things thereby wrought, and not the Instrument comes to exer∣cise our fancy.

No otherwise then the tools of Carpenters, &c. please but in relation to the work. Yet men seek to have their tools fitting: which handsomness accompanies, as the most usual form: but, to have a good work done by ill favoured tools, or an ill work by handsom ones, can hold no comparison in the Artificers choice.

So the skill in Arithmetick may be a thing pleasing in it self: as also the Arts of good Printing or Writing, and the well forming and placing of fi∣gures and letters, may be pleasing in themselves, considered apart; but come they once to be brought to use, then, not they, but the things which they signifie and import, take up our fancy.

So in Musick also, the Tune and harmony is attended, and not every eighth or fifth: nay there may be (and usually is) progression: and that Tune

may prompt us to some Song made thereafter; and that song again minde us of some mirth, company, or other accidents that accompanied it in the times of our hearing. For the ends and utmost discoveries of things are al∣ways coveted; and where knowledge and the figure is already sufficiently comprehended, nature is progressive in her enquiry, and cannot, out of com∣mon duty, be idle. And things are kept in memory as they were let in; that is with their most usual, or which is all one, with their strongest conco∣mitants.

As we see it come to pass in dreams; what strange progression will they make? So as fancy, in her method of transition from one thing to another, will make as it were an history; if the affections move not to such height and passion as to awake the party. And the object that begins therein is commonly that which we last went to sleep with, if it be of much concern; but then, that quickly runs into things and objects of strongest impression: and therefore the Stage and Company is usually what our youth was accu∣stomed unto, because then, as things came with greatest notice, so they have greatest settlement. For although many times, in the morning, we remem∣ber not the series and coherence of our dreams, because these (it may be) made little impression, yet a method of transition they must needs have had.

All which will inform us that affections arise not from present objects as now in themselves, but as in relation to our collections, and memory of their former abearance towards us, which is not grounded on one, but many ob∣servations; except that one were equivalent to many in strength: for it is all one to have a dead or absent party in remembrance because of long ac∣quaintance, as it is to remember another for some extraordinary favour and obligation. For he that brings one stone a day for one hundred days, make the like heap to him that lays down one hundred all at once. And, so also, a repitition of stroaks upon the forehead, with an Egg or the like, will at last make as great a swelling as one greater blow with a stronger thing; even for that the blood and humors, by little and little arrested in their pas∣sage by the small stroak, do by degrees amass equally to that more total stop∣age made by the great contusion.

As the outward parts stand affected and sensible by the recourse of the hu∣mors and mediation of the Nerves and annimal spirit, so much more the Brain. And as he that hath had the Gout doth again remember and know the precise pain thereof upon the recourse of the same humors, even so is the Brain put in minde and made sensible of its impressions, as well from the mo∣tion and recourse of the humors therein, as from outward objects. So that in sleep our dreams take often rise from hence also: and from those vapours arising from the Stomack; which do commonly minde us of the same thoughts then, as did accompany the like food or disgestion in the day time.

From these strong concomitant impressions accompanying objects, it comes that the weaker sort of men are so impetuous in Religion. For they, relying on Authority of particular persons, their zeal and devotion is heightened according to the passion and fervency accompanying the preacher in his delivery, and not from the reason of what he propounded. Whereupon Impression and Custom moves in Religion as it doth in other things; that is by constancy and asseveration: for looser men, though

more, are not so remarkable, for want of sedulity and asseveration in what they do.

And as that side hath most sectators that hath most zealous patrons, so also State alterations are swayed by the numbers of such as are most uni∣formly active: and although such as dislike the order of things established and done by them, may be of far greater number, yet if they be not unani∣mous in their number, so as to agree to choose another before it, and to agree in fervency of opposition, they are as like to hinder one another, as them.

Now as to know is little more then to remember, so Conscience is but the memory of things, actions, &c. as they relate to morality. For the Brayn (from sense) taking objects entire; Conscience picks thereout, what future hope or fear may make of concern, and puts them into his own method, as other affections do. For Conscience hath not onely her rule, as other affections, but arising from all things that have morality, (which accompanyeth every thing in one kinde or other) is an affection upon other affections. And therefore Conscience comes not until yeers of discretion, that other affections have some growth: all which she masters, according as hope and fear master her. And so Conscience, in her jurisdiction, is a Will or general affection by her self; Having Reasons proper. For Reason is when memory holds forth two things at once, that by comparison of them, according to their usual effects and consequents observed formerly, conclu∣sion may be made of the like to happen again.

And, as Conscience is memory of things, as to Religious fear, so Honor is memory of things, actions, persons, &c. as to Civil hope. Conscience hath not his correlate (as shame which is opposite to Honor) unless the passion of Hope be taken in. Honor and shame respect reward and punish∣ment present, or rather carry it with them; Conscience, that which is here∣after. And thereupon, one regards the Sentence and Judgemen of such as have present power, the other the commands and power of such as shall judge for the future. So that one sort of good Conscience may be want of memory or unaccusing, but Honor must be active. Absence of guilt con∣tents the one, but the other must be possessive. And as Conscience is an af∣fection upon affections, as they relate to guilt and punishment hereafter, so Honor governs affections as they have judgement of things, &c here: and as the known Will of that God I fear, can onely oblige me in the one, so the Will of those men I esteem, in the other.

And indeed, all our affections are (as instigated so) Governed by hope and fear. For under these two, as under the desire of attaining good or a∣voiding bad in the general, all things are included: and all other affections in the choice of objects have respect towards them, that is, (from observati∣on) to judge what expectations of good or harm; that is, pleasure of sense or honor, or pain of sense or shame, here or hereafter, is like to proceed from them, or their different managery and application.

But then, as more go to Heaven by the way of Hell, and we had rather have our commendable actions suppressed then the contrary much divulged, so fear is stronger then hope; for although pleasure be the object of the one, and pain of the other, yet because pleasure is never so perfect as pain, nor can be so fixed and continuing; nor again without fear of loss, it must therefore belooked upon as the most general and steady guide of our actions.

Upon which ground we need not wonder at the commonness of supersti∣tion; nor why, as children are scared with Hobgoblins, &c. so some men (little differing from them) should be so obnoxious to the terrors and af∣frights of such as they credit. In which case it may happen to these that are negatively superstitious, as being scandalized at some Ceremonies which they understand not themselves, but which their guides are pleased to blast, as under the notion of humane inventions, or the like, as it doth with that way of affrightment of children also, by telling them of Raw head and bloody bones: for as to them that for the present understand not that all living things should be so, these things are apprehended as really dangerous and terrible because terribly delivered; even so, under the odium of humane in∣vention, Popery or the like, are we many times brought to be superstitiously flying those things that are in themselves good: and are also by so much the better, as being by Christian Authority approved, & as having the more anci∣ent and Catholike President of the Christian Churches usage. For (doubtless) they cannot be so weak as seriously to believe that those that do refuse com∣munion with the Papists, even for that very difference sake which is in many things between them, should at the same time they account them erroneous in the service of God and in matters of Ceremonies also, implicitely follow them in some other things; and upon no other score but because they do so. But by these and such like arts it is usual with seditious persons to steal away peoples hearts from their own Church guides and Rulers. For upon the same reason that a second dis-affects (so far as to spoil the whole harmony) so one crossing and unexpected fear raceth that whole method of belief and perswasion we stood before possessed of, as to the goodness of our Religion, or of our practice therein.

And that fear is more pressing and prevalent then hope, appears in that our hope to attain good can never want our fear of missing it; nor can the possession of pleasure want the fear of deprivation. We may also observe that deaf men do ever suspect things are spoken to their ill or prejudice, even when they may as likely speak to their good. The like jealousie is entertain∣ed when any whisper in our Company, or speak to one another in a language we understand not.

Nay pleasure is but absence of pain, especially that of sense: and then we need not wonder why a positive thing should affect more then a negative. For pain being (as before noted) when the spirits are stopped in their wonted motions, and it must still happen but they should be more or less so, plea∣sure can neither be high nor lasting, but (at best) mixed; and be but by com∣parison of a less pain to a greater.

Upon knowledge and due consideration of the prevalence of this passion of fear towards the guidance of men as in a state of subjection, it seemed good in the eye of divine wisdom, to rank his service, and all our returns of duty and obedience, as under that notion. Nay we may observe that he doth not onely set down the commendations of such as have been dutiful and obe∣dient unto him under the oppression of such as feared him, but also, for the encrease of this return of duty and service towards himself, he is wont to promise a new increase and implantation of fear into the hearts of those parties and people from whom he expects it, as being the on∣ly steady grace that is effectual herein.

If we look unto Creatures below us, we shall finde that onely such of them

are disciplinable, and to be made tame and cohabitable as can be brought to be made sensible and subject to our corrections, and also kept in such a conti∣nual fear of us, as not to resist, or rise against us to our prejudice: Whereas Lions, Wolves, Foxes, and the like, which cannot be constantly awed, are called Salvage, amongst which sort we come to reckon mankinde it self, when it shall once arive at that degree of temerity as to be incorrigible and disrespective to Law and Government, being then become indisciplinable and impolitical. For as to be informidable, is to be indomitable, so to be indomi∣table is to be unsociable. Because if it were not for this mutual fear, every man would be daily affronted and injured by every man. Nay, the boys and youths as we passed the streets might be inclined even for sport sake, to abuse us with dirt or stones or the like, did not the terror of punishment to come from us or their Master keep them in aw. In which case, as it is to be consi∣dered, that as they are most ready to offer these abuses to other boys or those of their own rank, because less to be feared either for personal revenge or complaints, so, were it not for fear sake, especially for that fear which must come from Authority, no society could be maintained; especially in cases of great import; where revenge is ready to work more high.

And therefore those that say a Prince ought to rule by love onely, under∣stand not what they say; but, out of an hasty affectation to be eminent in a popular expression, forget that absurdity that attends it. Amongst equals, it is in vain for any man to expect that another should be serviceable unto him, who stands not by natural relation, it is not by some antecedent obliga∣tion, brought to a degree of loving him: in which case it may be called, a return of gratitude and not of subjection. That Prince also that is to attain a Principality or new Empire it will be necessary that he should in like man∣ner demean himself towards those he intends afterwards to rule as Sub∣jects. But as there is a manifest difference, both in material and fashion, be∣tween the stirrup by which we get up, and the saddle by which we ride, so is there between that relation he had to them before they were Subjects, and that which he hath to them afterwards, being then their equal, and now their ruler: and therefore it cannot but be thought that a different managery be∣longs to him that is to command, over it doth to him that is to entreat.

When any one is actually seised and estated in an office of rightful power, he can then be no otherwise loving as a superior, then as the other had first merited of him by his submission and obedience. In which case, as power and command must precede the return of duty and obedience, so must that approbation which must come from the superior in the acknowledgement of the desert of one more then another, be esteemed a reward in requital of some work done by the person, and not an affection to the person, without any such consideration. So that although Princes may have their peculiar friends or favorites, (like other men), yet, in reference to the act of Govern∣ment and obedience, the eye thereof cannot be firm without Law, nor Law without fear; until such a golden age shall be light upon, wherein the Edicts and commands of superiors shall be to the will of every one, at all times, so pleasing and conformable, as that the Commander shall not be distinguish∣able from the obeyer.

So that this passion of Fear being so necessary, both for making of us soci∣able, and for keeping us fitted and prepared for a due return of obedience ac∣cording to our relation of subjection, we are not onely to conceive the total

privation thereof to be a total defeat to Government and its force, but that proportionably, as there is a course taken for substracting or lessening of this fear, from that person that can onely immediately claim and make present use of it, so is there a proportionable stop given to the efficacy of that Go∣vernment which he is to execute.

As for example, in the divisions and distinctions of obedience into Religi∣ous and Civil, and active and passive, formerly spoken of: whereby men are brought from reckoning the breach of their Prince his Commands to be a thing of such terror as was formerly thought: and in the latter of these ca∣ses, to wit, in the distinction of obedience into active and passive, their haste to be rendred famous in so popular a speculation, hath made them become frivolous or unintelligible. For I would fain know, if he that did sit still, or keep at home, according to his Prince his command, were not to be called actively obedient unto him, as well as he that was put to the greatest labour and toyl in the performance of what he was enjoyned? Or (On the contrary) whether he were not as well passive that did suffer punishment for being active, when he was enjoyned to be quiet, as he was that endured pu∣nishment for being quiet and forbearing, when he should have been active and stirring.

And the truth is, to say actively obedient, is none other then a contradicti∣on: for Government being it self to be looked upon as a work ayming at an end, as then the Prince must be looked upon as directer and Agent, so can the subject in all Offices of imployment he is put to herein, as well for mo∣tion as station, be considered but as instrumental and passive onely: and so far as he suffers for neglect or contumacy, he cannot be called passive as in re∣lation to his obedience, but as to his stubbornness or disobedience. And therefore they should consider that since the benefits of Government and Po∣lity are not to be had, unless some as instruments shall submit to have their wills guided by the wills of those that are to direct, so is there no steady way but that of Conscience and Fear to make voluntary and sensitive Agents continually ready to be directed by the judgements of such as are above them; after the same manner as other instruments do depend on the hand of the Artificer.

These passions of hope and fear, although most prevalent, yet are not in∣nate: but arise from experience of objects pleasurable and painful. For chil∣dren, till some collection of Knowledge, hope not, nor fear not, as before noted.

As remembrance of pain, at first, causeth fear (for pain is the thing fear∣ed) so men that have thin skins, and are thereupon more sensible, have more fear then other Creatures; and those creatures that are most docible, are as we see most fearful and attentive, as Dogs, Parrats, &c. And as wise men have tenderer sense of feeling then fools, so, more sense, more fear, and con∣sequently, more wisdom; for fear causeth enquiry to be rid thereof.

But as thus, fear makes men generally come to be more wise, (insomuch as all wise men may be observed fearful,) yet this being in more things then fools, whose ignorance and inexperience will not let them know the danger of many things, this their generality of fearing of more things according to truth, keeps the fear of fewer things from being so superstitious and intense. For as all superstition comes of ignorance, so zeal that should be according to knowledge, should not put a man besides his senses: and if men had more wis∣dom,

God might be more rationally served then usually he is. And if our zeal and exercise of Region be not according to knowledge, (so as to be called our reasonable service of God) we cannot rightly be said to serve God as men and reasonable Creatures. For after the ground-work is laid, and we have transcended sense in apprehending Christ (with his mysteries) in our hearts by Faith, our outward service and worship is so much the better, as the more knowing; that is, in imploying of our abilities in discovering of what the true sense of Scripture, or the light of Reason will afford: as the next and best direction to attain what we desire to know or practise, as truth or good.

Nay, as we are in search of the Scriptures to imploy our own utmost abi∣lities, so are we not wholly to relye upon them; but, having in the first place freed our selves of all prejudice and prepossession, and in humility implored divine illumination and assistance in all things, we are then to proceed accor∣ding to the rules of Christian Faith and love in all deportments and actions, not otherwise directed by our superiors: who also are in this case to be look∣ed upon as the authorized interpreters of the Scriptures, as heretofore noted, Else it will fall out, that each one undertaking to examine and interpret them according to his own wilde fancy, and weak and ungrounded method of comprehension, and being also strongly, through education or interest fore∣stalled in his judgement, there will arise to be as many Religions and Opini∣ons, as men and interests. And that which is yet worse, mens natural pride and vainglory will prompt to such presumption of extraordinary revelation, that even things blasphemous and destructive of humane society, shall, in de∣spite of the Church, Reason, or Authority, be set on foot. Whereas, in truth in things of most private and separate concern, the sense of the Church, and the Analogy of Faith is to be venerably regarded, even as the supreme Chri∣stian Magistrate is also in all things of publike concern.

For in this case we are again fallen within the limits of moral care and con∣sideration. And therefore, as each mans reason is in him the best guide of what to do in the course of his own affairs, so publike Reason in that which hath publike respect to the end, that from the knowledge of what is there done, there may be a fit and a constant way left for attaining moral prudence and obedience: and that according to a well grounded experience and obser∣vation of moral and political directions and Edicts. Whereby each Subject may, from the constancy of the measure and manner of application, used by his Prince in rewards and punishments, come to frame to himself political me∣thods and schemes of comprehension and knowledge of his duty and bene∣fit in civil deportments, as well as he may learn Philosophy by observation of that constancy which is kept up in the course of Nature. For she being preserved and governed by uniform rules and laws, the same Causes must e∣ver produce the same effects, if the Agent and Patient be in themselves and circumstances alike vertuous and the same, the which wisdom must dis∣cover, from a well grounded observation of constancy in her observati∣ons: for should not natures course be constant, species and individual things could not have any steady provision for existence and benefit, but causes be∣ing indeterminable, effects would be so also. For it was from the constant observation of one thing following another, in all respects alike considered, that I come to know any thing; even as by continually observing heat to accompany fire, I know fire to be the cause of heat.

