The character of a trimmer his opinion of I. The laws and government, II. Protestant religion, III. The papists, IV. Foreign affairs / by ... Sir W.C.

THE Trimmer's Opinion OF THE LAWS and GOVERNMENT.

OUR Trimmer hath a great Veneration for Laws in general, as he hath more particularly for his own, he looketh upon them as the Chains that tye up our unruly Passions, which else, like Wild Beasts let loose, would reduce the World into its first State of Barbarism and Hostility; all the good things we enjoy, we owe to them; and all the ill things we are freed from by their Protection.

God himself thought it not enough to be a Creator, without being a Law-giver, and his goodness had been defective towards Mankind in ma∣king them, if he had not prescrib'd Rules to make them happy.

All Laws flow from that of Nature, and where that is not the Foundation, they may be legally impos'd, but they will be lamely obey'd: By this Nature is not meant that which Fools and Madmen would misquote to justify their Excesses; it is innocent and uncorrupted Nature, that which disposeth Men to chuse Vertue, without its being prescrib'd, and which is so far from inspiring ill thoughts into us, that we take pains to suppress the good ones it infuseth.

The Civil World has ever paid a willing subjection to Laws, even Conquerours have done homage to them; as the Romans who took Pat∣terns of good Laws, even from those they had subdued; and at the same time they Triumph'd over an enssav'd People, the same Laws of that Place did not only remain safe, but became Victorious; their new Ma∣sters, instead of suppressing them, paid them more respect than they had from those who first made them: and by this wise method they arriv'd to

such an admirable Constitution of Laws, that to this day they Reign by them; the Excellency of them Triumpheth still, and the World payeth now an acknowledgment of their obedience to that Mighty Empire, tho' so many Ages after it is dissolved; and by a better instance, the Kings of France, who, in practice use their Laws pretty familiarly, yet think their Picture is drawn with most advantage upon their Seals, when they are plac'd upon the Seat of Justice; and tho' the Hieroglyphick is not there of so much use to the People as they would wish, yet it shews that no Prince is so Great, as to think fit, for his own Credit at least, to give∣an outward, when he refuseth a real worship to the Laws.

They are to Mankind that which the Sun is to the Plants, as it cherish∣eth and preserveth them, so where they have their force, and are not clouded, every thing smileth and slourisheth; but where they are darkned, and are not suffered to shine out, it maketh every thing to wither and decay.

They serve Men not only against one another, but against themselves too; they are a Sanct••••ry to which the Crown hath occasion to resort as often as the People, ••o that it hath an Interest as well as a Duty to preserve them.

There would be no end of making a Panegyrick of Laws; let it be e∣nough to add, that without Laws the World would become a Wilder∣ness and Men little less than Beasts; but with all this, the best things may come to be the worst, if they are not in good hands; and if it be true that the wisest Men generally make the Laws, it is as true, that the strongest do often misinterpret them: and as River belong as much to the Chanel where they run, as to the Spring from whence they first rise, so the Laws depend as much upon the Pipes, thro' which they are to pass, as upon the Fountain from whence they flow.

The Authority of a King who is Head of the Law, as well as the Dig∣nity of Publick Justice, is debased, when the clear stream of the Law is puddled and distrub'd by Bunglers, or convey'd by unclean Instruments to the People.

Our Trimmer would have them appear in their full lustre, and would be grieved to see the day, when, instead of speaking with Authority from the Seats of Justice, they should speak out of a Grate, with a lamenting voice, like Prisoners that desire to be rescu'd.

He wisheth that the Bench may have a Natural as well as a Legal Su∣periority to the Bar; he thinketh Mens abilities much misplac'd, when the Reasons of those that Plead is visibly too strong for those who Judge and give Sentence.

When those from the Bar seem to dictate to their Superious upon

the Bench, their Furrs will look scurvily about them, and the re∣spect of the World will leave the bare Character of a Judge, to follow the Essential knowledge of a Lawyer, who may be greater in himself, than others can be with all their Trappings.

An uncontested Superiority in any Calling, will have the better of any distinct Name that Authority can put upon it, and therefore if ever such an unnatural Method should be produc'd, it is then that Westminster∣Hall might be said to stand upon its Head, and though Justice it self can never be so, yet the Administration of it would be rendered Ridi∣culous.

A Judge hath such a Power lodg'd in him, that the King will never be thought to have chosen well, where the Voice of Mankind hath not be∣fore-hand recommended the Man to his Election; when Men are made Judges of what they do not understand, the World censures such a Choice, not out of ill-will to the Men, but fear to themselves.

