Of government and obedience as they stand directed and determined by Scripture and reason four books / by John Hall of Richmond.

THE SECOND BOOK OF GOVERNMENT AND Its Ground and Foundation, according to VULGAR POSITIONS. (Book 2)

The Introduction.

IN pursuance of my first Proposal, for establishment of publike Peace and good, I have in the passed Book, brought Monarchy to its just height: and that, from such general and obvious Argu∣ments from Reason and Scri∣pture, as do, to my thinking, point directly to that end, and no way else. But, being to write in an age, where contrary preju∣dice will not ordinarily give men ability or leisure to attend the discovery, it fareth therefore with me, as with that Artifi∣cer, who, having brought something unexpectedly to pass, is forced for the farther confirmation of the thing it self, to sub∣mit it to the handling and tryal of the spectators in their own way. And because it may again be objected,

to what pur∣pose all this ado, since these very ends are, or may as well be attained, by the ways already approved of:

and that, by

men of great Eminence and Learning amongst us? It seems therefore now again needful to take all this Structure of Go∣vernment in pieces, and to examine it farther, part by part, ac∣cording to that Fabrick, and those materials, which are usu∣ally brought to the constitution thereof. In which Discourse, having first cleered and rectified those vulgar political Ma∣xims from their former rubbish and disguise, I shall then prove, that so much of each of them as is compatible with just Go∣vernment, and the ends thereof, are to be appropriate to Mo∣narchy onely. In this my undertaking, in the defence of Gods true Vicegerent amongst us, there seems to lye on my part, the like task as there did formerly on Moses, in the mani∣festation of God himself: that is, not onely to prove the Monarch to be so by way of plain demonstration, but also to extend this Reason, to the eating up of all those serpentine shews,* 1.1 wherewith these Janni and Jambri, the rebellious En∣chanters of our times, have hitherto deceived the people; and thereby kept them in a kinde of an Egyptian darkness. And, in this course, I shall begin first with ••he head thereof, the fained unity in Aristocracies and Democracies.

CHAP. I. Of Anarchy.

THey that suppose the word to imply onely that state and con∣dition of men where no Government at all is exercised, will much to seek to finde out any instance or example for proof of their Assertion: or indeed, any possibility how it should at all come to pass. Therefore, that which hath hi∣therto been spoken of the original of Government, in the fourth chapter of the precedent book, must be understood onely as supposing it to have its Reason in Nature, and that thereby it might have been known, although the same had been by no other light or positive Law found out and appointed: and not as determining that ever men were, or could be left by a careful God in such a confused condition, where, like a brood of Cadmus, wanting all manner of Breeding and Instruction, they should fall to the slaughter of one another; till their bleeding wounds, and not his Precepts or Providence, had taught them rules of Subjection. No, it would be too plain and great compliance with Athiesm to think Gods Omniscience in foreseeing, or his Goodness in preventing, so small or slack, as to leave man, a Creature upon whom (above all the rest) he had bestowed such workman∣ship and care, to the common hazard and condition of that which was meanest.

Leaving therefore these fancies aside, that think men should (like swarms of Bees) be brought to choice of Policy without any foregone experience or knowledge of Government, we must make Government the elder bro∣ther to Anarchy. For so we finde, that while there were but two persons in the world, the woman, by special appointment, was to have her desires sub∣ject to her husbands, and he was to rule over her. And, as Wives,* 1.2 so Chil∣dren and Servants, were subject to the Father of the Family, in such sort, that no man, but, being either Head or Member of a Family, (by one rela∣tion or another) either had or yeilded subjection. And, even before Kings to finde an Ex Lex or person (like Caine) under no protection, and conse∣quently under no Government, was a vain attempt.

And this prime or more natural Prerogative of Primo-geniture, and Fa∣ther of the Family, although it had not the name; yet it had the truth and reality of Monarchy: and that as well in the Authority as Unity of the per∣son: as by that phrase,* 1.3 the father of the Moabites and Amonites to this day, may appear: which must signifie succcession of these Monarchical Go∣vernors, in right of the fir••t Father. So that now, under the name of King, there is but a continuance and restitution of that ancient form, by change of the name from Pater Familiae, to Pater Patriae: importing a continuance of Power and Office, notwithstanding the encrease of t••rritory and num∣ber

of Subjects. For the length of life that gave these Ancients advantage to see many Families peopled out of their own loyns, gave them also right of Government in chief.

But this common Parent now dead, Pride, Covetousness, Ambition, &c. quickly clouded the respect due by birthright to the elder brother, who by the Law of God should rule over the other,* 1.4 and have their desires subject to him: and so, through stubbornness, did break that course which, if it had been observed, would have made Monarchy perpetual: but not being so, Anarchies succeed. For the divided Families, finde many occasions of controversie amongst themselves, which they, in their reputed equality of Jurisdiction, knew not how to determine: because, not submitting to that hereditary right (before spoken of) by the which Isaac had appointed Esau as servant to Jacob (as apprehending him the elder) and which Jacob also, for Peace-sake, gave to Judah amongst the Tribes of Israel (namely to be perpetual Law-giver) discord and dissention quickly broke in upon them. And this (no doubt) was the state of the old world before the flood; for we read not of any Monarchs; but that, as men began to multiply in the earth, so began they, for want of restraint, to be ruled onely by their own likings: which the heads of Tribes, for want of a common Head, exercising over one another as men of renown,* 1.5 the whole earth came to be filled with violence. For although each Family had its Government within it self, and so all men with∣in one Government or other, yet, since there wanted a definitive sentence or Monarch to unite these Governors amongst themselves, they were in the true estate of Anarchy.

But to Noah and his sons, that were to people the world afterwards, as these mischiefs were well known, so were they avoided. For after that the earth came to be so fully inhabited that now Families must interfere one up∣on another, and could not part peaceable as Abraham and Lot did, we finde them under Kings; as a necessary form for preservation of mankinde. Which blessed Government was ever accompanied with Gods promises of fruitful∣ness, as before recited. But if, by accident, they were removed, these peo∣ple were in the sense of Antiquity, if without Kings, without Government also, and in the estate of Anarchy and confusion. And thereupon, we finde it threatned, Isa. 7.16. that before the overthrow of Judah and Israel, the Land should be forsaken of both her Kings.* 1.6

And so much as will suffice to convince Anarchy to be absence of Mo∣narchy, is in Holy Writ implyed, when, in the inter-regnum of the Judges, it is said,* 1.7 there was no King in Israel, but every man did that which was righ∣teous in his own eyes. And yet were all men, at the same time, subject to the Fathers and chief of their Tribes; as appears by the act of the Danites: they had also the same Laws they had before for their direction. But, be∣cause there was now no single judge, who might interpret and inforce this Law, and give direction and command in chief, it was reckoned a state of Anarchy.

The like, at that time was imputed to the men of Laish; and made a rea∣son of their easie destruction: for there was no Magistrate in the Land that might put them to shame in any thing.* 1.8 Where, by Magistrate in the singular number, or heir of restraint (for so the original will bear) we may conceive their want of Monarchy was intended:* 1.9 for it was always esteemed as a wo to a Land when many were the Princes thereof. And indeed, is the punishment

of rebellion, for casting off the one first head, and so making many in their divided Factions and Tribes. And again, the state thereof is in the Text counted as preserved, by having one Prince: called there a man of under∣standing and knowledge. Meaning one of such capacity,* 1.10 as can act by him∣self: and not leave the kingdom to be governed by others, after Democra∣tick principles.

They that think understanding and knowledge was here more pointed at then the unity of the person, will be then troubled to finde, why the plurali∣ty of Princes should be disliked: since, in that respect, many understanding men must in quantity be more then one. And again, likely it was for one single person to want it, and almost impossible for a number of any greatness: whereupon it might, upon that supposition, have been set down, but by many men of understanding, &c. But the truth is, the curse and malediction is in the word many; or else many understanding Princes might have been a bles∣sing, as well as one. But why this one Prince is here set down, on the other side, as a man of understanding, is because Princes that want understanding, are great oppressors:* 1.11 and so could not be counted as the preservers of Coun∣tries. Whereas we shall never finde the having of one Prince, as one, to be otherwise given then as a blessing: nor of many, as many, (and that in supreme Authority at once) to be otherwise given then as a punishment. It being for the inconvenience of being governed by Democratick prin∣ciples, in the interim of any Monarchs insufficiency, that makes the nonage and other disabilities of Princes come to be esteemed the Lands woe.* 1.12

For if, at all, the equal Government of Peers or People, either indepen∣dently amongst themselves, or as joyntly sharing therein with the King, had been good or commendable, then this nonage of the King, which must ne∣cessarily produce it, should not have been reckoned as in it self a woe. But so we shall finde it undenyably to be accompted, if we look into the third chap∣ter of Isa.* 1.13 where God threatens the Jews to give them Children to be their Princes, and Babes to rule over them. And, in the next verse, tells the con∣sequential punishment that should follow the Anarchical rule of others in their names and rooms: viz. and the people shall be oppressed every one by another, and every one by his neighbor.* 1.14 And there being want of power in the per∣son that should be the fountain of power and Government, it shall soon fol∣low in the inferior relations: so that the childe shall behave himself proudly against the ancient, and the base against the honorable. But then,* 1.15 because these mischiefs had been by them observed to rise from want of Monarchi∣cal power, a man shall take hold of his Brother of the house of his Father, say∣ing, Thou hast cloathing, be thou our Ruler, and let this ruine be under thy hand.* 1.16 But, because God had determined to punish them, they shall be herein denyed also.

Which desolation, to follow the absence or inability of the Monarch, is again expressed in the twelfth verse, viz. as for my people, children are their oppressors, and women rule ever them; under which notions of women and children oppressors, we are to conceive persons disabled in the execution of their Governments themselves, through personal disability, and want of power and judgement. For since, we cannot think women and children could do it most in their own persons, we must thereupon conceive their punishment & oppression to arise from that divided, & Aristocratick way of Government which the Nobility or others should act, by reason of this want of superior

restraint. Whereupon, in the following verses, God, in the disability or ab∣sence of his Deputy, undertakes the cause of the oppressed himself: The Lord standeth up to plead, and standeth up to judge the people: the Lord will enter into judgement with the ancient of his people,* 1.17 and the Princes thereof: for ye have eaten up the vineyard, the spoile of the poor is in your houses: what mean you that you beat my people to pieces, and grinde the faces of the poor, saith the Lord of hosts.

And if we look into the New-Testament, and the time of our Saviour, we shall finde, not onely this malediction actually removed from the world, by the presence of him that came not to destroy mens lives but to save them, but,* 1.18 it will also appear, that this error and absurdity of Polarchy was by that time so well known, that the fountain of truth makes the impossibility of its right in Government amongst men, to be the medium of his Argument a∣gainst admission of any equality in our subjection to God: for had it been true, that a man might have served more then one Master, his Argument had been nothing. And why he puts it in the notion of Master, and not of Prince, may be for that the Jews had not any Prince of their own at that time: nor was there any Polarchy elsewhere to make instance in, so as his Auditors might conceive how inconsistent plurality of Commanders is with that singleness which belongs to the duty of obedience. And therefore, although he instance in a Family, because to them best known, yet it propor∣tionably holds in all Governments: namely, that intireness of obedience can onely be from entireness of command. For else, I see not but a man may as well serve two or more Partners in a Family, as he may do Partners in a Com∣monwealth.

But although our Saviour seem not to point against Polarchy expresly herein, yet St. James, that knew well his minde, and perceived the mystery of Antichristianism already working, doth it plainly; saying, My Brethren be not many Masters,* 1.19 knowing that we shall receive the greater condemnation. Surely, he meant not by this word many, to forbid any man to be Master of his own Servants or Family: to which end, as he did allow more Families then one, so must he allow several Masters to them. Nor could he be sup∣posed generally to reprove Pride or any other Vice, as barely Vices.

First, for that he, and others, used to name such crimes more plainly that all might know them: and next, for that such like Vices, being not allow∣able in any man at all, it had been more fit to have said be not any, then be not many. And therefore, I conceive the Master here meant, is that one publike supreme Commander, which is set over us: into which rank he for∣bids any more then one to enter, when he saith, be not many. And, that his mea∣ning was of these supreme Masters, will farther appear by the consequential guilt likely to follow in the great account of these publike Stewards, although rightfully undertaken; for in many things we offend all: that is, we have so many offences to answer for in our seperate and private callings already (in relation to things submitted to our own guidance) that we need not increase them by increase of our charge and trust.

But, if any there be, that do yet doubt that these last alleadged Texts (prohibiting parity in command) do reach to Political or State Governors, because set down many Masters onely: or that the former alleadged woe of Solomon, set down to attend the disability of the King, were not applyable to that disability which his subjects stubbornness did cause, as well as to that

which his natural incapacity did produce, let them here this wise man once again most plainly pronouncing them both: My son fear thou the Lord and the King, and meddle not with them that are given to change: For their ca∣lamity shall rise suddenly, and who knoweth the ruine of them both. The first verse expresly points out the onely Officer and person who, next unto God, we are to make the object of our highest obedience and fear: and the other, plainly sets forth the woe and ruine following, both to the seditious and se∣duced.

They that would interpret the prohibition against sedition and change here set down, as also the fore-recited punishment of many Princes for the wicked∣ness of a Land, not to import the admission of Polarchy in the place of Mo∣narchy, but the change of Princes one after another; do then (thereupon) confess, that all Lands and People that practise such seditious courses are wic∣ked: inasmuch as fear and obedience to an evil King might else have been excepted; and subjects themselves allowed to change him for a man of un∣derstanding: without consideration that they were blessings or punishments sent and set over us by God onely.

If it had been said, For the wickedness of a Land many are the evil Princes thereof, or, my son fear the present good King, and meddle not with them that would change him for another; then we might well indeed have thought, the words many, and change, to import succession. But then, why should not many Princes or men of understanding, ruling successively or at once, be set down as a blessing and preservative to a state, as well as one? For, if understanding make the blessing, as in it self, there will (as before noted) be more in this many, then in one. And lastly, what evasion will they finde a∣gainst the prohibition of many masters? What, must it intend suddain suc∣cession too? and so tolerate many at once to be in equal command, either in the Family or elsewhere: in such sort, as we might serve God and Mammon both at once, but not presently one after another, so as to change Mammon to serve God?

No certainly, the word many can admit of no such wresting; especially being put in the present Tense by are, it must plainly denote them to be such as are to be at the same time, and all at once; and not such as shall, or have been successively raigning, and so may come to be called many, in respect of those many ages and times wherein they reigned. For if so, how shall we do to state and compute any Lands Malediction, for want of a determinate present time wherein these many Princes might be said to raign, more then, then at another time? For if succession be unhappiness, then are all Lands so. It is not therefore to be doubted, but that Solomon intended Polarchy by many, as the plainest expression he could give thereof: having not learnt his wisdom from their Schools, where the notions of Aristocracies and De∣mocracies were invented.

Or, if the word many should be thought importing that condition of any people wherein many competitors are at once striving for the Regality, so as to introduce Civil War, then is the malediction confessed to be want of Monarchy. For although it be the height of Polarchical mischief to be in actual Civil War, and in open Arms, yet it takes not off the cause thereof from being malediction too: which is that faction and siding, which must always be where many Governors are at once.

But if any there be, who, from Gods permission of these Governments

to be in the world, do therefore think them lawful; and so are slow to inter∣pret any place of Scripture to make against them, there is no better way to discover their partiality to these forms above Monarchy, then by supposing the one to be put in the others stead; and so to think with themselves, if it had been said, For the wickedness of a Land one is the Prince thereof, but by many men of understanding the state thereof is preserved: and so also, My son fear God and this or that sort of Polarchy, &c. whither they would not (thereupon) have more readily concluded against Monarchy, then now a∣gainst Polarchy?

And hence (as our Preface noted) we may observe that there is not in Scripture to be found the mention of any people without a King; nor can any other Record instance in any state of eminence, which oweth not its foundation to that form of policy. For it was after-times onely, that, as the inordinate lusts of men began more to abound, so sought they to be rid of restraint: and therefore by little and little strived to take wholly away, or clip the wings of Majesty: that under pretence of ruling by Law, and so interpreting and ruling those Laws by themselves, they might at last be un∣der no rule at all. And now come Aristocracies and Democracies, being but Anarchies, and onely differing in number of Commanders from one another, to be called Governments lawful, against all Reason. For since po∣litical government must be onely where there is a distinct relation in the per∣sons of Governors and governed, here they are both the same, and so con∣founded, that they are not to be known one from another, and so cannot be rightly called Governments.

For Government is then onely, when the Governor, as Agent, and the governed, as Patient, stand reciprocally ready to operate towards the Go∣vernors ends.

Towards the Governors ends I say, for so far as the Patient or governed, hath design respective to it self in any thing, it cannot be called passive or subject, but active rather; and so no Government. And although Go∣vernment may be in degree more or less, in comparison of one government to another, as the vertue of Agency and Patibility stand in measure increa∣sed or remitted, yet doth the due execution of smaller commands make go∣vernment as well as the greater; and obedience to the smaller Prince is as truly constitutive of Government, as to the greatest; whilst his Subjects stand to their powers ready to receive and obey his Laws. For albeit that Government, being an active quality, ows its chief essence to the Governor, from whence it did at first proceed and take force, yet since this active qua∣lity is not of force to act otherwise then as in the Patient, as its proper sub∣ject, it cannot therefore be called government farther then that Correlate the Patient or Subject stands reciprocally fitted to admit the Governors power and impression. Fitted I say it must be hereunto, according to its re∣lation as aforesaid, so as to work as the Agent or Governor shall see cause: which fitness doth then constitute Government to be and continue, even whilst there is no real execution according to the vertue thereof. For Go∣vernment may be while this Agency is not outwardly exercised, but cannot at all be where the relations themselves are not distinctly and properly ready and kept up to act according to occasions.

So that now, in the confused fabrick of these Polarchies, we can by no means finde true Government, as being so disabled to finde where to fixe and

place this active quality of governing, and the passive quality of governed. For we shall not onely finde it uncertain whether the people or their own Magistrates and Senate are Governors, because sometimes the people or go∣verned are really taking on them to act their own wills as chief, but also (supposing the Government in the Senate) it will be still as hard so to fix it there, as to make it to be Government.

For in that fancied equality which they have in power to one another, who shall be superior? and if the persons in the major Vote be Soveraigns, and the lesser Vote and the rest of the people Subjects, who shall then be Sove∣raigns when these major voters come, by variety of occasions, to be many of them on the minor side? will not this render both relations, and the Go∣vernment it self thereupon founded, to be a thing unfixed and uncertain; or but Anarchy new-named? For the whole body cannot be Soveraigns, because the minor part must be still subject to the major: which major part again, having no personal or certain assurance it shall continue so, the Go∣vernment also may be so, or not so; and consequently, the same persons be Governors or not, as occasions shall lead them. Take then away, or un∣settle the relation of Governors, and that of governed will cease and be unfix∣ed also.

And whereas, again, Monarchies receive their main assurance from the mutual oaths between Governor and governed, where are the Oaths between State and people, as between Monarch and people? do they swear to ob∣serve the Laws, or do the people swear to them Alleagiance? Or if God be omitted, as not seemly to call him in as party or witness to a mock Govern∣ment, so unlike his, then the trust must be supposed implicite from the peo∣ple to them; and so to pass with their election. Whereupon, since this Electi∣on and trust is to the several and particular members, all alike, and equal, as they came to be chosen, how can some Members, under a minor Vote be ex∣cluded, without breach of that trust whereby they had equal power? Or was the trust to the whole joyntly (which is yet hard to be conceived since they must be elected personally and severally) how can a Major Vote ex∣clude John, Will: Thomas, and it may be a hundred more of equal trust to themselves? To say they trusted a major is unconceiveable; because trust follows Election, and Election must have a personal and definite, and not a notional object: such as a Major Vote is; which must be always contingent and unfixed.

And, if this major Vote have not its power from Election, how comes it to have it? or, how differs it from the tyranny of Anarchy, which is of all tyranny the worst? for every man is herein oppressed of his neighbour, and the weaker and fewer in continual vexation of the stronger and more in number: with this aggravation also, that herein they seem remediless;* 1.20 be∣cause their many oppressors, (for so the major part must be) have the countenance of Justice for what they do. They that tell us,

that since it is requisite that all controversies should be ended, it is therefore fit that a major part should be taken as the whole: forasmuch as in few, or no cases u∣niversal assent being to be expected, without this rule, no decision, or opini¦on of the Assembly could be had.

But then, I pray, what necessity of put∣ting your selves into such a condition of Government as must put you to this necessity? Indeed this collection of a major Vote is many times neces∣sary and good in Parliaments, and Assemblies in Monarchies; where the re∣sults

and opinions of the whole Council can no otherwise appear to the Prince, who for that cause assembled them: and where he himself, representing the whole people joyntly, shall in the determination, afterwards be on which side he pleaseth: and so leave none uninterressed, or unconsenting: Joyntly I say, for that in him onely, as being but one person, there can be an united and ge∣neral consent and representation. For, if that rule be true, that what is the concern of all should have the consent of all, how shall these Shires and Bur∣roughs that come now, as minor voters, to have their Representatives over∣born, be obliged to the determinations of a major Vote, not by them ele∣cted or entrusted, if by their joynt subordination to the Monarch, who did before give them power thus to elect, they stood not still obliged?

So that, they that alleadge a major Vote ought of it self to prevail, be∣cause it is to be presumed that, in case of opposition, even by by strength it would so fall out, where is then their Government founded on pretended consent, if meer force must be the rule? For what think they shall become of Equity, which alone should take place, as having Reason and Wisdom for its guide? what doth Equity and Reason so abound, as that the major part of men in general, or of any Society in particular should be always the juster and wiser? if not, what do we but endanger to follow a multitude to do evil, and speak in a cause to decline after many to wrest judgement.* 1.21 For if the mi∣nor side must acquiesse, onely because it is the minor and weaker in number and power, what differs this from the Government of Beasts and Fishes: which prevail not by strength of Reason or Argument, but by force of bo∣dy and number? Again, if the fewer must be always overborn and govern∣ed, who shall govern the other? Or, how can the major part be without subjection or government, and yet the whole State or Society be truely said to be governed? And while they shall pretend to determine the differences of the people, who shall have power to determine theirs? Will they set a major Vote upon a major Vote, or will they (as most usually) remain so many Ex Lex, or unbridled persons, in pursuit of their own Wills onely?

In a word, in this fained Government or political Paction, how can Peace or Unity be expected, where it is not so much as designed in shew or appea∣rance? For, whereas the submission of all in general to some kinde of coer∣cive and superior power is in Government on all hands necessary, here the greater part are exempted and left at liberty. And where political order ap∣points an Union in the body, by means of an Union in the head, in Demo∣cracy the head is made of many; and, by a monstrous deformity, made big∣er then the body. And where again, in Monarchy the whole people are sub∣ject to the Prince, and he to God (so that there remains but one personate Liberty as to the Laws of the Kingdom) here the greater part have no Laws to restrain them; but, according to the dictates of unbridled Nature good and bad, Justice and injustice; are at their own determination.

Against which, it will be bootless to object that the good of the major part is in reason to be preferred to that of the fewer, for that none will deny, supposing it in things equally concerning them: but who shall judge of that, when, instead of one person, of common concern and interest in the whole people, one faction shall thus be still judging another, and so, reckoning themselves the whole State, endeavor the subversion of their opposites, with∣out conceit of publike detriment.

But that which is most direct to shew this Government null or unlawful, is their want of Authority. For their deriving power from the people onely, must argue they s••ill want it: because the people having it not themselves, they cannot (as elsewhere proved) give it to others. For how can the peo∣ple give power to the people, more then a man can be said to give power to himself? whereupon, these Polarchs, having no mission from God, or Authority from that rule of Government by him set down, how can they be but in their administrations tyrannical; and be in danger, when they put any man to death, to commit murther with the sword of Justice?

And where again, it is alleadged,

That all power is founded in the Will, and that voluntary submission makes Authority lawful and tolerable;

these forms are but so in pretence, and carry on their executions by continual and irresistable terror and force, in regard of their number not to be withstood. Whereas the single Prince, can be obeyed but voluntarily; according as sense of Loyalty, Duty, or Love shall direct: and when, or so far as he shall use force, so as to be called tyranny or oppression, this must arise as he makes use of a major number or strength, and by the force of other men prevails against a minor part which he thinks fit to punish: but as King, or as one person in himself considered▪ he can never be but voluntarily obeyed.

For it is the gross vulgar mistake, that because there is in some Republikes freedom to elect Representatives allowed to the people by such as sway in the present domineering faction, that therefore they are also free and personally consenting in what these Representatives do. And under this flattering dis∣guise popular Orators prevail: affirming, that as we singly cannot will to de∣stroy or harm our selves, so communities also cannot be supposed to injure themselves.

For although (say they) they should enact a Law of some universal damage, yet since their enacting of it must conclude this damage was to them insensible, they cannot therein be harmful to themselves in ge∣neral, or injurious to others in particular. Not harmful to themselves, be∣cause upon any experience thereof they may alter it; not injurious to o∣thers, because, according to the foresaid supposition, each one being con∣senting, the Maxim of volenti non fit injuria acquits them thereof.

Where∣as in truth, these formal Elections can never be general nor free: nor can the particular actings and Laws of Governors be any more stiled the voluntary actings of the governed, then any other arbitrary Authoriry (for such it must be, if it be any) can be called the voluntary act of such as must o∣bey.

But, when they say a Community cannot harm it self, the falacy lies un∣der the notion of Community. For they would have it comprehend in our conceits the whole people: as though each one should be still personally acting and consenting in all things concerning their own harm or benefit. It is true this community of Trustees and Representatives (who indeed usually make themselves signifie the whole Community) can never (as taking them to be of one minde and interest) hurt themselves irremediably: but why may they not, nay why must they not (as a separate body) have a sepa∣rate interest from the people under them, and so joyn for enacting such things as may concern their power or riches in general? And why must they not again, as having several proprieties and seperate places of Honor and Power of their own to seek, (seperate from these of their fellow Senators) and divide amongst themselves likewise, and also divide the people, by siding to gain

and joyn a major Vote to attain them? at which time (truely) those that are of that part of the Community which is on the minor and weaker side, will think and finde themselves harmed, although the ma∣jor community, taking on them to be the whole community, do not hurt it self.

And whereas the preservation of Peace and Unity of Society, consists in the Unity of the definitive Sentence, here, through the many heads, the Uni∣on cannot be: Or if, as to the definitive part, they say there may be an Uni∣on by collection of major Votes: It is true so indeed, that there is an Uni∣on in the major Vote to that purpose; but is there not another Union in the minor Vote also against the major? and then it will come to pass, that this Affirmative and Negative Unions (as contrary to one another) will make a plain disunion: and so, this supposed great head of the State be two heads at least; and consequently, this political body, being divided also, it cannot resemble the natural; which is therefore called individual.

Nor can there be any firm Unity here expected; because the true cause and foundation thereof is wanting: in that they can never look on one ano∣thers proprieties, or theirs below them with equal concern and interest, as the Monarch doth to the generality of his Subjects. For he, having his ho∣nor and profit arising from all in general and each one in particular, is care∣ful of all alike: whereas they unite and agree but out of necessity. For at first, whilst they were yet rising, and were called factions, they were united in their several interest by hope of common gain, and now having attained it, they settle upon this confederacy through a common fear of losing it. So that hope chiefly unites Factions, and fear chiefly keeps them so, and settles Anarchies. Because, if their hope of gain, by overthrowing their own former Authority, had not exceeded their fear of so doing, they had not associated ar first; and so now if their common fear of loss from a Sove∣raign Authority did not exceed their present hopes of gaining from one ano∣ther, they would not so continue.

And farther, if in States the major part be the whole; why have not the Magistrates and Decrees their derivative Power from them onely? If they be not the whole, as indeed no part can be the whole, (but that it is necessary for more fulness of power that the acts proceed in the name of the whole) how come the lesser and absent parties, which might perhaps together make the major, to be rightly brought in to authorise those actions that are not theirs, but done against their consents? So that, to make an Unity in this head or definitive sentence, since the whole body of them and each one severally was alike trusted, there must be first a full Union of consent amongst themselves: and then, no remedy but to serve them as the Cardinals in the Popes election, that is, to keep them immured without Light or Food till they agree. At which time, it may be, the minor side will be as likely to overcome the major by their gift of absti∣nence, as the major would have before probably done them by force. But as this would make the Office of a Statesman little desired, so would it give causes a slow dispatch: and yet, till it be done, I see not how the o∣pinion of the major part can carry the sense of the whole, so as to make the whole and a part to be but the same thing.

Again, if acts must pass in the name of the whole, as the body intrusted; and in nature and reason more worthy then a part, why must not an appeal proceed so also? And since they which bring their causes thither, bring them to the whole assembly, until they have their unamous verdict, they have not what they came for: their trust to the whole being but in part satisfied. Nay, if things be well considered, they never or seldome have the major sence of the Senate neither; for to omit external force (which is wont to awe them) if there were such an equal number deducted from the major side as will answer those on the minor that disagreed from the major in opinon, there will be (many times) so inconsiderable a number of persons left to make the odds, that one would think it strange that three or four men should be held for, and represent the whole Senate. And yet it must so usually be with such, that instead of multitude of Councellors, would have multitude of Com∣manders; whereupon all Publike debates come to be managed as in a kind of Lottery, which none knows the issue of, until the casting up of Votes be taken.

For none can say that reason doth at all prevaile there, as of it self, but as swayed by heat of passion and contention: not by weight or number of arguments, but by noise or number of voices. And this, because in tak∣ing the issue of the debate, the reasons or arguments given by either side are not left to be considered of by those that are to take the resolutions of the Senate or Parliament, but the greater number of persons on either side doth constantly of it self so prevaile, as it cannot be called the reasonable, but accidental or occasional result or determination of such or such a counsel. Which is only avoidable, where one person of power hath liberty to give his reasonable sentence and judgement therein: and that, according as he shall finde the force of the reasons given on either side to prevaile: and not to be any way tyed to the blind hazard of number. One person he must be, and that of power above them also. For if they be more, you shall fall into the same hazard again, of having their sentence and debate ended by meer force and number also. And if this one person have not sole power, but be obnoxious unto any; then terror from without, and not reason from within may again sway his determination.

But it is answered,

That the major part is representatively the whole Se∣nate, as the whole Senate is representatively the whole people.

But how (I pray) can this be brought to pass? how can a shaddow make a shaddow, or deputies make deputies? Whence can the major part derive their power? Not from the people, they trusted the whole; not from the minor part, for they oppose them, and cannot give what they have not. Why did not the major Vote of the eleven Tribes pretend to this right against Benjamen? No, they knew they could not of right assume the power of the whole of themselves, they being but a part; therefore, in absence of their Judges (the next united whole on earth) they take power and authority from the foun∣tain thereof, namely from God himself: by whose assent and direction they came to be enabled herein: and until then, their resolutions in their assem∣blies had no rightful power for execution; but should have been reckoned amongst other Anarchical acts of self-liking, as wanting lawful authority otherwise to impose on their brethren and equals. And if delegates have not this power of delegation in themselves, where is it expressed or warran∣ted from their originals, the People? And therefore, supposing the voice and determination of the whole Senate may be of force to binde the people, as

having their power vertually in their several members by them chosen to that purpose, yet this domineering power of a major Vote will prove unlaw∣ful: as having nothing of the pretended paction and consent, or political as∣sociation therein: whose end and aime was chiefly protection, or defending the minor or weaker side against the stronger, if justice so required: at least, not to suffer the major part to judge of their own cause: but to appoint a de∣finitive and certain determination, that might be above all orders, numbers, and degrees.

So that Anarchy is where the major and stronger do alwayes govern the less and weaker; and is it self not subject to any third differenced authority. And true policy is where this tyrannical force is avoided, and that, by a just submision of the major, aswel as of the minor, unto a third common and indivissible judge: who thereupon becomes stronger then them both. And, although in all disputes there must be disagreement, and a major and minor side, yet he being the vertual whole, and both parts submitting to him, union and peace must follow. Till this be done, nature is not holpen by policy. For, if government imply no more then the exercise of force or power, an∣swerable onely to such rules as the stronger shall judge fitting, beasts have it aswel as men: who by numbers and strength prevaile upon one another. But, unto men, this decision seemed too unreasonable: For they found it on all hands prejudicial. Inasmuch, as themselves that were on the major side in one case, might anon be on the minor in another: and that then, as they would be themselves protected from violence being weak, so they should not inflict or use it being strong. They found that, whilst this way of pre∣vailing was continued, men studied not equity, but association: not to get right, but force and numbers on their side. And they found, that, as each man judgeth for himself, so did each faction and party also. In which con∣troversies the dangers of mens lives were more to be feared (in relation to the whole State) whilst they thus contended in multitudes, then while they strove singly: as set battailes destroy more then duels, and the two Israelites striving in Moses time before the Law, made not equal destructi∣on to the combination of Israel and Benjamin against each other after the Law.

On all sides they confessed, that right, and not force should prevaile in decision: but who should judge of this right? Would not each party pre∣tend to it? was it to be expected that either should say we contend for what belongs not to us? Therefore, while this course held, right had no certain aboad in causes or persons, but fleeted up and down as the major side did. Should any third person interpose, out of charity, and to reconcile them, both sides would answer as the said Israelite to Moses, Who made thee a Prince and a Judge over us?* 1.22 They had (no doubt) the Rules of Do as thou wouldst be done unto, or because I would receive no harm I should therefore do none; With such other common maximes of equity amongst men: and these, from the very first, acknowledged and assented unto. They had (no doubt) customes and rules of decision; besides other positive laws to that purpose. But to what availe? For those rules and laws, which should decide their quarrels, needed decision themselves: because each one pretended and in∣terpreted them for himself. Therefore, till they placed some supreme per∣son to interpret their law, unto whom, as unto the last appeal in all questi∣ons, all persons, assemblies, orders and degrees besides might be subordinate

and inferiour, Anarchy was not avoided. Neither was any law then of just force; but, on the contrary, when seeming Law and equity was now easily assumed by a major vote and faction, it was heightned and established.

And if any should argue,

That, since the number of contenders in these state assemblies are not to be presumed so great as when before the people judged themselves, and that therefore, the danger and mischief to follow the disagreements will probably not be so great and general.

We will therefore suppose them least, namely an Aristocracy or Oligarchy of two persons: yet the danger of disagreement will be then most. Suppose them (for peace sake) three; because two being alwayes on a side, it will probably scare the third to agreement: yet then, will not there be the conti∣nual terror of a major part upon the minor? wil not the force be equal, or more as of 2 against one, of the 1000 people against 600, or of 40 Senators against 30? In which cases, the people, by their elections and resignations, have not lost, but changed their miseries. For first, the manner and fear of disa∣greement is the same amongst their pretended peacemakers now, as it was with them before: and the mischief in prosecution thereof is not abated nei∣ther: because in then disagreements the people cannot secure themselves as lookers on: they cannot shift their own interests: but will in the con••ention be engaged on one side or other.

And therefore it is now manifest, that Anarchy is not want of government, but want of unity: and, being the same with Poliarchy, is not where no governors are (for no people can be so) but where there is equality and pow∣er alike, or in more then one as the word or••ginally doth import. As in the Inter-regnum of the Judges (before mentioned) because there was no single authority or King in Israel, it was said Every man did that which was right in his own eyes. It could not be meant of single persons: for as they belonged to some Tribe or other, so were they unde the authority of the Fathers thereof; but of the plurality of governors, and their equality amongst themselves: whereby the leaders (not their whole tribes following them) did what seemed good in their own eyes, vvithout any controle or coercive povver above them. And Anarchy is vvhere such equal authorities are, as while some condemn others may acquit: so that, at the end, it will be, as with the people of Laish in their inter-regnum, Wherein was no Magistrate that should put them to shame for any thing. And is onely avoidable, by en∣trusting one governor with unrepealable power of punishment and protection. For as in a family, whose head is wanting or otherwise disabled, although the wife, children, or some more eminent person may (as they can raise strength by faction and association) exercise authority over the rest, yet, be∣cause this cannot be called the right government, that family is in the true state of Anarchy; as being destitute of its head: as is also that state or Kingdome, which hath the like want.

And lastly, Anarchy is worse after the abandoning or removal of this unity in government, t••en is the approach or preparation to it: as a relapse is worse in our natural bodies, then a state of recovery. And so it is also where the factions are fevver, then vvhere they are more: as appears by the former example, vvhen all Israel vvas on the one side, and all Benjamin on the other. For, as all Anarchy is disunion or division of the whole body po∣liticke, so is the division of it into two parts most dangerous: because, being therein wholy in contrary parties interessed, they will want a third (as a me∣dium)

to unite them. Whereas, in petty and more divisions and factions, there cannot be so strong contrarieties and eager engagements of emnity: because, as two cannot be contrary to one, nor parties disagreeing amongst themselves will not so probably unite against a third which doth but so too, there may be hope that others may escape as being but lookers on, and equally well willers, or averse to both.

All this past discourse I foreknow cannot but extremly offend many, whom interest or ignorance have hitherto blinded with the specious shews and for∣malities of that freedom which these imitations of government make such boast of. So readily it falls into every mans fancy, that since he is hereby impowered to be acting and consenting to all that shall be done, his share of advantage will be great. Not considering, that he can no wayes be advanta∣ged without his fellows loss; and then, where is general freedome? Not thinking that as thus, under shew of liberty, he aimes at power to act his liking upon others, so he yeilds others the like advantage against himself: Insomuch, as he can neither chuse to act according to every ones command, nor but to suffer at every ones dispose. But however, I, that was to treat of policy and government in its divine and natural foundation, and not ac∣cording to humane authority and example, cannot be blamed (as I formerly said) for leaving these out of the number; when I found them not warranted thereby. For in government (as government) I finde one must govern another; but here, every one is aiming to be governing himself: which, if it be not Anarchy (as being but the first natural condi∣tion) I know not what is, nor where to finde any such thing. Neither could I, as I conceive, be true to my design of setling publike peace, without se∣clusion of these forms. For the very conceit of their justice and lawfulness, and the hope to attain and be sheltered under them, is the most usual and ready cause of civil disturbance and insurrections, and of subjects associati∣ons against their Prince. And many (without doubt) are of the same mind; who yet, in a kinde of flattering modesty, as loath to condemn the practise of so many, that do or say otherwise, are unwilling to express themselves in so plain a truth.

Nor could these forms have bin so readily fancyed by so many men, eminent both for goodness and Learning, had not the mischiefs and absurdities thence arising been hastily clouded in each ones conceit, by the hope he had that in these general meetings himself should still prevaile by those reasonable pro∣positions he had to make, tending evidently to the Publike good and his own honor: and that therefore, in order to both, he had just reason to cry them up. Forgetting all that while, how likely it was he might be mistaken in his proposals himself, or else might be unapprehended by his auditors: how that others might, in these assemblies, prevaile aswel as himself, and those of the worser sort aswell as the others. But, most of all forgetting, how, by the obtaining this his conceit and supposition of any one mans prevalence, he should quite overthrow the other supposition of a community in government. For, since many cannot speak at once, if some one mans advice do not take place, there can be no administration or government at all; if one man con∣stantly do so, then is that person a true Monarch, because the most absolute Monarch can aske no more then to have his councel followed. And indeed, as Anarchies are no farther capable of councel or execution in their govern∣ments then as they are Monarchical, so they, coming to be occasionally led by

their popular orators and heads, are but unfixed Monarchies: being there∣upon so much more ill, as more unfixed. For, while they decline the sub∣jection and guidance of one mans will, they are thereby enthralled to the lust of all.

There is also a great occasion taken for casting off Monarchy, from that ready apprehension each one hath, that where the Soveraignty is taken from one and put into many, he hath great probability of being one of that num∣ber; and the more especially, in regard of that high degree of desert and abili∣ty every man is in his own opinion endued with above others. Not consider∣ing, how, through the like partial respect and expectations of others, he might fail hereof: and then should he come to have many masters instead of one. Nay, not considering, how afterwards the many crossings of his will to be received from his fellows in Office, would, as coming from equals, or such to whom he held himself superiour in birth or merit, be more irk∣some then from superiors already acknowledged. But there being a farther and longer discourse required to foresee those evils that would follow to each one from this parity in command, then there is to apprehend the pleasure and benefit to arise from the command and power it self, and because again po∣sitives sway us beyond privatives, it is no wonder if men, in their thirst after Polarchical governments, come to be affected as men with lotteries: where∣in, although we do, or might beforehand know the certain loss that must ge∣nerally befall the Casters, yet shall we alwayes finde multitudes venturing that way: as being so hastily carryed on by the imagination of his present share of those prizes which may befall him, that he considers not (withall) those many chances that may fall out otherwise.

There is another great inducement for entertainment of these Anarchies, for that vulgarly men are led to conceive that the Commonweal doth signi∣fie the same with the Polarchs themselves that do therein bear sway: and this, because these States-men are wont to act all their designs in the Common∣wealths name. But, if men would well consider it, these tearms of Com∣monwealh, and Publike good are but bare political notions, not living crea∣tures, capable of address or interest: and that they are not otherwise man∣ageable, or to be represented or collected into a sum or total, then as in relation to the persons therein intrusted: so that, as they shall have their in∣terests more or less united amongst themselves, and are more or less com∣prehensive of the whole, so will the good of the Commonwealth be more or less convertible with theirs. And therefore, since the Polarchs cannot act but as separate persons, differing in interest from one another (for when they do make a major vote it is but what fear or hope did first make them agree to in order to their distinct interests) therefore their good can neither be reci∣procal amongst themselves, nor can the good of the Commonweal be con∣vertible with them all in general.

As for example, suppose the whole riches or stock of any place to be ten hundred thousand pound; and that the present Polarchs may in their several proprieties contain the half thereof, it must fall out, that, although in that respect they shall know the loss or good of the whole will involve that of their particulars, yet, it happening that in all Publike debates some part of the whole is more concerned then another, they must consequently be induced to favour that part most wherein their particulars are most involved: and they will generally chuse, rather to have their half encreased by one third part out

of their subjects wealth, then to have their subjects wealth to be generally encreased one third part more then it was by any foraign acquisition whereof themselves have no share. And this, because they being but separate per∣sons, cannot have whole interest: In which regard also, each one amongst them, will again be ready to joyn in faction against others of his fellows; & rather desire to have his own private stock of riches or honor to be encrea∣sed one third part out of theirs, then to assent to any thing that may double that of all the rest of his fellows; or of the whole people, without encrease of his own. From which it plainly appears that men are but deluded with this notion of a Commonwealth: as thinking there can be under Polarchy of any sort such an unity of interest or agreement as really to make but one Com∣monwealth. Whereas, in truth, there are to be found in all places and coun∣tries governed under the name of Republikes or Commonwealths, as many Commonwealths and Republiks as there are parties and factions: whilst each of them is taking to it self the name of the whole, and pursuing their more di∣stinct interests under that notion.