And from this constancy in Nature it comes also to pass, that what is most

naturally done is most uniformly done, and so most handsomly and delight∣fully done. Which coming to be imitated by us, will be also most vertuously and wisely done: but what is not done in natural imitation (as following no rule) is vitious and ill favoured. For folly being a short and false observation in the course of things, it concludes to act upon half premises: Whereupon the irregular processions and effects thereof, come through inequality to be inequity. For as truth can be but one, but errors divers: even so (as we noted formerly of beauty and handsom faces) vertuous actions have more likeness to one another then vitious. For all virtuous actions are done by cer∣tain rules and copies, and as they agree to these measures, their goodness is known: and as they differ therefrom, they do differ from themselves also, and approach to vice.

Things being thus stated, it will follow, that more reason, knowledge and understanding, is but more observation, and that an uncontradicted observati∣on is taken for a supreme reason in it self. For so (for example) the motion of gravity, because it is observed to accompany all things, none, or few search the reason of it, for there is not a more general or uniform rule in nature to exa∣mine it by; all proof going from things more generally observed and known to such as are less. Whereas to believe the Antipodes, and that men, upon the same reason of motion of gravity, should tend in the same line towards us, as we do towards them; this seems as difficult for belief, as it is diffe∣rent from the usual tendency of things, as to our appearance, which we call upwards and downwards. Nor can it be conceivable to any that will not take pains to get it comprehended from observation elsewhere.

In which case, if men have made and methodized observations aright, it may appear that the sum and superiour bodies move in spheres, even be∣cause the time they are absent and unseen is equal to that they compleat in compassing that half of the sphere which is seen, from whence, and the observation of eccilpses, the earth must be supposed to be spherical also.

And if this be farther enquired into, we shall find that this motion of heavy things downwards, is but part of a more general motion, and to be so concluded from that more general observation of union: And is but the appetite thereof made more observable through this more apparent motion toward union after separation. For the common knowledge and observance of boldness as they are unite, and keeping close together, as by so much more general then the motion of gravity, as rest it self is more general then local motion, for indeed what is usually called motion and rest, are but these two: but it is not so observable as the other, because rest, or union already made, hath no variety to cause intent observance, as variety of motion doth in the other. And therefore it is onely discoverable to such as can un-ravel nature in their contemplation, until they come to the bottom and first ground-work thereof. For then they shall find both this constant practise of union or adhesion of bodies, and also the cause thereof to be (the gene∣ral cause of all causes) that is, the will and law of God in order to his pro∣vidence.

And although inanimates have a kind of specification amongst themselves, whereby defire of proper union hath some force (as may be seen in that active part of earth, the Loadstone, in his variation, yet they follow in their whole mass) the general law of matter, in the common and general thirst

of union. For should there not be a common centre of gravity, whereby all earthly things, as they stood differenced in weight by dense and rare, might have and keep the proper places assigned them, Chaos and confusion would follow.

And therefore, this motion of heavy things to the earth being both necessa∣ry and natural, both for affording a place of receipt and production of crea∣tures, and for leaving all without, so rare and transparent, that the influences of superiour bodies might approach them, we must conclude, that as the whole earth is more then a part, so hath it this attractive force of union, greater also in the whole then apart. And therefore for a stone (or the like) to tend that way, and not to be diverted by the desire of union through prox∣imity of a like less body, is no wonder. And, as it is to the whole, so it is to the centre or middle part of the whole, that this desire of approach is annexed. And hence it may easily be conceived, that with our Antipodes this motion of bodies to the centre, in their hemisphere, is but the same with us, in our hemisphere. For the desire of union is equal in proportion to all parts of the whole mass, as well in the greater body attracting, as the lesser (which we may call passive and) attracted, and is from centre to centre in both.

And as the centre of attraction governs thus in all natural motions, so doth the centre of resistance in all violent motions. But as there, they im∣ploy their force to Union and Agreement, so here, to repulse and victory. For the ballance, the leaver, the wheel, and other mechanical instruments have their force, and are appliable to use, from the just computation of distance from the centre, in the parts where the strife lies in each of the op∣ponents; whereby that part of the ballance, leaver, &c. that is, shortest, and so nearest the centre of the whole opposition, will consequently, as most oppressed with its burthen, have least force in resistance; and the other, upon contrary reasons, will have most force: and this both of them proportion∣able to their distances in things of like weight and resistance: even as in fencing, he that is to put by the sword of another, will find proportionable ease, as there is difference of length between so much of the sword which the party incloseth in his hand, and of that part beyond and without it. For the upper part of the hand (where the defendants forefinger joynt is) being the centre of opposition, it will follow that the assailant will have difference of force, as he hath difference of distance from it; that is, answerably, as the length of the sword without his hand, is longer, from the place touched by the assailant to the handle, then the defendants hand is broad.

We before said the Brain to be the common sensory, and the Senses the scouts and intelligencers for information and knowledge: For colours, fi∣gures, &c. may be said to be by the brain felt, through the windows of eyes; and savours and sounds through the nose and ears. But, of the for∣raign intelligencers, the eye hath most advantage to knowledge; being ca∣pable of more variety of objects, and that at once; and of apprehending them at greatest distance. Now since, between men and beasts, there ap∣pears little, and but occasional difference in the number or excellence of the senses, and that all knowledge is acquired in us, and acquired by help of these senses, it would be known how this ability is attained.

In which discourse we will begin with sight, whose object is a luminous

or an opacous body, and that by means of beams of light directly issuing from the one, or reflected from the other. After the first way I see the Sun a candle, &c. after the other way, all opacous bodies that return their beams; in both cases the beam of light being the object of sight, colour, fi∣gure, &c. are but its concomitants.

There may be thought another way of discovery, that is, by Eclypse, where the body is discerned, not by reflecting or discovering the beam, but by impeaching and hiding it. So the Moon, in the Suns Eclypse, discovers her own body, not by sending, but by preventing the light: and indeed, colours so far as they are in degree distant from white or light, unto black or dark, in which last the beam is wholly entred and lost. So far, and all that while doth the beam suffer degree of Eclypse, in the different penetra∣tion and return it finds in the superficies of that body.

But although light beams be the only proper objects of sight, yet here∣by is the opacous body differenced in the manner of perception six ways. By Figure, by Motion, by Colour, by Magnitude, by Number, and by Scite or Posture. All which properties are so inseparably adjoyned unto every ma∣terial body, that neither in themselves, nor (consequently in our contem∣plation, a body can be without them, nor they without a body, except it be motion, For we may see and imagine a body endued with Colour, Pro∣portion, or Figure without motion, but a body with, or without motion, wanting Colour, Figure, Dimension, &c. we cannot apprehend, because there can be nothing in the fancy, but what was first in the sense; and there∣fore since no body was ever seen wanting these properties, it cannot enter in∣to the imagination without them, nor they without it. True it is, that I may conceive a body of a different Figure, Proportion, &c. unto any that I ever saw, as to the whole fabrick, yet must it be made up and have analogy unto some Figures formerly represented. For so let a Traveller tell of some strange Beast, he must (to make it conceiveable) give it some resemblance of head, feet, back, belly, or other shape, to the likeness of Lyon, Dog, Horse, or such like; whereupon having finished his discourse by such simi∣litude, you have a body figured in your fancy of such a shape as entire you had not before, but not so of the several parts. But now, to imagine a body void of colour, or a body of such a colour as I never saw, is impossible, be∣cause this property is descernable by sight only, and must have come from thence, or not at all, even from the divers observance of colorate objects. And although, I seldom can remember the instance or shape or the body that gave me this colour, because the variety of Figures is more then that of colours (and thereupon not so easily retained in memory) even so Colours may remain after the Figures are abolished.

And for a little better discussion and satisfaction herein, we will examine and instance in the miracle Christ wrought on the man born blind, who (upon his eyes opening) said he saw men Walking as trees. To satisfie which, we are to know, that Figure, Motion, Proportion, &c. are not the proper objects of sight, but of feeling: For although I cannot remember the particulars, yet I did at first feel the different Shapes and Figures of things, before I could distinguish them by sight; and if we observe children, while they are very little, all their learning is but a conference between their hands and eyes; that is, to instruct their eyes to make true estimation of Figure, Pro∣portion, &c. For after that by feeling they have observed the different sha∣dows

were made in rounds, flats, corners, and all other shapes and dimen∣sions whatsoever, they are consequently ready to make observation for all Figures following. So now this blind man having (it is likely) upon some occasion been left to rest himself under, or against a tree, he could not but (thereupon) be knowing of the shape thereof: And therefore the erect sta∣ture and size of men, in his new illumination, seemed most to resemble that of trees, of any other which he could know; For it is to be conceived he could not reach beyond the trunks of them.

And therefore Feeling being the next informer of the understanding (or rather understanding it self) is to be looked upon as the original and most exact sense; sight and other senses being only necessary for the quaintity and extent of its information: whose reports, having but respect to the appear∣ances of things, are not farther capable of evidence and certainty, then as consenting with, and controulable by feeling. Which sense, as it began to be with our selves, and shall last leave us (as being the assurance of that life by which we are we) So is to us the assurance of the realities of things in nature; even by making us perceptible of that which is the foundation and original; to wit of that their principle of existence or being. For hereby onely we come to gather our assurance that any thing at all really is: where∣as by the other we do but discover farther of the manner how; which must proportionably have dependance on the truth of the existence or being of thing it self.

And therefore is the eye is of largest contribution to the intellect (not from generality of object and receipt at distance only, but) because it can take in more of the Figure and Appearance of the object, then the others; by means of those several colorate rays emitted from the several corners and object parts of opacous bodies, into the expanded end of the optick nerve spread round the puple of the eye. Even so, to the encrease and extent of mans knowledge above beasts, in the sense of feeling, we are advantaged by our hands, which serve to inform the brain by the spinal marow, as other senses do by their inward pares of nerves. And then this paradox may be brought in, that mens hands are greatest outward advantages to their knowlesge. For in them men having excellence above other things, do not only excel them as Mechanicks, but by them they are able also to understand more. And even as Cats that play most catch best, so also, because we are by them, and the speading of the fingers, made perceptible of divers parts of the ob∣ject body at once, and thereby able to make more full figure thereof, as the retina tunica doth to the visual nerve. Whereas in the touchings that are apprehended by other parts, so small a circuit of the object body is placed upon so small an extension and portion of the nerves of my body, that no such perception of difference can arise between touch and touch, as to beget knowledge and affection to one thing much above another. And therefore we may observe that men cannot let their hats remain on their heads in the same posture they are put on by others, but must again place themselves to that kind of settlement they were accustomed unto. For the hat, covering and pressing the head round and in divers parts at once, must render it in a higher degree perceptible and affected with differences, then where, in that and other parts of the body, forraign touches are in so small measure re∣ceived.

But because each sense can but inform in its own proper sphere and object,

we will see a little how they lead to error, when brought from the controul of feeling. The Sun and Moon, &c. have neither, to fight, their true Di∣mensions nor Figures, and this because nothing could be felt at distance. An oar in the water, hath such a different Posture or Scite, that mine eyes alone can never inform me, that that part which is within, and that part which is without the water, do make but one streight piece: And multi∣plying glasses deceive us by numbers, as travelling by water doth deceive us in motion; and this upon no other reason, but because the same direction and crossing of lines is made by my passing by the trees and land, as would be if they passed by me, or one another.

And the like is for hearing and other senses, which (having their single proper objects) must refer to feeling, for science and assurance in other things not proper unto them. For although a perfect sight, hearing, smel∣ling, or tasting, can never fail (with due mediums) in differencing of colours, noises and savours without and beyond controul of feeling (which hath no∣thing to do with these things, but by these his proper organs) yet can they not know farther then as from and for him. And the more remote any thing is from feeling, the more uncertain its discovery.

Which happens to sight chiefly because it undertakes at greatest distance from it. Whereupon we find, that colours come to be lost afar off, and pictures, land-scapes, &c. do make things that are plain and even, to seem such risings, as by sight alone (having reference to like shadows in faces and things that had such risings) we might be deceived. For different session of light or colour making Figure conceivable in our sense, and not any real quality in the object, as the Painters Art (which is able to express all Figures by colours only) doth clearly demonstrate, it must follow that Figure and all the rest are (as we said) truly demonstrable from feeling only; which al∣so deceives the brain in crossing of nerves, as it is deceived by sight in crossing of lines: for from hence it comes to pass that one bullet felt by two fing••••s a cross seems to be two.

But now although motion be not so inseparable a property of bodies (and so ordinarily the object of sense, as some of the rest) yet, because it is of so great variety in its self, it gives the greatest information to the understand∣ing of all others: For that it denotes more of the inward qualities of a body; And again, you cannot conceive any one figure or proportion not capable of divers motions.

But then, though a body is many times seen, and so may be imagined without motion, yet, as it was never seen alone, so motion cannot be con∣ceived without a figurate body; and therefore although again, this property of figure be not so directive, as of it self, yet it is more necessary, as to me∣thod, by its presence and assistance, because my fancy cannot be comprehen∣sive of any object without a Figure.

And this we cannot forbid our selves in the contemplation of God him∣self, and all other spiritual substances, namely, to fancy them under one shape or another, wherein we conceive those attributes, and operations we ascribe to them should be most fitly exercised. Which, as it was the main rise to Idolatry, so was it of Heresie, Schism and Superstition also; mistaking Gods attributes under a wrong figure: which always coming far short of expressing his ability to act, must fall short also of rendring his Almightiness in all kinds of due esteem in our understandings. And again,

as these our conceived figures do differ from one another, so will there be difference in the opinions of the par••ies that do frame their concep∣tions from them.

And although men now grown to some years, can remember names and words without their figures that first imprinted them; yet (as ex∣perience tells us) we cannot remember the name of any single or di∣stinct thing or person, but his shape will first come into our fancy; shew∣ing, that as natural notions and the comprehensions of separate things arose and were confirmed in us from frequent or intent admittance through outward sense: So the peremptory conceipt of the fitness of Method and Rules of adjudication framed thereupon, must arise also from divers essays and observations of the analogy and correspondenc•• between them. And in childrens learning to speak, the articulation of words is not so great a hindrance as want of fancy through want of im∣pression of some Figure of that thing which these words should express; for Paria••s that can articular well enough, are for this cause uncapable to speak many things, or indeed any thing, but what must arise from large itteration, which must serve to them, as an affection arising from height and sharpness, or manner of sound and impression, through often hearing of the same tone, and not as an object of memory so distinct∣ly figured by it self, as to mind him of the object whereof he speaks; although indeed their speech is usually brought on by way of memory from Figure, as by the sight of persons or places that did teach or accompany their learning.

As the eye is the sense of largest supply to Feeling and memory, so (through variety of its objects) fancy hath more ability to conceive and distinguish the impressions thereof, then by any other of the senses. For sight hath all varieties of Figure, Number, Proportion, &c. for its observation; whereas the other senses are, for the most part, single in their objects: Nay, Figure alone is of such variety, as there can∣not be such exactness between any two things, take them of leaves of the same tree, stones; or what natural thing; you will, but some such difference to the eye may still be discovered, as a man may be said to know them by it. But Savours and Sounds, being, like single colours, without such remarkable difference, can seldom so imploy and affect the fancy, as to be remembred distinct from one another, as of them∣selves; but as accompanied with that figurate body, or some other sensible accident at the time of their admittance. And hence comes an∣other advantage men have to knowledge abeve other creatures, name∣ly, this greater variety of induction, by relying on sight and feeling more then they.

For smelling (which is the sense they most relye upon, and make use of) is capable but of little variety of impression; and their knowledge and instruction gathered from difference herein, serveth seldom to other imployment then to distinguish food by, it being indeed but as one and the same sense with tasting, or being but tasting at distance; even as tasting again is but the proper sense of feeling for one part, namely the stomack. And it will hence follow, that as the variety of the objects of sight exceed those of smell; and as the variety of feel∣ing with the hand exceeds that of feeling with the Pallat; so doth

mens advantage to knowledge exceed, even in this respect also, that of other creatures.

And again, as Beasts (relying and usuage of these more confined en∣quiries of Taste and Smelling) can produce (thereupon) but little know∣ledge, so such men or such creatures, as are in their senses most confined (whether in this kind, or in any other) must be also most confined in know∣ledge; as on the contrary, they that are intent on Figures, have advantage to memory; and so to knowledge. And therefore we can never remember that which happened unto us in our infancy, or very young, because we had not as then throughly learned to distinguish and retain Figures.

But then, although smelling have hereupon least influence upon us, as to our intellectual and moral habits; yet, by reason of its vicinity and enter∣course with the spirits themselves, it is most strongly operative for intro∣ducing affections in us, as in our natural condition, and thereby to move us more strongly to liking and action then the other senses can. And how∣ever we are not, like other Sensitives (that are not capable of making use of figurate objects, and receiving impression from them) lead to fancy, and distinguish particular things and persons from custom and usage hence only arising, but are able from those greater and more observable agreements and disparities which appear to sight and other senses, and from the oftner imployment of them thereabouts, many times to put a stop and controul up∣on what is approved by the other, and to choose and stand affected from them, and not from the other; yet in those things that depend upon more general acquaintance and commerce, and where long conversation hath grown up into habit and custom, without controul or notice of other senses, there the sense of smelling doth with us, as well as them, so far prevail as to pass into that we call Nature: For and towards the liking of such sorts or species of creatures, with whom we are most conversant, by means of those vapours and spirits that flow from them.