If the King had sole Power of chusing Physicians, Men would tremble to see Bunglers preferred, yet the necessity of taking Physick from a Doctor, is generally not so great as that of receiving Justice from a Judge; the Inferences will be very severe in such cases, for either it will be thought that such Men bought what they were not able to deserve, or which is as bad, that Obedience shall be look'd upon as a better Qualification in a Judge, than Skill or Integrity, when such sacred things as the Laws are not only touch'd, but guided by prophane hands; Men will fear that out of the Tree of the Law, from whence we expect Shade and Shelter, such Workmen will make us Cudgels to beat us with, or rather that they will turn the Canon upon our Properties, that were intrusted with them for their Defence.

To see the Laws Mangled, Disguised, Speak quite another Language than their own, to see them thrown from the Dignity of protecting Man∣kind, to the disgraceful Office of destroying them; and, notwithstanding their Innocence in themselves, to be made the worst Instruments that the most refined Villany can make use of, will raise Mens Anger above the power of laying it down again, and tempt them to follow the Evil Ex∣amples given them of Judging without Hearing, when so provoked by their desire of Revenge. Our Trimmer therefore as he thinketh the Laws are Jewels, so he believeth they are no better set, than in the Constitu∣tion of our English Government, if rightly understood, and carefully pre∣served.

It would be too great Partiality to say it is perfect or liable to no Objection; such things are not of the World; but if it hath more Ex∣cellencies and sewer Faults than any other we know, it is enough to re∣commend it to our Esteem.

The Dispute, which is a greater Beauty, a Monarchy or a Common∣wealth, hath lasted long between their contending Lovers, and (they have behav'd themselves so like, who in good Manners must be out of their Wits,) who used such Figures to exalt their own Idols on either side, and such angry Aggravations, to reproach one another in the Contest, that moderate Men have at all times smil'd upon this eagerness, and thonght it differ'd very little from a downright Frenzy: we in England, by a hap∣py use of the Controversie, conclude them both in the wrong, and re∣ject them from being our Pattern, taking the words in the utmost ex∣tent, which is a thing that Monarchy leaveth them no Liberty, and a Common-Wealth such a one, as allows them no Quiet.

We think that a wise Mean, between these two barbarous Extreams, is that which self-Preservation ought to dictate to our Wishes; and we may say we have attained this Mean in a greater measure, than any Nation now in being, or perhaps any we have read of; tho' ne∣ver so much Celebrated for the wisdom or plenty of their Constitutions; we take from one the too great power of doing hurt, and yet leave enough to govern and protect us; we take from the other, the Corfu∣sion, the Parity, the Animosities, and the License, and yet reserve a due care of such Liberty, as may consist with Mens Allegiance; but it being hard, if not impossible, to be exactly even, our Government has much the stronger Biass towards Monarchy, which by the more general Con∣sent and practice of Mankind, seemeth to have the Advantage in di∣spute against a Commonwealth: The Rules of a Commonwealth are too hard for the Bulk of Mankind to come up to, that Form of Go∣vernment requireth such a spirit to carry it on, as doth not dwel in great Numbers, but is restrain'd to so very few, especially in this Age, that let the Methods appear never so much reasonable in Paper, they must fail in Practice, which will ever be suited more to Mens Nature, as it is, than as it should be.

Monarchy is lik'd by the People, for the Bells and the Tinsel, the outward Pomp and the Gilding, and there must be milk for Babes, since the greatest part of Mankind are, and ever will be included in that List; and it is approv'd by wise and thinking Men, (Circumstances and Objections impartially consider'd) that it hath so great an advantage above all other Forms, when the Administration of that Power fal eth in good hands, that all other Governments look out of Countenance, when they are set in Competition with it. Lycurgus might have sav'd himself the trouble of making Laws, if either he had been lmmortal, or that he could have secur'd to Posterity, a succeeding Care of Princes like himself; his own Example was a better Law, than he could with