Which things can never happen unto an unlimited Monarch; whose honor and riches being in the whole, and inseparably subsisting by, and in∣creasing and diminishing with that of his people in general, it must follow that his care will be led to respect the whole good; as having his and that convertible: in such sort, that he cannot lose any part of his whole kingdom, but he will himself be a proportionable loser. Whereas the Polarchs propri∣eties and interests being no higher in the whole, then in reference to their part, they cannot but respect this their part in the first place, and the whole but in order thereunto.

But the truest ground for Scholastical mens entertaining this opinion, is that they have derived it, as also that other opinion of paction from the Gre∣cian Philosophers: who, being all of them born and bred in Republikes, it is no wonder if we finde them, in self-regard, so ready to commend something these forms: as not daring to gainsay the practice of their own country. From whom therefore we receiving in a manner all our Philosophy and opinions, and this amongst the rest, it is no marvail if from thence, and the general hope of share of power hence arising (as formerly noted) we are so inclinable to the defence thereof. Yet truely, unto any that considers with what prejudice the Greek and Roman Authors were to be supposed to write in the••e things, the preferment of Monarchy, even by some of the chief of them, is an argument undeniably concluding that the sufferance of the other was from necessity, and not choice. For, although they durst not reprove it as a fault in that kind of government, yet (doubtless) the many sad exampl••s of those ungrate∣ful and fatal rewards and usages, by them continually practised towards such of their own Citizens and subjects as have been most eminent in any kind of vertue, or most deserving or serviceable to their country, could not but, in conscience and reason, make them resolve that it must naturally arise from that form of administration. For their form of policy subsisting by, and openly aiming at parity and equality in honor and power (whilst each one in it was yet arrogating to himself) they must necessarily stomack any pre-emi∣nence that shall be given to any one above themselves: as justly fearing, he might thereupon take advantage of making himself their Master. Who (a∣gain) if (out of cautionary compliance) he shall never so lowly makes his ac∣knowledgements and submission to the whole Senate, yet if he do not so

also to such particular men as be leaders, and such as do speak for and uphold him, he will still be subject to envy and ruine: Nay, if he do it not to such also as do not appear for him, he will be hazarded by their revenge also. So that, in truth, vertue and merit have herein no longer security, then the party can protect himself by secret bribery of their Factious leaders, and by popular and base flattery and compliance: which can yet serve his turn but for a time. His surest course to prevent their malice & ill, being to advance himself above their power, and to make use of those forces to defend himself against them, with which he hath so often defended them against others. And, except it be by this course, I know not that any one famous servant to any Polarchy hath been recorded to scape censure and punishment for his reward: the surest way not to suffer like Scipio, being to act like Caesar.

But to this kind of Scholy some are so ignorantly inclined, as finding the tearms and notions of government usually imployed about these devised forms, and that in their best sense, they come to think them no where due and proper but there: For so, they think that true policy is (from its name and derivation) to import, not the government of a kingdome by a King, but of a City, and that by Citizens in equal authority. Not well considering, that in ancient times each territory or kingdom took its usual name from its City, as that did again from its most eminent King or founder: and that, as each City had its King, and was Monarchical onely, so the notion of Citizen signified but the same with another subject; and not power and rule. Nay, it should seem to infer greater subjection; as to those, who, by their habitation were more civilized by Laws and obedience, then to those in villages, called therefore Pagans.

The like misapprehension ariseth from the notions of people and Ma∣gistrates: which have different values in Republikes, over they have in Mo∣narchies.

But however, these Greeks (before mentioned) having cast off Kings, and the acknowledgement of all power above themselves, they must next found it on themselves; that is, in the community or people from whom also they must suppose even Kings to arise. Hereupon the title of Anarchy came to want difinition and existence. For to say it was in the Community, was to overthrow that main end for which this notion of a community was inven∣ted: namely, to pact and consent for conferring of power. For how can men in that condition be general or free pacters or consenters? If they say men are not to be supposed born unanimous, like Aunts of a litter, but rather (as formerly discoursed) like Cadmus-brood by Poets feined to that purpose (in their different appetites) pursuing one another in a confusion of every one a∣gainst every one, and that from thence they come to be a community, then they make a community and agreement to arise from that which is quite con∣trary: for how shall these disagreers be brought to voluntary and equal Parity and Paction.

Therefore there is no way but to say, Anarchy is absence of Unity; or the exercise of power without it: For it is not only a privation of good, by de∣stroying precedent union in the single person that did govern, but also an in∣fliction of evil, by setting up contention in the many heads now ruling.

And therefore, to say that Anarchy is then onely, when there is such a condition as that every one should be against every one, is to deny that it can be. For how should it come to pass? Because, as no settled government can

be overthrown but by union of opposition, and men cannot live without such relations of kindred and other interests as must keep them bound in some as∣sociations, so cannot they, as ab origines (such as the Greeks to this purpose supposed themselves) be so born or brought together, without all union by former friendship and relation, as to be, each one to each one, contra-distin∣guished and equal in all things.

Without due consideration of which impossibility, and of the intervenient degrees between the perfection of unity which true Monarchy will afford, and that confusion which the extream of Anarchy will yeild, men are usual∣ly led to this mistake. For, as we may, and justly do stile that a Monar∣chy, where the last appeal, and some other inseparable marks of Soveraignty do remain in one man, although many prerogatives may be parted with, e∣ven so, on the contrary, we must judge Anarchy to be where the Soveraign∣ty is in more: and if we do not this, there cannot be such a thing as Monar∣chy, aswell as no such thing as Anarchy. Because, as disability and remis∣ness will occasionally more or less make Princes leave and entrust their power to others, so, in like manner, are we to conceive of Anarchy: namely, that although the people (viritim) cannot, or do not personally act or agree in all administrations to Soveraignty proper (but that some one man at once may be trusted in several parts thereof; whereby, in respect of their approach to Monarch, they are for the present so far kept from the mischiefs of absolute Anarchy) yet since the right of government is at liberty claimed to be exer∣cised by all, the government must be Anarchical too: although, as we said, one Anarchy may be less Anarchical then another, in regard of their ap∣proach to unity and Monarchical administration; like as also one Monar∣chy may be less so then another; even so far as these Anarchical forms shall be mingled therewith.

Nor hath Monarchy gained precedence (as aforesaid) by the confessions of Polarchical writers, but it's open and active enemies, the Polarchs them∣selves, by their endeavors to resemble the real unity thereof in those repre∣sentations of themselves by presidents, speakers, or the like, and by contri∣vances to unite their votes and opinions in such sort as to be capable of com∣mand and government (by making their many wills seem but one) do all of them (by deed and experience) confess that they have neither worth nor fitness for government in themselves; and are so far only good, or rather so far distanced from ill, as they can approach that exemplar of union which in Monarchy is essential. Again, if we shall observe them in their fundamen∣tals for laws, and forms of execution of their governments, we shall far∣ther finde that as themselves are usually but some fragments and scraps of Monarchies rent off by Rebellion, so will the main body of their laws and semblance of policy, be found such onely as were by their former Sove∣raigns and Kings enacted and contrived.

But (to return) if Anarchy must be supposed but the first beginnings to the overthrow of established government, what shall we say of lawful conquest? Or, if it be in civil or intestine strifes onely, then, since (in these) men cannot strive singly, but as united in Factions, when shall it begin; and when shall Anarchy end? Shall it begin from the first underminings, or from the first overt act, or from which, or what sort of them? Shall it end when the other government is overthrown, and there be no enemy left to hinder its peaceable settlement in an union by it self? How shall it be known? and who shall

judge when this government or other opposition is wholly subdued, or so far as is requisite to its establishment in a government by it self? What if this government be thirty or fourty yeers destroying? And what if at last, it stand still on its own strength without farther fear from this opposing fa∣ction: which (it may be) now hath set up for it self also: and as a free State (as they call them) entred into aliance or agreement with them? In which and other cases, since the form of government in the faction established is the same in prevailing over one another now, as it was over those that held the government before; that is by force of a major part, why should not the same government aswel be an Anarchy now, as before? And, if there must be a set time when this prevailing faction ought, and may (though still the same people and faction) take on them the title of lawful government, which is it?

If you say, when they have made agreement, or utterly subdued their for∣mer Prince; this I conceive can (at best) but acquit them of rebellion, in order to himself; because done against him: and thereupon, for a Monarchy so gained, it will serve to make it a just government afterwards, because it is so in its form. But since Anarchy (consisting in division) must arise from the form of government, that is from the divided heads and persons whereby it is enforced, and not from the divers hands used in the managery (for all go∣vernments must have such) it must be confessed that Anarchy must be di∣stinguished as a different thing from rebellion; and remaine in the form of government, and not in the manner or circumstances of beginning or using it: or else, such a thing as Anarchy cannot be at all.

I know the common division of government was formerly into Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy; and their deviations, Tyranny, Oligarchy, and Anarchy: so making six sorts. But, as it is since found that there is but three sorts, by including their deviations, as Tyranny into Monarcy, Oli∣garchy into Aristocracy, and Anarchy into Democracy, so I, concluding but one onely right government (viz. of Monarchy) have reckonnd both the other under the common deviation of Anarchy: esteeming it all one, whither a lesser or greater number of people preside therein, which only thing doth difference Aristocracy from Democracy.

And as for that fancy of co-ordination, it may be reckoned an Oligarchy, consisting of so many Governors and Governments as the co-ordinates are: and as Monarchy is limited above, or under this supposed equality in co-or∣dination, so far is it more or less uncapable of its chief end, peace and pro∣tection. For, as all Parity must breed confusion, so dissention also: and the more Parity in governors the more dissention. Which, as it may rati∣onally be foreknown to arise from the very nature of that Government it self, so will it by instance most lively appear in that government of family: wherein, notwithstanding there is greatest interest and obligations towards concordance and mutual assistance, there are yet more observable disputes and differences arising between man and wife (even to the bringing the whole family in divisions and sidings) then between him and children, or between him and servants; who come not so neer to him in pretence of equality of power. For as they, pretending to less power, are therefore probably less subject to be sensible of the loss, so is he less subject to be covetous of the gain of that little.

Therefore it may be concluded, that the greater the power of the co-or∣dinate is, the more subject is that place to Faction and Rebellion: which we will next speak of.

CHAP. II. Of Faction and its Original, and usual Supports.

AS we have already shewed the necessity of self-seeking in Nature, so now we are to shew, that since Nature cannot be altered, how in Poli∣ty her course may be steered to publike good: so that men still retain∣ing their sense of good and bad, separate and distinct to themselves, they might therewith, and thereby also, be more provoked to the good of others. Therefore, after the vulger manner, to dream of publike spirited persons or publike souls (meaning such as have no private interest) is not onely untrue, but, could it be, it would, instead of benefit, be the ruine of that whole State. For, through the distracted endeavors of so many voluntary publike under∣takers, the whole would perish by degrees: and while each particular failed, for want of due self-regard, the whole would fail by consequent.

Experience of those many mischiefs and disturbances generally arising in the world through mens inconsiderate and violent prosecution of their own appetites and wills, without due regard to the sufferings of others, hath brought it into the serious doubt of many, whether this Philautia be lawful to be prosecuted or no: and while some (as finding it natural) have neces∣sarily thought it warrantable, yet have they onely thought it an allowable rule to be made the beginner, but not the ender of our enterprises. As though the end and design of each action, must not, in all voluntary and in∣telligent Agents, be before any attempt thereof. Or, as if any reasonable creature, could, out of self-regard begin any thing, which, in the issue, he did foresee would prove otherwise.

But it hath not been well considered, that those very Rules of Do as thou wouldst be done unto, and, Love thy neighbour as thy self, (on which their conceit is grounded) do of themselves imply and warrant each mans sepa∣rate good to be both first and last preferred before that of any other. Nay, these Rules being chiefly intended to avoid partiality in such dealings and di∣stributions as concern other parties, and so to be used by such as are to exe∣cute the Office of Judges and Umpires, doe in that case onely (as hereaf∣ter shall be shewed) appoint both the Judge on the one hand, and the two contending parties on the other, to square his sentence upon them, and they their obedience unto him, as fancying themselves reciprocally interessed. In which case, themselves not being immediate parties, every act of partiali∣ty is injustice: they having no rule to love one man better then another. Whereas, on the other side, if any man be party with another, all things he doth to the advantage of another against his own, is not onely unnatural and foolish, but unjust and sinful also.

What if we shall say farther, that in all dealings between one man and another, no man can be otherwise sinful, then as he is to himself foolish and neglectfull of his own good? It is not hard for men to conceive in the ge∣neral, that wickedness and folly fall one into another; and that no man can prejudice himself, but he must thereby sin: nor sin, but he must thereby prejudice himself. All the mistake being for want of consideration, that when any doth, by warrant from above, sense of Honor, or dictate of his Conscience, prefer the benefiting of another to the enjoyment of some pre∣sent content of his own, that, even in this case, it was self consideration of procuring reward or avoiding punishment to himself, that was the end of this good deed he did to them. In which regard, so far as he had not present self design (namely delight in the act it self) but was considerative of an end, even so far that end must have self design upon the whole issue in every voluntary Agent, as it is such; however they may differ from one another in degree of Wisdom and Prudence: that is, eithe•• inability to apprehend and believe how these courses are available to his good, or prudence in the managery or application of them accordingly. Wisdom in these cases grounding herself upon her sure Rule of comparison; Better forego a pre∣sent less pleasure to my self, by doing it to another, then by not doing good to another as I am commanded, to incur that punishment, and lose that greater reward which is to succeed to my self in place thereof.

Therefore, as in Natures polity in the Government of the World, there is pleasure annexed to such enjoyments as are most beneficial, to direct and incite us what to do in pursuit of our single preservations, (and so of the whole species) and pain on the contrary, to deter from what is hurtful; so, in political foundations, (that the whole Kingdom may be preserved) the du∣ties necessary to be performed or avoided by the several members thereof to that end, are to have such rewards and punishments annexed to their Edicts, that each particular member, being naturally led to seek pleasure and avoid pain, may, in the pursuit hereof, (by politick designation) follow the good of the Commonwealth also.

As for example, should the Commonwealth appoint (as out of duty to the whole, and out of common Charity to one another) that men should, without any self regard; have spent their whole time and labours in Tillage or otherwise, they would quickly finde the Proverb verified, That the com∣mon Ass is ill sadled. And they would finde, that since men are properly and expresly onely sensible of their own good, that therefore, as this stood re∣mitted, their actions would remit also. Reason therefore quickly taught all Founders of Laws and Rules for sociable living, that because the whole stock of common improvement must arise from private managery, to an∣nex unto publike employments and duties such private advantages and re∣wards as might encourage their undertakings.

And therefore, those that have gone about to propound the dis-impropri∣ation of Goods, Wives, &c. as thinking upon taking off the notions of meum and tuum, to take off all Civil War, do not onely (as aforesaid) un∣dertake what is impossible (as supposing, Man, a Creature of so much appe∣tite and leisure can be without something in that kinde to seek) but that which would be hurtful also. For although Bees, Ants, and such like creatures, which some inconsiderately think imitable, do enjoy a parity, and have their private good and the publike all one, in the same dire••t line for intention and

execution, yet if their different condition from mans be examined, it would be found as reasonable that man should do otherwise, as they should do so. For they are born all at once, so as being but one litter, and seeming but one thing, they do accordingly keep up co-habitation. And as this strict co-ha∣bitation keeps them from intermedling with other creatures, whereby to be affected with imitation of their appetites, so their own appetite of self-pre∣servation for necessary food, keeps them so wholly intent in the provision thereof, that they want the sole occasion to faction and disunion, which is idleness. And therefore they may be discerned always in haste, and imploy∣ed about that very one thing, namely provision of food: and that not with∣out need; for the whole yeers expence lies upon a short times gathering. Whereas men, that have such difference of age, company, appetite, judge∣ment, and so much leisure, cannot but be thought to have as different and private ayms. And to think that a man shall not have self-aym in all he doth, is to think he shall have no aym at all; but to do always one thing, and that out of present haste and necessity, as Ants do. But, as we finde all Sen∣sitives, as such, must, according to their degree of Knowledge, have self-aym (in so much as Beasts of most leisure have it most) so man, as the most contemplative, long-lived, rational creature, must have it most.

Which things duely considered, and the respective and different cares and parts of Prince and Subject, it will easily appear what things are, and must be the aim of both. For the one, seeing that the whole good was his par∣ticular good, and thereupon following the natural rule of self-seeking, he must, as he desired his own good, seek that of the whole people: because, if any part of the publike be decayed or lost, even so much his private is decayed and lost also. For the Prince should be in the body politique as the Brain to the body natural; without sense to it self, and yet be the common sense to all other parts. Then the Subject on the other side, as naturally seeking pleasure and avoiding the contrary, is, as regarding his particular herein, stirred up by the rewards and punishments of the Law, to do, or a∣void such things as are agreeable to publike interest. By which means, eve∣ry man seeking necessarily his own private, and then publike and private be∣nefits being in all relations the same and convertible, Polity is established, and Charity also: while our neighbours benefits are established in our own. And while Prince and people thus move in course, according to each ones order, the general welfare is maintained.

But if the harmony and proportions be broken, by any ones invading on the others imployment, mischief will follow. For if any order or estate of the people shall forsake their own bounds, and take upon them to judge of publike expedients and mischiefs, and act accordingly, then, as the pub∣like good will fail for want of care, so will their own good fail therewith al∣so. And so again it is, if the Prince, upon the terror of any discontented parties, hath parted with some of his Soveraignty or common interest to o∣ther hands: will not his care, that should be common to all alike, as Sub∣ject, come to be less to those; because they are less Subjects then o∣thers?

And then again, if the King himself, out of favour to any, shall give ex∣emptions or priviledges derogatory to his just Prerogative, this will cause a partial eye towards them in his time, & (it is like) an angry one towards them afterwards: in both cases hazarding publike care and Justice; because the

whole is not looked upon with equal interest. But the truth is, Princes er∣rors this way can seldom go far: for that the successors, finding this indul∣gence prejudicial, will still recal them into common again. For, as it is pro∣bable their Fathers favorites were none of theirs, so (you may be sure) none of the peoples; so far as to fear part-takings in devesting them.

But now, when this politique direction and rule for self-seeking is laid a∣side, and the rewards and threats to obedience cannot so prevail, but that some daring spirits, of more then ordinary ayms and affections (hoping to have their Ambition, Covetousness, and Revenge satisfied better in an ex∣traordinary way then what is by Law appointed) will be acting to publike disquiet, then it is that Faction is beginning: which is nothing else, but an unlawful association of Subjects, in opposition to their one supreme Autho∣rity: which association is by each one run into, as he findes his own hopes or fears therein attained or secured. In which case each Faction is in its act∣ings without publike allowance, to be looked on as a private person.

The original and rise of Faction being discontent, hence it is that no Go∣vernment whatsoever can be wholly without it: that is, in aym and design, however it may be kept from act and execution, through fear to prevail. And this, not onely, as all Government is in it self to be considered as a re••••raint of our wills, and so prompting us to contrivement of ease, but inasmuch as there can be but few persons so constantly and entirely favored or be friended by the present power of any place, as not to have many things in their ayms and hopes (in order to Revenge or Covetousness) to be got by siding and complyance elsewhere, therefore all men whatsoever are to be presumed more or less enclined to Faction, as they are more or less disconten∣ted.

But then because men singly, and in small numbers, cannot act, or secure themselves against established polity and the penalties thereof, they must next endeavor such strength by association, as to be thereby enabled to bring on their own aims by complying with the interests of others. And al∣though again, there can be no two men found of alike interest and aim in all things, yet men, not finding agreement so fully as they would, do then seek it in the neerest proportion they can: and since they finde none to make companions in all their ayms, they then joyn with such as concur in most. And so, having gotten (as they believe) association and strength enough to carry on their design, they now begin to separate and divide the Kingdom, by separating themselves. These that side with them they call (for repu∣tation sake) the people, and the good party: and those that joyn not, ene∣mies to the publike, ill-affected, &c. By this means having gotten such strength as to be able to pursue their own interests in opposition to lawful Authority, they proceed with less fear towards the accomplishment thereof: whether it be that more neer interest, the advantage of pleasure belonging to each ones person (commonly included under riches and desire of property) or that which is more distant, as of Wives, Children, Kindred, Friends, &c. which may be ranked under the sense of Honor. For still, our pursuit in attaining them is heightned, as we conceive our propriety and interest in them to lye.

Now, as the leaders private ends were (as beforesaid) Ambition, Co∣vetousness, or Revenge; so, to joyn interest and engage the people, they flatter them with the notions of Liberty, Propriety, and Justice; correspon∣ding

with their own aims before mentioned. For Liberty answers Ambition; both proceeding from Pride, and impatience of Government.

The desire of increase of Propriety, answers Covetousness. And po∣pular Justice is nothing else but Cruelty and Revenge. And now have they engaged all affections too. For Ambition is the extream of Honor, the pleasure of the Minde. Covetousness includes all the pleasures that sense can desire. And Revenge is the utmost bound of our malice against the things we hate, tending to the satisfaction of the irrascible faculty, as the other did of the concupiscible. Therefore the Leaders, never defining or telling what civil Liberty, Property, or Justice is, or ought to be, they leave it for the people (who have them promised as great matters) to think that by Liberty, they mean, not onely freedom from all subjection themselves,

but, because they are told all Power comes from them, and is at their dis∣pose, they think they shall now have power over others also.

By Propriety, they are led to think, not onely to have their own estates altogether inde∣pend••nt, but to be freed of all Taxes and Obligations besides. For the meanest cannot but expect (if he be not directly promised) that upon o∣verthrow of the enemy, great encrease will then come to his share And then, as the weakest Natures are ever most revengeful, and cruel, so Subjects can never want objects of this kinde, whom, under shew of publike Justice, they will always implacably prosecute.

Nor do the Leaders of Factions hide themselves and meanings on the naming of things onely, but of persons also. For having themselves cast off subjection, and teaching others to do the like, they use not the name of Subject any longer; it is now the people a word which (as used in Anar∣chies) signifies insubjection: and therefore can be never proper but in Anar∣chy) and sometimes it is the Commons they represent and stand for. And then, there is none so low, but thinks he is included in one of these notions: there is not one of the meanest servants in a Family, but is in his conceit one of the People, or one of the Commons at least: and answerably, he is ready to take the side that makes him such fair promises. And he may hope also, that as the greater includes the less, so a free-born Subject, as he is, shall be freed of Master, as well as Prince: for he is sure that all his bondage hath been from the one, and not from the other. They (poor souls) little thought that by People and Commons are meant onely such as the Leaders shall choose (after they have made themselves by their helps Masters of the other party) to stand as for the People, or to choose, or to be their Representatives. At which time (I hope) being the people them∣selves, they will not break their former Promises of having no intention but the good of the People. Upon occasion of which deceits and mistakes it comes to pass, that the generality of the people are ever murmuring a∣gainst these Governments, and more ready to change again then the Sub∣jects in Monarchies: as now finding that those large promises of general Li∣berty, &c. comes to none other end then to be at the continual dispose of their fellows; and that their own share in power or riches, answers not that great hopes they had thereof when they deposed their former Prince.

When this Association or Faction divides against the Ecclesiastical Go∣vernment it is called by a peculiar name of Schism: which is seldom want∣ing where the other is. For Religion, being taken of general concern to

all, the reaping up of abuses herein cannot but deeply engage: and, in order to this, the peoples Liberty in interpreting Scripture must be asserted: and then, having set up Levites to scholly them to their purpose, Conscience comes to be engaged for them also in this pretended Reformation, and as much as much as may be drawn from the other side.

But now, as all Faction hath in its aim the overthrow of Government, so it is, from its own divisions again, always a ruine to it self, as it had been to the Kingdom by division before. For the common enemy (as they call them) now subdued, which was the cause of their uniting, they begin to reflect upon themselves, both in the division and managery of the power and profits now come into their hands, and also of the neerer pro∣secution of those particular interests that brought them into this associa∣tion.

Both which occasions will again necessarily break them into sub-divisions: and lead them to finde out new associations of such as come yet neerest to correspond with them, against such as are farthest off: and upon like Grounds and Arguments as they had associated against others before, they associate against one another now.

Nor can this well be otherwise, because (as I said) publike good was not the cause of their joyning: except a forraign fear yet remain, or do arise to keep them united: or except the Leaders be allyed by kindred, or have all of them a common interest. The last commonly happens, when claim is laid to the Crown and Government. For then, as one mans interest made them associate, it will keep them so. The other is when the heads are few, and their interests so agreeing, that more is probably to be got by a great and sure share now possessed in the Government, then in adventuring for all. Therefore, the present successors to Monarchies overthrown by Faction are A∣ristocracies: but these many times so short-lived, as their Government is not to be setled and known. For one, or some amongst them, as courting more the people, will still, by their help, set themselves in the Throne: or if that fail, rather then submit again to his incensed fellows, he perswades, and sets up the peoples general power above them, under shew of more liberty: and so comes usually Democracies: which, if they fall not into Monarchy again by the force and choice of their souldiery, grow by degrees more Ari∣stocratick. For those that call themselves the people, secluding always as ma∣ny as they can, and taking in none to share with them in power, their number at last must be few.

Besides, as Nature in all things, being left to her own working, will by gentle and orderly steps tend to that perfection she was forcibly deprived of, so it may be observed, how by degrees all Governments do of their own nature, and uninterrupted by violence, always lead to that perfection and state of Unity again from which by force onely they were hitherto debar∣red. And, unto the undeniable proof of the natural right of Monarchical Government, it may be asserted, that, as no Government of it self (let alone in the hands of the governors, without the forcible intermedling of the go∣verned) but would still come to be Monarchy, so, no government was ever brought from fewer to more, but by the force and terror of the people upon the Governors themselves: who now (as in the Fable of the Serpent that would be governed by his own Tayl) will be governing themselves: and so make all lawfulness of Government (at last) vanish into forcible ob∣trusion.

There are many other particulars by which Faction useth to make its rise and support; which shall be spoken of in the next chapter of Rebellion, a∣mongst other things which are the originals of that also. For these two are of such like extraction, and so neer a kin, that what is properly the cause to one, is (for the most part) so to the other: Faction being but Rebellion in its birth, and as yet but in devise and contrivance; and Rebellion being but Faction brought into act and execution: even as Polarchy, or Anarchy is but both of them, brought to such maturity and perfection, as to be capa∣ble of self-subsistance.

CHAP. III. Of Rebellion, and its most notable Causes and Pretences.

AS the inordinate thirst of pleasure, and its consequent (Liberty to at∣tain it) is in us all, both natural and unlimited, so, where Rules and Laws of Polity and Government (the onely means of restraint) are not strictly enjoyned or duely obeyed, it commonly falls out, that what should have been a bridle, proves rather a Spur; and the possession of one inordinate lust, doth by it self make way for another: even as the abundance of drink, to the drunkard, is the cause of greater thirst to ensue. Observe we this, First, in that lesser Government of a Family: and you shall finde Children and Servants nowhere so unquiet and discontented, as where the indulgencies of the Parent or Master do most appear. And so it is in King∣doms also: where Subjects that have soft and mild spirited Princes, and from whose more gentle and easie natures they, having already attained ma∣ny things of Liberty and Freedom, do come at last to forget how inconsi∣stent these things may be with their duty or publike peace, and to think that their very asking should now be the onely rule for his granting. Whereup∣on, as it happens that there is most brawling, contention and unquietness in such Families, so, in such Commonweals, Mutinies and Rebellions do ever abound.

And, to keep the Scripture president herein, what other Reason can be given of those many murmurrings and insurrections of the Jews: even while under the government of Moses: one so far from oppressing their li∣berty, that he was the meekest man on the earth. And when again, they had all things in such plenty as even their very Lust was supplyed with miracles:* 1.23 what followed, but that which was given for quieting them at one time, proved the occasion of their mutiny at another? For so, while he smote the rock and the water gushed out: they are still asking,* 1.24 can he give bread, can he provide flesh for his people? And when they had this flesh, this manna, it was found too light food for their satisfaction: and this very food of Angels, was insufficient to stint their boundless desires. Therefore,* 1.25 while the very meat was in their mouths,* 1.26 God was forced to cure by severity, those breaches of obedience which abused Mercy and Clemency had made.

Look again to them under their Kings, and you shall finde none so ill used as the best of them; even David, and Solomon. In the last of whose time it is expressed, Judah and all Israel was then many as the sand which is by the sea in a multitude, eating, and drinking, and making merry. And again,* 1.27 Judah and all Israel dwelt safely, every man under his own vine, and under his own fig. tree, from Dan to Beersheba all the days of Solomon.* 1.28 And in whose time, as the wisest and most peaceful of Kings, that Kingdom had the great∣est eminency and happiness of any: their persons free, as expresly said, of the children of Israel did Solomon make no bondmen: and having riches in such abundance amongst them,* 1.29 that he made silver and gold to be in Jerusa∣lem as stones, &c. And yet, as in a kinde of wantonness and surfet, they come to his son Rehoboam to ask release of this grievous yoak of Solomon his Father. But in truth, we can interpret this their coming to Sechem to no other end then to make a Covenant and association to rebel: and the pre∣tence to make Rehoboam King, was but the outside of their appearance: when they intended to unmake him. For first, Rehoboams raign was not E∣lective but in right of his Father and Grandfather, as heretofore noted: and he might as well have reigned in their stead without the peoples approba∣tion, as Ishbosheth Sauls son did over them in Davids time, or as Nadab in Jeroboams stead, over the same Israelites, without any such confirma∣tion.

So that this Assembly was indeed to settle Jeroboams new Principality, and not to confirm Rehoboams. And therefore,* 1.30 since they first sent for him to come in the head of them, whom they knew to lay claim to the Crown, this action looks purposely to aim at a quarrel, and gain a denyal; whereby to get a pretence to rebel. And was indeed the threatned punishment of Solomons offence against God, and not of Rehoboams to the people: and so suffered to be done in pursuance of that end:* 1.31 namely the punishing his of∣fence with the rod of the children of men. Whereupon this his refusing the councel of the old men,* 1.32 must be considered as a fit and necessary means there∣unto. And this may seem the reason of Rehoboams answer, importing a denial to the ground of the peoples Petition, and answering in that man∣ner, as though experience had fully told him, that since too much indulgence and concession had lost to his Father, he would recover it by rigor and seve∣rity.

But, to affirm that this Rebellion was a punishment of Rehoboams answer onely, were to give God the lye: both for the reasons already mentioned, and as plainly crossing his direct Promise to Jeroboam: saying, I will rent the Kingdom out of the hands of his son, and give it unto thee,* 1.33 even ten Tribes. Plainly arguing a forepassed fault to God, and not of oppression to the people: upon which onely Reason he is warned to desist. For of that war, what good issue could be? To have Jeroboam beaten, were to fight a∣gainst God and his purpose: and to have Rehoboam beaten, were to counte∣nance rebellion in people.

But if you look to the fruit of these Concessions in David, you will finde him the fittest instance for retaliation in both kindes: whether you respect him as a gracious Prince, or an indulgent Father: as may appear by some in∣stances formerly given. The like will all other stories do, being but confir∣mations of this Maxim, That those people that have largest Immunities and Liberties, are ever the most seditious for more: and that civil war and rebel∣lion,

doth not arise from want of Liberty and Freedom in the Subjects, but from having too much: That is, from Princes intrusting so great a portion of Soveraign power into their hands, under colour of giving them Liberty, as shall encourage and enable them to stand in open opposition and defiance against him and his remaining Authority for more: and, by degrees to de∣mand, or rather command all, if they shall think good.

For as it comes to pass with all such prodigal persons, as well Princes as others, as use or know no other way for gaining love and credit, then by wa∣sting of that whereby it should have had foundation and continuance, they in the end finde, that as (before) their estates was the cause of their Loves, so, this being now gone, the other would fail also. And therefore they should beforehand have considered, that what was the onely mean to their desire, should have been the chiefest object of their care: lest in the end they come to finde, that too great liberality unto private and undeserving beggers, makes them but publique and unpittied beggars them∣selves.

Even so, when Princes are soothed up with the specious shews of win∣ning love by condescension, and parting with the fundamental rights of So∣veraignty, to please and gain the people, they must now expect, that what directed their love to them, while they had it, will be a cause of want of love, being parted with. They must consider, that since the different love and re∣spect of Princes above others, was but in regard of their different power; whereby it also came to pass, that what was beneficially by them done, was therefore more meritorious, as less constrained; abate them then this power of doing so, or otherwise, and how shall the love and thanks to Princes differ from that of other men?

And since Government, as Government, requires the administration and execution of things according to the will of the Governors (when as the pretended government by love respects onely the desires of the loved) how can it then be government? And Princes so governing, that is, by the will of the governed, as he and they are in their wills different, so must one ne∣cessarily be the overthrow of another. Wherefore, if fear and reverence be not made use of, but Subjects always courted by loving condiscentions, Experience, as well as Reason, tells us, that his Authority will stand on fickle ground.

Nor do Princes hereby onely offend against interest, but Duty also: to wit, against that prime and incommunicable trust of power from God to them derived, to enable them to govern their subjects according to his Laws. When they, beyond their own Commission to give, or the peoples capacity to receive, shall strive to dis-invest themselves of so inherent a propriety, and by a strange and preposterous way of proceeding, endeavor to invert Na∣ture, Reason, and all kinde of Order and Rule, to their own ruine, by this setting the commanded above the Commander, and making the Subject not subject. Whereof, what other sequel can we expect, but that, as a punish∣ment justly deserved, and most adequate and congruous to such an offence, all Insurrections and Rebellions against them, from hence most natural∣ly should proceed.

So that, when it shall once come to pass, that either fear to enjoyn or com∣mand what he knows to be fit, or the hopes for countenance or assistance in what he believes otherwise, shall so far work on his resolution, as to make his

Subjects the objects of his fear and courtship, he shall finde, that what is hereby, for the present gained, will come to him at so dear a rate, as, upon the issue, to endanger and cost him his whole estate: whereas Nations under absolute Soveraigns, are, in respect of these, but seldom observed to rebel.

For as, when the childe hath once so far prevailed over his indulgent Fa∣ther, as that his wanton appetite cannot be satisfied without the enjoyment of what is offensive to others; nay, not without those very morsels and what else belongs to the necessary sustentation of the Parent (which must now be the only object and remedy of its peevishness;) it wil be found that as this too great kindness was the cause this stubbornness, so it will, at last, prove a les∣sening of respect and duty in the childe: and the childe will thereupon also, be more truely called the guide of the Father, then the Father of him. And seldom have the Concessions of Princes any other fruit then to be invitati∣ons to new demands; till at last, Subjects have so wholly freed themselves from the more milde and tolerable government of one, that, through the greedy pursuit of such natural and universal liberty as is with government it self inconsistent, they again fall into the perfect slavery of Anarchy, where every man is oppressed of his neighbour: and, instead of one, have many Ty∣rants to disturb them. The usual issue of all unhappy people, grown wanton with too much Liberty: where the commonnels, and easiness of former grants, is made the onely rule for desiring, and obtaining new Petitions: which come at length to be reckoned as acts of duty, not of grace. But to these in brief it may be answered, if they may not be denyed, why do they petiti∣on? if they may, why do they rebel? And having so far considered Rebel∣lion in its prime cause, the division of Soveraignty, we will examine it by its usual pretences, and give some answers.

In the mean time, I shall desire such as may conceive these last passed dis∣courses or others elsewhere used, to be impertiment for a Treatise where Sub∣jects, and not Princes parts are to be set forth, to consider that I intend not here to shew Kings what to do, but to shew Subjects what to obey. And if this encroachment of Subjects on the Prerogatives of Princes be well consi∣dered, it will be found no less needful to be propounded to their considerati∣tions in regard of the inconveniences thereof inticing them to Rebellion, then in regard of that proneness again which Princes do hereupon take to fall into acts of Tyranny: insomuch as all tyrannous and severe regiment may be ob∣served to have arisen, either to remove, or prevent this danger: tyranny being nothing else but soveraign revenge or severity, according to the presumpti∣on of injury past, or to be feared.

The evil of Anarchy, and benefits of Government have ever been in all mens eys so apparent, that none have been hitherto found so desperate, as di∣rectly to profess to introduce the one by destroying the other: but deceived sometimes themselves are, and always they strive to deceive others, by shew of Liberty and Freedom: either from suffering some evil, or for attaining some forbidden content.

For (say they) the more general good and con∣tent is ever to be preferred to the more particular: which is the good of the whole people to that of the Rulers. For look into Nature, she made them equal: intending no more the satisfaction of one, then another. And the very end and aim of Society it self, was primarily the good of the gover∣ned, and of the Governors but in order thereunto. That hereupon, all, or

most people subject not themselves to the arbitrary rule of the Prince, but unto the known and established Law: by which onely, according to his oath and compact, he is bound to govern. For could men (say they) be imagined to have parted with their native freedom of Will, and debar themselves of the many pleasures of life, to no other end, but hereby to advance to a state of felicity some one, or more men, unto whom they could in nothing acknowledge themselves inferior? No, since Kings and Rulers were set up, and had obedience given unto them for the onely good of the people (for of them is the whole power derived, and they may at pleasure settle what Government they please, and as they think fit to restrain or en∣large it) therefore, when they shall be found to fail of this trust, and turn their power to their peoples hurt, they might with good reason re-assume their own strength, and imploy it to the attainment of those benefits, which by the wilfulness or foolishness of the other is crossed or neglected. And if in pursuance of this course, civil war and slaughter do follow; it must be imputed to the stubbornness of them in Authority: which then must be endured as a cure to the state: when as, by a momentany suffering of some mens loss, the perpetual hazard of all mens slavery is avoided: and is no o∣ther, then like tolerating a less evil to avoid a greater. And this power of resistance (say they) must be in all limited Monarchies; else the limita∣tion is nothing: but he remains as absolute as the other.

But because these and the like propositions, have for the most part been bred and countenan∣ced by some of the Romish and Jesuited Clergy, we will (by the way) look thereunto: leaving the farther censure of their intermedling to another place: and also referring the full answer and satisfaction in other things to the ensu∣ing chapters: wherein, under the titles of Liberty, Slavery, Property, &c. shall be shewed how Faction and Rebellion have unjustly laid claim to any justification under these notion.

A great Argument, and associate of mans frailty it is, that even from our best and most holy performances, advantages to sin and impiety have been taken. Arising chiefly, from the malice of that wicked one; always ready, (if the sowing of the Wheat cannot be wholly hindred) by his Agents to cause such Tares to spring amongst, and from it, that for their very sakes, the other might have none, or at least less use and esteem. For who would else have thought, that that very height of Piety, Religion, and Devotion, that caused the first nursing Fathers of the Church, as in honor and duty to God, to bestow divers great Priviledges and Powers upon the (at that time) well-deserving Clergy, should, by a strange and inconsiderate ingratitude, prove the readiest Feathers, with which the shafts were made for their own destruction? For so we finde, when Popes became inheritors onely of the Re∣venue and Prerogative of the Church, and not at all of their predecessors devotion or humility, they first begin to seat themselves above Kings, and all that is called God: and thinking they could never bring low enough that power, whose due height they had just cause to fear would be a curb to their pride, they not onely tread on their necks themselves, but, by their Agents and Factors, they everywhere teach and authorise the Princes own Subjects to do the like.

Telling them that all civil power is originally in the people: and that from them, and their underived majesty it was, that Kings had their Soveraignties: which as they might be by them streightened as they

saw occasion, so were they to judge of his defaults in case of tyranny or oppression.

And then, reserving to themselves the power of deposing and sentencing them, in case of heresie or schism; and of defining what they were, they had poor Kings (they thought) beneath them low enough: even as far as man is beneath God: Kings being the peoples, but themselves (as jure divino) Gods Deputies.

These things seem not so to be wondred at, in a time when implicit devo∣tion and superstition had caused such general ignorance, that any thing almost would take: but, for a sort of men, undertaking to reform all errors even ac∣cording to Gods Word, and professing such great hatred to Popery, as to cast off some harmless things, onely because they think them popish; for these (I say) to contradict a thing so expresly taught in Scripture, and (on the contrary) to assert a thing onely fraudulently brought in, and by none taught but Jesuits, can have no other ground, but that they agree in common aim; the aim of ambition and insubjection. For so, as the Pope puts Kings under the people, to advance himself in his room, as in Gods stead; so do Presbyters put him under too, that themselves, in their consistories, may de∣throne, and be above him, as in Christs stead. By which means, Christ be∣ing no longer King of Kings, but King of Presbyters, we should (for ad∣vancement of our Liberties) have (besides the domineering consistories) a King and a Pope in every Parish. Concerning the sum of which Doctrine, namely that all power, and that of Kings is from God onely, we have alrea∣dy spoken: but because I finde that divers learned men, favorers to neither of these sects, but lovers of Monarchy, did yet hold by consequent the same opinions, it will not be amiss to speak something hereof: and of the in∣conveniencies & absurdities arising from that conceit of derivation of power from Paction and consent: leaving the more particular handling of the Na∣ture and reality of Paction it self to its proper place.

These, though they thought that, notwithstanding this Concession, they would still evince all active resistance to be unlawful, even because it broke a Paction (made between I know not what King and their people (and so I al∣so sometimes thought from the plausibleness of the scholly) yet, upon stricter enquiry, an error on one hand or other cannot be avoided. That is, either ac∣knowledging that this is a thing useless, and serving the people to no purpose, or else all those consequences of Rebellion will naturally flow from it.

For you admitting it the peoples right, they put you to shew where you finde that they by any Paction utterly resigned this right into the Princes hand? as you may affirm such a Paction, so they deny. And for conquest, they say it can no more take away a known right, then any other force. And if it be the peoples right, it is their right as well against him as any other. Will you suppose such a contract when they elect a King; they press you to shew it: and say, they are to be supposed as all other rational Agents, to have done it for some advantage to themselves: and consequently, as trusters, may de∣mand accompt from the trusted, and make redresses also: else they have a dry right without a remedy. Therefore they appeal to these Pactions also, and say, That as they are tyed by Oaths of Alleagiance, so is the Prince by oath tyed to observance of the Law: and that, if he break his Oath, theirs is fallen of consequence: and then the power and trust re∣turns. If it happen they onely swear, and that to implicite obedience, they then say it is a force: and so invalid to binde any, since (as grant∣ed by you) all power is founded on the Will. So that we may

plainly see the mischief of this Scholly, when, as to make government the more easie (as in a kinde of flattery) people are told, that although they have originally this power, yet having once devested themselves thereof, what hath been their voluntary resignation, they have not now power to recal at pleasure. But let us a little examine these grounds, and their in∣ferences.

Their first is, quisque nascitur liber, in which they must suppose that peo∣people can be like (like Mushromes) springing up all at once out of the earth; without all relations one to another: so as not onely without Princes or Ma∣gistrates, but sons without fathers, wives without husbands, servants without masters, families without heads, and people without pastors. If not so, then is the son of every father, as he expects the same protection for person and estate his father had, bound to the same obedience his father was. If they decline this power of government in the diffusive body of the people (out of the same reason, and the impossibility of its convening) and there∣upon say that the heads of families have onely power to elect and dispose; for that it is to be supposed all in their families have already resigned to them all their power: then, this neither is, nor can be done by the heads of all fa∣milies; since women, Church-men, infants, and divers people under such and such qualifications for estates come to be left out. So that, when au∣thority comes to be derived from the people, it will be (as heretofore noted) but the contrivement of some Faction; using such or such restrictive qua∣lifications, as they may not be hindred in their aims.

