Of government and obedience as they stand directed and determined by Scripture and reason four books / by John Hall of Richmond.

CHAP. III. Of Rebellion, and its most notable Causes and Pretences.

AS the inordinate thirst of pleasure, and its consequent (Liberty to at∣tain it) is in us all, both natural and unlimited, so, where Rules and Laws of Polity and Government (the onely means of restraint) are not strictly enjoyned or duely obeyed, it commonly falls out, that what should have been a bridle, proves rather a Spur; and the possession of one inordinate lust, doth by it self make way for another: even as the abundance of drink, to the drunkard, is the cause of greater thirst to ensue. Observe we this, First, in that lesser Government of a Family: and you shall finde Children and Servants nowhere so unquiet and discontented, as where the indulgencies of the Parent or Master do most appear. And so it is in King∣doms also: where Subjects that have soft and mild spirited Princes, and from whose more gentle and easie natures they, having already attained ma∣ny things of Liberty and Freedom, do come at last to forget how inconsi∣stent these things may be with their duty or publike peace, and to think that their very asking should now be the onely rule for his granting. Whereup∣on, as it happens that there is most brawling, contention and unquietness in such Families, so, in such Commonweals, Mutinies and Rebellions do ever abound.

And, to keep the Scripture president herein, what other Reason can be given of those many murmurrings and insurrections of the Jews: even while under the government of Moses: one so far from oppressing their li∣berty, that he was the meekest man on the earth. And when again, they had all things in such plenty as even their very Lust was supplyed with miracles:* 1.1 what followed, but that which was given for quieting them at one time, proved the occasion of their mutiny at another? For so, while he smote the rock and the water gushed out: they are still asking,* 1.2 can he give bread, can he provide flesh for his people? And when they had this flesh, this manna, it was found too light food for their satisfaction: and this very food of Angels, was insufficient to stint their boundless desires. Therefore,* 1.3 while the very meat was in their mouths,* 1.4 God was forced to cure by severity, those breaches of obedience which abused Mercy and Clemency had made.

Look again to them under their Kings, and you shall finde none so ill used as the best of them; even David, and Solomon. In the last of whose time it is expressed, Judah and all Israel was then many as the sand which is by the sea in a multitude, eating, and drinking, and making merry. And again,* 1.5 Judah and all Israel dwelt safely, every man under his own vine, and under his own fig. tree, from Dan to Beersheba all the days of Solomon.* 1.6 And in whose time, as the wisest and most peaceful of Kings, that Kingdom had the great∣est eminency and happiness of any: their persons free, as expresly said, of the children of Israel did Solomon make no bondmen: and having riches in such abundance amongst them,* 1.7 that he made silver and gold to be in Jerusa∣lem as stones, &c. And yet, as in a kinde of wantonness and surfet, they come to his son Rehoboam to ask release of this grievous yoak of Solomon his Father. But in truth, we can interpret this their coming to Sechem to no other end then to make a Covenant and association to rebel: and the pre∣tence to make Rehoboam King, was but the outside of their appearance: when they intended to unmake him. For first, Rehoboams raign was not E∣lective but in right of his Father and Grandfather, as heretofore noted: and he might as well have reigned in their stead without the peoples approba∣tion, as Ishbosheth Sauls son did over them in Davids time, or as Nadab in Jeroboams stead, over the same Israelites, without any such confirma∣tion.

So that this Assembly was indeed to settle Jeroboams new Principality, and not to confirm Rehoboams. And therefore,* 1.8 since they first sent for him to come in the head of them, whom they knew to lay claim to the Crown, this action looks purposely to aim at a quarrel, and gain a denyal; whereby to get a pretence to rebel. And was indeed the threatned punishment of Solomons offence against God, and not of Rehoboams to the people: and so suffered to be done in pursuance of that end:* 1.9 namely the punishing his of∣fence with the rod of the children of men. Whereupon this his refusing the councel of the old men,* 1.10 must be considered as a fit and necessary means there∣unto. And this may seem the reason of Rehoboams answer, importing a denial to the ground of the peoples Petition, and answering in that man∣ner, as though experience had fully told him, that since too much indulgence and concession had lost to his Father, he would recover it by rigor and seve∣rity.

