Examen de ingenios, or, The tryal of wits discovering the great difference of wits among men, and what sort of learning suits best with each genius / published originally in Spanish by Doctor Juan Huartes ; and made English from the most correct edition by Mr. Bellamy.

CHAP. IX. Some Doubts and Arguments against the Doctrin of the last Chapter, with their Answers.

ONE of the Reasons why the Wisdom of Socrates has been so Celebrated even to this day, was, That after he had been pro∣nounced by the Oracle of Apollo the Wisest Man in the World, he spoke thus: This only I know, that I know nothing. All who heard or read this Saying, were of Opinion, that it was his, because Socrates was an humble Man, who despised the things of this World, and in respect of Divine things counted them nothing. But they were deceived in effect, for not one of the Antient Philosophers was endued with that Virtue of Humility, nor so much as knew what it was, till the Coming of our Lord, who taught it us.

All that Socrates intended thereby, was, the little certainty there is in Human Sciences, and how far the Knowledge of Philosophy is in whatever it pretends, from any Satisfacti∣on or Assurance; since it is found by Experi∣ence, that all is full of Doubts and Disputes; and that they cannot give their Sentiment in any one thing whatever, without fear of be∣ing Contradicted; to which purpose is that

Saying, The Thoughts of Men are full of fear, and all their foresight uncertain. But he that has the true Knowledge of things, may be settled and at ease, without Fear or Doubt of being deceived, and the Philosopher that is not so, may truly, and without the least dissimulation assert, that he knows nothing.

Galen made the same Reflection, when he said, * 1.1 Science is a sort of Knowledge, congruous, settled, and never wide of Reason: Not to be found among the Philosophers, especially when they search into the Nature of things, and yet much less in the Art of Physic; and to say all in a word, it is unknown to Men. According to this the true Knowledge of things is placed out of our reach, Man only having a kind of Opinion, which holds him wavering and in suspence, whether what he affirms be true or no. But what Galen observ'd more parti∣cularly in this, was, that Philosophy and Physic are of all Sciences in use among Men the most uncertain: And if this be true, what shall we say to the Philosophy here handled, in which the Understanding makes an Anato∣my of things, so obscure, as are the Powers and Faculties of the Rational Soul? In which Matter, so many Doubts and Difficulties of∣fer themselves, that there is nothing upon which one may safely rely or depend. One of which is, that we have given to the Un∣derstanding for an Instrument wherewith to Act, the Brain with Driness, having said

thereupon, that the reason why Men have Brains organiz'd much after the same man∣ner as Brute Beasts, was, because the Under∣standing (by which Man much excels other Animals) was a Faculty which wanted not Corporeal Organs, and so Nature wisely pro∣vided no particular Instrument for it, in the Brain of Man. Which Aristotle proved clear∣ly, when he said, That it belong'd to this Faculty to know and understand. Besides, the Reasons on which Aristotle insisted, to prove that the Understanding was not an Organic Faculty, are of such force, that it cannot well be otherwise concluded; because to this Faculty belongs to know and under∣stand the Nature and Being of all the material things in the World; insomuch, as if it were united with any Corporeal thing, that very thing would hinder the Knowledge of all others; as we see in the exterior Senses; that if the Taste be bitter, whatever the Tongue touches has the same savour; and if the Cri∣stalin-Humour be green or yellow, the Eye judges whatever it sees to be of the same Co∣lour; and the Cause of it is, that Inward Tin∣ctures bar the entrance of Objects from without. Aristotle said also, that if the Understanding were united to any Corporeal Instrument, it would be susceptible of a material Quality, because that which is united to it, be it hot or cold, must necessarily have Communicati∣on with heat or cold. But to say the Un∣derstanding

is hot, cold, moist, or dry, is a Proposition abominable to the Ears of any Natural Philosopher.

The other principal Difficulty is, That A∣ristotle, and all the Peripatitics, have establish∣ed two other Powers besides the Understand∣ing, Imagination, and Memory; which are the Remembrance and the Common Sense; in pursuance of this Rule. The Faculties are discerned by their Acts. They find besides the Operations of the Understanding, Imagina∣tion, and Memory, there are two others very different; the Wit of Man then arises from Five Faculties, and not from three alone, as we have already proved.