all his skill tell how to make; such a Prince is a Living Law, that dictates to his Subjects, whose thoughts in that case never rise above their Obedience, the Confidence they have in the Vertue and Knowledge of the Master, preventing the Scruples and Apprehensions to which Men are naturally inclin'd, in relation to those that govern them; such a Magistrate is the Life and Soul of Justice, whereas the Law is but a Body, and a dead one too, without his influence to give it warmth and vigour, and by the irresistible Power of his Vertue, he doth so recon∣cile Dominion and Allegiance, that all disputes between them are silen∣ced and subdued, and indeed no Monarchy can be Perfect and Absolute without exception, but when the Prince is Superiour by his Vertue, as well as by his Character and his Power, so that to serve out Presidents of unlimited Power, is a plain diminution to a Prince that Nature hath made Great, and who had better make himself a glorious Example to Posterity, than borrow an Authority from Dark Records, raised out of the Grave, which besides their Non-usage have always in them matter of Controversie and Debate, and it may be affirm'd, that the Instances are very rare of Princes having the worst in dispute with their People; if they were Eminent for Justice in time of Peace, and Conduct in time of War, such advantage the Crown giveth to those who adorn and confirm it by their own Personal Vertues.

But since for the greater Honour of Good and Wise Princes, and the better to set off their Character by the Comparison, Heaven hath de∣creed there must be a mixture, and that such as are perverse and insuffi∣cient, or both, are perhaps to have their equal turns in the Government of the World, and besides that the Will of a Man is so various, and so unbounded a thing, and so fatal too when joined with power unsupply'd; it is no wonder if those who are to be govern'd, are unwilling to have so dangerous as well as so uncertain a Standard of their Obedience.

There must be therefore Rules and Laws, for want of which, or at least the Observation of them, it was as Capital for a Man to say that Nero did not play well upon the Lute, as to commit Treason, or Blas∣pheme the Gods. And even Vespasian himself had like to have lost him∣self, for sleeping whilst he should have attended and admir'd that Em∣perours Impertinence upon the Stage; There is a wantonness in the too great Power that Men are generally too apt to be corrupted with, and for that Reason, a wise Prince, to prevent the temptation arising from common frailty, would choose to Govern by Rules for his own Sake, as well as for the Peoples, since it only seoureth him from Errors, and doth not lessen the real Authority that a good Magistrate would come to be possess'd of; for if the Will of a Prince is contrary either to Reason it

self, or to the universal Opinion of his Subjects, the Law by a kind restraint rescues him from a disease that would undo him; if his will on the other side is reasonable and well directed, that will immediately becomes a Law, and he is arbitrary by an easie and natural Consequence, without taking pains, or overturning the World for it.

If Princes consider Laws as things impos'd on them, they have the ap∣pearance of Fetters of Iron, but to such as would make them their choice as well as their practice, they are Chains of Gold; and in that respect are Ornaments, as in others they are a defence to them, and by a Com∣parison, not improper for God's Vicegerents upon Earth; as our Maker never commandeth our obedience to any thing, that as unreasonable Crea∣tures we ought not to make our own Election; so a good and wise Go∣vernour, tho' all Laws were abolish'd, would by the voluntary direction of his own Reason, do without restraint the very same things that they would have enjoyned.

Our Trimmer thinketh that the King and Kingdom ought to be one Creature, not to be separated in their Political Capacity; and when any of them undertake to act a-part, it is like the crawling of Worms after they are cut in pieces, which cannot be a lasting Nation, the whole Creature not stirring at a time; if the Body have a dead Palsie, the Head cannot make it move; and God hath not yet delegated such a healing power to Princes, as that they can in moment say to a Languishing Peo∣ple oppress'd in despair, take up your beds and walk.

The Figure of a King, is so comprehensive and exalted a thing, that it is a kind of degrading of him to lodge that power separately in his own Natural Person, which can never be truly or naturally great, but where the People are so united to him as to be Flesh of his Flesh, and Bone of his Bone; for when he is reduc'd to the single definition of a man, he sinketh into so low a Character, that he is a temptation under Mens Allegiance, and an impairing that veneration which is necessary to preserve their duty to him; whereas a Prince that is so joyned to his People that they seem to be his Limbs, rather than his Subjects, Cloathed with Mer∣cy and Justice rightly apply'd in their several places, his Throne supported by Love as well as by Power, and the warm wishes of his devoted Sub∣jects, like never-failing Incense still ascending towards him, looks so like the best Image we can frame to our selves of God Almighty, that Men would have much ado not to fall down and worship him, and would be much more tempted to the Sin of Idolatry, than that of Disobedience.