But, to affirm that this Rebellion was a punishment of Rehoboams answer onely, were to give God the lye: both for the reasons already mentioned, and as plainly crossing his direct Promise to Jeroboam: saying, I will rent the Kingdom out of the hands of his son, and give it unto thee,* 1.11 even ten Tribes. Plainly arguing a forepassed fault to God, and not of oppression to the people: upon which onely Reason he is warned to desist. For of that war, what good issue could be? To have Jeroboam beaten, were to fight a∣gainst God and his purpose: and to have Rehoboam beaten, were to counte∣nance rebellion in people.

But if you look to the fruit of these Concessions in David, you will finde him the fittest instance for retaliation in both kindes: whether you respect him as a gracious Prince, or an indulgent Father: as may appear by some in∣stances formerly given. The like will all other stories do, being but confir∣mations of this Maxim, That those people that have largest Immunities and Liberties, are ever the most seditious for more: and that civil war and rebel∣lion,

doth not arise from want of Liberty and Freedom in the Subjects, but from having too much: That is, from Princes intrusting so great a portion of Soveraign power into their hands, under colour of giving them Liberty, as shall encourage and enable them to stand in open opposition and defiance against him and his remaining Authority for more: and, by degrees to de∣mand, or rather command all, if they shall think good.

For as it comes to pass with all such prodigal persons, as well Princes as others, as use or know no other way for gaining love and credit, then by wa∣sting of that whereby it should have had foundation and continuance, they in the end finde, that as (before) their estates was the cause of their Loves, so, this being now gone, the other would fail also. And therefore they should beforehand have considered, that what was the onely mean to their desire, should have been the chiefest object of their care: lest in the end they come to finde, that too great liberality unto private and undeserving beggers, makes them but publique and unpittied beggars them∣selves.

Even so, when Princes are soothed up with the specious shews of win∣ning love by condescension, and parting with the fundamental rights of So∣veraignty, to please and gain the people, they must now expect, that what directed their love to them, while they had it, will be a cause of want of love, being parted with. They must consider, that since the different love and re∣spect of Princes above others, was but in regard of their different power; whereby it also came to pass, that what was beneficially by them done, was therefore more meritorious, as less constrained; abate them then this power of doing so, or otherwise, and how shall the love and thanks to Princes differ from that of other men?

And since Government, as Government, requires the administration and execution of things according to the will of the Governors (when as the pretended government by love respects onely the desires of the loved) how can it then be government? And Princes so governing, that is, by the will of the governed, as he and they are in their wills different, so must one ne∣cessarily be the overthrow of another. Wherefore, if fear and reverence be not made use of, but Subjects always courted by loving condiscentions, Experience, as well as Reason, tells us, that his Authority will stand on fickle ground.

Nor do Princes hereby onely offend against interest, but Duty also: to wit, against that prime and incommunicable trust of power from God to them derived, to enable them to govern their subjects according to his Laws. When they, beyond their own Commission to give, or the peoples capacity to receive, shall strive to dis-invest themselves of so inherent a propriety, and by a strange and preposterous way of proceeding, endeavor to invert Na∣ture, Reason, and all kinde of Order and Rule, to their own ruine, by this setting the commanded above the Commander, and making the Subject not subject. Whereof, what other sequel can we expect, but that, as a punish∣ment justly deserved, and most adequate and congruous to such an offence, all Insurrections and Rebellions against them, from hence most natural∣ly should proceed.

So that, when it shall once come to pass, that either fear to enjoyn or com∣mand what he knows to be fit, or the hopes for countenance or assistance in what he believes otherwise, shall so far work on his resolution, as to make his

Subjects the objects of his fear and courtship, he shall finde, that what is hereby, for the present gained, will come to him at so dear a rate, as, upon the issue, to endanger and cost him his whole estate: whereas Nations under absolute Soveraigns, are, in respect of these, but seldom observed to rebel.