But this done, they have lost their first ground of free-birth: for (I hope) they will not leave children and slaves at choice for obedience: and for that obedience that wife and servants give, their Pactions express not (I suppose) any such resignation of will or power from themselves to the head of the family, as thereby to oblige them to his Pactions in the state.

Yea but (they say) none but such persons as have some share in the kingdom, as having an estate of some value shall have share of power.

To this it may be first an∣swered, how shall such a law or appointment be made generally binding, un∣less we first allow of a precedent governor amongst them to establish it? Who again, if he were settled by former Paction, how come they now to be free? If not by Paction, then is not government grounded on Paction.

But let us proceed in their way of supposition. A Master of a family of a hundred servants is but equal to him that hath but three. And again, if the Master of a hundred servants be impoverished, and not able to maintain his former rank, his affection and ability to serve his country must be supposed lost, and a single man with fourty shillings per ann. put in before him. And then again, if estate enable men to be in the number of people, and so, fit to govern, me thinks it should proportionably do it; and so, four hundred pound yeerly will make one man two hundred people: and then it will be Regina peeunia indeed. These, and the like differencing rules are good to be made and observed in Monarchies: where the Monarch himself (to the end he may know his subjects desires and grievances) doth, by his writs, give the people of such and such distinct places, ranks and qualifications power to elect, and also gives and permits the elected to have power to proceed, according to former rules of his progenitors, or new ones of his own, but can∣not at all prove derivation of power from below. For if the original power

be in the whole community, and every one have his native and equal share, how comes it to be never so used? Is it due to all Masters of families? then is it from God, and due by Office: and not by Paction from them.

And if we suppose power to arise from the Master, as Master, then will one Master, as his family is greater, have more power then ano∣ther.

Estate cannot make it, for the reasons before given. If natural force and strength make it, the stronger will have most.

If wisdome rule it, who shall decide who are wise: and in what measure it is to be stated?

Put it to age, or what you will, it will be as hard to make any certain rate thereof, or to imagine how any should freely consent to be excluded by any relation, as to agree those in the chosen relations, by stint or size of estate, yeers, wisdom, &c.

And then, when the community have not the power equal, the others have it by force, or usurpation. And therefore, all power is by Office: and to such Offices as are appointed of God: as Fathers, and Kings. They have it Jure Divino: and are restrainable therein only by those above, not by those under them.

And therefore it is a most fond supposition, that because those assemblies of Parliaments, or the like, which are made in Monarchies by such like rules of distinction, and have their acts reputed as afterwards binding, that there∣fore other inventions should do so too. For in this case they are to consider, first, that there is a superior power constituting these differencing rules, and making up (as before noted) the whole representation in himself. And then, they are to consider, that the different ends of these and the other supposed conventions, will make them extreamly differ in their force of binding. For in the Monarchical conventions men may well be convened under the esti∣mate of riches, because, being summoned to advise and determine concerning publike leavies and the Kingdoms wealth or Commonwealth, they may be thought inclusive of it all: whereas in the suppposed convention for disposing mens natural power and right to govern, none can reasonably binde ano∣ther by vote, in that where all are equal by their own supposition.

But if they (in their supposed way of conferring of power) shall exclude children and servants, and leave none but the Master power to elect, then break they their supposition of equal and native freedom, because the major part is excluded. If they have power to elect, then, being so much the grea∣ter number, I hope they will chuse such a government as shall now binde their Master and Father, and not he them.

But let us go on by way of supposition. These selected heads are met to chuse and empower a governor, and to give them all their power; that is, their power of their several families, that so he having power of all families, may consequently have power of the whole kingdom: which done, they intend (belike) to give up house-keeping. If so, he will have a great task indeed. If not, I would know whether they mean to have less power over their families then before? No (they say) they mean to govern them under him. Well, I suppose you can give this power you have over them so far as you had it, and over your self too: but then, since the power of life and death, and other things necessary for the Prince to have, you

neither had over them nor your self, how can you give what you have not?

Again, suppose the people the original of power, and farther (to make this power useful) suppose they may recal it to right themselves when they finde it abused, and that thereupon, the liberty to appeal to them must ever lye o∣pen; why then, this serves to defeat the power of their representatives, as∣wel as of Princes. For these, being set up also for the peoples good, have no farther power neither then while they act that way: the people must still retain power to hinder them from doing otherwise; and consequently, must have power to judge whether they do so or not. And then, this power must ex∣tend and exercise it self in all causes; because their good or ill must be there∣in concerned. And so, I pray how shall business go on? must the governor ask the governed their consent before he command? What is this but (as in mockery) to say to them, Do as you list or I will make you? What is this but for people to command, and Magistrates to obey?

Again, although that maxime, Salus populi suprema lex, may be good in popular governments (as shall be shewed anone) where governing and go∣verned are supposed alternative and the same (because all come to be includ∣ed) but yet, where there is difference, there the good of both, as making up the whole, must be taken into proportionable and joynt consideration; unless they can imagine that, by contract, the King should render himself purposly miserable, to make others happy by his infelicity. If so, David and others, that had promises of kingship from God by way of reward, had cer∣tainly no such benefit. And if this right and duty of resistance were so in the people as is alleaged, why, in so many thousand yeers, and in the raign of so many unjust and evil Kings as are set down in the Old and New Testament, do we never find Prophet, Apostle, or other men instructing the people in a duty of so great concern. They, if they had liked, might as easily have said fight as obey; and resist, as not resist.

As for the Kings observation of the Laws and seeking the good of the people, I believe no good Kings but will make it their imployment; and, in order to it, no discret people but must thereupon grant, that it is his part to to know and interpret what this law and good is; for if it be left to be done by any other Party or Faction, not he, but they have now the charge.

For to say they will submit in all things just and reasonable and no farther, is to appeal back to themselves; and is not submission to another: but all things are left to their private determination as before; and just and reason∣able must be but what they will esteem such. For (as before shewed) men could not make question whether reason or equity should take place or no, it was by all agreed it should: but men differing amongst themselves on which side this right was and both parties confident of their own cause, there was no possibility to avoid destraction and attain peace, but by this voluntary and joynt submission to be herein governed by others.

So that laws of equity, peace, and government, require that all parties sub∣mit to their common and appointed judge and sentence. For as each man sing∣ly becomes a man by having a proper will and understanding; even so it comes to pass, that there can arise no difference against himself, because un∣derstanding and will do in him alwayes unite. Whereas, if Thomas his will were to be guided by Iohns understand, or contrary, and either of them want will or understanding, or have them over-born by another, it were in the first

place to overthrow the personal being of men, and in the other to make it useless. For should, or could my will incline to nothing but what aforaign un∣derstanding saw good, it would then be the will of him that had, and not of him that wanted this understanding: and for want of understanding, I should want will also. Or, should I suppose there could be an understanding that could submit to that of another, this were to destroy personality by con∣founding it: and to imagine an impossibility: fancing an understanding which should be, and not to be at the same time. Therefore, when by the help of anothers understanding mine is so cleared as to see reason to consent to what it saw not before, and upon it, my will inclined to action, this as∣sent of my will is the issue of the light now apprehended in mine own under∣standing, and not as it was before in anothers. So in the body politick, to keep the essence and union thereof entire, there must be the same residence for understanding and councel (at least for the last result thereof) as is for will and execution.

And therefore, as it would argue high arogance in any single subject to presume his own judgement better then anothers, especially then his superi∣ors, so is it but the same thing from subjects, to commend that councel themselves follow, before that which their Prince follows. For since good∣ness of councel doth not move by being but by being apparent, and since this trial and apparency must depend on the ability and judgement of him that chuseth it (none being able to take good councel but he that is in mea∣sureable to give it) it must therefore be granted, that the following of a∣nothers councel after mine own choice, differs little from following mine own.

If it should be argued, that Princes may be carried away by partiallity and private interest, and so some should think that the Councel of subjects should in that regard take place, this were to beg the question upon a suppo∣sition against all apparant reason. For how can any be supposed to be so equally and universally interessed as the Prince? How will they have this liberty stinted, both for persons and causes? And who shall be superiour to see it on all hands performed? Will they allow subjects indefinitely to have power herein as they themselves shall see cause? they then invert and over∣throw government.

If these prudent considerations cannot prevaile with rational men to stop the current of rebelion, yet methinks the conscientious ties of Religion and the due observation of those Gospel duties of patience, humility, obedience, long-suffering, &c. might. Christian Subjects should consider how Princes are of Gods setting up and not theirs: so that when he that hath their hearts in his hand shall send them such an one as they deserve, and in a fatherly way shall make them his rods to punish their faults, they are not to attempt the throwing these rods into the fire themselves: but to kiss them, in acknow∣ledgement of submission: and, unless they will undertake to measure their own sins, they must leave it to the same hand to withdraw, that did impose. And to this purpose, let them well consider that place of Job, Is it fit to say to a King thou art wicked, or to Princes ye are ungodly? if not to say so,* 1.34 much less to strike Princes for equity. Nay,* 1.35 although they be such as appear to us to hate right: yet, being our King, and Gods Minister, over whom we can have no lawful jurisdiction, we cannot condemn them more then he that is most just.* 1.36 For so he must be esteemed of us; and left to God for punishment: Who shall (in his own way and time) break in pieces mighty men without number, and set others in their stead.* 1.37

CHAP. IV. Of Liberty.

AS we have heretofore shewed the glory of God to be the end of creati∣on, and that this glory was encreased from the variety of creatures; in∣asmuch as from their augmentation of benefit, one above another, the en∣crease of his praise must proportionably arise: As we have also declared man∣kinde amongst other creatures greatest receivers, and most capable of re∣turn, so now, as to the same end, we are to consider men amongst them∣selves, as they stand in degrees of honour and power one above another. For as we shall finde them generally much elevated above other creatures, so also, much differenced by their own degrees of perfection. Insomuch as, whilst the meanest rank of men have great degrees of Divine resemblance above other creatures below them, so have also men of higher stations, as coming hereby to be called Gods by God himself, both an advantage and obligation above those of ordinary condition: to the end, that, as their power and eminence did encrease above others below, so their gratitude upwards should encrease also. For as every workman is himself ex∣pressed in his work, and hath his goodness, power, and skil made apparent by the general perfection of all he doth, so is he yet more eminently herein repre∣sented, when of the same lumpe or kind again, he shall cause vessels of diffe∣rent honor and perfection to arise.

In order to this, as we finde that those large abilities which men in gene∣ral have above other creatures do chalenge and establish their right of domi∣nion over them, so, since one man hath as great (almost) above another, it is supposeable thereby to chalenge also proportionable superiority amongst themselves. Nor fares it so with man alone, but it is generally observable; that as the Species of creatures have more of perfection one then another, so have they also more variety of degrees in the individuals thereof, one above another.

In inanimates, that have not wil, their different vertues are without claim or use in the exercise of power and dominion: yet (comparatively) we may see one Loadstone of greater efficacy then another: so as to draw from him, up∣on even tearms, the same mass of Iron. Look amongst plants; their diffe∣rent perfections in the same kinds are to all apparant; and how also one tree or fruit, that is perfectest in the same kind or plant, over powereth that which is less. In such sort, as when we are to set forth Gods power and bounty in the vertues and endowments of stones or plants of any kind, it is our custome, and duety, to instance it in such as are the most rare and per∣fect particulars of the same kind, which may by their worth eminently in∣clude the whole.

Beasts have their degrees of prudence and courage, whereby they come to resemble men, and be differenced above others of the same kind, recom∣pensed with the dominion over one another also.

Look above our selves, and although our happiness cannot yet extend to

know any thing of the true nature of Angels, yet, supposing them in that one known relation of ministring spirits, their different degrees and orders in this office of ministration, must assure to us their different gifts and abili∣ties in performance thereof.

And here again we are more particularly to consider what was before spoken; namely, that as creatures are in their kinds more perfect, so are the degrees in the same kind more various: that from eminence herein, eminence in power might proportionably arise. For as to have made any one Species imperfect in it self could not be imagined from the power of such an Author, so also, not to have made some individuals thereof more perfect then others (whereby (as it were) to confess that the Authors power by this certain stint was come to its highest pitch) could not be expected from omnipotency either: no more then it could from his justice or goodness, not to Communicate more of his power and particular presence in things thus made perfect. Not that any the lowest thing hath hereupon cause or reason to complain; because each one having a stock of blessing suitable to its capacity, and the smaller and greater vessel being both alike full, they must, in that respect, be alike pleased.

Nor could God but hereby be much advantaged in general acknowledge∣ment, whilst, in their grateful sense of enjoyment, all things rest contented with the measure of their receits. Thus while each superiour order of An∣gels (in that celestial Hierarchy) looks upon those successively below, they must acknowledge their encreased obligations of praise: whilst the lowest of all, standing yet satisfied with continual benefit (and also beholding it self so far enabled above other creatures) all that it can do will be thought too lit∣tle to requite so large a gratuity.

If men take also the same course, how shall those of higher power have reason to acknowledge higher praise: and the meanest Subject, even for his being man, and for that proportion of Religion, Liberty, Protection, &c. which he enjoyes above other creatures, have cause also to bless that inexhau∣stible fountain of goodness?

Whereas, if men and other creatures had been made for vertue or power equal in the individuals of the same kind, then, for want of eminent obligation, and examples of vertue and power in the particulars in each kind, Gods goodness and power should not have been so remarkably set forth as now.

Nay, this very Office of Kingship will not be lost by his subjection: for its chief duty being protection, this will be alwayes residing more or less in his power: so far as, by such redresses of oppression amongst men or other creatures as shall be the occasional objects of his pity, he shall prove himself actually a King herein: and also so much more resembling God then he, as he shall be more ready and propense thereto, rateable to his small degree of power.

And the same order may creatures below us go, untill they come to inani∣mates: on which the lowest of sensitives taking its pleasure and content, as it is thereby provoked to rejoyce (which is in its kinde to thank and praise ••is Maker) so, that inanimate or vegetive again, being not sensible of any pain or injury, continues in its kinde still obliged as before. For as power can be no where in perfection but in God himself, so, to make it subsistent in other things, as approaching him, it must be in making them so only in compari∣son of one another.

And as the original of power is one, so the more it is diffused, the more weak and unworthy it is. For if all men should have power over all men (af∣ter a Democratick supposition) as all men have power over all other creatures, or as all Lyons or other Species of creatures have power over other Species below them also; how would power come to no∣thing for want of eminence? for being thus levelled, he that should have most power, having but what the meanest would have had in the degree of subordination, and so, he that hath least having still but what he hath above other things (for over his fellows he must be supposed to have none) he of the lowest rank is not increased in his obligation, and all the o∣ther orders are decreased in theirs.

So that then, if there were not the necessity of subordination as for peace and government sake, yet, as to perfection, and approach to Divine resem∣blance (by bringing the diffused power in perfect creatures to unity and ex∣istence) it would be needful to men, as with Angels, that from the lowest order of all it should be gathered to fewer in the next rank; and so on to fewer still; till, after the Divine examplar, it were centred in one. Where∣by, as man is the perfection and Epitome of all other creatures, and as Adam contained all men, so should he, or some other, if our fall had not crossed, have stood as the more worthy for receit of Divine favor in himself, and di∣stribution of it to others; with no small advantage to the whole race; even as now we finde it come to pass by that fountain of mercy, but in a far higher degree, since the dignifying of our nature by that one person of our Saviour; and so, by him, having access, we come to be capable of those benefits which without him could not be expected.

In which respect we may finde him so often expressing himself under the notion of the Son of man: even as one who having taken on him the Semen, or original element of our kinde, should, to our undoubted comfort, there∣by make the whole race capable of dignity and bliss also. And this, not on∣ly in respect of our future condition, as Jesus; being that fundamental Corn of wheat by whose Resurrection and exaltation the several Individual graines of mankinde should be drawn unto him,* 1.38 but also, in respect of many temporal advantages arising to us here, as Christ and King.

In order to the receit of which temporal advantages, Christ himself ha∣ving in the several parts of his Church his particular deputed Christs (by means of them and their representing of him amongst us) it comes to pass, that each particular man is again made capable of the benefit of Divine protection: at least so far as concerns society and government, as shall be more fully declared in the next book.

And therefore we may observe, that when God appears in kindness it is to one at once; and that he never makes a general manifestation of himself but in judgement and terror, as to those stubborn Israelites; who thereupon said Let God speak no more to us least we die: Meaning that they would have some worthy and eminent person, like Moses, to beare their person and re∣present them to Godward. The which people again, although, as they were then Gods peculiar Church and people, and had all other nations blessed or punished, as they were to them benigne or averse, yet was that very love and favor God cast towards them, both at first placed, and afterwards continued, from that more eminent love and favor setled in their first father and original: In such sort, that, after their rejection of their

and our Saviour, a remnant according to the election of grace, should come still to be beloved for the Fathers sakes,* 1.39 by that God who out of particular kindness had once stiled himself the God of Abraham. And so we shall a∣gain finde favors and blessings promised them, even for his servant Davids sake: the King and representer of that Church and people. From all which it will be evident that subordination in power is from God: and for the good of the people it is that one is by his providence thus set over them: who should as their Representative stand for them to Godward.* 1.40

But to come neerer, to shew what that power or liberty is which is requi∣site or proper in political constitutions, we must consider each man as having an appetite and end to follow. But then, inasmuch as before shewed, in the attaining and pursuit of these our ends we did often cross and interfere one upon another, it was necessary that Laws and Rules of Government should be setled to accommodate our actions to Peace and Agreement. For the same Liberty we might before justly claim as men, and due to us by Nature, we cannot now expect as Subjects linked in politique Societies: because as I then acted for my self onely, I needed no prohibitions from evil, or invitations to good; but now, common concern makes Liberty suspensible to common approbation. And because this first natural Liberty was by our fall forfeit∣ed, and would, (if by our corrupted wills put in full use) prove our destru∣ction, it was necessary the same should by his power and Laws (and such as he should therewith intrust for Society and Government sake) be so far restrained, as the mutual good and peace of the whole should be advanced; and not the wanton affected Liberty of any part of the State or Kingdom, in prejudice thereof regarded.

And therefore, the true Liberty of Sub••ects will appear to be in the remo∣val of all external impediments which cross his desires, without regard of more publike utility. And the two extreams thereof are first Slavery: when this Liberty of the Subject is not regarded at all as to his, but to the Rulers benefit: and then licentiousness, which, without respect of peace and Govern∣ment, or the good of others, reacheth at all things without controul.

We may call it a desire of freedom from external impediments: external (I say) because inwardly I cannot be divided against my self. And though the Affections and Reason may have temporary disputes, yet when the Will puts forth to the attaining any object, the impediment that hinders my ob∣taining it must be without my self: and I can lay no complaint or reparation elsewhere. Wherefore this desire being external, and of a thing in the pow∣er and possession of another (for if it were in my own I should not deny my self, or had reason to complain) it will follow, that this obtaining Liberty in me to acquire, will be the loss of Liberty in him that is dispossessed. For if our desires are (as indeed usually they are) most heightened and fixed to those things which are most rare and scarce in their kind, and such as through the common endeavor of others have obtained price and estimation, will it not come to pass that my liberty to get from him what is already in his pos∣session or expectation, will prove as great a loss of freedom to him, as it is gain to me?

So that then, Liberty as it is usually endeavoured and sought, is but the acquisition of power to act or obtain something we have a minde unto, which is now in the possession or power of another. If then I, laying claim to my natural liberty, and forsaking the determination of my rightful superior, will

proceed to execution of mine own desires without considering those of others what can follow but confusion? For all men having in Nature equal desires and claim, why should mine prevail in mine own case, so far, as, without leave, to inflict on another what I did before complain of as a grievance towards my self?

For instance, when fault is found with the yoak of Government in Church or State, as oppressing the liberty of Conscience or person of the Subjects wrongfully, and men, in order thereunto, seek to dispossess the present exe∣cutioners, as abusing their power, and to settle it on themselves or such as they have most interest in, or confidence of (which must necessarily and doth always follow) what is this to the advancement of liberty of Sub∣jects in general, or beyond their own particular party? and is to shift, but not to ease the Yoak. What is this but for parties to take upon them to be Judges: and for one part of the Subjects, renouncing the sentence of judge∣ment and determination that was before held as publike and indifferent to all parties, now to usurp power over their fellows and equals?

If they plead it is not another Government they seek, but say, "There ought to be no restraint in such and such things at all: do they not hereby seek to introduce that liberty of Anarchy, and overthrow all possibility of Peace and Agreement? For since strife and competition can never happen but a∣bout such things as are desired by others as well as themseves; if then, in this prosecution of these desires on both sides, the common rule of determi∣nation be not observed as indifferent, must not one party fall out to be judge over the other? Whereupon, as that one party may, in the conquest, call themselves free, so may the other, being subjected and overcome, call them∣selves slaves.

From all which we may gather the usual mistake in application of this no∣tion of Liberty, as proper to the governed; when it is proper to the gover∣nor onely. For to say the Liberty of a Subject is none other then a contra∣diction: for wherein he is a Subject, he is not at liberty; and wherein any is at liberty, he is not a Subject. But because no government can be so exten∣sive, as not to remit some things to the choice of the Subject, he may still justly be called a Subject, even in what he is for the present free: because having been therein restrainable by his superior, his freedom and power to act therein by his own Will proceeded from the freedom and power of the other and is thereupon originally and truely the governors power and freedom, and not the others.

For since, to the stating of government, an explicite act or execution is not always required, but a true stating the Corelates of governing and go∣verned (whereby the Governor may act as he shall see occasion) it will fol∣low that freedom in the Subject or Patient, will in order to polity, depend on the freedom of the Governor and Agent: and that as these are more or less obnoxious, so will the governed be more or less free. For as the brain could not impart sense to its own Membrances and Nerves if it were in its own substance in any sort patible, and affected by impression of objects that way subjected unto it, nor could the eye judge of colors if the Christaline hu∣mor stood any ways particularly tainted, even so the freedom of Subjects can be but proportionable to that of the person whom they serve: both in order to the singleness and worth of the Commanders, (considered in themselves) and also in regard of the paucity of precepts from them proceeding. Hence

as God can be onely perfectly free, as being alone and onely in all kindes and degrees unsubjected, so can his service be onely perfect freedom. Not that service and obedience (as such) can be freedom: but the singleness and high worth of the Commander, must make the commanded to be comparatively free to all others, even in the execution of the command it self. And so will the abatement of number in the persons commanding do the like, even un∣til it comes to Unity or Monarchy: so as to make the benefit and good of commanding and commanded, to be reciprocal. For considering the com∣manded as a voluntary Agent, and so having an end proper to follow (and not to be governed like the meer passive instrument) the known good inten∣tion and power of the commander will be always so ready a stop to his re∣luctance, that the performance of the Governors will shall be the same with his own: as knowing his good to be in all things respected.

As these considerations will make the freedom of such as are Subjects to the Monarch onely, to be greater then the freedom of servants: because the Prince hath none but God to obey; whereas the Master hath the Prince, and Magistrates also: so again, will he be more free then the Subjects in Polar∣chies: who have so many above them, that they can, by their equality, neither have any eminence of freedom or honor amongst themselves, so as to give it to their subjects; nor can have such true reciprocal concern in their sub∣jects good, as upon the like assurance of their sincerity, to make the obedi∣ence to their commands the continual object of their Wills, as the Prince may, for that cause, do. And also because, in obeying him, they do, upon the matter, obey God onely; who hath so commanded: and so arive at a state of perfect freedom: that is to say the highest degree of freedom which humane subjection can admit. For liberty (as before noted) cannot consist in bare freedom to will, for then all would have it alike, but in liberty to act which must imply power: and that the party having it, must, as an Agent and Superior, have others again relating to him, as Patients and Inferiors.

So that, degrees of subjection being necessary, men then onely come to think they have lost their liberty when they forget that necessary and sure to∣ken of duty and obedience, to wit humility: and, proudly overlooking their equals or inferiors, would still retain that freedom and power they have over those beneath, and be also freed from those above him. Thus an insulting Peer, or proud Wife, if restrained by their Prince or husband, from taking their full liberty, calls their subjection slavery: and do repine and complain thereof (usually) oftner, then the meaner and inferior Subjects, or Ser∣vants.

Therefore, we may say that slavery is thirst of Liberty: and is not proporti∣oned to the measure of Liberty wanting, but to what is desired. And, enjoy∣ment of Liberty being in regard of the Will, he that cheerfully obeys twenty commands is freer then he that stomacks any one. And therefore, contented∣ness can never truely be tearmed slavery.

But they that seem to speak most against extream servitude, say that it wholly abates the courages of men: so that they become unuseful for de∣fence of their Country. A man might answer, that when all Kingdoms should have due subjection, all being valiant alike, none would be cowards. For valour is not proper to Subjects, as Subjects; or to be exercised without leave by one man against another. And if rebellion and stubbornness can onely make valiant, what if we wanted it?

But if it be necessary to be used against such, then it is true that meaner and baser people are not (on the suddain) so fit for martial affairs as others. But this happens rather for want of education and discourse, whereby to know and apprehend sence of honor and shame. For (doubtless) they have their lives in as little esteem as the other; and should usually dare do more, as less apprehensive of danger. And wise men (as wise) must be fearful: and therefore (usually) is the Commander better armed then the common man. But the mean bred man is most subject to run, because not so apprehen∣sive of the shame. And, if cowardliness follow subjection, then the very disci∣pline of souldiery should amate men most; for that it calls for strict obedi∣ence and duty; and under such tearms of rigour and severity, that nothing but necessity can make the meanest subject undertake it.

The truth is, though men of servile condition be at first unswayed by ho∣nor (the cause of valor) and also for a while (through ignorance) causelesly scared, as apprehending battails above their true danger, yet experience eve∣ry day tells us that of these are made good, if not the best, souldiers; at least for foot: for as sense of honor and encouragement encrease with them, so will valor also. Again, they coming from an inferior tank and state of for∣mer obedience, are more hardned against affliction then the other: and are beyond them also in discipline and obedience, the main suppor∣ters of an Army. And, however an Army of voluntiers may, through suddain heat, avail in some present enterprise, yet an Army can never conti∣nue and long subsist of such kinde of souldiers onely.

But let us suppose valour to follow degrees of honor, and that the Yeo∣man hath more then the Peasant, the Gentleman more then the Yeoman, the Knight, the Lord, the Earl, Marquess, Duke, each above other; what way shall be now taken to encrease the prowess and strength of a Nation? shall we enlarge the number of Nobility or Gentry, by taking in and enfran∣chising those below them, to encrease souldiery? how shall they then be free, when they come by this means to be the meanest and most servile themselvs? Shall we place between the Gentry and Peasantry, a middle degree of Yeo∣mandry, to make the body of an Army of; and so refuse the Peasant? Each Country hath its own rules herein. But it is generally to be known, that places of command have voluntaries enow: but Souldiers, as to the Bulk of them, are first made from necessitous persons, and then perfected by Dis∣cipline.

But to come to an issue, Freedom and Rebellion, Tyranny and Slavery, are tearms of relation; and are the one, or the other, as they exceed their due li∣mits. The Master of the Family, that exceeds in his power beyond the law of God, Nature, and his Prince, is a Tyrant; and his servants slaves: and so is the Prince that rules beyond the Law of God and Nature. And the Prince, or Master, that is straightned from rules or Power below them, are Slaves also. And again, as the Servants or Subjects that resist against such as are lawfully above them are Rebels; so, when their submission is no farther, they are free: be their service as servile as it will. For the tearms of slavery and tyranny express most usually the parties hatred or anger against such or such persons or authorities: and not the truths of the things themselves.

But, if things be rightly understood and considered, sociable Freedome, or the true liberty of Subjects cannot be separated from subjection and obe∣dience. In which condition he is more or less Free, as his Prince or Com∣mander

is more or less powerfull. And this, because all Laws of restraint having in their intention and aim the hinderance of the actings of some few Subjects that would else likely break forth to the prejudice of the liberty and free enjoyment of others, it will follow, that as Laws are more or less enfor∣ced and kept up, and as Princes are more or less obeyed, their Subjects will generally be more or less free: that is, unrestrained in their enjoyments. As for example, if the Laws against Murther and Theft, (with all their subordinate attendants to the disturbance of Subjects safeties or properties) be more or less particularly and severely made and executed, so will their liberties living under them, be truely more or less stated also: being thereby rid of the Ty∣ranny of one another, which is ever most, where the persons are more.

So that their mistake is now evident, that are so ready to teach Subjects to cal out for possession of that, which, as they are Subjects, is no ways proper un∣to them: inasmuch as liberty supposeth power, and not subjection. For as none can govern another wherein himself is not free, so, to suppose any one free, is to suppose him a Governor: for so potentially he is: wanting onely a relative object of subjection to bring this power into act. At which time he that stood before as a free man (separately considered), is now a Governor; in relation to this his object of subjection. And the servant or subject can be no otherwise free, then as left so by their superior: even as the Prince is no otherwise free, then as left so by God. For as power to act, whether natu∣rally, or civily, came from him, so are we by such superiors restrainable as by just derivation of power from him are to this end set over us. In which case (as before noted) our obedience is truely our liberty: as being but subject to God, and in pursuance of our own good, the object and end of liberty. And so we shall, whilst complying with the end of the Prince (the good of his subjects) pursue therein our own good also.

In which consideration, it will fare with the Prince, in those restraints he lays on his subjects for their good (by maintenance of publike Peace and So∣ciety) as it doth with Parents in those tasks and restraints they impose on their children, for their better education and benefit hereafter: to wit, that, as children, if left at liberty to be continually spending their time in play and sports, according to their present desires, would inconsiderately make their li∣berty their ruine, even so, subjects also, if the Prince, in a fatherly care to∣ward them, should not restrain them of such liberty to act on one another as might engage them in civil broils, his indulgence would be their destruction. And as all men do confess, that such Parents as do use those restraints do best perform their offices towards their children, even so must it be acknowledged of Princes: however it may, and doth usually fall out, that, as such Parents are by the children themselves esteemed unnatural and severe, even so, such Princes, by heady and licencious Subjects, are many times reckoned as Ty∣rants: of which we shall next discourse.

CHAP. V. Of Tyranny.

IN great alterations, especially of Government, we are not to expect that the Authors should give other then fair titles to what they themselves do, and as bad to the contrary. Thus the Athenians, after Codrus, would have no more Kings, because he was so good: and the Romans, imitating them in fondness of liberty, would after Tarquin have no more neither, be∣cause he was so bad. But the truth is, they were both of them people of impetuous spirits; as their neighbours, as well as their Kings might wit∣ness.

But, from the Greeks we have the name of Tyrant; importing primari∣ly a Lord or absolute Commander; and of no farther ill. For they were wont to give this name, even to lawful Kings; if they thought them more Lordly and absolute in their Government then they approved of: but gene∣rally to all Kings after their rejection amongst themselves: the more to dis∣grace that form themselves had cast off.

After whom, by way of imitation, the Romans hated the names of King and Dictator both, upon Tarquinius and Sillaes expulsions. For the ambiti∣ous heads in both places, so exasperated things in the peoples memories, that, through personal failings, the very Offices and their Titles came to be held odious; as importing oppression and cruelty. But as (hereupon) their dis∣like of that kinde of Government made them so hasty to fasten this Title to all Princes, so that very use of commonness took away at last from the op∣probriousness of the Title: insomuch as, coming in the end to signifie (as at first) but an absolute and severe Prince, or else one that through force or poli∣ty had gotten the Soveraignty, it came to pass that thereupon, the Princes themselves to whom it was given, answered thereto; as not reckoning it de∣rogatory. For so Plato directs his Epistle, To Dionysius the Tyrant: and he answers, Dionisius the Tyrant to Plato health. And by this name were Ptittacus and Periander, both Sages of Greece called. But process of time hath made that word to be now constantly taken in a much worse sense: as it doth ano∣ther word also from them received, namely Barbarian. Which name, by them formerly given to all not of their own Nation, and then, by reason of their greater learning and civility, having more esteem then their neighbors, in time it came also to signifie, not onely such as were not Greeks, but such as were rude and uncivilized also: be they of what Nation they would. Even as the Jew, calling all Gentile but his own Nation, and other Nations being at that time idolaters, Gentile and Idolater came to signify the same thing.

But to return to our enquiry; If the name of Tyrant be due to such as en∣ter without the express election or consent of the major part of the univer∣sal people, then was there never any but Tyrants: for no such election ever was had, or could be. If to such as come by the ordinary way of Providence, namely by power of the sword, what shall we think of the Cesars, with many other famous Emperors of Rome: and of Philip, Alexander, and others over Greece,

and other nations; that by conquest and force of the souldiers were holpen to their soveraignties; and so the major part of the people not freely con∣senting: and yet have been in Histories famous without such imputation?

They that say conquest may give title indeed, but that it is consent onely that gives right: If by consent they mean the major part of the whole mul∣titude freely and expresly voting, they will (as formerly said) never finde any so elected: but if by consent they mean non-opposition of his power and command, and so think that possession (as right of prescription in other things) should give him herein right also, they must then finde out some rea∣son to shew, why, since the force by which he entred is the same with that by which he rules, the facts he did in his entrance should be more unlawful then those he doth afterwards: and the subject (if other circumstances alter it not) not bound to obedience as well then as now. For fear prevails at both times; and it may be in the last time more; as having all the Militia in his power. Unless we shall think that the Prince, in complyance to this opinion shall, in complemental imprudence, resign all his Majesty and power; and, laying aside all that God and his own prowess had already bestowed, put himself (as a man of no greater right then others) to the suffrages of those his Subjects whom he hath hitherto so much offended by forceable intrusion and Go••ernment, whether he shall continue their King or no.

But it may be by some replyed, that

If he continue his absoluteness, the people (as exasperated) may endanger him by some violent attempt.

True indeed; but then this is most probable to grow from his remisness: for, a∣gainst him they fear least (as most unlike to punish them) and against the mildest Princes people rebel most. And therefore, for farther security, Princes use to impose Oaths of Alleageance on such they fear: that where his own terror cannot prevail, Gods may.

But, to come neerer the present business; he that by any means makes himself a Soveraign against the right of another is an usurper: and if he, or a lawful Prince, shall, through flattery, covetousness, or revenge, have respect onely to himself or some of his own favorites, without equal justice to all, according to the Laws of God, Nature, and his Conscience, he is so far a Tyrant as he shall then press it forcibly to the overthrow of anothers Liber∣ty or Property. For, in so doing, he ceaseth to act in the capacity of a pub∣like person: and, taking on him the affections incident to a private man, he doth thereupon become tyrannical and unjust.

Nay more, if he, for favor or fear of the seeming whole people or any party thereof, shall, against known Equity or his Conscience, put to death any one of his Subjects, upon no other consideration but in complyance to them, or shall not protect him to the hazard of his life or estate, in case of oppression, he is a murtherer to boot: upon the same ground that Pilate was; who by washing of his hands, could not cleer his fault of deserting the innocent. And of this kinde of Tyranny, soft and weak Princes can hardly be free. For they are ever over-ruled by seperate orders or persons of their Subjects: who must, in their prosecutions, have partial designs. For these Princes, be∣ing by their unactive spirits, kept from knowledge of the true state and dan∣gers of things, the threats and power of such as they are most obnoxious un∣to prevail with them to believe their private ends, dangers, and wrongs to be his: and thereupon, is his Authority made to become tyrannical; by execu∣tion of these mens interest and revenge upon their fellow Subjects.

But they that are so ready to accuse and cry out against the severe Govern∣ments of Princes as tyrannies (because by degrees themselves would be law∣less) may consider that Princes can never tyrannize, that is, seek to destroy or severely punish their subjects, as subjects; but as under the notion of their rebels; and such that will not be subjects, he always doth, and may punish. They are to consider, that tyranny can never proceed from a Prince of the same Religion to any height, where stubbornness did not precede as a cause: and which humility might not extinguish, or abate. For as it is not tyranny when a Prince, subjecting a forraign people that war with him, punisheth them, or useth them with severity; no more is it when done against such of his own people as disobey or resist. For they, in that case, taking the event upon their own hazard, have their punishment as enemies, and not as subjects: which may be cruelty, but cannot be Tyranny. For that must onely be the unjust and excessive infliction of a power submitted unto; and not from the degrees of triumph or possession made by a victor.

And those reports of such as Nero

To wish all Rome one neck, that it might be cut off at a blow,

do become his murtherers to tell, more then us to believe. For I cannot see how a rational man (which none denied him to be) should, at the same time he aims at Empire and Dominion, wish or plot the lessening of it. And, from hence, most evident it is, that Tyranny is (as before noted) but the usual term of political railing; used by such as aim at total insubjection: for otherwise, they would have better agreed in stating of Tyranny, and its marks and degrees, so as Princes might have known and avoided it.

If usually Government it self (at least such wherein themselves were not chief) were not the intended extream they meant to abolish under the odium of Tyranny, I would fain know why we have not found out as odious a name to express the other extream by; that is, the excess of Princes rewards and favors, as well as that of Tyranny to express their punishments? Being onely, because that no man is afraid of being too much rewarded, but ra∣ther would have that extream pass as a vertue, that it may always be run into by Princes. And upon this reason again, in the severe carriage of the Master of the Family, we use no such expression of Tyranny, because it might come about to our selves: and yet is the Father and Husband, more subject to con∣tract irreconcileable displeasure against Wife and Children, then the Prince against his subjects. For he may suspect his Wifes honesty, and his childrens extraction; which by no action, complyance, or submission of theirs can be avoided. But the Subject cannot but be beloved in that relation of a Subject: and always in his power it is, to make himself known to be such an one.

And if severity in punishment must make Princes to be Tyrants, who can judge of that, or its excess, or just measure, but he must there∣upon be above the Prince? And will not all Government be more or less Tyranny; because there is always more or less severity? If Tyranny be when the Laws of God and Nature are transgressed (as is sometimes defined) we are still to seek how to be bettered by this information: for who shall judge of that above the Prince also, so far as to condemn him of the breach of any positive Law of God; since he is, as chief Magistrate under God, to have their custody and interpretation; or of any injustice in Government, which, as his trust, can be tryed onely by his Conscience? But this definition will inform us that Tyranny is so far from

proceeding from power, that it is alwayes in the want thereof. For Princes are accompted Tyrants as they stand Subjects; that is, to the laws of God or Nature. Whence we may inferr, That Tyranny is the act of Oppression forceably committed by one Subject upon another.

For so was the taking Naboths Vineyard tyranny: not solely because Ahab had private respect therein, but because he proceeded according to sentence of authority derived from himself, in a particular wherein God had not re∣ferred any jurisdiction unto him; but wherein they stood both equally subject. For that God having, by express command from himself, (during the time that state was in a Theocracy) forbidden the alienation of inheritances, and the People being yet bound severally to look to the external obedience of these Laws as they were set down by Moses, Naboth might well make that answer he did,* 1.41 God forbid I should give the Inheritance of my Fathers unto thee. Importing, that because God had expresly forbid it me, (to whom I am in the first place to be subject) therefore I cannot alienate or give it unto thee. And that this reply was more grounded on fear of displeasing God, then sense of injury to himself, may be also concluded by the reasonable∣ness of Ahabs offer unto him; namely, of Money or exchange above the worth. But because, in the Jewish State, (although Kings were eminently entrusted,) the literall observation of the Law was still universally obliging, and to be obeyed by each one in particular, in order to the outward way of regiment God then exercised: therefore could not any King therein, by his command, free them from guilt in such externall performances as their conscience told them were against Divine precept. Therefore, in these cases, the Jewish subject had his only way to avoid rebellion on one hand or other, by being subject to both: namely, by being actively subject to all Gods com∣mands, and passively to such as the Prince commanded contrary: as formerly noted.

But although the usual acceptation of the tearm of Tyranny is in acts of high severity, yet, for mine own part, I believe whilst the Prince, in his Go∣vernment or punishments, is guided with publike consideration, he can never deserve the name of Tyrant. For even that indiscretion which suddain passi∣on may cause him in any thing to commit, must (at least) be excused by the goodness of his intention. But then, Princes hearts being inscrutable, who shall judge his intentions? Not Subjects certainly. For, besides that it is against their duty, it is unreasonable, as being parties. And, although an other subject (then the present sufferer) do judge, yet is he a party by con∣sequent too: because he will presently be applying it,

The case may be mine own.

And this self-consideration works with all Subjects in general to cry out upon all strictness in Government, as Tyranny. But however, all men must confess that the punished cannot judge over the punisher; that is, of the measure of the execution of his lawful Office.

And as for the name of Tyrant, me thinks Christians should rather imitate that modesty used by the Penmen of Gods Word, in not using it all, amids the Stories of so many that deserved it, then now to impute to Christian Kings, so commonly, the Heathen phrases of such as never knew the precept, Thou shalt not revile the Gods, nor curse the Ruler of thy people.* 1.42 And that (especially) because it is so hard a thing to say what actions are tyrannicall, and how many of them must amount to make that name justifiable to any person: for one cannot doe it, no more then the doing one just deed can make any be called a just man.

CHAP. VI. Of Slavery.

AMongst other devices men have for the decrying the reputations of such as oppose them in their ambitious designs, the chief is to render them odious by fastening to them the name, and therewith the guilt and scorn of that extream unto which they seem more neer then themselves: not regarding herein whether it be a truth or no. So, (for example amongst other things) they that would make their intended innovations please and take with the people (who are ever listening to all offers of liberty) were wont to call all government differing from their own Tyranny, and all people so governed Slaves.

The word (as report goeth) cometh unto us from that extream drudgery & servile usage which the Venetians put the Slavi or Slavonii unto, after they had subdued them: and from thence, all base and Arbitrary servitude comes to be called Slavery. But antiquity, and the best Commonwealths and men in them, have, by use, made this subjection lawful: and the word Family takes its name from Famulus, as having slaves the greatest part of its compo∣sure. Strict slavery we may call a degree of servitude; wherein the Life, Liberty, and Property of a man, hath no assurance or redress beyond the will of the Lord: for he is owned by him in so high a degree of propriety, that the Commonwealth with her Laws, seems not to regard or protect him as a member. Whereas the Citizen, or him we call a free Subject, claims a right or assurance in all these, by the common Rule or Law of his Country: and hath power of appeal in case of injustice.

But then again, these Citizens stand in all things as lyable to the dispose of the Law, and him or those that have the Soveraigne interpre∣tation and execution thereof, as the other doth to the dispose of his private Lord: so that, when it shall be hereby interpreted that the Life, Liberty, or Property of any one is forfeited, there is no remedy, more then to the Slave. Nay, the Lord, in respect of his more assurance of his Slaves obedience, can never look on him as an enemy: and in regard (a∣gain) of his more particular benefit by the life and health of his slave, he seems likely to take more care hereof, then the publike Lord or Soveraign; who, in regard of his more common and more multiplyed relations, holds (it is likely) each particular not of so great loss and concern. And there∣fore (comparing their numbers) more Subjects then Slaves have violent deaths: not onely as souldiers and luxurious, but as criminals. Forasmuch as slavery, wanting hope of farther Property or Liberty then shall stand with his Lords liking, wants also the two usual spurs to rebellion against his Lord, as the other hath against his Prince. And the veriest slave cannot be so wholly deprived of his Will and things delightful, but sometimes to have them: in which case, absence may, like abstinence in diet, make his relish more delightful: whereas the Sub••ects possessions, usually causing covetous∣ness of more, makes him undelightful with what he hath. And then, since in all strong and eager covetings, what is past is forgotten, and the anxious care

for enjoyment of what is sought, growing to be more to him that seeks more then to him that seeks less, the slave that, for reward of some past labour, hath a tester given him to drink or buy what he likes, is (no doubt) better rewarded and comforted, then where gain is onely for propriety sake: and to the owner accrews nothing, but the beholding it with his eys.