We have also said in the foregoing Chap∣ter, following Galen's Opinion, that the Me∣mory does nought else in the Brain but bare∣ly preserve the Figures and Species of things, even as a Coffer keeps Clothes and whatever else is laid up in it. And if by this Compa∣rison we may come to understand the Office of this Faculty, there will be still need to find a Rational Faculty to draw and fetch out the Figures from the Memory, and represent them to the Understanding, even as it is no less than necessary for some hand to open the Coffer, to take out thence what was laid up therein. Moreover we have said, that the Understanding and Memory were two con∣trary Powers, and that one destroyed the other; because one required much Driness;

and the other, much Moisture and Softness of Brain. But if that be true, how came Plato and * 1.2 Aristotle to affirm, That Men of a soft Flesh had a great deal of Understand∣ing, since softness is an effect of moisture? We have also granted, That to have a good Memory the Brain must be soft, inasmuch as the Figures must be stamped thereon, to make an Impression, and if it were hard, they could not be so well imprinted. True it is, that to receive the Figures easily, it is neces∣sary the Brain should be soft, but to preserve the Species long, all the Philosophers assert, that hardness and driness are no less necessa∣ry; as it appears in things from without; for an impression in a soft Matter soon wears out; but is never utterly effac'd, if made on a dry and hard Body. Accordingly we see many learn easily by Heart, what they as soon after for∣get. Of which † 1.3 Galen giving the Reason, affirms, That such from the abundance of Moisture have a fluid and no solid Substance in the Brain, which occasions the Figure to wear out as soon as it would do, should any pretend to Grave on Water. On the contrary, the other difficultly take any thlng, but never lose what they have once learned. Wherefore it seems impossible to have that Difference of Memory we have spoke of, to learn readily and to retain long.

'Tis also no less difficult to understand how so many Figures can be imprinted together in

the Brain, without one effacing the other; and that the same thing falls not out as we see in soft Wax, on which if one imprints several Seals of different Forms, some will force out the others, there remaining only behind a promiscuous Confusion of Figures. And what affords no less pain and difficulty, is, to know whence it arises, that the Memory by constant Ex∣ercise is made more capable to receive the Fi∣gures; since it is certain, that the Exercise not only of the Body, but even of the Mind, dries and consumes the Flesh.

It is also as difficult to discern how the Imagination is contrary to the Understand∣ing, if there appear no other reason more pressing than to say the subtil Parts of the Brain are resolved and discussed by much Heat, and that there remain behind the grossest and most earthy, since Melancholy is allow'd to be one of the grossest and earthiest Humors of the Body. Yet Aristotle said, That the Understanding received more Advantage from that, than from any other: The difficulty seems yet greater, when we come to consider, that Melancholy is a gross, cold, and dry Humor; and that Choler is of a delicate Substance, and of a hot and dry Temperament. This appears repugnant to Reason, because this last Humor promotes the Understanding by means of two Qualities, and is contrary only to one, which is Heat: And Melancholy favours it by Driness alone,

and nothing else, being contrary to it, both in the coldness and grossness of the Substance, which is what the Understanding most of all abhors. For which reason * 1.4 Galen assigned more Wit and Prudence to Choler than Me∣lancholy. Dexterity and Prudence are owing to Choler, but the Melancholy Humour is the cause of Integrity and Constancy.

Lastly it is demanded, Whence it comes, that the Application to Study and Assiduous Speculation renders many knowing and wise, who at the beginning wanted the good Na∣tural Qualities we have mentioned, and yet nevertheless by the force of Intention of Mind, they have attained the Knowledge of many Truths, of which before they were ignorant when it appears they had not the requisite Temperament to arrive at it; for if they had had it, they needed not to have taken so much pains.

All these Difficulties and many more, are opposite to the Doctrin laid down in the last Chapter, because in effect Natural Philo∣sophy has no such certain Principles to pro∣ceed by as the Mathematics, in which a Phy∣sician and Philosopher (who is also a Mathe∣matician) may always give some Demonstra∣tions; but in coming to Cure Diseases ac∣cording to the Rules of Physic, he will com∣mit therein many Errors, not always through his own fault, (since in the Mathematics he may be always sure) but because of the Uncer∣tainty

of his Art. Which made * 1.5 Aristotle say, The Physician who uses all the Diligence re∣quired by his Art, though he does not always Cure the Patient, yet he ought not to be esteemed Ʋn∣skilful in his Profession. But if the same man should commit the least Error in the Mathe∣matics, he would be without Excuse, because if they employ what care they ought in this Science, it is impossible to fail of being cer∣tain. So that since there is no Demonstration to be given of our Doctrin, all the fault is not to be attributed to Defect of Skill, nor is it to be inferred from thence that what we have deliver'd is false.

