20. C. Plinius to his friend Cornelius Tacitus, &c.
1. I Have many disputes with a learned and skilfull man, whom nothing pleaseth so much in pleading causes, as bre∣vity; which I confesse is to be observed, if the cause permit; otherwise it is but collusion to passe by things that are to be spo∣ken; it is collusion too to touch those things hastily and briefly which are to be insisted upon, fastned in, and repeated; for many things have a certain force and weight by larger handling.
Page 1002. For as a dart is fastned in the body, so speech in the mind, not by the force more than by the stay.
3 In this he dealeth with me by testimonies, and amongst the Greeks, he boasts to me of Lysias's orations; amongst our own, of the Gracchi and Cato, many of whose indeed are curt and short.
4. I oppose Demosthenes, Aeschines, and Hyperides, to Lysias, and man, besides to the Gracchi and Cato, viz Pollio, Caesar, Caelius, and chiefly Marcus Tullius, whose oration is said to be the best, which is the biggest.
5. And truly, as other good things, so every good book is the better, the bigger it is.
6. •ou see how nothing more than their greatnesse commendeth statues, images, pictures; besides, the shapes of men, and many living things, and trees also, if they be but handsome.
7. So it betides in Orations; moreover their bulk addeth a kind of authority and grace to the very volumes.
8. These arguments, and many others which I use to allege to the same purpose, as he is very full of his shifts and slippery in disputing, he so shifteth, that he maintaineth, these very same men, upon whose Orations I grounded, to have spoken fewer words than they have published.
9. I am quite of another mind.
10. Many orations of many men are my witnesses, and those of Cicero for Marena, for Varenus, wherein a short and bare no∣ting, as it were, of some crimes is shown by their titles alone.
11. By these it is apparent, that he spake very many things, and omitted them, when he put forth his orations.
12. The same Tully pleading for Cluentius, saith, That he alone pleaded a whole cause to the end, after the old custom, and that he pleaded for Cornelius four days together; we can make no doubt, but that he abridged what he had spoken at large for many days together, as it was needfull, being afterwards pared and purged, into one book, a great one indeed, and yet but one.
13. A good pleading is one thing, an oration another.
14. I know some think it to be so, but I (perhaps I am mista∣ken) am perswaded, that it may fall out, that a pleading may be good, which is not a good oration; and that it cannot be but a good pleading which is a good oration.
Page 10215. For an oration is the pattern of a pleading, and, as it were, the first copie.
16. And therefore in every good oration, we find a thousand extemporary flourishes; & in these too which we know were onely set forth, as in that against Verres, an Artificer, Whom? You do well to put me in mind. They said it was Polycletus.
17. It followeth then, that that pleading is the most absolute, which doth most resemble an Oration, if so be it gain a conveni∣ent and due time; which if it be denyed, it is no fault of the Oration, but the greatest of the judge.
18. Those Laws make for my opinion, which allow the lon∣gest times, and do not perswade them that plead to brevity, but to copiousness, that is, diligence: which briefness cannot shew but in very narrow causes.
19. I will add what use, which is an excellent master, hath taught me; I have often pleaded, I have often been a judge, I have often sate in counsell: one thing moves one man, one an∣other; and for the most part small matters draw on the greatest; mens judgments are various, their wills are various; hence it is, that they that have heard the same cause together, often think another, sometimes the same thing, but according to their several affections.
20. Besides, every one favoureth his own invention, and holdeth that for most certain which he hath foreseen, when it is mentioned by another.
21. We must therefore grant to every one something, which they may apprehend, and which they may own.
22. Regulus said once to me, when we pleaded together, You think all things that belong to a Cause are to be prosecuted, but I presently espy the throat, and I presse upon it. He presseth in∣deed what he chooseth, but he often mistaketh in his choise.
23. I made answer, That there may hap to be a knee, or a leg, or an anckle, where he thinketh the throat to be.
24. But I (said I) who cannot espy the throat, assay all things, I try all things; in short, I remove every stone.
25. And as in husbandry, I mind and order not onely my vineyards, but also my woods; and not onely my woods, but also my plain grounds; and in my plain grounds, I do not sow wheat Page 104 and rye alone, but barley, beans, and other pulse: So in pleading, I scatter many seeds, as it were, far and wide, that I may gather what do come of them.
26. For judges wits are full as dubious, uncertain, and fal∣lacious, as the nature of weather and grounds.
27. And I know very well, that that excellent orator Pericles was thus commended by the Comick Poet Eupolis.
28.
29. But neither did that goddesse of speech, nor that he che∣risheth them, befall Pericles himself by a shortnesse or quickn•sse of speech, or both these (for they differ) without an excellent fa∣culty of speaking.
30 For to delight, to perswade, require copiousnesse of speech, and time; and he onely is able to leave a sting in his hearers minds, who doth not prick, but fasten it in.
31. Adde, what another Comoedian saith of the same Pericles.
32. For not a curt and short oration, but a large, stately, and lofty one flasheth, and in conclusion troubleth and confoundeth all things.
33. Yet a mean is best, who denyeth it? Yet he as well mis∣seth the mean, that commeth below a thing, as he that goeth above it; that speaketh too little, as he that speaketh too much.
34. And therefore as you often hear that, too much, and more than needeth, so you may this, poorly and weakly; one is said to have outgone the matter, another is said to have fallen short of it; they both offend alike, the one by his weaknesse, the other by his strength; which truly, though it be not the token of a more pure, yet it is the signe of a greater wit.
35. Nor indeed, when I say this, do I like him in Homer, that had no measure in his words, but him that spake
36. Yet if I might have my choice, I would have that oration Page 106 which is like a winter's snow, that is, thick, continuall, and plentifull; at the last, divine and heavenly.
37. But a short pleading is more taking with many.
38. It is so indeed; but to idle persons, to respect whose niceness and sloth, as a judgment, is a fondnesse.
39. For if you advise with these, it is not onely better to plead briefly, but not at all.
40. This my opinion yet, which I shall alter, if you dissent; but I pray you tell me plainly, why you dissent?
41. For though I ought to yield to your authority, yet I think it better in so weighty a matter to be over-ruled by reason than authority.
42. Therefore, if I seem not to mistake, write so in as short a letter as you will; but yet write, for you will settle my judgment; but if I seem to mistake, provide a very large letter.
43. I have not hurt you, who have enjoyned you to a necessity of a short epistle, if you be of my mind; of a very long one, if you dissent from me. Farewell.