And the true use of Property the slave cannot want: that is, meat and drink, and things necessary. Nor is he equally afraid to lose them with the Citizen. For, whilst his Lord hath it, he must, for his own sake, help him too: but if his Lord be attainted, or suddainly or wholly despoiled, he is free, and may go to another: but the Citizen failing, ruines himself, and u∣sually his Family. But then, it may be said the subjects Trade, by which he lives, consists not of so base Offices as the slaves doth. And yet, there is no∣thing done by slaves, how base soever, but is done by free-men (as they call them) where they are not: and since these can be hired with mony, I see not but Obedience and Duty should make the deed as commendable.

And then, as the Subject may appeal from any injuring him to the Prince, so may the slave from any of the Family to his Lord: and as he is then re∣mediless, so is the other. And the slave hath this advantage, that his duty is more easily managed then the other; as it is easier to follow plain verbal directions, then intricate Laws: especially when another must interpret them.

To conclude, as the onely difference between the Lord of a Family and the Lordly Monarch is not in power to command, but in multitude of the commanded; so it will happen, that through impossibility of personal inspe∣ction, the Subject avoids the continual eye of his Prince, and thereby he is like one that hath his copy set, that may manage his duty more as he plea∣seth: yet the slave, that hath, by continual reproof and direction his hand guided, is more sure to do his work better, and so avoid blame likelier then the other: in whom, liberty may cause pride, and pride contempt, and contempt punishment.

And therefore, we are not to wonder that many have voluntarily gone in∣to slavery: and that some, after experience, and being now free, have (by suffering their ears to be boared) chosen it for perpetuity. For certain it is, that the condition of the one is more setled then the other: and that very de∣gree of liberty the subject hath above him resolves to this, that the slave must do his duty presently, where the other may fail, and be punished. Nay, in present possession the slave seems more happy; because more contented. For since some liberty must sometimes come to the slave, who expects little, and some restraint (incident to all Government) must come to the Subject, who is still gaping after more freedom; the one must be more content in the little he enjoys, then the other in that great measure he vainly ex∣pects.

But having spoken all this to take down the prejudice of such as (not knowing what slavery is) are ready to fasten it on all such as have not (as they believe) equal freedom to themselves, we shall therefore now, deter∣mine a slave to be him That is in all things at the arbitrary dispose of a Sub∣ject, and so out of common protection. For if any be enthralled to the Prince, I see not but that, as his appeal and protection is equal, his conditi∣on of freedom should be so also. As in Families, the life of Wife and Children have sometimes been at the same persons dispose, to wit, to the

head of the Family, as well as the slave. And therefore as we see there is difference in the Soveraignty of Princes, one in the comparison of another, so is there in degrees of serv••tude, of one Princes subjects from anothers, and of the same subjects amongst themselves. And if all be slaves where ab∣solute rule is, then are the subjects in Aristocracies and Democracies all slaves: with this aggravation, that, in regard of their many Lords, it is hard to escape either task or punishment.

But I look on slavery as having its foundation in Reason: where the strong∣er and Conquerer, having power to kill, saves for his own farther service: hereby obliging the other, by way of gratitude, to obedience. But (in after policies especially) it was scarce practised on fellow subjects or natives; but usually on such as were spared in wars: and so David and Solomon served ma∣ny they took. Whither this kinde of servitude may be fit to be continued for to save some sorts of condemned mens lives, and make them profitable to the Commonwealth, we will not now dispute: onely, we wish the fault of gi∣ving this title where it is not due were left off. For if it must follow Arbitrary Government, then (as before said) all Republikes have it: unless you will esteem it an case, that some of the people may rule by turns: by which means, as by a kinde of revenge, their discontent will abate.

And the truth is, in Aristocracies and Democracies (such as those of Greece Carthage, Rome, &c.) slavery is most usual, and most severely exacted. For there, as each one comes to esteem himself a King, having none above him, and yet comes to have so little share of Soveraignty, having it divided a∣mongst so many, it will come more severely to be managed over few; for pow∣er is an active quality. But Kings, that have many at their command, cannot be so severe, nor the burthen of one so heavy that is born by many shoulders, as where the same is by fewer persons more distinctly born. Again, subjects in Monarchies are by Laws of superiors in their houshold authorities stinted, and seldom is any vassalage great in degree, but where an appeal lies not in case of misusage. For in Republikes, where a Faction and number of persons by conspiracy and agreement come to rule over others, each one hath his in∣terest in the case: and the servant must look to be more a slave then elsewhere. For as slavery is the lowest degree of servitude, so is it incident to the lowest degree of Commanders: and the subject in a Republike differs in freedom from the Subject of a Monarch, as a King doth in power or honor from that of a Burgomaster. Therefore, if I had onely respected recrimination, and not truth, I needed not to have made any Apology for slavery: but have turned it, with its odium, upon its true Authors, the Polarchs themselves. But that which these people would have be considered and meant by slavery, is not that servitude they impose themselves on their Subjects, but what is by Prin∣ces imposed on theirs: that so, under the noise of slavery, they might cause all Monarchs subjects to become indeeed slaves to themselves.

But, farther to answer them that will make arbitrary power such an odious thing, and yet grant it to so many; that will make Government depend on Paction and consent, and yet use force therein themselves; let us a little ex∣amine their Justice by these Rules. Suppose those that call themselves the people be (as in Athens and Rome have been enrolled) usually not the tenth part so many, as the number of Tradesmen, Artificers, freed men, and slaves come too within their own City, besides other Cities and people they ruled over (which it may be in all made more then a hundred to one) how come

these fewer number to rule over the other, and to make Laws to binde them thus arbitrarily without their consents? where are the Pactions they can shew to warrant their so doing? what, are these the whole people, and yet not the tenth part of them? how com••s this name of people to be appropriate to so few, and to impart Soveraignty? Did the major part of subjects grant it? No sure. Do they claim Dominion over their slaves as taken in war? Then they make right of Conquest lawful Dominion. And when they appoint their measure of s••rvitude, and time for continuance, is not this arbitrary? What are these many, and variable Laws for shutting out, and taking into freedom, and the several degrees thereof but Arbitrary Government? How comes mankinde into this thraldom of one another? Nay how comes it that whole Nations are to be subject to this arbitrary disposal of the prevailing people of another City? Was it their fault their Prince fought against them? It may be they were not in the battail: if they were, what must they be punish∣ed for being overcome? If fight, or not fight, or well, or ill fighting be the same, is not their enslaving arbitrary?

And hereupon, we shall finde that Republikes are ever most greedy of Empire, and do make greatest use of conquest for the subjection of the liber∣ties of Nations and other Cities: they having so many to share in the spoils. And if we shall agree to their usual definition of freedom, calling him onely a Citizen and free that hath a share and voice in the Government, then all under their obeysance must be reckoned slaves, as indeed they are: the ex∣clusion of Tradesmen, in some Commonweals, the different admission of freed men, and different yeers of emancipation and admission of children to be Citizens, shews all their rule to be arbitrary, and not depending on their pretended Paction or consent.

Nor is the little finger of these Polarchies heavier then the loyns of Kings in point of Liberty onely, but in Property also: the publike Levies and Taxes being always rateably more in them, then in Monarchies that are of like ex∣tent for Territorie or number of Subjects. The which must so come to pass, because they can never subsist without Armies: both to force their own vas∣sals to obedience, and also to keep the major part of the whole commonalty and people from having power and opportunity to set up some more eminent person in trust and charge with the Commonwealth in their stead.

And, to conclude, as we defined the Liberty of a Subject to be when he shall be suffered to enjoy his own delight and good so far as publike utility is not cros∣sed, to slavery is hereof to be deprived without the same regard: but in neither case, is the reason and measure left to the parties own judgement, but to that which is publike and common.

CHAP. VII. Of Property.

WE have formerly discoursed how pleasure is the end of all sensi∣••ives, and that, as man had the most variety of perfection here∣in, so stood his obligation of gratitude and praise higher then of other creatures. And this is not only remarkable, in that every thing one way or other is made delightful, but then farther, because the stock of nature (in many kinds) is not of it self sufficient, and because again, the co∣vetous appetites of others will not many times let things extend to general satisfaction, therefore, to preserve our contents, and thereby invite us to thankfulness, we may observe that each one hath his pleasure and delight af∣fixed to what he possesseth: even so, that, be it of what kind it will, the possessions of others, in the same, or other kinde, passeth with less repining. For as the food we eat, be it never so unlike the body it self, or never so dif∣fering from other sorts, doth yet, by long retention and the divers concocti∣ons and passages of the body, attain at last to a perfect degree of assimulati∣on; even so our sence, through daily presence of our own particular enjoy∣ments, doth at last imprint them unto the fancy with such steady delight, that they come to be valued in a kinde of Identity, or second self.

Answerable hereunto, both in end and effect, is that property of proper∣ties; or that property that usually provokes us to seek all others, namely that great love of parents towards their children: which, as a thing of greatest use for preservation of mankinde, and esteemed of great concern to parents, comes to stick so close to our affections out of no other considerati∣on. Insomuch as, in all creatures, this affection prevailes as acquired to its particular object, and not out of any innate sympathy in nature. And there∣fore another yongling, of the same or divers kind, if the dam be ignorant of the change, obtains as great love as the true would do: So that Hens (we see) and other fowl will hatch and bring up fowl of other and different sorts to their own: and all, because in eggs they were not easily distinguishable: whereas, after they have taken full notice of their own, a remarkable stranger shall not be admitted. So, in other beasts, before their sense have had time to take notice of the shape or smell of their brood, part of, or all their litter may be changed: especially for others of the same kind, where there is no disparity of size, or yeers. As for men, mark such as have their wives in sus∣pition; how they will pick and choose among their children, not as any other affection, but as conceit of propriety shall lead them. And again, such as have just cause to suspect, but yet are not at all jealous (under this conceit of propriety) either love all alike, or distinguish not by any revealing sympathy. Nay, what mother, at the same time of her delivery, might not be cozened with a change; as also, while children are at nurse? Their best security be∣ing, that this affectionate esteem of propriety makes the poorest parent of all even loth to yeild thereunto.

And although our particular goods and estates, as being reckoned not of

so great concern, nor being so long or often in our sight, comes to have a less regard: Yet an especial indulgence we may observe cast towards them: in such sort, that the true fountain from whom they flow comes many times to be forgotten. For so full of pride and vain-glory are all sorts of men by na∣ture, and so heavy a burthen doth the due return of received benefits seem to our ungrateful dispositions, that rather then any diminution of content (through the acknowledgement of such receit) shall lye upon us, we are ready by all inventions we can make, to shift off the plain confession of any dependance whatsoever. And because It is a more blessed thing to give then to receive, we would in nothing, or at least in due measure,* 1.43 acknowledge our selves receivers.

The prevailence of this humor appears in all those goods and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which by the bounty of God, the earth and other elements and creatur•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 so plentifully afford us: For, how ready are we herein to finde out a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 relinquish and forget our common dependance and obligation, and to impale and impropriate to our selves set portions of them, answerable to our desires? From which, as from a stock now our own, our wants being supplied, our ac∣knowledgement and gratitude comes many times to be forgotten. And this is not onely practised by mankind in general against the common right of o∣ther creatures (as accounting himself sole Master and Proprietor of natures common revenue) but also by Kingdoms, Societies, and particular persons, to the detriment of one another.

To meet with this inconvenience, many things are by our All-seeing God in his law enjoyned; in acknowledgement of his original and Paramount propriety: for so comes a seventh of our time, a tenth of our substance, the first of our fruits, liquors, cattel, nay of our own sons to be his: to keep us in remembrance that we have not in our selves any unconditionate propriety, not so much as over our own persons. And, to shew that these things are of com∣mon interest (as between men, so) between men and beasts, every seventh yeer the land is to rest and lye still: That the poor may eat, and what they leave the beasts of the field may eat.* 1.44 And this consideration is expresly set to the letting the land lye fallow in the yeer of Jubilee;* 1.45 namely that the land is Gods: and so, they being but Stewards or Tennants, no humane right of prescription can prevail against his original right. And, in a word, to keep his right and our gratitude in continual memory, were all those sacrifices and other feasts instituted: serving but as so many Indexes and Lessons, to shew that the earth is the Lords and the fulness thereof. And although we, on whom the dregs of Time are come,* 1.46 are too prone to forget this everlasting precept of honouring God with our substance, yet, as a continual remembrance of his undoubted propriety,* 1.47 it is our custome and duty (as to pray to him for what we want, so) to thank him for all we receive: which thanks, in the receit of our ordinary food, is called grace: as denying all right of our own, and acknowledging all to be his grace and bounty.

Which being so, all Societies and men must be looked upon but as Ten∣nant, for such term and condition as the Landlord pleaseth. So that when this great King, after the manner of going into a far country, shall be pleas∣ed not so immediately to operate in worldly affairs and dispensations, but trust the several talents of his bounty to others, as namely to Kings (from whom he expects account to himself onely, as by him onely trusted) we are still to acknowledge Gods propriety in them; and For this cause are to pay

tribute; for they are Gods Ministers attending continually upon this very thing:* 1.48 That is, for to be as Gods unto us, aswel in fastening and assuring our proprieties amongst our selves by his laws (which could not be else distin∣guished from the common natural claim to one man more then another by any meer humane right) as they are to continue (again) Gods universal claim and propriety, by taking and demanding some part, to keep us in continual memory and acknowledgement of Gods supreme right still, and of this e∣stablishment of propriety by loyalty and obedience.

And as for Gods acknowledging his Minister herein for himself, it is well set forth by that speech of Zelophedads daughters, pleading that their inhe∣ritances should still remaine in propriety to them, because their father had not forfeited them by any rebellion against Gods chief Minister, that is, a∣gainst Moses the then King of Jesurun (or Israel) saying, Our father died in the wilderness, and was not in the company of them that gathered themselves toge∣ther against the Lord in the company of Rorah: but died in his own sin. By which, we may plainly perceive that they claim right for continuance of those the proprieties of their family which were by Gods Minister formerly settled,* 1.49 because their family had not made any such forfeiture by Rebellion as to cause them to revert again to the first Proprietor, God, and the Prince.

Which was the reason why, in the case of Naboths vineyard (before men∣tioned) Jezabel did advise to have him accused For blaspheming God and the King; that, under colour of these crimes, she might cause that inheritance to return;* 1.50 which could not be otherwise done. And therefore, as Kings are Gods Deputies and Vicegerents to us in representation of his power, so are they to be acknowledged his Deputies amongst us in respect of his un∣doubted and unquestionable propriety: even by their receit of such propor∣tions back from their subjects, out of those their proprieties by their laws made, as those Ministers of God attending continually upon this very thing shall see fit: either for advancement of Gods (the great owners) service, or the good of himself, or others in order thereunto. Which portions, in the New Testament, are usually included under the general names of cu∣stome and tribute: because amongst the Romans, to whom these taxes and contributions were given, they were the usual appellations for publike leavies.

And this precept of Saint Paul for acknowledging the Prince his para∣mount propriety, under the notion of paying tribute, is answerable to ano∣ther of our Saviours, including Caesars propriety in all things, under the pro∣per notion of money. For, in deciding that question of the lawfulness of paying tribute, he takes a sure way towards making our proprieties to be Caesars: In that, calling the piece of money Caesars, because it had Caesars image upon it, he concludes him to have the same right to all money as to that peice; for that all money had his image upon it. He doth not say give unto Caesar of your money, but, give him his own, Or, give unto Caesar the things that are Caesars:* 1.51 concluding that Gods immediate propriety being for the present entrusted and delegated to these in his stead, we were now to acknowledge them so far, as, by our readiness in yeilding of tribute to whom tribute, custome to whom custome, &c. we should thereby, amidst our com∣mon duties of giving to all their dues,* 1.52 give to God his due also: And, by our readiness in yeilding to his Ministers to this end appointed, testifie our pro∣portionable

readiness to have done the like to himself, in case he had deman∣ded it.

And demand it (no doubt) he doth, aswel from Christians now, as from the Jews formerly: nor hath he lost his true right, although he be not so immediate in his claim. For then, because the law was instituted in the time when God himself was King (that is, had no such direct Officer under him amongst the Jews) the acknowledgement of his propriety (as under the notion of tenths and offerings) was claimed in his own name: and God having thereupon disposed of it, takes the wrong done in Tythes and offerings as robberies of himself. But although these tenths and offer∣ings, as Gods gift to them, instituted by that Law which was still to con∣tinue, were to remain to the Priests and Levites unalterably, without the impeachment of those Kings that succeeded (inasmuch as they had their taxes besides) yet now amongst Christians, whom that Law binds not as positive, but as natural, those Tythes (where they are collected) are, or should be, paid to Princes in the first place, as Gods next Ministers. And although Princes do, upon just grounds, appropriate them to the Clergies maintenance, yet, in acknowledgement of his headship and propriety above them also, he hath tenths, fifteens, &c. reserved from them again. And this is done to each King under the Gospel, even as King; that is, as Christs Deputy: after the example of Abraham, Who,* 1.53 on the behalf of the Le∣vites, paid Tythes of all he had. For as Melchisedeck (the King of righte∣ousness and of peace) was a Type of our Saviour unto whom all king∣doms do belong, so do the tenths and tributes, as Gods and Christs right, belong to Kings their Deputies now: unto whose Office that of High Priest is subordinately annexed. Whereupon, as Kings are Tenants to God for their whole territories (be they greater or less) so are the people again Tenants to him; according to their several allotments and trusts. Upon which ground we may observe, that as every Prince hath the whole power and propriety of all within his dominions from God, and he thereupon cal∣led King of such or such a Countrey, so are all lands held, or to be held, a∣gain of the Soveraign after one tenure or other: nor can any alienation (though never so independent) exclude his power from making use thereof upon publike occasion: whereby to answer his great trust to God in respect of his service, or for general benefit of his people: nor from his own occasions leading that way also. The which was well proved by our Saviours example, who, sending for another mans Ass, bad his Disciples bring him away without other legal satisfaction, or answer to any for their so doing, Then that the Lord hath need of him.

Which speech of our Saviours will the more directly prove each Kings in∣disputable propriety,* 1.54 if we consider the time and occasion whereupon he useth it: to wit, that he never used it but upon occasion of expressing himself in his Kingly right and Office, in his riding in state to Jerusalem, and there exer∣cising kingly power. Plainly declaring that as no private possession can disim∣propriate the publike Lord, so may this grand proprietor redemand the same, not only to answer the more publike charges of the Commonwealth, but upon occasion of his own Royal support also.

In pursuance of which Original Right and Claim, or of doing what he will with his own, as we find God, during the Theocrity, making Laws of restraint both for the use and bequest of mens proprieties,* 1.55 so may we observe it still to

remain of unquestionable right to his supreme Deputy to do the like by their Laws and Edicts, in the disposal of such part of that kingdoms property which particular subjects, by Laws under him, hold in their hands. From whence, we may call property That share of the Commonwealth which by the Law is held in severalty to the possessor, free from the dispose of any but the law-maker himself. Which thing, as it is by them done by power from God, because the earth is the Lords and the fulness thereof, so cannot he lose the hold and claim of general right, but the Subject must loose his right of par∣ticular propriety also, which is derived from him by vertue thereof.

But, for a plainer example of Gods claiming his propriety, and particularly of power to impose tribute in acknowledgment thereof, we may observe the same fully set down in the 31 Chap. of Numb. In which, God as their present King, imposing such a leavy and tribute upon the people both of persons and goods as he saw fit, did thereupon become a plain and warrantable president for his succeeding Deputies to take the like from their subjects also, even as his Ministers attending for this very thing: that is, to receive Gods due, in acknowledgement of that propriety and protection they (by Gods blessing) enjoy under them. In which Chapter, we shall finde the tribute owned by God six several times, as the Lords tribute: although it were given away to others,* 1.56 even to the Levites, his then immediate Ministers for receit thereof.

And as this maxim, that God and the Prince are proprietors of all things, is in it self most true, so, if people would rightly consider it, it is by God upon good ground established for their benefit: because, as every one is most careful of his own, so the Prince, looking upon the possessions of the whole subjects and of every one in particular as his, will be more circumspect to encrease and preserve them, then when they aim to recover or possess any propriety or power more fully, shall set him at strife within his own Dominions. For Princes (as such) should have nothing in the dispose of subjects exempt from their Power, but Honor. For this he can never have by force, and without their consents; or the most or best of them: and therefore he will study, by Complacency, Justice, and meritorious deeds towards them, to be daily ac∣quiring this so precious a Jewel. And they will finde, that whilst he is to make his sole imployment after the search of this onely, that their common and respective benfits will be necessarily sought: whereas, by putting him to strug∣gle for other things which they cannot keep justly from him, his care will be neglected, and the mischief of Civil disturbance inevitably will follow.

And, when all is done, men are but abused by an affectionate conceit of the word: For propriety can never be in that degree they fancy: and if it be not at the dispose of one Prince, it must be of more. For since Laws are but the will and sentence of the Lawmakers, and since proprieties are also but the sen∣tence of Law, it will follow that proprieties of particulars are but the proprie∣ties of the publike person that is in soveraignty and power; though not in pre∣sent act, yet so, as that soveraign may reduce his power to act, as he shall see fit.

And hence it is, namely to debar Princes from occasion of seeking farther, that such large revenews are allowed in all kinds: that, through their power of interpreting law (the judge of propriety) they need not covet beyond what they have to their own use already. For to allow those that have the particular proprieties aright to judge the rule of propriety, is not only partial but to themselves prejudicial: opening, by that gap to soveraignty, an oc∣casion to perpetual Civil war. For since every particular propriety is but par∣cel

of the publike (that is, of the general propriety of that particular kingdom) if that publike have not a person of whole & equal interest herein, & thereby of whole and equal in the particulars hereof, how can the whole be duly re∣garded: since particular proprietors can have no aim but what is respective to themselves? But let us enquire a little farther into these things, & make them plain by instance, and consideration of some sorts of publike good, and of the manner how particular subjects come to have their proprieties therein. That stock of honor which each kingdom hath, one in respect of another, no man doubts but the same is at the Prince his dispose onely: that is, who shall be more honorable then others: and so also, for matter of Offices, and of power and command over one another. For if these things should not all be ap∣propriated to subjects, as from him the general proprietor, how should they proceed with Justice, or agree in sharing them to themselves? would not each one, to encrease his particular propriety, be so covetously contentious as to destroy thereby the stock of the whole propriety? But the reason why Princes cannot be in the particular propriety of riches such immediate dis∣pensors, as in Honors, Offices, &c. but must refer them to divers other Ma∣gistrates to be managed according to his general pleasure signified by Law, is for that land and (the fruit thereof) riches being continually necessary for each subject in particular to have, the business of continual allotment thereof would be so great, that one person could not arbitrarily dispose of it according to the occasion and proportions of that food, apparel, &c. which should ge∣nerally, and to each one be necessary; and which cannot to any one, at any time be wanting: Whereas Honor, Command, Power, &c. being necessary, but to few, doth both afford him ability personally to act, and time to con∣sult in each particular.

So then, wealth, riches, &c. are, from their general use and possession, to be guided by common rule or law; but honors are still manageable by particu∣lar rule, or prerogative law. And indeed, as this necessary and general use of food, &c. makes that kind or possession that is more immediate in acquiring it to be called and take on it the general name of Propriety, so is it (in a maner) the whole subject of law it self. And therefore, we may say the Prince hath no more right to disimpropriate any one contrary to law, then any man hath to take back from another any thing that by his general appointment was given to him; which is unjust, without other circumstances to authorize it. And therefore it will be considerable, whether this gift were absolute, and without all kind of reservation or no: or whether the Prince proceed herein accor∣ding to interest and increase of his particular propriety, or no? For if private propriety have encroached on that which should have remained as yet pub∣like and common, and that without leave, or if there be any conditionate re∣servation of rent, taxes, or of repossession at a certain time, or upon such, or such default, or the like; by the same general law and rule set down, the Prince may with better right (by his Magistrates) recover his own, then his subjects could dispossess him.

And as thus to himself and his own use, so although no reservation be ex∣pressed, but where the proprieties seem most high and absolute, the Prince (as aforesaid) may for the publike occasion make a publike leavy as he shall think good. For since all private proprieties will in themselves increase, and be more, as that publike whereof their parts is more, and doth increase, and so on the contrary, it will follow (as a thing of great equity) that private pro∣prietors

should contribute to this purpose: and that, according to such degree of exigence, as he that is publike proprietor shall finde fitting; that is, for the ways for increasing it by invention of Arts of all sorts, by foraign invasion, with Armies, Navies, &c. or by maintenance of it, by Religion, publike per∣sons, buildings, works, foraign traffick, agriculture, or such like, &c. To keep it from decay, by the same, or like means. For the necessity of having these things to each subject in particular, making it necessary that there should be one to judge and take care thereof in general, must also imply a necessity in the means, that is, publike maintenance, aswel as of the end, which is publike good. But now, although few doubt, that either there should be care or al∣lowance for publike advantage, or to resist publike detriment, there are many do yet actually, and by consequent, interrupt and deny it: by putting such ex∣ceptions and restraints on Princes herein, as, whilst they would disable him from taking more then is fit, they disable him from taking what truely is so: &(thereby) also from doing that good which they ought; as experience too of∣ten shew us. How Princes should guide themselvs in their own particular reve∣nues, and collection and managery of publike charges, is a proper discourse for hereafter. In the mean time, I shall answer in general; that since all these kinds of trusts, as also all others that are in mens managery, will be sub∣ject to abuse, therefore if it should happen that the Prince should in these things exceed publike regard, the damage and dishonor is not so great to the people to be by him over-reached, as by others of less note and concern in the publike. For he, as the publike Minister, ought to be by them maintained; and the more his honor, the more theirs: but to be cozened by their fellows, and to have them thereby made rich above them (which in all Republikes must come to pass) will neither gain them thanks nor credit. And again, the more the Prince shall gain by frugallity in the managery of those publike imployments and trusts, so much less need have they to add to his mainte∣nance and Royal support: Which as it is their duty to do as subjects, so though the same should be done in a manner more plentifully then ordinari∣ly, yet could not the whole kingdom be therein a loser: seeing it is spent up∣on its members, and within the bounds thereof. For the Prince himself can eat or wear but the share of another man, and what would have been eaten by others if he had not been: and having nothing of the rest but the beholding it with his eyes, it is eaten and enjoyed by their fellow subjects: for such even those are that are more particularly waiting on him and called his servants.

All which, well considered, together with what was formerly spoken of, the reason and beginning of property (namely common improvement by pri∣vate managery) as it will (on the one hand) shew it to be the duty of Kings that none of those talents should be hid by them, or lye idle in their own use without necessity, (whereby publike benefit might be hindred) so (on the o∣ther hand) how heavy will it make the offence of Subjects, that, instead of Tenants, shall make themselves such absolute and unconditionate proprie∣tors, as to withstand or deny publike occasions? For if they, after the man∣ner of the husbandmen in the Gospel, should seek to make the inheritance their own, and, by way of association and Covenant amongst themselves, seek to kill or dispossess the true heir, what think we shall the great Lord at his coming say to such husbandmen?

Therefore, as private mens judgements must submit to publike sentence, so their property to publike use: and as all mens proprieties are settled by

Law, so, upon occasion of preservation of that Law, they may be disposed of: & that according to the judgement of the King, the Maker, Keeper, and Inter∣preter of these Laws. For the Soveraigns office being to protect his subjects li∣berties & properties against all others, he cannot do it against himself, no more then he can binde his own hands. It cannot be done by another, because on earth he hath none equal, or Superior in his own Dominions. And if it could be, Government would not be: because our persons and estates are the onely objects of Government. And the same rule is in a Family that is independent: for, in both, all is to be supposed at the proper disposal of the Prince and Master. And upon the same ground that the sojourner in the Family, and Ambassador or stranger in the Commonwealth, have their freedom in per∣sons or estates (that is, because unsubjected) those that are subjected may be justly made lyable. And as these Reasons wil allow him power in general to lay Taxes according to publike occasions; so thereupon also, to judge in parti∣cular what is the concern of these occasions; and the charges and expence in them required: according whereunto he must have power in his Levies.

And they that from the instance of Naboths Vineyard, would conclude for the same absoluteness of Proprieties under the Gospel, will farther finde themselves mistaken: for that unto the Jews their promises for reward of obedience ran still in a strain of this kinde, Blessed shalt thou be in thy basket,* 1.57 in thy store, &c. but under the Gospel, not a Promise that way: but rather, Blessed are the poor, woe to the rich,* 1.58 &c. And as for this reason, it was not to be in the Prince his power to punish whom God hath rewarded, so again these established proprieties belonging necessarily to the support and division of the several Tribes and Families, their alienation from Tribe to Tribe, and Fa∣mily to Family, was prohibited by him that had promised and foretold, that our Saviour according to the flesh should come of the Tribe of Judah, and seed of David. All which considerations were the reason to keep that exact∣ness of Heraldry and Genealogies amongst them: lest the knowledge and proof of both David and his Family should have been confounded or lost. So that, by this means, particular mens proprieties having an end or good looking beyond the good of that Jewish Nation, it was the reason that nei∣ther the Prince, the Representative of that Nation onely, nor the proprie∣tors themselves, could, without leave from God (the sole universal Proprie∣tor of Jews and Gentiles) have power to sell and alienate their Proprieties of Land, more then they could change or lose ther Families or Names.

But, after our Saviors birth (the heir of all things) our Proprieties are to be retaken in him on other conditions,* 1.59 and to be held but as of him or his chief Ministers: not as in absolute severalty, but in such manner and measure as these his deputies shall finde fittest for supply of that general want which other our brethren under their charge shall require. All which we may ob∣serve intimated, not onely by our Saviors sending for the Ass before menti∣oned, but in the primitive selling their hereditary possessions.Of Lands,* 1.60 or houses, and laying them at the Apostles feet. By which deed, they, in the name and behalf of succeeding Christians, did renounce legal uncondition∣ate Propriety: and shew themselves now willing to accept of the distributi∣ons of Christs Ministers, to be held no otherwise from the common enjoy∣ment of others then the common owner shall authorise. And however the Apostles, during the power of heathen Magistracy, could not have compel∣led Ananias to have submitted his former title to their dispose, (but that he

might have kept it still his own) yet was their fact that did so, left as a com∣mendable president for Christian submission to authority upon publike occa∣sions.

But now, upon all these grounds and reasons before mentioned, it will ap∣pear that Polarchies must (amongst other their defects of right Government) be faulty also in this matter of Propriety. First, for that they, in their sepa∣rate and unwarrantable jurisdictions, being not capable to unite and repre∣sent (as from under God) the whole and intire Propriety of each Country, cannot thereupon be able to distribute and settle legal and rightful portions to each particular person and Family: but each separate person and Family herein, undertaking to be possessors and sharers by Authority derived from themselves onely, and not from any above them, must thereupon be unjust and partial usurpers. And again, the Polarchs having distinct Proprieties (whether you respect them as divided amongst themselves by Factions, or from one another singly, by that particular love which must follow the care of each mans Propriety) they can in neither consideration accompt their Proprieties and the publike to be the same and convertible; but must be sup∣posed to proceed both partially and oppressively in their Levies. And because the Governors themselves consist of different interests and judgements from one another, they must also be guided in what they do upon those below, or upon one another respectfully to that self-regard: according as they can drive it on by Faction; and not out of general consideration, as before noted.

And, as this will cause them to be partial and unjust, and by reason of un∣equal concern laying more on one part of their subjects then another, as they shall conceive them friends or enemies (under the notion of well-affe∣cted or ill-affected) so will this their own multitude cause them generally to be oppressive: in that they, with all their allyes and dependances, striving still to engross so large a part of the publike stock in their private hands, will here∣upon be put upon continual plots to make and raise Taxes; out of which they may raise their own fortunes also: which is the reason why the Taxes and Le∣vies in Polarchies run so high, over they do in Monarchies of proportionable bigness.

CHAP. VIII. Of Law, Justice, Equity, &c.

EXcept God Almighty, who alone is omniscient, and to whom, by creation and omnipresence, the goodness, deserts, intentions, and actions of all creatures, with all their circumstances and relations are truely valued and known, there is not unto any thing else imparted such a suf∣ficiency of comprehension, as to make a perfect and true estimate of the mo∣rality of actions, and distinguish between right and wrong, equity and ini∣quity. For as unto him, the rightful Judge of all things, this ability was on∣ly necessary and proper, so, to men and other creatures, to whom subjection did onely belong, it is more fit we should know what, then why to obey. And indeed, the sad price of our fall hath furnished us no farther, then with a seeming knowledge herein: and to no other avail, then to prove us thereby the more blinde, because we now think we see.

Examine our abilities in this search, even of those things that concern most each mens particular, and we shall finde, that while cu••••om, education, or the like, prevail as the censures of good and bad, in objects and actions and that this is differing again according to each parties inclination and constitu∣tion, the knowledge of good and bad must consequently have no certain or fixed aboad. And if thus in what is so nigh unto us and concerning our own more private good, what can be expected in things or actions of more gene∣ral concern; and wherein more general approbation should concur? Will it not hence follow, that if I have no sufficient ability to judge what is good for my self, I should have much less to do it for another? So that, experi∣ence of the different disputes hence arising, not to be satisfied and silenced by every mans own wisdom, brought men everywhere for quietness sake to refer themselves herein to custom and publike allowance: insomuch as now, Ju∣stice, Equity, and Right, is whatsoever the lawful Authority of each Coun∣try says it to be.

They that think that the rectitude of the Laws of God and Nature should correct and set right the positive constitutions of men, will finde great diffi∣culty truely to number and state what these Laws are. In which doing, and in the interpreting and applying them, so much difference and uncertainty will still arise, that we shall again (many times) want another light, to distin∣guish the beams of these lights from other lights, and also to shew when they point directly to the business in question, and when not. As for instance, in these Laws known to be received from God himself, how ready are we to balk their litteral interpretation, and judge of the fitness of their execution ac∣cording as they refer to publike Utility: and that by rules of our own seve∣ral reasons: and many times again, to trust to their letteral interpretation onely? Nay, all that acknowledge them for rules, practise sometimes one way, & sometimes another. Wherupon, denying that either way is to be wholly followed, it must needs leave it doubtful, whether in our so doing in each par∣ticular, we lean not too much to one hand or other. For so, theft by them

punished with restitution, is in other places capital: and on the contrary, Adultery by them punished with death, is by others censured in a less de∣gree.

Look we to the Laws of Nature; if thereby they intend those rules and customs which are universally common to us with beasts, how shall man, which so much differs from them, pick competent rules of good, and fitting both his and their particular? What, shall he live in Herds and Droves, and again destroy Policy and Property to enjoy their communion? And, because we would not have them kill us, must we (with the Banians) think it unlaw∣ful to kill them? And, in particular, what Law in Nature shall we finde to found marriage upon?

And if we seclude man, to follow some rule proper to his own species, and put him for his practice and imitation to learn what is done by others, you will finde this practical direction still render him as defective in ability to determine what is just and good, and what not, as before: For here, if you take in that practice of mankinde which is most common for a rule, who shall be ••udge of that: or shall the fewer and wiser Nations be governed by the more foolish? Shall Idolatry and slavery be thought founded on Na∣ture, because so generally heretofore, and yet practised?

If by Law of Nature you mean the best Reason, who shall judge of that also? Can you think that any Nation, People, Faction or single per∣son, will condemn themselves of imprudence and injustice in what they do?

And since each people hath its peculiar Reasons for what they act or de∣termine, and it may be unknown to any but themselves, how shall they ther∣in be guides to the practice of others, and their Reason be found a reason e∣very way fit for guidance of such as must necessarily differ from them? But experience being so ready to testifie both these differences and their irrecon∣cilableness, amidst that partial respect each people casteth to its own customs. I shall not need to instance therein: but shall here somewhat examine that rule which men have more generally concluded to be so infallibly and uni∣versally binding, as to suffice for application and direction in all particulars; namely the rule of Do as thou wouldst be done unto.

This rule must in it self be acknowledged as a direction most fit and full for the steering us in our deportments and abearances one towards another; being accompanied with such other helps and qualifications as hereafter shall be spoken of: but if taken alone, and at liberty made use of, according to each ones separate judgement, it will put us upon the same uncertainty (al∣most) we had before, For it makes the will and choice of each man the dire∣ction for good and equity: so that what I would be content another should do to me, I may do to him. And then, considering how weak and differing the judgements and wills of men are, right and wrong must have the same chance. So that he that is a fool and cannot tell what is for his own avail, may yet have hereby liberty to prejudice and impose on me. And again, he that through vitious inclination and custom cannot distinguish of good or bad, just or unjust, will have the same advantage over me too. As for ex∣ample, one that is brought up, or otherwise agrees in opinion with such as al∣low a Community of wives or other things, may he not by this rule make use of my wife, being himself before willing, I should not do the like to his?

They that seem to make this Rule more pointing and express, by enlarging

it, say that because I would not have any thing done to me against my liking, I should not therefore act on another against his. And then, according to this rule; they say the taking away a mans wife against his liking is a plain wrong: (and a sin I hope it is, although all private parties should consent) By this turning of the rule, they conclude indeed against the first inconveni∣ence, but avoid not the uncertainty of the direction, but onely alter it. For whereas before, I might act according to my own will and opinion of right and wrong, now is not the Will and Opinion of the Agent, but of the Pa∣tient made Judge: and I am to suspend execution till the consent thereof be had and known. And then, what help to the discovery of right or wrong; since every mans Will and judgement (as before) is still made Judge? And besides, by its limitation, it will put a stand to all business. For if I must not act until I know anothers liking, I shall then, it is to be presumed, not act his liking but in what may be first apprehended to my own advantage: nor he so from me. And then, in case of stubbornness, how shall business be done, and who shall judge when the denyal is just, or unjust; for nothing in the rule can do it? Again, what right hath the Will of another to be a stint and di∣rection to mine? as though my Will could not tell mine own desires, and were not as infallible in judging right and wrong as anothers. And take it which way you please, instead of giving the rules of directions for mens Wills to follow in the choice of good and bad, mens wills are made dire∣ctive to it. And although it be a rule certain and infallible (as aforesaid) in its self, as to the general stating of us just or unjust before God (who judgeth by the heart and general inclination as hereafter shall more appear) yet in respect of us, and the imbe••ility and partiality of our Reasons in using and applying it, it comes to be but contingent and fallible in particular manage∣ry: as not having direction and plainness enough, to shew in each action whe∣ther we have done well or no.

As for example, I that am to contract with another for House or Land, or any Commodity I want, am I to give the seller the price he asketh, because; supposing my self the seller of any thing, I should be willing the buyer should give me the price which I should then demand? or shall the seller be bound to let the buyer have it at the price he offers, be∣cause when himself is to buy of another, he would have it at the price he bids? If you suppose neither of these prices to take place, how shall Contracts go on? If either of them, how will you avoid the inconveniencies of partiality, arising through each mans judging for himself; but make it onely unnatural; whilst they must thus wholly be prosecuting each others good, and be in dan∣ger, whilst they are thus neglecting their own wants and desires, which they do know, to be, as in a kinde of Complement, reciprocally prejudicing each o∣ther, in obtruding to supply those wants and desires which they know not: unless we shall suppose all mens judgements, wants, and desires equal? Or shall we suppose that course to be taken which can make this rule alone most pointing, namely that we should neither so wholly consider our selves with∣out others, nor others without our selves, as to be forgetful of either: but that, both parties are to be taken into equal consideration. The Question will be, whether the buyer or seller shall be the judge and determiner herein? and next upon what manner of evidence shall he proceed towards the discovery of the others wants and desires, so as to secure himself that upon a just conference thereof with his own, he hath judged impartially: and so avoided sin, by ob∣serving the rule?

The seller, it may be, through good husbandry or good fortune got his commodity very cheap; it may be it cost him dear at first, or is grown so to him through casuality or neglect: what now shall he do? Shall he sell pro∣portionably cheap or deer to the rate the thing stands him in, he must then prejudice himself or another? shall he, as he knows the buyers poverty or riches, or as he findes the thing more fit and useful for him then others, en∣crease or abate accordingly his price? How shall he know these things? and how shall he be a competent judge? And if you make the buyer Judge, upon like considerations, how shall he know the others condition also?

Now, as for matter of Government, this rule will of it self alone be so far from estating men regular and obedient therein, that it will take off all kinde of subjection at all. For since the Prince or Magistrate would not be willing that I should have command over him, how can he justly have com∣mand over me? If we give the superior leave to apply the rule otherwise and say forasmuch as he himself wronged and in distress, would be glad to be re∣lieved by the power of another, therefore ought he also to preserve and en∣crease his power that he may in the like kinde be serviceable to others: then, supposing the present possession of power in the Superior a just bar against the inferiors assumption of the rule, and desiring power and superiority to be do∣ing the like to his superior, or others, we are fallen upon a right rule against re∣volt and insubjection towards the present higher Powers: and so we will next see how this rule can alone steer us under Government.

If it point at equal and Arithmetical Justice and proceeding, making the good and liking of Kings and beggers alike valuable and controleable at the arbitrary discretion of each other, then, by overthrowing distinction and pro∣portion, it overthrows Government and Society. Or take it to point Geo∣metrically and respectively, and so determining that beggers should do unto Kings as they would if themselves were Kings be done unto, and so on the contrary, how will they come to fancy (through so different educations) the same inclination to vertue, or ability to judge thereof? and since experience tells us, how hard it is for us to manage aright those callings we were bred in, what hope of ability or skill in those so far removed? For though David, as proper to his Office of King, could rightly judge amongst subjects, saying, the man that hath done this shall dye the death,* 1.61 & shal make restitution four fold, yet when he comes to be told thou art the man,* 1.62 he thinks not fit to execute mur∣ther on himself: but submits to God, as having onely power of punishment o∣ver him.* 1.63

And from this uncertainty and diversity of appliation, it was that men first entertained polity, and more positive and express rules of decision. But here again the same hazard overtakes us. For since these rules and directi∣ons are to be expressed by words, as the current Tokens of mens mindes, and words have not onely different interpretations themselves, but men also differ in the manner of expressing them, how shall it be known what the words themselves import, or whether poetical or Rhetorical improprieties have not so far abused us, as not to know whether litterally taken they are to express the Authors minde or no? To remedy which, there is no way to Peace but to admit a positive Authority for interpretation of this Authors minde, as we did before for yeilding thereunto.