To the first and main Doubt we Answer, that it must be consider'd there are two sorts of Understanding in man, one of which is the Power in the Rational Soul, and that is as incorruptible as the Rational Soul it self, with∣out depending in the least upon the Body or its material Organs, either for its Being, or Preservation; and Aristotle's Arguments have only place, with regard to this Power. The other sort of Understanding is all that, which appears necessary in the Brain of man, to the end he may understand as he ought: 'Tis in this Sense we use to say Peter has a better Understanding than John, which cannot be taken for the Power lodged in the Soul, be∣cause it is of equal Perfection in all, but ra∣ther for some of the organic Powers, which the Understanding makes use of in its Acts;

some of which it performs well, and others ill; not at all through its own fault, but be∣cause the Powers it makes use of in some find good Organs, and in others ill. Which is to be understood in no other manner, since we find by Experience, not only that some men Reason better than others; but even that the same Person Reasons and Discourses well at one Age, and ill at another, as we have, al∣ready prov'd. Nay, there are some who lose their Judgment, even as others recover it, from certain Distempers of the Brain. Which is particularly seen in the Hectic Fever better than in any other; for when that once begins to reach the Brain, the Sick Person begins also to Speak and Reason more Eloquently and Judiciously than he used, and how much the deeper that Evil gets Root, so much the more excellent are the Operations of the Un∣derstanding; which was not consider'd by some of the Antient Physicians, though this Knowledge be of so great importance in the first Appearance of the Disease when the Cure is easy.

But what these organic Powers are, of which the Understanding makes use in its O∣perations, has not yet been resolv'd or de∣termin'd, seeing the Natural Philosophers say, that if one man Reasons better than ano∣ther, it comes from the Understanding's be∣ing an Organic Power, and better dispos'd in one than another, and not for any other

Reason. For all Rational Souls and their Capacities (when separated from their Bo∣dies) are of equal Perfection and Knowledge. Those that follow the Doctrin of Aristotle, seeing by Experience that some Reason better than others, have found out a seeming Co∣lour, saying, That if one Man Reasons better than another, it comes not from the Under∣standing's being an organic Power, nor from the Brain's being better disposed in one than in the other, but because the Understanding, so long as the Rational Soul is in the Body, has occasion for these Figures and Species which are in the Imagination and Memory; in de∣fect of which, the Understanding happens to Discourse ill, though not through its own Fault, or by being joined to ill Organiz'd Matter. But this Answer contradicts the same * 1.6 Aristotle's Doctrin, who proves that the Understanding is better, as the Memory is worse; and on the other hand, the more the Memory advances and rises to a point, the more the Understanding fails and declines; which we have already prov'd in the Imagi∣nation. In pursuance of this, Aristotle de∣mands, Why the Old have so bad a Memory, with so good an Understanding; and the Young a good Memory, with a bad Under∣standing? Experience furnishes us with an Instance observ'd also by Galen, that when the Temperament and good Disposition of the Brain are destroy'd by Sickness, we often lose

the use of the Operations of the Understand∣ing, while those of the Memory and Imagi∣nation remain unimpair'd; which could never be, if the Understanding had not a particular Instrument by its self, distinct from that of the other Powers. What I shall Answer to this, is, That when the Brain is observed to be moister than it should, the easiness to re∣ceive and retain in the Memory improves; but when the Representation of the Species is not so vivid, nor so good, it is better effected without comparison with Driness, which is light and clear, than with Moisture, which is dark and troubled; insomuch, that the Understanding fails in its Operations, from the Clouds and Obscurity of the Species. Quite contrary, those who are of a dry Brain, have not a Memory that receives and retains well; but in recompence hereof they are provided with an Imagination which helps them to see clearly the Figures, because of the Light which attends the Driness, and it is that of which the Understanding has most need, according to Heraclitus's Saying, The dry light makes the Soul wise. What darkness, and what mists, moisture spreads over the Objects, and what light, driness brings along with it, may be easily observed in the Night, when the South or North Winds blow: The first renders the Stars dark and overcast, and the other bright and clear. The same thing falls out with re∣gard to the Figures and Species in the Me∣mory,

insomuch that it is not to be admired, that the Understanding sometimes blunders, and sometimes hits right, according as these Species and Figures which it makes use of in Speculation, prove either clear or obscure, without any necessity of its being therefore a Faculty tied to its Organs, or of any defect to be imputed to it.