Our Trimmer is of Opinion, that there must be so much Dignity inse∣parably annex'd to the Royal Function, as may be sufficient to secure it from violence and contempt; and contempt; and there must be Condescensions from the

Throne, like showers from Heaven, that the Prince may look so much the more like God Almighty'd Deputy upon Earth; for power without love hath a terrifying aspect, and the Worship which is paid to it is like that which the Indians give out of fear to Wild Beasts and Devils: he that feareth God only because there is an Hell, must wish there were no God; and he who feareth the King, only because he can punish, must wish there were no King; So that without a Principle of Love, there can be no true Allegiance, and there must remain perpetual Seeds of Resistance a∣gainst a Power that is built upon such an unnatural Foundation, as that of fear and terrour. All force is a kind of foul play, and whosoever aimeth at it himself, doth by implication allow it to those he plays with; so that there will be ever Matter prepared in the minds of People when they are provok'd, and the Prince, to secure himself, must live in the midst of his own Subjects, as if he were in a Conquer'd Country, raise Arms as if he were immediately to meet or resist an Invasion, and all this while sleep as unquietly from the fear of Remedies, as he did before from that of the Disease; it being hard for him to forget, that more Princes have been destroy'd by their Guards than by their People; and that even at the time when the Rule was Quod Principi placuit Lex esto: The Armies and Praetorian Bands which were the Instruments of that unruly Power, were frequently the means made use of to destroy them who had it. There will ever be this difference between God and his Vicegerents, that God is still above the Instruments he useth, and out of the danger of receiving hurt from them; but Princes can never lodge Power in any hands, which may not at some time turn it back upon them; for tho' it is possible enough for a King to have Power enough to satisfy his Ambition; yet no Kingdom hath Money enough to satisfie the avarice of under-Work∣men, who learn from that Prince who will exact more than belongeth to him, to expect from him much more than they deserve; and growing angry upon the first disappointment, they are the Devils which grow terrible to the Conjurers themselves who brought them up, and can't send them down again; And besides that, there can be no lasting Radical Secu∣rity, but where the governed are satisfied with the governours; it must be a dominion very unpleasant to a Prince of an clevated Mind, to impose an abject and sordid servility, instead of receiving the willing Sacrisice of Duty and Obedience. The bravest Priuces in all times, who were un∣capable of any other kind of fear, have fear'd to grieve their own Peo∣ple; such a fear is a glory, and in this sense 'tis an insamy not to be a Coward: So that the mistaken Heroes who are void of this generous kind of fear, need no other aggravation to compleat their ill Characters.

When a despotick Prince hath bruised all his Subjects with a slavish

Obedience, all the force he can use cannot subdue his own fears, Enemies of his own creation, to which he can never be reconciled, it being im∣possible to do injustice, and not to fear Revenge: there is no cure for this fear, but the not deserving to be hurt, and therefore a Prince who doth not allow his thoughts to stray beyond the Rules of Justice, has al∣ways the blessing of an inward quiet and assurance, as a natural effect of his good meaning to his People, and tho' he will not neglect due precau∣tions to secure himself in all Events, yet he is uncapable of entertaining vain and remote suspicions of those of whom he resolves never to de∣serve ill.

It is very hard for a Prince to fear a Rebellion, who neither doth, nor intendeth to do any thing to provoke it; therefore so great a diligence in the Governours, to raise and improve dangers and fears from the People, is no very good Symptom, and naturally begets an influence, that they have thoughts of putting their Subjects Allegiance to a Tryal; and there∣fore not without some Reason fear before hand, that the Irregularities they intend, may raise Men to a Resistance.

Our Trimmer thinketh it no advantage to Government, to endeavour the suppressing all kind of Right which may remain in the Body of the People, or to employ small Authors in it, whose Officiousness or want of Mony may encourage them to Write, tho' it is not very easie to have Abi∣lities equal to such a Subject; they forget that in their too high strain'd Arguments for the Rights of Princes, they very often plead against known Nature, which will always give a Biass to those Reasons which seem of her side; it is the People that Readeth those Books, and its the People must judge of them, and therefore no Maxims should be laid down for the Right of Government, to which there can be any Reasonable Ob∣jection; for the World hath an Interest, and for that Reason is more than ordinary discerning, to find out the weak sides of such Arguments as are intended to do them hurt; and it is a diminution to a Government, to Promote or Countenance such well affected mistakes, which are turned upon it with disadvantage, whenever they are detected or expos'd; and Natu∣rally the too earnest Endeavours to take from Men the Right they have, tempt them, by the Example, to Claim that which they have not.