So that when all is done, the result of right and wrong is but the sentence of Law, and the sentence of Law the sentence of the present supreme Judge

That is, either the direct sentence of God himself, in what is undoubtedly set down by him; or the sentence of the Prince; interpreting and judging in his stead, in all things here amongst us: unto whom the application and managery of this general rule was intrusted. For he, having in him, as uni∣versal Representative, the universal will included, can be onely in all parti∣culars directly said to do as he would be done unto, and to love his neigh∣bour as himself: because having a common and like interest in, and with them, and subsisting by their good and benefit, it must consequently be always by him measured as his own: that is, equally and impartially so, because to∣tally his. Whereas I, in doing as I would be done unto, or doing but as any other private person would have me, the dealing must be unjust because par∣tial: one Will and Understanding being onely judge of what was of con∣cern to both. And though both should consent, yet the rule might be bro∣ken, and commonly is: because few things can be of such separate concern, as wherein directly, or by consequent or example, others besides themselves were not interessed: and so, not having full content, the rule of Do as thou wouldst be done unto is broken by both of them.

For our Wills, in choice of good and bad, following each ones sepa∣rate Understanding, and that again depending on, and varying according to the several observations which each one hath made of what is most con∣stant and usual, it will follow that the nature and sense of right and good, must in our judgements be as variable as those inductions out of which we concluded it were. And this, because we are not here put into the world to be Standards of good and bad our selves, but to estimate and conclude it, ei∣ther out of that tacite verdict which the harmony of effects and operations in the course of Nature informs us of (whereby constancy proves at once both God the Author, and the Act good) or else implicitely to yeild to a positive command of God, determining good by his direct Precepts to us himself: and in case Gods own directions appears not, by referring us to Princes for what he leaves, and to Masters or Fathers for what they both leave unde∣termined: Lest else, our different Judgements and Affections, causing differing prosecutions in the attainment of more less and private good, they should lead us to lose our greatest earthly good, which is Peace and A∣greement.

And therefore, as all Government was at first Arbitrary, so it is not proba∣ble, until God himself by Moses had given set Rules for mens sociable li∣ving, any other composed or setled Rule was established for knowledge of good and right, then what proceeded from the Dictates of this Prince or head of the Family. For each Father had it as well in his power as du∣ty, (like Abraham) to command his children and houshold to keep the way of the Lord, and to do Judgement and Iustice.* 1.64 And then also, innocency of E∣ducation, and natural simplicity in the use of pleasure; as it kept them from much coveting, so from many of those strifes and injuries which our luxu∣ries now produce. And for reconciling those differences that should yet happen, they had the ready determination of the Father before mentioned.

Nor stood they in such need of positive Edicts to keep them steady in case of change, because, through length of age, he might live to see many Fa∣milies, and as it were whole Territories peopled out of his own loyns. Then was he probably brother, or neer of kin to the great Father of the next Ter∣ritory: and so, kept from forreign injury. Whereupon, what by knowledge

of their duety, and what by force of Education, and remembrance of these rules and precepts themselves formerly learned, the fathers of the several inferior Tribes and families had means of sociable entercourse and neighor∣hood. And, where maxims drawn from natural Law and equity were not so plain a guide, there, usual custome and practise was their supply: and where custom was dubious, parental authority was definitive, and bore sway.

And as that course of life is alwayes most pleasant to which we have been most enured, so it seemed also to them most reasonable, to continue those rules that publike consent, long use, and tacite agreement, had now made to have the force of Law. And, in a manner, all laws (especially such as are called common) are but the customes and usages of our country. Therefore, with them question was never made, whether customs should be kept or nor, but whether any such custom were; or whether it did make for the side of Plain∣tiff or Defendant? And the old definitive sentence being now dead, the dis∣persed and divided families found Law, in it self, no more available to Peace and Unity, then the Light of Nature had been before. For when Custom or Law was alleadged, what and if the other side denyed it, or gave it a con∣trary interpretation? In this case, no way to Peace, but to rely on some sen∣tence beyond appeal, for the decision and interpretation of these Laws. For, to imagine a Government to meerly arbitrary, as where there is no kinde of Law, Custom, or Rule of Government agreed unto or practised, is against Reason: because, even the prudence of Governors must, for their own ease sake, lead them to permit this course. And, it being for themselves impossi∣ble to entervene in all the emergencies of their subjects, it will be expedient to commend and enjoyn unto them, the observation of all such old usages as to them seem most expedient: which thence coming to be Laws, we may call Law a rule of deportment enforced by a Superior: and hath with us ac∣cording to its several aims, several names.

That which directs us to future bliss, divine Law. That which concerns us as men, and directs to the attaining the felicities of our kinde, we may call natures Law, or the rule of Reason. That which concerns men linkt in soci∣ety. National, or Civil Law: which is nothing else but a publike direction for mens sociable abearances one towards another. For as Peace, Union, and ceasing of strife, is the main end of polity and Government, so is this end, not onely to be attained by the decisive power when controversies are on foot, but by the directive power also: that prevents, as far may be, their birth and growth.

And for our failing or following this rule, it is not the law it self that can or doth determine: although the Judge, in his decision, take direction from thence, by way of president, how to proceed. They that think law hath in it self a power to decide controversies, let them consider that there are no where so many, as where laws do most abound. For men are there often∣est found enquiring the meaning of them: which (with us) is called going to Law. A thing which none would do, for the loss thereby received in case he be overthrown, if he had before hand known that the Law would have made against him: but each side through private passion and partiallity thinking it make for him, it would be considered, if there were not a defini∣tive sentence in the interpretation of law, of how little availe to peace Law would be in it self.

So that, Laws now appearing to be made chiefly for the governed, that

thereby they might have directions how to attain or avoid the benefit or punishment of sociable duties, we shall therefore finde them still promul∣ged and addressed to the people. But as for Governors, having the over∣sight of the whole publike good unto them committed, these rules are either by them framed, or by God and Nature set down as to be enforced and en∣joyned to that end: and all other secluded the interpretation or application of them.

To which end, namely to shew that the sentence of the Judge is still made the Standard and Rule of judgement, we are to interpret those words of Solomon, A King that sitteth on the Throne of judgement scattereth a∣way all evil with his eys: that is,* 1.65 which way soever his definition of judge∣ment doth lean, evil and injustice is departed from thence: and cannot be imputed thereunto, more then injustice to one that is just. For so doth he also explain it, to punish the just is not good,* 1.66 nor to strike Princes for E∣quity.

But the contexts of these two places do most plainly confirm Justice to be positive upon Authority, and not depending on the various judgement of private mens opinions: and this is done by adding the Precept of right Bal∣lances and Weights presently after.* 1.67 Which things are commonly taken as the emblems of Justice. For so it is said, A just weight and ballance are the Lords, all the weights of the bag are his work. By which words, God own∣ing the original of the measure of Justice to be from himself, (which we know he doth no otherwise execute and manage then by that divine sentence he put into the Kings mouth) it must follow, that as the proportion of Ju∣stice in all things is rated by those Standards which are by his Authority ap∣pointed, so also,* 1.68 as his Authority is uncontroleable in setting the Standard for the Pound, the Bushel, and the like, his Authority in stating and deci∣ding other controversies and things must be uncontroleable also: even for that all things done by a different Standard of Justice are for the same cause unjust. For as there can be but one Standard (as by the context of the o∣ther place appeareth, saying, Divers weights and divers measures are both of them alike abomination to the Lord) it is in effect to conclude as aforesaid,* 1.69 that at the first definition of the size of the Pound, Bushel, &c. were from Authority, even so, the measure of Justice in all things else must rest on his determination: and that, the difference from that is inequity, because departing from the rule to appointed; and not, as out of inherent justice in the things themselves. For had Authority appointed any other different weight or measure, which is now disallowable, to have been the true Standard, then had the other, that is now the rule of Justice against it, been the faulty one to it; even as those faulty ones are now so to this which is by Authority set down.

For except there be such a positive and standing way and rule for establish∣ment and defining righteousness and judgement, as by a King sitting in the Throne of judgement, who can say (as in the next verse follows) I have made my heart clean, I am pure from my sin? because,* 1.70 if his appointment and allow∣ance of such callings and ways of comerce make not our gainings upon one another lawful farther then the rule Do as thou wouldst be done unto hath first been reciprocally examined and assented unto by the particular dealers, then are all dealings unlawful: forasmuch as intent of separate advantage is still in each ones design, and the others benefit or suffering never openly

and impartially considered therewith: of which more anon.

Whereupon we must say, that since Laws are necessary in Government, and since a publike definitive sentence in their interpretation is necessary to Peace, and since in the Cases and Questions of misgovernment, the breach of Laws is as well denyed on the part of the Governors, as affirmed on the part of the governed, it is against all Reason and Rule of Equity, for any body or order of the people to usurp this inseparable and prime mark of Soveraignty: and become judge to their fellows, and to judge those that should have been their Judges also.

And if it be granted Princes to have power to make Laws, it must be presumed that themselves should best know their own meanings. And, a thing against reason it must seem, first to affirm that Rulers or Princes are to govern according to Law, and yet deny them the power of knowing and in∣terpreting them. What, would they have him follow a rule he understands not, how shall it be a rule then? Therefore, when men think it necessary for Kings to be sworn to govern according to Law, they must conclude they have liberty of interpretation allowed them; or his oath is null and useless.

And so we must conclude, that since all positive Laws are to be founded on those of God and Nature (for Law-makers can have no Laws but these above them) and since the meaning and measuring of these are disputable (as hath been hitherto shewed) Reason and Duty do enjoyn us to submit to the known and undenyable precept of obedience, rather then (after the sin of breach hereof) we should be but at the same uncertainty of interpretati∣on as before: with this aggravation, that in the first case our excuse for fail∣ing is easie, but in this last, it is no better then pride.

But they that yet think there are within the compass of natural Reason such general rules and maxims of Justice and Equity as to enable men to judge of right and wrong in things done by Superiors, let them tell me why Ely (of whom we finde nothing of ill mentioned besides) should be so se∣verely punished for his sons faults whom he did reprove:* 1.71 and why Samuel should escape, that shewed greater indulgence to his that were as bad? If, in these and other like instances they will say (as they must) that the judge of all the word doth right; in respect of his equal and paramount propriety in persons and things,* 1.72 they must then confess, that his deputy therein which shall be amongst us, must be holden as uncontrolable judge of right in his jurisdiction also. So that, for David to take away half Mephibosheths Land, who was loyal, and give it to Ziba his servant whom he knew had both abused his Master and him, and that without any legal form of process, must yet be acknowledged as rightly done by that supreme Officer, who being substituted in Elohims prime right of Mishpat amongst us, cannot therein be controled or censured by any else.* 1.73 And if any will yet say, that these for∣mer instances might have been found right even by the rules of common E∣quity, had we been knowing of all the circumstances of them, they do there∣by also confess, that since the Judge hath his secret reasons proper to him∣self to judge by, so can there be no definitive proportion of Equity but what is from his sentence proceeding: until there can be some way found to search into Gods secret Counsels, or the heart of the King which is unsearchable. For, as it is the glory of God to conceal a thing (that is to keep his judge∣ments

from common apprehension) so it is the honor of Kings to search out a matter: and, by vertue of his deputation from God,* 1.74 to give always a di∣vine sentence, whereby not to err in judgement: that is, not so to err,* 1.75 as not to be the rule of Justice to those below, although it may be erronious and unjust in it self: in relation to that full and high interest and jurisdiction which God hath above him. And therefore that wise King makes Under∣standing, Wisdom, Instruction, Justice, Iudgement and Equity,* 1.76 depending on obedience and attention to God and our lawful superiors; when he says, the fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom; but fools despise wisdom and Instruction; that is,* 1.77 all that are disobedient and conceitedly wise are fools: and when he next says, My son hear the instruction of thy Father,* 1.78 and forsake not the Law of thy Mother: that is, learn Religion, Law, Equity, &c. from thy ghostly and civil superiors.

Whereupon we may farther say, that justice and ••quity, so far as it con∣cerns a Commonwealth, is to be that way and course which is most advantage∣ous to publike utility; and that Law is the rule set down by those that have chief Authority and trust therein. And therefore is that maxim avowed as the ground of Law and Equity in a popular State, Salus populi suprema lex: For the directest course to that end is the greatest Equity: and those that have the charge of the end, have also the charge of the means, in assigning that which is most just and fit. And therefore in this case, we must reckon the society, as it is united for common good, as one person: So that then, as Nature teacheth all men to benefit themselves, so doth polity direct the publike. But then again, as each man in wronging another doth wrong himself, so societies, when they practice injustice, oppression, &c. do in re∣gard of Gods punishments feared to follow thereupon, wrong themselves also: and do (as we before observed of particular men) prefer a less and mo∣mentany benefit, to a more high and lasting one.

Upon which ground there is another maxim avowed in Monarchy, that the King can do no wrong. Not denying he may do himself and others harm: but so long as we do (according to our duties) submit to that he doth command, he can do no wrong. For he can of himself have no private respect, but must judge all alike as out of common regard: except where, and when some persons or order of the people, taking on them his Office of judging equity, and, in partiality to themselves, thinking and seeking more then is already allotted, make it a wrong to the other side, by having the cause decided by a private and partial judgement: for, take away Justice in the fountain, you may vainly seek it in the streams. And thereupon, Solo∣mon prays to God to give him an understanding heart: to judge the people,* 1.79 and to discern between good and bad.

And such as are not openly denying supreme Authority to be obeyed, and would yet by consequent overthrow it, by allowing inferiors a liberty to judg and act beyond, or otherwise then is enjoyned, let them consider the answer that God gives to his chief Magistrate that would undertake to know the way and means of honoring and serving God better then himself, and would make that solemn established Law of Sacrifice, defeat his present command which was but extemporary; namely that Obedience is better then sacrifice,* 1.80 and to hearken better then the fat of Rams. For I verily believe that no subordinate Magistrate or subject can have a fairer plea for disobeying his King commanding in Gods stead, then Saul might have had here

for refusing Samuel. For if it had been at all lawful for inferiors to judge of fitness and morality, or to set a former command or Law against a latter, what more just and reasonable then, first to preserve innocent creatures, whose destruction (on one hand) could have been a benefit to none, when as (on the other side) they (being thus imployed) should have so expresly advanced Gods way of service constituted so solemnly already. And we might thereunto add (that which some would make of highest value in judg∣ing good and bad) that the importunity and request of the people ran that way also.

And as our prying into the reason of Gods Laws, and not obeying his di∣rect Precepts, was our Original fault, and a sin in the government of nature, as shewing a mistrust of Gods wisdom or care of us, so, in obedience to civil Laws, to seek out another equity then they import, is not to be subject to Law, but to controle it. And as God said to Adam, Who told thee that thou wast naked,* 1.81 hast thou eaten the fruit I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? So Princes may say to subjects, that without authority undertake to judge of publike good and bad, Justice and injustice, how come you to know these things except you have transgressed the bounds I set you? Have you not proper stations of your own to walk in? Why meddle you with mine?* 1.82 For if thou judge the law, thou art not a doer of the law, but a Judge.

So that then, all obedience to Laws must be implicite: that is, to Gods Laws, as his; and Civil Laws, as the Princes. For if in either sort, I obey but what upon examination I finde reasonable, I take the Law-makers part upon me: and obey not him, but my self. For Law and Justice being the instruments whereby Governors Act upon the Governed, they must be at the choice and guidance of the workman and agent; and not of the work or patient, as heretofore noted.

Law (then) is Councel imposed: Justice is equity executed. In Laws, the Subjects are to act: in Justice the Prince, or Magistrate for him. In Laws he shews how much of his Will Subjects shall do; in Justice how much he will do himself. So that Law may be called Equity taught; and Justice E∣quity practised: and is when the Judges own Councels are acted by himself; whether in pursuance of Law, or not. For Justice and Equity may be with∣out standing Law, as in the less government of a family, but not Law without them; that is the Authority of the Prince.

Now for Justice it self, it proceeding from Equity, as being the sentence of the Judge upon the judged, it may be blinde as to execution; because that part concerns Ministerial Officers, but cannot as to the sentence and Judge: for taking, seeing, for understanding, his eyes must be only open, as to stating of Equity.

Disinterest, nor equal interest alone, cannot make men competent Judges: because they may be so qualified, and yet strangers and unknowing of the cause. And therefore Judges must (besides knowledge) have Concern, equal Concern, and whole Concern: and the like we must say of Power. For if all the matter and persons contending be not at his dispose, to what purpose his sentence? Nay, if his propriety be not the highest, and his power high∣est, he will in judgement proceed but faintly, for want of compleat interest and courage. For though the Concern and Power of the Judge may be e∣qual in, and over both, or all the subject persons, yet if be not su∣preme,

he must so far want the perfection of a Judge, as he wants interest to make him concerned to judge at all, and power to execute his sentence.

And more persons then one, or not having authority from one, cannot be competent Judges over others: for they must have unequal concern through unequal passions and interests: and must, through unequal power also (as be∣ing of different strength or courage) proceed differently and partially in their sentence. For whilst the same Plea or Cause is estimated by divers bal∣lances according to that divers judgement and interest abiding in those di∣vers persons in the seat of Justice, their sentence can never be uniform to the interest of the persons and the cause they judge, however they may be in their sentence outwardly agreeing amongst themselves; as in order to fear, or other interests of their own.

Nor can two or more persons judge their own causes, because of the same reasons: and also for that in this equality, none can have whole interest or power.

But to make these things plainer by instance. When any two parties that are at difference shall have their cause decided by any of the ordinary Judges appointed to that purpose, the failing of that Judge therein, so far as to make him culpable, must happen upon the grounds before noted. For if he have not concern enough, so as to think his duty, honor, and benefit to be founded and established by the practice of his imployment of a Judge, he will then wholly neglect it, or proceed so coldly therein, as for want of through examination of the full evidence of the truth of things on both sides, his judgement can be no otherwise then accidentally true and upright. And this inconvenience will not only be subject to mislead him in his first sen∣tence and decision of causes, but farther also, in case that bribery, friend∣ship, &c. have caused partial judgement, through want of entire and equal concern, it is the usual hindrance to all re-examination that should arise from equity by way of appeal: insomuch as, untill the oppressed party can find a way how to make the redress of his grivance appear of more availe and concern to the party appealed unto, then it is to him in the state it now stands, he can never rationally expect reparation, or furtherance from him there∣in.

From all which it must come to pass, that none but God Almighty can be held as the onely universal, ready, and upright Judge: so far as to be the onely true object of appeal. Because, as he hath onely omniscience suffici∣ent to know all circumstances that are necessary to the stating of Equity in each cause, so hath he alwayes such whole and high interest and concern in the good of his creatures, as to make him always ready to hear all complaints: Whereas all other subordinate Judges must, as they stand in degree below him, and so differenced in respect of concern, differ in their readiness to en∣tertain appeals and make redress.

By which means, the Monarch, who hath highest interest, power, and trust delegated from God, and hath his honor and interest of more concern in per∣formance of Acts of Justice then any other (even in such degree that he cannot find any reward else so valuable to divert him) must be presumed thereupon the readiest to hear and amend, when any thing in this kind shall be offered. And if the ordinary grievances of the poor or meaner sort, be not by him taken into consideration, like the more remarkable appeals from

great ones, it proceeds still from the same cause of want of concern, not in him, who, if he be an entire Monarch, and no wayes made obnoxious or de∣fective in propriety, would hear poor and rich alike, as equally sub••ects; but for want of concern in other persons of ranke and eminence, that should pre∣sent it and state it unto him. Which is a thing so difficult to be done, as expe∣rience tells us, that it is the great obstacle of all redress: namely for want of concern to make another take so much pains as throughly to examine the state of the grievance, and so apply himself towards re∣dress.

For we shall finde all private men to be still so full of their own business, as not to be sufficiently enclined to make any other of such equal concern, as to remit the present care thereof, to intend his, beyond respect to them∣selves. And although the sense of pitty and Justice be in all men natural∣ly, yet the difficulty will still lye, How, for want of concern, to make him attentive in such length of discourse as must be requisite to make my cause appear so. Upon which ground it is, that Fees are given to Advocates, Councellors, &c. by those that are appellants and suters: hereby enga∣ging them to take their Clients business into concern, and make it their own.

Men have hitherto thought Justice in the abstract to be before it in the concrete: as though truth, or the affections or adjuncts of things could have been before the things themselves. But as Divine Justice is but the proces∣sion of that equity which resideth in God the supreme Judge of all (whereby the affairs of all creatures are disposed and ordered according to the known measure and equality which their respective merits in relation to the good and Oeconomy of the whole doth require) so neither was humane Justice be∣fore the administrators thereof: no more then positive Law was before the Law-maker: who, by that did publikly determine what was fittest to be done in the Vierge of his jurisdiction also. Therefore, men making Justice to be juris statio, or dependant on the sentence or determination of the Law, could not choose but to have considered (onward) that that jus or law, must again have dependance on the Law-maker, or him that hath juris-dictio, had not a kind of conspiracy in the flattery of private mens abilities towards the judging right and wrong, made them determine Justice measurable by Law, and Law by themselves: that so (onward) publike Justice might be submitted to private sense of equity: whereby at last all should resolve in∣to opinion.

In which regard, it is no wonder that subjects in general, do, in order to obtain their fancyed degree of liberty, agree amongst themselves upon such maximes as they conceive restrictive of the exercise of their Princes power over them; upon the same ground as servants use to do towards that of their masters. For so experience tells us of those measures of good and bad ma∣sters which are by servants usually entertained amongst themselvs, in order to deny all masters and their actions to be good, farther then they are respective to, or carried on towards their interests or approbations. Thus the master that is most profuse for diet, apparel, &c. is called the best and most kind, by his own, and by all other servants too. Whereas that master that mea∣sures these things by his own conveniencies of estate, &c. and makes re∣straint accordingly, is called Churle and miserable. And so again, such ma∣sters as permit liberty and licentiousness, have the servants joynt applause

as just and kinde unto them: whereas such as restrain and punish them for faults, are by them called cruel and unjust. For how should it be expected they should like to be straightned or punished for what they had formerly approved?

Nor can men under servitude of any kind, separate themselves so far from their interests in relation that way (that is in desiring freedom) as to take the interest of the correlate into equal concern with their own: and not rather still to chose and fix upon such reasons and maximes as shall most confine the will of their governor to be submitted to theirs: and, in order thereunto, to fancy (as we see it come to pass) that there are general rules and laws whereby justice and right are as measurable by inferiors as others: yea even whilst they are inferiors.

But suppose there is in every man implanted the maximes and grounds of general Justice, as God to be worshiped, parents and superiors to be honour∣ed, every man to have his own, or the like, yet since they were in several men, variously concluded from several inductions and observations in the course of humane affairs (for they encrease and differ in men as yeers and a∣bility do) it must come to pass, that when they come to refer back and are to be applyed to particular occasions, they must be both different, and fa∣lible also: as not determining how to worship God, or w••erein to obey su∣superiors, or what every mans due is. Upon which grounds, it is no wonder that Astraea was fained to leave the world about the same time when Laws began most to abound; and men undertook to fancy, that that obedience to the Laws which was constitutive of Magistrates and subjects justice to∣wards one another, was also to be definitive and bounding of justice in the original.

But, if we make not justice to be residing in that sentence and determina∣tion of equity which each rightful superiour imposeth, then hath it indeed no certain aboad amongst men: Or, if they bound it by any other positive Law then what is to be by him interpreted and enforced, then they not onely take away all justice from the golden age of the world, which was there∣fore chiefly called so because the publike person to whose sence of equity things were intrusted did particularly judge in emergencies, and so more exactly measure causes then can be now by standing rules and laws, but they also (for the present) take it from fathers, masters of families, and the like: where right and justice is depending on their arbitrary and accasional di∣rections.

And therefore, as Divine Justice, or the general rule of equity in govern∣ment of the world, is dependent on the Divine Edict and determination of God, who hath the government hereof; and as the rule of justice of the fami∣ly is dependant on him that hath that charge also, so is the same to be granted in each kingdom: even to be the decision of him that hath Legislative power, and trust to determine of things towards the stating political peace or hap∣piness.

To which purpose some have conceived the word jus to be the abrievation of Jovis os; which we may call the Divine sentence in the lips of the King: making it the positive decree of the soveraign power. For although this Synterisis (or inward assent to the general maxims of equity) be usefully in all men, because they must more or less have dominion, yet for inferiors or ••quals, as such, at any time to use them upon their own authority,

cannot make the execution take the name of Justice; however the sentence may be in it self equal, or proportionable to the equity of the cause.

And indeed, that common definition of this vertue, of giving every one his own, would have caused men necessarily to conclude this the proper ver∣tue of the person in supreme power and propriety, (for how else shall he have right to distribute) had not (as before noted) private covetousness and arro∣gance of judgement, made men conclude it not to be justice, except under that notion of his own, each man had such distribution, as should not onely be directed by positive Law, but by it according to their interpretation also. As though there could be private propriety against the publike, or that the Prince, the Master of a Family, or other publike superior, were to regard the good and propriety of the contenders, or any other separate private persons, without regard to the whole propriety and good: and not rather make his distributions of the publike stock of honor, riches, &c. to private persons with repsective care to the whole.

In which respect, we may again call publike Justice The exercise of autho∣rity proceeding from each rightful superior, as his sense of equity in particu∣lar distributions shall lead them, with regard to publike advantage. So that, he judging according to sense of equity, as between two, both the parties contending are to be taken as one: and decission is to be so made between them, that the other more worthy party, the Commonwealth, be Geome∣trically considered. And this, although the whole present people be pre∣sent contenders in the two parties: yet is the succeeding community or their own future inconveniencies to be considered. From whence we may con∣clude a just man and a governor to be convertible: as also is the notion of Justice with that of government: having both issue from his authority and determination. Saving that under the notion of government (as more general) we usually comprehend both equity and justice: that is both the directive and coercive parts: but by Justice, we commonly conceive but the bare vindicative part to be acted, separate from the Legisla∣tive.

If in this his sentence, he bear such particular eye to the parties in compe∣tition as to forget or neglect common interest, he is unjust to God his superi∣or; as failling in his general trust: however, to his inferiors he must alwayes, upon the same reason, be acknowledged just.

We are also accustomed to apprehend the notion of justice to have (in re∣ference to the persons subjected) a more particular regard then that of go∣vernment: namely when then the Justiciar shall more expresly respect the comparative fitness or interest of any two separate parties: at which time, the governor being more remarkable by an explicite determination, it may thence be called particular government, as government it self may be called general and implicite Justice: both of them being stated and defined by the due exercise and receit of that power which caused their relations, that is of the governor or Justiciar as agent, upon the governed or justified as patient. In which case, the Agent and patient standing reciprocally constituting each other, according to their relations, to impose and receive, it follows that where the governor is not endued with his proper power to impose on the go∣verned, according to his vertue of Agency, and the governed, on the other hand, endued with the vertue of receit and patibillity, there cannot be

government. But, in proportion, as the inferior invades the power of Agency, or is insusceptible of the others Agency, so far the political harmony and order is broken and inverted, and approach is made unto Anarchy.

And many times also we difference Justice from Government by its object: as making it conversant about the Government of our proprieties, and apprehending the notion of the Government to have most particular reward to the Subjects personall liberties: and this way that definition of giving every man his own, and of the di∣vision of Justice into distributive and commutative may seem to look.

Philosophers, in their usual Scholy, desiring to make it a vulgar and common vertue, for their own applause sake amongst their Scholars, have fought to define and defference it from other vertues by its ob∣ject or effect, without assigning unto it a proper subject (by inherence whereunto, it might, like all other abstracted notions, stand formally differenced,) have thereupon made it to import as large as vertue it self: of which they would have it understood to be a kind. For so in our ap∣prehensions, a just mans imports as large a commendation as a good man, or a vertuous man.

But it is to be considered, as before noted, that this vertue can no otherwise be supposed common to all men, or every man, then as that man may at the same time be supposed a full superior or proprietor, in the distributions or commutations he is to make and that thereupon, it is not a vertue proper to him as a man, but as such a man: that is, as relating to him in his present power and superiority in what he is to di∣stribute, and his full propriety in the thing he doth exchange. And from thence it will still follow, that as this occassonal relation of supe∣riority did make the notion of Justice assignable as aforesaid, so, to make it capable of a constant specifical difference, there is no way but to affix it to him that is by Office a constant superior.

For they should have considered, that although this vertue cannot be without the others, namely without prudence preceding, and tempe∣rance and fortitude accompanying its execution, yet it having its objects wholly foraign, and respecting such persons onely as stand relating to other men in superiority, and not as each man hath power and govern∣ment over himself (as the other vertues do) it must thereupon have its different definition accordingly.

As for example, Temperance, that wholly relates to each one as having jurisdiction in himself for Government of his own appetites and affections, must therefore belong to all men, because all men have such things to govern: and can have foraign jurisdiction onely as accompaning the Justice of a superior. And so must prudence and fortitude, that partly relate to others good and partly to our own guidance, be commu∣nicable to all men likewise; because of the daily and general use of both, for the benefit of others, and their own separate good. Whereas Justice, that hath its object wholly in the good of others, and doth thereupon suppose the party quallified with abillity proportionable, must be appropriate to such onely as have by their relations power to act accor∣dingly.

And then it will come to pass, that although Justcie may have per∣fection of degrees, and be more or less a vertue as this governor is more or less prudent, temperate, or magnanimous, yet must the no∣tion of Justice be alwayes assigned to the actings of superiors upon in∣feriors, as such, notwithstanding occasional deviations.

For as to be a reasonable creature remaines the definition of all men, as men, yea though they be most foolish, so cannot the violent acti∣ons of some, deprive men in supreme authority from having the no∣tion of Justice appropriate to that sort of men onely. And this, be∣cause a man in supreme Authority being the subject wherein Justice can onely reside, even as mankind in general is the subject of reason, It is not therefore the pravity of some Monarch, or other occasional devia∣tions in some Acts, can deprive them of the definition of just, more then the unreasonableness or imprudence of some men, or of some actions of any man, can take from them or him that definition of a reason∣able creature. For the question being not concerning the perfection of the predicate, but of its propriety of inherence, therefore, as man∣kinde is amongst sublunary creatures the proper subject of reason, be∣cause none else can so truly or perfectly have it, so doth justice re∣main proper to men in supreme authority: although they may be in degree much inferior, or defective one to another.

And this truth we shall finde asserted by one that was incompara∣bly wiser and more knowing in these things then any of the Philoso∣phers; even by Solomon himself: Also to punish the Just is not good, nor to strike Princes for equity. In which words the just man and the superior stand plainly convertible:* 1.83 as also they do in that saying of Saint John, My little children let no man deceive you, he that doth righteousness is righteous, even as he is righteous: that is, since God the fountain of Justice gave them power to be doers,* 1.84 they are in their deeds alwayes just in relation to those below them: of all which more hereafter.

And therefore, lastly, as the abuse of this prerogative and advantage of reason, prevailes not with God to take it from mankinde, because of that general good which the use of it doth ordinarily afford, (both in mens deportments toward one another, and other creatures also) no more are the accidental abuses in the seat of Justice, of availe to take off, and defeat that continual benefit arising to mankinde by the ge∣neral exercise thereof. For in these cases, wisdom grounding her self upon an infallible rule of comparison, raises this her maxim, Better to suffer a misc••ief then an inconvenience••: better that the common benefit of Justice should be kept up, notwithstanding its occasional mischiefs, then the avoiding of those occasional mischiefs, should defeat the com∣mon benefit of Justice.

And indeed, the two extreams of this vertue mi••ht have denoted the proper subject thereof, had men had as great readiness to have ac∣knowledged their Princes vertues, as to mark their vices. For as un∣to none but men of power it can be a fault to neglect Justice, or ex∣tend it to tyranny or rigor, so can the vertue it self be formally agree∣ing to none, but such neither.

So that then, we may plainly finde that they that have hitherto defined Justice to be a vertue giving every one his own, by their not setting down certain rules to judge what these proprieties were, and how to be known, and ont determining the persons that shall have this power of distribution, they have made justice, that was ordained to be the great instrument of publike peace and quiet, to be the occasion of Civil war.

They that think they have come neerer the mark, by determining Justice to be Juris statio, meaning the sentence of Law, they have thereby indeed found out a good remedy to bridle the exorbitance or Magistrates, and also to direct them in each particular execution of their charge; but then, since justice is not a contemplative vertue, as depending upon the knowledge of the Law, but upon the due execution thereof, it will still follow, that as Juris statio doth depend on Juris dictio, and the execution of the Law is not otherwise justice then as the person executing the same hath above others power therein derived from that person that is Law-maker, even so also, justice it self must be acknowledged more or less such to inferiors, as it is more or less in its execution approaching and derived from its origi∣nall.

Whereupon we must say that when the tearm of Justice is given to infe∣riors, as denoting their upright dealing in the discharge of any trust, it is then (as before noted) confounded with the vertue or honesty: for hone∣sty is the proper commendation of any in that case, even as denoting trust and inferiority. Whereas, to do justice, or justly, supposeth a power to im∣pose and distribute. But when we do suppose any inferior person (as such) to be capable of justice, so far as he hath been equal to the rule and propor∣tion of his trust, we do thereby grant justice not to be any wayes originally in him, but to be properly onely assignable where the rule is; that is, to the party that holds the ballances, as being possessed of power: And therefore is Justice painted with a sword in the right hand, and scales in the lest, as be∣tokening that the estimation and decision of causes and controversies is the proper office of him that is in the supreme seat of authority and power, who is to be conceived the Trustor, and not on the judgement or censure of such as are inferior, or trusted.

And this, because the Trusted's justice or equal dealing being to be measur∣ed by the Trustor or superior, he can no otherwise be just then by him justi∣fied: which is not to be actively or formally just, but proportionably so. For although he might have been upright or honest in his return, as having herein done to the utmost of his abillity or conscience, yet cannot he be therefore truely called just: because the superior in his trust, might have had other ends or intentions in the assignment of the trust, then hath been, or could be by him adequately returned: in which case, falling short of the rule, he failes in point of Justice also.

And to manifest these things more clearly, namely that the Justice of superiors is not dependent on the judgement and sentence of men below, and that againe, our own conscience cannot justifie alone, we shall finde Saint Paul saying With me it is a very small thing to be judged of you, or mans judgement: yea I judge not mine own self, for I know nothing by my self, yet am I not thereby justified, but he that justifieth me is the Lord.* 1.85

From whence we may truly infer, that no man can be just before God in this life: not onely, because not fully knowing his will, but also in respect of inabillity; in coming short thereof, even when we are most conscientious. And so again, taking injustice to import negatively (that is, absence of justice) we may call all inferiors more or less unjust: and that also, whilst to their utmost they are most honest. Even as on the contrary, we may say all inferiors are more or less just, as more or less justified. Upon which ground, the Publican, a neglecter of the Law, went away rather justified then the Pharisee,* 1.86 a most exact keeper thereof. In which regard, justification being according to supremacy in power, it follows that any man may be called just, when justified before God the fountain of all rule and power, although to his Prince or Parents he may in some particulars fall short of his trust: like as, upon the same rule again, the justification of the Prince may include justice to any subject, notwithstanding his failing in any inferior charge.

So that now, the attribute of Justice being formally proper onely to su∣preme power, hence it comes that the acts of no superior but God can be universally and strictly called just. For Princes being, as his chief Magi∣strates, in some things restrained, and to be directed by his Laws, they can in those things be no farther esteemed just in execution, then as they are ob∣servant of them: Whereas in other things, by God referred to them as to his next entrusted Deputies, the stating of right or law must be dependant again on their sentence. In which case, as those Magistrates by them en∣trusted with execution of their Laws, must have above other subjects power to interpret, and act according to their own sense of equity and right, which is to be obeyed as justice by all others, even so again, the actions of Princes, as Gods supreme Magistrates, must, as in duty to God, be submitted unto by subjects in general.

And we must farther also say, that as Gods universal power and interest makes his actions to be alwayes equal and just, even because they are his, even so (in proportion) Princes must be held in their acti∣ons more or less just, as they are more or less powerful or whole proprie∣tors in what they judge. And farther, that as no man can be the proper and formal subject of justice but he that stands in relation a superior, so none unjust, but as he stands by relation an inferior: even as failing of, or ex∣ceeding in, the execution of that trust of power and propriety received from such as were herein above him. And, from the premises, we may farther say, that as the true stating and observance of the relations of governing and governed makes government, and the execution of this government makes Justice, so, in Republicks, where these relations are not fixed and certain, but that the governed as Agents do sometimes act on the governing as patients, there Justice must be proportionably wanting or uncertain.

Out of all hitherto spoken it will (I hope) appear to be each mans duty now, as he would be freed of the guilt of doing ill, aswell as that of stub∣borness and disobedience, not to take upon him to judge of the morality of laws and institutions, above, or without the leave of his superior. For as sin in the wil must proceed from error in the understanding, if I respite my par∣ticular inquisitivenes, and suffer my self to be guided by the general per∣swasion that right and wrong are better known to these I am bound to obey then to my self, the result of my actions, whether they did what was good

or no, must yet be safer to me that perform them by implicite obedience, then they can be otherwise. For if they be right and good, the merit of that obedience by which they were done will encrease their good: and if other∣wise, it will abate it, as being therein my just excuse. For the less will I had therein, the less sin I must also have: as shall be more fully discoursed of when we treat of Religion.

And bootless it is, to say that obedience to humane authority is to be gi∣ven in things indifferent: For if the doing or not doing be indifferent for le∣gality or benefit in my conceit, I yeild to authority, not as out of duty as such, but as doing what I should have done to any ordinary request. Or if, besides the sense of duty, I go to set my self a rule how far, and how far n••t, my own reason and conscience is to submit; so far as I take on me to ju••ge of the equity of the precept and the measure of my obedience, so far the ver∣tue and merit of obedience must cease.

So that now, to conclude this discou•••••• of Law and Justice, we are to esteem them the proper right and honor of him that hath the soveraignty: who, being to judge his subjects and fight their battailes, is to have this prime and inseparable mark of his office preserved inviolable. For, unless we will be again content to be let loose to our first natural liberty of having no certain proprieties, but make dominion again fleeting, and dependant on the issue of each mans occasional strength, to hold or acquire, and, in pur∣suance thereof, to his own censure of right and wrong to possess, there is no remedy but we must submit in matters of judgement and sense of legality and morality, to the same person we now publikely submit our bodi∣ly force: unless we should fondly think, that it were fit men should be put by rules of true policy in such a wretched condition, as to be left free to judge of right and wrong, that, to their greater torment, they may be by force deprived. Or, unless we shall farther suppose, that use of force and re∣sistance was in these cases remitted also; and so, absurdly make each subject a superior; by being his own judge and Magistrate.

CHAP. IX. Of the Publike good, Common good, or Commonweal.

WHat hath been hitherto spoken of the necessity of self-seeking, as to the preservation of that whole species which must con∣sist of those particulars, must, upon like reason, be now con∣sidered in the justification of wha•• each Kingdom doth for its separate good apart, without equal regard to ••e good of one another. For although the good of the whole race of mankinde be in common reason preferable to that of any Kingdom, yet since neither men themselves, nor all Countries in general, can be so reduced or associated under one entire government and care as to Call any man father or master on earth; it must therefore fall out that this general good, subsisting by, and arising according to that of par∣ticulars, the necessity of each kingdoms having separate propriety and in∣terest, and of an understanding and will proper to it self, will to it be the same (I mean to the preservation of each kingdom) as the having proprieties di∣stinct to the particular subjects of the same kingdom, is to the saubsistance and advancement of the general propriety of the whole kingdome: or as ha∣ving distinct understanding and will, is necessary to constitute each single person. And as God, who is, and can onely be the universal Monarch of all mankinde, doth so fasten mans specifical being and preservation, by plea∣surable objects accompanying his generation and food, or the contrary on things contrary (in such sort as we are thereby preserved from danger of total decay) so are particular parcels hereof left to the particular guidance of stewards and officers of his own appointing: who, having their distinct allotments for improvement, are through the natural sense of honor and greatness provoked to look to the encreasing thereof as their proper duties: and that, although, in their exchange or usury of these talents, other king∣doms be proportionable or greater losers.

From all which, gathering how each kingdome is to be justified in prose∣cuting their own good apart, we are next to consider what this good is. In this case also, we must, as conceiving these notions of Kingdom or Com∣monwealth to include a distinct multitude of mankind there associated by u∣nion of a common head, attribute unto them the same end we did unto men in general before: namely the prosecution of pleasure; although under a∣nother name, to wit that of plenty: which do••h suppose and imply that stock or store of things pleasurable, which each kingdome is to have for the use and benefit thereof. But because the care and charge for acquisition and preservation of the particulars that serve to promote and make up this plenty or pleasure doth belong to the Prince, we shall not here speak thereof.

In the mean time, considering all political happiness united, and that un∣der the general notion of pleasure, we must say, that as other pleasures

of privat persons, so the different pleasures of one Kingdome or Common∣wealth above another, is in vigor and sincerity of fruition, or in continu∣ance and extent thereof. For if a people should be pleased with appearing contents, or with riches and its appurtenances onely: as ease, dainty fair, fine cloaths, houses, or the like; these, as they came short of what might have been added in the same kinds, and as they stood unaccompanied of other political benefits, as Religion, Fertility, Arts, Militia, &c. and as again they wanted certainty for continuing in their possession or esteem, they wanted also of degree for compleating their political hap∣piness.

Nay farther, collecting the happiness of each Kingdom into a total, it is not onely needful that all and every member thereof be, so far as may be, made sensible thereof, but, because goodness and benefit is more or less, as it is extended, each Kingdom is also more or less happy, as it hath more or fewer to participate thereof. For as the happiness of a whole Kingdome must (collectively considered) be greater then the happiness of any single person or order in the same, so must the happiness of one Kingdom increase above that of another in proportion, as the persons by them made happy do differ in number. And therefore we must also say, that by Happiness of a Kingdom, we understand that whole stock of pleasures and benefits of all sorts wherewith each Kingdom is furnished: and withal, the fit application and distribution thereof, according to the general capacities and numbers of the subjects.

As for example, if one party of the kingdom, being too strong to be awed by the supreme power, do enrich themselves by the spoile and plunder of other subjects, it is not their taking upon them the shew of the whole people or Commonwealth, that can make their particular gain the gain of the whole kingdom: but it is rather really the loss: whilst, besides what is true∣ly spoiled by fire, rapine, other mischiefs accompanying Civil war so many men as must be imployed for souldiers, are kept not only from a∣griculture, manifacture, and other necessary imployments for publike en∣crease; but also to live luxuriously upon the labor of others: to their dis∣heartening, and decay of the Publike stock: as famine, the consequent of Civil war, doth well declare. But all this, is little to the most considerable loss of so many mens lives: which, as man is more valuable then any thing else, is the greatest loss can befal any Kingdom: not onely as in its self, but as it is wholly irreparable. No, when we see the ploughman, the shepherd, the spinster, or the like; to be intent in their labors and providing food and clothing for us. These we may truely call Commonwealths-men: foras∣much as they do by their occupations make real improvement without the loss of others. Whereas he that through publike disturbance, hath seated himself as high in Office and Power as his ambitious heart can desire, cannot at all be called a Commonwealths-man in what he hath done: nor in what he shal do in this his imployment and power, otherwise then as directed and war∣ranted by his Soveraign. Even because in all distributions and disposals made by any Magistrate of any of the Kingdoms stock already gained, a conse∣quential loss must light on them that were before possessed: when as they that make an encrease from nature or art, as they do thereby empoverish none, so are they alwayes to be held publikely beneficial, whilst they manage their proper imployments.