Some Natural Philosophers have pretend∣ed, that the Incorruptibility of the Heavens, their Clearness and Transparency, as well as the sparkling of the Stars, was owing to the great Driness of their Composition. 'Tis for the same cause Old men Reason so well, and Sleep so ill; because, say I, of the great Dri∣ness of their Brain, which is in a manner clear and transparent, and the Species and Figures as sparkling as the Stars. And as Driness har∣dens the substance of the Brain, from thence comes it, that they learn so ill by Heart: On the contrary, Children have a good Memory, Sleep well, and Reason ill, because of the great moisture of the Brain, which renders it soft, dark, full of Vapours, Clouds, Obscu∣rities, and the Species troubled and unclear, which presenting in that Condition to the Un∣derstanding, make it commit Errors, through the Defects of the Object, rather than its own. In this consists the difficulty found by Aristotle, in joining a good Understanding with a great Memory, and not from the Me∣mory's being contrary to the Understanding.

For if we consider well, we shall find, there is no Faculty subservient to so many Opera∣tions of the Understanding, as is the Memo∣ry; for so long as that has not something that keeps it employ'd, in representing the Figures and Species, this cannot reason after the man∣ner of the World; insomuch that for want of having wherewith to busie it self, the Man remains imperfect and a very Blockhead. 'Tis even as Galen reports, That in a certain Plague that happen'd in Asia, the men there lost their Memory to that Degree, as they forgot even their own Names; many forgot also what they had Learn'd in the Arts and Sciences; insomuch, as they were obliged to Study them again, as if they had never learn'd them at all. Some others also forgot their Language, remaining like Brute Beasts, with∣out being able either to Speak, or Reason in any wise, for want of Memory. It was upon this occasion, said Plato, that the An∣tients raised Temples and Altars to Memory, adoring her as the Goddess of the Sciences; for so he speaks: But besides the Gods thou hast brought me, there must be others also invok'd, and especially Memory, which gives the chief weight and Ornament to our Discourse, to the end that we may publickly acquit our selves well of our Charge. In which he had great Reason; for a Man knows not how many things the same Faculty has in store for him, it being no less than the Treasury of the Sciences. Now as

we shall elsewhere prove, when the Brain is well Temper'd, and no Quality exceeds the others, a Man has at the same time a good Understanding with a great Memory; which could not fall out, if these two Faculties were exact Contraries.

One may Answer to the second Argument, That not all difference of Actions shew a di∣versity of Powers; for, as we shall prove hereafter, the Imagination performs such strange Actions, that if this Maxim were true, which the Vulgar Philosophers receive, and to be Interpreted as they interpret it, there would be more than ten or twelve se∣veral Powers in the Brain. But because all these Actions agree in one kind, they denote but one Imagination, which afterward is di∣vided into several particular Differences, be∣cause of the Diversity of Actions it performs. To compose the Species in the presence or ab∣sence of the Objects, not only does not con∣clude that there are some different generical Powers, as are the Common Sense and the Imagination, but also that the same are no particular Faculties.

To the third Objection it may be Answer∣ed, That the Memory may be under two Con∣siderations. The one, as a Faculty that has its subject in the Rational Soul; and the other, as it regards a Corporeal Organ, which Na∣ture has framed for it in the Brain. For the first, it belongs not to the Jurisdiction of Na∣tural