And hence it is, that as all creatures do from their more usual associati∣on, come to like those of their own kind more then others, so also do they by degrees do it; even as each individual of the same species attains to full growth and perfection, whereby they may be reciprocally enabled both to give and take from each other these more strong impressions. Upon which ground each Sensitive at the time of its ripeness comes to be imbued and possessed with correspondent degree of delight in each others company, and also with that high desire of more near personal union and congression; even so far, until by means thereof, and of that mixture of more spiritous parts therein made, a third creature of their own kind is made up and gene∣rated.

That this inclination is but emergent from that Natura Naturata, those Laws of matter which the great Natura Naturans did at first impose, for and towards the mutual preservation of the Universe and its Species, and not from such discreet instinct and original perception, as that each thing (as by a kind of miracle, or as being a God to its self) should be knowingly led to choice and discrimination herein, will plainly appear in those mixtures which are produced from those meetings of creatures of several sorts at common watering places, or the like. The which we might well think would be much more common and strong, if any thing from its birth should have been kept to herd amongst those of that kind, then can be now, where at the

meetings at Nilus, or the like, there is but a short and occasional acquain∣tance, and that not till some maturity neither, when we must presume each thing necessarily imbued before with the relish of its own race. But were any creature from the time of its birth brought to herd amongst those of another sort, there is no doubt but that creature, at years of full growth and per∣fection, would have had its spirits so assimulated to those of that herd, as to choose congression there before any of its own kind, which it did but new∣ly or suddenly meet with. Although therein again, some allay and impedi∣ment must be supposed, from that aversion which each one of that herd would bear towards this single creature, from that greater familiarity and converse they have one towards another.

Not but that as there are degrees of likeness of flesh and humors in the se∣veral kinds of creatures one to another, and so consequently of that steam or spirit thence generated, and issuing out of the nostrils or pores; even so also are we to conceive that each thing is soonest won to the liking of that which is most near to its own kind: As the Ass (a Creature that is more sub∣ject to stray then herd) is to choose a Mare; whereas she again, that is used more to heard with those of her own kind, yields not but upon force or ne∣cessity. Upon which score, and also for that all Creatures both in the Nest and Litter, and from Conversation and Nourishment by their Dam, are possessed with an early tincture, they do ordinarily come to receive a great∣er impression towards the future liking of one another in the same kind, then can be afterwards dileted or taken off, without a very long tract of time.

As for distinction and choice of Sex, it proceeds from precedent dis∣courses or practical experiment, and not from natural instinct or knowledge. For two Dogs or other Creatures will, in their play, while they are mutu∣ally more affected by the nearness and heat of each others breath, be ready to ride one another, till experience have told them their mistake: Not but that, as there are times of maturity in Vegitables and Fruits, so in Sensitives also; at which time (no doubt) two individuals in a herd, or the like, will have degree of perception and inclination towards each other (as to know∣ledge of natural ripeness and perfection) from that degree of quantity and fervor of vapour and spirits reciprocally emitted, In which case, a short ex∣perience, in so plain a difference, may teach the male (who is commonly the assailant and chooser) easily to distinguish that female from the rest which is fittest for him, even by his sense of smelling. Nay, as nature hath furnish∣ed us with a sense of tasting proper for our stomacks; even so may we ob∣serve all sorts of Sensitives to be saluting each other with billing, smelling, or the like; whereby, as by a natural way of complement, a farther tryal might be made of that liking and agreement which was already induced by the eye.

Now although mankind stands not so wholly obnoxious to be captivated by these affections which are induced from the sense of smelling only, even because he hath affections stirred up in him from other senses also which are likewise prevalent in his actions, yet that naturally, and as men and sensitive agents, we come to be hereby also provoked and swayed, is not to be doubted. But true it is, that in us these affecting vapours do make their entrance more imperceptibly, because of that weakness of our smelling faculty, caused through rawness and indigestion in the stomack; whereby the same foul∣ness

and crudity that doth make a stinking breath, is also thereby hindred from the smell of that, or any thing else which is not very strong; which yet doth not hinder the receipt of those insinuating vapours, whereby the humours and habits of the body may come by degrees to be embued and affected.

From what hath been hitherto spoken, we may also know how to put a difference between those two several affections which use to pass under the same notion of Love. For that appetite before spoken of, may more pro∣perly be called natural lust or desire, and, being more sensual, is not proper to man as man, but affects him as a Sensitive: Whereas the other, taking its rise and ground from figure and impression in the fancy, as all sorts of knowledge doth, it may be called Noble, as to its beginning, as well as Heroick and Divine, as to its aim and end. And although it be true that they are usually heightned by each other (as to particular application) yet may they be one without another: For I may love like a man, without lustful thought, and lustful thoughts may again sway me beyond personal liking; neither of them being to be known (as to perfection) but when they are a∣lone: for that love is but small that must be enlivened from thought of sex, or continued by youth only; and as great a defect in nature it must also ar∣gue, to acquiess but to an eminent beauty.

As both these affections take their rise and growth from generals, so have they general and specifical aim and intention in the eye of providence and nature: but when they come to be reduced into act, they have in us person∣al inducement and design; at which time those affections that were amassed from many, cannot shew their proficience and full strength but to one at once. And therefore to keep them from being destructive to their first end, they ought in men (especially so far as they are sociable) to be bridled and guided by reason. In which doing, that more rational and noble affection of love is to precede and give direction to the other, as to the person, with re∣spect had to Law and Charity. Which Love again, although (as in it self considered) it cannot be too high to any one, yet for fear least that general duty of Love and Charity which we owe towards all, should by too great intention towards this one come to be diverted or neglected, we are both to take our own reason along with us, and also that of the publike, as heretofore noted.

And farther also, for fear least too great sense of contrariety and difference from those we so entirely love should (besides the espousal of personal quar∣rels and injuries) contract in us a consequential hatred and dis-affection to∣wards others, we are in this case also, to take to our guidance the rules of Religion also; whereby we are taught to love all alike.

And indeed, more controversies, quarrels, and publike disturbances do arise from too great fondness and indulgence, then any thing else. When as, through too great love and care to provide for those that have relation to us by family or friendship, others come to be neglected or injuriously dealt with; who otherwise would still have been looked upon as friends; there being more hatreds and discontents raised upon second and relative conside∣rations, then from any primary difference, which the parties have to one another, in reference to themselves apart, or to the rules of vertue or good∣ness.

And hence it comes that we not onely stand liking and disliking others as they are friends or enemies to our prime favorite, but because love and ha∣tred do arise and encrease by comparison, it may be also observed, how that in the same family, that greater affection which one brother or servant carri∣eth towards another above the rest, doth by consequence draw him into as great hatred and dis-esteem of others in the same relation, upon that onely consideration: Insomuch as we shall find anger and revenge no where so implacably prosecuted as by one brother against another.

No otherwise, then as subjects in the same Kingdom, are ready to break into factions and sidings through those diversities of sects and opinions a∣mongst themselves; whereby we see it come to pass, that, by reason of that continual exasperation which must arise from the daily sight and discourses of such things wherein they stand contrary, this repeated difference doth more strongly engage them to mutual discontent and deadly hatred, then it doth against strangers, and such as do more differ from them.

Insomuch as there are more Christians slain by one another, upon the score of Religion, then are by them upon others; or those of all other Religions upon them, upon the like ground: nay, we too truly find it, that, even in the sub-divisions and sects of Christianity, those that have lesser differences, will yet, by reason of vicinity, be drawn into more and more dangerous quarrels against one another, then against that sect which differs most from them both. In which case, if the publike rule and judgement for determi∣nation be not regarded, it will fare with them as it doth with men falling out about a mistaken word, gesture, look, or the like; even that (for want of a sit means of reconciliation) the discontent and hatred will daily encrease, un∣til it come to be determined in the field.

The names of Sympathy and Antipathy are usually given to the affections of both sorts, as well to those strong likings and aversions introduced at the nostrils, as those at the eyes; but if we respect more occult naturalness here∣in, then those of the first sort may be onely called natural, because they take their impression so inwardly, and by such insensible degrees, as seldom to admit controulment by other senses, or the impressions drawn from them. Whereas the other, that hath its rise from more artificial collections (as loving or liking other things according to their conformity to these Figures or Ideas of perfection, which, in each kind, are raised in mens fancies) may in both respects be brought to be controuled and examined by other Figures and Methods, as they shall be called up and judged by the Spirits and Hu∣mors; which in the other case cannot be, because these Spirits themselves do, in the affections that way brought in, become tainted in their own na∣ture and substance.

Those kinds of aversions which proceed from sight, as from difference and abhorrence of figure, may be easily reconciled and made familar by an ingenious patience; nor is it dangerous to give them of that food to eat. Whereas those things that have contrariety to the particular humors or temperament of the stomach, are not in that kinde to be jested with; for that although outward smell or taste should not be perceptive of difference (which many times it wonderfully is in that case) yet it is not to be questi∣oned but the vitiated stomack of the party will quickly nauseat and disgust it; and therefore we find that these sorts of longings or aversions are incident to the weaker and more sickly constitutions.

Here and in other places we have been the more copious for setting down the more concealed causes of those operations which use to pass under the rank of natural instincts, that, by placing every wheel of providence in its due order and motion, the real existence, wisdom and power of God might be more readily seen and acknowledged. The usual ground that leads men to Atheism and doubt whether there be any God at all, being many times scandal taken at the vulgar and ordinary assignation of effects unto God himself, as if they were by him immediately done: when as they, coming to find the same, like other things, to have their own natural cause of pro∣duction also, they thereby come to think that men are mistaken in the one, as well as the other. When as by help of a through insight and sufficiency of their own, to discover how no••hing is by chance done, but that the greatest and most important things being by divine wisdom and order brought to pass by those things which to us do appear most weak and contemptible, they may thereby, and by means of that obseavable gradation of causes, come to discern a God at the top of all: From whom, as they did at first take their source and original, as being in their whole mass but rays of divine bounty, so do they, in all their variations amongst themselves, still make some ex∣pressions and demonstrations of that perfection and simplicity which at first gave them their being.

Thus the natural desire of union (induced through custom) is by provi∣dence directed towards variety and multiplication, as before declared. In which again, as the individuals do through their natural pursuit of pleasure attain to their several perfections, they do then again, as in pursuit of the highest of these natural provocations, aim at a new union and coition also. By successive repetitions whereof, as each man, and each sensitive seems to reintegrate it self into that first Parent of their kind, so doth the submission of them, in their several kinds, to the same common Laws of Adam, or first matter, bring on a confession also that there is a common Parent and cause of union for them all. In which course, custom and variety are affections semblably made use of for the sustentation of Sensitives, as motion and rest are for prrservation of Naturals. Whereby it comes to pass, that as matter doth naturally affect closeness and settlement, which is answerable to union and rest, so doth it, by customary degrees observed in motion, release it self, in, and of that tendency to separation, which its own sublimed part, (by means of heat) had forced upon it: All things cheerfully dancing those rounds which are by Divine Rule and Providence appointed unto them.

As we are thus prevailed upon by custom to cast a different choice and liking towards things and persons, as they are in their naturals, so come we, through custom and constancy in company and conversation, to stand di∣versly affected towards them also, as in relation to their morals; there be∣ing a gracefulness and winning insinuation taken from behaviour, as well as from person. And this especially towards years, when as time sufficient hath passed for making observation of difference herein, and naturalizing our fan∣cies to those garbs and habits which cohabitation brings within our notice; at which time the other affections induced from personal beauty, &c. do al∣so abate of their vigour, so as not to divert in these. Hence it comes, that old folks are ever condemning, not only the present fashions, but the man∣ners and deportments of men also in the present age, over what they were

formerly, even because, from continued impression, and that taken whilst they were young, they must stand already filled and prepossessed in their fancies against any figure that can now be offered.

The which prejudication is most holpen on by compliance of interest and opinion, as we find by that ready assistance which each one of a sect casteth towards his fellow, as supposing himself holpen in that help which he yields unto them. And so again, in matters of Moral opinion and conversation, we are inclined and won to fancy and practise the like principles in matters of polity and obedience, as do the rest of our familiars and acquaintance. That child, that servant, that hath observed others of his brothers, or fellows, or others in others families, to gain liberty or any thing else, or to pass with∣out punishment or reproof for dis-respect to their Parent or Master, will thereupon come to be inclined to desire and attempt the like.

After the same manner, such subjects and people as are wonted to hear and read Stories of the commendations of such as have been Tyranicids, or have boldly opposed their Princes in their commands, or that have thriven themselves into the fancied liberty of Free-States, they do thereupon also come to be addicted more then others to the like degree of boldness and te∣merity. And indeed, there is nothing more dangerous in a State, then too much toleration of Philosophical Discourses and Books of this kind, it be∣ing one sure step to disloyalty and Civil disturbance. For as no man can come to any great height of evil on a sudden, so, in matters of obedience, we are brought to be Rebels upon these first grounds of dis-respect and irre∣verence cast towards Superiours, when, by too ordinary and familiar dis∣courses, subjects shall be informed of their Princes faults or weakness, and that he is not otherwise to be respected then as prosecuting the good of his people, whose servant he is, or the like. By which means the judgements and affections of people come to be forestalled and prejudiced against their present Government and Governors; no otherwise then a vitiated stomack, as before noted, doth through its own inward corrupt humors contract an antipathy and loathing against wholsom food. In respect of the danger of such like company, and such like Doctrine, is that Divine saying to be un∣derstood. Can a mon touch pitch, and not be defiled therewith.

To make us the better apprehensive of the rise and derivation of our know∣ledge from Figure, we may take another instance in our learning to number also, when as those Characters of Arithmetick, which we call Figures, are used in an artificial way, as outward helps to enable the fancy and memory to make comprehension and numeration inwardly of such natural things as were themselves the original ob••ects, whereby, as well as wherefore, the num∣ber themselves were framed. For as we finde children, one with another, making it one of the first tryals of their abilities to pose each other in mental addition of numbers, so is it to be conceived, that as they did at first learn from fight and experience that any thing single was called One (because none can be presumed to know what One is, that was never by sense made per∣ceptive of any one thing) so come they by degrees to comprehend, from the posture and form of two, three, or four Ones placed together, that these are the numbers which do answer the artificial computation of two, three; four, &c. And therefore having the question asked them how many two and three do make, or the like, they do at first help themselves herein by real na∣tural figures, as by calling into memory the figure of any three and two things

so and so posited; and so, by comparing them do know what they amount unto. Or else they help themselves in their numeration by an outward figure, as by counting on their fingers, or the like. And hence it is that other sen∣sitives are very little apprehensive of numbers, because they are so little ap∣prehensive and intent on Figures. For although from sight they are loosly able to configurate and remember the forms and shapes of such particular things as they account of concern, yet want they both time and inducement to remember what kind of figure three, four, or five of these did make when they were placed together, which is the prime way whereby fancy doth measure discrete quantities. From whence we may conclude, that Al∣gebra is more natural and solid then Arithmetick.

Some persons can remember great numbers of strange words that have no import or figure, but they do onely, as Parrats, remember them as im∣pressed from syllables and tone of delivery. If this be done by children, they must repeat them in the same order they were heard: In which case, the brain succeeding in its motion according as it received impression from the articulation of the several words, doth then perform that office which is called Memory. But some can also repeat them out of that order, as back∣ward, or the like, and can also remember and give an account of multitudes of different things seen presently one after another, in a different order also to what they saw them in; the which cannot be done, but by such as have attained years of ripeness; who, by that time have framed artificial common placs and Receptories in their brain, whereby to help themselves in the art of memory. Which art we find may be holpen and attained by the use of outward Figures, directing men to fancy common places of this kind, even as Arithmetique and the art of numbring is holpen by its figures: and we now see Books written on this artificial way of recognition, by proposing Schemes to that purpose.

But usually boys, in repetition of a lesson, or something without Book, or any thing which they understand not, are holpen by memory of the different forms of some of the letters, lines, and part of the leaf, where the same is set down. Insomuch, as the remembrance hereof, all along, directs them in repetition of what is therein contained: Even so, that they can tell you what page, and part thereof they are now saying; and when the memory of this figure fails, the other fails also. And so in all other things whilst a Figure can be held, it serveth the understanding as an index for dis∣course, and farther discovery of things accompanying it. But all discourse and arguments upon subjects not figurable, produce nothing but mazes and intoxications, as it fareth in some metaphysical notions and specula∣tions.

By what hath passed we may know what things and arts are the objects of Science, and what of probability onely. For as they depart from controlment of sense, they depart from Science; and if they come to be entertained as affe∣ctions, upon repetition and authority only, they must take their hazards to be more or less true and reasonable, as these figures were more or less fit for them which the party makes use of in his fancy to conceive them by; for the diffe∣ence of abilities in apprehension of abstracted things wil be in choice of fittest Figures. For example, as we have helped our selves in the conceipt of su∣periour

bodies and their postures and Motions, by representing them in globes and spheres (by remembrance of whose shape and linemeants, we can re∣member and conceive the others; for so, if we would examine the question of diurnal motion (between Copernicus and others) we are then fancying ing the Earth and Heavens turning round, as we have seen these Globes do.