For as, when the childe hath once so far prevailed over his indulgent Fa∣ther, as that his wanton appetite cannot be satisfied without the enjoyment of what is offensive to others; nay, not without those very morsels and what else belongs to the necessary sustentation of the Parent (which must now be the only object and remedy of its peevishness;) it wil be found that as this too great kindness was the cause this stubbornness, so it will, at last, prove a les∣sening of respect and duty in the childe: and the childe will thereupon also, be more truely called the guide of the Father, then the Father of him. And seldom have the Concessions of Princes any other fruit then to be invitati∣ons to new demands; till at last, Subjects have so wholly freed themselves from the more milde and tolerable government of one, that, through the greedy pursuit of such natural and universal liberty as is with government it self inconsistent, they again fall into the perfect slavery of Anarchy, where every man is oppressed of his neighbour: and, instead of one, have many Ty∣rants to disturb them. The usual issue of all unhappy people, grown wanton with too much Liberty: where the commonnels, and easiness of former grants, is made the onely rule for desiring, and obtaining new Petitions: which come at length to be reckoned as acts of duty, not of grace. But to these in brief it may be answered, if they may not be denyed, why do they petiti∣on? if they may, why do they rebel? And having so far considered Rebel∣lion in its prime cause, the division of Soveraignty, we will examine it by its usual pretences, and give some answers.

In the mean time, I shall desire such as may conceive these last passed dis∣courses or others elsewhere used, to be impertiment for a Treatise where Sub∣jects, and not Princes parts are to be set forth, to consider that I intend not here to shew Kings what to do, but to shew Subjects what to obey. And if this encroachment of Subjects on the Prerogatives of Princes be well consi∣dered, it will be found no less needful to be propounded to their considerati∣tions in regard of the inconveniences thereof inticing them to Rebellion, then in regard of that proneness again which Princes do hereupon take to fall into acts of Tyranny: insomuch as all tyrannous and severe regiment may be ob∣served to have arisen, either to remove, or prevent this danger: tyranny being nothing else but soveraign revenge or severity, according to the presumpti∣on of injury past, or to be feared.

The evil of Anarchy, and benefits of Government have ever been in all mens eys so apparent, that none have been hitherto found so desperate, as di∣rectly to profess to introduce the one by destroying the other: but deceived sometimes themselves are, and always they strive to deceive others, by shew of Liberty and Freedom: either from suffering some evil, or for attaining some forbidden content.

For (say they) the more general good and con∣tent is ever to be preferred to the more particular: which is the good of the whole people to that of the Rulers. For look into Nature, she made them equal: intending no more the satisfaction of one, then another. And the very end and aim of Society it self, was primarily the good of the gover∣ned, and of the Governors but in order thereunto. That hereupon, all, or

most people subject not themselves to the arbitrary rule of the Prince, but unto the known and established Law: by which onely, according to his oath and compact, he is bound to govern. For could men (say they) be imagined to have parted with their native freedom of Will, and debar themselves of the many pleasures of life, to no other end, but hereby to advance to a state of felicity some one, or more men, unto whom they could in nothing acknowledge themselves inferior? No, since Kings and Rulers were set up, and had obedience given unto them for the onely good of the people (for of them is the whole power derived, and they may at pleasure settle what Government they please, and as they think fit to restrain or en∣large it) therefore, when they shall be found to fail of this trust, and turn their power to their peoples hurt, they might with good reason re-assume their own strength, and imploy it to the attainment of those benefits, which by the wilfulness or foolishness of the other is crossed or neglected. And if in pursuance of this course, civil war and slaughter do follow; it must be imputed to the stubbornness of them in Authority: which then must be endured as a cure to the state: when as, by a momentany suffering of some mens loss, the perpetual hazard of all mens slavery is avoided: and is no o∣ther, then like tolerating a less evil to avoid a greater. And this power of resistance (say they) must be in all limited Monarchies; else the limita∣tion is nothing: but he remains as absolute as the other.