And in Power, as in all other things, the way for Princes to keep it is, not to grasp more than their Arms can well hold; nice and unnecessary enquiring into these things, or the Licensing some Books, and forbidding others, without sufficient Reason to justifie the doing either, is so far from being an Advantage to a Government, that it exposeth it to the Censure of being Partial, and to the suspicion, of having some suddain Designs to be carried on by these unusual methods.

When all is said, there is Natural Reason of State, an undesinable thing, grounded upon the Common Good of Mankind, which is Immortal, and in all Changes and Revolutions, still preserveth its Original Right of saving a Nation, when a Letter of the Law perhaps would destroy it; and by whatsoever means it moveth, carrieth a Power with it, that admitteth of no opposition, being supported by Nature, which inspireth an imme∣diate consent at some Critical times into every individual Member, to that which visibly tendeth to the preservation of the whole; and this being so, a Wise Prince instead of controverting the right of this Reason of State, will by all means endeavour it may be of his side, and then he will be secure.

Our Trimmer cannot conceive that the Power of any Prince can be last∣ing, but where 'tis built upon the foundation of his own unborrow'd vertue, he must not only be the first Mover and the Fountain, from whence the great Acts of State originally flow, but he must be thought so by his People, that they may preserve their veneration to him; he must be jea∣lous of his Power, and not impart so much of it to any about him, as that he may suffer an Eclipse by it.

He cannot take too much care to keep himself up, for when a Prince is thought to be led by those, with whom he should onely advise, and that the Commands he giveth are transmitted through him, and are not of his own growth; the World will look upon him as a Bird adorn'd with Feathers that are not his own, or consider him rather as an Engine than a living Creature; besides, 'twould be a Contradiction for a Prince to fear a Common-wealth, and at the same time create one himself, by delegating such a Power to any Number of Men near him, as is in∣consistant with the true Figure of a Monarch; it is the worst kind of Co∣ordination the Crown can submit too; for it is the exercise of Power that draweth the respect along with it, and when that is parted with, the bare Character of a King is not sufficient to keep it up; but tho' it is a diminution to a Prince, to parcel out so liberally his Power amongst his Favourites, it's yet worse to divide with any other Man, and to bring himself in Competition with a single Rival; a Partner in Govern∣ment is so unnatural a thing, that it is a squint-ey'd Allegiance that must be paid to such a double bottom'd Monarchy. The Caesars are an Example that the more civiliz'd part of the World will not be proud to follow, and whatsover Gloss may be put upon this Method, by those to whom it may be some use, the Prince will do well to remember, and reflect upon the Story of certain Men who had set up a Statue in Honour to the Sua, yet in a very little time they turned their backs to the Sun, and their Faces to the Statue.

These Mystical Unions are better plac'd in the other World, than they

are in this, and we shall have much ado to find, that in a Monarchy Gods Vicegerency is delegated to more Heads than that which is anointed.

Princes may lend some of their Light to make another shine, but they must still preserve the superiority of being the brighter Planet; and when it happens the Reversion is in Mens Eyes, there is more care to keep up the Dignity of Possessions, that Men may not forget who is King, either out of their hopes or fears who shall be. If the Sun shall part with all his Light, the Indians would not know where to find their God, after he had so deposed himself, and would make the Light (wherever it went) the Object of their Worship.

All Usurpation is alike upon Soveraignty, its no matter from what hand it cometh; and Crowned Heads are to be the more Circumspect, in respect Mens thoughts are naturally apt to ramble beyond what is pre∣sent, they love to work at a distance, and in their greedy Expectations; their minds may be fill'd with a new. Master, the old one may be left to look a little out of Countenance.

Our Trimmer owneth a Passion for liberty, yet so restrain'd, that it doth not in the least impair or taint his Allegiance, he thinketh it hard for a Soul that doth not love Liberty, ever to raise it self to another World, he taketh it to be the foundation of all vertue, and the only seasoning that giveth a relish to life, and tho' the laziness of a slavish subjection, hath its Charms for the more gross and earthly part of Man∣kind, yet to men made of a better sort of Clay, all that the World can give without Liberty hath no taste; it's true, nothing is sold so cheap by unthinking men, but that doth no more lessen the real value of it, than a Country Fellow's Ignorance doth that of a Diamond, in selling it for a Pot of Ale; Liberty is the Mistress of Mankind, she hath powerful Charms that do so dazzle, that we find Beauties in her which perhaps are not there, as we do in other Mistresses; yet if she was not a Beauty, the World would not run mad for her; therefore since the reasonable desire of it ought not to be restrain'd, and that even the unreasonable desire of it cannot be intirely suppress'd, those who would take is away from a People possessed of it, are likely to fail in the attempting, or be very unquiet in the keeping of it.