And so, to make us mindful and observant of matters of high and spe∣cial import as Coronations, Ordinations, witnessing of Deeds between par∣ty and party, or the like there are certain remarkable tokens exhibited unto the eyes; by whose order and sensible method of performance, the thing by them expressed comes to have proportionable esteem in our fancy, above other things that have not such ceremony used about them.

Nay, of such force are these sensible expressions, that Religion it self would soon vanish without their use in many things. For although all our outward worship and expression of devotion and obedience, as Sacraments, Prayer, Alms, &c. may be called Ceremonial (as they are but expressions of that in∣ward root of charity and love of God, we have in our hearts) yet must they be all acknowledged as necessary, to the quickning & supportation thereof. And so again, to the supportation and enlivening of these, must such Ceremonies as are unto them proper, be allowed also; our minds and devotion being not otherwise able to conceive and attend what they are or do import.

And as for those that do so bitterly inveigh against Ceremonies as hu∣mane inventions (for such they must be, as heretofore noted (if any be) they are not themselves able to keep up their own devotions without them; and although they make not so much use of expressions to the eye, they requite it in sedulity and constancy of what is performed by the ear, and the num∣bring Sermons and other select phrases of theirs, as Papists do their prayers upon beads, serves with them to the like end, namely, to keep their devo∣tion in exercise.

Besides, all men, to secure themselves against this strong and importu∣nate affection of fear, must always be ready, according to the pressure there∣of in their consciences, to encrease the other affection of hope, by all such actions as they conceive to be their duties; which prevailing upon, and pas∣sing into affections, by itteration and custom (and so much the sooner and more firmly doing it, as they are more sensible and methodical in them∣selves) we need not wonder why those that most decline and cry out against Ceremonies, and Set-forms of Worship, as superstitious, are themselves most superstitious; that is, most fearful and scrupulous of having (in gene∣ral, or in any particular) served God, so, or otherwise then they ought: for as there is no comparison (in assurance of a work done) betwixt those evi∣dences that flow from sight, and those that come from hearing, so (the per∣formance of holy duties consisting in actions) there must remain greater secu∣rity and satisfaction of conscience, to him that hath performed in most sensible, solemn and orderly manner, those duties he conceived were enjoyn∣ed him, then to him that imployeth not himself in practise of his devotions, in such serious and deliberate form.

To search a little more nearly into the cause why affections should be so strongly raised in us from reiteration of Tenents, and inculcation of Doctrines received from others only, of which we never had experience in our selves, nor are impressible from proper Figures, we are to consider, that although those collections can be only properly called Science, which do arise from

real figurate and perceptible objects, and were thereupon gathered into no∣tions, and thence into affections, even because in this case onely the affecti∣ons (in their disputes amongst themselves, and also for the satisfaction of others by tradition, and giving a reason or demonstration of things) may have recourse to the brain, to receive a judicious and deliberate determinati∣on, according to such evidences as the senses have there laid up, yet, as to the introducing of an affection, the often repetition of any thing to us un∣der the Classis of hope or fear, prevails towards the belief of what is there∣upon offered and presented, in as high manner, as if it had been impressed by a figurate object of its own; nay more, in all likelihood, because the ground and reason which it takes for its support, to wit, these passions of hope and fear are there strongly placed and proved already: Whereupon, being set so much onward on his way, as towards affirmation and proof, there is nothing can hinder its progress towards assurance, but plain sensible contradictions, or strong preoccupations.

As we formerly instanced how a repetition of strokes, made by an Egg or other like thing on the forehead, would by degrees make as great a tu∣mor as one greater blow given by a stronger or harder thing: so may we con∣ceive onward, that by successive continuance of these strokes, the same may be still more raised, untill it exceed, by far, that other swelling taken from the one only stroke: especially when it is to work upon a tumor and impres∣sion already made, like as Tenets and Doctrines usually doe; insinuating themselves as under the consent and command of prenotion and demonstra∣tion already conceived and assented unto, by the help of Similitudes, Types and Figures.

That blow which Logick gives with its conclusion from premises newly represented; however it may, for the sudden, strongly affect, by its more pointing and entire stroke; yet can it not raise an impression or swelling, answerable to those repeated blows made upon the affections and passions themselves; whereby, as building upon a groundwork already made and laid, it may well be supposed to proceed more thrivingly and assuredly for setting up a compleat Fabrick, then can be expected from a Figure and Idea impressed by it self; which must, on the other side, be supposed to be con∣tinually declining in its presence and force in the fancy, for want of pro∣gression or repair. For a Syllogism can give but one blow, and so depending on figurate induction, cannot produce higher assent then they can yield; which in wise men may be by observation contradicted, and by fools, for want thereof, unapprehended. Whereas relying and grounding upon the strength of affections already made, a discreet pressure can never fail of receipt and encrease.

Logick must clear his way to the will by the understanding, and must ap∣peal to the Indicative mood before it can make use of the Imparative; when as those things that enter as Rhetorical impressions, by their insinuation and mixture with those affections and passions that do already rule and command us, cannot fail of a constant power to govern & guide us also: and thereupon they, depending not so wholly on sense, but being usually above its controul, are not in like danger of a defeat by a negative from thence. For Logick must assertain us by the rule of all or none: whereas the other needs but look like truth, and, by joyning with that which hath been so fully assent∣ed unto already, stands always generally proved, where it is not totally con∣tradicted.

To prove that there is a God, a Resurrection, and future judgement, and the like, faith is enabled, by absence of negatives from sense, by degrees to silence doubtings, and to contract a positive assurance. In which case when that which, from authority or report of others, or conceit raised in my self, is at first apprehended as a thing that may be: it will afterwards, through absense of dissent or denial, shake off its first state of doubting, and become as a certaine conclusion of that which most assuredly is: when neither experience in my self, nor sufficient aurhority elsewhere, doth or can demonstratively contradict. Demonstratively, and highly demonstratively it must be also, after such time that this opinion hath once fastened it self up∣on these prevailing affections. Even as we find that children will be so far scared by formidable tales, and the apprehensions of such objects & things as they could never from sense have notice of, as to avoid being in the dark, ly∣ing alone, or the like: And although these conceits were first entertained from the ungrounded reports of such persons as are of much less credit with them for ability and learning, then those that do contradict it, yet can it not take off the prevalence of that which hath so steady a support within, and hath not strong experiments to contradict it from without.

This steady and effectual way of prevalence, it pleased the All-seeing providence to make use of in the propagation of the Gospel it self, divine wisdom never overthrowing nature, but by his grace steering and directing her. For although, at the first, for the remove of pre-occupation, and making an impression in the hearts and affections of men, he did extraordi∣narily appeal to sense by miracle, yet had the encrease of the Christian faith its ordinary and next dependance on this effectual way of preaching, even as that had again on the efficacy of the holy Ghost. Towards the furthe∣rance whereof, as well in the first receipt, as growth afterwards, it pleased God Almighty also to make that natural thirst to be always living, and that imbred sense of Morality, (accompanied with that continual humor of each mans adjudication for his own merit, and for the demerit of others) to serve as steps and degrees whereby to enter, as well as preside in the belief of man∣kind; and that in a more high and steady degree of energy and effectual operation, then could be done by any doctrine brought in, and made de∣pendant on such philosophical disputes as were then raised in the Grecian Schools. For although it be not hard to prove both a Deity, and the ex∣cellency of the Christian faith by such like disputations as S. Paul once used in the School of Tyranus (which may also be sometimes necessary for con∣viction of such as are capable of impressions that way soonest) yet considering that even the wise and best learned are swayed by natural affections as well as others, it is not to be doubted, but that the reliance on these two mastering passions of hope and fear, would render the instructer to be most generally and steadily prevalent, even by proposal and pressing upon them rewards and punishments of so great height, as were above the degree of any for∣mer comprehension.

In which case of exaltation of, and pressure upon these affections (espe∣cially that of fear) we shall be often drawn to seek or avoid benefits or dan∣gers which are neither present, nor can have other sensible assurance that they will be; and in the mean time, stand neglectful of those which sense it self demonstrates both to be, and to be formidable. For there is none that can have equal assurance of the reality of Purgatory or Hell fire, as of that

which is in his kitchin, yet, by reason of this so often and pressing presenta∣tions thereof to the fancy; and so to the affections by fear, he will, through the instigation thereof, have his will inclined to take notice of that which he believes is most to be feared; and so consequently will prosecute or avoid all those courses which he is made believe will acquit him of the danger hereof.

These things well considered, there will be good cause found, even in reason also, for that prevalency and spreading ability which attended the Professors of the Protestant Religion, over those of the Church of Rome. For those more nice and retired speculations of the Schoolmen could not, with all their fine subtilties, so accurately delivered in their Books and Dis∣putations, be reasonably presumed half so efficatious for conviction in those things where reason was but subservient, as was those more familiar insinuati∣ons which the Protestant Preachers applied themselves unto in their sermons, made suitable to the affections of their present Auditors. For first, there are more that hear Sermons; then read Books; and again, the Preacher can better know and distinguish the temper and inclination of his Auditory, then the writer can of those that shall read him: And besides, there is a great efficacy to be attributed to elocution and gracefulness of delivery.

And in the sub-divisions of Protestants again, we find that side still most prevalent and encreasing, that is most sedulous in this course of Preaching also: and that also in the plainest manner. For that language and exact me∣thod that would hecome a Sermon made at S. Maries, would be unfit and ineffectual to be used in a Country Auditory: In the first it is expected he should be exact in his observation of Order and Scholastick Rules and Ex∣pressions; whereas he that makes a Sermon, or writes a Book of a vulgar address, it behoves him to be more copious and plain in his delivery, even so far as he conceives his hearers or readers not fitted with pre-notion enough to conceive and understand him in a more compendious and exact method; and in case he find them possessed with strong aversions and pre-occupations he is then to enlarge himself, and to make use of repetition and inculcation of Doctrine; whereby he may be able to convict at several times, and by degrees, such as could not or would not be won at once, and on a sudden; the which I hope may serve as an apology for my self in those itterations and ways of pressure I have used all along this present Treatise; by which or by transferring and reflection on my self, if I have become a fool for truths sake, and for conviction of such as are puffed up against one another, and a∣gainst Christs Ministers too,* 1.1 I am not wanting of good Authority and presi∣dent therein.

But to return to the discourse of Figure, although particular words did arise from, and were made conceivable by particular figurate things and their accidents, yet when we can make notions and sentences, by joyning parti∣cular words, it is because many figures may be by use so brought into one, as to be conceived all at once; even as the whole story of any thing, where∣in are several figures painted, may (by often sight) be brought into one fi∣gure in our fancy, in such sort as if it were but one figure, as it is now but one whole piece.

And as again, in this whole piece or figure we are able to distinguish, upon occasion, the several figures therein one from another, according to their several postures and scituations; so, in each figurate body, these adjuncts

of Number, Scite, Habit, Proportion, &c. are but parts of figure it self, as constituting his whole form. Nay motion it self is not otherwise conceiva∣ble, then as altering the Figure of a body from what it was while, it was rest∣ing and quiessent: And therefore as any of them are change, the whole figure must be changed also, in regard the lines from thence issuing to our sight, will not be the same they were before. Whereupon it will also fol∣low, that as that party shall never so little alter his standing, or divers other persons, shall be beholding the same object, it must: by means of those se∣veral lines issuing from the diversly scituated parts thereof unto the eyes of the several beholders, put on a differing representation of shape and fi∣gure, except it be in pictures, or the like, which have such real levels and smoothness, as not to make an alteration in the return of the beam through inequality of the object.

As words and figures, so Sciences collect into totals in our fancies, under the general notion of good and bad, and useful or not. For we can no more seriously consider any thing without respect to our selves, then we can see with other mens eyes, or judge of them by their reason, for particulars had their admission through hope and fear, like or dislike. And from hence it is we find that subjects (especially such as look not to have share in the man∣nagery of them) are ever finding fault with the execution and rigour of the Laws, and will ever like those Laws best that themselves may interpret and mannage. And hence it is also that Merchants, and such as propound to raise themselves by trade and action, will not be brought to attend the discourses and speculations of schollers and contemplative persons: nor they again descend to the imployment of the others, each of them having long fancied their honor and benefits to arise their own way soonest: which they now apprehending themselves skilful in, are not to be expected so far to re∣mit their intention of benefit their own way, as to divert to an imployment that can but betray their ignorance.

Although, as we said, knowledge flow from sense, and beasts have them in equal number with us, it will not follow that therefore they should be as wise. For first they ordinarily come short of us in quickness of feeling: and although they have equal acuteness of sight, yet they usual trust to smel∣ling as aforesaid, which can yield little observation or variety, but chiefly they want time to learn: for they are at their perfection before children (of like years) have learnt any thing. But most of all, they want so much quick∣ness of sense, by reason of their hard breeding and thick senced skins, as to make them sensible of want. And again, their appetites are so few and cold, that they want spur to enquiry, and so to knowledge. Which last con∣sideration appears in Innocents, who are always laughing, and so far pleased with what they get or see, that they put not themselves forth to any enquiry after the possession or removal of any thing, whereby to encrease their un∣derstanding.

Though this stupidity have its original cause from numbness of feeling, as beasts have (for we find that they will endure pain or smart better then wise folk, who are commonly thinnest skinned) yet the nearest reason is easie con∣tent and satisfaction. And as we see beasts of prey to be the wisest, of such as live not with us, because their food is of hardest acquisition, so of those that are domestique, those that through necessity of getting food from us,

do observe us most, are consequently most crafty. For craft is but particu∣lar wisdom, as theirs is: which reacheth only at getting food, or avoiding of blows. But wisdom beasts cannot have: for it must be a general know and compleatness of comprehension, in some measure proportioned to hu∣mane ability. For as all things in nature are dependant upon one another, so no one can be throughly known without something be known of all: in such sort as nothing may be left to stand so far wanting or negative, as to the spoil∣ing of our Method.

And therefore as in the Mathematicks, he is to be held for the ablest Ar∣chitect or Engineer, that, through natural sufficiency and foregoing obser∣vation, is endued with a capacity to retain, and most exactly to comprehend in his brain the entire and precise models and methods of several buildings and engines, whereby, upon occasion of erection of house or engine, he may be able out of those frames and plots conceived in his fancy, by way of the∣ory, and out of knowledge of the true nature and use of materials, to con∣trive afterwards such a house or engine as may correspond with his end and desire, or to know whether it be feasiable or no: Even so, in matters of polity also, they are to be held as the most sufficient artists that, being most knowing of all those several parts whereof the political body is framed, and of their true nature and use, can frame to themselves the largest and most comprehensive methods and schemes of government; even such as by an entire configuration may include each several rank and order of men, so di∣sposed of and set on work, as that the whole political frame or building may be held up unto that way of work and rule which is fittest for it. Whereas he that will go about to contrive an engine for motion, or the like, without precedent knowledge of the Trochlick and Statick principles, and of the true natures of those materials whereof it is to be framed, and without full and exact comprehension of every part useful and necessary to his work: or he that will undertake to reform or set up a Government without fore-conside∣ration of the true differences and properties of command and obedience, and of the natural tempers and inclinations of men in their several orders, and how they may be made appliable and useful therein; and who is not al∣so entirely comprehensive hereof, so as in his Scheme or Model, to place every one in such a proper station, as by union and application of endeavour, the whole frame may be preserved and kept in motion, without neglect or leaving out of any, or suffering them to croud one upon another, even he shall find himself as much mistaken in his Politicks, as the other in his Mathematicks.

And the danger of falling short, and running into mistake, is by so much the more to be feared in making schemes and methods of this sort, then of the other, by how much we are less capable of autoptical figures and means of connection and juncture here then there. For he that is to frame an engine, cannot but from sight and experience be informed how one board or piece of wood is ordinarily joyned to another, by taking part from one and part from another, and so making them even, and as it were one intire piece; and also how that is holpen on, and upon occasion farther secured in fastness and strength, by pins, nails, plates of iron, or the like. Whereas, to the framing of Polity and Society, it is not so easie to conceive how the natural implantation of love, is by Precepts of Religion, enjoyning to bear one another burthens, made efficacious for fastening of one man to another; and

how again the application of divine and positive Rules and Laws, like pins and bolts, for the farther and more orderly securing of this political fabrick and structure, are necessary to be applyed also: for accomplishment of the entire frame, according as he that hath charge and oversight of the whole work shall think fit.

Vulgar capacities can easily make to themselves a representation of a King riding abroad, and occasionaly righting or relieving of a single person, be∣cause these and such like stories use to be figured and represented in Tales and Ballads; and they can also, because of instance in themselves, and their own prompting desires and hopes, be able to raise a figure of two persons ap∣pealing before him in his judgement seat, to give sentence between them, in like manner as the two harlots are painted before Solomon his majestical Throne; when as yet, it will be very hard for such as have not been conver∣sant in Histories, and often ruminated on the causes of Civil disturbance, to fancy how the whole people may be divided into two parties and factions, even as it were two persons; and how in that case there is no way to peace, and to prevent the danger of the whole by their quarrel, but by their joynt submission to the same Soveraign power also.