And as publike good may be thus damnified by private actings of sub∣jects one upon another by force, so may it by commerce also. For if some persons or degrees of subjects, do encrease their happiness or riches onely by consequent affliction or poverty of others, none can call this an addi∣tion of happiness to the Commonwealth or Kingdome in general. But if this be effected by lawful and usual wayes of contract, commerce, and traf∣fick of subjects amongst themselves, then (at the worst) what one looseth another gets: and so the whole Kingdom neither gets nor loses in the gene∣ral, or whole stock thereof. But, if this way of acquiring from one ano∣ther be without publike leave, then, by destruction and neglect of so much of that Kingdomes stock and improvement, as great lots must follow to the whole thereupon. For since to the whole Kingdom there can be no improvement but what is acquired either from nature, or husbandry, or invention of Arts; or from other kingdoms; as by Merchants, Arms, or the like, so can nothing be lost to the whole but by neglect of these, through di∣version of endeavor, or by actual destruction of what hath been so gained.

We may therefore well compare those distributions and partitions of ho∣nors, lands, &c. made amongst subjects by the Prince, unto that dole of bread, or the like, which, upon pre-regard had to each parties wants, is di∣stinctly and orderly given according to the direction of authority; and so nothing comes to be lost. Whereas we may compare that way of partition which subjects do factiously and partially take one them to make amongst themselves, to a kind of scrambling: wherein, while each party or person is confusedly endeavouring to engross to himself, without consider∣ing the wants of others, a great part comes to be spoiled in the contest, and by neglect: besides that danger of quarrelling, which must follow thereupon.

Upon consideration of all which, it will appear, that as the publike or whole good of the kingdom is not to be estimated by every private possession, but by all in general; so can it have no competent judge of its reality and extent, but that publik person that hath universal share therein: And so (farther,) that none but he that hath common interest in all the persons of his subjects, can be well able impartially to minde their universal contents, and provide against the covetous engrossements of publike and common benefits. And this, not only for deviding the present stocks of riches, honors, offices, & arms, amongst subjects, but also in differencing and setting the true value and proportions of each of them according to publike benefits, one in comparison of another. Else may his subjects place all their delight in riches, and so neglect Religion and Gods service: or, growing thereby secure, neglect the means of their preser∣vation, and acknowledge of arms. Or they may set their mindes wholly on honour: so as, through emulation, to fall into faction and civil war. For, as in our natural bodies, although the humors themselves be necessary for our preservation, yet if they exceed in quantity, so as to defeat and interupt one anothers workings, or be not in that proportion as the state of that body re∣quires, they then destroy the body: so, in politick bodies, although the having of all politicke benefits be useful therein, yet may the unequal and immode∣rate possession of some so them, destroy (without good care) the enjoyment and good of the whole.

And thereforefore, as the proper will and appetite of each person is in him supreme and uncontrolable Judge against all other foraign wills, and also o∣ver the private and single appetites of his own particular members, so is the

will of the publike person, in the same kingdom, uncontrolable judge of that kingdoms benefit: both against the publike judgement of other kingdoms, and also against the judgement of any of its own private members: or else there will (at last) be no such thing as publike good at all.

For when one Faction doth prevail on another, or one Community or Cor∣poration upon another, so far as to encrease in riches or other necessary appur∣tenances of pleasure; since what is by one order of Subjects gained is in the same proportion lost to another order, the gain of the Kingdom can be no o∣therwise conceited to encrease in the whole, then as these tradings and gain∣ings one upon another had licence and direction from publike Reason: even therein foreseeing how that Kingdoms publike stock might be therein en∣creased by forraign supply, or kept undiminished by avoiding home neglect. In the first case prevailing by way of acquisition and gain, in the other by way of parsimony and thrift.

No, it is not the assuming to themselves the name and notion of the Commonwealth, and so, by reason of their present supreme and uncontrole∣able power, commanding without general agreement or leave of the com∣mon head, that can make the actings of any prevailing party or faction to be rightly and justly called the Government of that Commonwealth: much less can it be conceiveable, how the particular gain of this powerful ruling Faction, and that separate and distinct encrease which is thereby raised to themselves and their party, by the consequential loss of a greater number of the people and inhabitants of the same place (by them kept in subjection) can in any true sence, be called the gain of the Commonwealth: let their pretensions of acting for, and in name of the Commonwealth or people, be as fair and plausible as they will.

CHAP. X. Of Paction and Commerce·

VNder God Almighty who alone is Omnipotent, and in himself All-sufficient, there is no sensitive Agent but stands in need of security and advantage to be obtained elsewhere: and which (according to the sence and knowledge thereof) doth not, to the utmost of its power, finde out means of trust, for avoiding the objects of its fear, or attaining those of its hopes. Thus, the Lion hath his Teeth and Tallons as his con∣fidence to defend himself, and also to obtain his prey. The Fox trusts to his craft for both. But generally, all Beasts, Fishes, and Birds, seek to shun their present fears, by the nimbleness of their Legs, Fins, and Wings: their food being usually so ready, to all that live not on prey, that little provision or care need to be taken.

In men, the weapons offensive and defensive are chiefly their reason: for as their fears and hopes encrease above other creatures, both through the know∣ledge of what truely is, or may be hurtful or good unto them (which beasts

do not) or through the variety of those objects of harm or delight (which beasts have not) so they have accordingly made larger provision for their se∣curities and advantages.

For supply of our continual wants, so far as they refer to Nature or God∣ward, we, like other creatures, have no cause of fear or mistrust, that the Covenant of Seed-time or Harvest,* 1.87 Summer and Winter, day and night, with the continuation of other influences and affordments of the creatures, should ever quite fail: because in him that appointed them, as there is no self-want to divert,* 1.88 so there is no variableness or shadow of change. Where∣as, in those supplies that are necessary for our use, and yet are in the power of others that have like use with our selves, the acquiring or possession of them cannot reasonably be expected, without a voluntary and free resigna∣tion.

To suppose it voluntary, is first to suppose it reasonable in the opinion of the party from whom the curtesie is expected. And reasonable it cannot be, till something equivalent, in the eye of the proprietor, be granted in satisfa∣ction and lieu thereof: whither it be in equal-goods, or curtesie, or onely in thanks, as a free gift. In which latter case onely, no pledge or contract useth to pass: though, to a generous minde, it be the straightest obligation that may be. But, in the other cases, the kinde of return or requital, with the weight, measure, number, or other estimation thereof is always agreed upon.

For although it might be alleadged,

That since in Nature there is no Propriety, why should not he that had store of Corn, Cattel, &c. share with him that wants, who is both his equal and hath like interest. And what more noble then in this case freely to give.

All which is true: but since these are things which each one cannot want, who shall have power to see this distribution made, or force one man to drudge for another? And since it is not to be presumed that he which plows and soweth, will be so far delighted in that expence and labour, as to do it for such as from whom (it may be) not so much as thanks is to be expected; therefore there will be danger, that either he that expected bread from him will want it, or else, be∣stowing his whole labor in getting bread for himself and others, he should, for want of time to imploy in other things, want all other food, and apparel also.

And therefore, as the setling of Propriety encreased tillage and other sorts of husbandry (which otherwise would have lain still) so Trade and Commerce make Propriety useful, to the improvement both of the goods of Nature and Art. For hereby the Husbandman, the Grasier, the Shoo∣maker, the Tayler, &c. have mutually to supply each others wants: and he that hath more food then he needs, may exchange the overplus for apparel or what else he wants. And so, whilst mens abilities are not diverted, but wholly imployed in one Trade, each one (to the common improvement) will grow of greater excellency therein.

And thereby also, mens several gifts and endowments come to be alterna∣tively and publikely useful and beneficial. For the strong and able bodied man, who (perhaps (hath not equal judgement to him that is weak, is fit∣test for execution and labour in those things which the invention of the other hath by his Art and Study made more easie: each ability finding an im∣ployment proper. And although, at the first, while Families were

great, they were like little Commonweales or Cities in themselves, and so might, through their many hands, and unity of Command and apply∣cation, be in all things well furnished, according to such proportion as their simplicity then required; yet less Families, being now collected in narrow bounds within Cities and Commonweals, as they could not otherwise subsist, so they are hereby served with greater ease and vari∣ety.

But, necessity, the mother of invention, saw yet a defect. For he that imployed himself in shoe-making, &c. might want food or other necessa∣ries, at such a time as they in whose hands these things were had no need of his shoes: but it may be of such other things as were not in his power. In this case there was no way, but to agree to some one or few things, that should serve as common values and exchanges for all others: which at first (it is like) was of Leather, Iron, or what was generally most useful. But this not serving to all wants and occasions, and through its plenty being sub∣ject to deceit, mettals of greatest scarcity come to be politickly brought in, and stampt by Authority, to give it denomination and value: So that, where anciently estates were reckoned by cattel or goods, it is now computed by mony.

But let us go on to discover what is just and not in matters of Commerce, (supposing men as under rules of Religion): A man comes to buy or bar∣gain with another for any thing he wants, what gain shall we allow the seller? shall it be twenty in the hundred, a double, or treble value: or else what can he get? Where shall Conscience stint it self? Shall the Law appoint the proportion? Why so? Is not the seller a Subject as well as the buyer? And if then the Law rate and stint not all commodities and dealings, it is partial: if it do, to what use; since the gain might as well have gone round; by my enhansing proportionably my commodities to him or others, as now our losses do, as being all of us low rated? But what if the buyer have not commodities, for all men cannot be stored alike? Why then commonly you discourage Trade: and so, through a general dearth of things, prejudice all men. Therefore authority interposeth but in few cases with success: and, in my judgement, in the silence of Authority, they are under no rule but of their own Consciences: namely of the rule of Doe as thou wouldest be done unto. For the buyer and seller, trusting to their own judgements and skill in their bargains, may advantage themselves as they shall see good. For where is no trust to be understood, there is no co∣zenage: otherwise all Trades would be unlawful. For if you measure unlawfulness by proportion of gain, the least again is unlawful also.

But for this partial respect to generally sheyed towards the buyer against the seller, there is the same reason to be given as was formerly for these many declamations against the atbitrary power of Princes, and for the many in∣ventions of bounding their single powers more then the powers of the ma∣ny superiors in Aristocracies and Democracies: namely, that as Subjects and parties are onely writers of those things, so few writers of Mo∣ral or Political duties are Tradesmen or sellers, but all buyers: and so, for their own interest sake, having not regard to the equal justice of the thing it self, would have them bounded, and not themselves.

And as it thus fareth at the Market or Tradesmans shop (namely that the buyer is at the sellers choice for the proportion of mony or other exchange to be given him in satisfaction for what he takes) the like it is with Officers, Artificers, or other persons, from whom any thing belonging to their offices or labor of minde is desired. To wit, that, where the rate of their pains and imployment is not stinted by a superior, there, he, being an equal subject with the other that hath need of his imployment, is not, like his slave or drudge, to be made to serve him without such requital as himself shall judge reasonable.

And so also it is in the case of that great publike officer the King: for, he having none on earth above him, who shall set any stint upon him: so far that if any will make use of his protection, he shall not again have liberty to encrease the rate thereof, according to occasion: as Merchants do of their wares, or other Officers or Artificers do of their skill? And upon the same reason that he may make rich and great men pay him greater Rates and Taxes for their protections, as having greater shares therein, why may he not generally upon occasion, encrease or diminish these Rates from all or any of his Subjects, as he findes this his office of protecting them to be more or less dangerous to himself, as well as difficult and expensive? For where God (his superior) hath not bounded him, I see not why he should be rated by any others: much less by the parties themselves, for that great hazard of his person he undergoes, in that security of person and estate which he gives unto them.

Let us look neerer to this in Pactions, where performance on both sides is not present, as in contracts before mentioned, but that both are future, or one party must perform before another. This Paction, and the security thereupon will be found void, without a common Authority to hold the ob∣liged party to performance: For else the first cannot in reason begin. There∣fore, since all trust doth require due return and discharge, men, for their mu∣tual securities herein, do not relye upon the single assurances of one anothers bare promises, but either engage witnesses therein, or trust to some such deed under hand & seal, as may be available to call in publike justice to their assist∣ance, in case that breach of Covenant should be offered. In which case, as nei∣ther side hath right to determine for it self, so can they not refuse the appeal and umperage of the superior Authority therewith intrusted. For so, in all Commonweals there is Law, and, by a just subordination, there is a Superior for decision of all things; till we come therein to the supreme of all: be∣yond whom, no appeal on earth is to be had. For that, if I should appeal from the Prince to any on earth, I change the Government: placing the so∣veraignty where the last appeal is. And because in these things we must come to some pawse, therefore if we place a supreme above a supreme, we make all controversies undecideable: and lose our selves as in a circle of giddy∣ness.

So then, the difference between a Contract and a Pact is, that, the one be∣ing a present exchange of Property, the alternative possession gives and se∣cures their rights, without supposition of superior civil power to the new pro∣prietors, as firmly as it did to the old. Whereas in Pactions, the possession of the new property being not yet had, he that performs last hath for his fu∣ture possession no assurance but what ariseth from a power superior and com∣mon to them both: Into whose hands the whole Propriety must thereupon

be supposed to be put; (as is usually done by deed in his name attested by witness) and that, according to the degree that this third power stands there∣in presently concerned and powerful, the trusting party hath his security. And therefore, to make Pactions and Contracts the same in Reason and E∣quity, the superior must have whole Propriety in the thing pacted for, and e∣qual and supreme power over the pacting parties: or else they contract for contingencies instead of certainties.

But then they agree, that either party, being a voluntary Agent, may gain on the other to his utmost. For in case the superior person do mittigate or alter, he doth it as in relation to his own common and supreme Propriety: because in those Pacts which he personally and expresly doth not ratifie, but onely by general rules, he may vary as he shall finde those general rules mi∣staken or wrested: otherwise you both ingage and dis-impropriate him against his consent. For since each superior, being to be supposed with many in sub∣ordinate relation under him, cannot personally and particularly preside in all bargains, but must for direction of his pleasure in these things give and make Laws, it stands with no reason that for his good intention herein (that is for dispatch of the business of others) he should be by them disadvanta∣ged himself.

Now, imagining a Paction between King and people (as is by some done,) this difference will arise between the ties and securities which subiects make one with another, and those they make with their King. First, Subjects bar∣gains are expressed, and that usually under hand and seal before witness: and then have they a person, and way of decision ready to reconcile their diffe∣rences. Whereas, between Prince and people, nothing like Paction appears: but is onely supposed. Again, the Prince having onely God above him, the Subjects have no appeal but thither; who onely is King of Kings: for how should the Subjects judge, they are parties, and beneath the Prince? How shall the Law judge; for that must be under its maker also?

Again, in Pactions one is performing before another: between Prince and people it is not known which is to begin, or which is to end: for their ties are continual, and reciprocal: the Prince is continually to protect them, and they continually to obey him. Is he sworn to keep the Laws and do Justice; they are sworn and obliged to obey the Laws, and him in execution of them. Therefore when Monarchs take oaths for maintenance of the Laws made, or for doing of Justice or other things, having none but God to judge hereof above him, he can be to him onely accomptable, as to a superior, for any breach: and if he be, he is no Soveraign. And if oaths do but what hu∣mane Law or Polity can do or secure without them, the attestation of Gods name and presence is but taking his Name in vain: the obligation of an oath being in value as far above Law, as God is above the Prince. And when the oath of Allegeance passeth from Subjects to Princes, it is for far∣ther securing him against opposition and revolt: because if sence of duty to God do not, it is not possible for the fear of one man to keep all in subje∣ction.

They that imagine Kingly Government is grounded on Paction with peo∣ple, as deriving from them his power over them, will appear in a farther mi∣stake herein, from consideration of the nature of Paction it self: which we shall a little more particularly examine. For first, they supposing that the community is at that time associated by mutual Paction so as to act in

the capacity of one person, do fail, in that neither express Articles to that purpose could ever be made or produced, nor could there be any witness, nor a third present obliging superior party supposed. For, witness there can be none, but such as are parties: and third common obliging and powerful party there cannot be, but God. For if another on earth, he is their Prince alrea∣dy: and it is he, not they, must give content. So that God not being present, as to manifestation of express consent in what they do, otherwise then by his Will already known by his Laws; the people having none but them∣selves (equal parties) to judge how far their Pactions are consonant to these Laws, must, as wanting present power to hold them obliged to one another, want also power to grant any thing one to another. And therefore, they failing to think that such a body can be at all, or that a body without a head can perform the Offices of Discourse, Will, and Understanding, which is to the making Pactions requisite, we will next see what likeness of Paction there is in any thing that appears between Prince and people, supposing them as pa∣ctors; which some do fancie for making subjects submission (as they think) lawful, because voluntary.

In this, the first great difficulty will be, how to bring the people into a ca∣pacity of appearance for making this stipulation. For if by their mutual and reciprocal Pactions amongst one another, they have but, (as is usually supposed to make them one body) transferred each others power, they are as far from being one body as before: because, as they were before separate in having their own distinct personal powers, so are still as distinct in possessi∣on of the powers of each other. For, if John have given his power to Tho∣mas, it must be (I suppose) that Thomas should also give his own power to Willsam: And then, as William may be supposed to have a treble power (that is his own and the two resigned) to at last, by his transferring these re∣signed powers onward, they will come into one hand. But this will be a long work, and much trouble there will be with whom to begin, and in what or∣der to follow therein; and who shall be the supreme obliging party, to see performance of these many Pactions.

But if they be supposed to pact all at once, how shall we in this confusion be able to finde out and distinguish the pacting persons from one another; and the third obliging party and witnesses from both?

For if John say to Thomas, I give you all my right in governing my self, upon condition that you give the same and all yours to such and such, and this we mutual∣ly oblige our selves by oaths to do,

Then, taking these pactors by pairs, here will be a long work again, and to no purpose: unless the third per∣son to be impowered with all power, do severally stipulate with these pares: and then he will have as many Kingdomes as pairs of Sub∣jects.

And to suppose each party pacting with the whole community, and saying

I give all my power to this Community, that they again may give it unto such a man;

Then must each man singly come to do to. Which done, each man will come but to have the same power he had at the first: forasmuch as every one being a member of the Community, hath also his equal share therein still. And therefore each one, as sharer in the power of the Com∣munity, must anew consent, or we are never the neerer of having a political person to Pact with; or of having made any Community or Corporation. And as this cannot be without a present superior Authority for so doing nei∣ther,

(by force of whose Law the same must be done) so will much more follow, that as they could not by Paction have become a Community with∣out some Superior Law and Power; so, beyond the leave of that Su∣perior Law or Power, cannot they, as a Community, act any thing of force: much less can they set a Superior above what is Superior to them al∣ready.

Again, it would be considered what they pact for in these their supposed Pactions with Princes, because all rational creatures must have an aym. In this case we must still continue supposing (for matter of Fact will never ap∣pear): either then they pact for their right to govern others, or for their right to govern themselves: If the latter, it must be meant onely so far as their separate deportments come to be publikely useful, for still I suppose each one must have power to manage his proper business. Then, Question being what shall be publike, what not, the supposed Paction must be invalid: because, expressing it not, it saves not, nor remedies not one pacting party from the power of the other: that is, the Subject from the Superior; to whom it belongs to have power to judge in all, or else he can judge in none. If it be meant of the first (that is; of his share of government of others) then must each person singly pact: to the end that the Community (inclu∣ding all) may have joynt right to govern. But then, how can they give what they have not? For since (as formerly shewed) none have by Na∣ture, and as men, rule over one another, but what is derived the natural way from constraint, how shall force or fear be reconciled with the supposed vo∣luntary Paction?

Again, if precedent Paction must be supposed to make Government law∣ful, how shall we do for establishment of Democracies? Do the people of such a place Covenant with themselves, both to transfer to themselves, and retain to themselves the government of such a place? Do they thus derive power from one to another, to no other purpose then to do every one as they like still, and to be just as much, and no more powerful, then before? Here is a mad work indeed. Or if it be not done, then by their Argument these Governments are but Anarchies; which is true in∣deed.

But if we should (to avoid some of the passed absurdities) suppose no Paction to pass between Prince and people, then, (grounding Justice and injury on the observation or violation of Pactions) we make them uncapa∣ble (by that supposition) of doing Justice to, or receiving injury from his Subjects: and so destroy Government, for want of mutual obligation and sense of duty.

Lastly, these considerations will much puzzle us on what to ground the duty of those in the Family towards the Master. If he need not derive his Authority from Paction, but as due by Office, then is power of Office, and founded on Gods Precepts: not on consent below. If children and servants must pact with one another to impower their Father or Master, then must he get them and take them in all at once: or else, upon the birth and admission of every new childe and servant, they must all pact anew, for fear that these new ones, for want of being Covenanters, should be injured when any thing is by their Father or Master done against their liking, And then, what shall we say of the Wifes subjection? Must the husband have many Wives, that one may pact with another to empower him? Can he not also have

Fatherly or Masterly power while he hath but one childe or one ser∣vant for the like reason? At what yeers must Children be supposed able to pact? And by what Authority must the Father command in the mean time?

Some, that first founded Government and power on this supposed way of pacting, have reckoned amongst sociable creatures Bees, Pismires, &c. which being bred all at once, do romain as it were but one litter: And again, they being of equality for wit, Courage, Size, Strength, &c. must have, accor∣ding to their agreement in these things and shortness of life, their particular sense of good undistinguished from that which is common: and are there∣fore onely instances, amongst sensitive Agents, for an independent Com∣munity, as heretofore shewed. But how shall these things be fancied a∣mongst men? What are our supposed Pactions no more then theirs? It is like indeed. But how shall we contrive men to be so contem∣temporary: or in such equality o•• Birth, Appetite, &c. to resemble them?

Suppose a Collony of men agree to go to a new Plantation, their agree∣ment to future Government will have example and reason from former sense and Education in Governments whereupon to found it self. And al∣though, with them, force prevailes not for the present establishing one man above another, yet riches or craft will: so as, by the unequal power there∣of, to destroy that supposed equal Paction, upon their coming to this new Colony, and also in receiving others to them: towards whom, if they proceed not by open force, yet in their new Agreements (as former∣ly amongst themselves) they prevail on one another by opinion of Power and Force: which must consequently overthrow supposition of equal Community. For the share of Power cannot be equal a∣mongst such as have it in degree one more then another: and where then is their formal consenting to set up others in power above them, since it arose but from the considerations they could not avoid it?

And men may make suppositions this way while they please, yet it is in truth no more possible for men in a perfect state of freedom to consent to any degree of subjection, then to consent to endure any other evil. For when men in this new Collony or in any other condition do submit to another, as in discretion, and out of choice of two evils to choose the less, it is but the same thing as to submit to a conquering Monarch. In which case, as the feared evil is more plain, so will it more prudentially justifie their submission.

The benefit and design of this prudential choice of subjection, is live∣ly set down by Jacob in Issacars blessing: viz. He saw that rest was good, and the Land that it was pleasant,* 1.89 and bowed his shoulder to bear, and be∣came a servant to tribute. That is, he finding that it was not to probable that he should gain perfect Freedom or Dominion by resistance, as it was apparent that he should thereby hazard and lose the benefits arising by sub∣jection, he therefore of two evils chose the less: and since he could not avoid the choice of subjection it self, he discreetly chose that kinde of submission therein as should render him most happy.

And this kinde of prudential Freedom is not onely all that humane condition is capable of in matters of subjection, but in all things else.

For absolute freedom, that is, not to be liable to inconvenencies in the enter∣tainment of the objects of choice (so far as that which shall be in it self most pleasing, shall not upon other consequential and unavoidable inconveni∣ences be often subject to be past by) is a prerogative of him that is omnipo∣tent onely: as having his power in all things equal to his will: and not of mankind; who, as bounded by the Laws of God, Nature and other his su∣periors, hath his power alwayes so stinted by his own imbecillity and the will of others, that the objects of his liking can be none other free to him, then as quallified and accompanied with such continual difficulties and ha∣zards, as must render it inconsideration thereof, the object of deliberation whether to take or leave, and not of absolute freedom whether to take or leave that particular object, simply and in it self alone considered. If sense of tast or honor prompt us to the enjoyment of any particular food or place of preferment, these objects in themselves desirable, do through those abate∣ments of dangers and inconveniencies arising in their acquisition or possessi∣on, become so far still the object of deliberation, that we many times de∣cline as evil, the prosecution of what we apprehend or know to be good: and whether we choose or leave, our freedom is not higher then of two e∣vils to choose the less: that is, the evil of want of the object we desire, or the evil of presence of it with its inconveniencies: Our liberty being ne∣ver higher nor lower in any thing then absence of constraint in taking or leaving. Nay more, he that in the highest objects of his delight is not bounded by laws of superiors (as not being under government) yet since these usually are by others desireable aswel as himself, he will have the con∣sideration of feared prejudice of his equals, still make it the object of de∣liberation: whereas the same liberty of choice and deliberation, cannot be so taken off by the highest and most severe law and penalty set down by au∣thority, but that there will still be absence from constraint and place left for deliberation, and consequently for volition either way. For as God alone is onely altogether unsubjected to the will of others, so inanimates and creatures below us, that wholly want will of their own, can be onely wholly subjected to the will of others.

And therefore, to return to farther examination of the Princes power as grounded on the content of the community and particularly by oaths, we say, that if things be duely searcht, the Princes oath is only voluntary and sub∣jects to be enforced by Law of the Country, or Law of nature, in prudence to his security. And oaths proceed not from mutual trust, but distrust. If either of them break these oaths, they are so far only punishable by God. For the Prince punisheth his Rebellious subjects, not as perjured, but as they are offenders; and subject to the laws: And therefore those that take not these oaths are for such offences equally punishable herein to those that do. And the truth is, that without these oaths, both King and People stood obliged to all reciprocal duties belonging to their offices: And if oaths should be taken to disable them in due performance of their offices, or enjoyn them to unlawful or unfit actions beyond their respective relative duties, they are invalid.

But although these Oaths cannot amount to a Paction, yet is their use good. For first, the solemn manner and place of delivery (being at the al∣ter) cannot but deeply imprint in Kings their duty to God, to whom, and his Laws they are to be obedient, aswell as the meanest subject: then, by

promising to govern according to Law, Justice, or the like, they are put in minde, that since their office is chiefly for their subjects good, they are to apply these rules to that purpose: at least so far as they see them thereto a∣vailable. And so again, subjects by these oaths come to know that God, as∣well as the law enjoyns them obedience.

In Aristocraties and Democraties, the capitulation is supposed between the whole state and each member: but in a Monarch, between the whole community and the Monarch. Subjects in Polarchies have no Oaths from the collective body, nor do the particular members of the state give any to the whole, as the subjects in Monarchies do to the Prince. And this, because each member in the state, as having a share in the state, and the state being not the whole state or soveraignty without him, he is neither in reason obliged to do it to them, nor much less they to him. For as in the first case (his share be∣ing something) it were absurd to demand of himself security for himself, so in the second, to give security where none is taken seems unreasonable. So that the maine security which Polarchies have against the revolt of the people is in their own forces and numbers: making so great a share of them, that, with themselves and dependants, they are commonly the greater party of such as have arms. And therefore subjects can never ease themselves of the oppres∣sion of Polarchies without foraign help, or of some of the States against the rest: or else, when war hath so far wasted these heads themselves and their forces, as the subjects may have strength enough to revolt. But the single persons of Monarchs, being disabled to prevail altogether by force, must relye also upon Oaths: and such obligations as may prevaile more by love then fear.

Now, to come to the example of Kings Covenanting with their people, it is oftenest urged in David. Who, as first of his family, and one that God intended to have firmely settled in that office, was thereupon to have the more solemn and notified entrance: And, for the peoples stronger ob∣ligation to acknowledge and serve him, he was to receive his annointings again as by their appointment and consent; and they also, to that purpose, to promise him obedience and service. For surely, none can think it was in Judahs or Israels power, whether or no he should have been their King: being before annointed by Gods direction, without consent of either of them.

So that their former King being now dead, we must suppose that in Justice they could do no otherwise:* 1.90 secondly nor in prudence, he being of such merit in himself, and having besides A great host like the host of God. Al∣though these considerations, as also his gifts, made the Elders of Iudah first anoint him, yet I finde no expression of the peoples doing it: or that the peo∣ple or Elders made any Covenant with him. And as for Israel, the Cove∣nant spoken of must be understood in pursuance of that made with Abner: who, as in the chief command, had made Ishbosheth, Sauls son, King before: to whose face he threatens to give the kingdom to David.* 1.91 And therefore, when in pursuance thereof, he makes a league with David to bring all Israel to him;* 1.92 It is to be understood of a league with Abner first made: for after the league between them Abner now calleth David, Lord and King:* 1.93 and saith, He will gather all Israel to David to make a league with him, that he might raign over all that his heart desired. Here is indeed obe∣dience and subjection promised on the peoples part when they should make this league with him; but what was the engagement from this or any

other King to subjects, by way of Covenant, I finde not.

But to proceed on this enquiry concerning Davids Covenanting, that which was probably Abners aime (besides his thirst of treacherous revenge was) indemnity for his past act against David: and therefore he durst not come till he had sent messengers on his own behalf. Which David accepts up∣on condition that he should bring his wife Michal with him: or else no forgive∣ness: expressed in that phrase of anger, Thou shalt not see my face except,* 1.94 &c. And likely it is Abner was taken into favor also: which might appear by Da∣vids feasting him, and Ioabs envious killing him, and by Davids mourning for him afterwards. And therefore his Covenanting with Israel afterwards can be interpreted (as before noted) but a promise of indempnity from him, according to, and in pursuance of the promise formerly made to Abner: who had before undertook and prevailed, To bring Israel and Benjamin to him.* 1.95 So that, after Abners death and their Kings, it was much more reason they should come to David for this Covenant then he to them. And it is to be noted, that they send to him, he comes not to them: as he did formerly to Iudah, with whom it was more likely he should have made a Covenant, if it had been necessary that kingly right and power had depended on Paction and consent of people. Therefore this Covenant could not imply equal sti∣pulation or resignation of any royal power: because then, Iudah had more reason to have pressed it, as having more power to stand on their tearms with David. For they, being not in like trouble and confusion, might have also joyned with Israel against him: nor was his strength then so great and for∣midable, as afterwards.

But their not doing it (as not having offended by resisting David as Israel had done seven yeers together) makes it evident that this covenant imported nothing but an act of oblivion, or the like: and that it was not at Davids suite, as summoning them to settle him in his throne, but at theirs, to be settled by him in their liberties, which were probably to be the same that their brethren of Iudah already had: And therefore they say unto him, We are thy bone and thy flesh:* 1.96 because those of Iudah might else presume to much as being his kin: acknowledging also to him (before they speak of Cove∣nant) that God had appointed and said unto him Thou shalt be ruler over my people Israel.* 1.97 And their annointing is not ascribed to freedom in them to have refused, but it is said, They annointed David King over Israel,* 1.98 accor∣ding to the word of the Lord by Samuel: that is, acknowledged him King as God had appointed.

And to shew that this League or Covenant imported but some promises of grace, or the like from the King to the people, and did not imply equal sti∣pulation, we may observe that he is alwayes set down as the free author and agent hereof: and that both to Abner and the people it is thrice called his League. In answer to which promise of indemnity or the like, we find that when the League is set down to be made from the people to David, it is ad∣ded (to denote their promise of fealty on the other side) that thou mayest raign over all that thy soul desireth. Upon which ground also,* 1.99 when Ioash is to be acknowledged King (being so young that he could not promise to the people so as to be binding) the Covenant goes in the peoples name, as their Covenant.

And this covenanting with David could not truely be supposed to im∣port any greater freedom to Israel then formerly they had under the govern∣ment

of Saul and his son; for this had been to have given David less Sove∣raignity then Saul: and to have made Israel more free then Iudah. Which (if so) makes against the whole drift of the argument: namely that Princes have their power by Paction from their subjects, when the example proves rather he thereby loseth it: and so comes at last to confess that Kings have all Civil power by God given as of right to their office, and that as Gods Vicegerent, he may grant, by Oath and promise, to his subjects such ex∣emptions and immunities as he shall think good: not derogating from his honor, or disabling him in his publike trust. Which promises, when they come to be publikely and solemnly made, as at Coronations or the like, are usually taken for Pactions: and the subjects thought givers, even in what they are but receivers.

But this matter of Covenanting between King and people, will be best conceived, as to the intention thereof (which as before noted was chiefly to acknowledge and confirme subjection and obedience to a new question∣able Prince) by that Covenant which Iehoida the high Priest caused to be made with young Ioash: where, at the time of his making, it is said, And all the Congregation made a Covenant with the King in the house of God,* 1.100 and, to shew what the Covenant was, it follows, He said unto them behold the Kings son shall raign as the Lord hath said of the sons of David.* 1.101 Then Iehoida appoints them particular services to do for the King: but for making any promise on the Kings part to the people, not a word there, nor no where else. Again, this covenanting in the house of God must imply their solemn Oaths of fealty and obedience: the which are expresly set down as implicitly and unconditionately given him. And the seaventh yeer Iehoida sent and fet the rulers over hundreds with the Captaines and the guards, and brought them unto him into the house of the Lord, and made a Covenant with them, and took an Oath of them in the house of the Lord,* 1.102 and shewed them the Kings son. The people here swearing, and that to a King of seven yeers old (that therefore could not be supposed to capitulate with them,) and their doing it in the house of the Lord, clearly interprets what was meant by renewing Sauls kingdom before the Lord in Gilgall, and of Davids covenantings for∣merly mentioned: namely, by Oaths solemnly taken, to establish obedience to a new race more strongly in the people: and not to crave their authority for impowring his Office.

In like manner are we to understand, 2 Chron. 23.16. where it is said, And Iehoida made a Covenant between him and between all the people, and between the King: that is, he promised obedience to the King, both in his own and the peoples behalf, that they should be the Lords people: and walk as obedient children to his Minister. Which last words do denote to us, that it was the custome of those people, at these conventions to make pro∣mise of obedience to God also: the state of Theocrity still continuing, whilst God had a Prophet amongst them. Which will yet be more likely to be the sense thereof, if we compare it with a paralel text and expression used at the making of Solomon King. Where David, as Gods chief Minister, commands the people to make their acknowledgement to God (as here the chief Priest doth in the Kings minority) saying, Now bless the Lord your God, after which it follows, And all the Congregation blessed the Lord God of their fathers, and bowed down their heads and worshipped the Lord and the King.* 1.103 In which words we must not think the King is idolatrously joyned with God in matter

of Divine worship, but as having obedience promised to him also, after they had promised it to God. From which we may also infer, that this cove∣nanting was no more needful to Kingly power, then it was to make gods: But since upon these solemn occasions they were to be assembled to make ac∣knowledgement of these his deputies, it was fit the Author and Fountain of all should be acknowledged in the first place.

Nay this young Joash, though (as other Kings) said to be made by the people, yet was it not to be understood as if his right had depended on their consent. For he was to raign as in right of inheritance from his father Da∣vid: who had also all his right and authority from God: and the people had no more rightful power to reject those individual persons, then they had power to refuse the keeping of Gods other commands; for all power (as heretofore noted) must come from above: that is from God to Kings, and from God or Kings to people: and not from inferiors to superiors. For none can, as from themselves alone, make others more powerful then themselves, more then they can make themselves other, or more then them∣selves.

And when God himself is often mentioned in holy writ as covenanting with people, he is never to be understood as if done for increasing his au∣thority by this means: but, whether he express the return of general obedi∣ence to his laws (which thereupon come to be called Covenant also) or not, he is in both respects so far from acknowledging any derivative power from them to accrew by their consents, that, on the other side, what they re∣ceive is of free-grace and goodness from him. For though this obedi∣ence, as due for the receit of more extraordinary and remarkable favors, come to claim a greater willingness, as carrying a token of more high obli∣gation (through such expressions of goodness) to certain people and persons, yet (as God) he had right to the same obedience and measure of gratitude, from those and all other his creatures: and must be presumed, as herein only applying himself to help our backwardness in this due return, by this repeti∣tion of extraordinary mercies. For however it be in peoples power to be more or less willing in obedience and gratitude, yet the duty thereof can ne∣ver cease: nor the duty of willingness herein neither: whether God be more particularly beneficient or no. Even so (in measure) it is with Kings, and parents also: who cannot be in any thing empowered from below, but must also, in the expressions of such Covenants and leagues, nor to be thought as equal Pactors. But so far as they, and those under them, can be according to their relations mutual Covenanters, it can be in no wise understood of such things as were formally constitutive of them in these relations: as for the inferior to give power of government, or the superior to give the other power of obedience. For this had been to have supposed them to have been before stated towards each other in a contrary respect: as the superior to have been an inferior, and the inferior a superior: and that they were now but ex∣changers. It is indeed many times practised, for superiors to promise pro∣tection, justice, and such like things as are proper for them that have power, and for inferiors (on the other side) to promise fidelity, obedience, and the like. And these things have their use: because they both, as voluntary agents, might be by this means reciprocally the better minded of the dis∣charge of their mutual obligations. But since the same things had been due from each to other; had they not been expressed, they cannot therefore be

reasonably thought constitutive of that separate power and vertue whereby the relatives act.

Hereupon as Gods particular benefits promised unto men are sometimes called Covenants, so mens solemn promises of obedience to God are called Covenants also: but whether we vow to him, or he promiseth to us, yet, as long as there is not at the same time any mutual express consent of both parties for acceptance of conditions, I see not how they can properly be counted stipu∣lations or Pactions; in any sense to be applied to the intended purpose. Nor do I also know how to admit the like phrase of what passeth between Prince and people: where the conditions or breach are not set down; but are onely implicite promises: and that commonly but on one side.

And if we look to Scripture phrase, we shall finde Covenant and promise to import the same thing: as in that promise to Noah of not drowning the world any more: God calls it making his covenant (not onely) with Noah and his seed,* 1.104 but with fowl, cattel, and every beast of the earth. Here the name of Covenant is seven times mentioned: sure it could not import any stipulation: for we find nothing expresly required back from them: nor could irrational creatures be capable of bargaining in this kind. And as the Rain∣bow was a sign of this Covenant or general promise, so was circumcision a sign of that particular Covenant or promise to Abraham, for performance in due time of the promised land and promised seed: they were not stipula∣tions; as if the parties were equal: or as if God wanted, or men had some∣thing in their powers, which otherwise then by voluntary bargains could not be granted.

So that whether Gods gracious promises to men, or mens promises of o∣bedience to God come to be stiled Covenants, It is not to be thought that God and man can come to such terms of equality as thus to stipulate: or as though God must entreat first: And therefore both are never promising re∣ciprocally at the same time. But however that these Covenants or promises of obedience from us served not to estate God in a right of power over us, yet they have great availe to minde us (under this notion) more strictly of our duty and obedience to him: as also have these signes of Unction, co∣ronation, &c, towards the settling our obedience to Princes.

All which (well considered) may instruct us what to think of those con∣discending phrases used by David and others in Scripture, when they would by this adulatory means win their subjects, or some eminent persons amongst them to some extraordinary performance: as when the Arke is to be brought back, or the revolted Israelites to be won to obedience by Ab∣ner or Amasa. In which, and such like cases, when subjects have by force taken upon them to be more powerful then they should, it is no wonder that Princes must, as in discretion, be forced to appear so much less then they ought. But yet, even in this condition, they can (for all that) be no more truely said to derive the power of their office from Paction, although they should in those cases pact with their subjects, then the father or master can be said ••o derive their authorities from those of their houshold. For these, for the like ends, may likewise entreat where they might rightfully com∣mand: even in case they should be by stubborn or Rebellious children or servants awed, or kept in durance: and so forced, for their release or security sake, or for fear of their running from them and betraying them, to use the fairest speeches they can, and also to make such promises as the other will

demand. For in these cases, the power of their offices being indivisible, and so they having the same right from God to all as any, this forceable depri∣vation can yeild to subjects, sons, or servants, no higher propriety in what they thus bereave them of, then the robber hath to what he takes from the owner: who may have as good reason as subjects, children, or servants, to say hereupon, that he gave the owner what is left; even because he took not all away, aswell as the other.

And therefore, the name of Paction cannot be proper where all the thing promised or mentioned is onely in the rightful power of one, and where none is superior to that one, as in cases between God and man. And there∣fore is God said to swear by himself as having none greater. For he,* 1.105 as superior to all both in power and concern, is both judge and party: so far, that ••e hath not onely power to judge of his own performance, because none above him, or knowing thereof but himself, but also of the obedience and wil∣lingness of people, because he is the onely supreme judge thereof too; though not as Covenanter, yet as God. So that when Saul, David, Abra∣ham, Samuel, &c. have been in our sense deprived of those promises that seem made to them and their seed for ever, we are herein to consider, that as God could not give away his power more then deny himself, so not cease to be judge of his own meaning in making the Covenant, or of theirs or his performance. Even so also (in proportion) it befalleth Kings: who, ha∣ving none but God above them, they cannot be obliged by Paction from their people; farther then either conscience and sense of honor shall lead: and as God in his attestations is said to swear by himself as having none greater, so is their Royall words the highest assurance that subjects can have. And there∣fore, though Kings as promisers and Covenanters be hound as men, yet, as Kings, they have onely power on earth to be Judges of their own or the peo∣ples performance. For though Kings extreamly differ from God in degree of superioriry, yet (as superiors) they have both the same reason for exercise thereof. And (on the behalf of both of them) it must seem a thing aswell unreasonable as ungrateful, for inferiors and receivers to make the good deeds of those above them in power and office, to serve as a means of their depriva∣tion.

Nor can that Paction but be invallid, where superior and inferior treating, as such should, Covenant to destroy those relations, whilst they yet pretend thereby to estate and settle them. So if a man in his wooing, promise the wife freedom of restraint or command other then what shall be to her liking, or to have power to execute or manage her own or the affairs of the family inde∣pendent of him, this, though it might induce her marriage or putting her self into his power, yet, it cannot take away any power necessarily belonging to his office for the good and quiet of the family: but rather, as the promise shew∣ed an extraordinary affection towards her, it should the more obliege her to obedience.

Nor can she, or children, or servants, have any freedom against him, but what a power superior to him allows: For so far as law restrains his arbitrary power, and doth (for instance) design in what cases joyntures, portions, and degrees of servitude shall rest in compact with him, this must be derived from power of a superior, and not from a power below, and in themselves. For they being appellants to law and a higher power, shew they can have no power above him; and that this superior power, and not themselves alone

can restrain him. No more can after Pactions between Prince and people, given by his free grant and promise, or forced by their rebellions, prevaile more to the disinvesting him of any just power, then the after indulgent pro∣mises to wife, children, or servants for non-restraint, can deprive the Master of what power is by law left him, and useful in the execution of his office: because as their power is given from above, so can it be onely restrained from above.