But because these and the like propositions, have for the most part been bred and countenan∣ced by some of the Romish and Jesuited Clergy, we will (by the way) look thereunto: leaving the farther censure of their intermedling to another place: and also referring the full answer and satisfaction in other things to the ensu∣ing chapters: wherein, under the titles of Liberty, Slavery, Property, &c. shall be shewed how Faction and Rebellion have unjustly laid claim to any justification under these notion.

A great Argument, and associate of mans frailty it is, that even from our best and most holy performances, advantages to sin and impiety have been taken. Arising chiefly, from the malice of that wicked one; always ready, (if the sowing of the Wheat cannot be wholly hindred) by his Agents to cause such Tares to spring amongst, and from it, that for their very sakes, the other might have none, or at least less use and esteem. For who would else have thought, that that very height of Piety, Religion, and Devotion, that caused the first nursing Fathers of the Church, as in honor and duty to God, to bestow divers great Priviledges and Powers upon the (at that time) well-deserving Clergy, should, by a strange and inconsiderate ingratitude, prove the readiest Feathers, with which the shafts were made for their own destruction? For so we finde, when Popes became inheritors onely of the Re∣venue and Prerogative of the Church, and not at all of their predecessors devotion or humility, they first begin to seat themselves above Kings, and all that is called God: and thinking they could never bring low enough that power, whose due height they had just cause to fear would be a curb to their pride, they not onely tread on their necks themselves, but, by their Agents and Factors, they everywhere teach and authorise the Princes own Subjects to do the like.

Telling them that all civil power is originally in the people: and that from them, and their underived majesty it was, that Kings had their Soveraignties: which as they might be by them streightened as they

saw occasion, so were they to judge of his defaults in case of tyranny or oppression.

And then, reserving to themselves the power of deposing and sentencing them, in case of heresie or schism; and of defining what they were, they had poor Kings (they thought) beneath them low enough: even as far as man is beneath God: Kings being the peoples, but themselves (as jure divino) Gods Deputies.

These things seem not so to be wondred at, in a time when implicit devo∣tion and superstition had caused such general ignorance, that any thing almost would take: but, for a sort of men, undertaking to reform all errors even ac∣cording to Gods Word, and professing such great hatred to Popery, as to cast off some harmless things, onely because they think them popish; for these (I say) to contradict a thing so expresly taught in Scripture, and (on the contrary) to assert a thing onely fraudulently brought in, and by none taught but Jesuits, can have no other ground, but that they agree in common aim; the aim of ambition and insubjection. For so, as the Pope puts Kings under the people, to advance himself in his room, as in Gods stead; so do Presbyters put him under too, that themselves, in their consistories, may de∣throne, and be above him, as in Christs stead. By which means, Christ be∣ing no longer King of Kings, but King of Presbyters, we should (for ad∣vancement of our Liberties) have (besides the domineering consistories) a King and a Pope in every Parish. Concerning the sum of which Doctrine, namely that all power, and that of Kings is from God onely, we have alrea∣dy spoken: but because I finde that divers learned men, favorers to neither of these sects, but lovers of Monarchy, did yet hold by consequent the same opinions, it will not be amiss to speak something hereof: and of the in∣conveniencies & absurdities arising from that conceit of derivation of power from Paction and consent: leaving the more particular handling of the Na∣ture and reality of Paction it self to its proper place.

These, though they thought that, notwithstanding this Concession, they would still evince all active resistance to be unlawful, even because it broke a Paction (made between I know not what King and their people (and so I al∣so sometimes thought from the plausibleness of the scholly) yet, upon stricter enquiry, an error on one hand or other cannot be avoided. That is, either ac∣knowledging that this is a thing useless, and serving the people to no purpose, or else all those consequences of Rebellion will naturally flow from it.