Philosophy, but to the Metaphysician, from whom we ought to learn what it is. For the second, it is a thing so difficult to con∣ceive, after what manner one man is furnish∣ed with a great Memory, and another has none at all, and what Instruments Nature has made in our Head, to make us recollect what is past, that Natural Philosophy is driven to invent and search out for some Instances more proper to make it understood, which are not true and certain. Plato willing to teach us how it came to pass that one man had a great Memory, and another but a little one, and how one remembred what was past clearly and distinctly, and the other confusedly, found two Examples very pertinent, by supposing a thing that is not. Let us feign, said he, to serve us for an Instance, that Nature had put into mens Souls a piece of Wax, in one greater, in the other less; in one purer and finer Wax, and in the other more course and drossy; in one harder, and difficulter to penetrate, and the other plianter, softer, and more ductile; and that the Sight, Hearing, and other Senses, were imprinted with a Seal, being no other than the Figure of what they had receiv'd and reported. After this rate, those who had a great deal of Wax, would have a large Me∣mory, because they had a great Field to sow it in. Those who had but a little Wax, would have a small Memory, for the same Reason. Those who had the Wax foul, unpurged and

drossy, would form confused, and ill-mark'd Ideas. Those who had the hard, would have trouble to learn by Heart, because that kind of Wax difficultly receives the Figures. They who have soft and tender, will have a great Memory, will easily learn, and retain by Heart all they know. After all this, it is certain, that Plato did not in good earnest believe, that when Nature formed us, she put in our Souls any such pieces of Wax; nor that man's Memory was made of any such matter; but it was only an Instance of a thing feigned, and accommodated to the rudeness of our Ca∣pacity: And not content with this Example, he sought out another, affording no less means to understand what he meant; which is, of the Writer and the Paper; for as the Writer sets down in Paper those things he would not forget, and revises them after he has put them in Writing; in the same manner it must be understood, that the Imagination imprints in the Memory the Figures of things, which the Senses and the Understanding have been ac∣quainted with, as well as those others, which she her self invents; and when it would re∣collect them, Aristotle has said, it returns to review and revolve. Plato made use of this Comparison, when he declared, that in Apprehension of the failing of his Memory in his Old Age, he was diligent in sub∣stituting another of Paper (which was his Books) that he might not lose his Labour,

but upon each Review, it might a-new be represented to him; the Imagination does no more, as often as it imprints in the Memory, and reads it over again, whenever it is to re∣collect it self. * 1.7 Aristotle was the first that broach'd this Opinion, and † 1.8 Galen the next, who spoke after this manner. For the Part of the Soul that Imagins, which ever it is, it seems to be the very same that Remembers. And this appears plainly, in that the things which we Imagin with much intention of mind, sink deeper into the Memory, and those of which we think but slightly, are soon forgot. And as the Writer, when he has writ a fair Letter, reads it easily, and without mistake; even so it fairs with the Imagination; for if it stamp them with force, the Figures remain well imprinted and mark'd in the Brain, otherwise they are hard to be distinguished. The same also befalls old Writings, of which, part re∣mains sound and fresh, and part worn out by Time, which cannot well be read, unless the Defects are supplied by Guess: The Imagi∣nation precisely takes the same Course, when some Figures are effaced in the Memory, and others retain'd. Whence sprang Aristotle's Error, who for no other reason believ'd that Remembrance was a different Power from Memory. Besides which, he said, that those who have a great Remembrance, have a good Understanding, which is equally false; because the Imagination, whence the Remem∣brance

proceeds, is contrary to the Under∣standing. For to fix things in the Memory, and to remember them after they are known, is an Act of the Imagination; even as Wri∣ting any thing, and reading it afterwards, is an Act of the Writer, and not of the Paper. According to which, the Memory is a Passive, and not an Active Power, as the Blank-Paper is no more than a Capacity for one to Write on.

The fourth Doubt may be thus solv'd, That it imports nothing to a Man's Wit, whe∣ther the Flesh be hard, or delicate and soft, if the Brain enjoy not also the same quality; for that we observe very often possesses a Temperament distinct from that of all other Parts of the Body. Nay, even when the Flesh, and the Brain accord, in being both alike tender and soft, it is a bad Indication for the Understanding, and no less for the Ima∣gination. Be it as it will, if we consider the Flesh of Women, and Children, we shall find, that it is softer and more tender than Men's, yet nevertheless Men are for the most part of a better Wit than Women. The Natural Reason of which, is, That the Hu∣mours that make the Flesh soft are Phlegm and Blood, because both the one and the other are moist (as we have already noted) and of these Humours, Galen has pronounced, that they make Men silly and blockish: On the contrary, the Humours which harden the