Our Trimmer admireth our blessed Constitutions, in which Dominion and Liberty are reconcil'd; it giveth to the Prince the glorious Power of Commanding Free-men, and to the Subject, the satisfaction of seeing the Power so lodged; as that their Liberties are secure; it doth not al••ow the Crown such a Ruining Power, as that no grass may grow where e'er it treadeth, but a Cherishing and Protecting Power; such a one as hath a grim Aspect only to the offending Subjects, but is the Joy and the Pride of

all the good ones; their own interest being so bound up in it, as to en∣gage them to defend and support it; and the King is in some Circumstan∣ces restrain'd, so as nothing in the Government can move without him; our Laws make a true distinction between Vassalage and Obedience, be∣tween devouring Prerogatives, and a Licentious ungovernable Freedom: and as of all the Orders of Building, the Composite is the best, so ours by a happy mixture and a wise choice of what is best in others, is brought into a Form; that is our Felicity who live under it, and the envy of our Neighbours that cannot imitate it.

The Crown hath power sufficient to protect our Liberties. The People have so much Liberty as is necessary to make them useful to the Crown.

Our Government is in a just Proportion, no Tympany, no natural swelling either of Power or Liberty; and whereas in all overgrown Mo∣narchies, Reason, Learning and Enquiry are banished in Effigy for Muti∣neers; here they are encourag'd and cherish'd as the surest Friends to a Government establish'd upon the Foundation of Law and Justice: When all is done, those who look for perfection in this World, may look as long as the Jews have for their Messias, and therefore our Trimmer is not so unreasonably Partial as to free our Government; no doubt there have been fatal Instances of its Sickness, and more than that, of its Mortality, for sometime, tho' by a Miracle, it hath been reviv'd again: but till we have another Mankind, in all Constitutions that are bounded, there will ever be some matter of Strife, and Contention, and rather than want pre∣tensions, Mens Passions and Interest will raise them from the most in∣considerable Causes.

Our Government is like our Climate, there are Winds which are some∣times loud and unquiet, and yet with all the Trouble they give us, we owe great part of our Health unto them, they clear the Air, which else would be like a standing Pool, and instead of Refreshment would be a Disease unto us.

There may be fresh Gales of asserting Liberty, without turning into such storms of Hurricane, as that the State should run any hazard of being Cast away by them; these struglings which are natural to all mixed Go∣vernments, while they are kept from growing into Convulsions, do by a natural agitation from the several parts, rather support and strengthen, than weaken or mame the Constitution; and the whole frame, instead of being torn or disjointed, cometh to be the better and closer knit by being thus exercised; but what ever faults our Government may have, or a discerning Critick may find in it, when he looketh upon it alone; let any one be set against it, and then it shews its Comparative Beauty; let us look upon the glittering outside of unbounded Authority, and upon a

nearer enquiry, we shall find nothing but poor and miserable deformity within; let us imagine a Prince living in this Kingdom, as if he were a great Gally, his Subjects tugging at the Oar, laden with Chains, and reduc'd to real Rags; to give him imaginary Lawrels, let us present him gazing among his Flatterers, like a Child never contradicted and there∣fore always Cozen'd, or like a Lady complemented only to be abus'd, condemn'd never to hear Truth, and consequently never to do Justice, wallowing in the soft Bed of wanton and unbridled Greatness, not less odious to the Instruments themselves, than to the Objects of his Tyranny, blown up to an Ambitious Dropsy, never to be satisfied by the Conquest of other People, or by the Oppression of his own; by aiming to be more than a Man, he becomes a Beast, a mistaken Creature, swell'd with Pane∣gyricks, and slatter'd out of his Senses, and not onely an Incumbrance, but a common Nuisance to Mankind, a harden'd and unrelenting Soul, and like some Creatures that grow fat with Poisons, he grows great by other Mens Miseries; an Ambitious Ape of the Divine Greatness, an unruly Gyant that would storm even Heaven it self, but that his scaling Ladders are not long enough; in short, a Wild Beast in rich Trappings, and with all his Pride no more than a Whip in God Almighty's hand, to be thrown into the Fire when the World has been sufficiently scourged with it: This Picture laid in right Colours would not incite Mer to wish for such a Government, but rather to acknowledge the happiness of our own, under which we enjoy all the Priviledges Reasonable Men can desire, and avoid all the Miseries others are subject too; so that our Trimmer would keep it with all its faults, and doth as little forgive those who give the occasion of breaking it, as he doth those that take it.