For you admitting it the peoples right, they put you to shew where you finde that they by any Paction utterly resigned this right into the Princes hand? as you may affirm such a Paction, so they deny. And for conquest, they say it can no more take away a known right, then any other force. And if it be the peoples right, it is their right as well against him as any other. Will you suppose such a contract when they elect a King; they press you to shew it: and say, they are to be supposed as all other rational Agents, to have done it for some advantage to themselves: and consequently, as trusters, may de∣mand accompt from the trusted, and make redresses also: else they have a dry right without a remedy. Therefore they appeal to these Pactions also, and say, That as they are tyed by Oaths of Alleagiance, so is the Prince by oath tyed to observance of the Law: and that, if he break his Oath, theirs is fallen of consequence: and then the power and trust re∣turns. If it happen they onely swear, and that to implicite obedience, they then say it is a force: and so invalid to binde any, since (as grant∣ed by you) all power is founded on the Will. So that we may

plainly see the mischief of this Scholly, when, as to make government the more easie (as in a kinde of flattery) people are told, that although they have originally this power, yet having once devested themselves thereof, what hath been their voluntary resignation, they have not now power to recal at pleasure. But let us a little examine these grounds, and their in∣ferences.

Their first is, quisque nascitur liber, in which they must suppose that peo∣people can be like (like Mushromes) springing up all at once out of the earth; without all relations one to another: so as not onely without Princes or Ma∣gistrates, but sons without fathers, wives without husbands, servants without masters, families without heads, and people without pastors. If not so, then is the son of every father, as he expects the same protection for person and estate his father had, bound to the same obedience his father was. If they decline this power of government in the diffusive body of the people (out of the same reason, and the impossibility of its convening) and there∣upon say that the heads of families have onely power to elect and dispose; for that it is to be supposed all in their families have already resigned to them all their power: then, this neither is, nor can be done by the heads of all fa∣milies; since women, Church-men, infants, and divers people under such and such qualifications for estates come to be left out. So that, when au∣thority comes to be derived from the people, it will be (as heretofore noted) but the contrivement of some Faction; using such or such restrictive qua∣lifications, as they may not be hindred in their aims.

But this done, they have lost their first ground of free-birth: for (I hope) they will not leave children and slaves at choice for obedience: and for that obedience that wife and servants give, their Pactions express not (I suppose) any such resignation of will or power from themselves to the head of the family, as thereby to oblige them to his Pactions in the state.

Yea but (they say) none but such persons as have some share in the kingdom, as having an estate of some value shall have share of power.

To this it may be first an∣swered, how shall such a law or appointment be made generally binding, un∣less we first allow of a precedent governor amongst them to establish it? Who again, if he were settled by former Paction, how come they now to be free? If not by Paction, then is not government grounded on Paction.

But let us proceed in their way of supposition. A Master of a family of a hundred servants is but equal to him that hath but three. And again, if the Master of a hundred servants be impoverished, and not able to maintain his former rank, his affection and ability to serve his country must be supposed lost, and a single man with fourty shillings per ann. put in before him. And then again, if estate enable men to be in the number of people, and so, fit to govern, me thinks it should proportionably do it; and so, four hundred pound yeerly will make one man two hundred people: and then it will be Regina peeunia indeed. These, and the like differencing rules are good to be made and observed in Monarchies: where the Monarch himself (to the end he may know his subjects desires and grievances) doth, by his writs, give the people of such and such distinct places, ranks and qualifications power to elect, and also gives and permits the elected to have power to proceed, according to former rules of his progenitors, or new ones of his own, but can∣not at all prove derivation of power from below. For if the original power

be in the whole community, and every one have his native and equal share, how comes it to be never so used? Is it due to all Masters of families? then is it from God, and due by Office: and not by Paction from them.

And if we suppose power to arise from the Master, as Master, then will one Master, as his family is greater, have more power then ano∣ther.

Estate cannot make it, for the reasons before given. If natural force and strength make it, the stronger will have most.

If wisdome rule it, who shall decide who are wise: and in what measure it is to be stated?

Put it to age, or what you will, it will be as hard to make any certain rate thereof, or to imagine how any should freely consent to be excluded by any relation, as to agree those in the chosen relations, by stint or size of estate, yeers, wisdom, &c.