But most of all they want prenotion enough to conceive, & wariness enough to consider, that the most common and usual way for men to be lead into these sidings and divisions amongst themselves, and into associations and in∣surrections against Authority, is from the doctrines of dis-affected persons vented in private Meetings and Congregations. In which case, to hope that the seeds of separation and discontent shall not be farther sowed by such as from dislike of what is already publikely taught and allowed, have already begun and set up this division, is as if one should permit those fires that used to burn publickly on the hearth of his house, to be now car∣ried into several corners thereof, on belief that, in requital of this liberty, it will now be neglectful of its own nature, and amidst variety of com∣bustible matter, obey him, saying, Good Fire, burn so discreetly, as not to endanger that Fabrick wherein thou art maintained.

So that as men, from the time they begin to be apprehensive and know∣ing of morality, do stand affected with a different sense of honor and conscience, so do they accordingly proceed to make methods and collecti∣ons towards the satisfaction of those strong affections of hope and fear, and that in their several kinds. In which doing, as we come to attain knowledge and discovery in the nature and course of things from the instigation of ap∣petites to attain satisfaction, so do we differently attain wisdom and know∣ledge, as these appetites and affections do differently, engage in discovery, and in ploting of means and methods for attaining them, and do more hardly or easily arrive at satisfaction. So for example, a fool can neither be much or stadily covetous or ambitious (especially the letter) or indeed have much of any virtue or vice, which grow chiefly from society, because things of Society are by him little regarded and understood, farther then to the outside and pride thereof: and so also must want virtue or vice, because so far as he wants understanding, he wants will.

So then it should seem necessary that the concupiscible and irascible appe∣tites should precede knowledge; and that I must have sense of want before I can have instigation to attain the means of content. For he that is con∣tent, and cannot give a reason of his content, is a fool, and the more content, the more folly, and the less hope of wisdom: and the more sense

of want, the more enquiry; and the more enquiry, the more wisdom: And therefore as the proverb is true, that of an unknown thing there can be no desire, because (as before shewed) observation and knowledge of particulars do grow into affections and appetites, so is it true again, that of undesired things, there can be no knowledge, because none will contrive or invent any means to attain any thing which they have not first a liking unto. But as Wis∣dom is generally found of such as seek her; so, in every particular, men are more or less knowing and crafty, as their desire to the thing hath made their diligence and attention to exceed.

And towards our instigation to knowledge and discovery, we are much holpen on by the humour of choller; for by its irritation, we are kept, as it were, awake and intent on objects, and provoked also towards action. But then again, for wisdom and moderation in our actions, we are beholding to the humor of melancholly; for by its dulness and fearfulness, we are brought to hesitation and advisement.

Hence we may learn what insinuations are best for youth, towards their proficience in wisdom; namely, things of hardest acquisition, and that have their benefit arising through engagements to largest enquiry: And these are chiefly sense of Religion, and sense of honor, for these oblige us to diligent at∣tention and search in all things, and all the circumstances of them also; inso∣much as nothing can be looked upon but as through these considerations, both generally, and differently concerning us in our benefit or harm. And these two may well go hand in hand, fixing them upon right objects, that is, works of Beneficence and Charity; for as Conscience directs us to love, and to do good to our neighbour, in obedience to God; so doth honor prompt us to do the like, by encouragement and direction of the Laws and Rules of our Prince and Country. By these means all engagements will be taken in, be∣cause intervening, with their concerns, in all we do, we shall in those secret things and occasions where honor cannot reach, be tyed by conscience to hearty performance also.

But then we are to consider, that conscience is of far more advantage to know∣ledge then honor; and that, not only, as more strongly terrifying and en∣gaging, but also as more universally doing it. For there are more things which in conscience I stand bound to perform, then those which honor takes notice of: whereas there is nothing truly honorable, but what conscience doth en∣courage and accompany, even as its best guide and surveyor. And this espe∣cially in matters of society, and our moral deportments therein, because men, out of interest or prejudicate custom or education, may make things honorable which are not, and may also make that honorable at one time which was not so at another, the which may prove thereby also dangerous to mislead us in mat∣ters of duty and obedience. Whereas, by a due regard had unto conscience, we shall be always kept both upright and steady.

Yet then again, by that which some call Conscience, men may be both kept and led into error; for if Religion be made to consist on a few slothful obser∣vances, or if, by dividing mens duties, you separate some of them from the re∣ligious tye of conscience, and so make their concern less: Or if lastly (through flattery) men be made proud of what they have already, by too soon assuming to themselves the title of Saints, or believing they cannot sin or fall away, or the like; then, I say, knowledge must want of its extent, by how much each one is more easily satisfied then otherwise he would be.

And from hence, we seldom find great heirs, notwithstanding the advan∣tage education might afford them, become so eminent for wisdom or ability; as those whose harder breeding and greater wants, engage them to invent and study means of supply and encrease; for the first, thinking only of enjoying what they have already, grow proud, without search of more honor.

So for Religion, too strict relyance on set tasks may well induce sloth∣fulness; nor it is not zeal alone that can attain wisdom, because it may be too implicit and negligent; that is, it may be placed in the observance of a few private directions and precepts, and not in the general observation of all de∣vout and charitable actions, according to the Laws and Rules of his Country. And therefore when many men, appearing of great tenderness and scrupelou∣sity, are yet known to be fools, it ariseth for that they (as all fools else) are slothfully implicite, and want such general scrupelousness or enquiry of their own as they seem to have. For when, they with most ardency, enveigh against the opinion and practices of some other person or order, it is but out of impli∣cite belief of others, and not out of precedent enquiry and satisfaction of their own; no, not in these very things they practise or condemn: And their devotion being still fixed but upon a few observations, and the rest carelesly rejected as abominable, they must so far want wisdom, as they want general zeal and en∣quiry, and can (at most) be but religious craft. And therefore as in covetous∣ness, and appetites of less general engagement, their discovery can amount to no more then a stare of craftiness; even so, when these greater engagers are not closely followed, they produce neither wisdom nor craft in any perfection.

We see then, that to resist affections and passions altogether, is to dilete our natural and individual beings. For if the diffused observations of things should not at last collect themselves into affections, it would not be possible to have any promptness towards pursuit & desire, for want of present appearance of former particulars therein concerned, or to have any steady rule for discourse within, for want of union and agreement amongst the notified observations towards determination: but they being now transmitted into affections, carry so general and ready a sway in judging and willing of all things else, that it is not to be supposed that the doing or not doing, having or not having of any thing, can be equally sought or avoided, and not differently, according to the degrees of in∣stigation from them proceeding.

And from this ground do passions proceed, which as they rise from affecti∣ons, as being heightned from extraordinary concern in objects, so is one passion generative of an other. And therefore the wisest men (although it be part of their wisdom to conceal them) have the most and most eager passions; which may be easily proved bp their breaking out upon pressure or sudden occasio••s, wherein discretion cannot, or is not warned of concealing them.

Affections work more inward, passions more outward, because I must like or dislike first, before I can act accordingly; and therefore mens affections are sel∣dom truly to be discovered, but by their passions; even as those again are best by their actions.

Actions without passion, differ from passionate ones but in measure, for all proceed from affections; the first only proceed from affections counterpoised by comparison of one to another, which we call discourse and reason, these from one violent affection alone.

When the affections move toward the enjoying any thing, called desire, the prosecution outward is accompanied with the passions of joy, love, jealousie,

envy, ambition, covetousness, &c. and when they are averse to any thing, cal∣led hatred, they are (in their outward means of avoiding it) accompanied with grief, anger, scorn, malice, revenge, &c. Amongst all which Government finds so few steady supporters, as she is forced to make use of those including and commanding passions of hope and fear, under whose force she is able, by means of rewards and punishments, to keep the other within rule.

We cannot forbid our selves affections by reason, for they and reason are all one: for as they did first proceed from the same root of in induction and experi∣ment; so when they come to provoke to action, they point at the same end, my particular good. But this consideration of my particular good may, from new observation, forbid the prosecution of an affection in some present thing. And affections, if they be violent, do turn into passions, and so sometimes a∣wake a contrary affection to stand up against execution, if his enjoyment be more then proportionable to the others, and this may be then called an inward reason for so doing, as a new argument or induction may be called an outward: For the many passed inconveniencies sustained through violent prosecutions, create in us a ready fear, to make stoppage till farther enquiry; but if against this pressing affection, no other affection appear then what have heretofore been remitted as unvaluable to stop the other, then this affection passeth uncontrolled afterwards, as to that affection; these two affections uniting and becoming one as experimented inductions do.

And so affections become satiate upon use, when particular objects have not proficiency, so as to persist in pleasing by variety; even as observation grows satiate and weak, upon itteration of the same inductions and experiments also.

So then, will differs from other affections as a double to a single, and is the issue of two reasons or affections aiming at precedence. For although the great∣er affection hath always mastery, yet is it not so entire as to the others total de∣feat, having no more pressure or prevalence for execution, then he was ex∣ceeding of the less affection in the promise of good or pleasure, or in the threats of avoidance. And as a greater affection may over power a less, so many less affections or reasons may do one that is greater, or a greater affection may over power many lesser; the will enforcing execution but ratable to the ex∣cess in difference. For though appetite (as appetite) covet infinitely, yet, upon conference with another reason or affection, the will assents and acts but so far and much of them as is attainable; and that, as it is conceived undestructive to other appetites.

But then although each object and thing have its peculiar method and affecti∣on for comprehension and estimation, yet because these lesser affections, for readier use and guidance of the will, do, through usage and custom, unite and place themselves in and under those general affections called Hope and Fear, it therefore falls out, that these two are the most general and express appearers in all we do: Appetite or hope of pleasure usually leading and provoking to to act, and fear of pain and prejudice to forbear, except where a sudden tem∣ptation, or a sudden affright doth violently move to present enjoyment or avoidance, without all kind of deliberation; in which case a man may be truly said to be guided by passion, and not by will; that is, by the violence of a sin∣gle affection. But generally, fear is the affection that keeps us in rules of wis∣dom and moderation; for else hope would lead us to do all and every thing presented under the apprehension of good or pleasure. And without it, Religion and Loyalty would quickly be at a loss heretofore noted.

And thus comes wisest men, that have most pressing affections and passions to have them ordinarily best regulated, because through knowledge and ex∣perience the one is still used and made a stop to the others extravagancy, unless when the pressure to sudden execution, as we said, gives not time to consider them. But towards years, most affections lose their height, because the experi∣rience of their hindrance (through other affections) makes them press us but rateable to that abatement. And therefore cannot aged persons be so strongly in love, both because the object cannot print so deeply as before; and also be∣cause the affection it self is now grown less that should entertain it. And the reason why young folks are not wiser at their strength of years and affections, then afterwards, is because their affections provoke in their full strength, with∣out any allay from fear and experiment of inconvenience: onely in age the af∣fection to that particular covetousness of riches, doth encrease upon a contrary reason, namely, experiment of convenience and use of them, having seldom any abatement to the contrary.

By what hath been hitherto said concerning the rise and beginning of know∣ledge and perception, we may be informed what to judge of that peremptori∣ness which the Peripateticks and Galenists do take against each other. For if the enquiry should be, in what part of us this discovery is first made, and by which part the knowledge of each thing is first attained, the answer must be, in the brain: because in that, as the first sentient, the figures of things are first impressed, and a discrimination made by comparison, before any of the more inward parts can be made consentient and stand affected therewith. But if the question should be, from whence that act of adjudication and determination towards action doth proceed which in us is the guide of all our essays? it must be answered, from the heart and affections; for from these the brain is instiga∣ted to raise figures, and to continue and pursue them as as they shall be judged to be of concern by the other. For the brain may be said to apprehend and re∣gard objects, as they are in themselves separate and absolute, but the heart, as they are modal and respective to our selves; it is a different knowledge to know and distinguish a man as a man, and as he is a friend or enemy, or the like.

Whereupon we may make the brain the seat of understanding and discourse, and the heart of the will; we may place natural Philosophy and the Mathema∣ticks in the one, and moral Philosophy in the other; because this points to good as the other doth to truth. But then again, as the desire to know is for honor or other benefit sake, and my desire of acquaintance and knowledge of things is for some ends of mine own; so these ends having place in some affection in the heart, it may, in that respect, be called the original of knowledge also; especi∣ally of all that points to action. Again, as we instanced how outward senses might be deceived, so must we say that feeling it self cannot be called full and steady, as in the brain; but so far as the heart is consentient therewith. So that as the heart is the first and chief of life, so of feeling; for upon his resentment of any thing, as from experience, we have the highest assurance of the realities of things which our nature can afford.

But if we respect the contemplative part only, then is it true that the brain is the seat even of moral knowledge also, because when any is to deliver any thing on that subject, that method by which he proceeds must be first con∣ceived in his own brain. To which, notwithstanding the affections must give trial and judgement; even by comparing and estimating how his own appetites and affections stand inclinable in the case. For as in water face answereth to face, even so doth the heart of man to the heart of man.

The which is as necessary to direct him in making his method for the tradi∣tion of Moral Philosophy, as a due consideration of the ability and capaci∣ty of the present hearers or Readers, is pre-required to be rendred intelligi∣ble and effectual in both. For as he that is not advertized and respectful of the prenotions and comprehensions of those he would instruct, may, by too great assention in his discourses above their sense, be rendred but as if he had spoken non-sense, (by appealing unto and relying upon principles and premi∣ses which were never by them apprehended and granted (an error ere-while noted in preaching); even so, success, cannot be in moral discourses; much ho∣ped for, where the Instructer or Preacher hath not due knowledge and re∣gard of the present affections and inclinations of his hearers. It being (in∣deed) the highest help and proof of ability, to excogitate and examine at home, by what steps and degrees he came himself to attain to the know∣ledge of things; and by what inducements he hath been brought to the li∣king or aversion of them; and also upon what grounds and considerations he hath been again brought to entertain contrary thoughts, towards those things which he liked or disliked before; that so, upon a due comparison of his condition to that of others, he may make a true estimate and judgement of a method, and way of discourse and delivery, most fit for the others in∣struction therein.

From all which we may discover that some of late have been too inconsi∣derately hasty in their censures put upon those ancient assignments of wis∣dom and knowledge to the heart. There is no doubt but when God calls for, and claims mens hearts to be exercised his service and worship, and when Solomon prays for an understanding heart to know good evil, but that both of them did very well know whence our actions and indeavours took their source and original, that is, from the affections: and as our moral abearances, as well one towards another, as in carrying our selves in a right and steady course of subjection towards God, was the thing chiefly aimed at, and not Philosophical speculation, so may we finde reason why we should be so often minded of searching and examining our hearts; because from them, and the affections therein abiding, the issues of life and death did proceed. And cer∣tainly, had Solomon been endued with a little more melancholy hesitation, and suffered the passion of fear to have been more often made use of as a stop and temperament to those jolities and enjoyments which in his greatness were so frequently presented unto him as the objects of hope and desire, and had not so inconsiderately trusted to his own heart, he would have proved himself more wise, then by that book written of all things from the Cedar in Lebanon to the Moss on the Wall. If he had I say but suffered the reve∣rential fear of offending God to have come in with an arrest of judgement, and so, by its counterpoise, call him to a deliberate examination before exe∣cution, he would then no doubt have been as happy and famous for the wise guidance of himself, and for giving a right sentence between his Passions and Affections within and at home, as he was in that sentence he gave be∣tween the Harlots.

In which case of advisement and deliberation, we may look upon the Brain as the Judgement-seat, where the Affections in competition, being by the heart summoned to plead, each one calls up and assists it self with such figurate Presidents and Examples as it thinks fit to imploy as evidences on its own side; the heart, as from a majestick Throne or Tribunal, may be

supposed to give that determination which is called Will.

But it is by the way to be conceived, that when the Ancients attributed Wisdom to the Heart, as the seat of affections, and the source from whence appetites and actions did proceed, they then reputed it as the noblest and chief of the inward parts; and did not thereby intend to deny that service∣ableness, both for raising and resenting of objects, which come from the stomack, the Diaphragm, and other membranous and highly sensible parts; nor how other Affections, by long contract may be induced upon other parts of the body; even as that more natural resentment of the kinde be∣fore spoken of, may be by this means well thought seated in the Liver.

But now to make farther application of some of these Discourses; since Affections have arisen (for the most part) from society, and the example and imitation of others, it seems most requisite that (in society) such means of prevention should be used, that their exorbitance be not the destruction ther∣of. Our general custom of living is that which pleaseth us, even upon no other reason but because it is so, and is the ground of what in each Na∣tion called Fundamental and Common Law, that is to say, common custom.

Now although a man may love his own home or manner of living bet∣ter then another, yet to be confined to the same house, food, &c. would be but imprisonment, so the desire of Liberty (in sociable living) is the same with that of variety in private usages; and Liberty in Government is no∣thing else but freedom of choice to follow mine own will in the various pro∣secution of mine own customs. And publike Law is nothing else but the restraint of this liberty in some particular usages. For the Laws of no Go∣vernment prescribe to men all they shall do or forbear; but onely direct and stint them in such and such practises, wherein custom and affection to some things above others, were otherwise like to prevail upon them to publike pre∣judice.