Flesh, are Choler and Melancholy, whence proceed the Wisdom and Knowledge of Men. So that to have soft and delicate Flesh,* 1.9 is a worse sign than to have dry and hard. And accordingly among Men that are of an equal Temperament, throughout the whole Body, it is very easie to guess at the Difference of their Wit, from the softness or hardness of the Flesh; for if it be hard and rough, it pre∣sages a good Understanding, or a good In∣vention, but if soft and delicate, it denotes the contrary, which is a good Memory with little Understanding, and less Invention. To discover then if the Brain correspond with the Flesh, the Hair ought to be consider'd; for if that be thick, black, harsh, and curled, it is a sign of a good Invention, or a good Un∣derstanding; but if lank, and soft, it is an Indi∣cation of a good Memory, and nothing more. But he that would know, and distinguish, whether it be Understanding, or Imagination, which is betoken'd, when the Hair is such as we mentioned, must consider, how the Youth behaves himself in Laughing, for that Passion strongly discovers if the Imagination be good or bad.

What the cause of Laughter is, many Phi∣losophers have pretended to know; but not one has made it Intelligible; they only all agree in this, that the Blood is the Humour that provokes a Man to Laugh, though none of them have told us what are the particular

Qualities of this Humour, that make a Man subject to Laughter. * 1.10 In a Phrensy the Laugh∣ing Fits are securer, and the crying Fits more desperate; for the first is made by means of the Blood, which a very benign Humour; but the other is no less than an effect of deep Melancholy. But we grounding only on the Doctrin we have handled, may easily under∣stand what is to be known in this matter. The cause of Laughter is no other (in my Opinion) than a tacit allowance of the Ima∣gination, when it sees or hears some Ren∣counter or Accident, which proves very agree∣able. And as this Power resides in the Brain, when any of those things present, it is strait mov'd, and with it the Muscles all over the Body; so we often approve sharp and witty Sayings, by a nod of the Head. But when the Imagination is very good, it is not grati∣fied with every Passage, but with those only, which are very pleasing; and if they are not such, it receives rather a Disgust than Plea∣sure. Whence it comes, that we seldom see Men of good Invention laugh; and what is yet more considerable, is, that those who rally the most agreeably, and are very Face∣tious, never laugh at their own Jests, or those of others; because they have so delicate and fine a Fancy, that their own witty Expres∣sions, and Railleries, are not moving, nor have all the Agreeableness and Grace they ought to have. To which may be added,

That the Grace and Air of the thing spoke, or offer'd, ought to be new, unheard-of, and unseen. Which is not the aim only of the Imagination, but also of the other ruling Powers in Man. Accordingly we find the Stomach strait nauseates the same Food it re∣ceived twice; the Sight, the return of the same Figure and Colour; the Hearing, the re∣petition of the same Tune, though it be good; and so even the Understanding is tired with the same Thought. Therefore he that rallies well, laughs not at all at his own witty Jests, because e'er they proceed out of his mouth, he knows well enough before-hand what he is to say. Whence I conclude the great Laughers want Imagination; and let the Jest be what it will, as flat as it is, it extreamly moves and tickles 'em. And therefore those who are very sanguine, as they have a great deal of moisture, which we have affirm'd to be con∣trary to, and destructive of the Imagination, so they also are very great Laughers. Moi∣sture has this peculiar, that because of its smoothness and softness, it blunts the edge, and allays the heat, causing it not to burn so much: Accordingly that agrees best with Driness, because it quickens its Actions; Add to this, that where Moisture is found, it is a sign that the Heat is slack and moderate, be∣cause it cannot resolve and consume it, nor can the Imagination with so weak a Heat speed its own Operations. From whence al∣so

it follows, that Men of great Understand∣ing are great Laughers, because they want Invention. As we may read of that great Philosopher Democritus, and many others whom I have seen and observed. Thus by means of Laughter we may discern, if the Persons that have hard and rough Flesh, and besides that, black and crisp, harsh and hard Hair, excel in the Understanding, or Imagi∣nation. So that Aristotle has been mistaken in what regards the smoothness or softness of the Flesh.

One may Answer the fifth Argument, That there are two sorts of Moisture in the Brain; one, which proceeds from the Air, when that Element is prodominant, in the Compo∣sition; and the other from Water, by means of which, the other Elements are blended to∣gether.