And then, when the community have not the power equal, the others have it by force, or usurpation. And therefore, all power is by Office: and to such Offices as are appointed of God: as Fathers, and Kings. They have it Jure Divino: and are restrainable therein only by those above, not by those under them.

And therefore it is a most fond supposition, that because those assemblies of Parliaments, or the like, which are made in Monarchies by such like rules of distinction, and have their acts reputed as afterwards binding, that there∣fore other inventions should do so too. For in this case they are to consider, first, that there is a superior power constituting these differencing rules, and making up (as before noted) the whole representation in himself. And then, they are to consider, that the different ends of these and the other supposed conventions, will make them extreamly differ in their force of binding. For in the Monarchical conventions men may well be convened under the esti∣mate of riches, because, being summoned to advise and determine concerning publike leavies and the Kingdoms wealth or Commonwealth, they may be thought inclusive of it all: whereas in the suppposed convention for disposing mens natural power and right to govern, none can reasonably binde ano∣ther by vote, in that where all are equal by their own supposition.

But if they (in their supposed way of conferring of power) shall exclude children and servants, and leave none but the Master power to elect, then break they their supposition of equal and native freedom, because the major part is excluded. If they have power to elect, then, being so much the grea∣ter number, I hope they will chuse such a government as shall now binde their Master and Father, and not he them.

But let us go on by way of supposition. These selected heads are met to chuse and empower a governor, and to give them all their power; that is, their power of their several families, that so he having power of all families, may consequently have power of the whole kingdom: which done, they intend (belike) to give up house-keeping. If so, he will have a great task indeed. If not, I would know whether they mean to have less power over their families then before? No (they say) they mean to govern them under him. Well, I suppose you can give this power you have over them so far as you had it, and over your self too: but then, since the power of life and death, and other things necessary for the Prince to have, you

neither had over them nor your self, how can you give what you have not?

Again, suppose the people the original of power, and farther (to make this power useful) suppose they may recal it to right themselves when they finde it abused, and that thereupon, the liberty to appeal to them must ever lye o∣pen; why then, this serves to defeat the power of their representatives, as∣wel as of Princes. For these, being set up also for the peoples good, have no farther power neither then while they act that way: the people must still retain power to hinder them from doing otherwise; and consequently, must have power to judge whether they do so or not. And then, this power must ex∣tend and exercise it self in all causes; because their good or ill must be there∣in concerned. And so, I pray how shall business go on? must the governor ask the governed their consent before he command? What is this but (as in mockery) to say to them, Do as you list or I will make you? What is this but for people to command, and Magistrates to obey?

Again, although that maxime, Salus populi suprema lex, may be good in popular governments (as shall be shewed anone) where governing and go∣verned are supposed alternative and the same (because all come to be includ∣ed) but yet, where there is difference, there the good of both, as making up the whole, must be taken into proportionable and joynt consideration; unless they can imagine that, by contract, the King should render himself purposly miserable, to make others happy by his infelicity. If so, David and others, that had promises of kingship from God by way of reward, had cer∣tainly no such benefit. And if this right and duty of resistance were so in the people as is alleaged, why, in so many thousand yeers, and in the raign of so many unjust and evil Kings as are set down in the Old and New Testament, do we never find Prophet, Apostle, or other men instructing the people in a duty of so great concern. They, if they had liked, might as easily have said fight as obey; and resist, as not resist.

As for the Kings observation of the Laws and seeking the good of the people, I believe no good Kings but will make it their imployment; and, in order to it, no discret people but must thereupon grant, that it is his part to to know and interpret what this law and good is; for if it be left to be done by any other Party or Faction, not he, but they have now the charge.

For to say they will submit in all things just and reasonable and no farther, is to appeal back to themselves; and is not submission to another: but all things are left to their private determination as before; and just and reason∣able must be but what they will esteem such. For (as before shewed) men could not make question whether reason or equity should take place or no, it was by all agreed it should: but men differing amongst themselves on which side this right was and both parties confident of their own cause, there was no possibility to avoid destraction and attain peace, but by this voluntary and joynt submission to be herein governed by others.