And so again, since understanding is (as beforeshewed) so fallible, and must be so differing in its grounds, it will appear necessary, for avoiding con∣tention and disturbance, that each one in things of common concern, do submit to a common understanding. For in this case we may regard the ap∣petites and affections as they are conceived in the subjects, in their separate orders and factions, to be unto the Prince, as those single figurate objects or inductions conceived in each ones brain; which are not to carry any peremp∣toriness of conclusion, as in themselves, but to serve as evidences and instan∣ces of choice unto him how to proceed in the execution of them, as they shall be found agreeable and approved by his experimented method and rule of publike good.

So that in all differences which shall arise between one order and another, or between party and party in the Kingdom, the King is, in the body poli∣tick, to resemble the heart in the body natural, in bearing sway and determi∣nation between the disagreeing affections and interests of his subjects; af∣ter the same manner as Solomon did between the Harlots, as before set down. By which means subjects enuring themselves to a constant way of decision and reconciling of differences, and thereby also being reduced into a con∣stant course in the observation of uniform and fixed Laws, Custom of ob∣servation

and practise will make the same generally pleasant, upon the like reason that (through use) each mans particular customs were to him pleasant before: insomuch as it may be a doubt, whether all customs were not from positive Laws at first: so that men having, from the usual practise of their superiors commands, throughly habituated themselves therein, they may (at last) be thought to perform them with delight, the Law it self be∣coming exolete and forgotten, as to its letter, and affection and custom ser∣ving to the upholding thereof. And this may seem the reason also why not onely one kingdom differs from another in Customs and Fundamentals, but divers places of the same kingdom do differ amongst themselves: namely, from divers Authorities which have therein born sway.

And as in nature we may observe, that such Creatures as have dread of o∣thers, are (notwithstanding) by cohabitation brought to liking of each o∣thers company: so when the first terrors of oppression and severity (which all Government is accompanied with) are by indurance made familiar, (as commonly coming under the rate they were feared,) it comes then to be so pleasant also, that all governable people will be found averse from change. Whereas else, if the publike and general way for decision of common Justice and good should be interrupted, it would procure sickness and disease in the body politick, no otherwise then obstructions do in our natural bodies. For as each body hath its proper constitution and habit, for measure and moti∣tion of its humors, so hath each kingdom its proper method and proportion of Laws and politick executions; the which, when accordingly followed, doth not onely keep that kingdom in health, but also, by their free passage according to custom, administer content and delight to all the members.

And this is made most apparent in those two great objects of Govern∣ment, Liberty and Property. It being evident that the happy and content∣ed estate in either of them, is not in greatness of extent and proportion, but in that pleasure which custom bringeth. For since the greatest possessors in these kindes have desire of addition, and since in the lowest possession natu∣ral necessity is supplied, all the rest will be but as coveted for Credit or Ho∣nor sake: which honor and estimation, being more sought by great and rich persons, (thereunto used) then by the low and poor, it will follow, that the condition of the servant and poorer sort of men hath generally more steady and equal content; and that therefore, the stating and measuring the publike Liberty must be referred to publike judgement and care; and that the grants herein must regard the real benefit of all, and not importunity of deman∣ders onely.

In which respect of judging and estimating of the reality and value of publike benefits, the Prince, as the heart in the body politick, is again to be looked upon as doing that other office, as in the body natural before set down: that is, by vertue that life and soul-ship whereby he animates the whole king∣dom, to be ready to give true evidence and demonstration whether the things disputed and stroven for, are things that have real beings and enti∣ties, or are not fictions and apparitions, entertained by weak and credulous persons: and how far also they are practicable and conducent to publike be∣nefit.

Else it may happen, with easie Princes, as with indulgent Parents, who, to still their children, leave them knives or the like, which instead of use turn to their dammage: no otherwise then uncontrolable priviledges of subjects

turn to their ruine through civil dissention, as heretofore observed. And therefore we see by experience that those very children, that have their pri∣vate Wills and Affections least satisfied, are, in the general, best pleased and contented, as being least crossed through least coveting: whereas those that have them most, are most restless and clamorous for more.

For as that course and manner of life must be much more uniform and constant, that is, directed by Law or one universal method or order, then that which (having no certain and determinate restraint, but being at liberty to and chose as it thinks good, in objects that concern others as well as him∣self) is left irregular; and must consequently have more crosses, by how much he deals with more objects and aims to hinder him: by which means, his li∣berty proving his restraint, it were much better and happier for him, to have his present liberty subjected by one, to his momentany discontent, then, by taking it upon him, to have it crossed by many, to his continual torment. For as an unusual posture will at first displease, which yet, through custom of en∣during, may become as pleasant as walking it self: so when I, using liberty in many things, am thereby put to many postures of restraint, this must conti∣nually displease, no otherwise then when the parts of our natural bodies are put into any other method or posture; then hath been hitherto familiar.

And as a natural body is not an individual longer then it is guided by a single Will, no more is the body politick this or that kingdom, that is guided in publick actions by more wills then one. And as again, the parts separated in a natural body do not by their absence demolish the essence of the whole, while those that remain continue subject to uniform direction, whenas, by be∣ing seperate, they fal, like as natural divided parts do, into the general acci∣dents of corruption: even so politick parts fall into Anarchy, after their sepa∣ration from the common Affection and Will: But while they remain con∣formable thereto, they will, like bodily members, gain to themselves joint content, and the reputation of symetry and comeliness.

For if subjects do at at any time finde fault with their government, it is either occasioned through some new and extraordinary injunctions, in not keeping a way of Government constant enough, (which makes arbitrary Go∣vernment so much cryed out upon), or else, because some other particular in∣terest or pleasure draws their appetite so strongly another way, that it grows weary and insensible of this. No otherwise then dogs and other creatures, who having the acquisition of food and generation only in pursuit and con∣templation, stand affected with those smells onely that tend thereunto: through eagerness herein, being made unapprehensive of the danger of run∣ing into new pastures, nor delighted with the content and security they en∣joy already.

And the like as is said of liberty, may be said of property; wherein co∣vetousness provokes to the same inconvenience which too much liberty doth; for as one is covetousness of riches, so is the other covetousness of Will, and then as sense of want must precede desire, so all covetousness is poverty: and in these two cases men must be looked upon, as so strongly respective to their own interests and concerns, as hastily to fall upon schemes and methods of adjudication and contrivance, without any equal regard to comprehend or take in the interests of others. For if the partial desires of any party, order, or faction of the people should be suffered to pass and act for it self, in relati∣on to liberty or property, or the like, it would soon be found that all others

would be thereby dis-impropriate and made slaves. And this upon the same ground that, in the course of Nature and Providence, the good of Suc∣cession and Posterity would be defeated, if that natural desire not to die, might be fulfilled to such as are for the time alive. For men that can, from the pressure of their own affections, well enough fancy themselves possessing of such a part of the earth, and of being thereon, as on a Stage, acting their parts amongst amongst divers others; cannot yet be (ordinarily) ingenuous and comprehensive enough to consider onward, (by enlarging of their fi∣gure) that divers other persons are thereon to act their successive parts also: and that thereupon it must necessarily follow, (as well for order sake as to make room for others) that each person must withdraw when that part is acted which was assigned him; for as himself is now possessing of his fathers stock and possession, upon occasion of his death, so must he, by his death, make room for the possession of others, else the whole plot must take end and fall into confusion. Even so, in a stare, we may easily conceive how soon the constitution and welfare thereof would perish by disorder, if the Statute and determinate rule of the Soveraign were not inviolably observed: for subjects would forget to do as they would be done unto, in regard of those liberties they would leave to posterity and their fellows; as men, in nature, are usually inconsiderate, that since their Fathers and Progenitors death made way for them, so ought they to do the like for their children.

In which case of restraining the general actions of men to be guided by the same uniform Rules and politick Laws, as natural Agents are in their courses, although the number of those that would be thereby offended, would exceed any number of men offended by particular crosses arising from prosecutions of their own devisings, because a far greater number were this way ruled then the other, yet let the discontented parties of the whole Kingdom, governed by no other restraint then what they occasionally make one upon another, be compared to those in any Kingdom of the same num∣ber, where an uniform constraint is imposed, and the persons in the first sort restrained will be more, and also (because of unexpectedness and want of order) their restraints will be more unpleasant in the kinde then the other: which hath now through custom of induration, lost the sense thereof, even as Millers and Jaylors, of those noises and sents they are used unto.

For as we finde by experience, that the onely reason of the discontent of the subjects of one Kingdom above those of another, is for that there is dif∣ference in their Governments and Customs, it must be much more likely to happen between Subjects and the same Kingdom, where the different usages and customs must be in the continual notice of one another. And thus it fareth not onely in case of licentiousness (or where no Government is) but upon the like reason (when Authority doth make restraint in any thing) it will follow, that as this restraint is more or less, (that is, as the subjected par∣ties have more or less possibility of breaking it,) so will the continuance of o∣bedience be more or less also. For although appetite affect pleasure and cu∣stom of each sort, yet, when such high difficulty or inconveniency shall ap∣pear, the reasonable will doth soon decline it; and being thereupon turned to the choice of an object or action for the present less affected in it self, doth through custom therein bring it (as aforesaid) into pleasure; and make our Obedience prove our Liberty.

And the very reason why men living under one Government are many

times affected with another, is not from unpleasantness of that uniformity they are under, but (on the contrary) supposing a greater uniformity of acti∣ons set by Law in that Government they commend then indeed there is. For in this case, usually considering their own contrivances onely, which must be regular; and that without just estimation, how the contrivances of others might, or do cross them, they mistake pleasure, by plotting an unifor∣mity in the fancy which can never be in act; and so come to pursue pain and trouble instead thereof. For it is not variety, as variety, that affects, but it is custom varied, which will imply custom and not variety: because to affect va∣riety of customs, is to affect Custom.

And therefore when men through the often contemplation and contri∣vance of an Idea or platform of Government in their fancy, come thereby to attain an affection and Will thereunto; this comes no otherwise to pass, then if a remarkable object should, through often presentation in the fancy, come to pass in the extream of love or hatred, according to that relish it was at first entertained with, and thereupon be called sympathy or antipathy; even so also, this apprehension takes sometimes with men, as if by sensible practice and induction their likings had been won; and they may (thereupon) be as well said to be guided by custom to like and approve that unexperien∣ced form, as that they live under: and it may be more, as having oftener and more attentively considered it and its benefits; when (on the contrary) the inconveniences and the pressures of the Government under which he lives, work so strongly towards the abatement of his affections, through the allay of fear, that he becomes not so intent in his relishes that way: and perad∣venture, out of that general love every man carries to his own contrivance, the inconveniences of the Government he now fancies, are as far removed from his conceit, as sense.

And it fares (in this case) with Government upon tryal, as with any other beloved and much desired object, namely that they never answer (in possessi∣on) that measure of delight they were coveted with, because the Idea in our fancy was the thing which we were in love with: which, as it was oftener seen in our fancy then the original in our sense, so was it pleasanter; and it was perfecter also, as being contemplated without those inconveniences, which are now found in the others enjoyment.

And besides this, our senses themselves are cozened with the inconvenien∣ces of things; for as each person (in their natural affectation of glory and reputation) is willing to appear publikely without faults, even so each Go∣vernment, (and the people therein) do their utmost to set forth their power, riches, freedom, peace, honor, &c. but their sufferings they so strive to con∣ceal, that we may be, and are as often deceived in judging a good Govern∣ment, or a happy and peaceabele State or Kingdom, as of a vertuous, rich, or honest person: or in discovering the many discords any marryed couple may have, by those outward kinde appearances that may pass betwixt them.

The like reason leads for regulating and stinting men in the exercise of Religion: which, as it is taken of much more concern, must be made equal∣ly acceptable and pleasing to all by set and positive rules; or else, through necessary exasperation (which difference wil beget amongst subjects) their dis∣contents will be higher then in other things: encreasing, as it were, by a con∣tinual Antiperistasis, until it break forth into the thunder and lightning of ci∣vil

war and commotion. For to be divided in sect and opinion, must by de∣grees turn into a division in Love and Charity: even because, as there is a co∣incidence between Faith and Charity; so is it, as well the beginner of quar∣rels, as the highest proof of uncharitableness, upon unauthorized grounds and suspitions, to censure or condemn any one in respect of his judgement or belief: and if done by any towards that Church whereof they are members it is undutiful also.

And this discord we shall finde arising, even from natural and necessary grounds also. For since the Will must follow the light of the Understan∣ding, how shall any be thought willing to associate and accompany those that do amiss? And since the reason why those of any Church do order their discipline and practise different from that of another, is but because they do proportionably differ in their belief and judgements in matters of Doctrine and Discipline, must it not then be presumed, that so far as the members of each Christian Church shall decline in their reverential regard towards their Churches soundness and veracity, even so far will they con∣quently judge it fit to divide themselves by seperate Congregations, or the like; whereupon, since a Christian Church and State are but the same (as heretofore proved), it will soon be found that this schism in the Church will be the same with a revolt in the State; and wants but strength and opportu∣nity to actuate its dislike into a rebellion. For although they may at first, for a countenance to their actions, and to draw in associates, make use of that de∣ceivable distinction of Religious and Civil affairs, and so pretend that they intend not at all to trench on the Civil jurisdiction, yet when by strength of Allies and Confederates they shall once have arrived at their desired degree of power, it will then appear that they which at first did intreat to be inde∣pendent in relation to the Church, will now practise to be so in reference to the State too; and so by degrees to be super-eminent and command in both. For must it not be expected, that that thirst of ambition and rule (by them called Zeal and Charity) which first caused them to draw in sectators, as the objects and trophies of their glory and power, should ever stoop to any stint or moderation afterwards; whenas, in order to spiritual things and religious cognizance, it is so easie a matter to draw in State affairs also; and then, as Christs immediate Ministers, to preside in them without controle.

And must it not then be expected, that that greater and higher tye of ter∣ror and fear by which men are kept in obedience, as in a religious subjection, must also make them, in case of difference with their civil head, to seem re∣gardless of terror from him, as having but power over the body onely; and so consequently, stick fast to the obedience of the other against him. For if the separation was not at first made upon such grounds as were hazardous of salvation, why was it made? and being made and continued, how can it be expected they should be thought less? so that when opportunity shall leave men at liberty which side to follow, they will certainly choose that which they acknowledge for right in the main.

Although some have in these cases stept in with an Apology, and thought tolleration of dissent from the Church allowable where a breach of Chari∣ty was not presently made by schism, but the points in question were meer∣ly speculative, yet will the example of the Arrians and others of old, and the Remonstrants and others of late, truely satisfie us of the danger hereof; and how by degrees it will also arise to Civil faction and commotion. For

in this case as formerly noted, the discontented preacher is to be looked up∣on as fire, and the people in their natural thirst to dislike and insubjection, to be looked upon as fewel. And therefore although instance may be made, and hope may be gathered, that these Tolerations have not arisen to a Civil war; yet can none make instance, nor reasonably presume that publike discontents should not be hereby exasperated and encreased, even to a due height and fitness to break forth into open insurrection upon any fit opportunity: For as in our bodies natural, there is an amassment of corrupt humors and habits from intemperance and irregularity of diet, exercise, &c. before some ex∣traordinary cold or the like discover any thing in a Feaver, or other formal disease. Even so, they should do well to consider that Civil war and Rebel∣lion in States and Kingdoms, are never to be feared to work to any strength or continuance, where there is not a precedent amassment of discontents: by which there may be a juncture made to obstruct the ordinary course of Re∣giment upon a revolt, and it is in this case to be highly observable, that the discontents of Religion, are ever chief and ringleaders. For as it is natural for mankinde to know, so also to be known to know; in such sort that we many times covet to know but through pride to appear knowing; it must therefore be presumed that the Authors and Abetters of each Sect and Con∣gregation, seeking to make themselves famous by the number and quality of those proselites they shall gain from one another, that therefore, in order to this encrease, and that of their own reputation, they must vilifie and de∣prave the Judgement and Practise of their opposites; and thereby, of necessary consequence, draw on exasperation and breach of Charity; and if the separation be made from the whole Church it must introduce diso∣bedience also. For Faith, Love, and Obedience, as they have a natural Co∣incidence, where there is some equal respect carryed towards them, so have they as necessary a separation and loss, where any of them is slighted or o∣mitted.

For as that Love and Obedience we are to give to God, doth depend on that belief we have of his Power, Goodness, and Truth; so also doth that respect and obedience which we are to give to the Church his re∣presentative power on earth, depend on our perswasion of its veracity and Authority. So that if men can be once brought to to dis-believe her soundness or insufficiency, (even so far as her communion may be hazardous and damnable), Obedience to her in any sort is not to be long expe∣cted.