The Master cannot give away the power that makes the office and yet continue the office: nor they assume power beyond the degree of children and servants, and yet continue such. For when wife, children, or servants, refuse any command of the Master, they do it not as they stand in these rela∣lations to him, but as they are joynt subjects to a command superior: and so this is not liberty from his power, otherwise then as thraldome to ano∣thers.

So when Princes command any thing contrary to Gods law, the subjects suspension to do it is not to disobey him, but to obey God: unto whom both stand subject: who, if he shall own and protect them therein, they are so far discharged of their obedience, otherwise not.

Whereupon, in all capitulations between Prince and people, the case will have great difference from that wherein wives or servants (before they are such) do stand considered as Pactors with their husbands or masters: be∣cause these alwayes have a present immediate superior to them both; namely the Prince or his Magistrate: unto whom they joyntly relating as Subjects, have a ready means for decision of any differences that shall arise between them about breach of Articles, if they had not the Law it self. Else their sti∣pulations would prove but the ready disturbers of that peace and charity which they intended to establish: even by adding those new occasions of quarrels that should arise to them hereabouts, to those formerly incident to them as men. Even as we finde, that amongst such as do not acknowledge God to have any present magistrate settled here above themselves to decide differences and demand obedience, the like continual breaches daily to arise about the meaning of his Laws.

But it will plainly appear that this plot of paction was but of late times de∣vised by sons of Beliall (or such as would not be under restraint) to serve their own ends, and not truths, if we consider that we finde not any one urging for the Jews right in chosing and impowering of their Judges. And all be∣cause men, being not now under the authority of such temporary officers, are not so careful to devise wayes and maxims for taking to themselves power to set them up, and make their restrictions by. But that which is the truth herein is, that since it is never urged that the Jews did challenge a right of setting up these lesser powers, it proves that their meaning is mistaken by those that think they had right to set up the greater. For if they could not set over them Moses, Joshua, and the rest, why should they have power to confer the office of Kingship? If they could not, or did not make Moses King of Jesurun, how came they to have right to make David?

And therefore, to sum up all, kingly office being by Divine institution, the power necessary for execution thereof is not by Paction from inferi∣ors, but by gift from God above. When Princes upon occasion promise the imparting of any power to magistrates or others of his people, this, as coming

from a rightful superior, is on them bestowed as of grace and gift; and not any way arguing, that the power remaining is from Inferiors to Superiors by capitulation.

For though those Monarchical Judges and High-Priests that ruled while Kings came, had not so much power as Kings, yet because they were straight∣ned from above onely (by Gods continuing King upon great and extraor∣dinary occasions) that Government was a Monarchy: no otherwise then those still continue Families, where Laws of superiors streighten the power of the Master most: by taking the cognizance and judgement of those un∣der him, as in the relation of Subjects.

Therefore when Government (as in neither of these cases) is not strait∣ned by power from below, it continues right Government; because nothing of subjection is remitted. For that power the Father exerciseth not, the Prince doth: and what the Prince doth not, nor cannot, is done by God: who is onely above him. And again, although the governeds obedience be to more then one, (as touching their general subjection) yet since in each particular command they have but one determinate Commander, and have but one in chief to appeal to, their Government is still right and Monar∣chical.

CHAP. XI. Of Magistrates, Councellors, &c.

AS we have hitherto declared the necessity of Government, and confined it to one person, so it must be supposed, that so great a charge cannot be managed by any single man without the assistance of others. Where∣upon, these assistants being in many thing the immediate executioners of power and commands, in, and upon the Subjects, it comes many times to pass that the original of power is forgotten, and the very right of Sove∣raignty it self usurped by, and imputed to these subordinate Ministers. This chiefly appears in those useful Ministers in each Kingdom, to wit, Councel∣lors and Magistrates; by whose help the single eys and hands of the Prince do receive information and execution elsewhere; and are thereby enabled to contrive and act what other ways in his proper person he could not.

The which inconvenience is not so incident to the Master of the Family: be∣cause in his less charge, he is able personally to look into his affairs, & to direct according to occasion himself: and so needs but seldom to ask Counsel, or to appoint standing Laws or Officers for execution therein. For Magistrates are but the executioners of Laws, and Laws are but the Processions of Councel, and Councel again, is but the result of particulars debated: we shall therefore speak of it in the first place, as the gound to the rest.

The excellency of man above other Creatures, and of one man above a∣nother, is in Wisdom, Discourse, Reason, Councel, &c. which is imployed

either in aiming at the best ends, or chusing the best means for attaining them: either in the knowledge and discovery of good and bad, or in knowledge of prosecution or avoidance thereof. Mans end we said (before) to be plea∣sure: which being of different sorts and degrees, according to the supply of the object, and capacity of the receiver; it will produce two differences of pleasure: that is, the difference in degree, vigor, and reality of fruition; and difference of the time of its lasting and continuance. The knowledge of the first of these belongs to each sensitive Agent, even as it is such: the other must depend upon Discourse: as must also the difficulties and expediences in attaining it. In all these things, if we consider men in Nature, that is, sepa∣rate and unsubordinate, they will depend upon his own Sense and Reason: but as he stands in relation or subjection to others, it must have measure and approbation from them accordingly.

Wherefore now, being to consider men as linked in society, where private good is to give place to general, and the judgement of what is general be∣longs to those that have general trust, the discourse both of the lastingness of the possession, and the way to acquire it, must belong to others also. Nay, as the Prince hath charge of all in general, so hath he over each one in par∣ticular: and as fewer persons are not to be pleasured to the harm of more, so is no one, or many, to harm themselves unavoidably. Therefore if the whole people, deceived with a false appearance of things (occasioned by their own weakness, or through fraudulent disguise of others) should request any thing which he foresaw would not be pleasant in possession, or would be overvalued in consequential inconveniences, he may justly deny. For it is his part, as to seek the subjects continual pleasure and good, so to avoid and divert what may produce their harm and affliction.

And the same we may say of single persons, or few: which if they shal choose to act without experience, and deceive themselves in the true estimation of pleasure, though herein they think they cross not others, yet, they are to be by him debarred: as having the charge of each ones good. For the same reason that forbids the pleasure of few to the damage of more, in regard of the equal relations they all have to him as subjects, forbids his permission in harming any one solitarily considered in the same relation. And as, when subjects are comparatively considered, the pleasure of more is to be preferred to that of few, and the harme of more to be diverted to that of few (in things equally prejudicial and unavoidable) so the pleasure or harm of all, many, or one, is, in the absence of such comparison and modification, to be absolutely granted or denyed.

So that then, all that Subjects (as such) can have implicite trust to be judges of, is, in the vigor and reality of the pleasure of what they desire: and this each one can have but for himself neither. For if it be of a pleasurable object which he hath not tried, he may over or under conceit it: as also, he is less able to judge or apprehend what will be the fruition of another there∣in.

Therefore now, to come to application, the good of the whole Kingdom being the object Councel, and the good of the whole arising from that of particulars, the first enquiry must be what truely are those several desires and aims of the subjects? The next must be, whether they have not deceived themselves, as to the valuing of their fruitions, or to the consequents atten∣ding them? And then, whether the possession or means of attaining them?

be feasible and lawful: that is to say, unprejudicial to others. All these things have their degrees of comparison to make them capable of choice or refu∣sal, according to the general maxims of a less evil to be endured before a greater, and a greater good to be chosen before a less: else, if many subjects, in a kinde of wantonness: should desire a pleasure which would highly and necessarily prejudice a fewer number, it is not to be granted: for that the Prince having equal interest and relation, the more in number would be the less in value: as would be the death or ruine of one Subject, to satisfie the an∣ger or avarice of many. In this case therefore, the rule of comparison still stands true; the less evil of displeasing many: to be preferred to the greater evil of undoing few: & these things depend on particulars, which are infinite.

As these considerations may give us light to judge of things debated in those more general Councels which are called Parliaments, where the desires and grievances of particular Subjects go upward, and are by degrees colle∣cted and represented unto the Prince, the general and common sense of good and bad, to the end suitable accommodations and remedies may be granted, so when this common Sensory and Judge of good and bad, gathering ground from hence, or by information elsewhere gotten, shall act downwards by those Magistrates neerest him, and, according to the fitness of any thing to be done or avoided, make any Edict or Law to that purpose, these com∣parative values must be acknowledged the prime guide of what is to be done both ways: and thereupon, that none but he hath power to admit and con∣clude of debates.

And this, because if any Councel have power to admit and receive what they like, and to make what conclusions thereupon they like too, what shall hinder them of absolute Soveraignty? For implicitly to follow Councel, is all one as to follow Command. And therefore, this peremptoriness of Councel being proper onely to such as have the highest power, because it is to be supposed the guide to power, it is the reason why Christ takes it as an honorable and powerful name to be called wonderful Councellor. And in the Scripture sense, My son I counsel thee, is the same as if it should have been said, My son I command thee: all of them shewing, that such as are under subjection in things that are commanded, must be under subjection for that counsel also whereupon those commands are grounded: or else it will be to be really superior, and to be under but in shew onely.

For if the Prince, like an ordinary Subject, must submit his Will to the gui∣dance of a superior understanding, he is himself a Subject: and if you take away his negative voice, you take away his Soveraignty. Which thing you also do, when you deprive him of his rightful power either to chose publick Councellors, or to admit of things Councelable; and to limit proceedings in debates. For as no man can command in what he is not himself free, or with Justice demand Obedience from another, to what he hath not yet ap∣proved as just in himself: so ought Princes to have their Understandings and Consciences satisfied and free in themselves, before they should impose on their subjects.

Therefore, I should think that those which meet in Parliaments to repre∣sent the desires of such and such particular places and people, can neither of right assemble without leave, from the Prince, whose Authority can onely make them a publike and lawful Convention, nor Debate or Councel reme∣dies further then they have leave and direction from him too: or else, they

shall become both Parties and Judges. Because, in these expedients, the whole Kingdom, or a greater part then themselves and those they stand for, coming many times to be involved, their private interest and judgement must in reason and duty submit to that which is impartial and common. Nay if the Prince should give them leave to Debate and Vote, and they, by joyning many private interests, should, by a kinde of confederacy, make a joint claim to the effecting any thing to the ruine of a few, all were yet free for the Prince, out of his common and impartial relation to them all, to approve or deny, as shall stand most valuable by generality or neerness of concern, ac∣cording to the rules before spoken of.

But when persons representing particular places, shall so far be suffered to proceed in Debates of remedies, as to come to Vote, conclude, and councel what is to be done, and have for their so doing no Authority but what was issuing from themselves; there can be nothing more destructive to the good government of a Kingdom then it, for it quite subverts the whole frame of Monarchy; and runs that nation into the mischiefs of Anarchy, whose absurdities have been formerly spoken off. And this is none other then if a single induction, or else some single appetite or affection, should of it self, and by its own presure upon us, prevail to the determination or execu∣tion of any thing we do, without taking notice of that general appetite and affection in us, called Will: which, by reason it hath been founded upon the continual experience of the different concerns and issues of these lesser appe∣tites can be onely able to say which, and how far any of them should pre∣vail. For subjects are to be taken onely as competent Judges of pleasant and unpleasant: but it is the Prince his Prerogative from God, to judge of good and bad.

And again, although a negative voice of Soveraignty should be allowed to restrain execution in these debates, yet the inconvenience of the subjects discontent will necessarily follow: Inasmuch as they shall finde their desires now ackowledged fit in the resolutions of so many, and onely crossed by one: which shall never fail to be construed out of some private interest of his own, or of some neer about him.

Therefore, as these Assemblies of Parliaments are necessary, that thereby the wants and grievances of subjects may be known, so do some Kingdoms wisely order to have many of them; that is in every Province or Shire one: by which means the peoples desires might be more particularly and distinct∣ly known; and accordingly represented to the Prince in a more general Councel to be considered of. Whereupon, these Assemblies of several Pro∣vinces meeting in several places, cannot at the same time joyn in the same Vote (as out of plot) in their desires and remedies; but their several requests and opinions being referred to a superior common censure and determinati∣on, each one will conclude that their private desires were denyed or delayed out of publike regard. And then the Prince, truely knowing the general de∣sire and grievance of his subjects, may accordingly provide for them, with∣out endangering publike discontent: which is like to fall out, when people shall be pu•• in minde of any new suit by knowledge of their Representatives Votes, which they will be always thinking the most equal and just rule to fol∣low: especially while they are consonant to their own desires: And yet in truth, nothing more unreasonable. For suppose the major number wise and unprejudiced, yet when the number of dissenters are taken out of them, the

over number can be onely taken as concluding that way: who cannot avail in credit against the Prince, the representative whole. And therefore he, for that very cause, and for that general account and trust sake, he is put into, he ought in all reason to have his Conscience and judgement left free: and to be first satisfied, whether these proposals are correspondent to the Laws of God and Nature, and truely conducent to publike benefit. But partiality and in∣terest doth so commonly cloud and byass subjects in these kinde of determi∣nations, that we may observe that in those places, and those very men that do most enveigh against this negative voice in the King, as leaving too arbitra∣ry a power in him that is to rule, are all that while, assuming to themselves, that should be ruled, an indisputable power of suspention or refusal in any Law or Precept of his, in case they in their judgements finde them contrary to the rules of Religion or publike Justice. And since all the reason which private persons can give for this their denyal, is but for some particular dan∣ger and hazard to themselves, they must thereupon grant, that he that is to answer for the welfare and safeties of others ought much more to have this liberty allowed him.

But certainly, had not Scripture and Antiquity acknowledged the Prince to have an indisputable right unto a Negative voice, and to be himself so su∣preme in all Councels and Debates, as that their chief value and reputation should depend on him, and not on them, I see not how the frequent threats of giving Children, Babes, and Women to be Kings and Princes, could be taken as a true woe or malediction, but rather otherwise. For that, in such places where their Kings were restrained from personal medling by such dis∣ability, it must follow that the Councellors proceeding with greater free∣dom in the deliberations and conclusions, they shall proportionably also cause the happiness of that State or Kingdom to encrease: by that encrease of un∣controlable Authority they shall by this means have.

By all which we may finde, that it is so far from being Tyranny or Op∣pression, that it is true prudence and duty in Princes, as to admit of no Coun∣cels or Councellors of whose sufficiency and integrity themselves are not sa∣tisfied, so never to grant them general and arbitrary power to conclude or vote: thereby to have their sense of things published till they shall be his too. For as it is distastful to do things without Councel, so much more a∣gainst it. And it will be prudence in him too, by no means to add their Au∣thority to his acts, or very seldom to do it: because it will in time eat out his power by its growing reputation, or cause Rebellion when he shall with∣draw.

And again the Nature of the thing it self will require this superintenden∣cy, for nothing more incident to Councels then partiality and siding, accor∣ding to interest, either of bribes, kindred, or friendship in debates that con∣cern parties and affairs in the same Kingdom: Or if it concern other King∣doms or States, there is nothing more usual then to have them Pensioners to forraigners. All which the Prince is in reason free from. For as he hath alike interest to all within his own Kingdom, so can he not have an equal wish to the welfare of himself and another Prince: which the Councellors may have, through ambition, bribery, or revenge to him or others: as Ahitophel and Abner, and other examples do declare.

Again, as in all other meetings of equals, Councels cannot be without fa∣ction: where some one mans reputation wins many after him, like flocks of

sheep, which way he shall encline. In which case, I see not how poling and numbring of the persons voting, can justly estimate right and wrong, or the result of the Councel either: for that these cannot be reckoned in the num∣ber of Counsellors to the Prince, but as servants to others.

Add to this, that usual height of arrogance which men ordinarily take to themselves in presumption of their abilities in this kinde; insomuch as truth is not so much desired, as victory. All which Passions, as they shall come to be by the Prince discovered, it were strange if an odds of two or three in a number, should be thought sufficient to conclude against the stronger in∣tegrity and Reason that shall appear to him to be in a less number of persons: as though the whole number of any Councel could be for Wisdom and Honesty equal, or that these things must ever follow the greater number. But, in these last discourses, I would not be again understood as teaching Princes in this place what to do, otherwise then may serve to let subjects know what they are to obey.

Now concerning Magistrates, and the reasons both for institution and limitation of their Offices, it may well appear out of what hath been hitherto spoken of Councellors. For as the one being chosen or admit∣ted to be helpers to the Prince in the farther information of his Under∣standing, are not thereupon to be so far consultative or deliberative as by their peremptoriness therein to overthrow and exclude that very end for which they were ordained, even so also Magistrates, being by him chosen or admitted as helpers to his Will in the better execution of what shall be by him decreed and appointed are not thereupon to proceed upon their own Decrees without leave of him that authorized them. Else it may happen, that Councellors determining as in their own rights, and Magistrates acting so too, they should (as too often it cometh to pass) thrust out and seclude that Soveraignty that set them up, and en∣gross it to themselves.

So that we may call the Magistrate a publike Officer appointed and autho∣rized by his Superior power for the oversight and execution of so much of his authority as he shall command and entrust unto him. From whence, the Ma∣gistrates may be apprehended to be of divers sorts; according to the nature of those trusts which that superior power shall commit unto them. For as he shall delegate them as chief Judges and disposers of things, either in Ecclesiastical, Civil, or Martial affairs, so may they come to differ in denominations, as Bishops, Judges, Commissioners, Ambassadors, and such like.

But, as, by the words appointed and authorised, he must be presumed under the Soveraign (especially when he is present) so, by the word over∣sight, he must be taken as of absolute power in his absence: or else his deputation and power is useless. And therefore when some are say∣ing Magistrates are bound to the Laws, so as to rule according to them; this is true, as far as concerns their trust and charge received from those above them, But as for such as are to be ruled by them, they must be (in the Soveraigns stead) absolutely above them: and the whole interpretation and enforcement of the Law must depend on them also.

So that from hence it will appear, that none but God Almighty is

an absolute Soveraign: because Princes, being by him intrusted with Divine and Natural Laws, are but as Magistrates under him. For when he shall immediately appear in any thing, by voice from himself, or by extraordinary direction from some Prophet, (which for our belief he at∣tests by miracle) their power is to cease; upon the same reason that the power of their own Magistrates ceases, or alters when themselves appear, or give to others more late or extraordinary Commission under their hands and seals.

But although it be true, that, in respect of God above, they be but Magistrates, yet the usual calling them Magistrates, as thereby making them but of equal rank and power with others, hath bred the fame mis∣apprehension to abate their just power, as the calling Subjects People, hath prevailed towards the belief of the encrease of theirs. For as Magi∣strates and people are republike compellations, which, subsisting by, and aiming at equality, do by their expressions signifie as much, so Prince and subjects are onely proper in a Kingdom, where greater disparity is the foundation thereof. But, while the King hath the title of supreme Magistrate given him, as importing his more large power from God, he is still in his true seat of power: for while he is such, he must in all Gods Laws, and where God presides not himself, be obeyed as in his stead: as that Statute and setled Officer for execution of his will according to all Laws already received. But if God send any Ambassador, or Com∣missioner, or Prophet, or Apostle, with an extraordinary message of his pleasure (as before shewed) then is he to be obeyed upon our knowledge thereof: as having neerer instructions from the fountain of power. For as it would be unreasonable for the Axe to boast it self against him that heweth therewith,. &c. In like manner would it also be,* 1.106 if Magi∣strates made by Princes should arrogate against them.

But now, as for such who doe acknowledge it unreasonable for the Magistrate or subordinate Officer to resist or rise up against that power that gave it Essence to be such, and would yet countenance disobedi∣ence against Princes, by affirming Magistrates and Officers in their King∣domes to be in some Employments and cases so far from being Subor∣dinate, and his Magistrates, that they may, as having power therein from God, both refuse his commands, and also subject him to the obedi∣ence of their own Authorities and Offices, they should doe well to con∣sider that God can have but one supreme Magistrate, namely, the King: and that all others can have power but as sent of him.* 1.107 They should consider that God hath made him Keeper of both Tables, so as to preside over us in all things, as well of Religious as Civill cognisance. In which re∣spects, we can no more divide him in his entire Trust and delegation in these things, then we can divide the author of these Trusts in his sole Power there∣in also.

Now it might be demanded of these men, That since these Magi∣strates and intrusted Officers had their places from the Prince onely, and since without Commission and power from him they could not have had Power in any thing outwardly to be exercised, more then other ordinary Subjects, how should it therefore come to pass that by vertue of a Deputation to serve, and be subordinately assisting unto him, they can claim right and power to be unsubjected, and in any thing above

him? But we shall here somewhat examine the usuall ground of this stubbornness: which is by distinguishing (at their pleasures) Religious and Civil duties, one from another, and then making men obliged to obedience in the first sort to Gods precepts onely; with this farther supposition, that themselves, or such are they fancy are to be obeyed as his Magistrates therein. And they then stint the Princes power to be onely exercised in what they refuse, and shall call Civil matters: of which distinction of duties we shall speak more fully anon.

In the mean time, because the conceit of Magistrates distinct and unsubordinate power, hath arisen from belief of this distinction of duties, we are to consider in brief, that being now Christians, we can∣not at our private pleasures renounce and take off that general relation, and say that in such and such particulars we act as natural men, in such as civil men, and in such onely as Christians: but since now, all un∣righteousness is sin,* 1.108 and a sin against God too, even to the degree of an idle word; so hath God united the high trust and oversight of all these things to this his onely supreme Magistrate: And this in so neer a tye of obedience, as where he is not divided in himself, that is to say, differenced from us in Religion (but is a Christian as well as we) there we cannot more divide from his Authority in our Christian obedience, then we can in our Civil: without dividing Christ that gave him this Office, and separating him likewise from his right of Kingship over us: and so affirm that we are to obey Kings as Gods deputies in the State, but not as Christs in the Church.

For albeit in some Assemblies of Christian Subjects, where persons in holy Orders do more particularly appear and preside, (as being an Assembly by the Prince constituted for more neer examination and stating what in the Scripture is more particularly contayned, or what is more expresly tending to Gods Worship and Service) Princes may be thought thereupon secluded, yet since they are still Christians Sub∣jects as others, and have (as we said) their whole Assembly and their particular powers therein authorized from the same head that other As∣semblies have, we may conclude that each Kingdom is as well such a Church as such a Kingdom: And as Christ is head of the Church, and King of Kings too, so is each King, under him, head of both also: and, while he continues a Christian Magistrate, he must be always so obeyed and acknowledged.

And although, where the Prince or Supreme Magistrate is no Christi∣an (as in the infancie of Christianity it fared) the saying is useful of gi∣ving to Caesar the things that are Caesars, and to God the things that are Gods,* 1.109 and of obeying God rather then man: because, in that case, the Magistrate not undertaking to be Gods or Christs Vicegerent at all, (so as to promote their honor and worship, but it may be the contrary) it were strange to give him the power of the Church which he will not own, but rather refuseth. Therefore he refusing to act as a Christian Magistrate in matters of Divine Precept, we must have recourse to Gods command our selves: or to such representation as any Assembly of the Church at that time can have. But where the supreme Magistrate is a Christian, there, as in all his relations, he is supreme to the rest of his Subjects, so is he in all his commands to be obeyed as a Christian Magistrate.

For if that rule of giving to Caesar, &c. be taken litterally and expresly, so as to exclude Kings (as Kings) from being Gods Ministers and Magi∣strates in Church matters, it must again exclude God from medling in se∣cular affairs or matters of the Commonwealth: doing thereby not so much wrong to Kings, as to God himself. For since without a Magistrate nothing can be done in the Law-makers absence, all Laws of Religion must then re∣main arbitrary and useless: and God would (by consequent) be as well thrust out of religious power, as directly hereby excluded out of the Civil.

So that, when that, or the Precept of obeying God rather then man is to be taken of direct use and force, it must be when Subjects stand subject∣ed as aforesaid: or else (as we said) in the case of new express command from God or Christ himself received: who, as the higher power, must then be obeyed; as in that particular case wherein this sentence was spoken may appear. For Christ having himself particularly and expresly said to his Apostles, Go teach all Nations,* 1.110 for them to have obeyed Magistrates forbid∣ding them to teach any more in his Name, had been expresly to have obeyed man rather then God: and to have put them in danger of Woe if they preach not. Even as, on the other side, to hearken to such Precepts as come to be invented and pressed by private men, contrary to the sense of Gods publike Minister, and without express revelation therein from God (which he is evi∣dently to prove) is, as done against Gods command, to obey man rather then God also. And this, not onely, whether the doers be private persons, or else subordinate Magistrates. For all power being in the King, and they deriving theirs as sent of him, as they cannot claim obedience from others but by Authority from him, so they must, as private persons in respect of him, give obedience to him, by whose power (under God) they had this their jurisdiction.

CHAP. XII. Of the Right of Dominion.

HAving hitherto spoken of the duty of subjection, and particularly to Kings, it will farther be necessary to say something in designation of the persons: that so the stubborn may be without excuse, and the Consciencious have direction and satisfaction (as far as may be) what to follow.

We must now again therefore consider, that as mans obligation of Praise and Thanks to God above other Creatures, arose from his different receit of things beneficial and pleasurable, so the use of these things standing necessa∣ry, some way for possession of them stood necessary also: else, while God had been so bountiful in giving, we might yet lose the benefit of enjoying them. For mankinde to make good his content against the molestation of other Creatures is not hard; because of his great skill and ability above them: but then, how to enjoy them from the disturbance of one another, we have no other way then that natural one, common to them also: which is by the decision of force; or by that other way, proper almost to man, which is by craft. For if such decision were not, but that every one, as having a like appetite and equal natural right, should have equal force also, one man would be a continual hinderance to another: which now, by the decision of victory, or the fear thereof, comes to be possessed by all: that is, by the victor first, and by the weaker afterwards.

When two beasts have their prey or love the same, if the issue of their contest were as equal as their right, their enjoyment would be none: And therefore, the same Law that gives them right to the thing, gives them also right in remove of opposition. But then again, as they want discourse so far as to make them provident for the future, so, having secured themselves of their present enjoyments, when that is over, the fear of dispossession is over also. But man, having as well his future as present wants in his care, by the same reasons that he provides for the one, he may likewise do it for the other: and as then (like them) I use means not to be disturbed in what I presently did, even so also (beyond them) I should take care not to be disturbed hereafter. Whereupon, we may gather that propriety of com∣mand and propriety of possession arose from the same root. For beasts, that looked onely at present possession of things, looked no farther also then security against present disturbance. But men, that aim at continual possession, must also provide against future inconvenience, and may, by the same reason that beasts beat or scare away one another now, so subject those that are in their present power, that they be not able to do the like for the future. So that then, propriety is but continued possession: and possession but present Propriety. And force is but present Government: as Govern∣ment is but continued force.

As beasts and men differ thus in continuance of their power over one ano∣ther, so also in managery thereof. For when one beast hath been victorious

over another, he hath not onely disabled him against future opposition, by fear, but as many others also as were present, at least such as held them∣selves weaker then that which they saw subdued. For they, having not abili∣ty so far to discourse as to engage others to their assistance (to the end that what cannot singly may be joyntly mastered) therefore, present and future subjection is to them the same. But because men can both watch advantages, whereby they may be singly able to recover, and can contrive association, in case they cannot, it remains reasonable for the present possessor, if he sees his fear of any thing in these kinds to be just (while the persons are or may be gotten into his power) to provide for his security: and that not only against single persons, but against associations also; as of more danger. Which sub∣jection and government comes, by continuance, to establish as great a right over mens personal liberties and actions, as continuance of possession doth in other proprieties: for it is founded thereupon.

To remedy which inconveniencies amongst mankinde, we shall find the positive and statute right of dominion in the elder brother to be declared up∣on the first mention of propriety: even to avoid those continual contests for mastery amongst brethren, which else the natural trial of right by meer force after the example of other creatures might continually endanger: and so makes mans propriety, by its uncertain issue, to be on the one side more coveted through hope, and on the other side never possessed through fear. For so we find the birthright given to Cain, presently upon the mention of his and Abels several callings and interests. And so much may easily be conceived to be implyed under those very names of theirs, given them at that time by their parents, which knew how to do it most properly: Cain signifying possession or inheritance, whereas Abel signified vanity or empti∣ness. And although they could not as yet, and during the life of their fa∣ther, have absolute proprieties, yet the nature of their several imploy∣ments may seem to foreshew the same thing: the elder being hereby put in∣to a neerer possession of the soile; and so made as it were a Landlord unto the other.

That this unction or donation of the power of dominion in the definite office of father of the family, or elder brother (which was to succeed there∣therein) was both institutive and also grounded upon the former natural right, appears by that speech which Jacob useth to Reuben while he is bles∣sing his sons. Reuben thou art my first born, my might, and the beginning of my strength: the excellency of dignity, and the excellency of power.* 1.111 By all which phrases it may appear, that although God did, for the general good and peace of men, determine the right of dominion on the elder (because one must have it) yet is natural right preserved all that may be: in that he was of all other to be presumed the strongest and ablest, for the reasons a∣foresaid.

So that the foregoing discourse is but to shew how government in general stands pointed out by nature, left alone to her self: and how that it is Mo∣narchical in particular amongst men, even as among other creatures. For they, for the time they obey, it is ever to one in chief: and we may observe, that amongst them, there is no such thing as a parity in command: but, by continued subordination, they are one under another, in the same heard and circuit of power, from the highest to the lowest. From whence it may ap∣pear, this government of one amongst men was but the dictate of nature also: and that it is aswell against natural practise as reason, either for

many equally to command many, or many equally to obey many.

Notwithstanding which, we do not therefore affirm that this way before spoken of was the onely rise to government at first; for we elsewhere shewed, that God, by establishing obedience first to parents, and then, for succession, to primogeniture, he left men in so settled a condition for mutual peace and agreement, as the blessing thereof could not have been lost, unless forfeited by rebellion and Anarchical confusion.

But when these rules shall be broken and interrupted, and the Laws of God for obedience to this present lawful Prince so far slighted as by force to subvert the government, and, for the present, to bring our selves into such confusion as what or who to obey is uncertain, then onely (I suppose) enquiry is to be made, what direction for well settled obedience can follow this disorder.

In which case, as men must be first presumed to have forsaken the command of God and King, and all that hath power above them, so being now to be supposed to have no other then the guide of nature and self-inte∣rest to follow, it might be by some thought that what was before shewed as allowable in nature in the dealings of each man towards other, in order to self-defence and security, should be warrantable to each faction during their contest: as supposing them to be as so many single men, united by their distinct interests.

Whereupon they might argue that as each one is by nature or reason directed and warranted to secure it self to the utmost against fear, and the quantity of that fear, and the security thereupon to be taken, being left to his judgement also, it will follow that any faction may herein proceed, even to the death or other overthrow of its opposers and enemies; if in its judgement his own preservation so require. For in doing otherwise, and out of pitty onely sparing, it would be to transgress the Law of Nature and Reason, and to prefer the sence of anothers preservation before its own. Therefore each party being diversly affected, and so looking upon each other as enemies, they must consequently be each of them intent to provide for their own securities: and whether they put it to the issue of war or not, the weaker is necessarily at the discretion of the stronger: even so, that what of liberty or property is remaining, he is bound in grati∣tude to the other, as of a free gift.

But in this case there is great disparity: for the single man had a separate will and understanding by nature implanted for his own guide and security even as all other natural agents: but we cannot say that nature hath so uni∣ted a multitude of any sort: nor can we pick out any example amongst crea∣tures, where, by joynt understanding and will, multitudes did command multitudes: nor can they so do with any colour of right, otherwise then as they are now Monarchical, and under one man: or were made an indepen∣dent community by their Prince.

And therefore I should rather think, that the most rational course that in this case can be taken to recover their former happiness and peace (I am sure that most Religious and conscientious it is) that they return to the same form of government and obedience under which they formerly enjoyed them. For although it might seem (for the present) tollerable, for each faction to stand upon tearms of safety and defence against the other, yet since the destruction of their former government must be acknowledged unlaw∣ful,

they are to consider that till they return to that form again they are in no true political way, but do altogether depend upon the natural way of continual force. And that, though for the present what they do as men, and in order to their securities might be allowable, yet looking on them∣selves as Christians, they must make what hast they can to be settled in the onely commended and right form again: as knowing their present actions have no ground in true Religion. For though it might be, in meer nature, allowable for their whole body (supposed as one man as aforesaid) to impose on the other, yet since they can never be truely one in interest whilst not act∣ing by one mans command, it will still fall out that several parties of them will impose too: then which nothing more unreasonable.

No nor unjust: it being plain partiality thus to prosecute the designs and interest of one party to the overthrow of another. For although self-love be natural and just, as heretofore noted, in which regard any one man on either side might warrantably act his designs to the prejudice of any one on the other, yet since none of the particular parties can have an entire interest, it must therefore follow, that in acting all the other interests of the rest of the faction to the overthrow of others equally his neighbor, he is partial and un∣just: having in nature no warrant to love one man better then another. This injustice being onely avoided in that party that adheres to a Monarch or Prince, and so joyning with him in his entire interest and claim, do all of them act but as one person. Whereas else, that different degree of love, or hatred, or interest, which each person on the one side bears to each one on the other, must make them unequal and unjust prosecuters.

So that although in case of self-defence against an unlawful invasion, or in some cases of acquisition and gain, it may be for the present allowable for men in this sort to unite and act without a joynt supreme authority, especially where it cannot for the present be had, yet in case of government, wherein a constant and settled way of managery of this common security and stock of riches is required, the case will be otherwise. For in the first condition, each one may be supposed firmly and uniformly united, and equally acting his own interest both in relation to self-defence and gain, even because each one seeking these things in the highest measure he can, doth thereupon e∣qually consider each one on the opposing side as an enemy to himself; nor doth look on those of his fellows but as equally his friends. Whereas, on the other side, when places of honor and command (tending to common security or the common revenew and stock of a Nation) come to be di∣vided or assertained amongst the subjects themselves in these cases, there be∣ing a differing enmity and competition necessarily to arise about the distribu∣tion and managery of these offices and proprieties between party and party in the same association, it cannot be avoided but that the unequal ambition and covetousness, residing in the several persons must make them (without a common united head) unequal and unjust guides and distributors of those things wherein they must constantly have such partial and unequal re∣spect to one another. Therefore, I conclude that true natural reason or justice no more warrants them to continue and exercise this kinde of authori∣ty in shew of a lawful government, then Scripture and nature warranted them in remove of their old. So that now, out of a conscientious prudence, they should have a fellow feeling of each others sufferings: and not continue perpetual judges over such as they can have no jurisdiction upon.

They are not now to think they have right to continue this their present tyranny over their fellows. For none other it is, when government is exer∣cised by any persons or orders of men but such as have by their offices power from God: which since these cannot have, as heretofore noted, It is not their specious and formal way of proceeding can make their actings to the prejudices of others just; more then can the actings by other robbers do the like. For as he that takes a purse by force upon the high way, is as cul∣pable as he that steals it, and as theeves that shall come so armed and ac∣companied as to beat off Guards and Watch, are as much robbers as others, so is it not publication of the act, which can but denote their present power, that can make Democratick censures lawful: more then if thieves, before they kill or spoil a man, should first hold a formal court of judicature amongst themselves, and there sentence him. For, in neither case, it takes off the guilt or illegallity of the fact, where parties become judges over their equals: but aggravates it rather, through imprudence and impunity.

And therefore, although what was before alledged in justification of the dealings of one faction towards another, might be allowable as in order to self-defence, and for security of the invaded party against the others force as beforesaid, yet can it not establish them in a right to continue doing wrong to others, for it was onely allowable as a course that should have prevented it. It is also to be understood, that in Christian policy, it is onely practi∣cable in the absence of Monarchy: as a temporary way to safety: and that neither numbers nor prescription, can ever make it a lawful government. For if there be a Monarch, then is that party that obeys and acts in his name not to be called a faction but subjects: and those that appose them oppose him, and are Rebells.

In which case, prevalence of number or power, nor all the specious pre∣tences of leaglity, can no more make attempts against their fellows lawful, then can the like pretences warrant any association of the servants of a family to attempt the like against such of their fellows as are put into office and au∣thority by their Master. For, in that case, the loyal and faithful subjects and servants while their Prince or Master continue in their offices, and while they pursue their quarrel, and stand up against their enemies, are to be presumed as lawfully acting: because acting by an authority from God derived. And unto them, being so united in the interest and cause of one supreme person, is the dealing of one party against another warrantable and allowable. For they, in pursuance of the loyal quarrel or their own safeties, may deal with the other as lawful enemies: but the other party cannot do so towards them: for that they not onely want a supreme joynt authority amongst themselves, whereby to difference subjects from enemies, but do also still oppose him they have, in opposing their fellow subjects that take his part.

Whereupon it will follow, that in case the revolted party have over∣thrown the other, they are now to count all their actions unlawful farther then they can derive them from an officer authorized by God Almighty; who is onely superior to them both. In conscience whereof, when they shall return to their old form again under one head, nature and policy come to be satisfied in all their claims. For first, the subdued faction or party will by this means be freed from the partiallity of dominion under so many professed adversaries, and have one indifferent Judge to them both: and so it must be reckoned as done with their consents. Then, the prevailing faction must be

supposed to do it willingly; as it is likely to a common favorite, and as be∣ing singly weary of each others precessure. And then lastly, supposing him∣self willing to undertake it, there comes consent all along. And then, be∣cause as men, we cannot quite shake off the natural way of gaining power by force, we are next to consider how these prevailing factions were again pre∣vailed over by their own chief head.

In which last deed, we must remember what was formerly allowed to man, as one of his proper wayes of conquest; namely craft. For how else shall one man conquer and keep under so many; be it by money, flattery, or the like, it skilleth not. But he being now in power, as the conquering party had before taken security of others against their fears, so much more may he, being but one, and having so many that have natural power to hurt also, use it if he see danger. Of which securities the most usual is the force of guards for his person, after the example of the best of Kings, David himself. Which, if not done when occasion of just fear requires, the former prevailing faction may at liberty oppress the other still; and themselves also be still in danger of mutual mischief, for want of restraint from injuring one another.

And to speak truely, this is so far from force, that there is but this way to make known the strength or desires of a people, and to know whether they have any, or no. For as their strength and desires must be known by such as appear therein, and not by polling the whole, so the strength and desires of these appearers, must, in what they act, be taken for the deed of all. And as when an Army of one country conquers another, although they be far the less number, and not elected by the people, yet we usually phrase it that such a Nation have overcome such a Nation; even so, things properly concern∣ing action being to be measured by the active part onely, it follows that what is done by the active and prevailing parts of the people, must be reckoned the act of the whole people: especially if the other do acquiess, or else they can have no action attributed to them at all. And upon no other ground then extraordinary eminence and appearance, are the actions of Princes made the actions of the whole people. For as all vertue gathers strength by union, so are the fewer united herein, to be reckoned to have both the vertue and appearance of the whole.

For, in this regard, it fareth with those associations made by the more active people of any place or country, as it doth with those more active and pressing affections and passions whereby every particular man is provoked unto acti∣on: to wit, that as the will in each person could never be brought to any de∣terminate design and execution, if those differing passions and affections, which are in every single man naturally abiding, should be severally and con∣tinually pressing upon him with equal importunity and vigor; so neither, could any nation or people be brought to any attempt at all, or conceived to be such or such a dictinst company of men, united and associated in a Com∣monwealth, did not the sence of honor, popularity, ambition, covetousness, or the like, finde so great and continual a prevalence in some, as to unite and pro∣voke them to publike undertakings: whilst the rest, again, being of a more dull and fearful temper, are content to sit still and enioy with quietness their present fortunes, or to move onely in the condition of followers to that party that promiseth greatest advantage and security. And as thus, the more vigo∣rous and appearing party of any nation or people is to carry with it the repu∣tation of the whole people, so also, is the more eminent and active person of

each faction and party to carry with him the reputation thereof also, as having as much more courage then the rest, as they had above others of the Nation. Even as, when in any man there is such a prevalent compliance and associa∣tion of several vertuous inclinations and affections as to make him to be deemed just, honest, valiant, temperate, or the like, yet, the merit and force thereof can never be equally ascribed to those several considerations and af∣fections by which these vertuous acts or habits were performed or acquired, but the same is still, eminently and chiefly to be applyed to the prevalence of some one more natural inclination of that particular party: as to sense of honor, conscience, reputation, frugallity, &c. which in each of those acts did most from strongly operate.

And now comes policy to its perfection: other governments without a King, looking like a Pyramis without a vertical point. For the people, diffusedly considered, and contradistinguished, are of no force or availe to others or themselves: but serve onely for the foundation. When they associate, they make some appearance above ground. As the heads of facti∣ons grew fewer and fewer, so the work riseth in beauty: till it come to its vertical point of unity.

But then, though government is founded on force, yet it is not so often on inbred force as foraign. For albeit, dominions have usually natural bounds, as seas, rivers, mountains, &c. or artificial, as walls, forts, &c. to keep them from mutual invasion, yet since (as to the generality of mankind) these are but particular associations for self-ends, it is also warrantable for any of these foraigners, as hope of gain or fear of damage shall direct (if divine law or particular contract hinder not) to use such force, and to take such caution of others, as shall serve for their content and security. And as this is most usu∣al, so more reasonable then the other. For first here was no precedent common government over them both, to whose decision they stood bound. Then, there is seldom such enmity as in homebred factions: whereby the prosecution comes to be more milde from the victor, and more tollerable in the vanquished: both for that, and also because the insolence of fellow sub∣jects seems usually more heavy then of strangers. Then again, homebred factions divide unity already settled: but this makes unity, by joyning two dominions.

So then there is no remedy, but that in all matters of civil subjection and interest, we are to submit to that politick governor we are born under: though we had no more hand in the choice of him then of our own fathers: yet, as to a person of more general concern, by duty and interest we stand much more bound to his authority. And as we have nothing, but the credit of our mother to assure us our right father, so nothing but the ordinary rule of providence to set up our right King: & therefore, possession doth as strongly binde us to our reputed Prince, as reputed father. For as Christ was obedient to his parents in all things, though he knew his father was not indeed so, so (like him) we must be to our present Prince; although a foraginer, and having no right but conquest: it being indeed the onely rule of providence in this kinde: suc∣cession depending thereon, and election having been never general and free; but onely sometimes made semblance of, for flattery and engagement of the people. And the same we may say of their expulsion also: it being usually done on a suddain, and not upon deliberate and full consent, but only by a prevailing party or faction.

And yet, all Kings conquering and governing by fear, must be supposed the voluntary head of his own party whereby he prevails and rules, which (it is probable) is as great as any that elects or deposeth Kings. And as general willingness is not necessary to make the entrance into government lawful; so neither is continued general willingness more necessary to make the exercise lawful in general, then is particular willingness to obey him in every particular: for that general willingness must arise from particulars, and these may vary according to occasion.

And if any yet think strange that force onely should have been at first the usual distinguisher of this property and right, as thinking that by Gods particular Precepts peaceable division might have been made, they are to consider that after the time that God was more immediately conversant a∣mongst men in the disposal of their worldly affairs and government, (at which time the Lord at first divided the earth amongst the Nations) he is not in his recess, to be again expected as apparently and immediately intermed∣ling, in rectifying those confusions which our stubbornness and rebellions have brought. And this, both for the reasons heretofore mentioned for this recess from government, and also because, if God should have immedi∣ately appeared in sharing proprieties, how should his Justice and more true knowledge of our differing deserts have been able, through each ones cove∣tousness and pride, to have past to our liking? Whereas now, we may com∣plain of fortune or our own weakness, but not of his partiality. And yet, we must not imagine him as an idle spectator. For though governments, by the appearing uncertainty of victory and conquest, seem thus cast into the lap of Fortune, yet the disposition is Gods. And he it is, that as surely sets up Kings now, as he did Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Darius, and others of old. And Conquest, or fear thereof, (the usual ways for disposing Kingdoms) he by his Providence as particularly now disposes, as of that lot which the Children of Israel cast at their formal election of Saul.