If the Brain partake of the first Moisture, the Memory will be very good, easie to re∣ceive, and strong to retain the Figures long, because the moisture of the Air is very Oily, and unctuous, in which the Species of things fasten strongly, as may be seen by Painting in Oil, which exposed to the Sun, or cast into the Water, sustains no damage; and if we rub a Writing all over with Oil, it never wears out. Since that which is obliterated to that degree that one cannot read it, is made legible by Oil, which gives it a kind of clearness and transparence. But if the smoothness and soft∣ness

of the Brain proceed from any other Hu∣mour, the Argument is strong; for if it re∣ceive easily the Figure, it also as suddenly wears out, because the moisture of the Water has no Oil, to which the Species could stick and catch. These two kinds of Moisture are distinguished in Hair; that which proceeds from Air, makes them thick, oily, and grea∣sy; and that from Water, slimy and limber.

The sixth Argument may receive this An∣swer, That the Figures of things in the Brain are not imprinted there like the Figure of the Seal in the Wax, but only by penetrating, remain there fixt; or after the manner as Birds are caught with Birdlime, and Flies with Honey, because these are not Corporeal Figures, and cannot be blended, nor break in upon one another.

We may resolve the seventh Difficulty thus, That the Figures confound and soften the Substance of the Brain, neither more nor less than Wax is softned between the Fingers. Besides that the Vital Spirits have the Virtue to soften and moisten the Members that are hard and dry, even as we see the heat of the Fire soften Iron. And we have already pro∣ved, that the Vital Spirits ascend up to the Brain, as often as any thing is learn'd by heart. Whether all Corporeal and Spiritual Exer∣cise drys or not, all Physicians hold, that mo∣derate Exercise fattens.

The eighth Argument is capable of this Reply, there are two kinds of Melancholy; * 1.11 one Natural, which is as it were the Cement of the Blood, whose Temperament is cold and dry, and which is of a very gross sub∣stance, and the same is of no advantage to the Wit, but makes Men Fools, Sots, and Gig∣lers, because of a defect in their Imagination. There is another call'd Atra-bilis, black or burnt Choler, which, according to † 1.12 Aristotle's Opinion, made the wisest Men; whose Tem∣perament is various, as is that of Vinegar,* 1.13 which sometimes pro∣duces some effects of heat, making the Earth quake like Dough, and at other times too much cools it; but is always dry, and of a very delicate substance. Cicero own'd, he had a slow Wit, because he had no adust Choler, and he spoke truth; for if he had been so, he would not have proved so Eloquent; for the Men of black Choler, want Memory, to which belongs Volubility of Speech. It has another quality, which mightily helps the Understanding, that is to be as resplendent as an Agat, by means of which Splendor, the Brain is illuminated, to the end the Figures may be clearly reflected. And this Heraclitus meant, when he said, A dry Light makes a most excellent Wit; which Splendor, the Natural Melancholy has not, but its Black, is Sleep and Death. And we

shall hereafter prove, that the Rational Soul has occasion to have a Brain of Light to reflect the Figures and the Species.

The Answer to the ninth Argument, is, That the Prudence and Dexterity of Wit, as Galen said, belong'd to the Imagination, by means of which Futurities are known, and with Allu∣sion to this, * 1.14 Cicero affirmed, The Memory is of the Past, and Prudence of the Future. The Dexterity of Wit is what we call in Spanish (Agudeza, in agibilibus) and is in other terms, Fineness, Wiliness, or Cunning and Craft in the things and Intrigues of the World. And therefore † 1.15 Cicero said, That Prudence was a Skill, which had a certain way to make choice of Good and Evil. Men of great Understanding are without this sort of Prudence, and Skill, because they want Imagination. According∣ly we see by Experience, that great Scholars, as to the things appertaining to the Under∣standing, taken from their Books, signify no∣thing to go and engage in the Affairs of the World. Galen said excellently well, That this sort of Prudence proceeded from Choler;‖ 1.16 for Hippocrates acquainting his Friend Dama∣getes with the Condition he found Demo∣critus in, when he went to Visit him, in or∣der to his Cure, writ that he was in the open Field under a Plain-tree, bare Leg'd,* 1.17 set upon a Stone, a Book in his hand, and sur∣rounded