And therefore although God have reserved to himself the Prerogative of trying the heart and reins, and Princes can have no Cognizance and jurisdiction over the thoughts and belief of men, yet so far as these their thoughts and perswasions do by words or actions make open tenden∣dency to the seduction of others in a course of sedition, contrary to the rules of Charity, so far are they censurable by the present Higher Power.* 1.2 And in this case Saint Pauls Admonition will be proper unto them, hast thou Faith, have it to thy self before God: that is, let not the desire of eminence and practise in thy different judgement make thee neglectful of Charity and those things that make for Peace, as is largely in that chapter set down: but rather know that for this very end

thou art for conscience sake also to be subject to the higher power; as is also largely commanded in the Chapter foregoing.

And although it be true again, that in many matters of Religion, Princes cannot command as Law-makers, and in their own names, as in more civil matters he doth; yet, as the supreme Magistrate entrusted from above with the interpretation and execution of these Laws and Rules, he may command under God, with the same authority which a High Constable, Lieutenant, or other Supreme State Officer, doth in the absence of himself. And upon the same reason that Civil Laws would be fond and useless things, if subjects should be thereby only told their duties, and not to have Magistrates to see them do it, and direct them in cases of doubt; the same would also happen, in the Laws of God himself: which, considering the blindness of our understandings, and aversion of our wills and affections to obey at all, as well as difference in do∣ing it, have much more need of such direction and constraint. The Prince being always to be regarded as the living Law, that is to say, the life thereof; because Law without an Interpreter to give it understanding, and an in∣forcer to give it will, is but a dead Letter; and (for the most part) use∣less.

So that, since Laws cannot live or go without the two supports of reward and punishment, if there be not a present powerful judge to see these kept up, the performance of Law will be but arbitrary; for why should any fear a punishment, or hope for a reward from a present authority that is uncertain or unable. Nay, unto those very Laws which by God himself are sent for our Government, what from incredulity, and what from natural reluctance, little ob∣servance can be expected, whilst his Minister shall be thought to bear the sword in vain. For can men once find means to avoid his coercion therein, they are then left to the partialities of their own interpretations, to make them signifie but what they please. And then (considering the general infection of Atheism, and the wrong and partial conceits of divine retribution, what likelihood of terror or hopes of prevailing, when the evil day, or day of judgement shall be put so far from them? since experience tells us, present terrors cannot many times do it.

Upon no other consideration then this, namely want of present appearance in acts of terror and Government, it doth fall out (as before noted) that the divisions and differences between child and child, and between subject and subject, do by degrees amount unto such deadly heights; they being nothing else but the mutual encroachments of censure and controul exercised upon one another, after an extemporary and occasional way of rule and authority, for want of a common and present superior Government for restraint of this li∣berty in them all. For as it is most true, that each one stands strongly per∣swaded towards the goodness of his own actions and enterprises (or else he would not do them) so must he of consequent dissent from those of others, and also do his utmost for reducing them to conformity with himself; which being nothing else but the execution of Power and Government, it must fol∣low that such families and Kingdoms which are under such indulgent Parents, or milde and fearful Princes, must be perpetually in danger of such mutinies and quarrels; because, for want of those bands of reverential fear and respect towards him, that mutual ••ye of love towards each other comes to be dissolved. For it being the nature of love (as all things else) to gather strength and steadi∣ness

by that confederacy and union which is made against it by an outward and common fear of disturbance, so must it fall out, that there being now no such binding dread of Authority kept up, for the uniting and associating of them to one another, through consent and fellow feeling of equal condition, that thereupon there will be time and oportunity left to those natural appe∣rites of Censure and Rule to break forth to publike disturbance. For as the Prince or Parent shall defist, or neglect to make use of fear and power, (those his proper instruments to rule by) so consequently must subjects and children be supposed ready to take them up; and, in contention thereabouts, to forget and neglect their own equal ties of Love and Charity.

And to speak directly, if Gods and Natures Laws have not a living coercive force for obedience (even as positive constitutions of the Supreme Magistrate) they will be of much less avail to guide us in outward deportments, then the Civil Constitutions of the Prince (without subordinate Magistrates) to deter∣mine their civil suites; inasmuch as the Prince (being more personally pre∣sent with us) might decide many of his subjects differences himself. And therefore as God would have all obedience to him go by the name of fear, and threatens even such large temporal punishments to the breakers of his Law, (as well knowing that we should be more certainly guided, by an affection of such universal and near concern, then by any other more private affection, which would be but of doubtful concern) so must it follow, that as this fear will be more or less, as it is more or less present, there must therefore be some pre∣sent Minister for our good, or f••r wrath, to execute rewards and punishments here accordingly. For since, in this life, (in respect of reward or punishment executed by God himself) none is able to distinguish of good or evil of all that is before him; so that we may observe (with the wise man) that all things come alike to all, there is one event to tho righeeous, and to the wicked, to the good, and to the clean and unclean, to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: As is the good, so is the sinner, and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath. It must therefore be granted, that fince these Laws were made for our guidance here, they must have their living Magistrate here also, to reinforce them as to execution, in respect of those rewards and punishments which, in regard of his present Power, he is enabled to make use of.

And therefore, in reference to this essential support and relation which fear carrieth towards the establishment of subjection and obedience, we may call obedience a correspondence ef••action, and deportment of the inferior, accord∣ing to the command of the superior, through the sense of duty and fear: For as sense of duty or conscience must keep up obedience, so sence of fear must keep up conscience. By which definition, as we may know how to distin∣guish between that subjection and obed••ence which other creatures give, who obey out of fear only, and not of sense of duty, as wanting understanding to apprehend it; so may we also perceive that since sense of duty must bring on a submission of will, that therefore hope can be very seldom, and love ne∣ver made the proper cause of obedience, as heretofore noted. For hope of benefit or advantage to arise by any thing commanded to be done, being the proper end and motive by which the superior was led to make this his com∣mand and direction, it must therefore follow, that hope of benefit cannot be also directly assigned as an end to him that obeys.

But here again, degrees are to be admitted and considered of, and that ac∣cording as the Commander is more or less All-sufficient and powerful in him∣self,

or defective and obnoxious. When God commands any thing, as he can∣not in himself be any ways respected as indigent, or necessitated for assistance to the atchieuing his designs (as to those very instruments and agents which are now commanded and set on work) even so the benefit thence arising, being in∣tentionally theirs, voluntary creatures may in the performance of his Edicts be well said to be sometimes guided by hope also; and that, not only because hope cannot be then so much esteemed the Commanders end, as the com∣mandeds; but also in reference to that greater power and readiness of reward and retribution which is in God above others.

Next unto whom, Princes, as most representing him on earth in Office and Power, and as having honor their end (whereby in their commands to be kept from justling with their subjects in the end of their obedience) may be also said to have obedience given them with more willingness, for those very hopes sakes; or rather, because of hope, to be given with less reluctance; for there may be degrees of aversion in dislike of one Government more then another, but none of willingness towards the choice of any Government, as Govern∣ment, which, as we said, must make his steady reliance on fear. And it is ob∣servable, that in these very Laws and Edicts that do make their enforcement through hope and promise of reward (which are but very few in comparison of what build upon terror and punishment) they may be reckoned as grounded on fear also; as being but negative to that, and seldom other then promises of exemption or limition in the execution of Government and Power, so as not to proceed to substraction of some benefit, as well as to the imposition of some evil; as by those examples of promises of obedience made in the Old Testa∣ment under the Theoraty, and that made by Saul, of making his fathers house free in Israel, that should slay Goliah, and by observation of the usual constitu∣tion of other Nation may appear. For as hope, as we formerly said, can∣not be without fear of loss and missing; so in things already possessed, fear to to lose is antecedent to hope to enjoy, and is thereupon its ground also.

And as for that mixture and influence which love carrieth towards obedi∣ence, it is to be considered, that when, like other irrational agents, we do by natural propension and instinct only, pursue in any thing those general rules of providence, whereby particular and mutual preservation is aymed at; in those cases men being looked upon (like other Sensitives) as involuntary, or in small degree so; the name of obedience is not to them assignable in a pro∣per and strict construction; because, for want of a known explicite precept, and sufficiency of understanding to apprehend sense of duty and direction in relation to a superior power, and for want of understanding to discover that oeconomy and relation creatures bear towards God, as well as one towards ano∣ther, they may thereupon be said to want, as well the tye of fear, as of love also.

When again, or so far at least, as we do attain to angelical perfection of comprehension and understanding, so as throughly to know, as well all the se∣veral relations which creatures do mutually bear one towards another, as also that relation and respect they all of them joyntly bear towards God their foun∣tain and original; in that respect again, as no external precept and direction seems needful to provoke to do or avoid that which its own understanding hath cleared unto it already, so may that performance of duty which was pra∣ctised and given in that condition, be called love indeed; which cannot be in the other.

So that to man alone, as seated in a middle rank, between creatures irration∣al and throughly intelligent, this notion of obedience is most due; even be∣cause he, in those multitude of appetites raised from observation and converse with other things, and want of true knowledge of his reciprocal relation to other things, together with his and their joynt subordination and dependance on God, is in both respects to have his love and obedience led on and di∣rected by express Law and sense of duty: In which his middle station, as having here that more perfect comprehension which Angels now have, and himself shall hereafter have, but in part communicated unto him, he may also in some degree be said to be guided by love in those commands which he performes; and that, not only as led by natural and charitable propension, but knowingly and gratefully led by sense of obligation to God; even as also sensible creatures below us, and whom we have occasion to imploy, may in our discipline over them be stiled obedient, when brought to the performance of our wills by awe and terror. There being nothing but sense of duty and gratitude that can reconcile love and fear; because else, obedience and fear do (as in their own nature) draw on hatred. And in heaven alone, they shall be throughly coincident, when our inlightned understandings shall be able truly to apprehend Gods favour and our own steady condition of perseverance and continuance therein; and then only can it be truly said of us in our obedience, that perfect love casteth out fear.

But here it is to be considered, as was formerly noted, that all things at first, and while they are strange, do move to fear, and also to hatred and dislike, and that they do by so much the sooner and more strongly do so, as each sen∣sitive doth conceive that first seen or known thing to have more or less power to hurt him, and also apprehends it self more or less within the danger there∣of. As therefore experience of indemnity, and sense and experience of ac∣ceptance and reward for yielding of obedience to this object of fear and po∣wer, doth by degrees abate of that, and make it looked upon as an object of love and goodness, so doth it therewith testifie, that love was but the conse∣quent of former obedience, even as obedience was of former fear; and so farther also, that the love of the commanded is subsequent and dependant on the love of the commanding, and that, not for obedience and imposition of the command it self, but for his kind resentment and acceptance of the obey∣ers duty.

So that then, to make a difference between that grateful return of kind∣ness which passeth between equals, and friend and friend, upon the score and sense of good nature only, and that return of respect and service which any, as in the state of subjection, doth yield at the appointment of a superior, and as fearing punishment for defailance: We may farther say, that obedience is begun in fear, continued by sense of duty, and perfected in love; and also, that the terror for performance and observation of Laws, ought to be, and is still proportionable to the greatness of the Law-maker. And therefore, in the constitution and promulgation of the Moral Law, or ten Command∣ments, we find those terrible apparitions made, that Gods fear might be so before their faces, that they sin not. As for promises, not a word then, as being but tokens of his love to such as had been regardful of this his fear. And so it must still follow, that those that are by office of command most powerful and terrible, are also soonest, and in the highest degree rendred most lovely in their service, as having (by reason of this power) their own ends

soonest sasisfied. Thus God, that hath no direct service to be done him here as to himself, is the best Master; and neither he nor others having need of our service hereafter, love and thanksgiving shall make up our obedience. In all which respects Princes are most resembling him of any any terrene Power; and so can most truly (of any) said to be served by love; which indeed they ought always to seek, but never to trust to.

And therefore, since our observations (as before noted) come at last to be collected into affections, and that when these affections come to interfere one upon another, they are guided by the general affection called will: So it is also necessary for ceasing of strife in the publike body, that the affections of particu∣lar orders and persons, should be guideded by the publike will of the King, a∣gainst whom there is no rising up. For he can only be supposed competent judg, which, and what affections ought to take place, and how far the granting to the desires of some, may stand with the desire and good of others. And none but he can be the common and entire sensory or centre of attraction and preservation; but subjects affections, being guided by several interests (even as they are severally collected in several persons) must make (in their dealings with others) several centres, which must thereupon be centres of opposition, that is of division and civil war.

And as the will, so the exercise of passions (the necessary attendants of will) must be in him onely; for if anger and hatred be at private dispose in punishments, they will proceed too destructively; and (as having no re∣gard beyond self-consideration) turn to malice and revenge. And so again (whilst these affections are in prosecution) how may covetousness, ambiti∣on, jealousie, envy, &c. make us (through partial respect only) to be com∣mon disturbers? whereas he that hath whole and equal concern, can no more proceed distructively to his subjects (in that relation of subjects) then to himself. For when publike good is crossed by any, his anger and hatred of the Author will be terminated in justice, as to any punishment; be∣cause no man can be too severe to himself; where he hath whole in∣terest.

And since (as we noted) observation and knowledge must arise from con∣cern; so publique good and peace being of nearest concern to him, his un∣derstanding must be supposed ordinarily more able to judge and determine what it is, then such as have private concern only to looke after, who there∣fore, in publike things, can only have craft. When as he, having his ho∣nor and benefit intermixed and emergent from all things rightly and duly done towards publike benefit, must be supposed always intent thereon, even for his own interest and advantage sake. Whereby it is to be supposed, that he shall be not only rendred the most able in understanding and judging how publike expedients may be best attained and managed, but also, by reason of often observation of the consequents and events of things, and which of them in possession hath proved most beneficial and pleasurable and which not, he may be justly also esteemed as the centre of political consen∣sation, as being enabled, in regard of his great share and general experience and presence in all publike dealings, to give the truest report of publique liking and inclination. For it is to be supposed, that political bodies have their proper genius and constitution, as well as natural ones have, and that

then he, as the life and spirit thereof, can best judge, and soonest disco∣ver how the humor of the people stand generally tainted and affected. So that when the inclinations and desires of subjects, in their dealing one with another, shall obtain his consent, it will then prove a coition towards the encrease of publike good: But so far as they shall undertake to act on one another without his liking or assent, so far will they rendred not only barren of any good issue, but ready also to be productive of those monsters of civil war and rebellion.

And as thus to the resentment of the general affections of the people, so to the differencing and discovering of the perfections and beauties of separate persons in regard of excellency and fitness towards publique imployment, he is to be looked upon as the most proper and able judge of what is in that kind lovely also. For as external feature and decorum hath its excellency measured by conformity to the most usual figures and shapes of the kind, the which they must be acknowed the most able to judge of that have made the most exact and general observations, even so the perfection and fitness of publike ministers being to be estimated by that conformity which is between their breeding and ability, and those imployments they are to manage; it must thence follow that the Prince being most conver∣sant and interessed, and having again most general acquaintance and know∣ledge of both publike persons and imployments (as being in himself both the perfection and epitome of such Officers, as well) as the centre of such offices he must be consequently thought the best judge of what persons are in this kind beautiful, and fit to be entrusted or rewarded with offices and badges of honor; the which we may call political or publike love.

By conformity unto the Prince his commands and directions, as to a stand∣ing examplar and copy, it will also come to pass, that there shall be such things stated as vertue and vice in morality, and righteousness and unrighte∣ousness in Religion. For when there is a certain and determinate rule set down in both, according to Divine and Natural Precept, it will follow that that which comes nearest to it will be most vertuous or righteous, and that which most differs will be most vitious and sinful. And then, by reason of this uniformity, not only peace and agreement will be secured, but our fan∣cies being for a while accustomed thereunto, content and delight will follow also. Even as (on the contrary) we see discontent, distraction and civil war, most frequently to follow those places, where least constraints to uni∣formity is kept up. For there is a beauty and handsomness arising in acti∣ons and deportments, in keeping a method and order in them according to their rule and copy, as there is a fairness and comliness in writing according to copy also.

We shall therefore, for conclusion of this quere, whether Government and Peace may be preserved without force or no, say, that since obedience, as obedience, will always displease, and since power and authority will be al∣ways affected and sought after; it will be evident that superiors shall be more or less such, as they are more or less endued with power and irresistability; and that, as power is necessary for the Governor, so is fear for the go∣verned, as heretofore noted; even for the necessary preservation of those relations, according to that saying, If I be a father, where is mine honor, if I be a Master where is my fear. For although a willing and hearty service

be most acceptable, and onely rewardable (as to the doer) yet the benefit of others will many times be gained by the deed itself; Whereas a known impunity will, by example, and as it finds hope to attain the like, procure common detriment, both by neglect of the deed it self, and by common invitation to disobedience. But if the subject, from his own or others ex∣perience, once find that his obedience, in respect of other damages and in∣forcements in the Princes power is unavoidable, he must be supposed even through discreet willingness to submit, and then through custom of so do∣ing, to arrive (at last) at a state of natural willingness in obedience it self, experience telling us that steadiest loyalty is in such subjects as have been used to greatest subjection, and most discontents and rebellions in such Families and Kingdoms, where children and subjects have been most free. And it will ever be a most certain truth, that that obedience which must unavoidably be given, will ever (in equal things) be more ready, free, and unreluctant, then that which may have hopes of avoidance.