For as we formerly mentioned, that the positive right of Dominion in the elder brother was at first grafted upon the natural stock of force, as suppo∣sing him ordinarily most able, so we are now to consider, that the right of Dominion being transferred again to the elective primogeniture of kingship, which is not amongst Christians openly by God determined to any line or person under the Gospel, as formerly to Saul and David, it must therefore fall out, that it is to be determined the secret way of divine Election and Providence, manifested by the common and meer natural rule of force and strength of body: which must now make known and decide that personal or lyneal right unto this Office amongst men, which is by divine Providence appointed. And it must therewithal follow, that the person so gaining pos∣session, is to have rightful claim unto all those Prerogatives which conquest can afford: being not otherwise to be limited then by the Laws of God, his own Conscience, and sense of honor. For as the decision of right and Ju∣stice between two contending subjects depends (as to them) on the deter∣mination of the Prince, so is the right and Justice of Dominion, between two contending Princes, to depend (as to manifestation thereof to subjects) on the determination of the Lord of hosts, manifested by victory.

The which, undoubtedly, in order to humane preservation and establish∣ment of the peace of kingdoms, may satisfie the Consciences of Subjects so

far, as to claim a just right to their submission and obedience: however the Conquerer himself, cannot farther expect peace in his own Conscience, nor a blessing to himself or posterity from God, then as he hath been just and Consciencious in his Claim and Conquest. It faring in this case, with sub∣jects in general, towards their Prince, as with the Tenants of any particu∣lar Landlord. For as these are to pay their Rents and Acknowledgements to him that by the present Judiciary power is put into possession, without be∣ing bound to examine whether he be a deseisor or not; or did by bribery, or other fraud thrust out the former owner; even so, subjects, being to pay their Obedience and Acknowledgements to their Prince, as Gods Minister, must likewise acknowledge him for such, whom they finde by the usual way of Providence put into possession. And further also, as the Tenant hath no avoidance against encrease of Rent or Service at the Will of his present Lord, but by leaving his Land and quitting his Tenancy; even so, is each subject lyable to such encrease of Taxes and personal duties, as his present Prince shall impose, whilst he is remaining within his Territories and Pro∣tection.

And as natural Reason will thus finde cause to submit to Gods rule of Pro∣vidence now used for the establishment of the person of the conquering King, so will the same reason lead them to suffer it to descend to his heir: left they should again subject themselves to new Civil wars; which is ever incident to Elective Monarchies. And therefore this ought to be avoided by the observation of the Law of Primogeniture, in these Offices now suc∣ceeding in paternal right of power; upon the same consideration that this fixed Law of birth-right was instituted: namely to avoid the like diffenti∣on and quarrel in succession to the heirship of the Family, while this power was formerly seated in the natural Father thereof.

Nay this right of inheritance not onely follows in Reason, but as graffed also and comprised in the right of meer natural possession. For as the elder brother (as aforesaid) was to be presumed most natural heir to the Fathers Dominion in regard of his more probable degree of strength, so also it is to be presumed that, as being born, he will have advantage of the natural way of right, which is first seisure. Upon which score, if there were no Pre∣cepts for hereditary Monarchy, natural Right, as well as Reason, would set∣tle it in the possessors issue, and particularly on the elder brother, as heir to his Fathers acquisitions. The which rule we shall finde approved by Saint Paul: and upon the like words as God gave Cain the power of Eldership, he confirms this right to the man over the woman: saying, Adam was first for∣med,* 1.112 and then Eve.

Upon which grounds, the lawfulness to Elect Monarchs, or institute Po∣liarchies will be taken away: inasmuch as the Office and Possession of King∣ship in right of the Father and elder Brother, having first Seisure before any other, it must follow, that none can have just right but God against him or his heir.

And if the beginnings and first rises of Kings be examined, towards the proof of settlement by Conquest, they will come so far short of deriving themselves from Adam in a natural line, as it will appear how their Ancestors, from a small stock, have by success and encrease of force, risen to that pre∣sent height. And even by this scale of Providence did David himself climbe; although God had determined him the kingdom: That is, first by

some magnanimous act to gain reputation, and thereby some few friends and followers to assist upon occasion: with these to encrease by degrees, till he become so formidable, that people had rather submit to his Government, then adventure their lives in opposition. In which case, their power of E∣lection is not so large as to choose him or not, or him or another, but whether they will take him on such terms as he proposeth, or put lives, liberties, and all to the hazard of war. In which condition, since fear was their guide, how are people more free before Election then afterwards: when Princes, for fear of punishment, are obeyed in then Governments and com∣mands?

And why should not fear be a wiser Passion then love? For they that are governed in their choice by love, consult not of dangers or inconveni∣ences that may happen; for this fear is against the nature of love: and ther∣fore the loved hath always power over the loving, and not on the contrary. And none do so usually curb the people, as those that through flattery of the noise of liberty have gotten to be their darlings; and so come to have sole trust and power: at which time, discretion bids him hold the streight reins of power upon their wavering affections, lest, by another, using his policy, he should be again supplanted. When as, all Princes entrances which are made through fear, are made with as great deliberation and policy as may be; at least with as much as the adverse Faction hath present power to use. And it is probable, that he that findes himself afterwards thus streightned, through the peoples fearing him in his entrance, will, as in order to his own honor and release of fear, seek as far as he may to gain their love. And the truth is, Princes cannot well rule without both: the great difficulty resting, when to use one, when another.

And if any Prince should be by people elected into a Government heredi∣tary, out of particular love and affection to his person, yet, since his person and those Electors could not always have it alike, or were sure (at least) to have sufficient degree of power and respect, there might be occasion for him (but much more for his successor) to have power and force in readiness to make use of, if reason should offer. For as there might be reasons of mu∣tual trust between the first Prince and people, so of distrust in the other: be∣cause nothing is more giddy or uncertain then popular liking. So that, al∣though the present Prince his vertues were equal, or alike, to the others at first setled by them, yet they being not the same people, or having changed their mindes, it is not reason he should be so much their enemy, as not by force to keep them from forcible alteration, and injuring themselves by Civil war.

And as for such Princes as come in by Conquest, I see not why force in the continuance should not be as lawful as in acquisition: more necessary to him (I am sure) it is; at least to have it in readiness. And this, not onely in respect of custody (answerable to that common rational maxim, that all things are best preserved by the same means they were acquired) but also in respect of recovery: inasmuch as, Government and Soveraignty never con∣tinuing at the same just height, it must at last come to nothing; without some active and able Prince set himself again upon an equal recovery of those Prerogatives which his predecessors have lost: which necessarily causing the subjects aversion, as judging it a new Conquest, he must first be Master of a good force, or else look to be quite overthrown. And if we consider all

Governments and Governors in their stories, we shall finde nothing so re∣markable as this their variation in power; and the different carriages of se∣veral Princes in their designs and ways of acquiring, losing, or recovering it. And both reasonable and necessary it must be, that as the Prince hath his Civil Magistrates for government of Properties, and his Ecclesiastical for guide of religious duties, so must he upon occasion have his Military Of∣ficers for Government of the subjects persons: or else in case of resistance, the other Governments will fall to nothing.

But now, having only hitherto determined obedience to the present Prince, without differencing whether he be an usurper or not, it will be expected as necessary that I give my opinion what prescription of time is requisite to constitute a ••ight in the peoples obedience. Truely I know not what time to set, amidst such variety of circumstances as may make difference: but be∣lieve, if there be equal competition of Title, present Obedience is due to the present higher power: and, without doubt, if any Prince have now made his Laws generally obeyed, taken oaths of his subjects, and they have ser∣ved him in the field, he is their true Soveraign against all others.

But although I suppose these three ways of confirmation will establish a right to any Prince, yet I conclude not that all are necessary at once. For the last of them may not come to be used in a long time after his entrance: and both it and the next, it may be practised but by few of his subjects. Yet, till he have been acknowledged in the seat of Justice, I know not how he can be acknowledged as setled in the Throne of his Kingdom.

As for Subjects that have deposed or thrust out their King, to make them∣selves Free-States (as they call them) they can never have right against him and his heirs: because his Property cannot be altered but by new possession. For, the former Soveraignty of one being not to be possessed by many, that Property cannot be lost to that line for present right, or, in defailance thereof to any other for future right; to be established by possession also: Because he comes to be as rightly estated herein, as in any other of Gods blessings that are now let loose without proprietor or owner.

Now the reasons why these things do fully estate a right to persons for Go∣vernment, is, because they contain all the tokens that the subjects (as sub∣jects) can give of their joynt consents and willingness: and if such a thing as Paction must be implyed between Prince and people, whereby each may stand reciprocally obliged (as on Soveraignty voluntarily assumed, and sub∣jection voluntarily undergone) it must be herein, how the Prince his assump∣tion of the Soveraignty appears voluntary, needs no proof beyond his search thereafter: and to have subjection to the person of any Prince known to be voluntary, there is no proof beyond fact it self: that is, their voluntary con∣tinuance under it, and submission thereunto. For if he continue to live un∣der his Laws and Government, and might yet depart, he cleerly evinceth his choice and approbation thereof. If he have taken an oath of obedience and fealty unto him, he stands obliged in Conscience also: for an unlawful oath he was not to take, and a lawful one he must keep.

But above all, if he have not onely acknowledged his willingness by obe∣dience, but by activity also, so as to have fought for him, he must be more expresly presumed as approving him. For though he may be pressed to war, yet the continuance therein for any time, as under his Government also, be∣ing necessarily to afford many opportunities of departure, the not doing it,

maketh the submission and approbation voluntary: I mean, as to general ap∣probation of him and his right. For that, as no Government, as Govern∣ment, can be without constraint; so many particulars of obedience must be unpleasant.

And however strange it may seem, that there should be in humane appea∣rance no other right then that of Force and Conquest unto the estating the first person of each Kingly race, yet if we will diligently observe the predicti∣ons of the New Testament pointing at the government of the Church, we shall finde them still declaratory as to the same effect. One of which we will explain in this place: setting this very thing forth in most open terms: and that shall be the speech of our Saviour made to the Jewish multitude, concerning the Government of the Kingdom of Heaven, or the Church. For these his Auditors, having heard the message sent from John to him, demanding an answer whether our Saviour were he that should come,* 1.113 or that they should look for another; and being ready to expect a temporal kingdom to be presently undertaken by our Saviour, it caused him (after the decla∣ration of Johns office to be the Elias to this Messiah) to give them satisfaction why it was inconvenient for him personally to undertaken. And this he doth, upon the ground of the different manner of the entrance and possessi∣on of Government under the Gospel, over it was under the Law. For un∣der the Law, as there was both a rule for peaceable entry (the persons be∣ing by God appointed that were to have the Crown setled on their race) so was there both Priests and Prophets who had a part of Monarchical jurisdi∣ction in some things allowed them: thereby also keeping Monarchical pow∣er from that absoluteness it should arrive at after the days of John. In whom the Law and the Prophets ceasing (meaning amongst other things) that separate power of Priestly and Prophetick jurisdiction, so far as they shared in the Soveraignty) it is the reason why our Saviour frames an answer which did both imply this difference, and shew the reason why himself could not take this charge upon him.

So that we may conceive, that that limitation until now, was added onely to give the Jews satisfaction why he then undertook not this charge himself:* 1.114 namely, that it was contrary to his minde and quiet way of demeanor a∣mongst them, to enter into a charge wherein so great force and violence must be used, both to acquire and possess: and not as determining that this forcea∣ble way of entry should then cease. For if we shall compare it with the pa∣ralel Text of Saint Luke; where Gods own inward Kingdom in our hearts is spoken of, we may interpret the expressions here of violent entry and pos∣session of the outward Government in the Church, to be prophetick also. For it being there said, that the Kingdom of God is preached,* 1.115 and every man presseth into it: we cannot conceive it of any present pressing into the Church; but as spoken of what should follow in the Churches encrease and splendor: at which time there should follow the most frequent use of violence for posse∣ssing of Christian Kingship also.

And that, by this Kingdom of God in this place spoken of, is intended Gods own inward immediate rule he should have in our hearts, & was diffe∣rent from that outward exercise of outward jurisdiction which he should give to others in his Church (called there the Kingdom of Heaven) appears plainly in the occasion of delivery therof. Because it was spoken to convince them, that,* 1.116 by reason of their own covetous humors, had derided our Savior for saying,

No man can serve two masters; but went about to justifie themselves before men, by shews of legal or moral righteousness: and could not yet well con∣ceive how God should judge men according to their hearts: such that could not believe that the single eye and light of love, was the fullfilling of the Law: even of every tittle thereof: for the letter thereof was to last till John; and after that time, Gods Kingdom to be preached. That is, men were to be won thereunto by the milde and still voice of the Gospel: whereas his outward Kingdom over mens persons, was to be acquired and managed by the help of natural Reason and force; together with such divine light as God should furnish the Prince with. For although, as the God of Nature and great preserver of men, he do by the rule of Reason, and by Precepts and Examples of Scripture, plainly determine obedience and Monarchical Government (as heretofore shewed), yet doth he reserve to himself (as Lord of hosts) the secret approbation and disposal of those particular persons and Families that shal from time to time rule amongst us here as his deputies. And hence it is that all Kings and free Princes write themselves Dei Gratia, not Electione Populi: for although prudence may many times lead Princes to make semblance of their having, and relyance on the free consent or choice of the people; (even that they may be the more endeered towards him by this his professed acknowledgment and dependance on their favors;) yet that this election was never but by some party onely, and a thing in it self not to be relyed upon, will appear in that no Monarch, being fully possessed, was ever yet known to resign his other holds, and wholly to submit thereunto, for lawful title to be setled to him or his.

Nor looks it but with a plain face of partiality and injustice, when we al∣low the Gentry and Nobility (amongst our selves) to be derived from the Arms and Ensigns of war, and yet allow not unto Conquest it self the like force to estate Kingly right. As though the same military Art or vertue did not adorn the leader, as well as the follower: or that Viriatus were not Ver∣tus in the Chieftain, more then in the ordinary souldier. Whereupon, for∣titude being so much all other vertues, as to be the hand or instrument wher∣by they are (as to Society) made useful, and to be conveyor of them to the notice of others, it hath made the world unanimously to submit to the plain eminence of this vertue, as the steadiest rule for judging the hidden a∣boad of the rest.

But although our Savior make that additional expression of until now, the onely reason for the answering the Jews why he undertook not this King∣dom himself, yet were there many other important reasons for it besides. As first, the assumption of any such like State was not congruous to him that was in his own person so ignominiously to suffer. Then, if he had sat down in Davids right onely, as the Jews expected, he had lost right unto the Gentile Church. Then again, wanting lyneal race of his own to succeed after him, he could not have stayed but encreased the Churches division. To prevent which, should he have set down rules to any other for succession, it would have been called partiality by the persons neglected: especially in the disposition of Christian Kingdoms; where he could not, as son of David, claim power at all: and wherein, until his Gospel had been entertained, he could not expect obedience as Christ neither. In regard of which, it chief∣ly may be understood why our Saviour should so often be found saying, I came not to send peace but sword: and such like Prophesies of the necessary

following wars and contentions which should arise for the obtaining those Governments amongst men.

So that we must say, that as the Prince of each Country sits down in the natural right of strength and first possessor, and thereby in the positive right of elder brother, so doth he thereby also, silence and extinguish all right in the use of force to any other under his jurisdiction and obeysance: even be∣cause their proprieties have their separation and assurance from his. For, as we formerly noted in right of that part of his Office over his subjects, name∣ly to judge them, he was to be indisputably submitted unto in matters of le∣gality and morality, so is he in the other part also, namely for fighting their battails; and that of both sorts: as well that of publike protection, where∣by the whole Kingdoms Proprieties are defended from forraign invasion, as that of separate protection, whereby each particular subject is defended from the force of each other.

For since none of the Subjects in each Kingdom, can say of his Lands and Possessions that they were gotten by any independent force and manner of acquisition, but were both gained and held by him in the relation of a Sub∣ject, and that by such ways and courses as were by the Laws of that Country prescribed or allowed, there can be no reason why unto Subjects (as such) there should be any such absoluteness of propriety granted, nor other way of gain from one another allowed, then what the publike Laws for Com∣merce do set down. For although one Prince to another be left to the na∣tural way of force for decision of Propriety, where Religion bindes not, yet have their Subjects no right to encroach or possess the Proprieties of one another, by other way of acquisition then that of allowable com∣merce: as heretofore declared.

But, be these things as cleer and apparent in Scripture or Reason as they will, it is not to be presumed, but that those different interests which will be still arising from those daily changings of Governments and Governors, will, through that different hope of advantage to be gained by one form of Go∣vernment, or person governing, more then another, be continually prompting them with Arguments of contradiction, at such time as they shall apprehend that person in whom their hopes do lye, and whom they would have seated in the Soveraignty, to be by any of these discourses disadvantaged in his claim. In which regard large declamations are from them to be expected for taking away the right by Conquest; and for branding and enfeebling it with the odious terms of Tyranny and Usurpation: whilst others, although not so personally interessed, yet, being discontented with that share of riches or preferment which the present settlement hath allotted them, are willing to call out for the peoples right to choose; and to joyn with, and accompany them in any thing of change and alteration in the Government: in hope that, from that new shuffling of fortunes and interest which must hence arise, they shall have a better game dealt them then before: not at all regarding that general mischief and confusion which must follow hereupon.

For will they say that it is fit this power should follow publike and free ele∣ction, then, to bring any Prince this way into power, without danger of Civil war, they must first imagine that that whole Nation out of which he is to be chosen hath but one person fit for this employment; and also that that per∣son hath so publikely and equally demeaned himself in his merits and favors, that they should be always so equally known, and equally beneficial, as to en∣gage

each one in an unanimous consent and agreement in his electi∣on.

Will they (for peace-sake) put it to the Major Vote; how shall it be known, except voices and consent be taken viritim? And how shall it be done but under government; where some must be imagined with general Authority to give direction herein? In which case, how shall those in present power be thought willing to submit to the suffrages of such as have none, whether they shall continue in it or no, or have their enemies (it may be) chosen in their rooms? If the major or stronger party do elect, and by force (or fear of it) prevail against the other, then what differs this from the course before spoken of; where the conquering Faction sets up its own chief in su∣preme power? Will they say, that since Princes are to be chosen more for eminence in wisdom, then in valor and prowess, that therefore his election for fitness, is to be tryed out by force of Argument, and not by force of hands, then, what hopes in this case to have an end of the controversie; since the minor party will no more conceive it self justly overcome this way then the other? For when do we see any person yeild to another in any Argument that is to be tryed out by discourse? Whereas victory will presently decide the contest of two Combatants. Besides, what greater assurance and de∣monstration of wisdom, then those effects thereof, whereby this greatness was acquired? Unless they would have it judged by talk onely, and not by action.

For mine own part, I do not believe there hath been any more studious then my self to finde out a way how Subjects might free themselves from these kinde of inconveniences, as of Tyranny, Usurpation, &c. and yet, all that while maintain publike peace: but, when I had throughly considered all those ways of redress that in this case I could think upon, and compared their probable benefit with those more certain consequents of Civil war which would attend them, I was at last forced to reckon these chances a∣mongst those irremediable miseries which humane condition stood subject unto, and which God, as in his more secret Justice, had to himself reserved for punishment of our sins: even in this very case, making us sensible of that our original pride and insubjection to him, which had now brought us from his more immediate care and rule over us, to be thus made subject to the op∣pression of such as are in Nature our equals; and thereupon to resolve, that no way could so assuredly prevent those torrents of Civil war, which upon these pretences would be continually let in, then by making a stop at that first gap made for entrance.

For experience doth tell us, that, under pretence of the unlawfulness of the first seisure by Conquest and Usurpation, Princes of a long continued race have been opposed, and by Civil War dispossessed, as Usurpers: thereby plainly shewing, that no Government or Governor can be in security, or pub∣like peace kept up, if a discontented party may be still hearkened unto. For if we admit Usurpation a just excuse for disobedience to a present Prince, and any party or order of the Subjects to be judge thereof, there will ne∣ver want a party who will make all Conquest to be the same: inasmuch as none can usurp Regal Authority to the dispossession of another, who were not by Conquest holpen in. And if it were unlawful for the first to com∣mand and govern by that claim, then is it so to all that succeed to govern, as upon his right.

I considered that Usurpation and Tyranny were usually the expressions of Passion and Interest: many times laid without desert; and that by the few∣er in number also: for had not the greatest part thought them otherwise they could never have got in. And hence it grew, that the old Prince was over called Tyrant, and the new one Usurper, by those parties that were their ene∣mies. And whilst some, out of their interests against Monarchy would reject all Government; as denying either the ways of Conquest or Usurpation to have Lawfulness of title, there are others again, that are ready to yield to the right of Conquest made by a forraign Prince, but strongly urge against U∣surpation of a Subject: Whilst those on the side of the Usurper, say,

That all Conquest is not onely Usurpation, but with this aggravation, that thereby a forraigner makes entrance, and rules in despight of a whole Na∣tion: Whereas the other cannot come in without the assistance and con∣sent of the major part; and being a native is not so like to alter their Laws and Religion as the other:

and they are ready to give instances for it a∣mongst the Jews.

When I foresaw, that, when all was done, Subjects were (upon their remo∣val) still to run the same hazard from the next Possessor; when I foresaw that there was no other remedy against Usurpation and Tyranny, then what was certainly accompanyed with a greater evil then the disease it self, and yet, all that while, no certainty of cure, I then concluded that I could not go lower then I have done, in asserting submission to the present Prince in possession; unless I should have been false to my main design of publike peace and good.

Nay, truely, I looked upon loyalty and subjection, as the onely sure reme∣dy to defend people against usurpation: Inasmuch as none being able to dis∣possess another, already in power, but by the help of his own subjects, dis∣loyalty must precede, and be a cause of Usurpation: And therefore, if no∣thing but Civil war will remedy it, better to be loyal, then, by it, cure one Usurpation by another. And I shall ingenuously say, that could any yet in∣form me how it may be done, I shall more heartily recant and withdraw my former Tenents, then I did propose them: looking upon it as an evil in it self, onely tolerable to avoid a greater: insomuch as, if right to command should depend on general approbation there is no Prince but must come to be diso∣beyed: and in that case we shall be much troubled who there shall be to state it, and to appoint what number or quality of Subjects may be thought fit to be hearkened unto herein.

But since I cannot finde how any in the condition of a Subject stands an∣swerable for the guilt thereof, if he have been passive onely, or that he is ob∣liged to search into his Soveraigns Right, or break his Allegeance upon any jealousie of his Title (who being to rule over others besides himself, there is no appearing reason his single judgement or Conscience should bear sway against theirs), I therefore saw no lawful way of prevention or redress but what must come from God. He, he, if we will at all conceive him to be, or to be regardful of humane affairs, must with submission be lookt upon as a setter up and guider of persons and affairs of so great import, which have the good or ill of so many depending on them.

When any Prince, by force or craft, shall ascend the Throne, although the several Victories by him gained, and Plots by him laid, as also all those ways and contrivances by which they were brought to pass, be to us fully

discovered, and they do thereupon look but like things of ordinary producti∣on and hazard; what, shall we thereupon acknowledge no deity but that of Fortune? Or, that which is worse, shall we acknowledge his power and Government, and yet so far mistrust his Wisdom or Goodness, as to think he hath not done it with due respect to his own glory and our deserts? In which case, how can disobedience become us, who cannot at all be knowing of Gods intentions herein, and therefore ought with patience to expect the e∣vent? for many times, he that subjects may for the present look upon as an Usurper, may be by him that can onely search Kings hearts sent as a blessing, in the place of him that in ordinary humane judgement had a greater right thereunto.

But when I say this may so happen, it is not to grant Subjects any liberty to assist any one against their present Prince, under hopes or colour of any such blessing, or to excuse them that did so: for this were to overthrow what was said before towards publike Peace, and of submission to the present So∣veraign. That which I would have men in this case seriously to consider of, is, that if they will not admit possession to have right in those Changes, then they must conceive the Government of each Christian Nation to be for per∣petuity impropriate to one single Family by God Almighty, as that of the Jews was to the lyneage of David: so as, notwithstanding any irreligious, un∣just, or oppressive acts in them, no alteration from Heaven should be expected, either for abdication of that lyneage, or dispossession of the right heir by any other of the same Family. But if there be neither president or hope, that such an establishment hath ever anywhere been, or can reasonably be looked for, then it must fall out that all bonds of Government and Allegeance stand now dissolved upon failance of just Title, or else it is to be justly claimed by possession. For certainly, the heirs of Conquerers and Usurpers can reign by no higher right then was that of their predecessors, from whom their Title was derived; but it may be often lower, as failing of the vertue of their first founder. And I do (for my part) believe, that Caesar had a greater right to the Soveraignty of Rome then any of his poste∣rity: not because he conquered more forraign Nations, or added more to the Roman Territory then they (for that he did not) but for such like crafts and policies, whereby he purchased that his perpetual Dictatorship, and for those very Conquests he made at home: by all which he became enabled to assume (which others may interpret usurp) the Soveraignty to himself. For having hereby power to keep those his warlike Country-men at peace and A∣greement amongst themselves, and restore them to their general liberty from the Tyranny of all those factious heads, who, like true Usurpers indeed, had engrossed all liberty and power to themselves, by pretence of being Keeepers of the Liberties of the people, and were so continually ready to engage their Nation in Civil war through their own sidings: he might (I say) more truely in that case be called his Countries preserver, then where a Forraign enemy is onely resisted; by how much Civil war is more destructive and dangerous then any other; and by how much the establishment of good Government and order in our native Country, is more heroick then to do it abroad. In which respect also, Caesar may worthily have precedence in his parallel with Alexander: who on the other side quietly at home succeeded in a Monarchy already setled by his victorious Father; and his Conquests over other Nati∣ons were but victories to his own honor and benefit, and not to their encrease

of liberty, being under Monarchs before. And although Caesars victories are usually thought more honorable, as being more dangerous and difficult, yet, it is not hardness alone in the means, but goodness of the end that must compleat true honor.

In consideration of all which, as I see not how the imputation of an Usur∣per, or the like, can in Conscience make any good excuse for Subjects resist∣ance or insubjection to that present Soveraign which is now by divine Pro∣vidence set over them, and who is thereupon to be taken as the Ordinance of God; so not in prudence neither: inasmuch as their opposing or repining at him is but the likely way to make him, that was an Usurper before against the right of another, to become hereby also a Tyrant against them; as fear∣ing their insurrections. Whereas else, it is like, he will, by milde and meri∣torious usages towards them, strive to gain by vertue, what he wants in Title.

More safe therefore (no doubt) it is for subjects to acquiesce, and in this case, to testifie their obedience and submission to God, by submission to this higher power by his Providence set over them: who, as his Vicegerent, and by reason of that present Office he is by him put in, is (as it were) espoused into part of his power: and cannot from thenceforth, and whilst he continues their Soveraign, be any more charged with any personal faults and failings then a married Wife can, by those of the Family, be taxed with any former dishonest act, whereby that respect due to her as Mistress of the Family should be taken off: nay although formerly she had been but one of their own fellow servants: because this duty is not due to her as such a woman, se∣perately considered, but according to her present relation, as being such a mans Wife: and so comes to be part of that duty they owe to their Master. Nor do I believe but those that through interest and partiality would decline obedience to the present Prince, would yet, on their parts, expect his protection in case any violence should be offered. But men are led to misconceive of actions of this nature, for want of due regard how the same person stands accountable for what he doth herein, according to that different condition he stood in at the time of doing.

Whosoever shall oppose, or make insurrection against that Prince that is in present possession, and under whose protection he lives, he, and all that side with him, are, all that while, not onely guilty of the sin of rebellion be∣fore the divine Tribunal, but before that political Tribunal also, wherein this Prince doth preside. Whereas all those that do assist this their present So∣veraign, are to be counted loyal, both by Law of God and Man. But if di∣vine providence or permission, have given such success to any subject, as to de∣prive the present Prince, and to seat himself in the Regal Throne, from that time, both he, and those that took his part cease to be rebels, as to the politi∣cal Tribunal, for any thing they shall act afterwards: but both of them stand Criminals before God as for their rebellion past. And he also, so far as he is an Usurper, stands accountable, both there, and in his own Conscience, for al those injuries which are or shall be committed in his present usurpation; as wel by himself as those that obey him. Whereas they again, that were by the Laws of God and man, to be accounted loyal to the former Prince, in respect of that obedience they then gave him as their present higher power, shall be∣come now rebels to this, if, while they live under his Government and Juris∣diction, they pay not that respect and obedience which is to Soveraignty due: and they do (therein) stand accountable as Criminals, aswel before the divine Throne, as that of their present Soveraign.

To the present Soveraign (I say) this subjection must be given, if (at all) we will allow subjection as a duty to be acted, and not as a bare contempla∣tive vertue onely. For in this case, as obedience is due to the higher power, even because it is so, so must it be actually given to him that is actually seised thereof: who onely, having present power to command, and also to punish in case of refusal, must be understood to be the true object of obedience and subjection, not onely for wrath, but also for Conscience sake: ••nd whose resistance, as the resistance of the Ordinance of God, makes that party a Criminal, not onely in respect of judgement hereafter, but also in re∣spect of that present Judiciary power wherein the Prince is now seated. For this tribute of subjection must be held as legally due to that person in whose name the Laws are enforced and executed, as the payment of other tribute doth belong to that Image and Circumscription which is stampt upon the Coyn; which was enjoyned to Caesar: a stranger by birth and religion, and one that had not so much as legal title at home; and yet being acknowledged by him that had all title, it will thereupon make the duty of subjection to the present power much more apparent.

But then again, although those that now take part with the present power are to be accounted loyal in all thy do in his obeisance, whilst he continues their Soveraign, and, on the contrary, those that were formerly loyal, are now to be held for Criminals for what they act contrary to their present supre∣macy, yet are they to be lookt upon with this difference in relation to their actings past. Those that were loyal cannot justly be punished by him that succeeds, for any opposition against him before he was possessed: for that were to discourage and punish loyalty. Whereas those that took part for setting up a new power, having all that while no lawful Authority for what they did, are for all those acts legally punishable by the deposed Prince; in case he shall be restored: none but he having power to pardon what was done against his Jurisdiction onely. For certainly, as caths of Alleageance and other ties of duty, were given to Princes by Subjects, with respect, and in relation to that power they then held, even so must Subj••••••s be held Cri∣minals to that power, for all disloyal acts done while that power was up: e∣ven as they must also be criminals when they do oppose that which succeeds. And it will concern every new Prince (even in point of prudence) to be care∣ful hereof. And although he cannot, in discretion and good nature, but be exemplar in depressing and rewarding some few that have more eminently opposed or assisted him, yet generally to punish or discourage such as have been true to the former established Government, onely because they have been so, and to reward such as sided for alteration, onely because they did so, will be found of most dangerous consequence, not onely to himself, but to the publike peace also: by leaving a president for necessitous and discontent∣ed persons to attempt the like innovations for the future, upon the like incou∣ragements and hopes of reward.

Upon due regard of the necessary rendring this obedience to the present Prince, in order to duety and maintainance of publike peace, and in tender∣ness of the indemnity of Subjects for so doing, was that most gracious and beneficial Law made, by that most prudent and politick Prince of our Na∣tion Henry the seventh: enacting that none should be questioned as Tray∣tors, for any thing done in obedience to the present King. This most wise Prince had well considered how often the subjects of this Land had been pu∣nished,

even for being true Subjects, by such as, being wholly swayed by sense of self-interest and revenge, did herein deal otherwise by them, then them∣selves would in like case be dealt by. For they would not themselves have been content that their followers should, for their loyalty to them, be so used by such as should again succeed in this power: and much less would they be content, that any should withdraw their subjection from themselves, now in present power, under colour of the better Title of another. And much less yet would they have been content, if themselves had been in the condition of subjection to any Prince, and had therein been constantly loyal; that this former Prince, having now neither occasion to imploy or means to maintain them elsewhere, should ingratefully stomack and reckon as a fault, that necessary livelihood he were now forced to seek in his native Country, under the protection and obeisance of another.

He foresaw that while that way of claim by Title was pleadable amongst the Subjects themselves, that they were not onely still at a loss for want of true evidence herein, but the whole Kingdom perpetually infested with Civil war; by that disagreement that must happen thereabout: whilst Subjects might, upon this pretence, be no subjects; by withdrawing obedience from the present subjector, to whom it is naturally, apparently, and presently due, to give it to such as were now but equals in Soveraignty: and so, being not able for the present to command it as a duty, what is to them herein done, can carry no other interpretation then as acts of love, friendship, respect, or the like▪ and not of loyalty and subjection. Which duty, obliging us to actual performance, the Question is not who should be, but who is in the feat of Authority.

He foresaw, that, under colour of setling obedience by evidence of Right and Title, friendship and interest were still put into the scale, in the prefer∣ment of one person before another; to the perpetual disturbance of the Subjects by their disagreements herein. Whereas, if right to possession had still followed possession, all Civil war should be avoided: because, being then guided by a thing so apparent to each ones sense, there could be none found to oppose or disturb him whom all did obey. Wheras those that withdrew their obedience from him that was actually possessed, under colour of that right which any other had to possess, as they must thereby confess it due in respect of that office he hath right unto, so (if they should separate themselves from their own interests and passions) they must acknowledge it, by the same rule, to be for the present, due to this present possessor. Else, by a strange and unnatural contradiction, he that is actually possessed, as King, should be, at the same time, actually dispossessed, and no King; by this absurd diversion and application of obedience unto a power which is not in being.

Sense and experience of his own former condition had rightly told him, that as this belief or opinion of the right of him that is dispossessed, can, du∣ring that his private condition, claim from his former Subjects a willingness & propension only to perform actual subjection when he shall be again possessed and restored to a capacity of actual command, so, in the mean time, the a∣ctual possession of this other, must, by the same rule, claim actual subjection and obedience unto him, from all that live under his obedience and jurisdi∣ction: unless (as we said) we should make that Precept for subjection to the higher power vainly given; when such as should be subject, should have a

liberty hereby left them whether they will at any time be so or no; by ma∣king some pretence or other, that it is not rightly due to him that hath now onely power to command it.

And therefore although this Prince, like others, did wisely cause such of his Subjects as were eminent, or to be suspected, to take oaths of Allegeance and Fidelity to himself and posterity, yet, by that truely self-denying Ordi∣nance before mentioned, he may well be thought more considerative of that future establishment of publike peace and benefit, then so peevishly respe∣ctive to the setling his race alone, as, upon any turn, to involve all men in the hazard of guilt and blood: by making that oath, which was made to preserve and encourage loyalty, a continual snare and punishment to all that had been so: and to such onely, who, in Conscience and friendship, stand enclined to his side.

But now, for conclusion of this Discourse, we shall say something in answer to such scruples as may arise concerning those that are cast into that unhappy condition as to be under any of these Polarchies: be∣cause (else) it might be supposed, from what hath hitherto been spoken, or may hereafter, that I did conclude that no man could live honestly or Conscienciously but under a Monarch. It is therefore to be considered (as we have formerly hinted) that as all these Polarchies have been formerly Monarchies, so are their Laws and Constitutions, for the most part, onely such as have been before setled and Authorized by a Monarch. In which case it will fall out, that the Subject living in any imploy∣ment and Calling allowed by the former Laws, is to be concluded law∣fully authorized in his deportments: as obeying and submitting to the Ancient and right Authority still. But in all new Constitutions and Commands on him imposed by these unauthorized Guides, by which he shall be put to act any thing that may have relation beyond himself, he is, in that case, for want of warrant from Christs direct Deputy, to secure his innocence the best he may, by assuming to himself the power of judging of Morality; and to act no farther then the Conscientious rule of Do as thou wouldest be done unto shall give leave. And, in that con∣dition, is he to make use of that distiction of obedience into Active and Passive: and of obeying God rather then man. So that, by his Pa∣tience and Willingness to suffer in his own person, rather then wrong another, he shall acquit himself of the guilt of that suffering he might bring on another, through want of a justly derived power. For when it shall be any mans unhappiness, not to have Christ, by his proper De∣puty, outwardly directing him how to love his neighbour as himself, as well as, by his Spirit and Gospel, inwardly fitting him thereunto, he is then, by his Consciencious abstenance from all appearance of evil, and by his readiness to be assisting unto him in all that shall be in his power; and which according to his wants, shall be justly or reasonably demanded of him, to make up that measure of bounden good to his neighbour, which he can∣not actively undertake and perform.

In this last Chapter I have again raised up and united the former Fabrick of Monarchy, which in all those precedent, seemed to be buried in the rub∣bish of popular mistake and confusion. And as in the first Book, the foun∣dation thereof was laid on that stock of discourse which Divine Edict, and the Rules of humane Nature or reason would afford, here I have again ad∣ded, to the strengthening and establishing of the Work, such farther supply as the presidents of other meer naturall agents would readily contribute; although men (like them) should be supposed put into the world at ran∣dome, and without other direction or law then what their owne senses could frame. It seems now therefore seasonable, that for confimation of all, we should have our recourse to Religion; so called, because it is the tye of all politie and commerce; to see how all these things stand therein warranted; and are both allowed and commanded by that great Guide and preserver of Man kinde: all which, by divine assistance, the following Book shall declare.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Jambri signifi∣eth rebellious.
• * 1.2

  Gen. 3.16.
• * 1.3

  Gen. 19.37, 38.
• * 1.4

  Gen. 4.7.
• * 1.5

  Gen. 6.11.
• * 1.6

  Isa. ••.16.
• * 1.7

  Judges 17.6.
• * 1.8

  Judges 18 ••.
• * 1.9

  Prov 28 2.
• * 1.10

  Ibidem.
• * 1.11

  Prov, 28.16.
• * 1.12

  Eccles. 10.16.
• * 1.13

  Isa. 3.4.
• * 1.14

  Verse 5.
• * 1.15

  Ibidem.
• * 1.16

  Verse 6, &c:
• * 1.17

  Vers. 13, 14, 15
• * 1.18

  Luke 9.56.
• * 1.19

  Jam. 3.1.
• * 1.20

  Isa. 3.••.
• * 1.21

  Exod. 23.2.
• * 1.22

  Exod.2 14.
• * 1.23

  Numb. 12.3.
• * 1.24

  Psal. ••3.20. Verse 19.
• * 1.25

  Vers. 25.
• * 1.26

  Ners. 30, 31.
• * 1.27

  1 King.4.20.
• * 1.28

  1 King.4.25
• * 1.29

  1 King. 9.22. 2. Chron. 1.15.
• * 1.30

  1 King. 12.3.
• * 1.31

  1 King. 11.11:
• * 1.32

  2 Sam. 7.14. 1 King. 12.8.
• * 1.33

  1 King.11.35.
• * 1.34

  Job 33.18.
• * 1.35

  Prov. 17.26.
• * 1.36

  Ibidem.
• * 1.37

  Verse 24:
• * 1.38

  John 12.24.32
• * 1.39

  Rom. 11.28.
• * 1.40

  Exod. 18.19.
• * 1.41

  1 Kings 21.3.
• * 1.42

  Exod. 22.28.
• * 1.43

  Act. 20.35.
• * 1.44

  Exod. 23.11.
• * 1.45

  Lev. 25.4, 5, &c Verse 23.
• * 1.46

  1 Cor. 10.26.
• * 1.47

  Prov. 3.9.
• * 1.48

  Rom. 13:6.
• * 1.49

  Numb. 27.3.
• * 1.50

  1 King. 21.10.
• * 1.51

  Mat. 22.21.
• * 1.52

  Rom. 13.7. Ibid.
• * 1.53

  Heb. 7.9, 10. Vers. 2.
• * 1.54

  Luk. 19.31.34
• * 1.55

  Deut. 21.16, 17
• * 1.56

  Verses 28.37, 38, 39, 40, 41.
• * 1.57

  Deut.28.5.&c.
• * 1.58

  Luke 6.20, 24.
• * 1.59

  Heb.1.2.
• * 1.60

  Act.4.34, 35.
• * 1.61

  2 Sam. 12.5, 6.
• * 1.62

  Verse 7.
• * 1.63

  psalm. 51.4.
• * 1.64

  Gen. 18.19
• * 1.65

  Prov. 20.8.
• * 1.66

  Prov. 17.26.
• * 1.67

  Prov. 16.11.
• * 1.68

  Verse 10.
• * 1.69

  Prov. 20.10.
• * 1.70

  Prov. 20.8. Verse 9.
• * 1.71

  1 Sam. 3.13. 1 Sam. 8.3.
• * 1.72

  2 Sam. 19.29.
• * 1.73

  1 Sam. 8.11. &c.
• * 1.74

  Prov. 25.2, 3·
• * 1.75

  Prov. 16.10.
• * 1.76

  Prov. 1.1, 2, 3, &c.
• * 1.77

  Verse 7.
• * 1.78

  Verse 8.
• * 1.79

  1 King. 3.9.
• * 1.80

  1 Sam. 15.22.
• * 1.81

  Gen. 3.11.
• * 1.82

  James 4.11.
• * 1.83

  Prov. 17.26.
• * 1.84

  1 John 3.7.
• * 1.85

  1 Cor. 4.3, 4.
• * 1.86

  Luk. 8.14.
• * 1.87

  Gen. 8.22.
• * 1.88

  Jam. 4.17.
• * 1.89

  Gen. 49.15.
• * 1.90

  1 Chro. 12.22.
• * 1.91

  2 Sam. 3.9.
• * 1.92

  Verse 12.
• * 1.93

  Verse 21. Ibid.
• * 1.94

  Vers. 13.
• * 1.95

  Vers. 19.
• * 1.96

  2 Sam. 5.1. Chap. 19.42.
• * 1.97

  1 Chron. 12.2.
• * 1.98

  Vers. 3.
• * 1.99

  2 Sam. 3.21.
• * 1.100

  2 Chron. 23.3.
• * 1.101

  Ibid.
• * 1.102

  2 Kings 11.4.
• * 1.103

  1 Chron. 23.20
• * 1.104

  Gen. 9.10.
• * 1.105

  Heb. 3.16.
• * 1.106

  Isai. 10.15.
• * 1.107

  1 Pet.2.14.
• * 1.108

  1 Joh. 5.17. Matth. 12.36.
• * 1.109

  Matth. 22.21. Act. 5.29.
• * 1.110

  Matth. 28.19. Mark. 16.15. Act. 5.40. 1 Cor. 9.16.
• * 1.111

  Gen. 49.3.
• * 1.112

  1 Tim. 2.13.
• * 1.113

  Matth. 11.3.
• * 1.114

  Verse 12.
• * 1.115

  Luke 16.16.
• * 1.116

  Matth. 11.12.