Our Trimmer is a Friend to Parliaments, notwithstanding all their faults, and excesses, which of late have given such matter of Objection to them, he thinks that tho' they may at sometimes be troublesome to Authority, yet they add the greatest strength to it under a wise Administration, to believe no Government is perfect, except Omnipotence recide in it, to be exercis'd upon great Occasions: Now this cannot be obtain'd by force upon the People, let it be never so great, there must be their con∣sent too, or else a Nation moveth only by being driven, a sluggish and restrained Motion, void of that Life and Vigour which is necessary to produce great things, whereas the virtual Consent of the whole being in∣clnded in their Representatives, and the King giving the faction of the united sense of the People, every Act done by such an Authority, seemeth to be an effect of their choice as well as part of their Duty; and they do with an eagerness, of which Men are uncapable whilst under a force, exe∣cute whatsoever is so enjoined as their own Wills, better explained by Par∣liament,

rather than from the terrour of incurring the Penalty of the Law for omitting it, and by means of this Political Omnipotence, what ever Sap or Juice there is in a Nation, may be to the last drop produc'd, whilst it rises naturally from the Root; whereas all Power exercis'd without con∣sent, is the giving Wounds and Gashes, and tapping a Tree at unseasona∣ble Times, for the present Occasion, which in a very little time must needs destroy it.

Our Trimmer believes, that by the advantage of our Scituation, there can hardly any such Disease come upon us, but that the King may have time enough to consult with Physitians in Parliament; pretences indeed may be made, but a real necessity so pressing, that no delay is to be ad∣mitted, is hardly to be imagined, and it will be neither easie to give an instance of any such thing for the time past, or reasonable to presume it will ever happen for the time to come; but if that strange thing should fall out, our Trimmer is not so strait-lac'd, as to let a Nation dye, or be stifled, rather than it should be help'd by the proper Officers. The Cases them∣selves will bring a Remedy along with them; and he is not afraid to allow that in order to its Preservation, there is a hidden Power in Government, which would be lost if it was designed, a certain Mystery, by which a Nation may at some Critical times secur'd from Ruine, but then it must be kept as a Mistery; it is rendred useless, when touch'd by unlucky hands; and no Government ever had or deserv'd to have that Power, which was so unwary as to anticipate their claim to it: Our Trimmer cannot help think∣ing it had been better, if the Triennial Act had been observ'd; first, be∣cause 'tis the Law, and he would not have the Crown, by such an example, teach the Nation to break it; all irregularity is catching, it hath a Con∣tagion in it, especially in an Age, so much more enclin'd to follow ill Patterns than good ones.

He would have a Parliament, because 'tis an Essential part of the Consti∣tution, even without the Law, it being the only Provision in extraordinary Cases, in which there would be otherwise no Remedy, and there can be no greater Solecisme in Government, than a failure of Justice.

He would have one, because nothing else can unite and heal us, all other Means are meer Shifts and Projects, Houses of Cards, and blown down with the least Breath, and cannot resist the difficulties which are ever presum'd in things of this kind; and he would have had one, because it might have done the King good, and could not possibly have done him hurt, without his Consent, which in that Case is not to be supposed, and therefore for him to fear it, is so strange and so little to be comprehended, that the Reasons can never be presum'd to grow in our Soyl, or to thrive in it when Transplanted from any other Country; and no doubt there are

such irresistable Arguments for calling a Parliament, that tho' it may be deny'd to the unmannerly threatning Petitions of men that are malicious and disaffected, it will be granted to the obsequious Murmurs of his Ma∣jesties best Subjects, and there will be such a Rhetorick it their silent Grief, that it will at last prevail against the Artifices of those. who either out of Guilt or Interest are afraid to throw themselves upon their Country, knowing how scurvily they have used it; that day of Judgment will come, tho' we know not the day nor the hour. And our Trimmer would live so as to be prepared for it, with full assurance in the mean time, that a la∣menting Voice of a Nation cannot long be resisted, and that a Prince, who could so easily forgive his People when they had been in the wrong, cannot fail to hear them when they are in the right.