CONCLUSION:

BUt it is now time to have done, having perhaps as much tyred others as my self in these tedious discourses, driven so vehemently on to the cure of that evil, which, while men are men, can never enter into a steady thought should be wholly done. For when all is said, Government will have its faults; and when in the rule of nature, we see it sometimes come to pass, that the stobborness of the matter is such, as will not admit of that form which to her policy in general, or to the production of some more perfect creature were in particular species necessary, (but that pestilence, murrains, mildews, &c.) to the destruction of men, beasts and vegitables; as also monstruous and im∣perfect shapes (incident to the generation of each race and kind, do sometimes happen) why should we wonder at ineffectualness herein? when, besides mat∣ter, there is a perpetual aversion of will in the governed; and (alas the while) the workmans skill or care in this, is too often so to seek, that, through his default also, the malady is increased. Since therefore nothing in this life can be to us perfect and without its inconveniences, we can only call that Go∣vernment good which is best, and which, upon tryal, hath fewest and least settled mischiefs; as not arising from its form, but contingent accidents in its ministration; and this is that which I have propounded as the drift of this whole Treatise.

Yet then again, as the many unavoidable diseases of our natural bodies, are not at all to discommend or excuse the Physicians care and pains for their mittigation or removal, so I hope in this grand disease of the politique Body (called Civil War) although I cannot attain to a perfect or constant cure, yet if the application of those remedies I have proposed, shall sometimes cause di∣version, and sometimes mittigation, I shall have comfort in my labours.

But in this (as all things else) we must leave the success to God, whose work alone it is, to still (as the raging of the Sea, so) the madness of the people. Even that mad and raging humor of liberty, which being blown to a rebel∣lious height by the breath of seditious Oratory, as seas by the wind, it is none other then if (in our natural bodies) the allurement of our pallats should tempt us to that food which should bring us to a feavor. And as these surfeits seldom

come but from such things as are best, and then again loathing of that very thing doth follow; so in the politique constitution (though nothing more ne∣cessary and commodious then peace) yet nothing more incident to mans fickle nature, then, in a giddy thirst for variety, to grow weary thereof; which, as a thing bringing Kingdoms and States to their fatal periods, no otherwise then bodily surfeits and sicknesses do single persons to their natural deaths, shall we say that as they are permitted for the punishment of our sins (which we can never want) so to this end also. And then, shall we say, that not so much in consideration of ours, or our progenitors sins, as that the will of God might be made manifest, are these things befallen us? Shall we say, that since none (of themselves) can be called righteous or good, that it may therefore be a reason that wickedness and vice are thus suffered, as to the estating us good by com∣parison, and that even again in Government, as to the adorning loyalty and other civil vertues, disobedience and rebellion is permitted also; and to make us thereby more sensible and thankful when peace shall again be restored.

But be the reasons what they will (our duties of obedience and submission being plain enough) it is our parts to look to that, and to leave these hidden things to God, whose judgements are unsearchable, and ••is ways past finding out. For sure I am, that however God for the punishing of a sinful people, permit their Princes, as he did David in the fact of numbring, to fall upon such unwarrantable acts as may bring on their punishments, yet can this punishment never warrant any active resistance of his Authority. Or be the King not good, as David was, but such another as Saul was, yet since he is our King, and the Lords anointed, who can without sin lift up their hand against him.

And why should we be more impatient of enduring those punishments from God, that come from the hands of evil Kings, then those of pestilence, famine, or the like, that come more immediately from nature, since all come from the same hand, and to the same end, the punishment of our sins. And since God owns the giving of them in his anger, and the having their hearts in his hand, and turning them wheresoever he pleaseth, why should we think of resisting one more then another?

Thus is wicked Pharoahs heart hardned, and his subjects the ••gyptians thereby plagued. And thus, as aforesaid, is good Davids heart stirred up to number the people, and these people thereupon punished with pesti∣lence. And who would have thought a three years famine so long after Sauls death, should be the punishment of surviving subjects for a past fact of zeal done by a King so long dead? Or that the house of Jehu, and his people by consequent, should be threatned with Gods punishment for the execution of that his justice upon the house of Ahab▪ three hundred years after the fact done; when as yet the very fact it self was so plainly appointed and warranted by divine authority.

In which examples of Kings sins being made causes of punishing peo∣ples sins with plagues, pestilence, famine, civil war, or the like, I would know if resisting of Kings had not been resisting of God, or if any such thing could have averted their punishment, but rather aggravated their offences, by adding this rebellion against their Prince, to their former against God, and so breaking more of his Laws. For suppose the people never so innocent, as in some of the alledged cases may appear, or suppose

as all of us are ready to flatter our own hypocrisies, that neither we nor our Fathers have sinned, as to those punishments, but that the Will of God might be made manifest, Oh let us not resist that Will, who owns all the evils that befalls each City, that is to say publike evils; lest while we will not be pu∣nished, as he appoints, by a King in his anger, he, by suffering him to be taken away, should, by Anarchy, plague us in his wrath.

In tender sense of publick Peace and Charity, and the blessed condition of the Peace makers themselves and those that are promoters and assistants in it, I shall now appeal to the Consciences and Judgements of all such as are wont to gild over their own Covetousness and Ambition with the shews of Ju∣stice and Religion, and are so forward to kill all that will not submit and joyn in opinion with them: you that will undertake to controle Heaven in its dis∣pensations, and under colour of Tyranny or Usurpation, of wrong rule or wrong entry, will at your pleasure be withdrawing your own and others obe∣dience from your present Prince, give me leave to summon your thoughts to a serious consideration of all those sad consequents that must attend it, that by calling your self to an accompt before the time of that general accomptcom, you may be both eased in your own reckoning then, and have your Consci∣ence here eased of those sins and miseries which your stubbornness must produce. Suppose then that you, with all those fair declamations of Law and Justice, or of Religion and Zeal, which you, in your popular Oratory, are so copious and ready in, shall be able to seduce and draw to your party such a considerable number of your fellow Subjects, as to form the same into a Civil war, wherein thousands must lose their lives as well on one side as the other, suppose I say, these several parties through thy perswasion slain by each other in the height of uncharitableness should now present them∣selves before thee with their wounded and macerated bodies, and all besmea∣red with gore and blood, and with grim and ghastly visages stare thee in the face as the horrid spectacles of thy confusion and amazement. But this is not all; seest thou that throng of desolate Widdows and Orphans, and of dis∣consolate Parents, who, as in sacrifice of thy ambition or avarice, are by the death of each other bereft of comforts, and left to a necessity of dying while they live; and so the never dying monuments of thy cruelty and Rebellion.

Let the shrikes and yellings of defloured and ravished Virging and Matrons, the groans, the tears, the sighs, of such as are in every corner, after the man∣ner of civil war, murthered, plundered, imprisoned, or otherwise dispoyled of life, or livelihood; let all those arise to thy remose. If not, nor the thought of that Forrest-face which thy native country must now put on, in respect of that destruction which must be introduced on its goodly Edifices, Corn, and Cattel, can move thee, as in Honor or Charity, yet let Piety: Piety I say, if thou hast any, the sense of the Honor of that God thou seemest to worship, let this move thee to think how in these Civil wars, those publike Oratories and publike places of worship dedicated to his name, must be al∣way in danger of ruine and sacriledge also, and how then canst thou persist in a course that must at once destroy all bonds of Love, Loyalty, and Reli∣gion; that must at once, and that with so high hand, offer such violence, the utmost violencence in thy power, to thy neighbour, to thy Prince, to thy God.

Doth not thy heart yet feel remorse? Heark, the Trumpet calls thee to the Judgement-seat of that great God himself, whose Honor and Authori∣ty on earth thou hast so often slighted and offended. Now for a Mountain,

now for a Rock, to cover thee from the face of the all-incenced Deity. Dost thou not now finde that the common Cause of condemnation against Chri∣stians is made for living and dying in hatred and malice? and how many are there now eying thee as the Author of, and ring-leader in those Civil distur∣bances where Christian against Christian have by thousands killed each o∣ther in the height and heat of uncharitableness? And seest thou not again how the sentence of blessed runs to the meek, to the patient, to the peace-ma∣kers? & while thou art setting forward thy trembling limbs, and stepping in, with an Apology for thy Rebellion, how hath new confusion seized thee, at the sight of that King and Prophet who did so often flye from his persecu∣ting Prince, and had his heart smiting him but for cutting off but the hemn of his Garment? what seest thou now? where are thy Texts of Scripture thy Pretexts of Law? See if thou canst make thy warrant and call unto publike Authority and Command, in any degree apparent and equal to his, or canst make thy sufferings equal to all that other (therefore) glorified company of Martyrs and Conf••ssors, who, amids all those dismal persecu∣tions, even for the most righteous cause of all, and plainly so, durst not lift up against him that was but a heathenish Prince, but chose to follow both the Precept and Example of him, who is now in the highest Throne of Ho∣nor, as a reward of his Patience. Oh horror of horrors, what is thy Judge become a party too; a Mountain, a Mountain, a Mountain.

No sooner hath thy all-dispairing soul caused thine all confounded eys to sink and settle on objects below, but, oh torment of torments. Who is this that is now to be thy Prince, and under whose Dominion thou must now for ever live? Thou shalt not need here to study pretensions of Tyranny and Op∣pression against thy Prince, nor invectives and standers against his Officers and Ministers. What is it which thou truly feelest now? Oh —

If this be the expectation, as (without Repentance) it can be none other, of all that are promoters of civil disturbance, how necessary then is it that we should timously thinking of bridling our covetous and unruly appetites, and learn patiently to submit unto that Regiment and condition of life wherein Providence hath places us. When discontent of any sort assaults us to impatience, think we then, this is not our rest. No happiness to be here expected, all things in this life comes to us mingled; as well to manifest and draw down our acknowledgement of Deity and Providence for the re∣ceipt of what is good, as to wean and withdraw our affections from this world to a better; in such sort that those very things wherein our greatest temporal preservation and good doth consist, are attended and accompani∣ed with such as are of greatest mischief. From the food with which our bodies are nourished, do we contract the most of our diseases; nay from those sorts of it which are best too, do we by intemperance, draw on those maladies which are most desperate and deadly.

From that very root of Love, and desire of beneficence and thirst of Honor, ingraffed for mutual comfort and assistance, do we daily finde con∣trary effects to be produced; when by too strict and irregular fixation and use thereof, according to the particular interest and guidance of our pri∣vate appetite and discretions, we are led into Faction and Civil war.

And so lastly, from that course of prevention and restraint which by di∣vine appointment was setled amongst us as the onely Soveraign remedy and cure of these exorbitances, namely the constitution and power of Monar∣chical

government; even this doth, together with the cure, make us lyable and obnoxious to those fatal mischiefs of Tyranny and Oppression also. Against which as we have neither reasonable or lawful remedy but that of Patience, so shall we finde it a true remedy indeed, and to usher us in∣to an habitation and Kingdom where neither a natural distemper, nor a ci∣vil distraction shall any more afflict us.

No, no, all cause of fear, either of loss or punishment is now banished; our obedience is become all love here, for a full comprehension of the plea∣sure of our present Soveraign, together with a full assurance of his continual ready acceptance, as well as of our own continual ready ability of performance shall make all apprehension of power stand as it were forgotten in that of goodness. And whereas we now know neither our own duties, nor Gods love and acceptance but in part, seeing them as through a glass darkly, then shall we know him, as to his Will and good pleasure, even as we are known of him, as to our hearty desire of serving and honoring him; and this, face to face. We shall not longer wait on tedious Inductions and Observations for some slender and fallible comprehension of these things, but at such time as Chari∣ty shall make up our Obedience, our knowledge shall be inherent, arising from presence and intuition. There is no such opacity here as to necessitate us to rays of light to discover, (at most) but skin-deep into the qualities of things; no, then the true Nature of things shall be as soon known as their names; and their inward, as their outward form. And therefore what cause then of fear that any thing should separate us from the love of God our pre∣sent Soveraign? Where there shall not be so much as a false accuser left to appear in that Kingdom; whereby to disturb us in our civil life, more then a disease to disturb us in our natural.

The life and health of our then refined bodies shall no more run the hazard of either famine or surfeit, by relying on such food as could not nourish us until dead, nor but bring death by nourishment. Our then no longer sickly nor mortal bodies, shall now have their more spiritual life and perfection secured and encreased from a food far more spiritual and perfect then our selves. In this true Paradise shall we finde the true tree of life it self; that bread of life that once came down from Heaven cloathed with our nature, that we might be made capable and Partici∣pant of his. With this food shall we be always delightfully fed, never full; always satisfied, never satiate.

As thus to our selves, so to our present society: instead of those thwart∣ings and injuries which used to come from the hands of competitors or ene∣mies, we shall, on all hands, be saluted with the ready Offices of complacen∣cy and love, for how can envy or malice have either Author or Object, where encrease of eminence or property cannot be so much as wisht for? Our en∣joyments then shall not be purchased or endeared at the price of want and dif∣ficulty: for fruition shall here antecede appetite, even so, as there shall not be so much as time or room left for a wish.

And whilst thou shalt be thus steadily compleat with happiness in thy self, so as neither to have cause to hope more, nor fear wors••, and that through the gift and participation of divine love, so shalt thou finde this love so much re∣fined also, as to be universally and reciprocally efficacious, not onely to pro∣cure the possession against fear of intrusion through others wants, but to en∣crease it through consensation of like benefit in them. Each one that could

not as one, contain more content, shall, by this union, contain all. We shall not then know one another by our old dividing relations of consanguinity or friendship, whereby petty unions were made destructive of the common, and introductive of general disagreement: No, every one is lookt upon with the heightened affection of a brother, by means of that more close tye and relati∣on to be derived from that Our father which is in Heaven. Hath any one been so heroick, as but to taste what it is to be truely in love with any per∣son here? Let him then think, that every one now shall be that he, or that she, but withour thought of a he or a she. Not so hazardously now beloved as to relye on the courtesie of a Idea, from the intent observation of whose per∣fection in our conceit, the imperfections of the original might come to be clou∣ded. No, as we shall no longer depend on the help of deceiveable no∣tions, nor Affections or Passions for our comprehension and understanding, so shall we not be in danger to be captivated with the glance of a single sense; and that from an outward perishing and deceiveable figure. Our Understanding and intuistive knowledge shall now make way for our will; it shall not stand to the issue of two contending passions here. Where nothing is farther to be hoped for or feared, all such composition must cease. We shall not in this place love at the hazard of our discretions, nor endanger the loss of our selves by the love of another: for in this society every other shall be truely known to be an other self, even so much thy self, that thou shalt not be to thy self, but in that self: for we shall be so like and so much one another, as not to know di∣stinction or separation but what number must make.

Oh that happy practice of love below that prepared thee for this blessed enjoyment of love above! Oh that happy performance of Obedience to thy former Fathers in the flesh, although unto death, that hath now redeemed thee from death, and fitted thee for this subjection unto the Father of Spi∣rits unto life! Oh happy participation in a Cross that makes thee now a sha∣rer with thy Saviour in his Crown! Thy former bread of affliction and tears of sorrow shall be by thy blessed Savior here turned into wine of comfort and food of life; not to be now tasted in a Sacramental sip or broken piece, and then onely in a topick Communion; but, in this true and real Communion with thy Redeemer himself, thou shalt totally and eternally enjoy that Catho∣like and blissful Communion of Saints. Truely blissful now indeed, and that in act and possession; free from the resentment and fear of all those persecuti∣ons and afflictions which formerly gave abatement to that fulness of joy which in the militant Communion could be expected. For here thou shalt, in and with them, in a continual and triumphant manner, be made a more neer and firm participant of all the gracious influences of deity: whose blessings and bounty can now be no more denyed or hid from thee, then thy most blessed meditator can be again separate from that nature of thine, which was by him for thy sake assumed.

But thou, thou ravished and exulting soul, what canst thou now finde to do, when thou hast found thy self thus full and hast found others thus full also, e∣ven to such a mutual encrease of joy and fulness? Why then thou and they must run over. Yes, yes, that thou shalt yet finde a new joy, nay thy greatest joy, in acknowledging thy joy. Thy grateful spirit shall now run and croud into the Chorus of the heavenly host, and there cheerfully accompany thy fel∣low Saints and Angels in symphony of Alleluiahs to that inexhaustible foun∣tain of goodness. When thou hearest the Cherubin and Seraphim crying

out Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of Sabboth, how will thy heart leap? how readily wilt thou also thrust thy self into the glorious company of the Apostles into the goodly fellowship of the Prophers, and into the noble Army of Mar∣tyrs, and there joyn with that triumphant Church, in a Magnificant or Te deu••, or other publike forms of Doxology; and therein acknowledge him the God of this thy rest and rejoycing too: for our Bibles themselves shall now shrink into Ps••lteries, and our Prayers into Praises; and as our greatest delight, so our greatest strife shall now be to be foremost in the Quire, and to be standing up and as eminent as we can in those grateful and uniform acclamations, of glory, glory, glory; and again, and again, in the same words, glory, glory, glo∣ry, &c. eve•• to eternity giving glory to those three most blessed persons; to whom be Praise and Glory here on earth both now and for ever, Amen.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Cor. 4, 1, 10, &c.
• * 1.2

  Rom. 14.22.