with Dead and Flead Beasts; at which Hippocrates being surpriz'd, asked him what he did with those Beasts that were in such a case? He Answer'd him, that he was in search of the Humor that made Men Fickle, Crafty, False, and Deceitful; and that in dis∣secting those brute Beasts, he had found, that Choler was the cause of this mischievous Quality, and that to be revenged on Men of Gall and Guile, he would treat them as he had done the Fox, the Serpent, and the Ape. This kind of Prudence is not only odious to Men, but also * 1.18 St. Paul says, The Carnal Mind is at Enmity against God. And Plato gave the Reason of it, saying, That Knowledge abstracted from Justice, rather merits the name of Craft and Cunning, than of Wisdom. The Devil always makes use of such Weapons, when he would do mischief to Men. This Wisdom (said † 1.19 St. James) descendeth not from above, but is earthy, sensual, and devilish. There is another sort of Wisdom attended with Up∣rightness and Simplicity, by which Men fol∣low that which is good, and fly that which is evil. ‖ 1.20 Galen says this kind belongs to the Understanding, because that Faculty is wholly incapable of Craft or Malice, only knowing how Evil is not done, but is Upright, Just, Frank and Innocent. The Man who is en∣dow'd with this kind of Wit, is called Up∣right and Simple. Accordingly Demosthenes being desirous to win the good Will of the

Judges, in a Speech he made against Eschines, called them Just and Upright, having an eye to the Simplicity of their Employment. Of whom * 1.21 Cicero said, Their Duty is simple, and one only Cause of all Good. The Coldness and the Driness of Melancholy is a very proper Instrument for this kind of Wisdom, but then it must be composed of fine and very delicate Parts.

We may Answer to the last Doubt, That when a Man is engaged in the Contempla∣tion of a truth he would know, and does not presently attain it, it is because his Brain is deprived of the Temperament convenient to what he desir'd, but fixing a while in Con∣templation as soon as the Natural Heat (that is in the Vital Spirits and Arterial Blood) flys to the Head,* 1.22 the same causes the Temperament of the Brain to rise always till it arrive at the degree it has occasion for. 'Tis true, that much Plodding does good to some, and harm to others; for if there be no want in the Brain to attain the due degree of Heat, there will be no occasion for deep Meditation; and if it pass beyond the point, the Understanding is strait disor∣dered, by an overflow of too many Vital Spirits; by means of which, it attains not to the Notice of the Truth it is in search of. Whence it comes, that we observe many Men speak very well extempore, but perform

very meanly with premeditation. On the contrary, others have such a slow Capacity, because of their great Coldness or Driness, that of necessity the Natural Heat, must be a long time in the Head to cause the Tempera∣ment to rise to the degree it wants, and there∣fore they quit themselves much better, when they have had time to recollect what they have to say, than when they are to speak ex∣tempore.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Lib. In∣troduc. c. V.
• * 1.2

  Lib. II. de anima.
• † 1.3

  Lib. Art. Med. cap. XII.
• * 1.4

  Lib. I. de natura humana, com. I.
• * 1.5

  Lib. I. Topic.
• * 1.6

  Lib. de memoria & remini∣scentia.
• * 1.7

  Lib. III. de anima.
• † 1.8

  Lib. II. de motu musculor.
• * 1.9

  Amongst brute Beasts there is none comes so near hu∣man Pru∣dence as the Elephant, and yet none have so hard and rough Flesh as he.
• * 1.10

  Lib. VI. Aph. LIII.
• * 1.11

  Galen. lib. II de sa∣nitate tu∣enda.
• † 1.12

  III. Sect Prob. I.
• * 1.13

  Horace reports Orestes to have been made such a one, but that he would do no harm to any one, speak∣ing very fine things from the brightness of his Cho∣ler and therefore he said, Jussit quod splendida bilis. Sermonum III.
• * 1.14

  Dialo de Senectute.
• † 1.15

  In Tus∣culan.
• ‖ 1.16

  In Epist. ad Dama.
• * 1.17

  Note, that Men of great Un∣derstanding have little Neatness in their Dress; they are all slovenly and greasy: The Reason of which, we shall shew in the Xth and XIth Chapters.
• * 1.18

  Ch. VIII. to the Ro∣mans.
• † 1.19

  Ch. III.
• ‖ 1.20

  Lib. III. prog. com. II.
• * 1.21

  Pro Syl∣la.
• * 1.22

  Note of what impor∣tance it is to apply dili∣gently to Learning, because when the proper Tempera∣ment in the Brain is want∣ing, it is attained by as∣siduous Plodding.