Examen de ingenios, or, The tryal of wits discovering the great difference of wits among men, and what sort of learning suits best with each genius / published originally in Spanish by Doctor Juan Huartes ; and made English from the most correct edition by Mr. Bellamy.

CHAP. XIII. That the Theory of the Laws pertains to the Memory; Pleading Causes and Judging them (which is the Practic) to the Understanding; and Governing of a Commonwealth, to the Imagination.

IT is not without a Mystery, that in the Spanish Tongue this Word Letrado, Letter∣ed is a common Term denoting all sorts of Lettered Men, as well Divines, as Lawyers, Physicians, Logicians, Philosophers, Orators, Mathematicians, and Astrologers; neverthe∣less when it is said, Fulano es letrado, such a one is Letter'd, we all understand with one consent, the Skill in the Laws is his Profession, as if it were his proper and peculiar Style, and

of no others. Altho' to solve this Doubt be easy, nevertheless to do it satisfactorily, it is requisite to know first, what the Law is, and what Obligations they are under who apply themselves to the Study of this Profession, to be afterwards made use of in the Employment of Judges or Advocates. The Law (to take it right) is nothing but the reasonable Will of the Legislator, by which he sets forth and declares in what manner such Cases shall be determined, as are ordinarily emergent in the Commonwealth, for conserving the Sub∣jects in Peace, and directing them how they are to live; and what they are to forbear. I said a reasonable Will, because it is not sufficient that a King or Emperor (who are the efficient Cause of the Law) declare their Will at any rate, that it may be Law; for if the same be not Just and Reasonable, neither is▪ it nor can it be called a Law, no more than he is a Man, who wants a Reasonable Soul. And there∣fore it has been agreed, that Kings should en∣act their Laws with the Advice of very Wise and Understanding Men; to the end they should be right, equal, and good, and the Subjects should receive them willingly, and be the more oblig'd to keep and observe them. The material Cause of the Law, is what is done in such Cases as ordinarily happen in the Commonwealth, after the Order of Nature, and not of utter Impossibilities, or of rare Contingencies, The Final Cause is, to order

the Life of Man, to teach him what to do, and what to forbear, that so being conforma∣ble to Reason, the Commonwealth may be preserv'd in Peace. For which end the Laws are appointed to be Written in clear Words, not Equivocal, Obscure, or of divers Senses; without Cyphers, or Abbreviations, but so Obvious and Manifest, that whoever reads them may readily understand and bear them in mind. And because none may plead Igno∣rance of them, they are appointed to be openly Proclaim'd, that whoever breaks them may be Punished.

In respect therefore of the Care and Dili∣gence observ'd by good Legislators, that their Laws should be just and clear, Judges and Ad∣vocates had given them in Charge; That in Actions,* 1.1 or Judgments, none of them should abound in their own Sense, but be directed by the Au∣thority of the Laws. That is to say, not to dispute if the Law be Just, or Unjust, nor to give it any other Sense than it naturally bears, according to the Letter. From which it follows, that the Lawyers are to keep close to the Text of the Law, and take the meaning which is drawn from thence, and no other.

This Doctrin being supposed, it is easie to understand whence the Lawyer is called Le∣trado, and other Lettered Men not so; which is to say, he is a letra dado, tied to the Letter,

a Man that is not left at liberty to judge ac∣cording to his own Understanding, but is ob∣liged to follow the very Letter.

Which having been so construed by those who are the best Practised in this Profession, they dare neither Affirm nor Deny any thing concerning the Decision of any Case, if they have not before them the Law deciding it in express Terms; and if at any time they ad∣vance any thing of their own Head, inter∣posing their own Authority and Reason, with∣out founding it on the Law, they do it not without Doubting and Modesty; and ac∣cordingly we have a common Proverb, Eru∣bescimus dum sine lege loquimur, importing, that we are asham'd to judge and advise where we have not the Law before us, that deter∣mines the matter. The Divines cannot be call'd (in this Sense) Letrados, Learn'd, be∣cause in Holy Writ, * 1.2 The Letter kills, but the Spirit gives Life. That being full of Mysteries, and abounding with Figures, dark and not obvious to every Understanding: Its Terms and Manner of Speech, of a very remote Sig∣nification, from that given by those skilled in the three Vulgar Tongues. Therefore he that interprets it according to the Letter, and takes the Sense that is drawn from the Gramma∣tical Construction will fall into many Errors.

Nor are the Physicians more obliged to submit to the Letter, for if Hippocrates and Galen, and other Grave Authors of that Sci∣ence

affirm a thing, and Experience and Rea∣son shew the contrary, they are not bound to follow them, and the reason is, because in Phy∣sic, Experience has more place than Reason, and Reason more than Authority: But in the Laws it happens quite otherwise, for there Authority, and the Decretals have more Power and Prevalence than all the Reasons to the contrary. Which being so, we have a way open to assign the Wit proper for the Laws; for if the Lawyer is to have his Understanding and Imagination determined to follow blind∣ly whatever the Law says, without adding or diminishing, it is certain, this Faculty relates to the Memory, and all they have to do is, to know the number of the Laws, and the Rules of Right, and to bear in mind each in particular by Heart, to reduce to Heads every Case and its Determination; to the end that as any Case occurs, he may know what Law determines it, and in what manner. There∣fore it seems to me, that the best Difference of Wit for a Lawyer, is, to have a great Me∣mory, and a small Understanding rather than much Understanding and little Memory; for if he is not to make use of his Wit and Abili∣ty, but must have regard to the great number of Laws as they are so distinguish'd from each other, with so many Exceptions, Restrictions, and Enlargements, it is more to the purpose to have by Heart what is determined by the Law in each Case that occurs, than to Discourse or

Reason after what manner it ought to be de∣termined; for one is necessary, and the other impertinent; no other Opinion being sufficient to carry the Point but the decision of the Law. So that it is certain, that the Theory of the Law belongs to the Memory, and not to the Understanding or Imagination; for which reason the Laws are so entirely positive, and the Lawyers have their Understandings so determined by the Will of the Ligislator, that they cannot interpose their own Opinion, but where they are in doubt what the Law has declared, when their Clients consult them, they are allow'd to say, I will look for the Case in my Books, which should the Physician say when they come for Cure of any Disease, or a Divine in a Case of Conscience, they would pass for Men of small Ability in their Profes∣sions. And the reason of it is, that these two last Sciences have their Definitions and Prin∣ciples Universal, under which particular Cases are contain'd; but in the Faculty of the Law, each Law contains only one Case, the follow∣ing Law not depending on it, though they are placed both under one and the same Title. Wherefore it is necessary to have notice of all the Laws, to Study each in particular, and to lay them up all distinctly in the Memory.

However against this Doctrin Plato observes a thing very considerable, which is, that in his time that Lawyer was suspected that knew much Law by Heart (finding by Experience

they never made such good Judges and Plea∣ders as their Ostentation promised) of which without doubt he reached not the Cause, since he said nothing of it in so proper a place, only he saw by Experience, that the Lawyers of great Memory being to defend a Cause, or give their Opinion in it, applied not the Law so well as became them.

The Reason or Cause of this Effect is not hard to assign from this Doctrin, supposing that the Memory be contrary to the Under∣standing, and that the true Interpretation of the Laws, to Amplify, to Restrain, and to Analyse them with their Contraries and their Contexts, is done by distinguishing, conclu∣ding, arguing, judging, and chusing which Works, (as we have often said already) are Acts of the Understanding; and for the Lawyer of a great Memory it is scarce possible he should possess them.

We have noted elsewhere, that the Me∣mory seems to have no other Office in the Head, than the Trust to preserve the Figures and Ideas of things; and that the Understand∣ing and Imagination are Powers that work with them. So as if the Lawyer have his whole Art in his Memory, and yet be wanting in Un∣derstanding and Imagination, he will no more be able to Judge or Plead a Cause than the Code, or Digest it self, which though they contain all the Laws and Rules of Right, yet know not how to Write ever a Letter in the Book.

Furthermore, though it be true, that the Law ought to be such as its Definition im∣ports, yet is it no less than a Miracle to find things with all the Perfections the Under∣standing feigns in them. That the Law be just and reasonable, that it foresee and provide against all that may happen; that it be Writ in clear Terms, void of Ambiguities, or Oppo∣sitions, and admit no different Senses, is not always to be attain'd, because in a word, it has been established by Man's Council, which is not of sufficient force to provide for all Con∣tingencies, as is seen by daily Experience; for after a Law has been Enacted, upon due Advice and Consultation, in a short time it comes to be Abrogated,* 1.3 because between its Promulgation and Execution a thousand In∣conveniences discover themselves, which were never dreamt of, in the Consults of Making it. For which reason, the Law directs Kings and Emperors to think it no shame to mend and correct Laws; because after all, they are Men, and no wonder that they Err. So much the rather, because there is no Law that can com∣prehend in Words or Sentences all the Cir∣cumstances of the Case to be decided; because the Wicked have more Fineness to find out Tricks, than the Good have Skill to try or give Judgment upon them. And therefore it was said, * 1.4 That it is impossible to write Laws or Ordinances of the Senate in such a manner as they shall embrace all Cases that may happen,

and therefore it is enough to determine those that ordinarily fall out: For if there come any other which are not pointed to or decided in the express Terms of any Law; the Law is not so lame in its Rules and Principles, but if the Pleader or Judge, have a good Understanding to know how to apply them, they may find out their true Determination and Defence, and whence to draw them.

If it should so prove that there are more Cases than Laws, it is requisite the Judge or Advocate should have, a great deal of Under∣standing to make new Laws, not any how, but such as from their Consonance to Reason may be received without contradiction. This the Lawyers of a great Memory cannot effect, for if the Cases that Art has thrown into their Mouths are not minced and chew'd before∣hand, they are at a loss what to do. The Lawyer of large Memory is compared to a Sales-man; that has in his Shop abundance of Suits ready made, and to fit him that wants, lets him try'em all, and if none of them will do, he let his Customer go; but the Lawyer of good Understanding, is like a good Taylor, with his Sheers in his Hand, and his piece of Cloath on the Board, who having taken Mea∣sure, cuts out the Suit according to his Size that is to have it. The Sheers of a good Pleader is his sharp Understanding, with which he takes measure of the Case, and Cloaths it with a Law that decides it, and if he finds not one

all of-a-piece to decide it in express Terms, he makes a Suit of the Remnants and Pieces of the Law wherewith to cover and piece it out.

The Lawyers who are furnish'd with such a Wit and Ability, are not to be stiled Le∣trados, seeing they don't Construe the Letter, nor are tied to the Terms of the Law; they seem to be rather Legislators, or Counsellors, of whom the Laws themselves go a begging what they will have them to determine; for if they have Power and Authority to Inter∣pret, to Restrain, to Amplify them, to draw Exceptions and Failures from them, if they may correct and amend them, it was well said that they seem to be Legislators. Of such a Skill as this it was said, * 1.5 By the Knowledge of the Law is not meant to have by rote the for∣mal Terms in which they are Written, but to take notice of their full Force and Power. But to know the Laws, is duly to comprehend how far their force extends, what point they have power to determine; the Reason of them be∣ing subject to many Alterations, upon the score of Circumstances of Time, Place, Per∣son, Means, Matter, Cause, and the Thing it self; all which Considerations diversify the Determination of the Law. And if the Judge, or Pleader, have not Understanding sufficient to conclude from the Law, or to take away, or add, what is in express Words in the Law, he will commit many Errors in sticking to

the Letter. Upon which ground it is said, * 1.6 The Words of the Law are not to be taken in the Jewish manner; which is to Construe the Letter, and take only the literal Sense.

From what has been said we may conclude, that Pleading is a Work of the Understand∣ing, and that if the Lawyer have a great Me∣mory, he is not in the least able to Judge or Plead, because of the Contrariety of these two Powers, and that is the reason why the Lawyers of great Memory, as Plato observ'd, defend not Causes well, nor apply the Laws as they ought. But here arises a Difficulty in this Doctrin, and that in appearance no slight one, That if it be true that the Under∣standing is that which puts the Case in the Law, and determines the same by distinguish∣ing, limiting, amplifying, inferring, and an∣swering the Arguments of the contrary Part, how is it possible that the Understanding should do all this, if the Memory present not all the Law to it; for as we have said before, it is order'd, That in Actions and Judgments no Man is to follow his own Sense, but is to be led by the Authority of the Laws. According to this, he must first know the whole Body of the Law, and all the Rules thereof, before he be able to meet with what is for the purpose in his Case, for though we have said the Plea∣der of good Understanding is Master of the Laws, yet all his Reasons and Arguments must be built on, and drawn from the Prin∣ciples

of that Faculty, without which they are of no force or validity. But to be able to do this there ought to be a vast Memory to keep and retain so great a number of Laws as are Writ in the Books. This Argument proves it necessary for an accomplished Pleader to have a great Understanding joined with a good Memory. All which is confessed, but what I would say, is, that since a great Un∣derstanding with a good Memory is not to be met with (because of the Repugnance there is between them) it is better that the Pleader be provided with a good Understanding, and an indifferent Memory, than to have a great Memory with a small Understanding; seeing that to supply the Defect of Memory, there are many Remedies, such as Books, Tables, Alphabets, and several other Inventions of Men; but if the Understanding be defective, there is no Remedy to be applied to that. Besides, Aristotle said, that Men of great Un∣derstanding, though they be deficient in Me∣mory, have yet a great Remembrance, by means of which they retain confused Notices of all they have seen, heard, or read, revol∣ving upon which; and running them over, they come to recollect themselves: And tho' there be not so many Expedients to represent the whole Body of the Law to the Under∣standing, yet the Laws are so grounded upon right Reason, that the Antients, as Plato re∣ports, called the Law it self by the Name of

Prudence and Reason. So that the Judge or Pleader that is furnished with a good Under∣standing when he is Judging or giving his Opinion, though he hath not the Law before him, shall yet commit fewer Errors, because he hath with him the Instrument made use of by the Emperors in forming the Laws them∣selves. Accordingly we see it often happen, that a Judge being a Man of ready Wit pro∣nounces a good Sentence without knowing the Decision of the Law, and afterwards finds the same so answered in his Books; and this we see happens also to Pleaders, when they give their Opinion in a Case without Study∣ing.

The Laws and the Rules of Right well considered, are the Spring and Source whence the Pleaders draw their Arguments and Rea∣sons to prove what they pretend; which Work for certain is performed by the Understand∣ing, of which Power if the Pleader be unpro∣vided, or have it in a very low degree, he will never have Skill to form an Argument, though he knew all the Law by Rote. We see plainly that this befals those that Study the Art of Rhetoric (wanting the Ability proper for it) that though they learn without Book the Topics of Cicero (which are the Foun∣tains whence flow the Arguments that are to prove each Problem by the Affirmative and Negative) yet they never know how to raise an Argument: And others of greater Wit

and Ability there are, who without seeing a Book, or learning the Topics, raise a Thou∣sand Arguments accommodated to the Case in question. The same comes to pass in Lawyers of good Memory, who can recite the whole Text of the Law very faithfully, and yet out of the vast Body of Laws know not how to draw one Argument to ground their Opinion upon: On the other hand there are others who never Studied hard at Sala∣manca, and yet without poring on Books, or taking their Degrees, work Wonders when they come to plead a Cause. Hence we un∣derstand how much it imports the Common-wealth, that there should be a Choice and Trial of Wits fit for the Sciences, since there are some who without Art understand what ever they are to do, and others with a Cart-load of Precepts and Rules, commit a Thou∣sand Absurdities, because they have not the Disposition which the Practice requires. So then if to Judge and Plead is to be performed by Distinguishing, Concluding, Arguing, and Chusing, it stands with Reason, that he who applies himself to the Study of the Law, should be furnished with a good Under∣standing, since these Works are the Effects of that Power, and not of the Memory or Imagination.

How to find whether the Youth have this Difference of Wit, or no, is worth know∣ing, but it will be fit before-hand to distin∣guish

the Qualities possest by the Understand∣ing, and how many Differences it Embraces, to the end we may know more distinctly, to which of these Differences the Study of the Law belongs.

As to the first it is to be noted, That though the Understanding be the most Noble Faculty in Man, and of the greatest Dignity, yet is there not any that is so easily led into Errors about Truth as that. * 1.7 Aristotle attempted to prove it, affirming, That the Sense is ever true, but that for the most part the Understanding reasoned ill. Which is plainly seen by Experience, for were it not so amongst the Divines, the Physicians, the Lawyers, and Philosophers, there would not be so many Dissentions, so Divers Opinions, such Variety of Judgments and Conceits upon every Point, there being no more than one Truth.

Whence it arises, that the Senses have so great a Certainty in their Objects, and that the Understanding is so easie to be imposed upon on its part, is not hard to conceive, if it be considered, that the Objects of the Five Senses, and the Species by which the Ob∣jects are known, have a real, firm, and stable being by Nature, before they are known; but what Truth the Understanding has to Speculate, if the Understanding does not give it a Frame and Fashion, has no formal Being of its own. All lies dispersed and loose

in the Materials, like a House resolved into Stone, Earth, Timber and Tiles, with which so many Errors may be committed in Build∣ing as there are Men that undertake to Re-build it, with an ill Imagination. The same thing happens in the Building raised by the Understanding, in framing of a Truth: For all, except those that have a good Wit, will commit a Thousand Absurdities, with the self-same Principles. Hence comes that great Diversity of Opinions found among Men, concerning the same thing; for every one gives it a Form and Figure, according to his Understanding.

From these Errors and Opinions are the Five Senses exempt, for neither the Eyes make the Colour, nor the Taste the Savours, nor the Touch the Tangible Qualities, but the whole is ordered and compounded by Nature, before any one of the Senses knows its Object.

Because Men are not well acquainted with this wretched Condition of the Understand∣ing, they so confidently give their Opinion, without knowing certainly what kind of Wit theirs is, whether it forms the Truth well or ill. And if it be not so, let us ask some Men of Letters, who after they have Writ down and Confirmed their Opinion with many Arguments and Reasons, and have after changed their Sentiments and Opi∣nions at another time, when or how they

can be assured that they have found out the Truth at last? The first time, as they them∣selves confessed, they have failed, seeing they unsaid all that they said before. And for the second, I affirm, that they are to be yet more distrustful of their Understandings, because they are to suspect that that Power, which already once so ill framed the Truth in Con∣fidence of its Arguments and Reasons, may yet again slide into Error, when it is sup∣ported by the same Reason. More especi∣ally because it is often seen by Experience, that the first Opinion is more Probable, and the latter they take up with, is worse and less Probable.

They think it a sufficient Token that their Understanding lights upon the Truth, when they perceive it enamoured of such a Figure, and that there wants not Arguments and Motives to move it to conclude in that sort; but in effect this is a Fallacy, because there is the same Correspondence between their Understandings and its false Notions, as there is in each of the other Inferior Powers, with regard to their Objects: For if we ask the Physicians, What Meat is best and most * 1.8 savory of all in use among Men? I believe they would answer, There is not any (that for Distemper'd Men and weak Stomachs) that is absolutely good or bad, but that it is such as the Stomach that receives it: Since

there are Stomachs, according to * 1.9 Galen's Saying, that better brook Beef than Hens and Trouts; and others, that have an Aver∣sion for Eggs and Milk; and some who love them to the Excess of hurting themselves. And for the manner of dressing Meat, some affect Roast, others Boil'd; and in Roast, some like it with the Blood running: and others, dried and burnt to a Coal. But what is most considerable, is, that the same Meat eat to day with a great Gusto and Relish, to morrow will be Nauseated, and a worse longed-for. All this is to be understood, when the Stomach is good and sound; for if it be out of order, and affected with the Green Sickness, which the Physicians call Pica, or Malacia, then the Appetite hunts for things which Humane Nature abhors, as Chalk, Earth, and Coals, which have a better Re∣lish with such than Hens or Trouts.

If we pass to the Generative Faculty, we shall find therein as many Appetites and Va∣rieties; for some Men there are who affect a Homely, and abhor a Handsom Woman; and others are better pleased with a Fool, than a Wise Woman; some who love a Lean, and hate a Fat one; even Silks and a gay Dress displease those, who run mad for one in Rags: This is to be understood when the Parts of Generation are sound; for if they are attended with the Disease of the Sto∣mach, called Malacia, or the Green-Sickness,

they Lust after Bestial Uncleannesses. The same happens in the Sensitive Faculty, for of the tangible Qualities, Hard and Soft, Rough and Smooth, Hot and Cold, Moist and Dry, there is none of them all that equally pleases the Touch of every Man; because there are some who sleep better on a hard Bed than a soft, and others again better on a soft than a hard.

The same Varieties of Gusts and strange Appetites are found in the Compositions of the Understanding; for if we assemble toge∣ther a Hundred Men of Letters, to whom we propose some Doubt, each of them will give a several Judgment, and Reason upon it in a particular manner; One and the same Argument will appear to one Sophistic, and to another highly probable, and to a third as concluding as if it were a Demonstration. And this not only holds true in several Un∣derstandings, but we see by Experience, that one and the same Reason concludes the same Understanding at one time, and not at another. Insomuch, that Men change their Opinions every day, some gaining in process of Time a more delicate Wit, come to dis∣cern the Defects of their Reason, by which they were led before; and others losing their good Temperament of Brain, abhor the Truth, and embrace false Notions.

But if the Brain happens to be tainted with the Evil called Malacia, then we shall

see strange Judgments and Compositions, false and weak Arguments will prevail more than the strongest and most probable; to a good Argument they will find an Answer, and submit to a bad; from the Premises whence a right Conclusion might be drawn, they will collect a wrong; and by strange Arguments and extravagant Reasons support their ill-grounded Fancies. Though this Doctrin be most certain and true, yet we may give it a greater and stronger Demonstra∣tion; if we draw some Instances out of Holy Writ, which will at first sight shew us the good and the bad Arguments of each, ari∣sing from good or bad Understandings. And because the most ordinary Defect is, when from good Premises they draw an ill Con∣clusion (which is the greatest Absurdity that can be committed) I shall report that Para∣ble of St. Matthew, which tells us, That a certain Man undertaking a Journey into a far Country, called his Servants, and delivered to them his Goods, to one he gave Five Ta∣lents, to another Two, and to another One. Then he that had received the Five Talents was so industrious as to double them; the like did the second; but the third went and digged in the Earth, and hid his Lord's Mo∣ney. After a long time the Lord of those Servants cometh and reckoneth with them. And so he that had received Five Talents, came and brought other Five Talents, say∣ing,

Lord thou deliveredst me Five Ta∣lents, and behold I have gained besides them Five Talents; he also that had received the Two Talents said the same; but he that recei∣ved One, came and said, Lord, I knew thee that thou wer't an hard Man, reaping where thou hast not sown, and gathering where thou hast not strowed, and I was afraid, and went and hid thy Talent in the Earth; Lo here thou hast that is thine. The Ma∣ster displeased with this Account, thus seems to Expostulate the Matter with him: For the self same Reasons you make use of, you ought to have taken care to have doubled your Talent; for if I am a hard Man, and reap where I sow not, and gather where I strow not, it will follow rather of course, you were to labour with the more diligence to improve your Talent, to please and pa∣cify me as the others have done, and not to sleep away thy time, as if I were an easie Man, and minded nothing less than making the best of my Own. Accordingly, says the Text, I will judge thee out of thy own Mouth, thou wicked and slothful Servant; thou knew∣est that I reap where I sowed not, and gather where I have not strowed, thou oughtest there∣fore to have put my Money to the Exchangers, and then at my coming I should have received mine own with Ʋsury. 'Tis a thing so com∣mon among Men of little Understanding, to draw a false and contrary Conclusion from

sound and true Premises, that there is nothing more Ordinary.

There are other Understandings no less awkward than these: For when they are to defend their Assertions, and prove any thing they offer, they alledge Reasons that make against them, not knowing what they do: Of this sort are those who shall say to God at the Day of Judgment, in excuse of them∣selves, when they are to be Condemned, Lord, Lord, have we not Prophesied in thy Name? Have we not cast out Devils in thy Name? Have we not wrought Miracles in thy Name? Which is even as if a Gentleman that had committed High Treason against his Prince and his Crown, for his Defence should alledge, that he had received a Thousand Fa∣vours from his Hands, and that from a low Degree, he had made him one of the Gran∣dees of his Kingdom, and Governor of many Cities and strong Places; which Reason, as there is nothing more absurd, serves only the more to exasperate him, and to hasten his Execution. Which appears plainly from these Words, If my Enemy had done this, sure∣ly I would bear with him, but thou that eatest like a Friend at my Table, &c. Such Persons are accustomed to insist on Reasons, and ex∣travagant Excuses, that are nothing to the purpose, but only because they come first to hand.

There is another sort of Understanding amongst Men of as ill a Make as that before spoke of; for although they have before their Eyes the true Premises, they know not how to draw a Conclusion from them. There∣fore the Gospel recounts, that the Disciples of Jesus Christ wanting Bread, and despair∣ing of being fed, our Lord said to them, What reason you among your selves, because you have brought no Bread? Do you not yet under∣stand, neither remember when I brake the five Loaves among five thousand, how many Baskets full of Fragments took ye up? They say unto him twelve. And when the seven among four thou∣sand, how many Baskets full of Fragments took ye up? And they said seven. And he said unto them, How is it that ye do not understand? The Centurion had a much better Under∣standing to draw Conclusions, since he knowing the Omnipotence of Jesus Christ, would not suffer him to take the Pains to go to his House to heal one of his Servants; but begged him to do it in the very Place where he was, though so distant. And ha∣ving seen the Earthquake, and all that hap∣pened upon JESUS CHRIST's dying on the Cross, from these things that served him in the Nature of Premises, he strait drew this Conclusion; Truly this was the Son of God: From whence others, for want of his Understanding, would draw a Thou∣sand Absurdities. But what is most surpri∣zing

in this Case, is, that the Children of Is∣rael being of a good Capacity, and so well acquainted with Holy Writ as they were, and the signs proving Jesus Christ was the true Messiah promised in the Law, being so clear and evident, they could not draw the same Conclusions the Centurion did, nor know their Lord, For if they had known him, says St. Paul, they would not have Crucified the Lord of Glory. Of which Isaiah gives the reason in plain terms; Make the Heart of this People (said he) fat, and make their Ears heavy, and shut their Eyes. From which Words the Prophet gives us to understand, that the People of Israel had before a very exquisite and nice Understanding, and that it was dulled by their Sins; that they had had a good Sight, but that it was darkned; that they once heard very well, but were become deaf: So that it was no wonder that from so strong Premises before their Eyes, they drew not the same Consequence as the Cen∣turion; for though he saw, they saw not; though he heard, they heard not; and tho' he understood, they understood not.

There is also another kind of Understand∣ing, which draws the true Conclusion; but very slowly, which is a kind of after-Wit, when the Opportunity is lost, or as some af∣ter the dispute is over, would fain begin the same again; in order to make use of a perti∣nent Reply that came after into their mind,

and of which they never thought in the heat of their Dispute: The same happened to the two Disciples that were passing with Jesus Christ, towards the Village of Emaus, when he said to them; O fools and slow of Heart to believe all that the Prophets have spoken. There are others on the contrary, so quick in draw∣ing a Conclusion from so few Premises, and those so weak, that all are surprized at it: Such was Nathaniel, of whom our Lord said, Behold an Israelite indeed, in whom there is no guile. Which Nathaniel hearing, ask'd him, Whence knowest thou me? To which Jesus Christ answered, Before that Philip call'd thee, when thou was't under the Fig-tree, I saw thee. Nathaniel replied, Rabbi, thou art the Son of God, thou art the King of Israel. Jesus Christ answered and said to him, Because I said un∣to thee, I saw thee under the Figtree, believest thou? thou shall see greater things than these. To which Grave and Learned Men having regard, endeavour to give their Opinion, without shewing the Reasons upon which they were grounded, because it is well known that Authority has no more force than the Reason upon which it is raised; and as the Arguments conclude indifferently on the one side and the other, because of the Difference of Understandings each Man frames a Judgment of the Reason, according to the Understanding he has: Whereupon it passes for more gravity to say, such is my

Opinion for certain Reasons which have mo∣ved me, than to produce the Arguments on which he relied.

But if they are driven to render Reasons for their Opinions, they forget none of them, how slight soever, insomuch that that which they little thought of, has sometimes better effect, and convinces more strongly, than that which they took to be the best. In which appears the Wretchedness of our Un∣derstanding, that Composes, Divides, Ar∣gues, and Reasons, and at last, when it is near the Conclusion, is without Proof, or Light, to know if its Opinion be true or no.

This Uncertainty Divines are under in matters that are not of Faith, for when they have reasoned well, they have no infallible Proof, or any evident success that discovers which Reasons are best; so that each Divine gives his Opinion as well grounded as he can. And provided he answer in appearance the Contrary Arguments, he comes off with Ho∣nour, and there is no more to be hoped for from him. But unhappy are the Physicians, and Generals of Armies! For after they have concluded well, and overthrown with pow∣erful Arguments the Foundations of the con∣trary Opinions, they wait the Success; if it be good, they pass for able and approved, but if bad, all the World cries out, that they built upon false Grounds.

In Matters of Faith, which the Church proposes to us, there can be no Error, because God who knows how uncertain the Reasons of Men are, and how easily they are deceiv∣ed, has not permitted that things so high and of so great importance should depend on our only Determination; but where Two or Three are gathered together in his Name, with the Solemnities of the Church, he is pre∣sent in the midst of them to preside in the Act, where he approves what they say well, and rejects their Errors, and reveals what can't be discover'd by the reach of Human Under∣standing. The Proof of the Arguments con∣cluding in Matters of Faith, is to consider, if that which they infer, and conclude, be the same thing that the Catholic Church teaches and declares; for if they can gather any thing to the contrary, it is an infallible Sign that these Reasons are naught: But in all other Questions where the Understanding has the liberty to Judge, they have not yet found the means to know what Reasons are con∣cluding, nor when the Understanding com∣poses the Truth well. We only depend on the good Consonance they have; which is an Argument very liable to Err, because there are abundance of False things, that have a fair Appearance of Truth, and prove stronger than the truest.

Physicians and Generals have Success and Experience for Proof of their Reasons: For

if Ten Captains prove by Reasons that it is best to give Battel, and as many on the other side defend the Contrary; the Success will ju∣stify the one, and set aside the other Opinion: And if Two Doctors dispute whether the Pa∣tient will live or die, it will appear by his Death or Recovery which had the best Rea∣son of the Two. Nevertheless for all that, the Success is not yet a Proof sufficient; for whereas the same Effect hath many Causes, the Success may well be by means of one Cause, and yet the Reasons be grounded upon a Contrary.

* 1.10 Aristotle says also, That to know what Reasons conclude, it is good to follow the re∣ceived Opinion; for when many Wise and Considering Men affirm the same thing, and conclude all from the same Reasons; it is an Argument, though it be but Topical, that they are concluding, and that they compre∣hend well the Truth. But if it be well con∣sidered, this Proof is still very Fallacious and Deceitful; for in the Force of the Under∣standing, weight avails more than number, for it fares not here, as in bodily Forces, where many Hands joined, can do much to lift up a Weight, and a few but little. But to discover a hidden Truth, one piercing Un∣derstanding alone, shall do more than a Hun∣dred thousand, that are not: And the reason of it is, because the Understandings help not one another, neither of many make one, as

it fares in Bodily Forces. Therefore well said the Wise Man, Provide thy self with many Peace-makers, but with one Counsellor of a thou∣sand. According to which Opinion, Hera∣clitus spoke pertinently when he said, One to me is as good as a Thousand. As for Causes and Pleadings each Advocate gives his Opi∣nion the best grounded upon Law he can; but after having well discoursed, he cannot know certainly by any Art if his Understand∣ing has composed such a Judgment as true Justice requires; for if one Lawyer proves in form of Law, that the Plantiff is in the right, and the other denies it also by way of Law; by what Expedient shall it appear, which of the two Advocates Reasons better? The Sentence of the Judge makes no Demon∣stration of true Justice, nor can it be called Success, because his Sentence amounts to no more than an Opinion, and he does no other than fall in with one of the Council. And to increase the number of Learned Men in the same Opinion, is not an Argument to believe that their Sentiment is the Truth; for we have already said and proved, that many weak Capacities (though they join together to discover some dark and hidden Truth) shall never arrive at the point, or degree of Strength, as a single one that is of a deeper Reach.

And that the Sentence of the Judge makes not Demonstration of the Truth, is clearly

seen, in that it is reversed in a Higher Court, where they very often Judge after another manner; and what is yet worse, it may hap∣pen that the Inferior Judge may have a bet∣ter Understanding than he before whom the Appeal lies, and his Opinion may chance to be more conformable to Reason. That the Sentence of the Superior Judge is no more a sufficient Proof of Justice is a thing yet more manifest; for we see every day that in the same Cases (without adding or diminishing any thing) and from the same Judges quite con∣trary Sentences issue. And he who has already been once mistaken, in confidence of his own Reasons, may very well be mistaken again; so that his Opinion is the less to be depended upon, because, He that is Once in the Wrong, is ever presumed in the Wrong, says the Wise Man. Pleaders observing the Diversity of Opinions amongst the Judges, and how each is sway'd by the Reason that seems most to prevail with him, and that sometimes they are concluded by one Argument, and some∣times by another quite contrary, thereupon they boldly undertake to defend any Cause indifferently in the Negative or Affirmative; the rather, because they see by Experience that on one side and the other they may ob∣tain Sentence in their Favour. And so it comes to be Verified, what Wisdom has said, That the Thoughts of Men are full of Fear, and their Foresight Ʋncertain. The Remedy then

for this, since the Reasons of the Law remain without Proof and Experience, is to make choice of Men of great Abilities to be Judges and Pleaders, inasmuch as Aristotle says the Reasons and Arguments of such are as firm and riveted as Experience it self. And by such a Choice it seems that the Common-wealth may be better secured, that her Offi∣cers shall administer Justice. Whereas if (as it has been used) the Door be open for all without distinction to enter and possess those Posts, without making Trial of their Wit, the Inconveniences we have noted will hap∣pen every day.

By what Signs it may be known, that he who would apply himself to the Study of the Laws, has the Difference of Wit required for this Science, we have heretofore in a manner explained; but to refresh the Me∣mory, and prove it more at large, we must know, that when the Child who learns to Read shall know well his Letters, and shall readily give the sound to each, after the order of the Alphabet, it is an Indication of a good Memory; for it is certain, that such a Work as this, is neither performed by the Under∣standing nor Imagination; and that it is alone the Office of the Memory, to preserve the Fi∣gures of things, and to report the Name of each, as there is Occasion: And if he has a great Memory, we have already prov'd, that by consequence he wants Understanding.

To Write a running fair Hand, as we have noted, discovers the Imagination; so much that the Child who in a few Days knows how to hold his Hand upon his Paper, to draw his Lines strait, and to cut all his Letters even, and in good Form and Figure, gives Proof of a mean Understanding, because this is the Work of the Imagination, and these two Powers have a great Contrariety be∣tween them, as we before noted.

And if being set to Grammar, he learn the same with ease, and in a short time he makes good Latin, and Writes Epistles Elegantly, with the round Cadences of Cicero, he will never prove either a good Judge of Pleader, because it is an indication he has a good Me∣mory, and without a Miracle he will be de∣fective in his Understanding: But if he be un∣wearied in Plodding on the Laws, and stay a long time in the Inns of Court, he will not fail to be a famous Reader, and to be follow∣ed by abundance of Hearers; for the Latin Tongue is very agreeable in the Chair, and to Read publickly with great Applause, there will be occasion of many Allegations, and to muster up in every Law, all that has been Written upon it; to which purpose the Me∣mory is of much more use than the Under∣standing; for though it be true, that in the Chair he is to Distinguish, Infer, Argue, Judge, and Chuse; to gather the true Sense of the Law; yet in the end, he puts the Case

as best likes him, raises what Objections, and solves them how he pleases, and gives his O∣pinion as he will, without any gain-saying; for which things a mean Understanding is sufficient. But when one Pleader speaks for the Plantiff, and another for the Defendant, and a third Lawyer fills the Place of a Judge, this is like a Fight with drawn Sword, and where they cannot speak so at random as when they fight in the Air without an Enemy.

If the Child advance not much in Grammar, it is to be suspected that he has a good Un∣derstanding, and therefore I say suspected, because it does not necessarily follow, that he who can't learn Latin, hath a great Under∣standing. Seeing we have proved before, that Children furnished with a strong Ima∣gination, shall never attain any Perfection in that Tongue. But that which may best dis∣cover this, is, Logic, for this Science bears the same proportion with the Understanding, as the Touchstone does with Gold. Accord∣ingly it is most certain, that if he who makes his Course in Philosophy, does not begin in a Month or two, to Reason, and raise some Objections, and if there come not to his mind Arguments and Answers upon the matter treated of, he has no Understanding at all; but if he prove towardly in this Science, it is an infallible sign, that he has the right Un∣derstanding for the Law, so that he may out of Hand apply himself to it, without the

least scruple. Though I should think it bet∣ter first to run through the Art; for Logic is no more to the Understanding, as we have already said, than the Clogs which are clapt on the Feet of an untrained Mule, going with which some time, he takes to a more steady and agreeable Pace. The same march our Un∣derstanding makes in Disputes, being bound up by the Rules and Precepts of Logic.

But if the Child which we have examined speeds not well in the Latin Tongue, nor in Logic, as he ought, it must be considered, if he be not provided with a good Imagina∣tion, before we take him from the Study of the Laws, for herein is found a great Mystery, and it is good that the Republic know it; it is that there are some Lawyers, who being in the Chair, work Wonders, in Interpreting the Laws, and others in Plead∣ing; but if you put the Staff of Office in their Hands, you shall find them no more able to Govern, than if the Laws had never been made for any such thing. On the Contrary, there are others, who with two or three misunderstood-Laws, which they learn'd at Salamanca, if they should be put into any Command, would acquit themselves to Ad∣miration. At which effect some Curious Wits are Surprized, because they dive not into the Cause from whence it springs. For the Rea∣son of it is, that to Govern belongs to the Ima∣gination, and not to the Understanding, or

Memory. And that this is the Case, may be plainly proved, considering that the Common-wealth is to be maintained by Order and Consent of Parts, every thing being in its due Place, so that all joined together falls into a good Figure and Correspondence. This we have proved many times before is a Work of the Imagination, nor is it much more to the purpose to make a great Lawyer a Magistrate, than to make a Deaf Man a Judge of Music. This is to be understood ordinarily, and not to be taken for a General Rule. For we have already proved, that Nature may join a great Understanding with a great Imagination, so that in such a Case, it would not be incon∣sistent, but that the same Person might prove an Excellent Pleader, and a famous Gover∣nor; and we heretofore discovered that Na∣ture being found strong with all the Powers she can have, and labouring in a well dispo∣sed Matter, may produce a Man of great Memory, Understanding, and Imagination, who Studying the Laws, may prove a Fa∣mous Reader, an Accomplished Pleader, and no less Admirable a Governor. But Nature makes so few such, as this cannot well pass for a General Rule.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Thou shalt not do so to the Lord thy God, but what thing soever I have Com∣manded, observe and do it; thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish therefrom.
• * 1.2

  II. Cor. III.
• * 1.3

  The Thoughts of Men are fearful, and their Fore∣sight uncer∣tain. Wisdom chap▪ IX.
• * 1.4

  L. nec leges F. d leg.
• * 1.5

  F. de le∣gibus & sen. con∣sult. scire leges.
• * 1.6

  Gloss. in 1. damni pascis, ver. aliquas, de damno in∣fecto.
• * 1.7

  Lib. de anima c. III.
• * 1.8

  Hiop de aliment.
• * 1.9

  Lib. I. de alim. fa. cap. I.
• * 1.10

  Lib. I. Top.