So that laws of equity, peace, and government, require that all parties sub∣mit to their common and appointed judge and sentence. For as each man sing∣ly becomes a man by having a proper will and understanding; even so it comes to pass, that there can arise no difference against himself, because un∣derstanding and will do in him alwayes unite. Whereas, if Thomas his will were to be guided by Iohns understand, or contrary, and either of them want will or understanding, or have them over-born by another, it were in the first

place to overthrow the personal being of men, and in the other to make it useless. For should, or could my will incline to nothing but what aforaign un∣derstanding saw good, it would then be the will of him that had, and not of him that wanted this understanding: and for want of understanding, I should want will also. Or, should I suppose there could be an understanding that could submit to that of another, this were to destroy personality by con∣founding it: and to imagine an impossibility: fancing an understanding which should be, and not to be at the same time. Therefore, when by the help of anothers understanding mine is so cleared as to see reason to consent to what it saw not before, and upon it, my will inclined to action, this as∣sent of my will is the issue of the light now apprehended in mine own under∣standing, and not as it was before in anothers. So in the body politick, to keep the essence and union thereof entire, there must be the same residence for understanding and councel (at least for the last result thereof) as is for will and execution.

And therefore, as it would argue high arogance in any single subject to presume his own judgement better then anothers, especially then his superi∣ors, so is it but the same thing from subjects, to commend that councel themselves follow, before that which their Prince follows. For since good∣ness of councel doth not move by being but by being apparent, and since this trial and apparency must depend on the ability and judgement of him that chuseth it (none being able to take good councel but he that is in mea∣sureable to give it) it must therefore be granted, that the following of a∣nothers councel after mine own choice, differs little from following mine own.

If it should be argued, that Princes may be carried away by partiallity and private interest, and so some should think that the Councel of subjects should in that regard take place, this were to beg the question upon a suppo∣sition against all apparant reason. For how can any be supposed to be so equally and universally interessed as the Prince? How will they have this liberty stinted, both for persons and causes? And who shall be superiour to see it on all hands performed? Will they allow subjects indefinitely to have power herein as they themselves shall see cause? they then invert and over∣throw government.

If these prudent considerations cannot prevaile with rational men to stop the current of rebelion, yet methinks the conscientious ties of Religion and the due observation of those Gospel duties of patience, humility, obedience, long-suffering, &c. might. Christian Subjects should consider how Princes are of Gods setting up and not theirs: so that when he that hath their hearts in his hand shall send them such an one as they deserve, and in a fatherly way shall make them his rods to punish their faults, they are not to attempt the throwing these rods into the fire themselves: but to kiss them, in acknow∣ledgement of submission: and, unless they will undertake to measure their own sins, they must leave it to the same hand to withdraw, that did impose. And to this purpose, let them well consider that place of Job, Is it fit to say to a King thou art wicked, or to Princes ye are ungodly? if not to say so,* 1.12 much less to strike Princes for equity. Nay,* 1.13 although they be such as appear to us to hate right: yet, being our King, and Gods Minister, over whom we can have no lawful jurisdiction, we cannot condemn them more then he that is most just.* 1.14 For so he must be esteemed of us; and left to God for punishment: Who shall (in his own way and time) break in pieces mighty men without number, and set others in their stead.* 1.15

Notes

• * 1.1

  Numb. 12.3.
• * 1.2

  Psal. ••3.20. Verse 19.
• * 1.3

  Vers. 25.
• * 1.4

  Ners. 30, 31.
• * 1.5

  1 King.4.20.
• * 1.6

  1 King.4.25
• * 1.7

  1 King. 9.22. 2. Chron. 1.15.
• * 1.8

  1 King. 12.3.
• * 1.9

  1 King. 11.11:
• * 1.10

  2 Sam. 7.14. 1 King. 12.8.
• * 1.11

  1 King.11.35.
• * 1.12

  Job 33.18.
• * 1.13

  Prov. 17.26.
• * 1.14

  Ibidem.
• * 1.15

  Verse 24: