The questions concerning liberty, necessity, and chance clearly stated and debated between Dr. Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury.

A VINDICATION OF TRUE LIBERTY FROM Antecedent and Ex∣trinsecal Necessity.

J. D.

EIther I am free to write this Discourse for Liber∣ty against Necessity, or I am not free. If I be* 1.1 free, I have obteined the cause, and ought not to suffer for the truth. If I be not free, yet I ought not to be blamed, since I do it not out of any voluntary election, but out of an inevitable Necessity▪

T. H.

RIght Honourable, I had once resolved to answer J. D'••. ob∣jections to my Book De Cive in the first place, as that which concerns me most, and afterwards to examine this disco••••se

of Liberty and Necessity, which (because I never had uttered my opinion of it) concerned me the less. But seeing it was both your Lordships, and J. D▪s. desire, that I should begin with the later, I was contented so to do. And here I present and submit it to your Lordships judgement.

J. D.

(^a) THe first day that I did read over T. H. his defence of the necessity of all things, was April 20. 1646. Which proceeded not out of any disrespect to him; for if all his discourses had been Geometrical demonstrations, able not onely to perswade, but also to compel assent, all had been one to me, first my journey, and afterwards some o∣ther trifles (which we call business) having diverted me un∣til then. And then my occasions permitting me, and an ad∣vertisement from a friend awakening me, I set my self to a serious examination of it. We commonly see those who de∣light in Paradoxes, if they have line enough confute them∣selves; and their speculatives, and their practicks familiarly enterfere one with another. (^b) The very first words of T. H. his defence trip up the heels of his whole cause; I had once resolved; To resolve praesupposeth deliberation; but what deliberation can there be of that which is inevitably determined by causes, without our selves, before we do de∣liberate? can a condemned man deliberate whether he should be executed, or not? It is even to as much purpose, as for a man to consult and ponder with himself whether he should draw in his breath, or whether he should increase in stature. Secondly, (^c) to resolve implies a mans dominion over his own actions, and his actual determination of himself; but he who holds an absolute necessity of all things, hath quitted this dominion over himself, (& which is worse) hath quitted it to the second extrinsecal causes, in which he makes all his actions to be determined; one may as well call again Yesterday, as resolve or newly determine that which is de∣termined to his hand already. (^d) I have perused this trea∣tise, weighed T. H his answers, considered his reasons, and conclude that he hath missed, and missed the Question▪ that

the answers are evasions, that his arguments are paralo∣gisms, that the opinion of absolute and universal Necessity is but a result of some groundless and ill chosen principles, and that the defect is not in himself, but that his cause will admit no better defence; and therefore by his favour I am resolved to adhere to my first opinion. Perhaps another man reading this discourse with other eyes, judgeth it to be per∣tinent and well founded. How comes this to pass? the trea∣tise is the same, the exteriour causes are the same, yet the resolution is contrary. Do the second causes play fast and loose? do they necessitate me to condemn, and necessitate him to maintain? what is it then? the difference must be in our selves, either in our intellectuals, because the one sees clearer than the other, or in our affections, which betray our unsterstandings, and produce an implicite adhaerence in the one more than in the other. Howsoever it be, the dif∣ference is in our selves. The outward causes alone do not chain me to the one resolution, nor him to the other reso∣lution. But T. H. may say, that our several and respective deliberations and affections, are in part the causes of our contrary resolutions, and do concur with the outward cau∣fes, to make up one total and adaequate cause, to the neces∣sary production of this effect. If it be so, he hath spun a fair thred, to make all this stir for such a necessity as no man ever denyed or doubted of; when all the causes have actu∣ally determined themselves, then the effect is in being; for though there be a priority in nature between the cause and the effect, yet they are together in time. And the old rule is, (^e) whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is. This is no absolute necessity, but onely upon supposition, that a man hath determined his own liberty. When we question whether all occurrences be necessary, we do not question whether they be necessary when they are, nor whether they be necessary in sensu composito, after we have resolved and finally determined what to do, but whether they were neces∣sary before they were determined by our selves, by or in the praecedent causes before our selves, or in the exteriour causes without our selves. It is not inconsistent with true

Liberty to determine it self, but it is inconsistent with true Liberty to be determined by another without it self.

T. H. saith further, that upon your Lorships desire and mine, he was contented to begin with this discourse of Liberty and Necessity, that is, to change his former resolution. (^f) If the chain of necessity be no stronger, but that it may be snapped so easily in sunder; if his will was no otherwise de∣termined without himself, but onely by the signification of your Lordships desire and my modest intreaty, then we may easily conclude, that humane affairs are not alwaies go∣verned by absolute necessity; that a man is Lord of his own actions, if not in chief, yet in mean, subordinate to the Lord Paramount of Heaven and Earth; and that all things are not so absolutely determined in the outward and precedent cau∣ses, but that fair intreaties, and moral perswasions may work upon a good nature so far, as to prevent that which otherwise had been, and to produce that which otherwise had not been. He that can reconcile this with an Antece∣dent Necessity of all things, and a Physical or Natural de∣termination of all causes, shall be great Apollo to me.

Whereas T. H. saith that he had never uttered his opini∣on of this Question, I suppose he intends in writing; my conversation with him hath not been frequent, yet I re∣member well, that when this Question was agitated between us two in your Lordships Chamber by your command, he did then declare himself in words, both for the absolute ne∣cessity of all events, and for the ground of this necessity, the Flux or concatenation of the second causes.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Number, I.

(^a) THe first day that I did read over T. H. his defence of Necessity, &c.

His deferring the reading of my defence of necessity, he will not (he saith) should be interpreted for disrespect. Tis well; though I cannot imagine why he should fear to be thought to disre∣spect

me. He was diverted (he saith) by trifles called business. It seems then he acknowledgeth that the will can be diverted by business. Which though said on the By, is contrary I think to the Mayne, that the Will is Free; for free it is not if any thing but it self ca•• divert it.

(^b) The very first words of T. H. his defence, trip up the heeles of his whole cause, &c.

How so? I had once (saith he) Resolved▪ To Resolve praesupposeth deliberation. But what deliberation can there be of that which is inevitably determined without our selves? There is no man doubts but a man may deliberate of what himself shall do, whether the thing be impossible or not, in case he know not of the impossibility; though he cannot deliberate of what another shall do to him. Therefore his examples of the man condemned, of the man that breatheth, and of him that grow∣eth, (because the Question is not what they shall do) but what they shall suffer, are impertinent. This is so evident, that I wonder how he that was before so witty, as to say, my first words tript up the ••e••les of my cause, and that having line enough I would con∣fute my self, could presently be so dull, as not to see his Argu∣ment was too weak to support so triumphant a language. And whereas he seemeth to be off ended with Paradoxes, let him thank the Schoolmen whose senceless writings, have made the greatest number of important Truths see•• Paradoxe.

(^c) This Argument that followeth is no better. To Resolve (saith he) implies a mans dominion over his actions, and his actual determination of himself, &c.

If he understand what it is to Resolve, he knowes that it signifies no more then (after deliberation) to Will. He thinks therefore to Will is to have dominion over his own actions and actually to determine his own Will. But no man can determine his own will; for the will is appetite, nor can a man more deter∣mine his will than any other appetite; that is, more than he can determine when he shall be hungry and when not. When a man is hungry, it is in his choise to eat or not eat; this is the liberty of the man; But to be hungry or not hungry (which is that which I hold to proceed from necessity) is not in his choise. Besides these words dominion over his own actions, and determination

of himself, so farre as they are significant, make against him. For over whatsoever things there is dominion, those things are not Free, and therefore a mans actions are not Free▪ And if a man determine himself, the Question will still remain what determi∣ned him to determine himself in that manner.

(^d) I have perused this Treatise, weighed T. H. his ans∣wers, considered his reasons, &c.

This and that whic•• followeth, is talking to himself at ran∣dome, till he come to all••adge that which he calleth an old rule, which is this, (^e) Whatsoever is, when it is, is necessarily so as it is. This is no absolute necessity, but onely upon supposition that a man hath determined his own liberty, &c.

If the Bishop think that I hold no other Necessity than that which is expressed in that old foolish rule, he neither understand∣eth me, nor what the word Necessary signifieth. Necessary is that which is impossible to be otherwise, or, that which can∣not possibly otherwise come to passe. Therefore Necessary, Possible, and Impossible, have no signification in reference to time past, or time present, but onely time to come. His Ne∣cessary, and his in sensu composito signifie nothing; My Necessary is a Necessary from all Eternity; and yet not incon∣sistent with true Liberty, which doth not consist in determining it self, but in doing what the Will is determined unto. This do∣minion over it self, and this, sensus compositus, and this, de∣termining it self, and this, necessarily is when it is, are con∣fused and empty words.

(^f) If the chain of Necessity be no stronger, but that it may be snapped so easily in sunder, &c. by the signification of your Lordships desire, and my modest intreaty, then we may safely conclude that humane affairs, &c.

Whether my Lords desire, and the Bishops modest intreaty were enough to produce a Will in me to write an answer to his treatise, without other concurrent causes, I am not sure. Obedience to his Lordship did much, & my civility to the Bishop did somwhat, & perhaps there were other imaginations of mine own, that contri∣buted their part. But this I am sure of, that alltogether they were sufficient to frame my will thereto; and whatsoever is sufficient to

produce any thing, produceth it as necessarily as the fire necessa∣rily burneth the F••wel that is cast into it. And though the Bis∣hops modest intreaty had been no part of the cause of my yeilding to it, yet certainly it would have been cause enough to some civil man, to have requited me with fairer Language, than he hath done throughout this Reply.

T. H.

ANd first I assure your Lordship, I find in it no new Argu∣ment,* 1.2 neither from Scripture nor from Reason, that I have not often heard before, which is as much, as to say, that I am not supprised.

J. D.

(^a) THough I be so unhappy, that I can present no no∣velty to T. H. yet I have this comfort, that if he be not supprised, then in reason I may expect a more mature answer from him, and where he failes, I may ascribe it to the weakness of his cause, not to want of preparation. But in this case I like Epictetus his Councell well, that (^b) the Sheep should not brag how much they have eaten, or what an excellent pasture they do go in, but shew it in their Lamb and Wool. Opposite answers and downright Arguments advantage a cause. To tell what we have heard or seen is to no purpose. When a respondent leaves many things un∣touched, as if they were too hot for his Fingers, and de∣clines the weight of other things, and alters the true state of the Question, it is a shrewd sign either that he hath not weighed all things maturely, or else that he maintains a des∣perate cause.

Animadversions upon his Reply Numb. II▪

(^a) THough I be so unhappy that I can present no no∣velty to T. H. yet I have this comfort that if he be not supprised, then in reason I may expect a more mature answer from him, &c.

Though I were not supprised, yet I do not see the reason for which, he saith, he may expect a more mature answer from me; or any further answer at all. For seeing I writ this at his modest request, it is no modest expectation to look for as many answers as he shall be pleased to exact.

(^b) The Sheep should not bragg how much they have eaten, but shew it in their Lamb and Wool.

It is no great bragging, to say I was not supprised; for who∣soever chanceth to read Suarez his Opuscula where he writeth of Free-will, and of the concourse of God with Mans Will; shall find the greatest part, if not all that the Bishop hath urged in this Question. But that which the Bishop hath said of the Rea∣sons and Authorities which he saith (in his Epistle) do offer themselves to serve in this cause; and many other passages of his Book, I shall (I think) before I have done with him, make ap∣pear to be very bragging, and nothing else. And though he say it be Epictetus his counsell that Sheep should show what they eat, in their Lamb and Wool, It is not likely that Epictetus should take a metaphor from Lamb and Wool; for it could not easily come into the mind of men that were not acquainted with the pay∣ing of Tithes. Or if it had, he would have said Lambs in the Plural, as Lay men use to speak. That which followes of my leaving things untoucht, and altering the state of the Question; I remember no such thing, unless he require that I should ans∣wer, not to his Arguments onely, but also to his Syllables.

T. H.

THe Praeface is an handsome one, but it appears even in that,* 1.3 that he hath mictaken the Question; for whereas he sayes thus, if I be free to write this discourse, I have obteined the cause, I deny that to be true, for 'tis not enough to his freedome of wri∣ting, that he had not written it, unless he would himself; if he will obtein the cause, he must prove that before he writ it, it was not necessary he should write it afterward. It may be he thinks it all one to say, I was free to write it, and it was not necessary I should write it. But I think otherwise; for he is free to do a thing, that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may for∣bear if he have the will to forhear. And yet if there be a neces∣sity

that he shall have the will to do it, the action is necessarily to follow; and if there be a necessity, that he shall have the will to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The Questi∣on therefore is not, whether a man be a free Agent, that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, accord∣ing to his will; but whether the will to write, and the will to for∣bear, come upon him according to his will, or according to any thing else in his own power. I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will, but to say I can will if I will, I take to be an absurd speech. Wherefore I cannot grant him the cause upon this Preface.

J. D.

TAcitus speaks of a close kind of adversaries, which ever∣more begin with a mans praise. The Crisis or the Cata∣strophe of their discourse is when they come to their but; As he is a good natured man, but he hath a naughty quality; or he is a wise man, but he hath committed one of the greatest follies; So here the Praeface is an handsome one, but it appears even in this, that he hath mistaken the Question. This is to give an Inch, that one may take away an Ell without suspici∣on; to praise the handsomeness of the Porch, that he may gain credit to the vilifying of the House. Whether of us hath mistaken the Question, I refer to the judicious Reader. (^a) Thus much I will maintain, that that is no true necessity, which he calls necessity; nor that liberty, which he calls li∣berty; nor that the Question, which he makes the Question.

First for liberty, that which he calls liberty, is no true li∣berty.

For the clearing whereof it behooveth us to know the dif∣ference between these three, Necessity, Spontaneity, and Liberty.

Necessity and Spontaneity may sometimes meet together; so may Spontaneity and Liberty; but reall necessity and true li∣berty can never meet together. Some things are necessary and not voluntary or spontaneous; some things are both necessary and voluntary; some things are voluntary and not free; some things are both voluntary and free; But those things which are truly necessary can never be free, and those things which

are truly free can never be necessary. Necessity consists in an Antecedent determination to one; Spontaneity consists in a conformity of the Appetite, either intellectual or sensitive to the object; True Liberty consists in the elective power of the rational Will; That which is determined without my con∣currence, may nevertheless agree well enough with my fancy or desires, and obtein my subsequent consent; But that which is determined without my concurrence or consent, can∣not be the object of mine election. I may like that which is inevitably imposed upon me by another, but if it be inevi∣tably imposed upon me by extrinsecal causes, it is both folly for me to deliberate, and impossible for me to choose, whe∣ther I shall undergo it not. Reason is the root, the fountain, the original of true liberty, which judgeth and representeth to the will, whether this or that be convenient, whether this or that be more convenient. Judge then what a pretty kind of liberty it is which is maintained by T. H. such a liber∣ty as is in little Children before they have the use of reason, before they can consult or deliberate of any thing. Is not this a Childish liberty? and such a liberty as is in brute Beasts, as Bees and Spiders, which do not learn their faculties as we do our trades, by experience and consideration; This is a brutish liberty, such a liberty as a Bird hath to flie, when her wings are clipped, or to use his own comparison, such a li∣berty as a lame man, who hath lost the use of his limbs hath to walk; Is not this a ridiculous liberty? Lastly (which is worse than all these) such a liberty as a River hath to des∣cend down the Channel; what! will he ascribe liberty to inani∣mate Creatures also, which have neither reason, nor spon∣taneity, nor so much as sensitive appetite? Such is T. H. his liberty.

(^b) His Necessity is just such another, a necessity upon supposition, arising from the concourse of all the causes, in∣cluding the last dictate of the understanding in reasonable creatures. The adaequate cause and the effect are together in time, and when all the conurrent causes are determined, the effect is determined also, and is become so necessary, that it is actually in being; But there is a great difference between

determining, and being determined. If all the collateral cau∣ses concurring to the production of an effect, were antece∣dently determined, what they must of necessity produce, and when they must produce it, then there is no doubt but the ef∣fect is necessary. (^c) But if these causes did operate freely, or contingently, if they might have suspended or denied their concurrence, or have concurred after another manner, then the effect was not truly and antecedently necessary, but ei∣ther free or contingent. This will be yet clearer by con∣sidering his own instance of casting Ambs-Ace, though it partake more of contingency than of freedome. Suppo∣sing the positure of the parties hand who did throw the Dice, supposing the figure of the Table and of the Dice themselves, supposing the measure of force applied, and supposing all other things which did concur to the pro∣duction of that cast, to be the very same they were, there is no doubt but in this case the cast is necessary. But still this is but a necessity of supposition; for if all these concurrent causes, or some of them were contingent or free, then the cast was not absolutely necessary. To begin with the Ca∣ster, He might have denied his concurrence and not have cast at all; He might have suspended his concurrence, and not have cast so soon; He might have doubled or dimini∣shed his force in casting, if it had pleased him; He might have thrown the Dice into the other Table. In all these ca∣ses what becomes of his ambs-ace? The like uncertainties offer themselves for the maker of the Tables, and for the maker of the Dice, and for the keeper of the Tables, and for the kind of Wood, and I know not how many other circumstances. In such a mass of contingencies, it is impo∣ssible that the effect should be antecedently necessary. T. H. appeales to every mans experience. I am contented. Let every one reflect upon himself, and he shall find no con∣vincing, much less constreining reason, to necessitate him to any one of these particular acts more than another, but onely his own will or arbitrary determination. So T. H. his necessity is no absolute, no antecedent, extrinsecal ne∣cessity, but meerly a necessity upon supposition.

(^d) Thirdly, that which T. H. makes the Question, is not the Question. The Question is not, saith he, Whether a man may write if he will, and forbear if he will, but whether the will to write or the will to forbear, come upon him according to his will, or according to any thing else in his own power. Here is a distinction without a difference. If his will do not come upon him according to his will, than he is not a free, nor yet so much as a voluntary Agent, which is T. H. his Liberty. Certainly all the freedome of the Agent, is from the freedom of the will. If the will have no power over it self, the Agent is no more free than a Staff in a mans hand. Secondly, he makes but an empty shew of a power in the will, either to wtite or not to write. ^• If it be precisely and inevitably determined in all occurrences whatsoever, what a man shall will, and what he shall not will, what he shall write, and what he shall not write, to what purpose is this power? God and Nature never made any thing in vain; but vain and frustraneous is that power which never was and never shall be deduced into Act. Either the Agent is determined before he acteth, what he shall will, and what he shall not will, what he shall act, and what he shall not act, and then he is no more free to act, than he is to will; Or else he is not derermined, and then there is no necessity. No effect can exceed the vertue of its cause; if the action be free to write or to forbear, the power or faculty to will, or nill, must of necessity be more free. Quod efficit tale il∣lud magis est tale. If the will be determined, the writing or not writing is likewise determined, and then he should not say, He may write or he may forbear, but he must write, or he must forbear. Thirdly, This answer contradicts the sense of all the world, that the wil of man is determined without his will, or without any thing in his power; Why do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not? Why do we represent reasons to them? Why do we pray them? Why do we intreat them? Why do we blame them if their will come not upon them according to their will. Wilt thou be made clean? said our Saviour to the Paraiyticke person, John 5. 6. to what purpose, if his will was extinsecally deter∣mined? Christ complains, We have piped unto you and y••

have not danced, Matth. 11. 17. How could they help it, if their wills were determined without their wils, to forbear? And Matth. 23. 37. I would have gathered your Children together, as the Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings, but ye would not. How easily might they answer according to T. H. his doctrine, Alas blame not us, Our wills are not in our own power or disposition, if they were, we would thankfully embrace so great a favour. Most truly said St. Austin, Our will should not be a will at all, if it were not in our power. ^f This is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned from our Tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by nature; We need not turn over any obscure books to find out this truth. The Poets chant it in the Theaters, the Shepheards in the mountains, the Pastors teach it in their Churches, the Doctors in the Universities, the com∣mon people in the markets, and all mankind in the whole world do assent unto it, except an handful of men, who have poisoned their intellectuals with paradoxical princi∣ples. Fourthly, this necessity which T. H. nath devised, which is grounded upon the necessitation of a mans will without his will, is the worst of all others, and is so far from lessening those difficulties and absurdities which flow from the fatal destiny of the Stoicks, that it increaseth them, and rendreth them unanswerable. ^g No man blameth fire for burning whole Cities, No man taxeth poison for destroy∣ing men, but those persons who apply them to such wicked ends. If the will of man be not in his own disposition, he is no more a free Agent than the fire or the poyson. Three things are required to make an act or omission culpable; First, that it be in our power to perform it, or forbear it, Secondly, that we be obliged to perform it, or forbear it. respectively. Thirdly, that we omit that which we ought to have done, or do that which we ought to have omitted. ^h No man sins in doing those things which he could not shun, or forbearing those things which never were in his power. T. H. may say, that besides the power, men have also an appetite to evil objects, which renders them culpa∣ble. It is true, but if this appetite be determined by ano∣ther,

not by themselves, Or if they have not the use of rea∣son to curb or restrain their appetites, they sin no more than a stone descending downward, according to its natu∣ral appetite, or the brute Beasts who commit voluntary er∣rours in following their sensitive appetites, yet sin not.

ⁱ The Question then is not whether a man be necessita∣ted to will or nill, yet free to act or forbear. But saving the ambiguous acception of the word, Free, the Question is plainly this, whether all Agents, and all events natural, civil, moral, (for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that concerns not this Question,) be predetermi∣ned extrinsecally and inevitably without their own concur∣rence in the determination; so as all actions and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be o∣therwise, after any other manner, or in any other place, time, number, measure, order, nor to any other end, than they are. And all this in respect of the supream cause, or a concourse of extrinsecal causes determining them to one.

^k So my preface remains yet unanswered. Either I was extrinsecally and inevitably predetermined to write this dis∣course, without any concurrence of mine in the determina∣tion, and without any power in me to change or oppose it, or I was not so predetermined; If I was, then I ought not to be blamed, for no man is justly blamed for doing that which never was in his power to shun. If I was not so pre∣determined, then mine actions and my will to act, are nei∣ther compelled nor necessitated by any extrinsecal causes, but I elect and choose, either to write or to forbear, ac∣cording to mine own will, and by mine own power. And when I have resolved, and elected, it is but a necessity of supposition, which may and doth consist with true liberty, not a reall antecedent necessity. The two hornes of this Di∣lemma are so strait, that no mean can be given, nor room to passe between them. And the two consequences are so evident, that instead of answering, he is forced to decline them.

Animadversions upon his Reply Numb. III.

^a THus much I will maintaine, that that is no true neces∣sity, which he calleth Necessity; nor that Liberty, which he calleth Liberty; nor that the Question, which he makes the Question, &c. For the clearing whereof, it be∣hooveth us to know the difference between these three, Ne∣cessity, Spontaneity, and Liberty.

I did expect, that for the knowing of the difference between Necessity, Spontaneity, and Liberty, he would have set down their Definitions. For without these, their difference cannot possibly appear; for how can a man know how things differ, unless he first know what they are; which he offers not to shew. He tels us that Necessity, and Spontaneity may meet together, and Spontaneity, and Liberty; but Necessity and Liberty ne∣ver; and many other things impertinent to the purpose. For which (because of the length) I refer the Reader to the Place. I note onely this, that Spontaneity is a word not used in com∣mon English; and they that understand Latine, know it means no more, than Appetite, or Will, and is not found but in liv∣ing Creatures. And seeing he saith that Necessity and Spon∣taneity may stand together, I may say also, that Necessity and Will, may stand together; and then is not the Will Free (as he would have it) from Necessitation. There are many other things in that which followeth, which I had rather the Reader would consider in his own words, to which I referre him, than that I should give him greater trouble in reciting them again. For I do not fear it will be thought too hot for my fingers, to shew the vanity of such words as these, Intellectual appetire, Con∣formity of the appetite to the object, Rational will, Elective power of the Rational will; nor understand I how Reason can be the root of true Liberty, if the Bishop (as he saith in the beginning) had the liberty to write this discourse. I under∣stand how objects, and the Conveniences and the Inconvenien∣ces of them may be represented to a man, by the help of his sences;

but how Reason representeth any thing to the Will, I under∣stand no more, than the Bishop understands there may be Liber∣ty in Children, in Beasts, and inanimate Creaturs. For he seemeth to wonder how Children may be left at Liberty; how Beasts imprisoned may be set at Liberty; and how a River may have a free course; and saith, what! will he ascribe Li∣berty to inanimate Creatures also? And thus he thinks he hath made it clear how Necessity, Spontaneity, and Liberty differ from ••••e another. If the Reader find it so, I am contented.

^b His Necessity is just such another, a Necessity upon sup∣position, arising from the concourse of all the causes, inclu∣ding the last dictate of the understanding in reasonable Crea∣tures, &c.

The Bishop might easily have seen, that the Necessity I hold, is the same Necessity that he denies; namely a Necessity of things future, that is, an antecedent Necessity derived from the very beginning of time; and that I put Necessity for an Impossibility of not being, and that Impossibility as well as Possibility are never truly said, but of the future. I know as well as he that the cause when it is adaequate (as he calleth it) or entire (as I call it) is together in time with the effect. But for all that the Necessity may be and is before the effect, as much as any Necessity can be. And though he call it a Ne∣cessity of supposition, it is no more so, than all other Necessity is. The fire burneth neoessarily; but not without supposition, that there is fewel put to it. And it burneth the fewel (when it is put to it) necessarily; but it is by supposition, that the or∣dinary course of nature is not hindred; For the fire burnt not the three Children in the Furnace.

^c But if these causes did operate Freely, or Contingently, if they might have suspended, or denied their concurrence, or have concurred after another manner, then the effect was not truly and antecedently necessary, but either free, or Con∣tingent.

It seems by this he understandeth not what these words Free, and Contingent mean. A little before he wondred I should attribute Liberty to inanimate Creatures, and now he puts causes amongst those things that operate Freely. By these cau∣ses

it seems be understandeth onely men, whereas I shewed before that Liberty is usually ascribed to whatsoever Agent is not hin∣dred. And when a man doth any thing Freely, there be many other Agents immediate, that concur to the effect he intendeth, which work not Freely, but necessarily; as when the man mo∣veth the Sword Freely, the Sword woundeth necessarily, nor can suspend or deny its concurrence; And consequently if the man move not himself, the man cannot deny ••is concurrence. To which he cannot reply, unless he say a man originally can move himself, for which he will be able to find no Authority of any that have but tasted of the knowledge of motion. Then for Contingent he understandeth not what it meaneth, for it is all one to say it is Contingent and simply to say it is; saving that when they say simply it is, they consider not how or by what means; but in saying it is contingent they tell us they know not whether necessarily or not. But the Bishop thinking Contingent to be that which is not necessary, instead of arguing against our knowledge of the necessity of things to come, argueth against the necessity it self. Again he supposeth that Free and Con∣tingent causes might have suspended or denied their concur∣rence. From which it followeth that Free causes, and Con∣tingent causes are not causes of themselves, but concurrent with other causes, and therefore can produce nothing but as they are guided by those causes with which they concur; for it is strange, he should say, they might have concurred after ano∣ther manner; for I conceave not how when this runneth one way, and that another, that they can be said to concur, that is run together, And this his concurrence of causes contingent, maketh (he saith) the cast of Ambs-ace not to have been ab∣solutely necessary. Which cannot be conceaved unless it had hindred it; and then it had made some other cast necessary, perhaps Deux-ace, which serveth me as well. For that which he saith of suspending his concurrence, of casting sooner or la∣ter, of altering the casters force, and the like accidents serve not to take away the necessity of Ambs-ace, otherwise then by mak∣ing a necessity of Deux-ace, or other cast that shall be thrown.

^d Thirdly, that which T. H. makes the Question, is not the Question, &c.

He hath very little reason to say this. He requested me to tell him my opinion in writing concerning Free-will. Which I did, and did let him know a man was Free in those things that were in his power, to follow his will; but that he was not Free to Will, that is, that his will did not follow his will, which I expressed in these words, the Question is, whether the will to write, or the will to forbear, come upon a man according to his will, or according ta any thing else in his own power. He that cannot understand the difference between Free to do if he will, and Free to will, is not fit (as I have said in the Stating of the Question) to hear this Controversie disputed, much less to be a writer in it. His consequence, if a man be not Free to will, he is not a Free, nor a Voluntary Agent, and his say∣ing the Freedome of the Agent is from the Freedome of the Will, is put here without proof; nor is there any considerable proof of it through the whole Book ••ereafter offered. For why; he never before had heard (I believe) of any distinction be∣tween Free to do and Free to will, which makes him also say if the Will have not power over it self, the Agent is no more Free, than a Staff in a mans hand. As if it were not Freedome enough for a man to do what he will▪ unless his Will also have power over his Will, a••d that his Will be not the power it self, but must have another power within it to do all volun∣tary acts.

^c If it be precisely and inevitably determined in all occur∣rences whatsoever, what a man shall Will, and what he shall not Will, and what he shall write, and what he shall not write, to what purpose is this power, &c.

It is to this purpose, that all those things may be brought to passe, which God hath from Eternity predetermined. It is therefore to no purpose here to say, that God and Nature hath made nothing in vain. But see what weak Arguments he brings next, which though answered in that which is gone be∣fore, yet if I answer not again, he will say they are too hot for my fingers. One is, If the Agent be determined what he shall Will, and what he shall Act, Then he is no more Free to Act than he is to Will; as if the Will being necessitated, the doing of what we Will were not Liberty. Another is, If a

man be Free to Act, he is much more Free to Will; because Quod efficit tale illud magis est tale; as if he should say, if I make him angry, then I am more angry; because Quod effi∣cit, &c. The third is, If the Will be determined, then the writing is determined, and he ought not to say he may write, but he must write. Tis true, it followeth that he must write, but it doth not follow I ought to say he must write, unless he would have me say more than I know, as himself doth often in this Reply.

After his Arguments, come his difficult Questions. If the Will of man be determined without his Will, or without any thing in his power, why do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not? I answer, Because we desire to know, and cannot know but by their telling, nor then neither for the most part. Why do vve represent reasons to them? Why do vve pray them? Why do we intreat them? I ans∣wer, because thereby we think to make them have the Will they have not. Why do we blame them? I answer, because th'y please us not. I might ask him, whether blaming be any thing else but saying the thing blamed is ill or imperfect. May not we say a Horse is lame, though his lameness came from neces∣sity; or that a man is a fool or a knave, if he be so, though he could not help it? To what purpose did our Saviour say to the Paralytique person, Wilt thou be made clean, if his Will vvere extrinsecally determined? I answer, that it was not because he would know, for he knew it before; but because he would draw from him a confession of his want. We have piped unto you, and ye have not danced; how could they help it? I answer, they could not help it. I vvould have gathered your Children as the Hen gathereth her Chickens under her vvings, but ye vvould not. Hovv easily might they ansvver according to T. H. his doctrine, Alas, blame not us, our vvills are not in our ovvn povver? I answer, they are to be blamed though their Wills be not in their own power. Is not good good, and evill evill though they be not in our power? and shall not I call them so? and is not that Praise and Blame? But it seems the Bishop takes blame not for the dispraise of a thing, but for a praetext and colour of malice and revenge against him

he blameth. And where he sayes our Wills are in our power, he sees not that he speaks absurdly; for he ought to say, the Will is the Power; and through ignorance detecteth the same fault in St. Austin, who saith, our Will should not be a Will at all, if it were not in our power; that is to say, if it were not in our Will.

^f This is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned from our Tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by Nature, &c.

This piece of Eloquence is used by Cicero in his defence of Milo, to prove it lawful for a man to resist force with force, or to keep himself from killing; which the Bishop (thinking himself able to make that which proves one thing prove any thing,) hath translated into English, and brought into this place to prove Free-will. It is true, very few have learned from Tutors, that a man is not free to Will; nor do they find it much in Books. That they find in Books, that which the Po∣ets chant in their Theaters, and the Shepheards in the Moun∣tains, that which the Pastors teach in the Churches, and the Doctors in the Vniversities, and that which the common people in the Markets, and all mankind in the whole World do assent unto, is the same that I assent unto, namely, that a man hath freedome to do if he will; but whether he hath freedome to Will, is a Question which it seems neither the Bishop nor they ever thought on.

^g No man blameth fire for burning Cities, nor taxeth poy∣son for destroying Men, &c.

Here again he is upon his arguments from Blame, which I have answered before; and we do as much blame them as we do men; for we say fire hath done hurt, and the poyson hath killed a man, as well as we say the man hath done unjustly; but we do not seek to be revenged of the fire and of poyson, be∣cause we cannot make them ask forgiveness, as we would make men to do when they hurt us; so that the blaming of the one and the other, that is, the declaring of the hurt or evill action done by them, is the same in both; but the malice of man is onely against man.

^h No man sins in doing those things which he could not shun.

He may as well say, no man halts which cannot chuse but halt; or stumbles, that cannot chuse but stumhl••. For what is sin but halting or stumbling in the way of Gods Commande∣ments.

ⁱ The Question then is not, whether a man be necessi∣tated to will or nill, yet free to act▪ or forbear. But saving the ambiguous acceptions of the word Free, the Question is plainly this, &c.

This Question which the Bishop stateth in this place, I have before set down verbatim and allowed: and it is the same with mine, though he perceave it not. But seeing I did nothing, but at his request set down my opinion, there can be no other Question between us in this controversie, but whether my opinion be the truth or not.

^k So my preface remains yet unanswered, Either I was extrinsecally and inevetably predetermined to write this dis∣course, &c.

That which he sayes in the preface is that if he be not Free to write this discourse, he ought not to be blamed. But if he be Free he hath obteined the cause.

The first consequence I should have granted him, if he had written it rationally and civilly; the later I deny, and have shown that he ought to have proved that a man is Free to Wil. For that which he sayes, any thing else whatsoever, would think, if it know it were moved, and did not know what moved it. A woodden Top that is lasht by the Boyes, and runs about sometimes to one Wall, some∣times to another, somtimes spinning, sometimes hitting men on the shins, if it were sensible of its own motion, would think it pro∣ceeded from its own Will, unless it felt what lasht it. And is a man any wiser, when he runns to one place for a Benefice, to a∣nother for a Bargain, and troubles the world with writing er∣rors, and requiring answers, because he thinks he doth it with∣out other cause than his own Will, and seeth not what are the lashings that cause his Will?

J. D.

ANd so to fall in hand with the Question, without any further proems or prefaces. By Liberty, I do neither* 1.4 understand a liberty from sin, nor a liberty from misery, nor a liberty from servitude, nor a liberty from violence, but I understand a liberty from Necessity' or rather from Necessitation, that is, an universal immunity from all ine∣vitability and determination to one, whether it be of ex∣ercise onely which the Schooles cal a liberty of contradiction, and is found in God, and in the good and bad Angels, that is not a liberty to do both good and evill, but a liberty to do or not to do this or that good, this or that evill respe∣ctively; or whether it be a liberty of specification and exer∣cise also, which the Schooles call liberty of contrariety, and is found in men indowed with reason and understanding, that is, a llberty to do and not to do, good and evill, this or that. Thus the coast being cleared, &c.

T. H.

IN the next place he maketh certain distinctions of liberty, and sayes, he means not liberty from sin, nor from servitude, nor from violence, but from Necessity, Necessitation, inevita∣bility, and determination to one; It had been better to define li∣berty than thus to distinguish, for I understand never the more what he means by liberty. And though he sayes he means li∣berty from Necessitation, yet I understand not how such a li∣berty can be, and it is a taking of the Question without proof; for what else is the Question between ut but whether such a li∣berty he possible or not. There are in the same place other di∣stinctions, as a liberty of exercise onely, which he calls a liberty of contradiction, (namely, of doing not good or evill simply, but of doing this or, that good, or this or that evill respectively.) And a liberty of specification and exercise also, which he calls a liberty of contrariety, namely, a liberty not onely to do or not to do, good or evill, but also to do or not to do, this or that good or evill. And with these distinctions he sayes, he clears the coast, whereas in truth he darkneth his meaning, not onely

with the Jargon of exercise onely, specification also, contradicti∣on, contrariety, but also with pretending distinction where none is; for how is it possible for the liberty of doing or not doing this or that good or evill, to consist (as he sayes it doth in God and An∣gels) without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evill.

J. D.

^a IT is a rule in art, that words which are homonymous, of various and ambiguous significations, ought ever in the first place to be distinguished. No men delight in confused generalities, but either Sophisters or Bunglers. Vir dolosus versatur in generalibus, deceitful men do not love to descend to particulars; and when bad Archers shoot, the safest way is to run to the marke. Liberty is sometimes opposed to the slavery of sin and vitious habits, as Rom. 6. 22. Now being made free from sin. Sometimes to misery and op∣pression, Isay 58. 6. To let the oppressed go free. Sometimes to servitude, as Levit. 25. 10. In the year of Jubilee ye shall proclaim liberty throughout the land. Sometimes to violence, as Psal. 105. 20. The prince of his people let him go free. Yet none of all these are the liberty now in question, but a liber∣ty from necessity, that is a determination to one, or rather from necessitation, that is a necessity imposed by another, or an extrinsecal determination. These distinctions, do virtually imply a description of true liberty, which comes neerer the essence of it, than T. H. his roving definition, as we shall see in due place. And though he say that he under∣stands never the more what I mean by liberty, yet it is plain by his own ingenuous confession, both that he doth understand it, and that this is the very Question where the water sticks between us, whether there be such a liberty free from all ne∣cessitation and extrinsecal determination to one. Which being but the stating of the Question, he calls it amiss the taking of the Question. It were too much weakness to beg this Question, which is so copious and demonstrable. ^b It is strange to see with what confidence now adayes particular men slieght all the Schoolmen, and Philosophers, and Clas∣sick Authors of former ages, as if they were not worthy to

unloose the shoe-strings of some modern Author, or did sit in darkness, and in the shaddow of death, until some third Cato dropped down from Heaven, to whom all men must repair, as to the Altar of Promotheus, to light their torches. I did never wonder to hear a raw Divine out of the Pulpit declare against School Divinity to his equally ignorant Au∣ditors; It is but as the Fox in the Fable, who having lost his own taile by a mischance, would have perswaded all his fellowes to cut off theirs, and throw them away as unprofi∣table burthens. But it troubles me to see a Scholar, one who hath been long admitted into the innermost closet of Nature, and seen the hidden secrets of more subtil learning, so far to forget himself, as to stile School-learning no bet∣ter than a plain Jargon, that is a senseless gibrish, or a fus∣tian language, like the chattering noyse of Sabots. Suppose they did sometimes too much cut truth into shreds, or de∣light in abstruse expressions, yet certainly, this distinction of liberty into liberty of contrariety and liberty of contradicti∣on, or which is all one, of exercise onely, or exercise and spe∣cification jointly, which T. H. rejects with so much scorn, is so true, so necessary, so generally received, that there is searce that writer of note, either Divine or Philosopher, who did ever treat upon this subject, but he useth it.

Good and evill are contraries, or opposite kinds of things, therefore to be able to choose both good and evill, is a li∣berty of contrariety or of specification; To choose this, and not to choose this, are contradictory, or which is all one, an exercise or suspension of power; Therefore to be able to do or forbear to do the same action, or to choose or not choose the same object, without varying of the kind, is a liberty of contradiction, or of exercise onely. Now a man is not onely able to do or forbear to do good onely, or evil onely, but he is able both to do and to forbear to do both good and evil. So he hath not onely a liberty of the action, but also a liberty of contrary objects; not onely a liberty of exercise, but also of specification; not onely a liberty of contradiction, but also of contrariety. On the other side, God and the good Angels, can do or not do

this or that good, but they cannot do and not do both good and evil. So they have onely a liberty of exercise or contradiction, but not a liberty of specification or contra∣riety. It appears then plainly, that the liberty of man is more large in the extension of the object, which is both good and evil, than the liberty of God and the good An∣gels, whose object is onely good. But withal, the liber∣ty of man comes short in the intension of the power. Man is not so free in respect of good onely, as God, or the good Angels, because (not to speak of God whose liberty is quite of another nature) the understandings of the An∣gels are clearer, their power and dominion over their acti∣ons is greater, they have no sensitive appetites to distract them, no Organs to be disturbed; we see then this distincti∣on is cleared from all darkness.

And where T. H. demands how it is possible for the li∣berty of doing, or not doing this or that good or evil, to consist in God and Angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil. The answer is obvious and easie, referendo singula singulis, •• rendring every act to its right ob∣ject respectively. God and good Angels have a power to do or not to do this or that good, bad Angels have a power to do or not do this or that evil, so both jointly considered have power respectively to do good or evil. And yet accor∣ding to the words of my discourse, God, and good and bad Angels being singly considered, have no power to do good or evil, that is, indifferently, as man hath.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Number, IV.

HE intendeth here to make good the distinctions of Liberty of Exercise, and Liberty of Contradiction; Liberty of Con∣trariety, and Liberty of Specification and Exercise. And he begins thus.

^a It is a rule in Art, that words which are homonymous, or of various and ambiguous significations, ought ever in the first place to be distinguished, &c.

I know not what Art it is that giveth this rule. I am sure it is not the Art of Reason which men call Logique. For Reason teacheth, and the example of those who onely reason methodically, (which are the Mathematicians) that a man when he will de∣monstrate the truth of what he is to say, must in the first place de∣termine what he will have to be understood by his words; which de∣termination is called definition; whereby the significations of his words are so clearly set down, that there can creep in no ambi∣guity. And therefore there will be no need of distinctions; and consequently his rule of Art, is a rash precept of some ignorant man▪ whom he and others have followed.

The Bishop tells us that Liberty is sometimes opposed to sin, to oppression, to servitudo; which is to tell us that they whom he hath read in this point, are inconstant in the meaning of their own words; and therefore they are little beholding to him. And this diversity of significations he calls distinctions. Do men that by the same word in one place mean one thing, and in another a∣nother, and never tell us so, distinguish? I think they rather confound. And yet he sayes, that these distinctions do vertu∣ally imply a description of true Liberty, which cometh neerer the essence of it, than T. H. his roving definition; Which definition of mine was this, Liberty is when there is no external impediment. So that in his opinion a man shall sooner understand Liberty by reading these words, Rom. 6. Being made free from sin, or these words, Esay 58. To let the op∣pressed go free, or by these words, Levit. 25. You shall pro∣claim Liberty throughout the Land, than by these words of mine, Liberty is the absence of external impediments to motion▪ Also he will face me down that I understand what he meanes by his distinctions of liberty of Contrariety, of Contra∣diction, of Exercise onely, of Exercise and Specification jointly. If he mean I understand his meaning, in one sence it is true; for by them he means to shift off the discredit of being able to say nothing to the Question, as they do, that pretending to know the cause of every thing, give for the cause of why the Loadstone draweth to it Iron, sympathy, & occult quality; making they cannot tell, (turned now into Occult) to stand for there∣all cause of that most admirable effect. But that those words

signifie distinction I constantly deny. It is not enough for a dis∣tinction to be forked, it ought to signifie a distinct conception. There, is great difference between luade distinctions and cloven feet.

^b It is strange to see with what confidence now adayes par∣ticular men slight all the Schoolmen, and Philosophers, and Classick Authors of former ages, &c.

This word particular men is put here in my opinion with lit∣tle judgement, especially by a man that pretendeth to be learned. Does the Bishop think that he himself is, or that there is any Universal man? It may be he means a private man. Does he then think there is any man not private, besides him that is in∣dued with Soveraign power? But it is most likely he calls me a particular man, because I have not had the authority he has had to teach what doctrine I think fit. But now, I am no more Particular than he; and may with as good a grace despise the Schoolmen, and some of the old Philosophers, as he can despise me, unless he can shew that it is more likely that he should be better able to look into these Questions sufficiently, which require me∣ditation and reflection upon a mans own thoughts, he that hath been obliged most of his time to preach unto the people, and to that end to read those Authors that can best furnish him with what he has to say, and to study for the rhetorick of his expressions, and of the spare time (which to a good Pastor is very little) hath spent no little part in seeking preferment, and encreasing of rich∣es; than I that have done almost nothing else, nor have had much else to do but to meditate upon this and other natural Que∣stions. It troubles him much that I stile School-learning Jargon. I do not call all School-learning so, but such as is so, that is, that w ^ch they say in defending of untruths, and especially in the main∣tenance of Free-will, when they talk of liberty of Exercise, Spe∣cification, Contrariety, Contradiction, Acts Elicite and Ex∣ercite, and the like; Which though he go over again in this place, endeavouring to explain them, are still both here and there but Jargon, or that (if he like it better) which the Scripture in the first Chaos calleth Tohu and Bohu.

But because he takes it so hainously, that a private man should so hardly censure School-Divinity; I would be glad to know with what patience he can hear Martin Luther, and Phillip

Melancthon speaking of the same. Martin Luther that was the first beginner of our deliverance from the servitude of the Romish Clergy, had these three Articles censured by the U∣niversity of Paris. The first of which was, School-Theolo∣gy is a false interpretation of the Scripture, and Sacraments, which hath banished from us true and sinceere Theology. The second is, At what time School-Theology, that is, Mock-Theology came up, at the same time the Theology of Christs Crosse went down. The third is, It is now almost 300 years since the Church has endured the licentiousnes of School Doctors in corrupting of the Scriptures. Moreover the same Luther in another place of his works saith thus, School-Theology is nothing else but ignorance of the truth, and a block to stumble at, laid before the Scriptures. And of Tho. Aquinas in particular he saith, that it was he that did set up the Kingdome of Aristotle, the destroyer of godly Doctrine. And of the Philosophy whereof St. Paul biddeth us beware, he saith it is School-Theology. And Melancthon a Divine once much esteemed in our Church, saith of it thus, Tis known that that profane Scholastique learning, which they will have to be called Divinity, began at Paris; which being ad∣mitted, nothing is left sound in the Church, the Gospel is obscured, Faith extinguished, the Doctrine of works recei∣ved, and instead of Christs People, we are become not so much as the people of the Law, but the people of Aristotles Ethiques. These were no raw Divines, such as he saith preacht to their equally ignorant Auditors. I could ad to these the slighting of School-Divinity by Calvin, and other learned Protestant Doctors; yet were they all but private men, who it seemes to the Bishop had forgot themselves as well as I.

J. D.

THus the coast being cleared, the next thing to be done,* 1.5 is to draw out our forces against the enemy; And be∣cause they are divided into two Squadrons, the one of Christians, the other of Heathen Philosophers, it will be best to dispose ours also into two Bodies, the former drawn from Scripture, the later from Reason.

T. H.

THe next thing be doth after the clearing of the coast, is the dividing of his forces, as he calls them, into two Squadrons, one of places of Scripture, the other of Reasons, which Allegory be useth, I suppose, because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship, who is a Millitary Man. All that I have to say, touching this is, that I observe a great part of those his forces, do look and march another way, and some of them do fight among themselves.

J. D.

IF T. H. could divide my forces, and commit them together among themselves, it were his onely way to conquer them. But he will find that those imaginary contradictions, which he thinks he hath espied in my discourse, are but fancies, and my supposed impertinences wil prove his own real mista∣kings.

IN this fift Number there is nothing of his or mine, perti∣nent to the Question, therefore nothing necessary to be re∣peated.

J. D.

Proofs of Liberty out of Scripture.

FIrst, whosoever have power of election have true Liber∣ty,* 1.6 for the proper act of liberty is election. A Sponta∣neity may consist with determination to one, as we see in Children, Fools, mad Men, bruit Beasts, whose fancies

are determined to those things which they act Spontaneous∣ly, as the Bees make Honey, the Spiders Webs. But none of these have a liberty of election, which is an act of judge∣ment and understanding, and cannot possibly consist with a determination to one. He that is determined by some∣thing before himself or without himself, cannot be said to choose or elect, unless it be as the Junior of the Mess choos∣eth in Cambridge, whether he will have the least part or nothing. And scarcely so much.

But men have liberty of election. This is plain, Numb. 30. 14. If a Wife make a vow its left to her Husbands choice, either to establish it or to make it void. And Josh. 24. 15. Choose you this day whom you will serve, &c. But I and my house will serve the Lord. He makes his own choice, and leaves them to the liberty of their election. And 2 Sam. 24, 12. I offer thee three things, choose thee which of them I shall do. If one of these three things was necessarily de∣termined, and the other two impossible, how was it left to him to choose what should be done? Therefore we have true liberty.

T. H.

ANd the first place of Scripture taken from Numb. 30. 14 is one of them that look another way; The words are, If a Wife make a vow, it is left to her Husbands choice, either to e∣stablish it, or make it void; for it prooves no more but that the Husband is a free or voluntary Agent, but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not determined to what he shall choose by praecedent necessary causes.

J. D.

MY first Argument from Scripture is thus formed,* 1.7 Whosoever have a liberty or power of election, are not determined to one by praecedent necessary causes.

But men have liberty of election.

The assumption or minor proposition is prooved by three places of Scripture, Numb. 30. 14. Josh. 24. 15. 2 Sam. 24. 12. I need not insist upon these, because T. H. ac∣knowledgeth, that it is clearly prooved that there is election in Man.

But he denieth the major Proposition, because (saith he) Man is necessitated or determined to what he shall choose by prae∣cedent necessary causes; I take away this answer three wayes.

First, by Reason. Election is evermore either of things* 1.8 possible, or at least of things conceived to be possible, that is, efficacious election, when a man hopeth or thinketh of obteining the object. Whatsoever the will chooseth, it chooseth under the notion of good, either honest or de∣lightful or profitable, but there can be no reall goodness apprehended in that which is known to be impossible: It is true, there may be some wandring pendulous wishes of known impossibilities, as a man also that hath comitted an offence, may wish he had not committed it, but to choose efficaciously an impossibility, is as impossible as an impossi∣bility it self. No man can think to obtein that which he knows impossible to be obteined; but he who knows that all things are antecedently determined by necessary cau∣ses, knows that it is impossible for any thing to be other∣wise than it is; Therefore to ascribe unto him a power of election to choose this or that indifferently, is to make the same thing to be determined to one, and to be not de∣termined to one, which are contradictories. Again, who∣soever hath an elective power, or a liberty to choose, hath also a liberty or power to refuse, Isa. 7. 10. Before the Child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good. He who chooseth this rather than that, refuseth that rather than this. As Moses choosing to suffer affliction with the people of God, did thereby refuse the pleasures of sin. Heb. 11. 24. But no man hath any power to refuse, that which is neces∣sarily praedetermined to be, unlesse it be as the Fox refused the Grapes which were beyond his reach. When one thing of two or three is absolutely determined, the other are made thereby simply impossible.

^a Secondly, I proove it by instances, and by that univer∣sal* 1.9 notion, which the world hath of election; what is the difference between an elective and hereditary Kingdom? but that in an elective Kingdom they have power or liberty

to choose this or that Man indifferently: But in an heredita∣ry Kingdome they have no such power nor liberty. Where the Law makes a certain Heir, there is a necessitation to one; where the Law doth not name a certain Heir, there is no necessitation to one, and there they have power or liber∣ty to choose. An haereditary prince may be as grateful and acceptable to his subjects, and as willingly received by them (according to that liberty which is opposed to compulsion or violence) as he who is chosen, yet he is not therefore an elective Prince. In Germany all the Nobility and Com∣mons may assent to the choice of the Emperour, or be well pleased with it when it is concluded, yet none of them e∣lect or choose the Emperour, but onely those six Princes who have a consultative, deliberative, and determinative power in his Election. And if their votes or suffrages be e∣qually divided, three to three, then the King of Bohemia hath the casting voice. So likewise in Corporations or Common-wealths, sometimes the People, sometimes the Common Councell, have power to name so many persons for such an office, and the Supreme Magistrate, or Senate, or lesser Councel respectively, to choose one of those. And all this is done with that caution and secrecy, by billets or other means, that no man knowes which way any man gave his vote, or with whom to be offended. If it were neces∣sarily and inevitably predetermined, that this individual person and no other shall and must be chosen, what need∣ed all this circuit and caution, to do that which is not pos∣sible to be done otherwise, which one may do as well as a thousand, and for doing of which no rational man can be offended, if the electors were necessarily predetermined to elect this man and no other. And though T. H. was plea∣sed to passe by my University instance, yet I may not, un∣till I see what he is able to say unto it. The Junior of the Mess in Cambridge divides the meat in four parts, the Seni∣or chooseth first, then the second and third in their order. The Junior is determined to one, and hath no choice left, unless it be to choose whether he will take that part which the rest have refused, or none at all. It may be this part is

more agreable to his mind that any of the others would have been, but for all that he cannot be said to choose it, because he is determined to this one. Even such a liberty of election is that which is established by T. H. Or rather much worse in two respects. The Junior hath yet a liberty of contradiction left to choose whether he will take that part or not take any part, but he who is precisely predeter∣mined to the choice of this object, hath no liberty to refuse it. Secondly, the Junior by dividing carefully may pre∣serve to himself an equal share, but he who is wholly deter∣mined by extrinsecal causes, is left altogether to the mercy and disposition of another.

Thirdly, I proove it by the texts alleadged, Numb. 30.* 1.10 13. If a Wife make a vow, it is left to her Husbands choice, either to establish it or make it void. But if it be predeter∣mined, that he shall establish it, it is not in his power to make it void. If it be predetermined, that he shall make it void, it is not in his power to establish it. And howsoe∣ver it be determined, yet being determined, it is not in his power indifferently, either to establish it, or to make it void at his pleasure. So Joshua 24. 15. Choose you this day whom ye will serve: But I and my house will serve the Lord. It is too late to choose that this day, which was determined otherwise yesterday, whom ye will serve, whether the Gods whom your fathers served, or the Gods of the Amorites. Where there is an election of this or that, these Gods, or those Gods, there must needs be either an indifferency to both objects, or at least a possibility of either. I and my house will seve the Lord. If he were extrinsecally predetermined, he should not say I will serve, but I must serve. And 2 Sam. 24. 12. I offer thee three things choose thee which of them I shall do. How doth God offer three things to Davids choice, if he had predetermined him to one of the three by a concourse of necessary extrinsecal causes? If a soveraign Prince should descend so far as to offer a delinquent his choice, whether he would be fined, or imprisoned, or ba∣nished, and had under hand signed the sentence of his ba∣nishment, what were it else but plain drollery, or mockery?

This is the argument which in T. H. his opinion looks ano∣ther way. If it do, it is as the Parthians used to fight, fly∣ing. His reason followes next to be considered.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Number, VI.

IN this Number he hath brought three places of Scripture to prove Free-Will. The first is, If a Wife make a vow, it is left to her Husbands choice either to establish it, or to make it void. And Choose you this day whom you will serve, &c. But I and my house will serve the Lord. And I offer thee three things choose thee which of them I shall do. Which in the Reply he endeavoureth to make good; but needed not, seeing they prove nothing but that a man is Free to do if he will, which I deny not. He ought to prove he is Free to will, which I deny.

^a Secondly, I prove it by instances, and by that univer∣sal notion which the world hath of Election.

His instances are first the difference between an Hereditary Kingdom, and an Elective; and then the difference between the Senior and Junior of the Mess taking their commons; both which prove the liberty of doing what they will, but not a liberty to will; for in the first case the Electors are Free to name whom they will, but not to Will; and in the second the Senior having an appetite, chooseth what he hath an appetite to; but chooseth not his appetite.

T. H.

FOr if there come into the Husbands mind greater good by esta∣blishing* 1.11 than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow necessarily. And if the evill that will follow thereon in the Husbands opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow. And yet in this following of ones hopes and feares con∣sisteth the nature of Election. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this. And consequently choosing and necessity are joyned together.

J. D.

••THere is nothing said with more shew of reason in this cause by the patrons of necessity, and adversaries of true liberty than this, That the Will doth perpetually and infallibly follow the last dictate of the understanding, or the last judgement of right reason. 〈…〉〈…〉 in this, and this onely, I confess T. H. hath good seconds. Yet the com∣mon and approved opinion is contrary. And justly: For,

First, this very act of the understanding is an effect of* 1.12 the will, and a testimony of its power and liberty. It is the will, which affecting some particular good, doth in∣gage and command the understanding to consult and deli∣berate what means are convenient for atteining that end. And though the Will it self be blind, yet its object is good in general, which is the end of all human actions. There∣fore it belongs to the Will, as to the General of an Army to move the other powers of the soul to their acts, and a∣mong the rest the understanding also, by applying it and re∣ducing its power into act. So as whatsoever obligation the understanding doth put upon the Will, is by the consent of the Will, and derived from the power of the Will, which was not necessitated to moove the understanding to con∣sult. So the Will is the Lady and Mistriss of human actions, the understanding is her trusty counseller, which gives no advise, but when it is required by the Will. And if the first consultation or deliberation be not sufficient, the Will may moove a review, and require the understanding to inform it self better, and take advise of others, from whence ma∣ny times the judgment of the understanding doth receive al∣teration.

Secondly, for the manner how the understanding doth* 1.13 determine the Will, it is not naturally but morally. The Will is mooved by the understanding, not as by an effici∣ent, having a causal influence into the effect, but onely by proposing and representing the object. And therefore

as it were ridiculous to say, that the object of the sight is the cause of seeing, so it is to say, that the proposing of the ob∣ject by the understanding to the will, is the cause of willing; and therefore the understanding hath no place in that con∣course of causes which according to T. H. do necessitate the will.

Thirdly, the judgement of the understanding is not al∣wayes* 1.14 practicè practicum, nor of such a nature in it self, as to oblige and determine the will to one. Sometimes the understanding proposeth two or three means equally avail∣able to the atteining of one and the same end. Sometimes it dictateth, that this or that particular good is eligible or fit to be chosen, but not that it is necessarily eligible, or that it must be chosen. It may judge this or that to be a fit means, but not the onely means to attain the desired end. In these cases no man can doubt, but that the Will may choose, or not choose, this or that indifferently. Yea, though the understanding shall judge one of these means to be more expedient than another, yet for as much as in the less expedient there is found the reason of good, the Will in respect of that dominion which it hath over it self, may ac∣cept that which the understanding judgeth to be less expe∣dient, and refuse that which it judgeth to be more expedi∣ent.

Fourthly, sometimes the will doth not will the end so ef∣ficaciously,* 1.15 but that it may be, and often is deterred from the prosecution of it by the difficulty of the means; and notwithstanding the judgement of the understanding, the will may still suspend its own act.

Fiftly, supposing but not granting, that the will did ne∣cessarily* 1.16 follow the last dictate of the understanding, yet this proves no antecedent necessity, but coexistent with the act; no extrinsecal necessity, the will and the understand∣ing being but two faculties of the same soul; no absolute necessity, but meerly upon supposition. And therefore the same Authors who matntain that the judgement of the un∣derstanding doth necessarily determine the will, do yet much more earnestly oppugne T. H. his absolute necessity

of all occurrences. Suppose the Will shall apply the un∣derstanding to deliberate and not require a review. Sup∣pose the dictate of the understanding shall be absolute, not this or that indifferently, nor this rather than that compa∣ratively, but this positively, nor this freely, but this neces∣sarily. And suppose the will do will efficaciously, and do not suspend its own act. Then here is a necessity indeed, but neither absolute, nor extrinsecal, nor antecedent, flow∣ing from a concourse of causes without our selves, but a ne∣cessity upon supposition, which we do readily grant. So far T. H. is wide from the truth, whilest he maintains, either that the apprehension of a greater good doth neessitate the Will, or that this is an absolute necessity.

^b Lastly, whereas he saith, that the nature of election doth consist in following our hopes and fears, I cannot but ob∣serve that there is not one word of Art in this whole trea∣tife, which he useth in the right sence; I hope it doth not proceed out of an affectation of singularity, nor out of a contempt of former Writers, nor out of a desire to take in sunder the whole frame of Learning, and new mould it af∣ter his own mind. It were to be wished that at least he would give us a new Dictionary, that we might understand his sence. But because this is but touched here sparingly and upon the by, I will forbear it, until I meet with it a∣gain in its proper place. And for the present it shall suffise to say, that hopes and fears are common to brute Beasts, but election is a rational act, and is proper only to man, who is Sanctius his animal mentis{que} capacius altae.

T. H.

THE second place of Scripture is Josh. 24. 15. The third is 2 Sam. 24. 12. whereby tis clearly proved, that there is election in man, but not proved that such election was not ne∣cessitated by the hopes, and fears, and considerations of good and bad to follow, which depend not on the Will, nor are subject to election. And therefore one answer serves all such places, if they were a thousand.

J. D.

THis answer being the very same with the former, word for word, which hath already sufficiently been shaken in pieces, doth require no new reply.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb. VII.

^a THere is no thing said with more show of reason in this cause by the Patrons of Necessity then this, that the Wil doth perpetually and infallibly follow the last dictate of the understanding, or the last judgement of right reason, &c. Yet the common and approved opinion is contrary, and justly; for first this very act of the understanding is an effect of the Will, &c.

I note here first, that the Bishop is mistaken in saying that I or any other Patron of Necessity, are of opinion that the Will followes alwayes the last judgement of right Reason. For it followeth as well the judgement of an erroneous as of a true rea∣soning; and the truth in general is that it followeth the last opi∣nion, of the goodness or evilness of the object, be the opinion true or false.

Secondly I note, that in making the understanding to be an effect of the Will, he thinketh a man may have a will to that which he not so much as thinks on. And in saying, that it is the Will, which affecting some particular good, doth ingage and command the Understanding to consult, &c.

That he not onely thinketh the Will affecteth a particular good, before the man understands it to be good, but also he thinketh that these words doth command the understanding; and these; for it belongs to the Will as to the General of an Army to move the other powers of the soul to their acts, and a great many more that follow which are not sense; but meer confusion & emptiness: as for example, The understanding doth determine

the will, not Naturally, but Morally; and The will is moved by the understanding, is unintelligible. Moved not as by an Efficient, is non-sense. And where he saith, that it is ridiculous to say, the object of the sight is the cause of seeing, he showeth so clearly that he understandeth nothing at all of Natural Philosophy, that I am sorry I had the ill fortune to be engaged with him in a dispute of this kind. There is nothing that the simplest Country Man could say so absurdly concerning the understanding, as this of the Bishop, the judgement of the understanding is not alwaies practicè practicum. A Coun∣try Man will acknowledge there is judgement in Men, but will as soon say the judgement of the judgement, as the judgement of the understanding. And if practicè practicum had been sense, he might have made a shift to put it into English. Much more followeth of this stuff.

^b Lastly, whereas he saith, that the nature of Electi∣on doth consist in following our hopes and fears, I cannot but observe that there is not one word of Art in this whole trea∣tise which he useth in the right sense. I hope it doth not proceed out of an affectation of singularity, nor out of a contempt of former Writers, &c.

He might have said, there is not a word of Jargon, nor Non∣sense; and that it proceedeth from an affectation of truth, and contempt of metaphysical Writers, and a desire to reduce into frame the Learning which they have confounded and disor∣dered.

T. H.

SUpposing, it seemes, I might answer as I have done, that* 1.17 Necessity and Election might stand together, and instance in the actions of Children, Fooles, and brute Beasts, whose fancies I might say, are necessitated and determined to one: be∣fore these his proofs out of Scripture he desires to prevent that in∣stance; and therefore sayes, that the actions of children, fooles, mad-men, and beasts are indeed determined, but that they pro∣ceed not from election, nor from free, but from spontaneous Agents. As for example, that the Bee when it maketh honey

does it spontaneously; And when the Spider makes his webb, he does it spontaneously, and not by election. Though I never meant to ground any answer upon the experience of what chil∣dren, fools, mad-men, and beasts do, yet that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by spontaneous, and how it differs from voluntary, I will answer that distinction and shew, that it fighteth against its fellow Arguments. Your Lordship therefore is to consider, that all voluntary actions, where the thing that induceth the will is not fear, are called also sponta∣neous, and said to be done by a mans own accord. As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for Merchandise, or out of affection, he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latin is Sponte, and therefore the action is spontaneous. Though to give ones money willingly to a theef to avoid killing, or▪throw it into the Sea to avoid drowning, where the motive is fear, be not called spontaneous. But every spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary, for voluntary presupposes some precedent deliberation, that is to say, some consideration and meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the doing and abstaining from the action deliberated of, whereas many actions are done of our own accord, and be therefore spontaneous; of which ne∣vertheless, as he thinks, we never consulted, nor deliberated in our selves, as when making no question, nor any the least doubt in the world, but that the thing we are about is good, we eat, or walk, or in anger strike or revile, which he thinks sponnaneous, but not voluntary nor elective actions. And with such kind of actions he sayes necessitation may stand, but not with such as are volnntary, and proceed upon election and deli∣beration Now if I make it appear to you, that even these acti∣ous which he sayes proceed from spontaneity, and which he ascribes onely to fooles, children, mad-men, and beasts, proceed from deliberation and election, and that actions inconsiderate, rash and spontaneous are ordinarily found in those that are by themselves and many more, thought as wise or wiser than ordi∣nary men are. Then his Argument concludeth, that necessity and election may stand together, which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his Arguments to proove. And first your Lordships own experience furnishes you with proof e∣nough,

that Horses, Doggs, and other brute beasts do demurre oftentimes upon the way they are to take. The Horse retiring from some strange figure he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what else doth man that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward action, another while retire from it, as the hope of greater go••d drawes him, or the fear of greater evill drives him? A Child may be so young as to do all which it does without all deliberation, but that is but till it chance to be hurt by doing somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod; for the actions wherein he hath once a check, shall be deliberated on the second time. Fools and mad Men manifestly deliberate no less than the wisest Men, though they make not so good a choice, the images of things, being by diseases altered. For Bees and Spiders, if he had so little to do as to be a spectator of their asti∣ons, he would have confessed not only Election, but also Art, Prudence, and Policy in them, very near equal to that of Mankind. Of Bees Aristotle sayes, their life is civil. He is deceived, if he think any spontaneous action after once being checked in it, differs from an action voluntary and elective, for even the setting of a mans foot in the posture of walking, and the action of ordinary eating, was once deliberated, how and when it should be done; And though it afterward become easie and ha∣bitual, so as to be done without fore-thought, yet that does not hinder, but that the act is voluntary, and proceeds from electi∣on. So also are the rashest actions of cholerick persons volun∣tary and upon deliberation; for who is there but very young chil∣dren that has not considered, when and how far he ought or safely may, strike or revile. Seeing then he agrees with me that such actions are nec••cessitated, and the fancy of those that do them is determined to the actions they do, it follows out of his own doctrine, that the liberty of election does not take away the necessity of e∣lecting this or that individual thing. And thus one of his Ar∣guments fights against another▪

J. D.

VVE have partly seen before how T. H. hath coined a new kind of liberty, a new kind of necessity, a new kind of election, and now in this section a new kind of

spontaneity, and a new kind of voluntary actions. Al∣though he say, that here is nothing new to him, yet I begin to suspect, that either here are many things new to him, or otherwise his election is not the result of a serious mature deliberation. ^a The first thing that I offer, is, how of∣ten he mistakes my meaning in this one section; first, I make voluntary and spontaneous actions to be one and the same, he saith I distinguish them, so as spontaneous acti∣ons may be necessary, but voluntary actions cannot. Se∣condly, ^b I distinguish between free acts and voluntary acts. The former are alwayes deliberate, the later may be indeliberate; all free acts are voluntary, but all voluntary acts are not free. But he saith I confound them and make them the same. ^c Thirdly, he saith I ascribe spontaneity onely to Fools, Children, mad Men and Beasts, But I ac∣knowledge spontaneity hath place in rational men, both as it is comprehended in liberty▪ and as it is distinguished from liberty.

^d Yet I have no reason to be offended at it; for he deals no otherwise with me than he doth with himself. Here he tels us that voluntary praesupposeth deliberation. But Numb. 25. he tells us contrary, that whatsoever followeth the last appetite is voluntary, and where there is but one appetite, that is the last. And that no action of a man can be said to be without de∣liberation, though never so suddain. So Numb. 33. he tels us, that by spontaneity is meant, inconsiderate proceeding, or else nothing is meant by it, yet here he tels us, that all voluntary actions which proceed not from fear, are spontaneous, whereof many are deliberate, as that wherein he instanceth himself, to give money for Merchandise. Thirdly, when I said that Children before they have the use of reason, act spontane∣ously, as when they suck the Breast, but do not act freely because they have not judgement to deliberate or elect, Here T. H. undertakes to proove, that they do deliberate and elect. And yet presently after confesseth again, that a Child may be so young, as to do what it doth without all delibe∣ration.

Besides these mistakes and contradictions he hath other

errours also in this ••ection. As this, that no actions pro∣ceeding from fear are spontaneous. He who throwes his goods into the Sea, to avoid drowning doth it not onely spontaneously but even freely. He that wills the end, wils the means conducing to that end. It is true that if the action be considered nakedly without all circumstances, no man willingly or spontaneously casts his goods into the Sea. But if we take the action as in this particular case invested with all the circumstances, and in order to the end, that is, the saving of his own life, it is not onely voluntary and sponta∣neous, but elective and chosen by him, as the most proba∣ble means for his own preservation. As there is an Ante∣cedent and a subsequent will, so there is an Antecedent and a subsequent spontaneity: His Grammatical argument, grounded upon the derivation of spontaneous from sponte, weighs nothing; we have learned in the rudiments of Lo∣gick that conjugates are sometimes in name onely, and not indeed. He who casts his goods into the Sea, may do it of his own accord in order to the end. Secondly, he erres in this also, that nothing is opposed to spontaneity but onely fear. Invincible and Antecedent ignorance doth destroy the nature of spontaneity or voluntariness, by removing that knowledge which should and would have prohibited the action. As a man thinking to shoot a wild Beast in a Bush▪ shoots his friend, which if he had known, he would not have shot. This man did not kill his friend of his own accord.

For the clearer understanding of these things, and to know* 1.18 what spontaneity is, let us consult a while with the Schools about the distinct order of voluntary or involuntary actions. Some acts proceed wholly from an extrinsecal cause; as the throwing of a stone upwards, a rape, or the drawing of a Christian by plain force to the Idols Temple, these are cal∣led violent acts. Secondly, some proceed from an intrinse∣cal cause, but without any manner of knowledge of the end, as the falling of a stone downwards, these are called natu∣ral acts. Thirdly, some proceed from an internal principle, with an imperfect knowledge of the end, where there is an

appetite to the object, but no deliberation nor election, as the acts of Fools, Children, Beasts, and the inconsiderate act; of men of judgement. These are called voluntary or spontaneous acts. Fourthly, some proceed from an intrin∣secal cause, with a more perfect knowledge of the end, which are elected upon deliberation, These are called free acts. So then the formal reason of liberty is election. The neces∣sary requisite to election is deliberation. Deliberation im∣plyeth the actual use of reason. But deliberation and electi∣on cannot possibly subsist, with an extrinsecal praedetermina∣tion to one. How should a man deliberate or choose which way to go, who knows that all wayes are shut against him, and made impossible to him, but onely one? This is the genuine sense of these words Voluntary and Spontaneous in this Question. Though they were taken twenty other waies vnlgarly or metaphorically, as we say spontaneous ulcers, where there is no appetite at all, yet it were nothing to this controversie, which is not about Words, but about Things; not what the words Voluntary or Free do or may signifie, but whether all things be extrinsecally praedetermined to one.

These grounds being laid for clearing the true sense of the words, the next thing to be examined is, that contradicti∣on which he hath espied in my discourse, or how this Ar∣gument fights against his fellows. If I (saith T. H.) make it appear, that the spontaneous actions of Fools, Children, mad Men and Beasts, do proceed from election and delibe∣ration, and that inconsiderate and indeliberate actions are found in the wisest men, then this argument concludes, that necessity and election may stand together, which is con∣trary to his assertion. If this could be made appear as easi∣ly as it is spoken, it would concern himself much, who when he should prove, that rational men are not free from neces∣sity, goes about to prove that brute Beasts do deliberate and elect, that is as much as to say, are free from necessity. But it concerns not me at all, it is neither my assertion, nor my opinion, that necessity and election may not meet toge∣ther in the same subject, violent, natural, spontaneous, and

deliberate or elective acts may all meet together in the same subject. But this I say, that necessity and election cannot consist together in the same act. He who is determined to one, is not free to choose out of more then one. To be∣gin with his later supposition, that wise men may do inconside∣rate and indeliberate actions, I do readily admit it. But where did he learn to infer a general conclusion from par∣ticular premises? as thus, because wise men do some inde∣liberate acts, therefore no act they do is free or elective. Secondly, for his former supposition, That Fools, Chil∣dren, mad Men, and Beasts do deliberate and elect, if he could make it good, it is not I who contradict my self, nor fight against mine own assertion, but it is he who endea∣vours to prove that which I altogether deny. He may well find a contradiction between him and me, otherwise to what end is this dispute? But he shall not be able to find a difference between me and my self: But the truth is, he is not able to proove any such thing; and that brings me to my sixth Consideration.

That neither Horses, nor Bees, nor Spiders, nor Chil∣dren, nor Fools, nor Mad-men do deliberate or elect. His* 1.19 first instance is in the Horse, or Dog, but more especially the Horse. He told me, that I divided my argument into squadrons, to apply my self to your Lordship, being a Mi∣litary man; And I apprehend, that for the same reason he gives his first instance of the Horse, with a submission to your own experience. So far well, but otherwise very dis∣advantageously to his cause. Men use to say of a dull fellow, that he hath no more brains than a Horse. And the Pro∣phet David saith, Be not like the Horse and Mule which have no understanding. Psal. 32. 9. How do they deliberate with∣out understanding? And Psal. 49. 20. he saith the same of all brute Beasts. Man being in honour had no understand∣ing, but became like unto the Beasts that perish. The Horse d••••urres upon his way, Why not? Outward objects, or inward fancies may produce a stay in his course, though he have no judgement, either to deliberate or elect. He re∣tires from some strange figure which he sees, and comes on again

to avoid the spur. So he may; and yet be far enough from deliberation. All this proceeds from the sensitive passion of fear, which is a perturbation arising from the expectati∣on of some imminent evil. But he urgeth, what else doth man that deliberateth? Yes very much. The Horse feareth some outward object, but deliberation is a comparing of several means conducing to the same end. Fear is com∣monly of one, deliberation of more than one; fear is of those things which are not in our power, deliberation of those things which are in our power; fear ariseth many times out of natural antipathies, but in these disconveniences of nature, deliberation hath no place at all. In a word, fear is an enemy to deliberation, and betrayeth the succours of the Soul. If the Horse did deliberate, he should con∣sult with reason, whether it were more expedient for him to go that way or not; He would represent to himself, all the dangers both of going, and staying, and compare the one with the other, and elect that which is less evil; He should consider whether it were not better to endure a little hazard, than ungratefully and dishonestly to fail in his du∣ty towards his Master, who did breed him, and doth▪ feed him. This the Horse doth not; Neither is it possible for him to do it. Secondly, for Children, T. H. confesseth that they may be so young, that they do not deliberate at all; Afterwards as they attein to the use of reason by de∣grees, so by degeees they become free Agents. Then they do deliberate, before they do not deliberate. The rod may be a means to make them use their reason, when they have power to exercise it, but the rod cannot produce the power before they have it. Thirdly, for Fools and mad Men; It is not to be understood of such mad Men as have their lucida intervalla, who are mad and discreet by fitts; when they have the use of reason, they are no mad Men, but may deliberate as well as others; Nor yet of such Fools as are only comparative Fools, that is, less wise than others. Such may deliberate, though not so clearly, nor so judiciously as others; but of meer mad Men, and meer natural Fools, to say that they, who have not the use of

reason, do deliberate or use reason, implies a contradicti∣on. But his chiefest confidence is in his Bees and Spiders, of whose actions, (he saith) if I had been a spectator, I would have confessed, not only Election, but also Art, Prudence, Policy, very near equal to that of Mankind, whose life, as A∣ristotle saith, is civill. Truly I have contemplated their acti∣ons many times, and have been much taken with their curi∣ous works, yet my thoughts did not reflect so much upon them, as upon their maker, who is sic magnus in magnis, that he is not, minor in parvis; So great in great things, that he is not less in small things. Yes, I have seen those silliest of creatures, and seeing their rare works, I have seen enough to confute all the bold-faced Atheists of this age, and their hellish blasphemies. I see them, but I prai∣sed the marvaillous works of God, and admired that great and first intellect, who hath both adapted their organs, and determined their fancies to these particular works. I was not so simple to ascribe those Rarities to their own inven∣tion, which I knew to proceed from a meer instinct of Na∣ture. In all other things they are the dullest of creatures. Naturalists write of Bees, that their fancy is imperfect, not distinct from their common sense, spread over their whole body, and only perceiving things present. When Arist∣otle calls them Political or Sociable Creatures, he did not intend it really that they lived a civil life, but according to an Analogy, because they do such things by instinct, as tru∣ly Political Creatures do out of judgement. Nor when I read in St. Ambrose, of their Hexagones or Sexangular celles, did I therefore conclude, that they were Mathema∣ticians. Nor when I read in Crespet, that they invoke God to their aid, when they go out of their Hives, be••••••∣ing their thighs in form of a crosse, and bowing themselves; did I therefore think, that this was an act of religious pie∣ty, or that they were capable of Theological vertues, whom I see in all other things in which their fancies are not deter∣mined, to be the silliest of creatures, strangers not only to right reason, but to all resemblances of it.

Seventhly, concerning those actions which are done* 1.20

upon precedent and passed deliberations; They are not only spontaneous, but free acts. Habits contracted by use and experience do help the Will to act with more facility, and more determinately, as the hand of the Artificer is hel∣ped by his tools. And precedent deliberations, if they were sad and serious, and prooved by experience to be pro∣fitable, do save the labour of subsequent consultations, frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora, yet ne∣vertheless the actions which are done by vertue of these for∣merly acquired habits are no less free, than if the delibera∣tion were coexistent which this particular action. He that hath gained an habit and skill to play such a lesson, needs not a new deliberation how to play every time that he playes it over and over; yet I am far from giving credit to him in this, that walking or eating universally considered are free actions, or proceed from true liberty, not so much because they want a particular deliberation before every in∣dividual act, as because they are animal motions, and need no deliberation of reason, as we see in brute beasts. And nevertheless the same actions, as they are considered indi∣vidually, and invested with their due circumstances, may be and often are free actions subjected to the liberty of the Agent.

Lastly, whereas T. H. compareth the first motions or* 1.21 rash attempts of cholerick persons with such acquired habits, it is a great mistake. Those rash attempts are voluntary actions, and may be facilitated sometimes by acquired ha∣bits; But yet for as much as actions are often altered and varied by the circumstances of Time, Place and Person, so as that act which at one time is morally good, at another time may be morally evil. And for as much as a general precedent deliberation how to do this kind of action is not sufficient to make this or that particular action good or ex∣pedient, which being in it self good, yet particular circum∣stances may render inconvenient or unprofitable, to some persons, at some times, in some places. Therefore a pre∣cedent general deliberation how to do any act, as for in∣stance, how to write, is not sufficient to make a particular

act, as my writing this individual Reply to be freely done, without a particular and subsequent deliberation. A man learns French advise••••y, that is a free act: The same man in his choler and passion reviles his friend in French, with∣out any deliberation; this is a spontaneous act, but it is not a free act; If he had taken time to advise, he would not have reviled his friend. Yet as it is not free, so neither is it so necessary, as the Bees making honey, whose fancy is not only inclined but determined by nature to that act. So every way he failes. And his conclusion, that the li∣berty of Election, doth not take away the necessity of e∣lecting this or that individual thing, is no consequent from my doctrine, but from his own. Neither do my argu∣ments fight one against another, but his private opinions fight both against me and against an undoubted truth. A free Agent endowed with liberty of election, or with an e∣lective power, may nevertheless be necessitated in some in∣dividual acts, but those acts wherein he is necessitated, do not flow from his elective power, neither are those acts which flow from his elective power necessitated.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Number, VIII.

^a THe first thing that I offer is, how often he mistakes my meaning in this one Section. First I make Vo∣luntary and Spontaneous actions to be one and the same; He saith I distinguish them, &c.

It is very possible I may have mistaken him; for neither he nor I understand him. If they be one, why did he without need bring in this strange word Spontaneous? Or rather, why did the School men bring it in, if not meerly to shift off the difficulty of maintaining their tenet of Free-Will?

^b Secondly he saith▪ I distinguish between Free acts and Voluntary acts; but he saith, I confound them and make them the same.

In his Reply Number 2. he saith, that for the clearing of

the Question, we are to know the difference between these three, Necessity, Spontaneity, and Liberty; and because I thought he knew that it could not be cleared without under standing what is Will, I had reason to think that Spontaneity was his new word for Will. And presently after some things are Necessary, and not Voluntary or Spontaneous; some things are both Necessary and Voluntary. These words Vo∣luntary and Spontaneous so put together, would make any man beleeve Spontaneous we••e put as▪ explicative of Volun∣tary; for it is no wonder in the eloquence of the School men. Therefore presently after, these words Spontaneity consists in a conformity of the Appetite, either intellectual or sensitive, signifie that Spontaneity is a conformity or likeness of the appe∣tite to the object; which to me soundeth as if he had said, that the Appetite is like the Object; which is as proper as if he had said the Hunger is like the Meat. If this be the Bishops meaning, as it is the meaning of the Words, he is a very fine Philosopher. But hereafter I will venture no more to say his meaning is this or that, especially were he useth terms of Art.

^c Thirdly he saith, I ascribe spontaneity onely to Fools, Children, mad Men and Beasts. But I acknowledge Spon∣taneity hath place in rataonal men, &c.

I resolve to have no more to do with Spontaneity. But I desire the Reader to take notice, that the common people, on whose arbitration dependeth the signification of words in com∣••••n use, among the Latines and Greeks did call all actions and motions whereof they did perceive no cause, Spantaneous, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: I say, not those actions which had no causes, for all actions have their causes, but those actions whose causes they did not perceive. So that Spontaneous as a general name comprehended many actions and motions of ina∣nimate creatures; as the falling of heavy things downwards, which they thought spantaneous, and that if they were not hin∣dred, they would discend of their own accord. It comprehen∣ded also all animal motion, as beginning from the Will or Ap∣petite; because the causes of the Will and Appetite being not perceived, they supposed as the Bishop doth that they were the

causes of themselves. So that that which in general is called Spont••neous, being applyed to Men and Beasts in special, is called Voluntary. Yet the Will and Appetite, though the very same thing, use to be distinguished in certain occasions. For in the publique conversation of Men, where they are to judge of one anothers Will, and of the regularity and irregu∣larity of one anothers actions, not every Appetite, but the last is esteemed in the publique judgement for the Will. Nor eve∣ry action proceeding from Appetite, but that onely to which there had preceded or ought to have preceded some deliberati∣on. And this I say is so, when one man is to judge of anothers Will. For every man in himself, knoweth that what he desi∣reth or hath an appetite to, the same he hath a will to, though his will may be changed before he hath obteined his desire. The Bishop understanding nothing of this, might if it had pleased him, have called it Jargon▪ But he had rather pick out of it some contradictions of my self. And therefore saith,

^d Yet I have no reason to be offended at it (meaning such contradictions) for he dealeth no otherwise with me than he doth with himself.

It is a contradiction, he saith, that having said that volun∣tary presupposeth deliberation, I say in another place, that whatsoever followeth the last appetite is voluntary, and where there is but one appetite that is the last. Not observing that voluntary presupp••seth deliberation, when the judgement whe∣ther the action be voluntary or not, is not in the Actor but in the Judge, who regardeth not the will of the Actor where there is nothing to be accused in the action of deliberate malice; yet knoweth that though there be but one appetite, the same is tru∣ly will for the time, and the action (if it follow) a voluntary action.

This also he saith is a contradction, that having said, no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so suddain, I say afterward that by spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding.

Again he observes not that the action of a man that is not a child, in publique judgement how rash, inconsiderate, and sud∣dain

soever it be, is to be taken for deliberation, because it is supposed, he ought to have considered and compared his intend∣ed action with the Law; when nevertheless that suddain and indeliberate action was truly voluntary.

Another contradiction which he finds is this, that having undertaken to proove that Children before they have the use of reason do deliberate and elect, I say by and by after a Child may be so young as to do what he doth without all deli∣beration. I yet see no contradiction here; for a Child may be so young as that the appetite thereof is its first appetite, but afterward and often before it come to have the use of reason, may elect one thing and refuse another, and consider the conse∣quences of what it is about to do. And why not as well as Beasts, which never have the use of reason? for they deliberate as men do. For though men and beasts do differ in many things very much, yet they differ not in the nature of their delibera∣tion. A man can reckon by words of general signification, make propositions, and syllogismes, and compute in numbers, magnitudes, proportions, and other things computable; which being done by the advantage of language, and words of general significations, a beast that hath not language cannot do, nor a man that hath language, if he misplace the words, that are his counters. From hence to the end of this Number, he dis∣courseth again of Spontaneity, and how it is in Children, mad Men and Beasts; which as I before resolved I will not med∣dle with; let the Reader think and judge of it us he plea∣seth.

J. D.

SEcondly, ^a they who might have done, and may do ma∣ny things which they leave undone; And they who leave undone many things which they might do, are neither com∣pelled nor necessitated to do what they do, but have true li∣berty. But we might do many things which we do not▪ and we do many things which we might leave undone, as is plain, 1 King. 3. 11. Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thy self long life, neither hast asked riches for

thy self, nor hast asked the life of thine enemies, &c. God gave Solomon his choice. He might have asked riches, but then he not had asked wisdom, which he did ask. He did ask wisdom, but he might have asked riches, which yet he did not ask. And Acts 5. 4. After it was sold, was it not in thine own po∣wer? It was in his own power to give it, and it was in his own power to retein it. Yet if he did give it, he could not retein it; And if he did retein it, he could not give it. Therefore we may do, what we do not. And we do not, what we might do. That is, we have true liberty from ne∣cessity.

T. H.

THE second Argument from Scripture consisteth in Histo∣ries of men that did one thing, when if they would they might have done another. The places are two, one is in the 1 Kings 3. 11. Where the history sayes, God was pleased that Salo∣mon who might, if he would, have asked riches or revenge, did nevertheless ask wisedom at Gods hands. The other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, Acts 5. 4. After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?

To which the answer is the same, with that I answered to the former places. That they proove there is election, but do not disprove the necessity which I maintain of what they so elect.

J. D.

VVE have had the very same answer twice before. It seemeth that he is well pleased with it, or else he would not draw it in again so suddenly by head and shoul∣ders, to no purpose, if he did not conceive it to be a Pan∣chreston, a salve for all sores, or Dictamnum, soveraigne Dittany, to make all his adversaries weapons to drop out of the wounds of his cause, only by chewing it, without any application to the sore. I will not waste the time to shew any further, how the members of his distinction do crosse one another, and one take away another. To make every election to be of one thing imposed by necessity, and of a∣nother

thing which is absolutely impossible, is to make e∣lection to be no election at all. But I forbear to press that in present. If I may be bold to use his own phrase; His answer looks quite another way from mine Argument. My second reason was this, They who may do, and might have done many things which they leave undone, and who leave undone many things which they might do, are not necessi∣tated, nor precisely, and antecedently determined to what they do.

But we might do many things which we do not, and we do many things which we might leave undone, as appears evidently by the texts alledged. Therefore we are not an∣tecedently and precisely determined, nor necessitated to do all things which he do. What is here of Election in this Ar∣gument? To what proposition, to what tearm doth T. H. apply his answer? He neither affirmes, nor denieth, nor distinguisheth of any thing contained in my argument. Here I must be bold to call upon him for a more pertinent answer.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb. IX.

THe Bishop for the proving of Free-Will had alledged this text, Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thy self long life, &c. And another Acts 5. After it was sold was it not in thine own power? Out of which he inferres, there was no necessity that Solomon should ask wise∣dom rather than long life, nor that Ananias should tell a lye concerning the price for which he sold his Land. And my ans∣wer that they prove Election, but disprove not the necessity of Election, satisfieth him not; because saith he,

^a They who might have done what they left undone, and left undone what they might have done, are not necessi∣tated.

But how doth he know (understanding power properly taken) that Solomon had a reall power to ask long life? No doubt So∣lomon

knew nothing to the contrary; but yet it was possible that God might have hindred him. For though God gave So∣lomon his choice, that is, the thing which he should choose, it doth not follow, that he did not also give him the act of Election. And for the other text, where it is said, that the price of the Land was in Ananias his power, the word Power signifieth no more than the word Right, that is, the right to do with his own what he pleased, which is not a reall and natural power, but a civil power made by Covenant. And therefore the for∣mer answer is sufficient, for that though such places are clear enough to prove Election, they have no strength at all to take a∣way Necessity.

J. D.

THirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things come* 1.22 to pass by inevitable necessity, then what are all those in∣terrogations, & objurgations, and reprehensions, & expostu∣lations which we find so frequently in holy Scriptures, (be it spoken with all due respect) but fained and hypocritical ex∣aggerations? Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldest not eat? Gen. 3. 11. And ver. 13. he saith to Eve. Why hast thou done this? And to Cain, Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance cast down? And why will ye dye, O house of Israel? Doth God command openly not to eat, and yet secretly by himself or by the second causes necessitate him to eat? Doth he reprehend him for doing that, which he hath antecedently determined that he must do? Doth he pro∣pose things under impossible conditions? Or were not this plain mockery and derision? Doth a loving Master chide his Servant because he doth not come at his call, and yet knowes that the poor Servant is chained and fettered, so as he cannot move, by the Masters own order, without the Servants default or consent? They who talk here of a towfold will of God, secret and revealed, and the one op∣posite to the other, understand not what they say. These two Wills concerne several persons. The secret Will of God is what he will do himself; The revealed Will of

God is what he would have us to do; It may be the secret Will of God to take away the life of the Father, yet it is Gods revealed Will that his Son should wish his life, and pray for his life. Here is no contradiction where the A∣gents are distinct. But for the same person to command one thing, and yet to necessitate him that is commanded to do another thing; To chide a man for doing that, which he hath determined inevitably and irresistibly that he must do; This were (I am afraid to utter what they are not a∣fraid to assert) the highest dissimulation. Gods chiding prooves mans liberty.

T. H.

TO the third and fifth Arguments, I shall make but one answer.

J. D.

^a CErtainly distinct Arguments, as the third and fifth are, the one drawn from the truth of God, the other from the justice of God, the one from his objurgations and repre∣hensions, the other from his judgements after life, did re∣quire distinct answers. But the plain truth is, that neither here, nor in his answer to the fifth Argument, nor in this whole Treatise, is there one word of solution or satisfacti∣on to this Argument, or to any part of it. All that looks like an answer is contained, Numb. 12. That which he does is made just by his doing, Just I say, in him, not alwaies just in us by the example; for a man that shall command a thing o∣penly, and plot secretly the hinderance of the same, if he pun∣ish him whom he commanded so, for not doing it, is unjust: ^b I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is not so bad as the words intimate, and as I apprehend, That is to im∣pute falshood to him that is Truth it self, and to justifie fein∣ing and dissimulation in God, as he doth tyranny, by the infiniteness of his power, and the absoluteness of his domi∣nion. And therefore by his leave, I must once again ten∣der him a new summons for a full and clear answer to this

Argument also. He tels us, that he was not supprised. Whe∣ther he were or not, is more than I know. But this I see plainly, that either he is not provided, or that his cause ad∣mits no choice of answers. The Jews dealt ingenously when they met with a difficult knot, which they could not untie, to put it upon Elias. Elias will answer it when he comes.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb. X.

THE Bishop argued thus, Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things come to pass by inevitable neces∣sity, then what are as those interrogations we find so fre∣quently in holy Scriptures, (be it spoken with all due res∣pect) but faigned and hypocritical exaggerations? Here putting together two repugnant suppositions either craftily or (be it spoken with all due respect) ignorantly, he would have men beleeve that I because I hold Necessity, I deny Liberty. I hold as much that there is true Liberty, as he doth, and more, for I hold it as from Necessity; and that there must of Neces∣sity be Liberty, but he holds it not from Necessity, and so makes it possible there may be none. His expostulations were, First, Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? Secondly, Why hast thou done this? Thirdly, Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance east down? Fourthly, Why will ye dye O house of Israel? These Arguments requiring the same answer which some o∣ther do, I thought fit to remit them to their fellowes. But the Bishop will not allow me that. For he saith,

^a Certainly saith he distinct Arguments, as the third and fifth are, &c. did require distinct Answers.

I am therefore to give an account of the meaning of the afore∣said objnrgations and expostulations; Not of the end for which God said Hast thou eaten of the tree &c. but how those words may be taken without repugnance to the doctrine of Necessity. These words Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I command∣ed that thou shouldest not eat, Convince Adam that not∣withstanding

God had placed in the Garden a means to keep him perpetually from dying in case he should accommodate his Will to obedience of Gods commandement concerning the tree of knowledg of good and evil, yet Adam was not so much master of his own Will as to do it. Whereby is signified that a mortal man though invited by the promise of immortality cannot govern his own Will, though his Will govern his Actions, which dependance of the Actions on the Will, is that which properly and truly is called Liberty. And the like may be said of the words to Eve, why hast thou done this? and of those to Cain, why art thou wroth? &c. and to Israel, why will ye dye O house of Israel? but the Bishop here will say dye, signifieth not dye, but live eter∣nally in torments. For by such interpretations any man may answer any thing, and whereas he asketh, Doth God repre∣hend him for doing that which he hath antecedently deter∣mined him that he must do? I answer, no; but he convin∣ceth and instructeth him, that though immortality was so easie to obtain, as it might be had for the abstinence from the fruit of one onely tree; yet he could not obtain it but by pardon, and by the sacrafice of Jesus Christ; nor is there here any punishment, but onely a reducing of Adam and Eve to their original morta∣lity, where death was no punishment but a gift of God. In which mortality he lived neer a thousand years, and had a nume∣rous issue, and lived without misery, and I beleeve shall at the Resurrection obtain the immortality which then he lost. Nor in all this, is there any plotting secretly, or any mockery or derisi∣on, which the Bishop would make men beleeve there is And whereas he saith, that they who talk here of a twofold Will of God, secret and revealed, and the one opposite to the o∣ther, understand not what they say. The Protestant Doct∣tors both of our, and other Churches, did use to distinguish be∣tween the secret and revealed Will of God; the former they cal∣led voluntas bene placiti, which signifieth absolutly his Will, the other voluntas signi, that is, the signification of his Will, in the same sense that I call the one his Will, the other his Com∣mandement, which may sometimes differ. For Gods Com∣mandement to Abraham was, that he should sacrafice Isaack, but his Will was, that he should not do it. Gods denunciation

to Ninive was, that it should be destroyed within forty daies, but his Will was that it should not.

^b I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is not so bad, as the words intimate▪ and as I apprehend; That is to impute falshood to him that is Truth it self, &c.

What damned Rhetorique and subtile Calumny is this? God (I said) might command a thing openly, and yet hinder the doing of it, without injustice; but if a man should command a thing to be done, and then plot secretly the hinderance of the same, and punish for the not doing of it, it were injustice. This is it which the Bishop apprehends as an imputation of falshood to God Almighty. And perhaps if the death of a sinner were, as he thinks, an eternal life in extream misery, a man might as far as Job hath done, expostulate with God Almighty, not ac∣cusing him of injustice, because whatsoever he doth is therefore just because done by him; but of little tenderness and love to mankind, and this expostulation will be equally just or injust, whether the necessity of all things be granted or denyed; for it is manifest that God could have made man impeccable, and can now preserve him from sin, or forgive him if he please; and therefore, if he please not, the expostulation is as reasonable in the cases of Liberty as of Necessity.

J. D.

FOurthly, if either the deeree of God, or the foreknow∣ledge* 1.23 of God or the influence of the Starrs, or the con∣catenation of causes, or the physical, or moral efficacy of objects, or the last dictate of the understand∣ing, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. For he was subjected to the same de∣crees, the same prescience, the same constellations, the same causes, the same objects, the same dictates of the un∣derstanding. But, quicquid ostendes mihi sic, incredulous od••; The greatest opposers of our liberty, are as earnest maintai∣ners of the liberty of Adam. Therefore none of these sup∣posed impediments take away true liberty.

T. H.

THe fourth Argument is to this effect; If the decree of God, or his foreknowledge, or the influence of the Stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or morall efficacy of cau∣ses, or the last dictate of the understanding, or whatsoever it be, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty, Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulous odi. That which I say necessitateth and determineth every action, (that he may no longer doubt of my meaning) is the sum of all those things, which being now existent, conduce and concurre to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now ••ere wanting, the effect could not be produced. This concourse of causes, whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things God Almighty) the decree of God.

But that the fore-knowledge of God, should be a cause of any thing, cannot be truly said, seeing fore-knowledge is knowledge, and knowledge dependeth on the existence of the things known, and not they on it.

The influence of the Stars is but a small part of the whole cause, consisting of the concourse of all Agents.

Nor. doth the concourse of all causes make one simple chain, or concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains joyned together, not in all parts, but in the first link God Almighty; and consequently the whole cause of an event, does not alwayes depend upon one single chain, but on many together

Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary Agents, and necessitates the Will, and consequently the Action; but for moral efficacy▪ I understand not what he means by it. The last dictate of the judgement concerning the good or bad that may follow on any action, is not properly the whole cause, but the last part of it. And yet may be said to produce the effect necessarily, in such manner as the last feather may be said to break an Hor∣ses back, when there were so many laid on before, as there wan∣ted but that to do it.

Now for his Argument, That if the concourse of all the cau∣ses necessitate the effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true liberty. I deny the consequence, for I make not only the effect, but also the election of that particular effect to be necessary, in as much as the Will it self, and each propension of a man during his deliberation is as much necessitated, and depends on a suf∣ficient cause, as any thing else whatsoever. As for example, it is no more necessary that fire should burn, then that a man, or other creature, whose limbs be moved by fancy, should have e∣lection, that is, liberty to do what he has a fancy to, though it be not in his will or power to choose his fancy, or choose his electi∣on or will.

This Doctrine, because he saies he hates, I doubt had better been suppressed, as it should have been, if both your Lordship, and he had not pressed me to an answer.

J. D.

^a THis Argument was sent forth onely as an espie to make a more full discovery, what were the true grounds of T. H. his supposed Necessity; which errand being done, and the foundation whereupon he bnilds being found out, which is as I called it a concatenation of causes, and as he calls it a concourse of necessary causes; It would now be a superfluous, and impertineut work in me to undertake the refutation of all those other opinions, which he doth not undertake to defend. And therefore I shall wave them at the present, with these short animadversions.

^b Concerning the eternal decree of God, he confounds the decree it self with the execution of his decree. And concerning the fore-knowledge of God, he confounds that speculative knowledge, which is called the knowbedge of vi∣sion, which doth not produce the intellective objects, no more then the sensitive vision doth produce the sensible ob∣jects, with that other knowledge of God, which is called the knowledge of approbation, or a practical knowledge, that is, knowledge joyned with an act of the Will, of which Divines do truly say, that it is the cause of things, as the

knowledge of the Artist is the cause of his work. God made all things by his word, John. 1. that is by his wisdom. Concerning the influence of the Stars, I wish he had ex∣pressed himself more clearly; For as I do willingly grant, that those Heavenly Bodies do act upon these sublunary things, not onely by their motion and light, but also by an occuit vertue, which we call influence, as we see by mani∣fold experience in the Loadstone, and Shell-fish, &c. So if he intend, that by these influences they do naturally or physically determine the Will, or have any direct domini∣on over humane Counsels, either in whole or in part, ei∣ther more or less, he is in an errour. Concerning the con∣catenation of causes, where as he makes not one chain, but an innumerable number of chains, (I hope he speaks hyper∣bolically, and doth not intend that they are actually infi∣nite,) the difference is not material whether one or many, so long as they are all joyned together, both in the first link, and likewise in the effect. It serves to no end, but to shew what a shaddow of liberty T. H. doth fancy, or rather what a dream of a shaddow. As if one chain were not sufficient to load poor man, but he must be clogged with iunumerable chains. This is just such another freedom as the Turkish Galli-slaves do enjoy. But I admire that T. H. who is so versed in this Question, should here con∣fess, that he understands not the difference between physi∣cal, or natural, and moral efficacy. And much more that he should affirm, that outward objects do determine volun∣tary agents by a natural efficacy. No object, no second A∣gent, Angel or Devill, can determine the Will of man na∣turally, but God alone, in respect of his supreme domini∣on over all things. Then the Will is determined naturally, when God Almighty, besides his general influence, where▪ upon all second causes do depend, as well for their being as for their acting, doth moreover at some times, when it pleases him in cases extraordinary, concurre by a special influence, and infuse something into the Will, in the nature of an act, or an habit, whereby the Will is moved, and excited, and applyed to will or choose this or that. Then

the Will is determined morally, when some object is propo∣sed to it with perswasive reasons and arguments to induce it to will. Where the determination is natural, the liberty to suspend its act is taken away from the will, but not so where the determination is moral. In the former case, the Will is determined extrinsecally, in the later case intrinse∣cally; The former produceth an absolute necessity, the la∣ter onely a necessity of supposition. If the Will do not sus∣pend, but assent, then the act is necessary; but because the Will may suspend and not assent, therefore it is not abso∣lutely necessary. In the former case the Will is moved ne∣cessarily and determinately; In the later freely and indeter∣minately. The former excitation is immediate, the later is mediaté mediante intellectu, and requires the help of the understanding. In a word, so great a difference there is between natural and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and mine in this Question.

There remains onely the last dictate of the understanding, which he maketh to be the last cause that concurreth to the determination of the Will, and to the necessary production of the act, as the last feather may be said to break an Horses back, when there were somany laid on before, that there want∣ed but that to do it. I have shewed Numb. 7. that the last dictate of the understanding, is not alwaies absolute in it self, nor conclusive to the Will, and when it is conclusive, yet it produceth no antecedent nor extrinsecal Necessity; I shall only ad one thing more in present, That by making the last judgement of right reason to be of no more weight then a single feather, he wrongs the understanding as well as he doth the Will; and endeavonrs to deprive the Will of its supreme power of application, and to deprive the under∣standing of its supreme power of judicature and definition. Neither corporeal agents and objects, nor yet the sensitive appetite it self, being an inferiour faculty, and affixed to the Organ of the Body, have any direct or immediate dominion or command over the rational Will. It is without the sphear of their activity▪ All the access which they have unto the Will, is by the means of the understanding, sometimes

cleare, and sometimes disturbed, and of reason either right or mis-informed. Without the help of the understanding, all his second causes were not able of themselves to load the Horses back with so much weight as the least of all his fea∣thers doth amount unto. But we shall meet with his Horse load of feathers again Numb. 23.

These things being thus briefly touched, he proceeds to his answer. My argument was this, If any of these ••rall these cau∣ses formerly recited, do take away true liberty, (that is, still intended from necessity) then Adam before his fall had no true liberty.

But Adam before his fall had true liberty.

He mis-recites the argument, and denies the consequence, which is so clearly proved, that no man living can doubt of it. Because Adam was subjected to all the same causes as well as we, the same decree, the same prescience, the same influ∣ences, the same concourse of causes, the same efficacy of objects, the same dictates of reason But it is onely a mistake, for it appears plainly by his following discourse, that he intended to deny, not the consequence, but the assumption; For he makes Adam to have had no liberty from necessity before his fall, yea he proceeds so far, as to affirm, that all humane wills, his and ours, and each propension of our wills, even during our deliberation, are as much ne∣cessitated as any thing else whatsoever; that we have no more power to forbear those actions which we do, than the fire hath power not to burn. Though I honour T. H. for his person, and for his learning, yet I must confess ingeniously, I hate this Doctrine from my heart. And I believe both I have reason so to do, and al others who shall seriously ponder the horrid consequences which flow from it. It destroyes liber∣ty, & dishonours the nature of Man. It makes the second cau∣ses & outward objects to be the Rackets, and Men to be but the Tennis-Balls of destiny. It makes the first cause, that is, God Almighty, to be the introducer of all evil, and sin into the world, as much as Man, yea more than Man, by as much as the motion of the Watch is more from the Artificer, who did make it and wind it up, than either from the spring,

or the wheels, or the thred, if God by his special influence into the second causes, did necessitate them to operate as they did. And if they being thus determined, did necessi∣tate Adam inevitably, irresistably, not by an accidental, but by an essential subordination of causes to whatsoever he did, Then one of these two absurdities must needs follow, either that Adam did not sin, and that there is no such thing as sin in the world, because it proceeds naturally, necssa∣rily, and essentially from God Or that God is more guil∣ty of it, and more the cause of evil than Man, because Man is extrinsecally, inevitably determined, but so is not God. And in causes essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause is alwaies the cause of the effect. What Tyrant did ever impose Lawes that were impossible for those to keep, upon whom they were imposed, and punish them for breaking those Laws, which he himself had necessitated them to break, which it was no more in their power not to break, than it is in the power of the fire not to burn? Excuse me if I hate this Doctrine with a perfect hatred, which is so dishonour∣able both to God and Man, which makes Men to blaspheme of necessity, to steal of necessity, to be hanged of necessi∣ty, and to be damned of necessity. And therefore I must say and say again; Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulous odi. It were better to be an Atheist, to believe no God; or to be a Manichee, to believe two Gods, a God of good, and a God of evil; or with the Heathens, to believe thirty thousand Gods, than thus to charge the true God to be the proper cause and the true Author of all the sins and evills which are in the world.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Number, XI.

^aTHis Argument was sent forth only as an espie, to make a more full discovery, what were the true grounds of T. H. his supposed Necessity.

The Argument which he sendeth forth as an Espie, is this,

If either the decree of God, or the Fore-knowledge of God, or the Influence of the Stars, or the Concatenation (which he saies falsly I call a Concourse) of causes, or the Physical or Moral Efficacy of objects, or the last Dictate of the Under∣standing, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. In answer whereunto I said, that all the things now existent, were necessary to the production of the effect to come; that the Fore-knowledge of God causeth nothing though the Will do; that the influence of the Stars is but a small part of that cause which maketh the Necessity; and that this consequence If the concourse of all the causes necessi∣tate the effect, then Adam had no true liberty, was false. But in his words, if these do take away true liberty, then A∣dam before his fall had no true liberty, the consequence is good; but then I deny that Necessity takes away Liberty; the reason whereof which is this, Liberty is to choose what we will, not to choose our Will, no iucul••ation is sufficient to make the Bishop take notice of, notwithstanding he be other where so wit∣ty, and here so crafty, as to send out Arguments for spies. The cause why I denied the consequence was, that I thought the force thereof consisted in this, that Necessity in the Bishops o∣pinion destroyed Liberty.

^b Concerning the eternal Decree of God, &c.

Here begins his Reply. From which if we take these words, knowledge of Approbation, Practical knowledge, Heaven∣ly Bodies act upon sublunary things, not onely by their mo∣tion, but also by an occult vertue, which we call influence. Moral efficacy. General influence. Special influence. In∣fuse something into the Will. The Will is moved. The Will is induced to will. The Will suspends its own act, Which are all Non-sense, unworthy of a Man, nay and if a Beast could speak, unworhthy of a Beast, and can befal no crea∣ture whose nature is not dep••aved by Doctrine, nothing at all remaineth to be answered. Perhaps the word Occult vertue is not to be taxed as unintelligible, But then I may tax therein the want of ingenuity in him that had rather say, that heavenly Bodies do work by an occult vertue, then that they work he knoweth not how; which he would not confess, but endea∣vours to make Occult be taken for a Cause. The rest of this

Reply is one of those consequences, which I have answered in the beginning, where I compare the inconveniences of both opini∣ons, that is, That either Adam did not sin, or his sin proceed∣ed necessarily from God; which is no stronger a consequence than if out of this, That a man is lame necessarily, one should inferre, That either he is not lame, or that his lameness pro∣ceeded necessarily from the Will of God. To the end of this Number there is nothing more of argument. The place is fil∣led up with wondering and railing.

••. D.

FIftly, If there be no Liberty, there shall be no day of* 1.24 Doom, no last Judgement, no rewards nor punishments after death. A man can never make himself a criminal, if he be not left at liberty to commit a crime. No man can be justly punished for doing that, which was not in his power to shun. To take away Liberty, hazards Heaven, but un∣doubtedly it leaves no Hell,

T. H.

THE Arguments of greatest consequence are the third and fift, and fall both into one. Namely, If there be a neces∣sity of all events, that it will follow, that praise and reprehen∣sion, reward and punishment, are all vain and unjust. And that if God should openly forbid, and secretly necessitate the same action, punishing men for what they could not avoid, there would be no belief among them of Heaven or Hell.

To oppose hereunto, I must borrow an answer from St. Paul, Rom. 9. ver 11. from the 11. verse of the Chapter to the 18. is laid down the very same objection in these words. When they (meaning Esau and Jacob) were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, That the purpose of God accord∣ing to election, not by works, but by him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said to her (viz. to Rebeckah) that the elder shall serve the younger. And what then shall we say,

is there injustice with God? God forbid. It is not-therefore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God that sheweth mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I have stirred thee up, that I may shew my power in thee, and that my Name may be set forth in all the earth, Therefore whom God willeth, he hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he hard∣eneth. Thus you see the case put by St. Paul, is the same with that of J. D. and the same objection in these words following, Thou wilt ask me thin, why will God yet complain, for who hath resisted his will? To this therefore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was Gods will, or that the decree of God con∣cerning Esau was not before he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what he did, but thus, Who art thou, O Man, that interrogatest God? shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the Clay, of the same stuff, to make one vessel to honour, another to dishonour? According therefore to this answer of St. Paul, I answer J. D's objection, and say, The power of God alone, without other help, is sufficient Justifica∣tion of any action he doth. That which men make among them∣selves here by Pacts and Covenants, and call by the name of Justice, and according whereunto men are counted and tearm∣ed rightly just and unjust, is not that by which God Almigh∣ties actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his counsails are to be measured by human wisedom▪ That which he does is made just by his doing; Just I say in him, not alwaies just in us by the Example; for a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hinderance of the same, if he punish him he so commanded for not doing it, is unjust. So also his Counsails, they be therefore not in vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When God afflicted Job, he did object no sin to him, but justified that afflicting him by telling him of his power. Hast thou (sayes God) an arm like mine? Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? and the like. So our Saviour con∣cerning the man that was born blind, said it was not for his sin, nor his parents sin, but that the power of God might be shewn in him▪ Beasts are subject to death and torment, yet they

cannot sin. It was Gods will it should be so. Power irre∣sistible justifieth all actions really and properly in whomsoever it be found. Less power does not. And because such power is in God only, he must needs be just in all his actions. And we, that not comprehending his Counsails, call him to the Bar, commit injustice in it.

I am not ignorant of the usual reply to this answer by di∣stinguishing between Will and Permission. As, that God Al∣mighty does indeed permit sin sometimes, And that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth shall be committed, but does not will it, nor necessitate it. I know also they distin∣guish the action from the sin of the action, saying, God Al∣mighty does indeed cause the action, whatsoever action it be, but not the sinfulness or irregularity of it, that is, the discor∣dance between the Action and the Law. Such distinctions as these dazel my understanding. I find no difference between the will to have a thing done, and the permission to do it, when he that permitteth it can hinder it, and knowes it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any difference between an acti∣on that is against the Law, and the sin of that action. As for example, between the killing of Uriah, and the sin of Da∣vid in killing Uriah. Nor when one is cause both of the action and of the Law, how another can be cause of the disagree∣ment between them, no more than how one man making a lon∣ger and shorter garment, another can make the inequality that is between them. This I know, God cannot sin, because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently no sin. And because whatsoever can sin, is subject to anothers Law, which God is not. And therefore tis blasphemy to say, God can sin. But to say, that God can so order the world as a sin may be ne∣cessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such or other distinctions can make it clear that St. Paul did not think Esaus or Pharaohs actions proceeded from the will and purpose of God, or that pro∣ceeding from his will could not therefore without injustice be blamed or punished, I will as soon as I understand them turn unto J. D's opinion. For I now hold nothing in all this Que∣stion between us, but what seemeth to me not obscurely, but

most expresly said in this place by Saint Paul. And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture.

J. D.

T. H. thinks to kill two birds with one stone, and sa∣tisfie two Arguments with one answer, whereas in truth he satisfieth neither. First, for my third reason. ^a Though all he say here, were as true as an Oracle. Though pun∣ishment were an act of dominion, not of Justice in God; yet this is no sufficient cause why God should deny his own act, or why he should chide or expostulate with men, why they did that which he himself did necessitate them to do, and whereof he was the actor more than they, they being but as the stone, but he the hand that threw it. Notwith∣standing any thing which is pleaded here, this Stoical opi∣nion doth stick hypocrisie and dissimulation close to God, who is Truth it self.

And to my fift Argument, which he changeth and rela∣teth amiss, as by comparing mine with his, may appear, His chiefest answer is to oppose a difficult place of St. Paul, Rom. 9. 11. Hath he never heard, that to propose adoubt is not to answer an Argument, Nec bene respondet qni litem lite re∣solvit. But I will not pay him in his own coin. Where∣fore to this place alledged by him, I answer, The case is not the same. The Question moved there, is, how God did keep his promise made to Abraham to be the God of him and of his seed, if the Jews who were the legimate progeny of Abraham were deserted. To which the Apostle answers ver. 6, 7, 8. That that promise was not made to the carnal seed of Abraham, that is, the Jewes, but to his spiritual Sons which were the Heirs of his Faith, that is to the belee∣ving Christians; which answer he explicateth, first by the Allegory of Isaack and Ishmael, and after in the place ci∣ted of Esau and of Jacob. Yet neither doth he speak there so much of their persons as of their posterities. And though some words may be accommodated to Gods prede∣stination, which are there uttered, yet it is not the scope of

that text, to treat of the reprobation of any man to Hell fire. All the posterity of Esau were not eternally reproba∣ted, as holy Job and many others. But this Question which is now agitated between us, is quite of another na∣ture, how a man can be a criminal who doth nothing but that which he is extrinsecally necessitated to do, or how God in Justice can punish a man with eternal torments for doing that, which it was never in his power to leave un∣done. That he who did imprint the motion in the heart of man, should punish man, who did only receive the im∣pression from him. So his answer looks another way.

But because he grounds so much upon this text, that if it can be cleared he is ready to change his opinion, I will examine all those passages which may seem to favour his cause. First, these words ver. 11. being not yet borne, nei∣ther having done any good or evil, upon which the whole weight of his argument doth depend, have no reference at all to those words ver. 13. Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated, for those words were first uttered by the Pro∣phet Malachy, many ages after Jacob and Esau were dead, Mal. 1. 2. and intended of the posterity of Esau, who were not redeemed from captivity, as the Israelites were. But they are referred to those other words, ver. 12. The elder shall serve the younger, which indeed were spoken be∣fore Jacob or Esau were Born, Gen. 5. 23. And though those words of Malachy had been used of Jacob and Esau before they were Born, yet it had advantaged his cause nothing, for hatred in that text doth not signifie any re∣probation to the flames of Hell, much less the execution of that decree, or the actual imposition of punishment, nor any act contrary to love. God saw all that he had made, and it was very good. Goodness it self cannot hate that which is good. But hatred there signifies Comparative hatred, or a less degree of love, or at the most a negation of love. As Gen. 29. 31. When the Lord saw that Leah was hated, we may not conclude thence that Jocob hated his Wife, The prece∣dent verse doth fully expound the sense, ver. 30. Jacob loved Rachel more than Leah. So Mat. 6. 24. No man can

serve two Masters, for either he will hate the one and lóve the other. So Luke 14. 26. If any man hate not his Father and Mother, &c. he cannot be my Disciple. St. Matthew tells us the sense of it, Mat. 10. 37. He that loveth Father or Mother more than me, is not worthy of me.

Secondly, those words ver. 15. I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, do prove no more but this, that the preferring of Jacob before Esau, and of the Christians be∣fore the Jewes, was not a debt from God, either to the one or to the other, but a work of mercy. And what of this? All men confess that Gods mercies do exceed mans deserts, but Gods punishments do never exceed mans misdeeds. As we see in the Parable of the Labourers, Matth. 20. Friend I do the no wrong, did not I agree with thee for a penny, Is it not lawful for me to do with mine own as I will? Is thy eye evil because I am good? Acts of mercy are free, but acts of Justice are due.

That which followes ver. 17. comes something nearer the cause. The Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, for this same purpose I have raised the up, (that is, I have made thee a King, or I have preserved thee) that I might shew my power in thee. But this particle (that) doth not alwaies signifie the main end of an action, but sometimes only a consequent of it. As Matt. 2. 15. He departed into Egypt, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Prophet, out of Egypt have I called my Son; without doubt Josephs aim or end of his journey was not to fulfil prophesies, but to save the life of the Child. Yet because the fulfilling of the prophecy was a consequent of Josephs journey, he saith, That it might be fulfilled. So here, I have raised thee up that I might shew my power. Again, though it should be granted that this particle that, did denote the intention of God to destroy Pharaoh in the Red Sea, yet it was not the antecedent intention of God, which evermore respects the good and benefit of the creature, but Gods consequent in∣tention upon the prevision of Pharaohs obstinacy, that since he would not glorifie God in obeying his word, he should glorifie God undergoing his judgements, Hitherto we

find no eternal punishments, nor no temporal punishment without just deserts.

It follows ver. 18. whom he will he hardneth: Indeed hardness of heart is the greatest judgement that God layes upon a sinner in this life, worse than all the Plagues of Egypt. But how doth God harden the heart? not by a natural influ∣ence of any evil act or habit into the will, nor by inducing the will with perswasive motives to obstinacy and rebellion, for God tempteth no man, but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and intised. Jam. 1. 13. Then God is said to harden the heart three wayes, First, negativly,* 1.25 and not positively, not by imparting wickedness, but by not imparting grace, as the Sun descending to the tropick of Capricorne, is said with us to be the cause of Winter, that is, not by imparting cold, but by not imparting heat. It is an act of mercy in God to give his grace freely, but to de∣tein it is no act of injustice. So the Apostle opposeth hard∣ning to shewing of mercy, To harden is as much as not to shew mercy.

Secondly, God is said to harden the heart occasionally and not causally, by doing good, which incorrigible sinners* 1.26 make an occasion of growing worse and worse, and doing evil; as a Master by often correcting of an untoward Scho∣lar, doth accidentally and occasionally harden his heart, and render him more obdurate, insomuch as he grows even to despise the Rod. Or as an indulgent parent by his pati∣ence and gentleness doth incourage an obstinate son to be∣come more rebellious. So, whether we look upon Gods frequent judgements upon Pharaoh, or Gods iterated fauours in removing and withdrawing those judgements up∣on Pharaohs request, both of them in their several kinds, were occasions of hardning Pharaohs heart, the one making him more presumptuous, the other more desperately rebel∣lious. So that which was good in it was Gods; that which was evil was Pharaohs. God gave the occasion, but Pha∣raoh was the true cause of his own obduration. This is clearly confirmed, Exod. 8. 15. When▪ Pharaoh saw that there was respite, he hardned his heart. And Exod. 9. 34. When Pha∣raoh

saw, that the Rain and the Hail, and the Thunders were ceased, he sinned yet more, and hardned his heart, he and his servants. So Psal. 105. 25. He turned their hearts, so that they hated his people, and dealt subtilly with them: That is, God blessed the Children of Israel, whereupon the Egyp∣tians did take occasion to hate them, as is plain. Exod. 1. ver. 7, 8, 9, 10. So God hardned Pharaohs heart, and Pha∣raoh hardned his own heart. God hardned it by not shew∣ing mercy to Pharaoh, as he did to Nebuckadnezzar, who was as great a sinner as he, or God hardned it occasionally, but still Pharaoh was the true cause of his own obduration, by determining his own will to evil, and confirming him∣self in his obstinancy. So are all presumptuous sinners, Psal. 95 8. Harden not your hearts as in the provocation, as in the day of temptation in the Wilderness.

Thirdly, God is said to harden the heart permissively,* 1.27 but not operatively, nor effectively, as he who o••ly lets loose a Greyhound out of the slip, is said to hound him at the Hare. Will▪ you see plainly what St. Paul intends by hardening? Read ver. 22. What if God willing to shew his wrath and to make his power known (that is, by a consequent will, which in order of nature followes the prevision of sin,) indured with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fit∣ted to destruction. And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, &c. There is much diffe∣rence between induring and impelling, or inciting the vessels of wrath. He saith of the vessels of mercy, that God prepa∣red them unto glory. But of the vessels of wrath, he saith only that they were fitted to destruction, that is, not by God, but by themselves. St. Paul saith, that God doth endure the ves∣sels of wrath with much long suffering, T. H. saith, that God wills and effects by the second causes all their actions good and bad, that he necessitateth them, and determineth them irresistibly to do those acts which he condemneth as evill, and for which he punisheth them. If doing willingly, and enduring, If much long suffering, and necessitating, imply not a contrariety one to another, reddat mihi minam Dioge∣nes, Let him that taught me Logick, give me my money a∣gain,

But T. H. saith, that this distinction between the opera∣tive and permissive Will of God, and that other between the action and the irregularity do dazel his understanding. Though he can find no difference between these two, yet others do, St. Paul himself did, Acts 13. 18. About the time of forty years suffered he their manners in the Wilderness. And Acts 14. 16. Who in times past suffered all Nations to walk in their own wayes. T. H. would make suffering to be inciting, their manners to be Gods manners, their wayes to be Gods wayes. And Acts 17. 30. The times of this ig∣norance God winked at. It was never heard that one was said to wink or connive at that which was his own act. And 1 Cor. 10. 13. God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that you are able. To tempt is the Devils act, therefore he is called the Tempter; God tempts no man to sin, but he suffers them to be tempted. And so suffers that he could hinder Sathan, if he would. But by T. H. his doctrine, To tempt to sin, and to suffer one to be tempted to sin, when it is in his power to hinder it, it is all one. And so he transforms God (I write it with horrour) into the Devil, and makes tempting to be Gods own work, and the Devil to be but his instrument. And in that noted place, Rom. 2. 4. Despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and for∣bearrance, and long▪suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance, but after thy hardness and im∣penitent heart treasurest up unto thy ••elf wrath against the day of wrath, and revelation of the righteous judgement of God. Here are as many convincing Arguments in this one text a∣gainst the opinion of T. H almost as there are words. Here we learn that God is rich in goodness, and will not pun∣ish his creatures for that which is his own act; Secondly, that he suffers and forbeares sinners long, and doth not snatch them away by sudden death as they deserve, Thirdly, that the reason of Gods forbearance is to bring men to repen∣tance. Fourthly, that hardness of heart and impenitency is not causally from God, but from our selves. Fiftly, that it is not the insufficient proposal of the means of their conver∣sion on Gods' part, which is the cause of mens perdition,

but their own contempt and despising of these means. Sixt∣ly, that punishment is not an act of absolute dominion, but an act of righteous judgement, whereby God renders to every man according to his own deeds, wrath to them and only to them who treasure up wrath unto themselves & eter∣nal life to those who continue patiently in well-doing. If they deserve such punishment who only neglect the goodness and long suffering of God, what do they who utterly deny it, and make Gods doing and his suffering to be all one? I do beseech T. H. to consider what a degree of wilfulness it is, out of one obscure text wholly misunderstood, to con∣tradict the clear current of the whole Scripture. Of the same mind with St. Paul was St. Peter, 1 Pet. 3. 22. The long suffering of God waited once in the daies of Noah. And 2 Pet. 3. 15. Account that the long suffering of the Lord is salva∣tion. This is the name God gives himself, Exod. 34. 6. The Lord, the Lord God, mercyful and gracious, long suffering, &c.

^b Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith to be commonly true, That he who doth permit any thing to be done, which it is in his power to hinder, knowing that if he do not hinder it, it will be done, doth in some sort will it. I say in some sort, that is, either by an antecedent will, or by a consequent will, either by an operative will, or by a permissive will, or he is willing to let it be done, but not willing to do it. Sometimes an antecedent engagement doth cause a man to suffer that to be done, which otherwise he would not suffer. So Darius suffered Daniel to be cast into the Lions den, to make good his rash decree; So He∣rod suffered John Baptist to be beheaded, to make good his rash oath; How much more may the immutable rule of justice in God, and his fidelity in keeping his word, draw from him the punishment of obstinate sinners, though ante∣cedently he willeth their conversion? He loveth all his creatures well, but his own Justice better. Again, some∣times a man suffereth that to be done, which he doth not will directly in it self, but indirectly for some other end, or for the producing of some greater good; As a man willeth

that a putrid member be cut off from his body, to save the life of the whole. Or as a Judge being desirous to save a malefactors life, and having power to reprieve him, doth yet condemn him for example sake, that by the death of one, he may save the lives of many. Marvel not then if God suffer some creatures to take such courses as tend to their own ruine, so long as their sufferings do make for the greater manifestation of his glory, and for the greater be∣nefit of his faithful servants. This is a most certain truth▪ that God would not suffer evil to be in the world, unless he knew how to draw good out of evil. Yet this ought not to be understood, as if we made any priority or posteriori∣ty of time in the acts of God, but onely of Nature, Nor do we make the antecedent and consequent will to be con∣trary one to another, because the one respects man pure and uncorrupted, the other respects him as he is lapsed. The objects are the same, but considered after a diverse manner. Nor yet do we make these wills to be distinct in God, for they are the same with the divine essence, which is one. But the distinction is in order to the objects or things willed. Nor, lastly, do we make this permission to be a naked or a meer permission. God causeth all good, pemitteth all evil, disposeth all things, both good and e∣vill.

^c T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the act∣ion. I answer, because he concurres to the doing of evill by a general, but not by a speciall influence. As the Earth gives nourishment to all kinds of plants, as well to Hem∣lock as to Wheat, but the reason why the one yeilds food to our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is not from the general nourishment of the Earth, but from the special quality of the root. Even so the general power to act is from God, In him we live, and move, and have our being. This is good. But the specification, and determi∣nation of this general power to the doing of any evill, is from our selves, and proceeds from the free will of man; This is bad. And to speak properly, the free will of man

is not the efficient cause of sin, as the root of the Hemlock is of poison, sin having no true entity or being in it, as poi∣son hath. But rather the deficient cause. Now no defect can flow from him who is the highest perfection. ^d Where∣fore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and determinate act of killing Uriah to be from God. The general power to act is from God, but the specification of this general and good power to murther, or to any particu∣lar evil, is not from God, but from the free will of man. So T. H. may see clearly if he will, how one may be the cause of the Law, and likewise of the action in some sort, that is, by general influence; and yet another cause concurring by special influence and determining this general and good po∣wer may make it self the true cause of the anomy or the irre∣gularity. And therefore he may keep his longer and shor∣ter garments for some other occasion. Certainly, they will not fit this subject, unless he could make general and special influence to be all one.

But T. H. presseth yet further, that the case is the same, and the objection used by the Jews, ver. 19. Why doth he yet find fault? who hath resisted his will, is the very same with my argument; And St. Pauls answer ver. 20. O man who art thou that repliest against God? shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over his Clay, &c, is the very same with his answer in this place, drawn from the irresistible power, and absolute dominion of God, which justifieth all his actions. And that the Apostle in his answer doth not deny, that it was Gods will, nor that Gods decree was before Esaus sin. To which I reply.

First, that the case is not at all the same, but quite diffe∣rent, as may appear by these particulars; first, those words, before they had done either good or evill, are not, cannot be refer∣ed to those other words, Esau have I hated; Secondly, If they could, yet it is less than nothing, because before Esau had actually sinned, his future sins were known to God. Third∣ly, by the Potters clay, here is not to be understood the pure mass, but the corrupted mass of mankind. Fourthly,

the hating here mentioned is only a comparative hatred, that is, a less degree of love. Fiftly, the hardening which St. Paul speaks of, is not a positive, but a negative obdurati∣on, or a not imparting of grace, Sixtly, St. Paul speaketh not of any positive reprobation to eternal punishment, much less doth he speak of the actual inflicting of punishment without sin, which is the Question between us, and where∣in T. H. differs from all that I remember to have read, who do all acknowledge that punishment is never actually inflicted but for sin. If the Question be put, why God doth good to one more than to another, or why God imparteth more grace to one than to another, as it is there, the answer is just and fit, because it is his pleasure, and it is sawciness in a creature in this case to reply, May not God do what he will with his own▪ Matth. 20. 15. No man doubteth but God imparteth grace beyond mans desert; ^c But if the case be put, why God doth punish one more than another, or why he throws one into hell fire, and not another, which is the present case agitated between us; To say with T. H. that it is because God is Omnipotent, or because his po∣wer is irresistible, or meerly because it is his pleasure, is not only not warranted, but is plainly condemned by St. Paul in this place. So many differences there are between those two cases. It is not therefore against God, that I reply, but against T. H. I do not call my Creator to the Bar, but my fellow creature; I ask no account of Gods counsails, but of mans presumptions. It is the mode of these times to fa∣ther their own fancies upon God, and when they cannot justifie them by reason, to plead his Omnipotence, or to cry, O altitudo, that the wayes of God are unsearchable. If they may justifie their drowsie dreams, because Gods po∣wer and dominion is absolute; much more may we reject such phantastical devises which are inconsistent with the ••ruth, and goodness, and justice of God, and make him to be a Tyrant, who is the Father of Mercies, and the God af all consolation. The unsearchableness of Gods wayes should be a bridle to restrain presumption, and not a sanctu∣ary for spirits of error.

Secondly, this objection conteined ver. 19. to which the Apostle answers ver. 20. is not made in the person of Esau or Pharaoh, as T. H. supposeth, but of the unbelieving Jews, who thought much at that grace and favour which God was pleased to vouchsafe unto the Gentiles, to acknowledge them for his people, which honour they would have appro∣priated to the posterity of Abraham. And the Apostles answer is not onely drawn from the Soveraign Dominion of God, to impart his grace to whom he pleaseth, as hath been shewed already, but also from the obstinacy and pro∣per fault of the Jews, as appeareth ver. 22. What if God wil∣ling (that is, by a consequent will) to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endureth with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction. They acted, God endured; They were toltrated by God, but fitted to de∣struction by themselves; for their much wrong doing, here is Gods much long suffering; And more plainly ver. 31. Is∣rael hath not atteined to the Law of righteousness, wherefore? because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the Law. This reason is set down yet more empha••ically in the next Chapter ver. 3. They (that is, the Israelites) being ignorant of Gods righteousness (that is, by faith in Christ,) and going about to establish their own righteousness, (that is, by the works of the Law) have not submitted themselves to the righteousness of God. And yet most expresly Chap. 11. ver. 20. Because of undelief they were broken off, but thou stand∣est by faith▪ Neither was there any precedent binding de∣cree of God, to necessitate them to unbelief, and conse∣quently to punishment. It was in their own power by their concurrence with Gods grace to prevent these judgements, and to recover their former estate, ver. 23. If they (that is, the unbelidving Jews) abide not still in unbelief, they shall be grafted in. The Crown and the Sword are immovable, (to use St. Anselmes comparison) but it is we that move & change places. Sometimes the Jews were under the Crown, and the Gentiles under the Sword, sometimes the Jews under the Sword, and ••he Gentiles under the Crown.

Thirdly, though I confess, that human pacts are not the

measure of Gods Justice, but his justice is his own immutable will, whereby he is ready to give every man that which is his own, as rewards to the good, punishments to the bad, so nevertheless God may oblige himself freely to his creature. He made the Covenant of works with mankind in Adam, and therefore he punisheth not man contrary to his own Covenant, but for the transgression of his duty. And Divine justice is not measured by Omnipotence, or by irresistible power, but by Gods will; God can do many things according to his absolute power which he doth not. He could raise up children to Abraham of stones, but he never did so. It is a rule in Theology, that God cannot do any thing, which argues any wickedness or imperfecti∣on, as God cannot deny himself, 2 Tim▪ 2. 13. He cannot lie, Tit. 1. 2. These and the like are fruits of impotence, not of power. So God cannot destroy the righteous with the wicked, Gen. 18. 25. He could not destroy Shdome whil'st Lot was in it, Gen. 19 22. not for want of domini∣on or power, but because it was not agreeable to his Justice, nor to that Law which himself had constituted. The A∣postle saith Heb. 6. 10. God is not unrighteous to forget your work. As it is a good consequence to say, this is from God, therefore it is righteous, so is this also; This thing is un∣righteous, therefore it cannot proceed from God. We see how all creatures by instinct of nature do love their young, as the Hen her Chickens; how they will expose themselves to death for them; And yet all these are but shadowes of that love which is in God towards his Creatures. How impi∣ous is it then to conceive, that God did create so many milli∣ons of souls to be tormented eternally in hell, without any fault of theirs, except such as he himself did necessitate them unto, meerly to shew his dominion, and because his power is irresistible? The same priviledge which T. H. appro∣priates here to power absolutely irresistible, a friend of his in his Book de Cive cap. 6. pag. 70. ascribes to power re∣spectively irresistible, or to Soveraign Magistrates, whose power he makes to be as absolute as a mans power is over himself, not to be limitted by any thing but onely by their

strength. The greatest propugners of Soveraign power think it enough for Princes to challenge an immunity from coer∣cive power, but acknowledge, that the Law hath a direct∣tive power over them. But T. H. will have no limits but their strength. Whatsoever they do by power, they do justly.

But, saith he, God objected no sin to Job, but justified his afflicting him by his power. First, this is an Argument from authority negatively, that is to say, worth nothing. Secondly, the afflictions of Job were no vindicatory punish∣ments to take vengeance of his sins, (whereof we dispute) but probarory chasstisements to make triall of his graces. Thirdly, Iob was not so pure, but that God might justly have laid greater punishments upon him, than those afflicti∣ons which he suffered. Witness his impatience, even to the cursing of the day of his nativity, Job 3. 3. Indeed God said to Job, where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Job 38. 4. that is, how canst thou judge of the things that were done before thou wast born? or compre∣hend the secret causes of my judgements? And Job 42. 9. Hast thou an arm like God? As if he should say, why art thou impatient? doest thou think thy self able to strive with God? But that God should punish Job without desert here is not a word.

Concerning the blind man, mentioned John 9. his blind∣ness was rarher a blessing to him than a punishment, being the means to raise his Soul illuminated, and to bring him to see the face of God in Jesus Christ. The sight of the bo∣dy is common to us with Ants and Flies, but the sight of the soul with the blessed Angels. We read of some, who have put out their bodily eyes because they thought they were an impediment to the eye of the Soul. Again, neither he nor his parents were innocent, being conceived and born in sin and iniquity, Psal. 51. 5. And in many things we offend all, Jam. 3. 2. But our Saviours meaning is evident by the Disciples question, ver. 2. They had not so sinned, that he should be born blind. Or they were not more grie∣vous sinners than other men, to deserve an examplary judg∣ment

more than they; but this corporal blindness befel him principally by the extraordinary providence of God, for the manifestation of his own glory, in restoring him to his sight. So his instance halts on both sides; neither was this a punishment, nor the blind man free from sin. His third instance of the death and torments of Beasts, is of no more weight than the two former. The death of brute Beasts is not a punishment of sin, but a debt of nature. And though they be often slaughtered for the use of man, yet there is a vast difference between those light and momentary pangs, and the unsufferable and endless pains of hell; between the meer depriving of a creature of remporal life, and the sub∣jecting of it to eternal death; I know the Philosophical spe∣culations of some who affirme, that entity is better than non-entity, that it is better to be miserable, and suffer the tormenss of the damned, than to be annihilated, and cease to be altogether. This entity which they speak of, is a Metaphy∣sical entity abstracted from the matter, which is better than non-entity, in respect of some goodness, not moral nor natu∣ral, but trancendental, which accompanies every being. But in the concrete it is far otherwise, where that of our Saviour of∣ten takes place, Mat. 26. 24. Woe unto that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed, It had been good for that man, that he had not been born. I add, that there is an Analogical Ju∣ctice and Mercy due, even to the brute Beasts. Thou shal•• not mus••••e the mouth of the Oxe that treadeth out the corn. And, a just man is merciful to his Beast.

^f▪ But his greatest errour is that which I touched before, to make Justice to be the proper result of Power. Power doth not measure and regulate Justice, but Justice measures and regulates Power. The Will of God, and the Eternal Law which is in God himself, is properly the rule and mea∣sure of Justice. As all goodness whether Natural or Mo∣ral, is a participation of divine goodness, and all created Rectitude is but a participation of divine Rectitude, so all Lawes are but participations of the eternall Law, from whence they derive their power. The rule of Justice then is the same both in God and us, but it is in God, as in him

that doth regulate and measure; in us, as in those who are regulated and measured. As the Will of God is immutable, alwayes willing what is just and right and good; So his ju∣stice likewise is immutable. And that individual action which is justly punished as sinful in us, cannot possibly pro∣ceed from the special influence and determinative power of a just cause. See then how grossely T. H. doth understand that old and true principle, that the Will of God is the rule of Justice, as if by willing things in themselves unjust, he did render them just, by reason of his absolute dominion and irresistible power, as fire doth assimilate other things to it self, and convert them into the nature of fire. This were to make the eternal Law a Lesbian rule. Sin is defined to be that which is done, or said, or thought contrary to the eternall Law. But by this doctrine nothing is done, nor said, nor thought contrary to the Will of God. St. Anselm said most truly, then the will of man is good and just and right, when he wills that which God would have him to will: but according to this doctrine every man alwayes wills that which God would have him to will. If this be true, we need not pray, Thy Will be done in earth as it is in heaven, T. H. hath devised a new kind of heaven upon earth. The worst is, it is an hea∣ven without Justice. Justice is a constant and perpetual act of the Will, to give every one his own; But to inflict pu∣nishment for those things which the Judge himself did de∣termine and necessitate to be done, is not to give every one his own; right punitive Justice is a relation of equallity and proportion, between the demerit and the punishment; But supposing this opinion of absolute and universal neces∣sity, there is no demerit in the World, we use to say, that right springs from Law and Fact, as in this Syllogism, Eve∣ry thief ought to be punished, there's the Law; But such an one is a thief, there's the Fact, therefore he ought to be punished, there's the right. But this opinion of T. H. grounds the right to be punished, neither upon Law, nor upon Fact, but upon the irresistible power of God. Yea, it overturneth as much, as in it lies all Law; First, the eternall Law, which is the ordination of divine Wisdom, by which

all Creaturs are directed to that end which is convenient for them; that is, not to necessitate them to eternall flames. Then the Law participated, which is the ordination of right reason, instituted for the common good, to shew unto man, vvhat he ought to do, and what he ought not to do. To vvhat purpose is it to shevv the right vvay to him vvho is dravvn and haled a contrary vvay by Adamantine bonds of inevi∣talbe necessity?

^g Lastly, hovvsoever T. H. cries out, that God cannot sin, yet in truth he makes him to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin. For he makes him to be the cause not onely of the Lavv, and of the action, but even of the irregula∣rity it self, and the difference betvveen the Action and the Lavv, vvherein the very essence of sin doth consist. He makes God to determine Davids Will, and necessitate him to kill Uriah. In causes physically, and essentially subordiuate, the cause of the cause is evermore the casue of the effect. These are those deadly fruits vvhich spring from the poi∣sonous root of the absolute necessity of all things, vvhich T. H. seeing, and that neither the sins of Esau, nor Pharaoh, nor any vvicked person do proceed from the operative, but from the permissive Will of God, and that punishment is an act of Justice, not of dominion onely; I hope that according to his promise he vvill change his opinion.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Number, XII.

THE Bishop had argued in this manner, If there be no Liberty, there shall be no last Judgement, no Revvards nor Punishments after death. To this I answered, that though God cannot sin, because what he doth his doing maketh just; and because he is not subject to anothers Law, and that therefore it is blasphemy to say, that God can sin, yet to say that God hath so ordered the world, that sin may necessarily be committed is not blasphemy. And I can also further say, though God be the cause of all motion and of all actions, and therefore unless sin be no mo∣tion, nor action, it must derive a necessity from the first mo∣ver; nevertheless it cannot be said that God is the Author of

sin, because not he that necessitateth an action, but he that doth command and warrant it, is the Author. And if God own an action, though otherwise it were sin, it is now no sin. The act of the Israelites in robbing the Egyptians of their Jewels, without Gods warrant, had been theft. But it was neither theft, cou∣sonage, nor sin; supposing they knew the warrant was from God. The rest of my answer to that inconvenience, was an oppo∣sing to his inconveniences, the manifest Texts of St. Paul, Rom. 9. The substance of his Reply to my Answer is this.

^a Though punishment vvere an act of dominion not of Justice in God; yet this is no sufficient cause, vvhy God should deny his ovvn act; or vvhy he should chide or expo∣stulate vvith men, vvhy they did that vvhich he himself did necessitate them to do.

I never said that God denied his act, but that he may expostu∣late with men; And this may be (I shall never say directly it is) the reason of that his expostulation, viz. to convince them, that their wills were not independent, but were his meer gift; and that to do, or not to do, is not in him that willeth, but in God that hath mercy on, or hardeneth whom he will. But the Bishop interpreteth hardening to be a permission of God. Which is to attribute to God in such actions, no more than he might have at∣tributed to any of Pharaohs servants, the not perswading their Master to let the People goe. And whereas he compares this permission to the indulgence of a parent, that by his patience in∣courageth his son to become more rebellious, (which indulgence is a sin)▪ he maketh God to be like a sinful man. And indeed it seemeth that all they, that hold this Freedome of the Will, con∣cieve of God no otherwise than the common sort of Jewes did, that God was like a man, that he had been seen by Moses, and after by the seventy Elders, Exod 9. 10. Expounding that and other places literally. Again he saith, that God is said to harden the heart permissively, but not operatively, which is the same distinction with his first, namely negatively, not positively, and with his second occasionally and not causally; so that all his three wayes, how God hardens the heart of wicked meu, come to this one of permission, which is as much as to say, God sees,

looks on, and d••th nothing, nor ever did any thing in the busi∣ness. Thus you see how the Bisho•• expoundeth St. Paul. There∣fore I will leave the rest of his •…•…mentary upon Rom. 9. to the judgement of the Reader, to think of the same as he plea∣seth.

^b Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H saith, That he who doth permit any thing to be done, which it is in his power to hinder▪ knowing that if he do not hinder it, it will be done, doth in some sort will it, I say in some sort, that is, either by an antecedent Will, or by a consequent Will; either by an o∣perative Will, or by a permissive Will; or he is willing to let it be done, but not willing to do it.

Whether it be called antecedent or consequent, or opera∣tive or permissive, it is enough for the necessity of the thing▪ that the heart of Pharaoh should be hardened, and if God were not willing to do it, I cannot conceive how it could be done without him.

^c T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the Action, and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the Action, I answer because he concurres to the doing of evil, by a general but not by a special influence.

I had thought to passe over this place, because of the non-sense of general and special influence, seeing he saith that God con∣curres to the doing of evil, I desire the Reader would take no∣tice, that if he blame me for speaking of God as of a necessitating cause, and as it were a principal Agent in the causing of all Actions, he may with as good reason blame himself for making him by concurrence, an accessory to the same, and indeed let men hold what they will contrary to the truth, if they write much, the truth will fall into their pens. But he thinks he hath a similitude, which will make this permissive Will, a ve∣ry clear business. The earth (saith he) gives nourishment to all kinds of plants, as well to Hemlock, as to Wheat; but the reason why the one yeilds food to our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is not from the general nourishment of the earth, but from the special quality of the root. It seemeth by this similitude, he thinketh, that God doth not operatively, but premissively Will that the root of Hemlock

should poison the man that eateth it, but that Wheat should non∣rish him be willeth operatively. Which is very absurd; or else he must confess that the venimous effects of wicked men, are wil∣led operatively.

^d Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and determinate act of killing Uriah to be from God. The general power to act is from God, but the spe∣cification of this general and good power, to murther, or to any particular evil, is not from God, but from the free will of man.

But why am I so mightily mistaken? did not God foreknow that Uriah in particular, should be murthered by David in par∣ticular, and what God foreknoweth shall come to pass, can that possibly not come to pass? and that which cannot possibly not come to pass, doth not that necessarily come to pass? and is not all necessity from God? I cannot see this great mistake. The general power (saith he) to act is from God, but the spe∣cification to do this act upon Uriah, is not from God, but from Eree-will. Very learnedly. As if there were a power, that were not the power to do some particular act; or a power to kill, and yet to kill no body in particular. If the power be to kill, it is to kill that which shall be by that power killed, whe∣ther it be Uriah or any other; and the giving of that power is the application of it to the act; nor doth power signifie any thing actually, but those motions and present acts from which the act that is not now, but shall be hereafter, necessarily proceedeth. And therefore this Argument is much like that, which used heretofore to be brought for the defence of the divine Right of the Bishops to the Ordination of Ministers. They derive not (say they) the Right of Ordination from tho civill Soveraign, but from Christ immediately. And yet they acknowledge that it is unlawful for them to Ordain, if the civil power do forbid them. But how have they right to Ordain, when they cannot do it law∣fully? their answer is they have the Right, though they may not exercise it; as if the Right to Ordain, and the Right to Exer∣cise Ordination were not the same thing. And as they answer concerning Right, which is Legal Power, so the Bishop answer∣eth concerning Natural Power, that David had a general po∣wer

to kill Uriah from God, but not a power of applying this power in special to the killing of Uriah from God, but from his own Free-will; that is be had a power to kill Uriah, but not to exercise it upon Uriah, that is to say, he had a power to kill him, but not to kill him; which is absurd.

^e But if the case be put why God doth punish one more than another, or why he throwes one into Hell fire, and not another, which is the present case between us; to say with T. H. that it is because God is Omnipotent, or because his po∣wer is irresistible, or meerly because it is his pleasure, is not onely not warranted, but is plainly condemned by St. Paul in this place.

I note first that he hath no reason to say, the case agitated between us, is whether the cause why God punisheth one man more than another be his irresistible power, or mans sin. The case agitated between us is, whether a man can now choose what shall be his Will anon, or at any time hereafter. A∣gain 'tis not true that he sayes 'tis my opinion that the irresi∣stible power of God, is the cause why he punisheth one more than another. I say onely that when he doth so, the irresistible power is enough to make it not unjust. But that the cause why God punisheth one more than another, is many times the will he hath to show his power, is affirmed in this place by St Paul, Shall the thing formed, say to him that formed it, &c. And by our Saviour in the case of him that was born blind, where he saith, Neither hath this man sinned nor his parents; but that the works of God may be made manifest. And by the expostulation of God with Job. This endeavour of his to bring the text of St. Paul to his purpose, is not onely frustrate, but the cause of many insignificant phrases in his discourse; as this, It was in their own power by their con∣currence with Gods grace, to prevent these judgements, and to recover their former estates, which is as good sense, as if he should say, that it is in his own power, with the concurrence of the Soveraign Power of England to be what he will. And this, that God may oblige himself freely to his Crea∣ture. For he that can oblige, can also when he will release; and he that can release himself when he will, is not obliged.

Besides this, he is driven to words ill becoming him that is to speak of God Almighty, for he makes him unable to do that which hath been within the ordinary Power of men to do. God (he saith) cannot destroy the Righteous with the Wicked, which nevertheless is a thing ordinarily done by Armies, and He could not destroy Sodome while Lot was in it, which he interpreteth, as if he could not do it lawfully, one text i•• Gen. 18. 23, 24, 25. There is not a word that God could not de∣stroy the Righteous with the Wicked. Onely Abraham saith (as a man) shall not the Judge of all the earth do Right. A∣nother is Gen. 19, 22. Haste thee, escape thither; for I can∣not do any thing till thou be come thither. Which is an or∣dinary phrase, in such a case where God had determined to burn the City, and save a particular man, and signifieth not any obligation to save Lot, more than the rest. Likewise con∣cerning Job, who expostulating with God, was answered only with the explication of the infinite power of God, the Bishop answereth, that there is never a word of Jobs being punished without desert; which answer is impertinent, for I say not that he was punished without desert, but that it was not for his desert that he was afflicted; for punished, he was not at all.

And concerning the blind Man, John 9. who was born blind that the power of God might be shown in him; he answers that it was not a punishment, but a blessing. I did not say it was a punishment; certainly it was an affliction. How then doth he call it a blessing? reasonably enough, because (saith he) it was the means to raise his soul illuminated, and to bring him to see the face of God in Jesus Christ. The sight of the Body is common to us with Ants and Flies, but the sight of the soul, with the blessed Angels. This is very well said; for no man doubts, but some afflictions may be blessings; but I doubt whether the Bishop, that sayes he reads of some who have put out their bodily eyes, because they thought they were an impediment to the eye of the soul, think that they did well. To that where I say that brute Beasts are afflicted which can∣not sin, he answereth, that there is a vast difference, between those light and momentary pangs, and the unsufferable and endless pains of Hell. As if the length or the greatness of the

pain, made any difference in the justice or injustice of the in∣flicting it.

^f But his greatest error is that which I touched before, to make Justice, to be the proper result of Power.

He would make men beleeve, I hold all things to be just that are done by them, who have power enough to avoid the punish∣ment. This is one of his pretty little policies, by which I find him in many occasions, to take the measure of his own wisdom. I said no more but that the Power which is absolutely irrefisti∣ble makes him that hath it above all Law, so that nothing he doth can be unjust. But this Power can be no other than the Power divine. Therefore let him preach what he will upon his mistaken text, I shall leave it to the Reader, to consider of it without any further answer.

^g Lastly, howsoever T. H. cries out, that God cannot sin, yet in truth he makes him, to be the principal and most proper cause of all sin, for he makes him to be the cause not onely of the Law, and of the Action, but even of the irregularity it self, &c. wherein the very essence of sin doth consist.

I think there is no man but understands, no not the Bishop himself, but that where two things are compared, the simili∣tude or dissimilitude, regularity or irregularity that is between them, is made in and by the making of the things themselves that are compared. The Bishop therefore that denies God to be the cause of the irregularity, denies him to be the cause both of the Law and of the Action. So that by his doctrine, there shall be a good Law whereof God shall be no cause, and an Action, that is, a local motion that shall depend upon another first Mo∣ver, that is not God. The rest of this Number is but rail∣ing.

J. D.

Proofs of Liberty drawn from Reason.

THe first Argument is Herculeum or Baculinum, drawn* 1.28 from that pleasant passage between Zeno and his man;

The serva••t had committed some pettilarceny, and the Master was cudgeling him well for it; The servant thinks to creep un∣der his Masters blind side, and pleads for himself; That the ne∣cessity of destiny did compell him to steal. The Master answers, the same necessity of destiny compels me to beat thee. He that denies Liberty is fitter to be refuted with rodds, than with arguments, until he confess that it is free for him that beats him either to continue striking, or to give over, that is, to have true Liberty.

T. H.

OF the Arguments from Reason, the first is, that which he saith, is drawn from Zenos beating of his wan which is therefore called Argumentum baculinum, that is to say, a wooden Argument. The story is this, Zeno held that all acti∣ons were necessary, His man therefore h••ing for some fault bea∣ten, excused himself upon the necessity of it. To avoid this excuse, his Master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him. So that not he that maintaiued, but he that derided the necessity of things was beaten, contrary to that he would in∣fer; And the Argument was rather withdrawn than drawn from the story.

J. D.

VVHether the Argument be withdrawn from the story, or the answer withdrawn from the argument, let the Reader judge. T. H. mistakes the scope of the reason, the strength whereof doth not lie, neither in the authority of Ze∣no, a rigid Stoick, which is not worth a button in this cause; Nor in the servants being an adversary to Stoical necessity, for it appears not out of the story, that the servant did de∣ride necessity, but rather that he pleaded it in good earn∣est for his own justification. Now in the success of the fray, we were told even now, that no power doth justifie an action, but onely that which is irresistible. Such was not Zenos. And therefore it advantageth neither of their cau∣ses,

neither that of Zeno, nor this of T. H. What if the ser∣vant had taken the staff out of his Masters hand and beaten him soundly, would not the same argument have served the man as well as it did the Master? that the necessity of desti∣ny did compell him to strike again. Had not Zeno smarted justly for his Paradox? And might not the spectators well have taken up the Judges Apothegm, concerning the dis∣pute between Corax and his Scholar, An ill egg of an ill bird? But the strength of this argument lies partly in the igno∣rance of Zeno, that great Champion of necessity, and the beggarliness of his cause, which admitted no defence but with a cudgel. No man (saith the servant) ought to be beaten for doing that which he is compelled inevitably to do, but I am compelled inevitably to steal. The major is so evident, that it cannot be denied. If a strong man shall take a weak mans hand perforce, and do violence with it to a third person, he whose hand is forced, is innocent, and he onely culpable who compelled him. The minor was Ze∣nos own doctrine; what answer made the great patron of destiny to his servant? very learnedly he denied the con∣clusion, and cudgelled his servant, telling him in effect, that though there was no reason why he should be beaten, yet there was a necessity why he must be beaten. And part∣tly, in the evident absurdity of such an opinion which de∣serves not to be confuted with reasons, but with rods. There are four things, said the Philosopher, which ought not to be called into question, First, such things where of it is wick∣edness to doubt; as whether the soul be immortal, whether there be a God, such an one should not be confuted with reasons, but cast into the Sea, with a milstone about his neck, as unworthy to breath the air, or to behold the light. Secondly, such things as are above the capacity of reason; as among Christians, the mystery of the holy Trinity. Thirdly, such principles as are evidently true; as that two and two are four in Arithmetick, that the whole is greater than the part in Logick. Fourthly, such things as are obvious to the sen∣ses; as whether the snow be white. He who denied the heat of the fire, was justly sentenced to be scorched with

fire; and he that denied motion, to be beaten until he re∣canted. So he who denies all Liberty from necessitation, should be scourged untill he become an humble suppliant to him that whips him, and confesse, that he hath power, either to strike, or to hold his hand.

T. H.

IN this Number 13. which is about Zeno and his man, there is contained nothing necessary to the instruction of the Reader. Therefore I pass it over▪

J. D.

SEcondly, this very perswasion, that there is no true Li∣berty* 1.29 is, able to overthrow all Societies and Common wealths in the World. The Laws are unjust which prohibite that which a man cannot possibly shun; All consultations are vain, if every thing be either necessary or impossible. Who ever deliberated, whether the Sun should rise to mor∣row, or whether he should sail over mountains? It is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding than fools, children, or mad men▪ if all things be necessary. Praises and dispraises, rewards and punishments, are as vain as they are undeserved, if there be no liberty. All Councells, Arts, Arms, Books, Instruments are superfluous and foolish, if there be no liberty: In vain we labour, in vain we study, in vain we take Physick, in vain we have Tutors to instruct us, if all things come to pass alike, whether we sleep or wake, whether we be idle or industrious, by unalterable necessity. But it is said, that though future events be cer∣tain, yet they are unknown to us. And therefore we pro∣hibite, deliberate, admonish, praise, dispraise, reward, pu∣nish, study, labour, and use means. Alas, how should our not knowing of the event be a sufficient motive to us to use the means, so long as we believe the event is already cer∣tainly determined, and can no more be changed by all our endeavours, than we can stay the course of Heaven with

our finger, or add a cubite to our stature? Suppose it be unknown, yet it is certain. We cannot hope to alter the course of things by our labours; Let the necessary causes do their work, we have no remedy but patience, and shrug up the shoulders. Either allow liberty, or destroy all So∣cieties.

T. H.

THE second Argument is taken from certain inconveniences which he thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true, that ill use may be made of it, and therefore your Lordship and J. D. ought at my request to keep private, that I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed none; and what use soever be made of truth, yet truth is truth; and now the Question is not what is fit to be preached, but what is true. The first inconvenience he sayes, is this, that Lawes which prohibite any action are then unjust. The second, that all consultations are vain. The third, that admonitions to men of understanding are of no more use than to fools, children and mad men. The fourth, that praise, dis∣praise, reward and punishment are in vain. The fift, that Coun∣cells, Arts, Armes, Books, Instruments, Study, Tutours, Medicines are in vain. To which Argument expecting I should answer by saying, that the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use means, he adds (as it were a reply to my answer foreseen) these words. Alas, how should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means? Wherein be saith right, but my answer is not that which he expecteth. I answer.

First, that the necessity of an action doth not make the Law which prohibits it unjust. To let pass, that not the necessity, but the will to break the Law maketh the action unjust, because the Law regardeth the will, and no other precedent causes of action. And to let pass, that no Law can be possibly unjust, in as much as every man makes by his consent the Law he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself; I say, what necessary cause soever preceeds an action, yet if the action be forbidden, he that doth it willing∣ly may justly be punisht. For instance, suppose the Law on

pain of death prohibit stealing, and there be a man who by the strength of temptation is necessitated to steal, and is there upon put to death, does not this punishment deterr others from theft? is it not a cause that others steal not? doth it not frame and make their will to justice? To make the Law is therefore to make a cause of Justice, and to necessitate justice, and conse∣quently it is no injustice to make such a Law.

The institution of the Law is not to grieve the delinquent for that which is passed, and not to be undone, but to make him and others just, that else would not be so. And respect∣eth not the evil act past, but the good to come. In so much as without this good intention of future, no past act of a delin∣quent could justifie his killing in the sight of God. But you will say, how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what were done were necessary? To this I answer, that men are just∣ly killed, not for that their actions are not necessitated, but that they are spared and preserved, because they are not noxi∣ous; for where there is no Law, there no killing, nor any thing else can be unjust. And by the right of Nature we de∣stroy, without being unjust, all that is noxious both beasts and men. And for beasts we kill them justly, when we do it in order to our own preservations. And yet J. D. confesseth, that their actions, as being onely spontaneous and not free, are all necessitated and determined to that one thing which they shall do. For men, when we make Societies or Common∣wealths, we lay down our right to kill, excepting in certain cases, as murther, theft, or other offensive actions; So that the right which the Commonwealth hath to put a man to death for crimes, is not created by the Law, but remains from the first right of Nature, which every man hath to preserve him∣self, for that the Law doth not take that right away, in case of criminals, who were by Law excepted. Men are not there∣fore put to death, or punished for that their theft proceedeth from election, but because it was noxious and contrary to mens preservation, and the punishment conducing to the preserva∣tion of the rest. In as much as to punish those that do volunta∣tary hurt, and none else, frameth and maketh mens wills such as men would have them. And thus it is plain, that from the ne∣cessity

of a voluntary action cannot be inferred the injustice of the Law that for biddeth it, or of the Magistrate that punish∣eth it.

Secondly, I deny that it makes consultations to be in vain; 'tis the consultation that causeth a man, and necessitateth him to choose to do one thing rather than another. So that unless a man say, that cause to be in vain, which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation o••t of the necessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seems be reasons thus, If I musts needs do this rather than that, then I shall do this rather than that, though I consult not at all; which is a false proposition, a false consequence, and no better than this. If I shall live till to morrow, I shall live till to morrow, though I run my self through with a sword to day. If there be a necessity that an action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing necessarily required as a means to bring it to pass. And therefore when it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before another, tis determined also for what cause it shall be chosen, which cause for the most part is delibe∣ration or consultation. And therefore consultation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain, by how much the election is more necessitated.

The same answer is to be given to the third supposed incon∣venience; Namely, that admonitions are in vain, for ad∣monitions are parts of consultations. The admonitor being •• Counsailer for the time, to him that is admonished.

The fourth pretended inconvenience is, that praise and dis∣praise, reward and punishment will be in vain. To which I answer, that for praise and dispraise, they depend not at all on the necessity of the action praised or dispraised. For, what is it else to praise, but to say a thing is good? Good, I say for me, or for some body else, or for the State and Commonwealth. And what is it to say an action is good, but to say, it is as I would wish or as another would have it, or according to the will of the State, that is to say, according to Law? Does J. D. think, that no action can please me or him, or the Common∣wealth, that should proceed from necessity?

Things may be therefore necessary, and yet praise-worthy, as also necessary, and yet dispraised, and neither of both in vain, because praise and dispraise, and likewise reward and punish∣ment, do by example make and conform the will to good or evill. It was a very great praise in my opinion, tha•• Velleius Patercu∣lus gives Cato, where he sayes, he was ••••od by Nature, Et quia aliter esse non potuit.

To his fift and sixt inconvenience, that Councells, Arts, Arms, Books, Instruments, Study, Medicines, and the like, would be superfluous, the same answer serv•• that to the former; That is to say, that this consequence, if the effect shall necessarily come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its cause, is a false one. And those things named, Councells, Arts, Arms, &c. are the causes of those effects.

J. D.

NOthing is more familiar with T. H. than to decline an Argument. But I will put it into form for him. ^• The first inconvenience is thus preffed. Those Lawes are unjust and tyrannical, which do prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done, and punish men for not doing of them. But supposing T. H. his opinion of the necessity of all things to be true, all Lawes do prescribe ab∣solute impossibilities to be done, and punish men for not doing of them. The former proposition is so clear that it cannot be denied. Just Lawes are the Ordinances of right Reason, but those Lawes which prescribe absolute impossi∣bilities, are not the Ordinances of right Reason. Just Laws are instituted for the publick good, but those Lawes which prescribe absolute impossibilities, are not instituted for the publick good. Just Lawes do shew unto a man what is to be done, and what is to be shunned; But those Laws which prescribe impossibilities, do not direct a man what he is to do, and what he is to shun. The Minor is as evident; for if his opinion be true, all actions, all transgressions are de∣termined antecedently inevitably to be done by a natural and necessary flux of extrinsecal causes. Yea, even the

will of man, and the reason it self is thus determined. And therefore whatsoever Lawes do prescribe any thing to be done, which is not done, or to be left undone which is done, do prescribe absolute impossibilities, and punish men for not doing of impossibilities. In all his answer there is not one word to this Argument, but onely to the conclusion. He saith, that not the necessity, but the will to break the Law makes the action unjust. I ask what makes the will to break the Law, is it not his necessity? What gets he by this? A perverse will causeth injustice, and necessity causeth a per∣verse wilf. He saith, the Law regardeth the will, but not the precedent causes of action. To what proposition, to what tearm is this answer? he neither denies, nor distinguish∣eth. First, the Question here is not what makes actions to be unjust, but what makes Lawes to be unjust. So his ans∣wer is impertinent. It is likewise untrue, for First, that will which the Law regards, is not such a will as T. H. ima∣gineth. It is a free will, not a determined, necessitated will; a rational will, not a brutish will. Secondly, the Law doth look upon precedent causes as well as the volun∣tariness of the action. If a child before he be seven years old, or have the use of reason, in some childish quarrell do willingly stab another, whereof we have seen experience, yet the Law looks not upon it as an act of murther, because there wanted a power to deliberate, and consequently true liberty. Man-slaughter may be as voluntary as murther, and commonly more voluntary, because being done in hot blood, there is the less reluctation, yet the Law considers, that the former is done out of some sudden passion without serious deliberation, and the other out of prepensed malice, and desire of revenge, and therefore condemns murther as more wilful and more panishable than Man-slaught∣ter.

^b He saith, that no Law can possibly be unjust; And I say, that this is to deny the conclusion, which deserves no reply; But to give him satisfaction, I will follow him in this also. If he intended no more, but that unjust Lawes are not ge∣nuine Lawes, nor bind to active obedience, because they

are not the ordinations of right Reason, nor instituted for the common good, nor prescribe that which ought to be done, he said truly, but nothing at all to his purpose. But if he intend (as he doth) that there are no Lawes de facto, which are the ordinances of reason erring, instituted for the common hurt, and prescribing that which ought not to be done, he is much mistaken. Pharaohs Law to drown the Male Children of the Israelites, Exod. 1. 22. Nebuckadnez∣zars Law, that whosoever did not fall down and worship the golden Image which he had set up, should be cast into the fiery furnace, Dan. 3. 4 Darius his Law, that who∣soever should ask a Petition of any God or man, for thirty dayes, save of the King, should be cast into the Den of Li∣ons, Dan. 6. 7. Ahashuerosh his Law, to destroy the Jew∣ish Nation, root and branch, Esther 3. 13. The Pharisees Law, that whosoever confesseth Christ, should be excom∣municated, John 9. 22. were all unjust Lawes.

^c The ground of this errour is as great an errour it self, (Such an art be hath learned of repacking Paradoxes) which is this. That every man makes by his consent the Law which he is bound to keep; If this were true, it would preserve them, if not from being unjust, yet from being injurious: But it is not true. The positive Law of God, conteined in the old and new Testament; The Law of Nature, written in our hearts by the finger of God; The Lawes of Conque∣rors, who come in by the power of the Sword; The Laws of our Ancesters, which were made before we were born, do all oblige us to the observation of them, yet to none of all these did we give our actual consent. Over and above all these exceptions, he builds upon a wrong foundation, that all Magestrates at first, were elective. The first Go∣vernours were Fathers of Families; And when those petty Princes could not afford competent protection and security to their subjects, many of them did resign their several and respective interists into the hands of one joint Father of the Country.

And though his ground had been true, that all first Le∣gislators were elective, which is false, yet his superstructure

fails, for it was done in hope and trust, that they would make just Lawes. If Magistrates abuse this trust, and deceive the hopes of the people, by making tyrannical Lawes, yet it is without their consent. A precedent trust doth not justi∣fie the subsequent errours and abuses of a Trustee. He who is duely elected a Legislator, may exercise his Legislative power unduely. The peoples implicite consent doth not render the tyrannical Lawes of their Legislators to be just.

^d But his chiefest answer is▪ that an action forhidden, though it proceed from necessary causes, yet if it were done wil∣lingly, it may be justly punished, which according to his cu∣stome he proves by an instance; A man necessitated to steal by the strength of temptation, yet if he steal willingly, is just∣ly put to death. Here are two things and both of them un∣true.

First, he fails in his assertion. Indeed we suffer justly for those necessities which we our selves have contracted by our own fault, but not for extrinsecal, antecedent necessities, w^ch were imposed upon us without our fault. If that Law do not oblige to punishment which is not intimated, because the subject is invincibly ignorant of it; How much less that Law which prescribes absolute impossibilities, unless perhaps invincible necessity be not as strong a plea as invincible ig∣norance. That which he adds, if it were done willingly, though it be of great moment, if it be rightly understood, yet in his sense, that is, if a mans will be not in his own disposi∣tion, and if his willing do not come upon him according to his will, nor according to any thing else in his power, it weighs not half so much as the least feather in all his horse-load. For if that Law be unjust and tyrannical which commands a man to do that which is impossible for him to do, then that Law is likewise unjust and tyrannical, which commands him to wil that which is impossible for him to will.

Secondly, his instance supposeth an untruth, and is a plain begging of the Question. No man is extrinsecally, antece∣dently and irresistibly necessitated by temptation to steal. The Devil may sollicite us, but he cannot necessitate us. He

hath a faculty of perswading, but not a power of compel∣ling. Nosignem habemus, spiritus ••••ammam ciet, as Nazi▪anzen. He blowes the coles, but the fire is our own. Mor∣det duntaxat sese in fauces illius objicientens, as St. Austin, he bites not until we thrust our selves into his mouth. He may propose, he may suggest, but he cannot move the will ef∣fectively. Resist the Devil, and he will flie from you. Jam. 4. 7. By faith we are able to quench all the fiery darts of the wic∣ked, Eph. 6. 16. And if Sathan, who can both propose the object, and choose out the fittest times and places, to work upon our frailties, and can suggest reasons, yet cannot ne∣cessitate the will (which is most certain,) then much less can outward objects do it alone. They have no natural ef∣ficacy to determine the will. Well may they be occasions, but they cannot be causes of evil. The sensitive appetite may engender a proclivity to steal, but not a necessity to steal. And if it should produce a kind of necessity, yet it is but Moral, not Natural; Hypothetical, not Absolute; Coexistent, not Antecedent from our selves, nor Extrinse∣call. This necessity, or rather proclivity, was f•••••• in its causes, we our selves by our own negligence in not oppo∣sing our passions when we should, and might, have freely given it a kind of dominion over us. Admit that some sud∣den passions may and do extraordinarily surprise us; And therefore we say, motus primo primi, the first motions are not alwayes in our power, neither are they free, yet this is but very rarely, and it is our own fault that they do surprise us. Neither doth the Law punish the first motion to theft, but the advised act of stealing. The intention makes the thief. But of this more largely Numb. 25.

^e He pleads moreover, that the Law is a cause of justice, that it frames the wills of men to justice, and that the punish∣ment of one doth conduce to the preservation of many. All this is most true of a just Law justly executed. But this is no god-a-mercy to T. H. his opinion of absolute necessity. If all actions, and all events be predetermined Naturally, Ne∣cessarily, Extrinsecally, how should the Law frame men morally to good actions? He leaves nothing for the Law to

do, but either that which is done already, or that which is impossible to be done. If a man be chained to every indi∣vidual act which he doth, and from every act which he doth not, by indissolvible bonds of inevitable necessity, how should the Law either deterre him or frame him? If a Dog be chained fast to a post, the sight of a rod cannot draw him from it. Make a thousand Lawes, that the fire shall not burn, yet it will burn. And whatsoever men do (accord∣ing to T. H.) they do it as necessarily, as the fire burneth. Hang up a thousand Theevs, and if a man be determined in∣evitably to steal, he must steal notwithstanding.

^f He addes, that the sufferings imposed by the Law upon de∣linquents, respect not the evil act past, but the good to come, and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the Magistrate for any crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a reall intention to benefit others by his example. The truth is, the punishing of delinquents by Law, respecteth both the evil act past, and the good to come. The ground of it, is the evil act past, the scope or end of it, is the good to come. The end without the ground cannot justifie the act. A bad intention may make a good action bad; but a good intention cannot make a bad action good. It is not lawful to do evil, that good may come of it, nor to punish an innoceut person for the admonition of others; that is to fall into a certain crime, for fear of an uncertain. A∣gain, though there were no other end of penalties inflict∣ed, neither probatory▪ nor castigatory, nor exemplary, but only vindicatory, to satisfie the Law out of a zeal of Ju∣stice, by giving to every one his own, yet the action is just and warrantable. Killing, as it is considered in it self without all undue circumstances, was never prohibited to the lawful Magistrate, who is the Vicegerent or Lieuten∣ant of God, from whom he derives his power of life and death.

T. H. hath one plea more. As a drowning man catcheth at every Bu••rush, so he layes hold on every pretence to save a desperate cause. But first, it is worth our observation to see how oft he changeth shapes in this one particular. ••

First, he told us, that it was the irresistible power of God that justifies all his actions, though he command one thing openly, and plot another thing secretly, though he be the cause, not onely of the action, but also of the irregularity, though he both give man power to act and determine this power to evil, as well as good; though he punish the Crea∣tures, for doing that which he himself did necessitate them to do. But being pressed with reason, that this is tyranni∣cal; first, to necessitate a man to do his will, and then to punish him for doing of it, he leaves this pretence in the plain field, and flies to a second. That therefore a man is justly punished, for that which he was necessitated to do, be∣cause the act was voluntary on his part. This hath more shew of reason than the former, if he did make the will of man to be in his own disposition, but maintaining, that the will is irresistibly determined to will whatsoever it doth will, the injustice and absurdity is the same; First, to ne∣cessitate a man to will, and then to punish him for willing. The Dog onely bites the stone which is thrown at him with a strange haud, but they make the first cause to punish the instrument, for that which is his own proper act. Where∣fore not being satisfied with this, he casts it off, and flies to his third shift. Men are not punished (saith he) •…•…fore, because their theft proceeded from election (that is, because it was willingly done, for to Elect and Will, saith he, are both one; Is not this to blow hot and cold with the same breath?) but because it was noxious and contrary to mens preservation, Thus far he saith true, that every creature by the instinct of nature seeks to preserve it self; cast water into a dusty place, and it contracts it self into little globes, that is, to preserve it self. And those who are noxious the eye of the Law, are justly punished by them to whom the executi∣on of the Law is committed; but the Law accounts no per∣sons noxious, but those who are noxious by their own fault. It punisheth not a thorn for pricking, because it is the nature of the thorn, and it can do no otherwise, nor a child before it have the use of reason. If one should take mine hand perforce, and give another a box on the ear with

it, my hand is noxious, but the Law punisheth the other who is faulty. And therefore he hath reason to propose the question how it is just to kill on man to amend another, if he who killed did nothing but what he was necessitated to do. He might as well demand how it is lawful to murther a compa∣ny of innocent. Infants to make a bath of their lukewarm blood, for curing the Leprosie. It had been a more ra∣tional way; first to have demonstrated that it is so, and then to have questioned why it is so. His assertion it self is but a dream, and the reason which he gives of it why it is so, is a dream of a dream.

The sum of it is this; That where there is no Law, there no killing or any thing else can be unjust; that before the consti∣tution of Commonwealths every man had power to kill another, if he conceived him to be hurtfull to him; that at the constituti∣on of Commonwealhts particular men lay down this right in part, and in part reserve it to themselves, as in case of theft, or mur∣ther. That the right which the Commonwealth hath to put a malefactor to death is not created by the Law, but remaineth from the first right of Nature, which every man hath to pre∣serve himself; that the killing of men in this case is as the killing of beasts in order to our own preservation. This may well be called stringing of Paradoxes.

But first, ^h there never was any such time when Man∣kind was without Governors and Lawes, and Societies. Pa∣ternal Government was in the world from the beginning, and the Law of Nature. There might be sometimes a root of such Barbatous Theevish Brigants, in some rocks, or desarts, or odd corners of the World, but it was an abuse and a dege∣neration from the nature of man, who is a political creature. This savage opinion reflects too much upon the honour of mankind.

Secondly, there never was a time when it was lawfull or∣dinarily for private men to kill one another for their own preservation. If God would have had men live like wild beasts, as Lions, Bears, or Tygers, he would have armed them with hornes, or tusks, or talons, or pricks; but of all creatures man is born most naked, without any weapon to

defend himself, because God had provided a better means of security for him, that is, the Magistrate.

Thirdly, that right which private men have to preserve themselves, though it be with the killing of another, when they are set upon to be murthered or robbed, is not a re∣mainder or a reserve of some greater power which they have resigned, but a priviledge which God hath given them, in case of extream danger and invincible necessity, that when they cannot possibly have recourse to the ordinary remedy, that is, the Magistrate, every man becomes a Magistrate to himself.

Fourthly, nothing can give that which it never had; The people, whilest they were a dispersed rable (which in some odd cases might happen to be) never had justly the power of life and death, and therefore they could not give it by their election. All that they do is to prepare the matter, but it is God Almighty, that infuseth the soul of pow∣er.

Fiftly and lastly, I am sorry to hear a man of reason and parts to compare the murthering of men with the slaughter∣ing of brute beasts. The elements are for the Plants, the Plants for the brute Beasts, the brute Beasts for Man. When God enlarged his former grant to man, and gave him liber∣ty to eat the flesh of his creatures for his sustenance, Gen. 9. 3. Yet man is expresly excepted, ver. ••. Who so sheddeth mans blood, by man shall his blood be shed. And the reason is assigned, for in the image of God made he man. Before sin entred into the World, or before any creatures were hurt∣ful, or noxious to man, he had ••••minion over them, as their Lord and Master. And though the possession of this sove∣raignty be lost in part, for the sin of man, which made not onely the creatures to rebel, but also the inferiour 〈…〉〈…〉, to rebel against the superiour, from whence it comes, that one man is hurtful to another, yet the dominion still re∣mains; wherein we may observe how sweetly the provi∣dence of God doth temper this cross, that though the strongest creatures have withdrawn their obedience, as Lions and Bears. to shew that man hath lost the •…•…∣cy

of his dominion, and the weakest creatures, as Flies and Gnats, to shew into what a degree of contempt he is fallen, yet still the most profitable and useful creatures, as Sheep and Oxen, do in some degree retain their obedience.

ⁱ The next branch of his answer concernes consultations, which (saith he) are not superfluous, though all things come to pass necessarily, because they are the cause which doth necessi∣tate the effect, and the means to bring it to pass. We were told Numb. 11. that the last dictate of right reason was but as the last feather which breaks the Horses back. It is well, yet that reason hath gained some command again, and is become at least a Quarter-master. Certainly if any thing under God have power to determine the will, it is right rea∣son. But I have shewed sufficiently, that reason doth not determine the will physically, nor absolutely, much less ex∣trinsecally, and antecedently, and therefore it makes no∣thing for that necessity which T. H. hath undertaken to prove.

^k He adds further, that as the end is necessary, so are the means; And when it is determined, that one thing shall be cho∣sen before another, it is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen. All which is truth, but not the whole truth; for as God ordaines means for all ends, so he adapts and fits the means to their respective ends, free means to free ends, contingent means to contingent ends, necessary means to necessary ends, whereas T. H. would have all means, all ends, to be necessary. If God hath so ordered the World, that a man ought to use and may freely use those means of God, which he doth neglect, not by vertue of Gods decree, but by his own fault; If a man use those means of evil, which he ought not to use, and which by Gods de∣cree, he had power to forbear; If God have left to man in part the free managery of human affairs, and to that purpose hath endowed him with understanding, then consultations are of use, then provident care is needfull, then it concerns him to use the means. But if God have so ordered this world that a man cannot, if he would, neglect any means of good, which by vertue of Gods decree it is possible for him to use,

and that he cannot possibly use any means of evill, but those which are irresistibly and inevitably imposed upon him by an antecedent decree, then not onely consultations are vain, but that noble facn••ty of reason it self is vain: do we think that we can help God Almighty to do his proper work? In vain we trouble our selves, in vain we take care to use those means, which are not in our power to use, or not to use. And this is that which was conteined in my prolepsis or prevention of his answer, though he be pleased both to disorder it, and to silence it. We cannot hope by our labours, to alter the course of things set down by God; let him perform his decree, let the necessary causes do their work. If we be those causes, yet we are not in our own dis∣position, we must do what we are ordained to do, and more we cannot do. Man hath no remedy but patience, and to shrug up the shoulders. This is the doctrine flowes from this opinion of absolute necessity. Let us suppose the great wheel of the clock which sets all the little wheels a going, to be as the decree of God & that the motion of it were perpe∣tually infallible from an intrinsecal principle, even as Gods decree is Infallible, Eternal, All-sufficient. Let us suppose the lesser wheels to be the second causes, and that they do as certainly follow the motion of the great wheel, without missing or swerving in the least degree, as the second causes do pursue the determination of the first cause. I desire to know in this case what cause there is to call a Councill of Smiths, to consult and order the motion of that which was ordered and determined before to their hands. Are men wiser than God? yet all men know, that the motion of the lesser wheels is a necessary means to make the clock sirike.

^l But he tells me in great sadness▪ that my Argument is just like this other; If I shall live till to morrow, I shall live till to morrow, though I run my self through with a sword to day, which saith he, is a false consequence, and a false proposition. Truly, if by running through, he understands killing, it is a false, or rather a foolish proposition, and implyes a con∣tradiction. To live till to morrow, and ••o dye to day, are inconsistent. But by his favour, this is not my consequence,

but this is his own opinion. He would perswade us, that it is absolutely necessary that a man shall live till to mor∣row, and yet that it is possible that he may kill himself to day. My Argument is this. If there be a liberty and po∣ssibility for a man to kill himself to day, then it is not abso∣lutely necessary, that he shall live till tomorrow; but there is such a liberty, therefore no such necessity. And the con∣sequence which I make here is this. If it be absolutely ne∣cessary, that a man shall live till to morrow, then it is vain and superfluous for him to consult and deliberate, whether he should dye to day, or not. And this is a true conse∣quence. The ground of his mistake is this, that though it be true, that a man may kill himself to day, yet upon the supposition of his absolute necessity it is impossible. Such Heterogeneous arguments and instances he produceth, which are half builded upon our true grounds, and the other half upon his false grounds.

^m The next branch of my argument concerns Admoniti∣ons, to which he gives no new answer, and therefore I need not make any new reply; saving onely to tell him, that he mistakes my argument; I say not onely, If all things be ne∣cessary, then admonitions are in vain, but if all things be necessary, then it is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding than fools, children, or mad men. That they do admonish the one and not the other, is confessedly true; and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this, that the former have the use of reason, and true liberty, with a dominion over their own actions, which children, fools, and mad men have not.

Concerning praise and dispraise, he inlargeth himself. The scope of his discourse is, that things necessary may be praise-worthy. There is no doubt of it, but withal their praise reflects upon the free agent, as the praise of a statue reflects upon the workman who made it. To praise a thing (saith he) is to say it is good. ⁿ True, but this goodness is not a Metaphysical goodness, so the worst of things, and whatsoever hath a being, is good. Nor a Natural goodness; The praise of it passeth wholly to the Author of Nature;

God saw all that he had made, and it was very good. But a Moral goodness, or a goodness of actions rather than of things. The moral goodness of an action is the confor∣mity of it with right reason. The moral evil of an action, is the deformity of i••, and the alineation of it from right reason. It is moral praise and dispraise which we speak of here. To praise any thing morally, is to say, it is morally good, that is, conformable to right reason. The morall dispraise of a thing is to say, it is morally bad, or disa∣greeing from the rule of right reason. So moral praise is from the good use of liberty, moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty: but if all things be necessary, then moral li∣berty is quite taken away, and with it all true praise and dis∣praise. Whereas T. H. adds, that to say a thing is good, is to say, it is as I would wish, or as another would wish, or as the State would have it, or according to the Law of the Land, he mistakes infinitely. He and another, and the State, may all wish that which is not really good, but only in appear∣ance. We do often wish what is profitatble, or delightful, without regarding so much as we ought what is honest. And though the will of the State where we live, or the Law of the Land do deserve great consideration, yet it is no in∣fallible rule of moral goodness. And therefore to his que∣stion, whether nothing that proceeds from necessity can please me, I answer, yes. The burning of the fire pleaseth me when I am cold; And I say▪ it is good fire, or a creature created by God, for my use and for my good: Yet I do not mean to attribute any moral goodness to the fire, nor give any moral praise to it, as if it were in the power of the fire it self, either to communicate its heat, or to suspend it, but I praise first the Creator of the fire, and then him who provided it. As for the praise which Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, that he was good by nature, Et quia aliter esse non potuit, it hath more of the Oratour than either of the The∣ologian or Philosopher in it. Man in the State of innocen∣cy▪ did f••ll and become evil, what priviledge hath Cato more than he? No, by his leave. Narratur & dij Catonis saepe m••ro caluiss•• virtus. but the true meaning is, that he was

naturally of a good temper, not so prone to some kinds of vices as others were; This is to praise a thing, not an acti∣on, naturally, not morally. Socrates was not of so good a natural temper, yet prooved as good a man; the more his praise, by how much the difficulty was the more to con∣form his disorderly appetite to right reason.

Concerning reward and punishment, he saith not a word, but onely that they frame and conform the will to good, which hath been sufficiently answered. They do so indeed, but if his opinion were true, they could not do so. But be∣cause my aim is not onely to answer T. H. but also to satis∣fie my self; ^o Though it be not urged by him, yet I do ac∣knowledge, that I find some improper and analogical re∣wards and punishments used to brute beasts, as the hunter rewards his dog, the master of the Coy-duck whipps her, when she returns without company. And if it be true, which he affirmeth a little before, ••hat I have confessed, that the actions of brute beasts are all necessitaeed and determined to that one thing which they shall do, the difficulty is increased.

But first, my saying is misalledged. I said, that some kinds of actions which are most excellent in brute beasts, and make the greatest shew of reason, as the Bees working their Honey, and the Spider weaving their Webbs, are yet done without any consultation, or deliberation, by a meer in∣stinct of nature, and by a determination of their fancies to these onely kinds of works. But I did never say, I could not say, that all their individual actions are necessary, and antecedently determined in their causes, as what dayes the Bees shall fly abroad, and what dayes and houres each Bee shall keep in the Hive, how often they shall fetch in Thyme on a day and from whence. These actions and the like, though they be not free, because brute beasts want reason to deliberate, yet they are contingent, and therefore not necessary.

Secondly, I do acknowledge, that as the fancies of some brute creatures are determined by nature, to some rare and exquisite works; So in others, where it finds a natuall pro∣pension, Art which is the Imitator of Nature, may frame

and form them according to the will of the Artist, to some particular actions and ends, as we see in Setting-dogs, and Coy-ducks, and Parrots; and the principal means whereby they effect this, is by their backs, or by their bellies, by the rod, or by the morsell, which have indeed a shaddow, or resemblance of rewards and punishments. But we take the word here properly, not as it is used by vulgar people, but as it is used by Divines and Philosophers, for that re∣compense which is due to honest and dishonest actions. Where there is no moral liberty, there is neither honesty nor dishonesty, neither true reward nor punishment.

Thirdly, ^p when brute creatures do learn any such qua∣lities, it is not out of judgement, or deliberation, or dis∣course, by infering or concluding one thing from another, which they are not capable of. Neither are they able to conceive a reason of what they do, but meerly out of memo∣ry, or out of a sensitive fear, or hope. They remember, that when they did after one manner, they were beaten; and when they did after another manner, they were cherished, and accordingly they apply themselves. But if their indivi∣dual actions were absolutely necessary, fear or hope could not alter them. Most certainly, if there be any defert in it, or any praise due unto it, it is to them who did instruct them.

Lastly, concerning Arts, Arms, Books, Instruments, Study, Physick, and the like, he answereth not a word more than what is already satisfied. And therefore I am silent.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb. XIV.

^a THe first inconvenience is thus pressed. Those Lawes are unjust and tyrannical, which do prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done, and punish men for not doing of them.

I have already in the beginning, where Irecite the inconve∣niences

that follow the doctrine of necessity, made clear, that the same inconveniences follow not the doctrine of Necessity any more than they follow this truth, whatsoever shall be, shall be, which all men must confess▪ The same also followeth upon this, that whatsoever God foreknowes cannot but come to pass, in such time and manner as he hath foreknown it. It is there∣fore evident that these inconveniences are not rationally deduced from those Tenets. Again it is a truth manifest to all men, that it is not in a mans power to day, to choose what Will he shall have to morrow, or an hower, or any time after. Inter∣vening occasions, business, (which the Bishop calls trifles) Trifles of which the Bishop maketh here a great business to change the Will. No man can say what he will do to morrow, unless he foreknow (which no man can) what shall happen before to morrow. And this being the substance of my opinion, it must needs be that when he deduceth from it, that Counsells, Arts, Armes, Medicines, Teachers, Praise, Prayer, and Piety, are in vain, that his deduction is false, and his ratiocination falla∣cy. And though I need make no other answer to all that he can object against me, yet I shall here mark out the causes of his se∣veral Parologismes.

Those Lawes (he saith) are unjust and tyrannical, which do prescribe things absolutly impossible to be done, and pu∣nish men for not doing of them. In which words this is one absurdity that a Law can be unjust, for all Lawes are Divine or Civil, neither of which can be unjust. Of the first there is no doubt. And as for Civil Lawes they are made by every man that is subject to them, because every one of them consenteth to the placing of the Legislative Power. Another is this in the same words, that he supposeth there may be Lawes that are not Tyrannical; for if he that maketh them have the soveraign Po∣wer, they may be Regal, but not Tyrannical; if Tyrant signi∣fie not King, as he thinks it doth not. Another is in the same words, that a Law may prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done. When he sayes impossible in them∣selves, he understands not what himself means. Impossible in themselves are contradictions onely, as to be, and not to be, at the same time, which the Divines say is not possible to God. All

other things are possible at least in themselves. Raising from the dead, changing the course of nature, making of a new Hea∣ven, and a new Earth, are things possible in themselves; for there is nothing in their nature able to resist the Will of God; and if Laws do not prescribe such things, why should I believe they prescribe other things that are more impossible. Did he e∣ver readin Suarez of any Tyrant that made a Law commanding any man to do, and not to do the same Action, or to be and not to be at the same place, in one and the same moment of time. But out of the doctrine of Necessity, it followeth he sayes, that all Lawes do prescribe absolute impossibilities to be done. Here he has left out in themselves, which is a wilfull Falla∣cy.

He further sayes that Just Lawes are the Ordinances of right Reason, which is an error that hath cost many thousands of men their lives. Was there ever King that made a Law which in right reason had been better unmade? and shall those Lawes therefore not be obeyed? shall we rather rebell? I think not, though I am not so great a Divine as he. I think rather that the Reason of him that hath the Soveraign Authority, and by whose Sword we look to be protected, both against war from abroad, and injuries at home, whether it be Right or Erroni∣ous in it seslf, ought to stand for Right to us that have submit∣ted our selves thereunto by receiving the protection.

But the Bishop putteth his greatest confidence in this, that whether the things be impossible in themselves, or made impossi∣ble by some unseen accident, yet there is no reason that men should be punished for not doing them. It seemes he taketh punish∣ment for a kind of revenge, and can never therefore agree with me that take it for nothing else but for a correction, or for an example, which hath for end the framing and necessitating of the Will to virtue; and that he is no good man, that upon any provocation useth his power, (though a power lawfully obtained) to afflict another man without this end, to reforme the will of him or others. Nor can I comprehend (as having onely humane I∣dea's) that that punishment which neither intendeth the cor∣rection of the offender, nor the correction of others by example, doth proceed from God.

^b He saith that no Law can possibly be unjust, &c.

Against this he replies that the Law of Pharaoh to drown the Male Children of the Israelites; and of Nebuckadnezxar to worship the golden Image; and of Darius against praying to any but him in thirty dayes; and of Ahashuerosh to destroy the Jewes; and of the Pharisees to excommunicate the confessors of Christ, were all unjust Lawes. The Lawes of these Kings as they were Lawes have relation onely to the men that were their subjects; And the making of them, which was the action of e∣very one of those Kings, who were subjects to another King, namely to God Almighty, had relation to the Law of God. In the first relation there could be no injustice in them; because all Laws made by him to whom the people had given the Legisla∣tive Power, are the Acts of every one of that people; and no man can do injustice to himself. But in relation to God, if God have by a Law forbidden it, the making of such Lawes is inju∣stice. Which Law of God was to those Heathen Princes no other but salus populi, that is to say the properest use of their natural reason, for the preservation of their subjects. If therefore those Lawes were ordained out of wantonness or cruelty, or envy, or for the pleasing of a Favorite, or out of any other sinister end, as it seemes they were, the making of those Lawes was unjust. But if in right Reason they were necessary for the preservation of those people of whom they had undertaken the charge, then was it not unjust. And for the Pharisees who had the same written Law of God, that we have, their excommunication of the Christians, proceeding (as it did) from envy, was an Act of malicious injustice. If it had proceeded from misinterpreta∣tion of their own Scriptures, it had been a sin of ignorance. Ne∣vertheless, as it was a Law to their subjects (in case they had the Legislative Power, which I doubt of) the Law was not un∣just. But the making of it was an unjust action, of which they were to give account to none but God. I fear the Bishop will think this discourse too subtile, but the judgement is the Readers.

^c The ground of this error, &c. is this. That every man makes by his consent the Law which he is bound to keep, &c.

The reason why he thinketh this an error, is because the po∣sitive Law of God conteined in the Bible is a Law with out our assent; the Law of Nature was written in our hearts by the finger of God without our assent; the Lawes of Conquerours who come in by the power of the Sword were made without our assent; and so were the Lawes of our Ancestors which were made before we were born. It is a strange thing that he that understands the non-sense of the Schoolmen, should not be able to perceave so easie a truth as this which he denieth. The Bi∣ble is a Law. To whom? To all the World? He knowes it is not. How came it then to be a Law to us? Did God speak it viva voce to us? Have we then any other Warrant for it than the Word of the Prophets? Have we seen the miracles? Have we any other assurance of their certainty than the autho∣rity of the Church? and is the authority of the Church any o∣ther than the authority of the Commonwealth, or that of the Commonwealth any other than that of the Head of the Common∣wealth, or hath the Head of the Commonwealth any other au∣thority than that which hath been given him by the Members? Else, why should not the Bible be Canonical as well in Con∣stantinople as in any other place? They that have the Legis∣lative power make nothing Canon, which they make not Law, nor Law which they make not Canon. And because the Le∣gislative power is from the assent of the subjects, the Bible is made Law by the assent of the subjects. It was not the Bishop of Rome that made the Scripture Law without his own tem∣poral Dominions; nor is it the Clergy that make it Law in their Dioceses and Rectories. Nor can it be a Law of it self without special and supernatural revelation. The Bishop thinks because the Bible is Law, and he is appointed to ▪teach it to the people in his Diocese, that therefore it is Law to whom soever he teach it; which is somewhat grosse, but not so grosse as to say that Conquerors who come in by tho power of the sword, make their Lawes also without our assent. He thinks belike that if a Conquerour can kill me if he please, I am presently obliged without more a doe to obey all his Lawes. May not I rather dye, if I think fit? The Conquerour makes no Law o∣ver the Conquered by vertue of his power; but by vertue of

their assent that promised obedience for the saving of their lives. But how then is the assent of the Children obtained to the Laws of their Ancestors? This also is from the desire of pre∣serving their lives, which first the Parents might take away, where the Parents be free from all subjection; and where they are not, there the Civil power might do the same, if they doubted of their obedience. The Children therefore when they be grown up to strength enough to do mischeif, and to judge∣ment enough to know that other men are kept from doing mis∣cheif to them, by fear of the Sword that protecteth them, in that very act of receiving that protection, and not renouncing it openly, do oblige themselves to obey the Lawes of their Pro∣tectors; to which, inreceaving such protection they have as∣sented. And whereas he saith, the Law of Nature is a Law without our assent, it is absurd; for the Law of Nature is the Assent it self, that all men give to the means of their own pre∣servation.

^d But his cheifest answer is, that An action forbidden, though it proceed from necessary causes; yet if it were done willingly, may be justly punished, &c.

This the Bishop also understandeth not, and therefore de∣nies it. He would have the Judge condemne no man for a crime if it were necessitated; as if the Judge could know what acts are necessary, unless he knew all that hath anteceded, both visible and invisible, and what both every thing in it self, and altogether can effect. It is enough to the Judge, that the act he condemneth, be voluntary. The punishment whereof may, if not capital, reforme the will of the offender; if capital, the will of others by example. For heat in one body, doth not more create heat in another, than the terrour of an example creat••th fear in another, who otherwise were inclined to commit injustice.

Some few lines before he hath said that I built upon a wrong foundation, namely, That all Magistrates were at first elective, I had forgot to tell you, that I never said nor though it. And therefore his Reply, as to that point is impertinent.

Not many lines after, for a reason why a man may not be justly punished, when his crime is voluntary, he offereth this,

that Law is unjust and tyrannical which commands a man to Will, that which is impossible for him to Will. Whereby it appears he is of opinion, that a Law may be made to command the Will. The stile of a Law is Do this, or Do not this; or If thou Do this, thou shalt Suffer this; but no Law runs thus, Will this, or Will not this; or If thou have a Will to this, thou shalt Suffer this; He objecteth further that I hegg the question, because no mans Will is necessitated. Wherein he mistakes, for I say no more in that place, but that he that doth evill willingly, whether he be necessarily willing, or not necessarily, may be justly punished. And upon this mistake he runneth over again his former and already answered non∣sense saying, we our selves by our own negligence, in not op∣posing our passions when we should and might, have freely given them a kind of dominion over us; and again motus primo primi, the first motions are not alwayes in our power. Which motus primo primi, signifies nothing, and our negli∣gence in not opposing our passions, is the same with our want of Will, to oppose our Will, which is absurd; and that we have given them a kind of dominion over us, either signifies nothing, or that we have a dominion over our Wills, or our Wills a dominion over us, and consequently either we or our wills are not Free.

^e He pleads moreover that the Law is a cause of Justice, &c. All this is most true, of a just Law, justly executed.

But I have shown that all Lawes are just, as Lawes, and therefore not to be accused of injustice, by those that owe sub∣jection to them; and a just Law is alwayes justly executed. Seeing then that he confesseth that all that he replieth to here is true, it followeth that the Reply it self, where it contradicteth me, is false.

^f He addeth that the sufferings imposed by the Law upon Delinquents, respect not the evil act past, but the good to come; and that the putting of a Delinquent to death by the Magistrate for any crime whatsoever, cannot be justified be∣fore God, except there be a reall intention to benefit others by his example.

This he neither confirmeth nor denieth, and yet forbeareth

not to discourse upon it to little purpose; and therefore I pass it over.

^g First he told us, that it was the irresistible power of God that justifies all his Actions; though he command one thing openly, and plot another thing secretly; though he be the cause not onely of the Action, but also of the irregularity, &c.

To all this which hath been pressed before, I have answered also before, but that he sayes I say having commanded one thing openly, he plots another thing secretly, it is not mine, but one of his own ugly Phrases. And the force it hath proceedeth out of an apprehension he hath, that affliction, is not Gods correction, but his revenge upon the Creatures of his own making; and from a reasonning he useth, because it is not just in a man, to kill one man for the amendment of ano∣ther, therefore neither is it so in God; not remembring that God hath, or shall have killed all the men in the World, both nocent and innocent.

My assertion (he saith) is a Dream, and the sum of it this, that where there is no Law, there no killing or any thing else can be unjust; that before the constitution of Common∣wealths, every man had power to kill another, &c. and adds, That this may well be called stringing of Paradoxes. To these my words he replies,

^h There was never any time when Mankind was without Governours, Lawes and Societies.

It is very likely to be true, that since the Creation there ne∣ver was a time in which Mankind was totally without Society. If a part of it were without Lawes and Governours, some o∣ther parts might be Commonwealths. He saw there was Pa∣ternal Government in Adam, which he might do easily, as be∣ing no deep consideration. But in those places where there is a Civil Warre at any time, at the same time there is neither Lawes nor Commonwealth, nor Society; but onely a tempo∣ral League; which every discontented Souldier may depart from when he pleases, as being entred into by each man for his private interest, without any obligation of conscience. There are therefore almost at all times multitudes of lawless men;

but this was a little too remote from his understanding to per∣ceave. Again, he denies that ever there was a time, when one private man might lawfully kill another for his own preser∣vation; and has forgotten that these words of his (Number 2.) This is the beleef of all Mankind, which we have not learned from our Tutors, but is imprinted in our hearts by Nature; we need not turn over any obscure Books to find out this truth, &c. Which are the words of Cicero in the defence of Milo, and translated by the Bishop to the defence of Free-will, were used by Cicero to prove this very thing, that it is and hath been alwayes lawful for one private man to kill another for his own preservation. But where he saith it is not lawful ordi∣narily, he should have shown some particular case wherein it is unlawful. For seeing it is a beleef imprinted in our hearts, not only I, but many more are apt to think it is the Law of Na∣ture, and consequently Vniversal and Eternal. And where he saith, this right of defence where it is, is not a remainder of some greater power which they have resigned, but a pri∣viledge which God hath given them in case of extream dan∣ger and invincible necessity, &c. I also say it is a priviledge which God hath given them; but we differ in the manner how; which to me seems this, that God doth not account such killing sin. But the Bishop it seems would have it thus, God sends a Bishop into the Pulpit to tell the People it is lawful for a man to kill another man when it is necessaay for the preservation of his own life; of which necessity, that is, whether it be invin∣cible, or whether the danger be extreame, the Bishop shall be the Judge after the man is killed, as being a case of conscience. Against the resigning of this our general power of killing our enemies, he argues thus, Nothing can give that which it never had; the People whilest they were a dispersed rable (which in some odd cases might happen to be) never had justly the power of life and death; and therefore they could not give it by their election, &c. Needs there much acuteness to under∣stand, what number of men soever there be, though not united into Government, that every one of them in particular ha∣ving a right to destroy whatsoever he thinketh can annoy him, may not resign the same right, and give it to whom he please,

when he thinks it conducible to his proservation? And yet it seemes he has not understood it.

He takes it ill that I compare the murthering of men with the slaughtering of brute beasts; as also a little before, he sayes my opinion reflects too much upon the honour of man∣kind. The Elements (saith he) are for the Plants, the Plants for the brute Beasts, and the brute Beasts for Man. I pray, when a Lyon eats a Man, and a Man eats an Oxe; why is the Oxe more made for the Man, than the Man for the Lion? Yes he saith, God gave man liberty (Gen. 9. 3.) to eat the flesh of the Creatures for his sustenance. True. But the Li∣on had the liberty to eat the flesh of man long before. But he will say no; pretending that no man of any Nation, or at a∣ny time, could lawfully eat flesh, unless he had this licence of holy Scripture, which it was impossible for most men to have. But how would he have been offended, if I had said of man as Pliny doth, Quo nullum est animal neque miserius, neque su∣perbius? The truth is, that man is a Creature of greater po∣wer, than other living Creatures are; but his advantages do consist especially in two things, whereof one is the use of speech by which men communicate one with another, and joine their forces together, and by which also they Register their thoughts, that they perish not, but be reserved, and afterwards joined with other thoughts, to produce general Rules for the di∣rection of their actions. There be Beasts that see better, others that hear better, and others that exceed mankind in other senses. Man excelleth beasts onely in making of Rules to him∣self, that is to say, in remembring, and in reasoning aright up∣on that which he remembreth. They which do so, deserve an honour above brute beasts. But they which mistaking the use of words, deceive themselves and others, introducing errour, and seducing men from the truth, are so much less to be honou∣red than brute beasts, as error is more vile than ignorance. So that it is not meerly the nature of man, that makes him wor∣thier than other living Creatures, but the knowledge that he acquires by meditation, and by the right use of reason in ma∣king good rules of his future actions. The other advantage a man hath, is the use of his hands for the making of those things

which are instrumental to his well-being. But this advantage is not a matter of so great honour, but that a man may speak negligently of it without offence. And for the dominion that a man hath over beasts, he saith it is lost in part for the sin of man, because the strongest Creatures as Lions, and Bears, have withdrawn their obedience; but the most profitable and useful Creatures, as Sheep and Oxen, do in some de∣gree, retain their obedience. I would ask the Bishop in what consisteth the dominion of man, over a Lion or a Bear. Is it in an obligation of promise, or of debt? That cannot ••e; for they have no sense of debt or duty. And I think he will not say, that they have received a command to obey him from authority. It resteth therefore that the dominion of man consists in this, that men are too hard for Lions and Bears, because though a Lion or a Bear be stronger than a man, yet the strength, and art, and specially the Leagu••ing and Societies of men, are a greater po∣wer, than the ungoverned strength of unruly Beasts. In this it is that consisteth this dominion of man; and for the same reason when a hungry Lion meeteth an unarmed man in a desert, the Lion hath the dominion over the man, if that of man over Lions, or over Sheeep and Oxen, may be called dominion▪ which properly it cannot; nor can it be said that Sheep and Oxen do otherwise obey us, than they would do a Lion. And if we have dominion over Sheep and Oxen, we exercise it not as dominion, but as hostility; for we keep them onely to labour, and to be kill'd and devoured by us; so that Lions and Bears would be as good Ma∣ters to them as we are. By this short passage of his, concerning Dominion and Obedience, I have no reason to expect a very shrewd answer from him, to my Leviathan.

ⁱ The next branch of his Answer, concerns Consultati∣ons, which (saith he) are not superfluous, though all things come to pass necessarily, because they are the cause which doth necessitate the effect, and the means to bring it to pass.

His Reply to this is, that he hath shewed sufficiently, that reason doth not determine the will Physically, &c. If not Physically, how then? As he hath told us in another place, Mo∣rally. But what it is to determine a thing Morally, no man living understands. I doubt not but be had therefore the Will to

write this Reply, because I had answered his Treatise concerning true Liberty. My answer therefore was (at least in part) the cause of his writing, yet that is the cause of the nimble local motion of his fingers. Is not the cause of local motion Physical? His Will therefore was Physically and Extrinsecally, and Antecedently, and not Morally caused by my writing.

^k He adds further, that as the end is necessary, so are the means. And when it is determined, that one thing shall be cho∣sen before another, it is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen. All which is truth, but not the whole truth, &c.

Is it not enough that it is truth? must I put all the truth I know into two or three lines? No. I should have added, that God doth adapt and fit the means to their respective ends, free means to free ends, contingent means to contingent ends, necessary means to necessary ends. It may be I would have done so, but for shame. Free, Contingent, and Necessary, are not words that can be joined to Means or Ends, but to Agents and Actions; that is to say, to things that moove, or are moved. A Free Agent being that whose motion, or action is not hindered nor stopt. And a Free Action, that which is produced by a Free Agent. A Contingent Agent, is the same with an Agent simply. But because men for the most part think those things are produced without cause, whereof they do not see the cause, they use to call both the Agent and the Action Contingent, as attributing it to fortune. And therefore when the causes are Necessary, if they perceive not the necessity, they call those necessary Agents and Actions, in things that have Ap∣petite, Free; and in things inanimate, Contingent. The rest of his Reply to this point, is very little of it applied to my answer. I note onely that where he sayes, but if God have so ordered the World, that a man cannot, if he would, neglect any means of good, &c. He would fraudulently insinuate that it is my opinion, that a man is not Free to Do if he will, and to Abstain if he will. Whereas from the beginning I have often declared that it is none of my opinion; and that my opinion is on∣ly this, that he is not Free to Will, or which is all one, he is not Master of his future Will. After much unorderly discourse

he comes in with This is the doctrine that flows from this opi∣nion of absolute Necessity; which is impertinent; seeing no∣thing flows from it more than may be drawn from the confession of an eternal Prescience.

^l But he tells me in great sadness, that my Argument is no better than this; If I shall live till to morrow, I shall live till to morrow, though I run my self thorow with a sword to day, which (saith he) is a false consequence, and a false proposition. Truly, if by running through, he understand killing, it is a false, or rather a foolish proposition. He saith right. Let us therefore see how it is not like to his; He sayes, If it be ab∣solutely necessary that a man shall live till to morrow, then it is vain and superfluous for him to consult, whether he should dye to day or not.

And this (he sayes) is a true consequence. I cannot per∣ceive how it is a better consequence than the former; for if it be absolutely necessary that a man should live till to morrow, (and in health, which may also be supposed) why should he not (if he have the curiosity) have his head cut off to try what pain it is. But the consequence is false, for if there be a necessity of his living, it is necessary also that he shall not have so foolish a curiosity. But he cannot yet distinguish between a seen and un∣seen necessity, and that is the cause he beleeveth his consequence to be good.

^m The next branch of my Argument concerns Admoni∣tions, &c.

Which he saies is this, If all things be necessary, then it is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding, than fools, children, or madmen, but That they do ad∣monish the one and not the other, is confessedly true; and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this, that the former have the use of reason, and true liberty, with a dominion over their own actions, which children, fools, and madmen have not.

The true reason why we admonish men and not children, &c. is because admonition, is nothing else but telling a man, the good and evil consequences of his actions. They who have ex∣perience of good and evill, can better perceive the reasonable∣ness

of such admonition, than they that have not; and such as have like passions to those of the Admonitor, do more easily con∣ceive, that to be good or bad which the Admonitor sayeth is so, than they who have great passions, and such as are contrary to his. The first▪ which is want of experience maketh children, and fools unapt, and the second, which is strength of passion, maketh madmen unwilling to receive admonition; for children are igno∣rant, and mad men in an errour concerning what is good or evill for themselves. This is not to say children and mad men want true Liberty, that is, the liberty to do as they will, nor to say that men of judgement, or the Admonitor himself hath a dominion over his own actions, more than children or mad men, (for their actions are also voluntary) or that when he admonisheth he hath alwayes the use of reason, though he have the use of deliberation, which children, fools, mad men, and beasts also have. There be therefore reasons under heaven which the Bishop knowes not of.

Whereas I had said, that things necessary may be praise∣worthy, and to praise a thing is to say it is good, He di∣stinguisheth and saith,

ⁿ True, but this goodness is not a Metaphysical goodness, so whatsoever hath a being is good, nor a Natural goodness; The praise of it passeth wholly to the Author of Nature, &c. But a Moral goodness, or a goodness of actions rather than of things. The Moral goodness of an action is the conformi∣ty of it to right Reason, &c.

There hath been in the Schooles derived from Aristotles Metaphysicks an old Proverb rather than an Axiome, Ens, Bonum, et verum convertuntur. From hence the Bishop hath taken this notion of a Metaphysical goodness, and his do∣ctrine, that whatsoever hath a being is good; and by this in∣terpreteth the words of Gen. 1. God saw all that he had made, and it was very good. But the reason of those words is that Good is relative to those that are pleased with it, and not of absolute signification to all men. God therefore saith that all that he had made was very good, because he was pleased with the Creatures of his own making. But if all things were ab∣solutely good, we should be all pleased with their Being, which

we are not, when the actions that depend upon their Being are hurtful to us. And therefore, to speak properly, nothing is good or evil, but in regard of the action that proceedeth from it, and also of the person to whom it doth good or hurt. Satan is evil to us because he seeketh our destruction, but good to God, because he executeth his commandements. And so his Metaphysical goodness is but an idle tearm, and not the mem∣ber of a distinction. And as for Natural goodness, and evil∣ness, that also is but the goodness and evilness of Actions, as some Hearbs are good because they nourish, others evil be∣cause they poyson us; and one Horse is good because he is gen∣tle strong, and carrieth a man easily, another bad because he resisteth, goeth hard, or otherwise displeaseth us, and that quality of gentleness, if there were no more Lawes amongst men than there is amongst beasts, would be as much a moral good in a horse or other beast as in a man. Tis the Law from whence proceeds the difference between the Moral and the Natural goodness, so that it is well enough said by him, that Moral goodness is the conformity of an acti∣on with right Reason; and better said than meant; for this right Reason which is the Law, is no otherwise certainly Right than by our making it so by our approbation of it, and volun∣tary subjection to it. For the Law-makers are men and may erre, and think that Law which they make is for the good of the people sometimes when it is not. And yet the ••••••ions of subjects, if they be conformable to the Law are Morally good, and yet cease not to be Naturally good, and the praise of them passeth to the Author of Nature, as well as of any other good whatsoever. From whence it appears that Moral praise is not as he sayes from the good use of liberty, but from obedi∣ence to the Lawes, nor Moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty, but from disobedience to the Lawes. And for his consequence If all things be necessary, then Moral Liberty is quite taken away, and with it all true praise and dispraise, there is neither truth in it, nor argument offered for it; for there is nothing more necessary than the consequence of volun∣tary actions to the Will. And whereas I had said, that to say a thing is good, is to say it is as I, or another would wish,

or as the State would have it, or according to the Law of the Land, he answers, that I mistake infinitely. And his rea∣son is, because we often wish what is profitable, or delight∣ful, without regarding as we ought, what is honest. There is no man living that seeth all the consequences of an action from the beginning to the end, whereby to weigh the whole sum of the good, with the whole sum of the evill consequents. We choose no further than we can weigh. That is good to e∣very man which is so farre good as he can see. All the reall good, which we call honest and Morally vertu••us, is that which is not repugnant to the Law, Civil or Natural; for the Law is all the right Reason we have, and though he, as often as it disagreeth with his own reason denie it, is the infallible rule of Moral goodness. The reason whereof is this, that because nei∣ther mine nor the Bishops reason, is right Reason, fit to be a rule of our Moral actions, we have therefore set up over our selves a Soveraign Governour, and agreed that his Lawes shall be unto us, whatsoever they be, in the phace of Right roason, to dictate to us what is really good; in the same man∣ner as men in playing turn up Trump, and as in playing their game their Morality consisteth in not renouncing, so in our civil conversation, our Morality is all co••••••••ned in not dis∣obeying of the Lawes.

To my question, whether nothing could please him that proceeded from Necessity, he answers, yes. The fire pleaseth him when he is cold, and he sayes it is good fire, but does not praise it Morally. He praiseth (he sayes) first the Crea∣tor of the fire, and then him who provided it. He does well; yet he praiseth the fire when he saith it is good, though not Morally. He does not say it is a just fire, or a wise, or a well manered fire obedient to the Lawes, but these Attributes it seems he gives to God, as if justice were not of his nature, but of his manners. And in praising Morally him that provi∣ded it, he seemes to say, he would not say the fire was good, if he were not Morally good that did provide it.

To that which I had answered concerning reward and pu∣nishment, he hath replied (he sayes) sufficiently before, and

that that which he discoursenh here, is not only to answer me, but also to satisfie himself, and saith,

^o Though it be not urged by him, yet I do acknowledge, that I find some improper and analogical rewards and pu∣nishments, used to brute beasts, as the Hunter rewards his Dog, &c.

For my part I am too dull to perveave the difference be∣tween those rewards used to brute beasts, and those that are used to men. If they be not properly called rewards and pu∣nishments let him give them their proper name. It may be he will say he has done it in calling them Annalogical, yet for any thing that can be understood thereby, he might have called them Paragogical, or Typical, or Topical if he had pleased. He adds further, that whereas he had said, that the action of Bees and Spiders were done without consultation, by meer in∣stinct of nature, and by a determination of their fancies, I missaleadge him, and say he made their individuall Actions necessary. I have onely this to answer that seeing he sayes, that by instinct of nature their fancies were determined to special kinds of works, I might justly inferre they were de∣termined every one of them to some work, and every work is an individual action, for a kind of work in the general is no work. But these their individual actions he saith are con∣tingent, and therefore not necessary; which is no good con∣sequence: for if he mean by contingent that which has no cause, he speaketh not as a Christian, but maketh a Deity of Fortune, which I verily think he doth not. But if he mean by it, that whereof he knoweth not the cause, the consequence is naught.

The means whereby Setting-dogs, and Coy-ducks, and Pa∣rats are taught to do what they do, is by their backs, by their bellies, by the rod, or by the morsell, which have indeed a shaddow, or resemblance of rewards and punishments. But we take the word here properly, not as it is used by vulgar plople, but as it is used by Divines, and Philosophers, &c. Does not the Bishop know that the Belly hath taught Poets, and Historians, and Divines, and Philosophers. and Artifi∣cers their several Arts, as well as Parrats? Do not men do their duty with regard to their backs▪ to their necks, and to

their morsells, as well as Setting-dogs, Coy-ducks and Par∣rats? Why then are these things to us the substance, and to them but the shadow or resemblance of rewards or punish∣ments?

^p When brute creatures do learn any such qualities, it is not out of judgement or deliberation or discourse, by inferring or concluding one thing from another, which they are not capable of, neither are they able to conceive a reason of what they do, &c. but they remember that when they did after one manner, they were beaten; and when they did after a∣nother manner, they were cherished; and accordingly they apply themselves.

If the Bishop had considered the cogitations of his own mind, not then when he disputeth, but then when he followed those businesses which he calleth trifles, he would have found them the very same which he here mentioneth, saving instead of beating, (because he is exempt from that) he is to put in dammage. For setting aside the discourse of the tongue, in words of general signification, the Idea's of our minds are the same with those of other living creatures, created from Visi∣ble, Audible, and other sensible objects to the eyes and other Organs of sence, as theirs are. For as the objects of sense are all individual, that is singular, so are all the fancies pro∣ceeding from their operations; and men reason not but in words of universal signification uttered, or tacitely thought on. But perhaps he thinketh remembrance of words to be the Ide∣a's of those things which the words signifie; and that all fan∣cies are not effected by the operation of Objects upon the Or∣gans of our senses. But to rectifie him in those points is grea∣ter labour (unless he had better principles) than I am wil∣ling or have at this tim•• leasure to undergo.

Lastly, whereas he sayes, if their Individual actions were absolutely necessary, Fear or Hope could not alter them. Thats true. For it is Fear and Hope that makes them neces∣sarily what they are.

J. D.

THirdly, let this opinion be once radicated in the minds* 1.30 of men, that there is no true liberty, and that all things come to pass inevitably, and it will utterly destroy the stu∣dy of Piety. Who will bewaile his sins with tears? what will become of that Grief, that Zeal, that Indignation, that holy Revenge, which the Apostle speaks of, if men be once throughly perswaded that they could not shun what they did? A man may grieve for that which he could not help, but he will never be brought to bewaile, that as his own fault, which flowed not from his own errour, but from an∣tecedent necessity. Who will be careful or sollicitous to performe obedience, that beleeveth there are inevitable bounds and limits set to all his devotions, which he can nei∣ther go beyond, nor come short of? To what end shall he pray God to avert those evils which are inevitable? or to confer those favours which are impossible? We indeed know not what good or evill shall happen to us, but this we know, that if all things be necessary, our devotions and endeavours cannot alter that which must be. In a word, the onely rea∣son why those persons who tread in this path of fatal destiny do sometimes pray, or repent, or serve God, is because the light of nature and the strength of reason, and the evidence of Scripture, do for that present transport them from their ill chosen grounds, and expell those Stoical fancies out of their heads; A compleate Stoick can neither pray, nor re∣pent, nor serve God to any purpose. Either allow liberty, or destroy Church, as well as Commonwealth, Religion as well as Policy.

T. H.

HIs third Argument consisteth in other inconveniences which he saith will follow, namely impiety and negli∣gence of Religious duties, Repentance, and zeal to Gods ser∣vice. To which I answer, as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the far greatest part of mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men whom either the study of acquiring wealth, or preferments, or whom the apperite of sensual delights, or the impatience of medita∣ting, or the rash imbracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things, that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety. And therefore, if he had not desired this answer, I would not have written it. Nor do I write it, but in hope your Lordship, and he will keep it private. Nevertheless in very truth, the necessity of events does not of it self draw with it any impiety at all. For piety consisteth onely in two things; One, that we honour God in our hearts, which is, that we think of his power as highly as we can, for to honour any thing is nothing else but to think it to be of great power. The other that we signifie that ho∣nour and esteem by our words and actions, which is called cul∣tus, or worship of God. He therefore that thinketh that all things proceed from Gods Eternal Will, and consequently are necessary, does he not think God Omnipotent? does he not esteem of his power as highly as is possible? which is to honour God as much as can be in his heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by external acts and words to acknow∣ledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? Yet is this exter∣nal acknowledgement the same thing which we call Worship. So this opinion fortifieth piety in both kinds, externally and in∣ternally, and therefore is far from destroying it. And for Repentance, which is nothing but a glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out of the way, though the cause that made him go astray were necessary, yet there is no •…•…ason why he should not grieve; and again, though the cause •…•…hy he returned into the way were necessary, there remaines

still the causes of joy. So that the necessity of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of repentance, grief for the errour, nor joy for the returning. And for Prayer, whereas he saith, that the necessity of things destroyes prayer, I deny it. For though prayer be none of the causes that moove Gods Will, his Will be∣ing unchangeable, yet since we find in Gods Word, he will not give his blessings but to those that ask them, the motive to pray∣er is the same. Prayer is the gift of God, no less than the bles∣sings. And the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed. Tis manifest, that thanksgiv∣ing is no cause of the blessing past; And that which is past is sure, and necessary. Yet even amongst men, thanks is in use as an acknowledgement of the benefit past, though we should ex∣pect no new benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God Al∣mighty is but thanksgiving for his blessings in general; and though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a signification that we expect nothing but from God, in such manner as he, not as we will. And our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray, Thy will, not our will be done, and by example teaches us the same, for he prayed thus, Father, if it be thy will, let this cup pass, &c. The end of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not to move, but to honour God Almighty, in acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him onely.

J. D.

I Hope T. H. will be perswaded in time, that it is not the Covetousness, or Ambition, or Sensuallity, or Sloth, or Prejudice of his Readers which renders this doctrine of absolute necessity dangerous, but that it is in its own nature destructive to true godliness; ^a And though his answer consist more of oppositions than of solutions, yet I will not willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed. ^b First, he erres in making inward piety to consist meerly in the e∣stimation of the judgement. If this were so, what hinders but that the Devils should have as much inward piety as the best Christians, for they esteem Gods power to be infinite,

and tremble? Though inward piety do suppose the act of the understanding, yet it consisteth properly in the act of the will, being that branch of Justice which gives to God the honour which is due unto him. Is there no Love due to God, no Faith, no Hope? Secondly, he erres in making inward piety to ascribe no glory to God, but onely the glo∣ry of his Power or Omnipotence. What shall become of all other the divine Attributes, and particularly of his Good∣ness, of his Truth, of his Justice, of his Mercy, which be∣get a more true and sincere honour in the heart than great∣ness it self? Magnos facile laudamus, bonos lubenter. Third∣ly, this opinion of absolute necessity destroyes the truth of God, making him to command one thing openly, and to necessitate another privately; to chide a man for doing that which he hath determined him to do; to profess one thing, and to intend another. It destroyes the goodness of God, making him to be an hater of mankind, and to delight in the torments of his creatures, whereas the very doggs licked the sores of Lazarus in pitty and commisera∣tion of him. It destroyes the Justice of God, making him to punish the creatures for that which was his own act, which they had no more powerto shun, than the fire hath po∣wer not to burn. It destroyes the very power of God, making him to be the true Author of all the defects and evils which are in the world. These are the fruits of Impotence, not of Omnipotence. He who is the effective cause of sin either in himself, or in the Creature, is not Almighty. There needs no other Devil in the world to raise jealousies and suspitions between God and his creatures, or to poyson mankind with an apprehension, that God doth not love them, but onely this opinion, which was the office of the Serpent, Gen. 3. 5. Fourthly, for the outward worship of God. ^e How shall a man praise God for his goodness, who believes him to be a greater Tyrant than ever was in the world? who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault, to express his power? How shall a man hear the word of God with that reverence, and devotion, and faith, which is requisite, who believeth that God causeth

his Gospel to be preached to the much greater part of Chri∣stians, not with any intention that they should be convert∣ed and saved, but meerly to harden their hearts, and to make them inexcusable? How shall a man receive the bles∣sed Sacrament with comfort and confidence, as a Seal of Gods love in Christ, who believeth, that so many millions are positively excluded from all fruit and benefit of the pas∣sions of Christ, before they had done either good or evil? How shall he prepare himself with care and conscience, who apprehendeth, that Eating and Drinking unworthily is not the cause of damnation, but because God would damn a man, therefore he necessitates him to eat and drink unworthily? How shall a man make a free vow to God, without grosse ridiculous hypocrisie, who thinks he is able to p••rform nothing, but as he is extrinsecally necessitated? Fiftly, for Repentance, how shall a man condemn and ac∣cuse himself for his sins, who thinks himself to be like a Watch which is wound up by God, and that he can go nei∣ther longer nor shorter, faster nor slower, truer nor falser, than he is ordered by God? If God sets him right, he goes right. If God set him wrong he goes wrong. How can a man be said to return into the right way, who never was in any other way, but that which God himself had chalked out for him? What is his purpose to amend, who is de∣stitute of all power, but as if a man should purpose to fly without wings, or a beggar who hath not a groat in his purse, purpose to build Hospitals?

We use to say, admit one absurdity, and a thousand will follow. To maintain this unreasonable opinion of abso∣lute necessity he is necessitated (but it is hypothetically, he might change his opinion if he would) to deal with all ancient Writers, as the Goths did with the Romans, who destroyed all their magnificent works, that there might re∣main no monument of their greatness upon the face of the earth. Therefore he will not leave so much as one of their opinions, nor one of their definitions, nay, not one of their ••earms of Art standing. ^f Observe what a description he hath given us here of Repentance. It is a glad returning

into the right way, after the grief of being out of the way. It amazed me to find gladness to be the first word in the des∣cription of Repentance. His repentance is not that repen∣tance, nor his piety that piety, nor his prayer that kind of prayer which the Church of God in all Ages hath acknow∣ledged. Fasting and Sackcloth, and Ashes, and Tears, and Humi-cubations, used to be companions of Repentance. Joy may be a consequent of it, not a part of it. ^g It is a returning, but whose act is this returning? Is it Gods alone, or doth the penitent person concur also freely with the grace of God? If it be Gods alone, then it is his repentance, not mans repentance, what need the penitent person trou∣ble himself about it? God will take care of his own work. The Scriptures teach us otherwise, that God expects our concurrence, Revel. 3. 19. Be zealous and repent, behold I stand at the dore, and knock. If any man hear my voice, and open the dore, I will come into him. It is a glad returning into the right way. Why dare any man call that a wrong way, which God himself hath determined? He that wil∣leth, and doth that which God would have him to will and to do, is never out of his right way. It followes in his de∣scription, after the grief, &c. It is true, a man may grieve for that which is necessarily imposed upon him, but he can∣not grieve for it as a fault of his own, if it never was in his power to shun it; Suppose a Writing-master, shall hold his Scholars hand in his, and write with it; the Scholars part is only to hold still his hand, whether the Master write well or ill; the Scholar hath no ground, either of joy or sorrow as for himself, no man will interpret it to be his act, but his Masters. It is no fault to be out of the right way, if a man had not liberty to have kept himself in the way.

And so from Repentance he skips quite over New obedi∣ence, to come to Prayer, which is the last Religious duty insisted upon by me here. But according to his use, with∣out either answering or mentioning what I say. Which would have shewed him plainly what kind of prayer I intend, not contemplative prayer in general, as it includes thanks∣giving, but that most proper kind of prayer which we call

Petition, which used to be thus defined, to be an act of Reli∣gion by which we desire of God something which we have not, and hope that we shall obtain it by him▪ Quite contrary to this T. H. tells us, ^h that prayer is not a cause, nor a meanes of Gods blessing, but onely a signification that we expest it from him. If he had told us onely that prayer is not a meritori∣ous cause of Gods blessings, as the poor man by begging an almes doth not deserve it, I should have gone along with him. But to tell us, that it is not so much as a means to procure Gods blessing, and yet with the same breath, that God will not give his blessings, but to those who pray, who shall reconcile him to himself? The Scriptures teach us otherwise, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my Name, he will give it you, John 16. 23. Ask and it shall be given you, seek and ye shall find, knock and it shall be opened unto you, Matth. 7. 7. St. Paul tells the Corinthians, 2 Cor. 1. 11. that he was helped by their prayers, thats not all, that the gift was bestowed upon him by their means, So prayer is a means: And St. James saith chap. 5. 16. The effectual fer∣vent prayer of a righteous man availeth much. If it be effe∣ctual, then it is a cause. To shew this efficacy of prayer, our Saviour useth the comparison of a Father towards his Child, of a Neighbour towards his Neighbour, yea, of an unjust Judge, to shame those who think, that God hath not more compassion than a wicked man. This was signi∣fied by Jacobs wrestling and prevailing with God. Prayer is like the Tradesmans tools wherewithal he gets his living for himself, and his family. But, saith he, Gods Will is un∣changeable. What then? He might as well use this against study, Physick, and all second causes, as against Prayer. He shewes even in this, how little they attribute to the en∣deavours of men. There is a great difference between these two, mutare voluntatem, to change the will, which God never doth, in whom there is not the least shadow of turn∣ing by change; His will to love and hate, was the same from eternity, which it now is, and ever shall be. His love and hatred are immovable, but we are removed, Non tellus cymbam tellurem cymbareliquit, And velle mutationem,

to will a change, which God often doth. To change the will argues a change in the Agent, but to will a change, on∣ly argues a change in the object. It is no inconstancy in a man to love or to hate, as the object is changed. Praesta mihi omnia ••ad••m & idem sum. Prayer works not upon God, but us; It renders not him more propitious in him∣self, but us more capable of mercy. He saith, this, That God doth not bless us, execpt we pray, is a motive to prayer. Why talks he of motives, who acknowledgeth no liberty, nor admits any cause, but absolutely necessary? He saith, Prayer is the gift of God, no less than the blessing which we pray for, and conteined in the same decrree with the blessing. It is true, the spirit of prayer is the gift of God, will he con∣clude from thence, that the good imployment of one talent, or of one gift of God, may not procure another? Our Saviour teacheth us otherwise, Come thou good and faithfull servant, thou hast been faithful in little, I will make the ruler over much. Too much light is an enemy to the sight, and too much Law is an enemy to Justice. I could wish we wrangled less about Gods Decrees, until we understood them better. But, saith he, Thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing past, and prayer is but a thanksgiving. He might even as well tell me, that when a beggar craves an almes, and when he gives thanks for it, it is all one. Every thanks∣giving is a kind of prayer, but every prayer, and namely Petition, is not a thanks-giving. In the last place he urgeth, that in our prayers we are bou••d, to submit our Wills to Gods Will, who ever made any doubt of this? we must submit to the Preceptive Will of God, or his Commandements; we must submit to the effective Will of God, when he de∣clares his good pleasure by the event or otherwise. But we deny, and deny again, either that God wills things, ad extra, without himself necessarily, or that it is his pleasure that all second causes should act necessarily at all times, which is the question, and that which he alledgeth to the contrary comes not near it.

Anim••dversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb. XV.

^a ANd though his answer consist more of oppositions than of solutions, yet I will not willingly leave one grain of his matter unweighed.

It is a promise of great exactness, and like to that which is in his Epistle to the Reader, Here is all that passed between us upon this subject, without any addition or the least vari∣ation from the original, &c. Which promises were both need∣less and made out of gallantry; and therefore he is the less pardonable in case they be not very rigidly observed. I would therefore have the Reader to consider, whether these words of mine, Our Saviour bids us pray Thy Will, not our Will be done, and by example teaches us the same, for he prayed thus, Father if it be thy Will let this cup pass, &c. which seem at least to imply that our prayers cannot change the Will of God, nor divert him from his eternal decree, have been weigh∣ed by him to a grain according to his promise. Nor hath he kept his other promise any better; For (Number 8.) reply∣ing to these word•• of mine, If he had so little to do as to be a spectator of the actions of Bees and Spiders, he would have confessed not onely Election, but also Art, Prudence, and Policy in them, &c. He saith, Yes, I have seen those silliest of Creatures, and seeing their rare works I have seen enough to confute all the bold-faced Athiests of this age, and their hellish blasphemies. This passage is added to that which pas∣sed between us upon this subject. For it is not in the Copy which I have had by me (as himself confesseth) these eight years. Nor is it in the Body of the Copy he sent to the Presse, but onely in the margent, that is to say, added out of anger a∣gainst me, whom he would have men think to be one of the bold-faced Athiests of this Age.

In the rest of this Reply he endeavoureth to prove, that it followeth from my opinion, that there is no use of Piety. My opinion is no more than this that a man cannot so determine to

day, the will which he shall have to the doing of any action to morrow, as that it may not be changed by some external acci∣dent or other, as there shall appear more or less advantage to make him persevere in the Will to the same action, or to Will it no more. When a man intendeth to pay a debt at a certain time, if he see that the deteining of the money for a little longer may advantage himself, and ••eth no other disad∣vantage equivalent likely to follow upon the detention, hath his will changed by the advantage, and therefore had not de∣termined his Will himself; but when he foreseeth discredit or perhaps imprisonment, then his Will remaineth the same, and is determined by the thoughts he hath of his Creditor, who is therefore an external cause of the determination of the debtors Will. This is so evident to all men living, though they never studied School-Divinity, that it will be very strange if he draw from it the great impiety he pretends to do. Again my opinion is only this, that whatsoever God foreknowes shall come to pass, it cannot possibly be that that shall not come to pass. But that which cannot possibly not come to pass, that is said by all men to come to pass necessarily; therefore all events that God foreknowes shal come to pass, shall come to pass necessari∣ly. If therefore the Bishop draw Impiety from this, he fal∣leth into the Impiety of denying Gods Prescience. Let us see now how he reasoneth.

^b First, he erres in making inward Piety to consist meer∣ly in the estimation of the judgement. If this were so, what hinders but that the Devils should have as much inward Piety as the best Christians, for they esteem Gods power to be in∣finite, and tremble?

I said that two things concurr'd to Piety; one, to esteem his power as highly as is possible. The other, that we signifie that estimation by our words and actions, that is to say, that we worship him; This later part of Piety he lea∣veth out; and then it is much more easie to conclude as he doth, that the Devils may have inward Piety. But neither so doth the Conclusion follow; For Goodness is one of Gods Powers, (namely that Power by which he worketh in men, the Hope they have in him) and is relative; and therefore un∣less

the Devil think that God will be good to him, he cannot esteem him for his Goodness. It does not therefore follow from any opinion of mine, that the Devil may have as much inward Piety as a Christian. But how does the Bishop know how the Devils esteem Gods Power? and what Devils does he mean? there are in the Scripture two sorts of things, which are in English translated Devils, one is, that which is called Satan, Diabolus, and Abaddon, which signifies in English an Enemy, an Accuser, and a Destroyer of the Church of God. In which sense, the Devils are but wicked men. How then is he sure that they esteem Gods Power to be infinite? for trembling inferrs no more than that they apprehend it to be greater than their own. The other sort of Devils are called in the Scripture Doemonia, which are the faigned Gods of the Heathen, and are neither bodies nor spiritual substances, but meer fancies, and fictions of terrified hearts, faigned by the Greeks and other Heathen People, and which St. Paul calleth Nothings; for an Idol saith he is Nothing. Does the Bishop mean that these Nothings esteem Gods Power, to be infinite and tremble? there is nothing that has a real being, but God and the World, and the parts of the World; nor has any thing a faigned being but the fictions of mens braines. The World and the parts thereof are corporeal, indued with the dimensions of Quantity, and with Figure. I should be glad to know in what Classis of Entities, (which is a word that Schoolmen use) the Bishop ••anketh these Devils that so much esteem Gods Power and yet not love him, nor hope in him; if he place them not in the rank of those men, who are enemies to the People of God, as the Jewes did.

^c Secondly, he erres in making inward Piety, to ascribe no glory to God, but onely the glory of his Power, or Om∣nipotence. What shall become of all other the Divine Attri∣butes, and particularly of his Goodness, of his Truth, of his Justice, of his Mercy, &c.

He speaketh of Gods Goodness, and Mercy, as if they were no part of his Power. Is not Goodness in him that is good the Power to make himself beloved, and is not Mercy Goodness? are not therefore these Attributes contained in the

Attribute of his Omnipotence. And Justice in God, is it any thing else but the Power he hath, and exerciseth in distribu∣ting blessings and afflictions? Justice is not in God as in man, the observation of the Lawes made by his superiours. Nor is Wisedom in God a logicall examination of the means by the end, as it is in men; but an incomprehensible Attribute gi∣ven to an incomprehensible nature, for to honour him. It is the Bishop that erres, in thinking nothing to be Power, but Riches, and High place, wherein to dominere and please him∣self, and vex those that submit not to his opinions.

^d Thirdly, this opinion of absolute Necessity, destroyes the Truth of God, making him to command one thing open∣ly, and to necessitate another privately, &c. It destroyes the goodness of God, making him to be a hater of mankind, &c. It destroyes the Justice of God, making him to pu∣nish the creatures for that which was his own act, &c. It de∣stroyes the very Power of God, making him to be the true Author of all the defects and evils, which are in the world.

If the opinion of absolute necessity do all this, then the opi∣nion of Gods Prescience does the same; for God foreknoweth nothing that can possibly not come to pass; but that which cannot possibly not come to pass, cometh to pass of necessity. But how doth necessity destroy the Truth of God by command∣ing and hindering what he commandeth? Truth consisteth in Affirmation and Negation, not in commanding and hindering; it does not therefore follow if all things be necessary that come to pass, that therefore God hath spoken an untruth; Nor that he professesseth one thing and intendeth another. The Scripture which is his word, is not the profession of what he in∣tendeth, but an indication of what those men shall necessarily intend, whom he hath chosen to salvation, and whom he hath determined to destruction. But on the other side, from the Negation of necessity, there followeth necessarily the Negati∣on of Gods Prescience; which is in the Bishop (if not igno∣rance) impiety. Or how destroyeth it the Goodness of God, or maketh him to be an hater of mankind, and to delight in the torments of his creatures, whereas the very doggs licked the sores of Lazarus, in pitty and commiseration of him? I

cannot imagine when living creatures of all sorts are often in torments, as well as men, that God can be displeased with it, without whose will they neither are nor could be at all tormen∣ted. Nor yet is he delighted with it; but health▪ sickness, ••ase, torments, life and death are without all passion in him dispenced by him, and he putteth an end to them then when they end, and a beginning when they begin, according to his eternal purpose, which cannot be resisted. That the necessi∣ty argueth a delight of God in the torments of his creatures, is even as true as that it was pitty and commiseration in the doggs, that made them lick the sores of Lazarus. Or how doth the opinion of necessity destroy the Justice of God, or make him to punish the creatures for that which was his own act? If all afflictions be punishments, for whose act are all other Creatures punished which cannot sin? Why may not God make the affliction both of those men that he hath elected, and also of those whom he hath reprobated, the necessary causes of the conversion of those he hath elected; their own afflictions serving therein as chastisements, and the afflictions of the rest, as examples? But he may perhaps think it no injustice to pu∣nish the creatures that cannot sin, with temporary punish∣ments, when nevertheless it would be injustice to torment the same creatures eternally. This may be somewhat to Meek∣ness and Cruelty, but nothing at all to Justice and Injustice: For in punishing the innocent the injustice is equall, though the punishments be unequal. And what cruelty can be grea∣ner than that which may be inferred from this opinion of the Bishop, that God doth torment eternally, and with the extrea∣mest degree of torment, all those men which have sinned, that is to say, all mankind from the creation to the end of the world, which have not believed in Jesus Christ, whereof very few in respect of the multitude of others have so much as heard of his name, and this, when Faith in Christ is the gift of God him∣self, and the hearts of all men in his hands to frame them to the belief of whatsoever he will have them to believe? He hath no reason therefore for his part to tax any opinion, for ascribing to God either cruelty or injustice. Or how doth it destroy the Power of God, or make him to be the Author

of all the defects and evils which are in the world? First, he seemeth not to understand what Author signifies. Author is he which owneth an Action, or giveth a warrant to do it. Doe I say that any man hath in the Scripture, (which is all the warrant we have from God for any Action whatsoever) a Warrant to commit Theft, Murder, or any other sin? Does the opinion of necessity inferre, that there is such a warrant in the Scripture? Perhaps he will say no, but that this opinion makes him the cause of sin. But does not the Bishop think him the cause of all Actions? And are not sins of commission Actions? Is Murder no Action? And does not God himself say Non est malum in▪civitate quod ego non feci? And was not mur∣der one of those evils? whether it were or not, I say no more but that God is the cause (not the Author) of all Actions and Motions. Whether sin be the Action, or the Defect, or the Irregularity▪ I mean not to dispute. Nevertheless I am of opinion, that the distinction of Causes into Efficient and Defi∣cient is Bohu, and signifies nothing.

^e How shall a man praise God for his Goodness, who be∣leeves him to be a greater Tyrant than ever was in the world? who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault, to express his Power.

If Tyrant signifie (as it did when it came first in use) a King, tis no dishonour to beleeve that God is a greater Tyrant than ever was in the world; for he is the King of all Kings, Emperours and Common-Wealths. But if we take the word (as it is now used) to signifie those Kings onely, which they that call them Tyrants are displeased with; that is, that Go∣vern not as they would have them, the Bishop is nearer the cal∣ling him a Tyrant than I am, making that to be Tyranny, which is but the exercise of an absolute Power; For he holdeth (though he see it not) by consequence, in withdrawing the Will of man from Gods dominion, that every man is a King of himself. And if a man cannot praise God for his Goodness, who creates millions to burn eternally without their fault; how can the Bishop praise God for his Goodness, who thinks he hath crea∣ted millions of millions to burn eternally, when he could have kept them so easily from committing any fault? And to his

How shall a man hear the Word of God with that reve∣rence, and devotion, and faith which is requisite, who be∣leeveth that God causeth his Gospel to be preached to the much greater part of Christians, not with any intention, that they should be converted and saved, &c. I answer that those men who so beleeve have Faith in Jesus Christ, or they have not Faith in him, If they have, then shall they by that faith hear the Word of God with that reverence and devo∣tion, and faith which is requisite to salvation. And for them that hath no faith, I do not think he asketh how they shall hear th•• Word of God with that reverence, and devotion, and faith which is requisite, for he knowes they shall not till such time as God shall have given them faith. Also he mistakes if he think that I or any other Christian beleeve, that God intendeth by hardening any mans heart, to make that man inexcusable, but to make his Elect the more careful.

Likewise to his question, How shall a man receave the Sacrament with comfort, who beleeveth that so many mil∣lions are positively excluded from the benefit of Christs Passion, before they had done either good or evil. I answer as before, by Faith, if he be of Gods Elect; if not, he shall not re∣ceave the Sacrament with comfort. I may answer also that the Faithful man shall receave the Sacrament with comfort by the same way that the Bishop receaveth it with comfort. For he also beleeveth that many millions are excluded from the benefit of Christs Passion, (whether positively or not positively is nothing to the purpose, nor doth positively signifie any thing in this place) and that so long before they had either done good or evil, as it was known to God before they were born that they were so excluded

To his How shall he prepare himself with care and consci∣ence, who apprehendeth that eating and drinking unwor∣thily, is not the cause of damnation, but because God would damn a man, therefore he necessitates him. I an∣swer that he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, does not be∣leeve that God necessitates him to Eat and Drink unworthily, because he would damn him; for neither does he think he Eats and Drinks unworthily, nor that God intends to damn him;

for he beleeveth no such damnation, nor intendeth any prepara∣tion. The beleef of damnation is an Article of Christian faith; so is also preparation to the Sacrament. Tis therefore a vain question, how he thaet hath no faith shall prepare himself with care and conscience to the receiving of the Sacrament. But to the question how they shall prepare themselves that shall at all prepare themselves; I answer it shall be by Faith, when God shall give it them.

To his How shall a man make a free vow to God, who thinks himself able to perform nothing, but as he is extrin∣secally necessitated. I answer, that if he make a vow it is a Free vow, (or else it is no vow) and yet he may know when he hath made that vow, (though not before) that it was extrinse∣cally nocessitated, for the necessity of vowing before he vowed, hindered not the Freedome of his Vow, but made it.

Lastly, to How shall a man condemn and accuse himself for his sins, who thinks himself to be like a Watch which is wound up by God, &c. I answer, though he think him∣self necessitated to what he shall do, yet if he do not think himself necessitated, and wound up to impenitence, there will follow upon his opinion of necessity no impedment to his repentance. The Bishop disputeth not against me, but against sombody that holds a man may repent, that beleeves at the same time he can∣not repent.

^f Observe what a description he hath given us here of Repentance. It is a glad returning into the right way, after the grief of being out of the way. It amazed me to find glad∣ness to be the first word in the description of repentance.

I could never be of opinion that Christian repentance could be ascribed to them, that had as yet no intention to forsake their sins and to lead a new life. He that grieves for the evil that hath happened to him for his sins, but hath not a resolution to obey Gods Commandements better for the time to come, griev∣eth for his sufferings but not for his doings, which no Divine I think will call Christian Repentance; but he that resolveth upon ameudment of life, knoweth that there is forgiveness for him in Christ Jesus, whereof a Christian cannot possibly be but glad. Before this gladness there was a grief preparative to

Repentance, but the Repentance it self was not Christian Repentance till this Conversion, till this glad Conversion. Therefore I see no reason why it should amaze him to find glad∣ness to be the first word in the description of Repentance, saving that the light amazeth such as have been long in darkness. And for the Fasting, Sackcloth, and Ashes, they were never parts of Repentance perf••cted, but signes of the beginning of it. They are external things; Repentance is internal. This Doctrine pertaineth to the e∣stablishing of Romish Penance, and being found to conduce to the power of the Clergy, was by them wished to be restored.

^g It is a returning, but whose act is this returning? If it be Gods alone, then it is his Repentance, not mans Repent∣ance, what need the penitent person trouble himself about it.

This is ill argued, for why is it Gods Repentance, when he gives man Repentance, more than it is Gods Faith, when he gives man Faith. But he labours to bring in a concurrence of Mans Will with Gods Will; and a power in God to give Repentance, if man will take it; but not the Power to make him take it. This concurrence he thinks is proved by Revel. 3. 19. Be zealous, and repent, behold I stand at the door, and knock. If any man hear my voice, and open the door. I will come in to him. Here is nothing of concurrence, nor of any thing eqvivalent to it, nor mention at all of the Will or Purpose, but of the calling, or voice by the Minister. And as God giveth to the Minister a Power of perswading; so he giveth also many times a concurrence of the Auditor with the Minister in being perswaded. Here is therefore somewhat equivalent to a concurrence with the Minister, that is, of man with man, but nothing of the concurrence of man, (whose Will God frameth as he pleaseth,) with God that frameth it. And I wonder how any man can conceive, when God giveth a man a Will to do any thing whatsoever, how that Will when it is not, can concurre with Gods Will to make it selfe be. The next thing he excepteth against is this, that I hold.

^h That prayer is not a cause, nor a means of Gods bles∣sing, but onely a signification that we expect it from him.

First instead of my words a signification that we expect no∣thing

but from him, he hath put a signification that we ex∣pect it from him. There is much difference between my words and his in the sense and meaning, for in the one there is honour ascrihed to God, and humility in him that prayeth; but in the o∣ther presumption in him that prayeth, and a detraction from the honour of God. When I say Prayer is not a cause nor a meanes, I take cause and meanes in one and the same sense, affirming that God is not moved by any thing that we do, but has alwaies one and the same eternal purpose, to do the same things that from eternity he hath foreknown shall be done; and me thinks there can be no doubt made thereof. But the Bi∣shop alledgeth 2 Cor. 1. 11. That St Paul was helped by their prayers, and that the gift was bestowed upon them by their means, and James 5. 16. The effectual and fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much. In which places the words meanes, effectual, availeth, do not signifie any causation; for no man nor creature living can work any effect upon God, in whom there is nothing, that hath not been in him eternally heretofore, nor that shall not be in him eternally hereafter; but do signifie the order in which God hath placed mens pray∣ers, and his own blessings. And not much after the Bishop himself saith, Prayer works not upon God, but us. There∣fore it is no cause of Gods Will, in giving us his blessings, but is properly a signe, not a procuration of his favour. The next thing he replieth to is, that I make prayer to be a kind of thanksgiving, to which he replies, He might even as wel tell me that when a Beggar craves an Alms, and when he gives thanks for it, it is all one. Why so? Does not a Beggar move a man by his prayer, and sometime worketh in him a compassion not without pain, and as the Scripture calls it, a yerning of the Bowels, which is not so in God when we pray to him. Our prayer to God is a duty; it is not so to man. There∣fore though our prayers to man be distinguished from our thanks, it is not necessary it should be so in our prayers and thanks to God Almighty.

To the rest of his Reply in this Number 15. there needs no further Answer.

J. D.

FOourthly, the order, beauty, and perfection of the world doth require, that in the Universe should be Agents of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some contingent. He that shall make either all things necessary, guided by destiny; or all things free, governed by election; or all things con∣tingent, happening by chance, doth overthrow the beauty and the perfection of the world.

T. H.

THE fourth Argument from Reason is this. The Order,* 1.31 Beauty and Perfection of the World, requireth, that in the Universe, should be Agents of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some contingent. He that shall make all things ne∣nessary, or all things free, or all things contingent, doth o∣verthrow the beauty and pefection of the World.

In which Argument I observe, first, a contradiction. For seeing he that maketh any thing in that he maketh it, he ma∣keth it to be necessary, it followeth, that he that maketh all things, maketh all things necessary to be. As if a workman make a garment, the garment must necessarily be. So if God make every thing, every thing must necessarily be. Perhaps the beauty of the World requireth (though we know it not) that some Agents should work without deliberation, which he calls necessary Agents. And some Agents with delibera∣tion, and those, both he and I call free Agents. And that some Agents should work, and we not know how; And those effects we both call contingent; But this hinders not, but that he that electeth may have his election necessarily deter∣mined to one by former causes; And that which is contingent, and imputed to Fortune, be nevertheless necessary, and de∣pend on precedent necessary causes. For by contingent, men do not mean that which hath no cause, but which hath not for cause any thing which we perceive. As for Example; when a Travailer meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause sufficient enough to produce it▪ but be∣cause the journey caused not the rain, nor the rain the journey, we say, they were contingent one to another. And thus you see, though there be three sorts of events, Necessary, Con∣tingent,

and Free, yet they may be all necessary, without the destruction of the beauty or perfection of the Univers.

J. D.

THE first thing he observes in mine Argument is con∣tradiction, as he calls it, but in truth it is but a de∣ception of the sight. As one candle sometimes seems to be two, or a rod in the water shewes to be two rods, Quic∣quid recipitur, recipitur ad m••dum recipientis. But what is this contradiction? Because I say, he who maketh all things, doth not make them necessary. What! a contradiction, and but one proposition? That were strange. I say, God hath not made all Agents necessary; he saith, God hath made all Agents necessary. Here is a contradiction indeed, but it is between him and me, not between me and my self But yet though it be not a formal contradiction, yet perhaps it may imply a contradiction in adjecto. Wherefore to clear the matter, and dispell the mist which he hath raised; It is true, that every thing when it is made; it is necessary that it be made so as it is, that is, by a necessity of infallibility, or supposition, supposing, that it be so made, but this is not that absolute, antecedent necessity, whereof the que∣stion is between him and me. As to use his own instance; Before the Garment be made, the Tailor is free to make it, either of the Italian, Spanish, or French fashion indiffe∣rently: But after it is made, it is necessary that it be of that fashion whereof he hath made it, that is by a necessity of supposition. But this doth neither hinder the cause from being a free cause, nor the effect from being a free effect, but the one did produce freely, and the other was freely produced. So the contradiction is vanished.

In the second part of his answer ^a he grants, that there are some free Agents, and some contingent Agents, and that Perhaps the beauty of the World doth require it, but like a shrewd Cow, which after she hath given her milk, casts it down with her foot, in the conclusion he tells us, that ne∣vertheless they are all necessary. This part of his answer is a meer Logomachy, (as a great part of the controversies in the world are) or a contention about words. What is the mean∣ing

of necessary, and free, and contingent actions. I have shewed before what free and necessary do properly signi∣fie; but he misrecites it. He saith, I make all Agents which want deliberation to be necessary, but I acknowledge that many of them are contingent. ^b Neither do I approve his definition of contingents, though he say I concurre with him, that they are such Agents as work we know not how. For according to this description many necessary actions should be contingent, and many contingent actions should be necessary. The Loadstone draweth Iron, the Jet chaff, we know not how, and yet the effect is necessary, and so it is in all Sympathies and Antipathies or occult qualities. Again, a man walking in the streets, a Tile falls down from an house, and breaks his head. We know all the causes, we know how this came to pass. The man walked that way, the pin failed, the Tile fell just when he was un∣der it; And yet this is a contingent effect. The man might not have walked that way, and then the Tile had not fal∣len upon him. Neither yet do I understand here in this place by contingents, such events as happen beside the scope, or intention of the Agents; as when a man digging to make a grave, finds a Treasure, though the word be sometimes so taken. But by contingents, I understand all things which may be done, and may not be done, may hap∣pen or may not happen, by reason of the indetermination, or accidental concurrence of the causes. And those same things which are absolutely Incontingent are yet Hypo∣thetically necessary. As supposing the passenger did walk just that way, just at that time, and that the pin did faile just then, and the Tile fall, it was necessary that it should fall upon the Passengers head. The same defence will keep out his shower of rain. But we shall meet with his shower of rain again, Number 34. Whither I referre the further explication of this point.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Number, XVI.

IN this Number he would prove that there must be Free A∣gents, and Contingent Agents, as well as Necessary Agents, from the Order, Beauty, and Perfection of the World. I that thought that the Order, Beauty, and Perfection of the World re∣quired that which was in the World, and not that which the Bishop had need of for his Argument, could see no force of con∣sequence to inferre that which he calls Free and Contingent. That which is in the World is the Order, Beauty, and Perfecti∣on which God hath given the World; and yet there are no A∣gents in the World, but such as work a seen Necessity, or an un∣seen Necessity; and when they work an unseen Necessity in crea∣tures inanimate, then are those creatures said to be wrought upon Contingently, and to work Contingently. And when the Necessity unseen is of the actions of men, then it is commonly called Free, and might be so in other living creatures; for Free and Voluntary are the same thing. But the Bishop in his Re∣ply hath insisted most upon this, that I make it a contradiction to say that He that maketh a thing, doth not make it necessary, and wonders how a Contradiction can be in one Proposition, and yet within two or three lines after found it might be; and therefore to clear the matter he sayes that such Necessity is not Antecedent, but a Necessity of Supposition; which never∣theless is the same kind of Necessity which he attributeth to the burning of the fire, where there is a necessity that the thing thrown into it shall be burned, though yet it be but burning, or but departing from the hand that throwes it in; and therefore the Necessity is Antecedent. The like is in making a Garment; the Necessity begins from the first motion towards it, which is from Eternity, though the Taylor and the Bishop are equally unsensible of it. If they saw the whole order and conjunction of Causes, they would say it were as Necessary as any thing else can possibly be; and therefore God that sees that order and con∣junction, knowes it is necessary.

The rest of his Reply is to argue a contradiction in me; for he sayes.

^a I grant that there are some Free Agents, and some Con∣tingent

Agents, and that perhaps the beauty of the World doth require it, but like a shrewd Cow, which after she hath given her milk casts it down with her foot, in the con∣clusion I tell him that nevertheless they are all necessary.

It is true, that I say some are Free Agents, and some Con∣tingent; nevertheless they may be all necessary For accord∣ing to the significations of the words Necessary, Free, and Con∣tingent, the distinction is no more but this; of Necessary A∣gents, some are Necessary, and some are Agents; and of A∣gents, some are living creatures, and some are inanimate; which words are improper, but the meaning of them is this; men call ne∣cessary Agents such as they know to be necessary, and contingent Agents such inanimate things as they know not whether they work necessarily or no, and by free Agents, men whom they know not whether they work necessarily or no. All which confusion a∣riseth from that presumptuous men take for granted, that that is not whith they know not.

^b Neither do I approve his definition of Contingents, that they are such Agents as work we know not how.

The reason is because it would follow that many necessary A∣ctions should be contingent, and many contingent Actions ne∣cessary. But that which followeth from it really is no more but this: That many necessary Actions would be such as we know not to be necessary, and many Actions which we know not to be necessary, may yet be necessary, which is a truth. But the Bi∣shop defineth Contingents thus, All things which may be done and may not be done, may happen, or may not happen by reason of the Indetermination, or accidental concurrence of the Causes. By which definition Contingent is nothing, or it is the same that I say it is. For, there is nothing can be done and not be done, nothing can happen and not happen by reason of the Indetermination or accidental concurrence of the causes. It may be done or not done for ought he knowes, and happen or not hap∣pen for any determination he perceaveth; and that is my defi∣nition. But that the indetermination can make it happen or not happen, is absurd; for indetermination maketh it equally to happen or not to happen; and therefore both; which is a con∣tradiction. Therefore indetermination doth nothing, and what∣soever causes do, is necessary.

J. D.

FIftly take away liberty, and you take away the very nature* 1.32 of evil, and the formal reason of sin. If the hand of the Painter were the law of painting, or the hand of the Writer the law of writing, whatsoever the one did write, or the other paint, must infallibly be good. Seeing therefore, that the first cause is the rule and Law of goodness, if it do necessitate the will, or the person to evil, either by it self immediatly or me∣diatly by necessary flux of second causes, it will no longer be evill. The essence of sin consists in this, that one commit that which he might avoid. If there be no liberty to produce sin, there is no such thing as sin the world- Therefore it appears, both from Scripture and Reason, that there is true Liberty.

T. H.

TO the fift Argument from reason, which is, that if liberty be taken away, the nature and formall reason of sin is taken away I answer, by denying the consequence. The nature of sin consi••••eth in this, that the action done proceed from ou•• will, and be against the Law. A Judge in judging whether it be sin or not, which is done against the Law, l••oks at no higher cause o•• the acti∣on then the will of the doer. Now when I say the action was neces∣sary, I do not say it was done against the will o•• the doer, but with his will, and so necessarily, because mans will, that is, every act of the will, and purpose of man had a sufficient and therefore a ne∣cessary cause, and consequently every voluntary action was neces∣sitated. An action therefore may be voluntary and a sin and ne∣vertheless be necessary. And because God may afflict by right derived from his ••mnip••tency, though sin were not. And the ex∣ample of punishment on voluntary sinners, is the cause that pro∣duceth Justice, and maketh sin less frequent; for God to punish such sinners, as I have shewed before, is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his objections, both out of Scripture and Reason.

J. D.

SCis tu simulare ••upressum. quid hoc? It was shrewd coun∣s••il which Alcibiades gave to Themistocles, when he was busy about his accounts to the State, that he should rather study how to make no accounts. So it seems T. H. thinks it a more compendious way to baulk an argument, then to satis∣fie it. And if he can produce a Rowland against an Ol••ver, if he can urge a reason against a reason, he thinks he hath quitted himself fairely. But it will not serve his turn. And that he may not complain of misunderstanding it, as those who have a po∣litick deafness, to hear nothing but what liketh them▪ I will first reduce mine argument into form, and then weigh what he saith in answer, or rather in opposition to it. (a) That opi∣nion which takes away the formall reason of sin, and by conse∣quence, sin it self, is not to be approoved; this is cleer, be∣cause both Reason and Religion, Nature, and Scripture do proove, and the whole world confesseth, that there is sin. But this opinion of the necessity of all things, by reason of a con∣flux of second causes, ordered and determined by the first cause, doth take away the very formal reason of sin. This is prooved thus. That which makes sin it self to be good, and just, and lawfull, takes away the formall cause, and destroyes the essence of sin; for if sin be good, and just, and lawfull, it is no more evill, it is no sin, no anomy. But this opinion of the necessity of all things, makes sin to be very good and just▪ and lawful; for nothing can flow essentially by way of Phy∣sicall determination from the first cause, which is the Law and Rule of Goodness and Justice, but that which is good, and just, and lawfull; but this opinion makes sin to proceed essentially by way of Physicall determination from the first cause, as ap∣pears in T. H. his whole discourse. Neither is it material at all whether it proceed immediatly from the fist cause, or me∣diately, so as it be by a necessary flux of second and determi∣nate causes which produce it inevitably. To these proofs hee answers nothing, but onely by denying the first consequence, as he calls it, and then sings over his old song, That the nature of sin consisteth in this, that the action proceede from our will, and

be against the Law, which in our sense is most true, if he under∣stand a just Law, and a free rationall will. (b) But supposing (as he doth) that the Law injoins things impossible in them∣selves to be done▪ then it is an unjust and Tyrahnical Law, and the transgression of it is no sin, not to do that which never was in our power to do. And supposing likewise (as he doth) that the will is inevitably determined by special influence from the first cause then it is not mans will, but Gods Will, and flows essentially from the Law of Goodness.

(c) That which he addes of a Judge▪ is altogether imperti∣nent, as to his defence. Neither is a Civil Judge the proper Judge, no•• the Law of the Land the proper Rule of Sin. But it makes strongly against him; for the Judge goes upon a good ground, and even this which he confesseth, that the Judge looks at no hig••er cause, then the will of the doer, prooves, that the will of the doer did determine it self freely, and that the malefactor had liberty to have kept the Law, if he would: Certainly, a Judge ought to look at all material circumstances, and much more at all essential causes. Whether every suffici∣ent cause be a necessary cause, will come to be examined more properly, Numb. 31. For the present, it shall suffice to say, that liberty flows from the sufficiency, and contingency from the debility of the cause. (d) Nature Never intends the ge∣neration of a monster. If all the causes concur sufficiently, a a perfect creature is produced, but by reason of the insufficien∣cy, or debility, or contingent aberration of some of the causes, sometimes a Monster is produced. Yet the causes of a Monster were sufficient for the production of that which was produ∣ced, that is a Monster▪ otherwise a Monster had not been pro∣duced. What is it then? A Monster is not produced by ver∣tue of that order which is set in Nature, but by the contin∣gent aberration of some of the natural causes in their concur∣rence. The order set in Nature, is, that every like should be∣get its like. But supposing the concurrence of the causes to be such as it is, in the generation of a Monster, the generation of a Monster is necessary; as all the events in the world are when they are, that is, by an hypothetical necessity. (e) Then he betakes himself to his old help, that God may punish by right

of omnipotence though there were no sin. The question is not now what God may do, but what God will do, according to that Covenant which he hath made with man, Fac hoc & vives, Do this and thou shalt live. Neither doth God punish any man contrary to this Covenant, Hosea. 13. 9. O Israel, thy destruction is from thy self, but in me is thy help He that wills not the death of a Sinner, doth much less will the death of an innocent Creature. By death or destruction in this dis∣course, the onely separation of Soul and Body is not intended, which is a debt of nature, and which God, as Lord of Life and Death, may justly do, and make it not a punishment, but a blessing to the party; but we understand the subjecting of the Creature to eternal torments. Lastly, he tells of that benefit which redounds to others from Exemplary Justice, which is most true, but not according to his own grounds, for neither is it Justice to punish a man for doing that which it was impos∣sible always for him not to do; Neither is it lawfull to punish an innocent person, that good may come of it; And if his opi∣nion of absolute necessity of all things were true, the destinies of men could not be altered, either by examples or fear of pu∣nishment.

Animadversions upon the Reply. Numb. XVII.

WHereas he had in his first discourse made this consequence, If you take away Liberty, you take away the very na∣ture of evil, and the formal reason of sin. I denied that con∣sequence. It is true, he who taketh away the Liberty of doing, ac∣cording to the will, taketh away the nature of sin; but he that de∣nieth the Liberty to Will, does not so. But he supposing I under∣stood him not, will needs reduce his argument into form, in this manner.

(a) That opinion which takes away the formal reason of sin and by consequence, Sin ••t self, is not to be approved. This is granted. [But the opinion of necessity doth this.] This I deny, He proves it thus,

This opinion makes sin to proceed essentially, by way of Physicall determination from the first cause. But whatsoever proceedes essentially by way of Physical determination from the first cause, is Good, and Just, and Lawfull. Therefore this opinion of necessity maketh sin to be very Good, Just, and Lawfull. He might as well have concluded whatsoever man hath been made by God is a good, and just man. He observeth not that sin is not a thing really made. Those things which at first were actions were not th••n sins, though actions of the same na∣ture with those, which were afterwards sins; nor was then the will to any thing a sin, though it were a will to the same thing, which in willing now we should sin. Actions became sins, then first, when the commandement came: for as St. Paul saith, Without the Law sin is dead; and sin being but a transgression of the Law, there can be no action made sin but by the Law. There∣fore this opinion though it derive actions essentially from God, it derives not sins essentially from him, but relatively, and by the Commandement. And consequently the opinion of necessity, ta∣keth not away the nature of sin, but necessitateth that action which the Law hath made sin. And whereas I said the nature of sin consisteth in this, that it is an action proceeding from our will and against the Law, he alloweth it for true; and there∣fore he must allow also, that the formal reason of sin lieth not in the Liberty or necessity of willing, but in the will it self (necessa∣ry, or unnecessary) in relation to the Law. And whereas he li∣mits this truth which he allowed, to this, that the Law be just, and the will a Free rational Will, it serves to no purpose; for I have shown before, that no Law can be unjust. And it seemeth to me, that a rationall Will, if it be not meant of a Will after de∣liberation, whether he that deliberateth reasoneth aright or not, signifieth nothing. A rational man is rightly said, but a rational Will in other sense, then I have mentioned, is insignificant.

(b) [But supposing (as he doth) that the Law injoynes things impossible in themselves to be done, then it is an un∣just and Tyrannical Law, and the transgression of it no sin, &c. And supposing likewise (as he doth) that the Will is ine∣vitably determined, by special influence from the first cause, then it is not mans Will, but Gods Will.] He mistakes me in

this. For I say not the Law injoyns things impossible in them∣selves, for so I should say it injoyned contradictories. But I say the Law sometimes (the Law-makers not knowing the secret ne∣cessities of things to come) injoynes things made impossible by se∣cret and extrinsicall causes from all eternity. From this h••s error he infers, that the Laws must be unjust and Tyrannical, and the transgression of them no sin. But he who holds that Laws can be unjust and Tyrannical, will easily find pretence enough under any Government in the World to deny obedience to the Laws, un∣lesse they be such as he himself maketh, or adviseth to be made. He says also, that I suppose the will is inevitably determined by special influence from the first cause. It is true, saving that sen∣selesse word Influence, which I never used. But his consequence, then it is not mans Will, but Gods will, is not true; for it may be the Will both of the one and of the other, and yet not by con∣currence, as in a league, but by subjection of the will of man, to the Will of God.

(c) [That which he adds of a Judge is altogether imperti∣nent, as to his defence: Neither is a Civil Judge the proper Judge, nor the Law of the Land a proper Rule of sin.] A Judge is to judge of voluntary crimes. He has no commission to look into the secret causes that make it voluntary. An be∣cause the Bishop had said, the Law cannot justly punish a crime that proceedeth from necessity, it was no impertinent answer to say▪ the Judge lookes at no higher cause then the Will of the Doer. And even this▪ as h•• sayeth, is enough to proove, that the Will of the Doer did determine it self freely, and that the Malefactor had liberty to have kept the Law if he would To which I answer, that it proves indeed, that the Malefactor had Liberty to have kept the Law if h•• would; but it proveth not, that he had the Liberty to have a Will to keep the Law. Nor doth it prove that the Will of the Doer d••d determine it self freely; for nothing can prove non-sence. But here you see what the Bishop p••••sueth in this whole Reply, namely, to prove, that a man hath Liberty to do if he will, which I deny not; and thinks when he hath done that, he hath proved a man hath Liberty to Will, which he calles the Wills determining of it self freely. And whereas he adds, a Judge ought to look at all essential causes,

It is answer enough to say, he is bound to look at no more then hee thinks he can see.

(d) [Nature never intends the generation of a Monster. If all the causes concur sufficiently, a perfect creature is pro∣duced, but by reason of the insufficiency or debility, or con∣tingent aberration of some of the causes, sometimes a Mon∣ster is produced] He had no sooner said this, but finding his er∣ror, he retracteth it, and confesseth that the causes of a Monster were sufficient for the production of that which was produced, that is, of a Monster; otherwise a Monster had not been pro∣duced. Which is all that I intended by sufficiency of the cause. But whether every suff••••••••nt cause be a necessary cause or not, he meaneth to examine in Numb. 31. In the meane time, he saith onely, that Liberty flows from the sufficiency, and contingency from the debility of the cause; and leaves out necessity, as if it came from neither. I must note also, that where he says, Na∣ture never intends the generation of a Monster, I understand not whether by nature, he meane the Author of Nature, (in which meaning it derogates from God) or nature it self, as the Universal work of God, and then it is absurd; for the uni∣verse as one aggregate of things natural, hath no intention. His Doctrine that followeth, concerning the generation of Mon∣sters, is not worth consideration; therefore I leave it wholy to the Judgement of the Reader.

(e) Then he betakes himself to his old help, that God may punish by right of omnipotence, though there were no sin. The question is not now, what God may do, but what God will do, according to that Covenant which he hath made with Man, Fac hoc & vives, Do this, and thou shalt live.] Tis plaine (to let passe that he puts Punishment, where I put Af∣fliction, making a true sentence false) that if a man do this he shall live, and he may do this if he will. In this the Bishop and I disagree not. This therefore is not the question; but whe∣ther the will to do this, or not to do this, be in a mans own Elec∣tion. Whereas he adds He that wills not the death of a sinner, doth much lesse Will the death of an innocent creature. He had forgot for a while, that both good and evil men are by the Will of God all mortall; but presently corrects himself, and says,

he means by Death, Eternal torments, that is to say, eternal life, but in torments. To which I have answered once before in this Book, and spoken much more amply in another Book, to which the Bishop hath inclination to make an answer, as appea∣reth by his Epistle to the Reader. That which followeth to the end of this number, hath been urged and answered already divers times; I therefore passe it over.

J. D.

BUT the Patrons of necessity being driven out of the* 1.33 plain field with reason, have certain retreats or distincti∣ons, which they flye unto for refuge. First, they distinguish between Stoical necessity and Christian necessity, between which they make a threefold difference.

First, say they, the Stoicks did subject Jupiter to destiny, but but we subject destiny to God; I answer, that the Stoical and Christian destiny are one, and the same, fatum quasi effatum Jovis. Hear Seneca, Destiny is the necessity of all things, and actions, depending upon the disposition of Jupiter, &c. I add, that the Stoicks left a greater liberty to Jupiter over destiny, than these Stoicall Christians do to God over his decrees, ei∣ther for the beginnings of things as Euripides, or for the pro∣gress of them as Chrysippus, or at least of the circumstances of time and place, as all of them generally, So Virgil, Sed tra∣here & moras ducere, &c. So Osyris in Apuleius, promiseth him to prolong his life Ultra fato constituta tempora, beyond the times set down by the destinies.

Next, they say, that the Stoicks did hold an eternall flux and necessary connexion of causes, but they believe that God doth act, praeter & contra naturam, besides and against na∣ture. I answer, that it is not much material, whether they at∣tribute necessity to God, or to the Starrs, or to a connexion of causes, so as they establish necessity. The former reasons do not only condemn the ground or foundation of necessity, but much more necessity it self upon what ground soever. Ei∣ther they must run into this absurdity, that the effect is de∣termined, the cause remaining undetermined, or els hold such a necessary connexion of causes, as the Stoicks did.

Lastly, they say, the Stoicks did take away liberty and con∣tingence, but they admit it; I answer, what liberty or con∣tingence was it they admit, but a titular liberty, and an empty shadow of contingence, who do profess stifly, that all acti∣ons and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, in any other Place, Time, Number, Order, Measure, nor to any other end than they are, and that in respect of God, determining them to one; what a poor ridiculous liberty, or contingence is this?

Secondly, they distinguish between the first cause, and the second causes; they say, that in respect of the second causes many things are free, but in respect of the first cause▪ all things are necessary. This answer may be taken away two wayes.

First, so contraries shall be true together; The same thing* 1.34 at the same time shall be determined to one, and not deter∣mined to one; the same thing at the same time must necessa∣rily be, and yet may not be. Perhaps they will say, not in the same respect. But that which strikes at the root of this question is this, If all the causes were onely collateral, this exception might have some colour, but where all the causes being joined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one totall cause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series, or subordination of causes be ne∣cessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt, makes the effect necessary; Necessity or Liberty is not to be esteemed from one cause, but from all the causes joyned together. If one link in a chain be fast, it fastens all the rest.

Secondly, I would have them tell me whether the second* 1.35 causes be predetermined by the first cause or not; If it be de∣termined, then the effect is necessary, even in respect of the se∣cond causes; If the second cause be not determined, how is the effect determined, the second cause remaining undetermi∣ned? Nothing can give that to another which it hath not it self. But say they, nevertheless the power or faculty remai∣neth free. True, but not in order to the act, if it be once de∣termined. It is free, in sensu diviso, but not in sensu composito, when a man holds a bird fast in his hand, is she therefore free to flie where she will, because she hath wrings? Or a man

imprisoned or fettered, is he therefore free to walk where he will, because he hath feet and a loco-motive faculty? Judge without prejudice, what a miserable subterfuge is this, which many men confide so much in.

T. H:

Certain distinctions which he supposing may be brought to his arguments are by him removed.

HE saith, a man may perhaps answer, that the necessity of things held by him, is not a Stoical necessity, but a Chri∣stian necessity, &c. but this d••stinction I have not used, nor in∣deed have ever heard b••fore. Nor do I think any man could make Stoical and Christian two kinds of necessiti••s, though they may be two kinds of doctrin. Nor have I drawn my answer to his ar∣guments from the authority of any Sect, but from the nature of the things themselves.

But here I must take notice of certain words of his in this place, as making against his own Tenet, where all the causes, saith he, being j••yned together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one totall cause, If any one cause, much more the first, in the whole series of subordination of causes be necessary, it deter∣mines the rest, and without doubt maketh the effect necessary. For that which I call the necessary cause of any effect, is the joy∣ning togeth••r of all causes subordinate to the first into one totall cause. If any o•••• of those, saith he, especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, th••n all the rest are determined, and the effect also necessary. Now, it is manifest, that the first cause is a ne∣cessary cause o•• all th•• effects that are next, and immediat to it, and therefore by h•••• own reason, all effects are necessary. Nor is that distinction of necessary, in respect of the first cause, and necessary in respect of second causes mine; It does (as he well no∣t••th) imply a contradiction.

J. D.

BEcause T. H. disavowes these two distinctions, I have joy∣ned them together in one paragraph. He likes not the di∣stinction of necessity or destiny, into Stoicall and Christian, no more do I. We agree in the conclusion, but our motives are diverse. My reason is, because I acknowledg no such ne∣cessity, either as the one or as the other, and because I con∣ceive, that those Christian writers, who do justly detest the na∣ked destiny of the Stoicks, as fearing to fall into those gross absurdities and pernicious consequences which flow from thence, do yet privily (though perhaps unwittingly) under another form of expression, introduce it again at the backdoor after they had openly cast it out at the foredoor: But T H. rusheth boldly without distinctions (which he accounts but Jargon) and without foresight, upon the grossest destiny of all others, that is, that of the Stoicks. He confesseth, that they may be t••o kinds of doctrine. May be? Nay, they are without all peradventure. And he himself is the first who beares the name of a Christian that I have read, that hath raised this sleeping Ghost out of its grave, and set it out in its true co∣lours. But yet he likes not the names of Stoicall and Christian destiny, I do not blame him, though he would not willingly be accounted a Stoick. To admit the thing, and quarrel about the name, is to make our selves ridiculous. Why might not I first call that kind of destiny, which is maintained by Christi∣ans, Christian destiny? and that other maintained by Stoicks, Stoicall destiny? But I am not the inventer of the tearm. If he had been as carefull in reading other mens opinions, as he is confident in setting down his own, he might have found not only the thing but the name it self often used. But if the name of fot••m Christi num, do offend him, Let him call it with Lipsius, ••atum verum, who divides destiny into four kinds; 1. Mathematicall or Astrological destiny, 2. Natural destiny, 3. Stoical or violent destiny; and 4. true destiny, which he calls ordinarily nostrum, our destiny; that is, of Christians, and fa∣tum pium, that is godly destiny, and defines it just as T. H. doth his destiny, to be a series or order of causes depending

upon the divine Counsel, de const. l 1. cap. 17. 18. & 19. Though he be more cautelous than T. H. to decline those rocks which some others have made shipwrack upon, Yet the Divines thought he came too neer them, as appears by his Epistle to the Reader, in a later Edition. And by that note in the margent of his twentieth Chapter, Whatsoever I dispute here, I submit to the judgment of the wise, and being admoni∣shed, I will convert it. One may convince me of error, but not of obstinacy. So fearfull was he to overshoot himself, and yet he maintained both true liberty, and true contingency. T. H. saith, he hath not sucked his answer from any Sect; And I say so much the worse; It is better to be the disciple of an old Sect than the ring-leader of a new.

Concerning the other destinction of liberty, in respect of the first cause, and liberty in respect of the second causes, though he will not see that which it concerned him to answer, like those old Lamiae, which could put out their eyes when they list; As namely, that the faculty of willing when it is deter∣mined in order to the act (which is all the freedom that he acknowledgeth) is but like the freedom of a bird, when she is first in a mans hand, &c. Yet he hath espied another thing wherein I contradict my self, because I affirm, that if any one cause in the whole series of causes, much more the first cause, be necessary, it determineth the ••est. But, saith he, it is ma∣nifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next. I am glad yet it is not I who contradict my self, but it is some of his manifest truths which I contradict. That the first cause is a necessary cause of all effects, which I say, is a manifest falshood. Those things which God wills with∣out himself, he wills freely not necessarily. Whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily, doth act or work all that it can do, or all that is in its power; But it is evident, that God doth not all things without himself, which he can do, or which he hath power to do. He could have raised up children unto Abraham of the very stones, which were upon the banks of Jordan, Luk. 3. 8. but he did not. He could have sent twelve Legions of Angels to the succour of Christ, but he did not. Matth. 26. 53. God can make T. H. live the yeers of Me∣thuselah,

but it is not necessary that he shall do so, nor pro∣bable that he will do so. The productive power of God is in∣finite, but the whole created world is finite. And therefore God might still produce more, if it pleased him. But this it is, when men go on in a confused way, and will admit no di∣stinctions. If T. H. had considered the difference between a necessary being, and a necessary cause, or between those acti∣ons of God, which are immanent within himself, and the tran∣sient works of God, which are extrinsecall without himself, he would never have proposed such an evident error, for a ma∣nifest truth. Qui pauca considerat, facile pronuntiat.

Animadversions upon the Reply Numb. XVIII.

THE Bishop supposing I had taken my opinion from the Au∣thority of the Stoick Philosophers, not from my own Me∣ditation, falleth into dispute against the Stoicks, whereof I might if▪ I pleas'd take no notice but passe over to Number 19. But that he may know I have considered their doctrine concerning Fate, I think fit to say thus much, that their error consisteth not in the opinion of Fate, but in faigning of a false God. When there∣fore they say, Fatum est effatum Jovis, They say no more but that Fate is the word of Jupiter. If they had said it had been the Word of the true God, I should not have perceived any thing in it to contradict; because I hold as most Christians do, that the whole world was made, and is now Governed by the Word of God, which bringeth a necessity of all things and actions to depend upon the divine disposition. Nor do I see cause to find fault with that, (as he does) which is said by Lipsius, that (a) Fate is a series or order of causes depending upon the Divine counsel, though the Divines thought he came to near them] (as he thinks I do now) And the reason why he was cautelous, was because be∣ing a member of the Romish Church, he had little confidence in the judgment, and lenity of the Romish Clergie; and not because he thought he had over-shot himself.

(b) Concerning the other distinction of liberty in respect of the first cause, and liberty in respect of the second causes,

though he will not see that which it concerned him to an∣swer, &c. as namely, that the faculty of willing &c.] I answer, that distinction he alledgeth not to bee mine, but the Stoicks; and therefore I had no reason to take notice of it, for he disputeth not against me but others. And whereas he says, it concerned me to make that answer which he hath set down in the words following, I cannot conceive how it concerneth me, (what∣soever it may do somebody else) to so••a•• absurdly.

I said that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next, and immediate to it; which can not be doubted, and though he deny it▪ he does not disprove it. For when he says, those things which God wills without himself, he wills freely and not necessarily. He says rashly, and untruly. Rashly, be∣cause there is nothing without God, who is Infinite, in whom are all things, and in whom we live, move, and have our being; and untruly because whatsoever God foreknew from eternity, he willed from eternity, and therefore necessarily. But against this he argueth thus. Whatsoever cause acts, or works necessarily, doth work or act all that it can do, or all that is in its power; but it is evident that God doth not all things which he can do, &c. In things inanimate, the action is alwaies according to the extent of its power; not taking in the Power of Willing because they have it not. But in those things that have Wil••, the action is according to the w••ole Power, wi•••• and all It is true that God doth not all things that he can do if he will, but that he can Will, that which he hath not Willed from all eternity, I deny; unlesse that he can not only Wil a change, but also change his wil which all Divines say, is immutable; and then they must needs be neces∣sary effects, that proceed from God. And his Texts, God could have raised up Children unto Abraham, &c. And sent twelve Legions of Angels &c. make nothing against the necessity of those actions which from the first cause proceed immediately.

J. D.

THirdly, they distinguish between liberty from compulsion,* 1.36 and liberty from necessitation. The Will, say they, is free from compulsion, but not free from necessitation. And this they fortifie with two reasons. First, because it is granted by all Divines, that hypothetical necessity, or necessity upon a

supposition, may consist with liberty: Secondly, because God and the good Angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. To the first reason I confess; that necessity upon a supposition may sometimes consist with true liberty, as when it signifies onely an infallible certitude of the understanding in that which it knows to be, or that it shall be; But if the sup∣position be not in the Agents power, nor depend upon any thing that is in his power; If there be an exteriour antecedent cause which doth necessitate the effect, to call this free, is to be mad with reason.

To the second reason, I confess that God and the good Angels are more free than we are, that is, intensively in the degree of freedom, but not extensively in the latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, but not of specifica∣tion. A liberty of exercise, that is, to do or not to do, may consist well with a necessity of specification, or a determina∣tion to the doing of good. But a liberty of exercise, and a ne∣cessity of exercise; A liberty of specification; and a necessi∣ty of specification, are not compatible, nor can consist toge∣ther. He that is antecedently necessitated to do evil, is not free to do good. So this instance is nothing at all to the pur∣pose.

T. H.

BUT the distinction of free, into free from compulsion, and free from necessitation, I acknowledg; for to be free from compulsi∣on, is to do a thing so, as terrour be not the cause of his will to do it; for a man is then onely said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to it, as when a man willingly throws his goods into the Sea to save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed. Thus all men that do any thing from love, or revenge, or lust are free from compulsion, and yet their actions may be as ne∣cessary as those which are done upon compulsion; for sometimes o∣ther passions work as forcibly as fear; But free from necessitation I say nothing can be; And 'tis that which he undertook to dis∣proove. This distinction, he sayes, useth to be fortified by two rea∣sons. But they are not mine. The first, he sayes is, That it is gran∣ted by all Divines, that an hypothetical necessity, or necessity upon

supposition, may stand with liberty. That you may understand this, I will give you an example of hypotheticall necessity. If I shall live, I shall eat, this is an hypotheticall necessity. Indeed it is a necessary proposition, that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition should be true, whensoever uttered, but tis not the neces∣sity of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary, that the man shall live, or that the man shall eat. I do not use to fortifie my distincti∣ons with such reasons. Let him confute them as he will, it con∣tents me. But I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how an easy and plain thing, but withal false, may be with the grave usage of such words, as hypotheticall necessity, and neces∣sity upon supposition and such like tearms of Schoolmen, obscur'd and made to seem profound learning.

The second reason that may confirm the distinction of free, from compulsion, and free from necessitation, he sayes is, that God, and good. Angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. This reason, though I had no need of it, yet I think it so far forth good, as it is true that God and good Angels do good necessarily, and yet are free; but because I find not in the Articles of our Faith nor in the Decrees of our Church set down, in what manner I am to conceive God, and good Angels to work by necessity, or in what sense they work freely, I suspend my sentence in that point, and am content, that there may be a freedom from compulsion, and yet no freedom from necessitation, as hath been prooved in that, that a man may be necessitated to some actions without threats and with∣out fear of danger; But how he can avoid the consisting together of freedom and necessity, supposing God and good Angels are freer than men, and yet do good necessarily, that we must now examin.

I confess (saith he) that God and good Angels are more free than we, that is intensively in degree of freedom, not extensively in the latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, not of specification. Again, we have here two distinctions, that are no distinctions, but made to seem so by tearms invented, by I know not whom, to cover ignorance, and blind the understanding of the Reader. For it cannot be conceived that there is any liberty grea∣ter than for a man to do what he will, and to fobrear what he will. One heat may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than another. He that can do what he will, hath all liberty possi∣bly,

and he that cannot, has non•• at all▪ Also liberty (as he says, the Schooles call it) of exercise, which is as I have said before, a liberty to do, or not to do, cannot be without a liberty (which they call of specification) that is to say, a liberty to do or not to do this or that in particular; for how can a man conceive, that he has liberty to do any thing, that hath not liberty to do this or that, or somewhat in particular. If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this and that, and every other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a liberty to eat flesh, more than he that hath no l••cense at all?

You may by this again see the vanity of distinctions used in the Schools; And I do not doubt but that the imposing of them by authority of Doctors in the Church, hath been a great cause that men have laboured, though by sedition, and evil courses to shake them off; for nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannising over mans reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the Scripture, b•••• by pretense of learning, and more judgment than that of other men.

J. D.

HE who will speak with some of our great undertakers, a∣bout the grounds of learning, had need either to speak by an Interpreter, or to learn a new Language, (I dare not call it Jargon or Canting) lately devised, not to set forth the truth, but to conceal falshood. He must learn a new Liberty, a new necessity, a new Contingency, a new Sufficiency, a new Spontaneity, a new kind of Deliberation, a new kind of Ele∣ction▪ a new Eternity, a new Compulsion, and in conclusion, a new Nothing. (a) This proposition, the will is free, may be understood in two senses, Either that the will is not compelled, or that the will is not alwayes necessitated; for if it be ordina∣rlly, or at any time free from necessitation, my assertion is true, that there is freedom from necessity. The former sense, that the will is not compelled, is acknowledged by all the world as a truth undeniable, Voluntas non cogitur For, if the will may be compelled, then it may both will and not will the same thing at the same time, under the same notion, but this implies a contradiction. Yet this Author (like the good wo∣man whom her husband sought up the stream when she was

drowned, upon pretense that when she was living, she used to go contrary courses to all other people,) he holds, that true compulsion and fear, may make a man will, that which he doth not will, that is, in his sense may compell the will. As when a man willingly throws his goods into the Sea to save himself, or submits to his enemy for fear of being killed, I an∣swer, that T. H. mistakes sundry wayes in this discourse.

(b) First, he erreth in this, to think, that actions procee∣ding from fear, are properly compulsory actions, which in truth are not only voluntary, but free actions; neither com∣pelled, nor so much as Physically necessitated. Another man, at the same time, in the same Ship, in the same storm, may choose, and the same individual man otherwise advised, might choose, not to throw his goods over-board. It is the man him∣self, who chooseth freely this means to preserve his life. It is true, that if he were not in such a condition, or if he were freed from the grounds of his present fears, he would not choose neither the casting of his goods into the Sea, nor the submit∣ting to his enemy But considering the present exigence of his affairs, reason dictates to him, that of two inconveniences, the less is to be chosen, as a comparative good. Neither doth he will this course, as the end or direct object of his desires, but as the means to attain his end. And what Fear doth in these cases, Love, Hope, Hatred, &c. may do in other cases, that is, may occasion a man to elect those means to obtain his willed end, which otherwise he would not elect. As Jacob to serve seven yeers more, rather than not to enjoy his beloved Rachel. The Merchant to hazard himself upon the rough Seas, in hope of profit. Passions may be so violent, that they may necessitate the will, that is, when they prevent deliberati∣ons, but this is rarely, and then the will is not free. But they never properly compell it. That which is compelled, is against the will, and that which is against the will, is not willed.

(c) Secondly, T. H. erres in this also, where he saith, that a man is then onely said to be compelled when fear makes him willing to an action. As if force were not more prevalent with a man then fear; we must know therefore, that this word com∣pelled is taken two wayes, sometimes improperly, that is, when

a man is mooved or occasioned by threats or fear, or any pas∣sion, to do that which he would not have done, if those threats, or that passion had not been; Sometimes it is taken properly, when we do any thing against our own inclination, mooved by an external cause, the will not consenting, nor concurring, but resisting as much as it can. As in a rape, or when a Christian is drawn or carried by violence to the Idols Temple. Or as in the case of St. Peter, John 21. 18. Another shall guide thee, and carry thee whither thou wouldst not. This is that compulsi∣on which is understood, when we say, the will may be letted, or changed, or necessitated, or that the imperate actions of the will (that is, the actions of the inferiour faculties which are ordinarily moved by the will) may be compelled; but that the immanent actions of the will, that is, to will, to choose, cannot be compelled, because it is the nature of an action pro∣perly compelled to be done by an extrinsecal cause, without the concurrence of the will.

(d) Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man be free, but whether they be ordinarily free. Suppose some passions are so suddain and violent, that they surprise a man, and betray the succours of the soul, and prevent delibe∣ration, as we see in some motus primo primi, or antipathies, how some men will run upon the most dangerous objects, up∣on the first view of a loathed creature, without any power to contain themselves. Such actions as these, as they are not or∣dinary, so they are not free, because there is no deliberation nor election. But where deliberation and election are, as when a man throws his goods over-board, to save the Ship, or submits to his enemy, to save his life; there is alwayes true liberty.

Though T. H. slight the two reasons which I produce in favour of his cause, yet they who urged them, deserved not to be stighted, unless it were because they were School-men. The former reason is thus framed; A necessity of supposition may consist with true liberty, but that necessity which flowes from the naturall and extrinsecall determination of the will, is a ne∣cessity of supposition; To this, my answer is in effect; That (e) a necessity of supposition is of two kinds, sometimes the

thing supposed is in the power of the Agent to do, or not to do: As for a Romish Priest to vow continence, upon suppo∣sition that he be a Romish Priest, is necessary, but because it was in his power to be a Priest, or not to be a Priest, therefore his vow is a free act. So supposing a man to have taken Phy∣sick, it is necessary that he keep at home, yet because it was in his power to take a Medicine or not to take it, therefore his keeping at home is free. Again, sometimes the thing suppo∣sed is not in the power of the Agent to do, or not to do; suppo∣sing a man to be extrem sick, it is necessary that he keep at home, or supposing that a man hath a naturall antipathy a∣g••inst a Cat, he runs necessarily away so soon as he sees her Be∣cause this antipathy, & this sickness are not in the power of the party affected, therefore these acts are not free. Jacob blessed his Sons, Balaam blessed Israel, these two acts being done, are both necessary upon supposition; But it was in Jacobs power not to have blessed his Sons, So was it not in Balaams power, not to have blessed Israel, Numb. 22. 3••. Jacobs will was determined by himself, Balaams will was Physically de∣termined by God. Therefore Jacobs benediction proceeded from his own free election; And Balaams from Gods deter∣mination. So was Ca••phas his Prophesy, John 11. 51. There∣fore the Text saith, He spake not of himself. To this T. H. saith nothing, but only declareth by an impertinent instance, what Hypotheticall signifies. And then adviseth your Lordship to take notice how Errours and Ignorance may be cloked un∣der grave Scholastick tearms. And I do likewise intreat your Lordship to take notice, that the greatest fraud and cheating, lurks commonly under the pretense of plain dealing; wee see Juglers commonly strip up their sleeves, and promise extraor∣dinary fair dealing before they begin to play their tricks.

Concerning the second argument drawn from the liberty of God, and the good Angels. As I cannot but approove his modesty, in suspending his judgment concerning the manner how God and the good Angels do work necessarily or freely, because he finds it not set down in the Articles of our Faith, or the Decrees of our Church, especially in this age, which is so full of Atheisme, and of those scoffers which St. Peter pro∣phesied

of, 2 Pet. 3. 3. Who neither believe, that there is God or Angels, or that they have a Soul, but only as ••alt, to keep their bodies from putri••action; So I can by no means assent unto him, in that which followes, that is to say, that he hath proved, that Liberty and Necessity of the same kind may consist together, that is, a liberty of exercise with a ne∣cessity of exercise; or a liberty of specification, with a neces∣sity of specification. Those actions which he saith are necessi∣tated by passion, are for the most part dictated by reason, ei∣ther truly, or apparently right, and resolved by the will itself. But it troubles him that I say, that God and the good Angels are more free than men intensively in the degree of freedom, but not extensively in the latitude of the object, according to a liberty of exercise, but not of specification, which he saith, are no distinctions, but tearms invented to cover ignorance. Good words. Doth he onely see? Are all other men stark blind? By his favour, they are true and necessary distincti∣ons; And if he alone do not conceive them, it is because di∣stinctions, as all other things▪ have their fates, according to the capacities or prejudices of their Readers. But he urgeth two reasons, One heat, saith he, may be more intensive than another, but not one liberty than another. Why not, I wonder? Nothing is more proper to a man than reason, yet a man is more rational than a child, and one man more rationall than another, that is, in respect of the use and exercise of reason. As there are degrees of understanding, so there are of liberty. The good Angels have cleerer understandings than we, and they are not hindred with passions as we, and by consequence, they have more use of liberty than we. (f) His second reason is, He that can do what he will, hath all liberty, and he that cannot do what he will, hath no liberty. If this be true, then there are no degrees of liberty indeed. But this which he calls liberty, is rather an Omnipotence than a liberty, to do what∣soever he will. A man is free to shoot, or not to shoot, al∣though he cannot hit the white, whensoever he would. We do good freely, but with more difficulty and reluctation than the good Spirits. The more rational, and the less sensual the will is, the greater is the degree of liberty. His other excep∣tion

against liberty of exercise, and liberty of specification, is a meer mistake, which grows meerly from not rightly under∣standing what liberty of specification, or contrariety is. A li∣berty of specification, saith he, is a liberty to do, or not to do this, or that, in particular. Upon better advice he will find, that this which he calls a liberty of specification, is a liberty of contradiction, and not of specification, nor of contrariety. To be free to do or not to do, this or that parti∣cular good, is a liberty of contradiction, so likewise to be free to do or not to do this, or that particular evill. But to be free to do both good and evill, is a liberty of contrariety, which extends to contrary objects, or to diverse kinds of things. So his reason to proove, that a liberty of exercise cannot be with∣out a liberty of specification, falls flat to the ground. And he may lay aside his Lenten license for another occasion. I am a shamed to insist upon these things which are so evident, that no man can question them who doth understand them.

(g) And here he falls into another invective against distin∣ctions, and Scholastical expressions, and the Doctors of the Church, who by this means tyrannized over the understandings of other men. What a presumption is this for one private man, who will not allow human liberty to others, to assume to him∣self such a license, to control so Magistrally, and to censure of gross ignorance and tyrannising over mens judgments, yea, as causes of the troubles and tumults which are in the World, the Doctors of the Church in general, who have flourished in all ages and all places, only for a few necessary and innocent di∣stinctions. Truly said Plutarch, that a sore eye is offended with the light of the Sun; (h) What then, must the Logicians lay aside their first and second Intentions? their Abstracts and Concrets, their Subjects and Predicates, their Modes and Fi∣gures, their Method Synthetick and Analytick, their Fallacies of Composition and Division, &c? Must the moral Philoso∣pher quite his means and extremes, his pricipia congenita & ac∣quisita, his liberty of contradiction and contrariety, his ne∣cessity absolute and hypothetical, &c? Must the natural Phi∣losopher give over his intentional Species, his understanding Agent and Patient, his receptive and eductive power of the

matter, his qualities infinitae or influxae, symbolae or dissymbolae, his temperament ad pondus, and adj••stitiam, his parts Homo∣geneous and Heterogeneous, his Sympathies and Antipathies, his Antiperistasis, &c? Must the Astrologer and the Geogra∣pher leave their Apog••um and Perigaeum, their Arctick and Antarctick Poles, their Aequator; Zodiack, Zenith, Meridi∣an, Horison, Zones▪ &c? Must the Mathematician, the Meta∣physician, and the Divine, relinquish all their tearms of Art, and proper id••otismes, because they do not rellish with T. H. his palate? But he will say, they are obscure expressions; What marvel is it, when the things themselves are more ob∣scure? Let him put them into as plain English as he can, and they shall be never a whit the better understood by those who want all grounds of learning. Nothing is clearer than Ma∣thematical demonstration, yet let one who is altogether igno∣rant in Mathematicks hear it, and he will hold it to be as T. H. tearms these distinctions, plain Fustian or Jargon. Every Art or Profession hath its proper mysteries and expressions, which are well known to the Sons of Art, not so to strangers. Let him consult with Military men, with Physitians, with Navigators, and he shall find this true by experience. Let him go on shipboard, and the Mariners will not leave their Sterbord and Larbord, because they please not him, or be∣cause he accounts it Gibrish. No, no, it is not the Schoole-Divines, but Innovators and seditious Orators, who are the true causes of the present troubles of Europe. (••) T. H. hath forgotten what he said in his book, De Cive cap. 12. That it is a seditious opinion to teach, that the knowledge of good and evill belongs to private persons. And cap. 17. that in que∣stions of Faith the Civill Magistrates ought to consult with the Ecclesiasticall Doctors, to whom Gods blessing is derived by impo∣sition of hands, so as not to be deceived in necessary truths, to whom our Saviour hath promised infallibility. These are the very men whom he traduceth here. There he ascribes infallibility to them, here he accuseth them of gross superstitious ignorance. There he attributes too much to them, here he attributes too little. Both there and here he takes too much upon him. The Spirits of the Prophets are subject to the Prophets, 1 Cor. 14. 32.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply. Numb. XIX.

(a) THis proposition, the Will is Free, may be understood in two senses; Either that the Will is not compelled, or that the Will is not alwayes necessitated, &c. The former sense, that the Will is not compelled is acknowledged by all the world, as a truth undeniable. I never said the Will is com∣pelled, but do agree with the rest of the World in granting that it is not compelled. It is an absurd speech to say it is compelled, but not to say it is necessitated, or a necessary effect of some cause. When the fire heateth, it doth not compell heate; so like∣wise when some cause maketh the Will to any thing, it doth not compell it. Many things may compel a man to do an Action in producing the Will; but that is not a compelling of the Will, but of the man. That which I call necessitation, is the effecting and creating of that Will which was not before, not a compelling of a Will already existent. The necessitation or Creation of the Will, is the same thing with the compulsion of the man, saving that we commonly use the word compulsion, in those Actions which proceed from terrour. And therefore this distinction, is of no use; and that raving which followeth immediately after it, is nothing to the question, whether the Will be free, though it be to the questi∣on, whether the man be Free.

(b) [First, he erreth in this, to think that actions procee∣ding from fear are properly compulsory actions, which in truth are not onely Voluntary, but free actions.] I never said nor doubted, but such actions were both Voluntary and free; For he that doth any thing for fear, though he say truely, he was compelled to it, yet we deny not that he had Election to do or not to do, and consequently that he was a Voluntary and free Agent. But this hinders not but that the terrour might be a necessary cause of his Election, of that which otherwise he would not have Elected, unlesse some other potent cause made it necessary he should elect the contrary. And there fore in the same ship, in the same storm, one man may be necessitated to throw his goods over-board, and

another man to keep them within the Ship; and the same m••n in a like storm be otherwise advised; if all the causes be not like. But that the same invidual man, as the Bishops says, that close to throw his goods over board might choose not to throw his goods over board, I cannot conceive, unlesse a man can choose to throw over board, and not to throw over board; or be so advised and otherwise advised all at once.

(c) [Secondly, T. H. errs in this also, where he saith, that a man is then only said to be compelled, when ••ear makes him wil∣ling to an Action. As if force were not more prevalent with a man then fear, &c.] When I said fear, I think no m••n can ••oubt, but the fear of force was understood. I cannot se•• therfore what quar∣rel he could justly take at saying, that, a man is compelled by ••ar, onely; unlesse he think it may be called compulsion when •• man by force, seizing on another mans limbs, moveth them▪ as himself, not as the other man pleaseth, but this is not the meaning of compul∣sion. Neither is the Action so done, the Action of him that suf∣fereth, but of him that useth the force. But this (as if it were a question of the propriety of the English tongue) the Bishop denies, and sayes, when a man is moved by fear, it is improperly said he is compelled. But when a man is moved by an external cause, the Will resisting as much as it can, then he says, he is properly said to be compelled; as in a Rape, or when a Christian is drawn or car∣ryed by violence to the idols Temple. Insomuch as by this distinction it were very proper English to say, that a stone were compelled when it is thrown, or a man, when he is carried in a Cart. For my part I understand compulsion to be used rightly of living creatures onely, which are moved onely by their own animal motion, in such manner as they would not be moved without the fear. But of this dispute the English and Well-bred Reader, is the proper Judge.

(d) [Thirdly, the question is not, whether all the actions of a man be free, but whether they be ordinarily free.] Is it impossible for the Bishop to remember the question, which is Whe∣ther a man be Free to Wil? Did I ever say that no Actions of a man are free? On the contrary I say, that al his Voluntary Actions are Free, even those also to which he is compelled by fear. But it does not therefore follow, but that the Will, from whence those

Actions and their Election proceed, may have necessary causes; against which he hath never yet said any thing. That which fol∣loweth immediately, is not offered as a proof, but as explication how the passions of a man surprise him; therefore I let it passe, no∣ting onely that he expound th•• Motus primo primi (which I understood not before) by the word Antipathy.

(e) A necessity of supposition is of two kinds, sometimes a thing supposed is in the power of the Agent, to do or not to do, &c. sometimes a thing supposed is not in the power of the Agent to do or not to do, &c.

When the necessity is of the former kind of supposition then, (he says) Freedom may consist with this necessity. In the latter sense hat it cannot. And to use his own instances, to vow continence in a Romish Priest, upon supposition that he is a Romish Priest, is a necessary Act; because it was in his power to be a Priest or not. On the other side supposing a man having a natural Antipathy against a Cat; because this Antipathy is not in the power of the party affected, therefore the running away from the Cat is no Free act.

I deny not but that it is a Free act of the Romish Priest to vow continence, no•• upon the supposition that he was a Romish Priest, but because he had not done it, unlesse he would; if he had not been a Romish Priest, it had been all one to the Freedom of his Act. Nor is his Priesthood any thing to the Necessitie of his vow, saving that if he would not have vowed he should not have been made a Priest. There was an antecedent necessity in the causes extrinsecal; first that he should have the Wil to be a Priest, and then consequently that he should have the Wil to vow. Against this he alledgeth nothing. Then for his Cat, the mans running from it is a Free Act, as being voluntary, and ari∣sing from a false apprehension (which neverthelesse he cannot help) of some hurt or other the Cat may do him. And therefore the Act is as free as the Act of him that throweth his goods into the Sea. So likewise the Act of Jacob in blessing his sons, and the Act of Balaam in blessing Israel, are equally Free, and equally voluntary▪ yet equally determined by God, who is the Author of all blessings, and framed the will of both of them to blesse, and whose Will (as St. Paul saith) cannot be resisted. Therefore both their Actions were necessitated equally; and (because they were Volun∣tary)

equally Free. As for Caiphas his prophecy which the Text saith, He spake not of himself, it was necessary; first, because it was by the supernatural gift of God to the High-priests as sove∣raigns of the Common-wealth of the Jews, to speak to the people as from the mouth of God, that is to say, to prophesie; and secondly, whensoever he did speak not as from God, but as from himself, it was neverthelesse necessary he should do so, not that he might not have been silent if he would, but because his will to speak was an∣tecedently determined to what he should speak from all Aeternity; which he hath yet brought no argument to contradict.

He approveth my modesty in suspending my judgement concern∣ing the manner how the good Angells do work, Necessarily, or Freely, because I find it not set down in the Articles of our Faith, nor in the decrees of our Church▪ But he useth not the same modesty himself. For whereas he can apprehend neither the Nature of God, nor of Angels; nor conceive what kind of thing it is, which in them he calleth Will, he neverthelesse takes upon him to attribute to them, Liberty of Exercise, and to deny them a Liberty of Speci∣fication; to grant them a more intensive Liberty then we have, but not a more extensive▪ using not incongruously in the incompre∣hensibility of the subject ••••comprehensible terms, as Liberty of Exer∣cise, & Liberty of Specification; & degrees of intention in Liberty, as if one liberty, like heat, might be more intensive then another. It is true that there is greater liberty in a large then in a strait pri∣son, but one of those Liberties is not more intense then the other.

(f) His second reason is, He that can do what he Will, hath all Liberty; and he that cannot do what he Will, hath no Liberty.

If this be true, then there are no degrees of Liberty indeed. But this which he calls Liberty, is rather an Omnipotence, then a Liberty.] 'Tis one thing to say, a man hath Liberty to do what he will, and another thing to say he hath power to do what he Will. A man that is bound would say readily he hath not the Liberty to walk, but he will not say he wants the Power. But the sick man will say he wants the Power to walk▪ but not the Li∣berty. This is as I conceive to speak the English tongue; and consequently an English man will not say the Liberty to do what he Will, but the Power to do what he Will, is Omnipotence. And therefore either I or the Bishop understand not English. Whereas

he adds that I mistake the meaning of the word, Liberty of speci∣fication, I am sure that in that way wherein I expound them, there is no absurdity. But if he say I understand not what the School∣men mean by it, I will not contend with him; for I think they know not what they mean themselves.

(g) [And here he falls into another invective against distinctions, and Scholastical expressions, and the Doctors of the Church, who by this means tyrannized over the under∣standing of other men. What a presumption is this, for one private man, &c] That he may know I am no enemy to intelli∣gible distinctions, I also will use a distinction in the defence of my self against this his accusation. I say therefore that some distin∣ctions are Scholastical onely, and some are Scholastical and sa∣piential also. Against those that are Scholastical onely, I do, and may inveigh. But against those that are Scholastical and Sapiential also, I do not inveigh. Likewise some Doctors of the Church (as Suarez, Johannes à Duns and their imitators) to breed in men such opinions as the Church of Rome thought su∣table to their interest▪ did ••rite such things, as neither other men nor themselves understood. These I confesse I have a little sleigh∣ted. Other Docters of the Church (as Martin Luther, Philip Melancthon John Calvin, William Perkins, and others) that did write their sense clearly, I never sleighted, but alwayes very much reverenced, and admired▪ Wherein then lieth my presumption? if it be because I am a private man, let the Bishop also take heed he con∣tradict not some of those whom the World worthily esteemes, least he also (for he is a private man) be taxed of presumpti∣on

(h) What then, must the Logicians lay aside their first and second intentions, their Abstracts and Concrets, &c. Must the Moral Philosopher quit his means and extreames, his Principia congenita & aquisita, his liberty of contradiction and contra∣riety, his necessity absolute and Hypothetical, &c. Must the Na∣tural Philosopher give over his intentional species, &c. Because they do not relish with T. H. his Palate?] I confesse that among the Logicians, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, &c. are termes of Art▪ But if the Bishop thing that words of first and second inten∣tion, that Abstract & Concret, that Subjects & Predicates, Moods

& Figures, Method Synthetique & Analytique, Fallacies of Com∣position and Division be terms of Art, I am not of his opinion. For these are no more terms of Art in Logick▪ then Lines, Figures, Squares, Triangles &c. in the Mathematicks. Barbara, Ce∣larent, and the rest that follow are terms of Art invented for the easier Apprehension of youngmen, and are by youngmen understood. But the terms of the School with which I have found fault, have been invented to blind the understanding, and cannot be understood by those, that intend to learn Divinity. And to his question whe∣ther the Moral Philosopher must quit his means and extreams, I answer, that though they are not terms of Art, he ought to quite them, when they cannot be understood, and when they can, to use them rightly. And therefore though means and extreams, be terms intelligible, yet I would have them quit the placing of ver∣tue in the one, and of vice in the other. But for his liberty of con∣tradiction & contrariety, his necessity absolute & Hypothetical (if any moral Philosopher ever used them) then away with them, they serve for nothing but to seduce young Students. In like man∣ner let the natural Philosopher no more mention his intentional Species, his understanding Agent and Patient, his Receptive and Eductive power of the matter, his qualities infusae or in∣fluxae, Symbolae or Dissymbolae, his Temperament ad pondus and ad justitiam. He may keep his parts Homogeneous and Hetero∣geneous; but his Sympathies and Antipathies, his Antiperistasis and the like, names of excuses, rather then of causes▪ I would have him ••••ing away. And for the Astrologer (unlesse he means Astro∣nomer) I would have him throw away his whole trade; but if he mean Astronomer, then the terms of Apogaeum, and Perigaeum, Artique, Antartique, Aequator, Zodiack, Zenith, Meridian, Horizon, Zones, &c. are no more terms of Art in Astronomy, then a Saw, or a Hatchet in the Art of a Carpenter. He cites no terms of Art for Geometry, I was afraid he would have put Lines, or perhaps Equality or Inequality for terms of Art. So that now I know not what be those terms he thinks I would cast away in Geometry. And lastly for his Metaphysician, I would have him quit both his terms and his Profession, as being in truth (as Plu∣tarch, saith in the beginning of the life of Alexander the Great) not at all profitable to learning, but made onely for an essay, to the learner;

and the Divine to use no word in preaching, but such as his Audi∣tors, nor in writing, but such as a common Reader may under∣stand; And all this not for the pleasing of my Palate, but for the promotion of truth.

(i) T. H. Hath forgotten what he said in his Book De Cive, Cap. 12. that it is a seditious opinion to teach that the knowledge of good and evill belongs to private persons. And Cap. 17. that in questions of Faith, the civill Magistrates ought to consult with the Ecclesiastical Doctors, to whom Gods blessing is derived by imposition of hands, so as not to be deceived in necessary truths, &c. There he attributes too much to them, here he attributeth too little, both there and here he takes too much upon him. The Spirits of the Prophets are subject to the Prophets.] He thinks he hath a great advantage against me from my own words in my Book de Cive, which he would not have thought if he had understood them. The knowledge of good and evill, is Iudicature, which in Latin is cognitio causarum not Scientia. Every private man may do his best to attain a knowledge of what is good and evill in the action he is to do; but to judge of what is good and evill in others belongs not to him, but to those whom the Soveraign Power appointeth thereunto. But the Bi∣shop not understanding, or forgetting that Cognoscere is to judg, as Adam did of Gods commandement, hath cited this place to little purpose. And for the infallibility of the Ecclesiastical Doctors by me attributed to them, it is not that they cannot be deceaved, but that a subject cannot he deceived in obeying them when they are our lawfully constituted Doctors. For the supreme Ecclesia∣stical Doctor is he that hath the supreme Power; and in obeying him no subject can be deceived; because thy are by God himself commanded to obey him. And what the Ecclesiastical Doctors lawfully constituted do tell us to be necessary in point of Religion, the same is told us by the Soveraign Power. And therefore, though we may be deceaved by them in the beleef of an opinion, we can not be deceived by them in the duty of our Actions. And this is all that I ascribe to the Ecclesiastical Doctors. If they think it too much, let them take upon them lesse. Too little they cannot say it is, who take it, as it is, for a Burthen. And for them who seek it as a wordly preferment, it is too much. I take (he

says) too much upon me. Why so? Because The Spirits of the Prophets, are subject to the Prophets. This is it that he finds fault with in me, when he says I am a private man, that is to say no Prophet, that is to say no Bishop. By which it is manifest that the Bishop subject••th not his Spirit but to the Convocation of Bi∣shops, I admit that every man eught to subject his Spirit to the Prophets. But a Prophet is he that speaketh unto us from God; which I acknowledgement to do, but him that hath due Authority so to do. And no man hath due Authority so to do immediately, but be that hath the supream Authority of the Commonwealth; nor mediately but they that speak such things to the people, as ••e that hath the Supream Authority alloweth of. And as it is truth in this sense, that The Spirits of the Prophets are subject to the Pro∣phets; So it is also true, that we ought not to believe every Spirit, but to trye the Spirits, whether they are of God; be∣cause many false Prophets are gone out into the World. 1 J••h. 4. 1. Therefore, I that am a private man may examine the Pro∣phets; which to do I have no other means but to examine whether their Doctrine, be agreeable to the Law; which theirs is not, who divide the Common Wealth into two Common-Wealths, Civil and Ecclesiastical.

J. D.

NOw, to the distinction it self I say first, that the proper* 1.37 act of liberty is election, and election is opposed, not only to coaction, but also to coarctation or determination to one. Necessitation or determination to one, may consist with spontaneity, but not with election or liberty, as hath been shewed. The very Stoicks did acknowledge a spontaneity. So our adversaries are not yet gone out of the confines of the Stoicks.

Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business. This I take to be the clear resolution of the Schools; There is a double act of the will, the one more remote, called Imperatus, that is, in truth the act of some inferiour faculty, subject to the com∣mand of the will, as to open or shut ones eyes; without doubt these actions may be compelled. The other act is neerer, called actus elicitus, an act drawn out of the will; as to will, to

choose, to elect; this may be stopped or hindered by the inter∣vening impediment of the understanding, as a stone lying on a table is kept from its natural motion, otherwise the will should have a kind of Omnipotence; But the will cannot be compel∣led to an act repugnant to its inclination, as when a stone is thrown upwards into the air, for that is both to incline, and not to incline to the same object, at the same time, which im∣plies a contradiction. Therefore to say the will is necessitated, is to say, the will is compelled so far as the will is capable of compulsion. If a strong man holding the hand of a weaker, should therewith kill a third person, haec quidem vis est, this is violence, the weaker did not willingly perpetrate the fact, be∣cause he was compelled. But now suppose this strong man had the will of the weaker in his power as well as the hand, and should not onely incline, but determine it secretly and insensi∣bly to commit this act, is not the case the same? whether one ravish Lucretia by force, as Tarquine, or by amatory potions, and Magicall Incantations, not only allure her, but necessitate her to satisfy his lust, and incline her effectually, and draw her inevitably, and irresistibly to follow him spontaneously, Lu∣cretia in both these conditions is to be pittied; but the latter person is more guilty, and deserves greater punishment, who endevours also so much as in him lies, to make Lucretia irrisi∣stibly partake of his crime. I dare not apply it, but thus only; Take heed how we defend those secret and invincible necessita∣tions to evil though spontaneous and free from coaction.

These are their fastnesses.

T. H.

IN the next place, he bringeth two arguments against distin∣guishing between being free from compulsion, and free from ne∣cessitation. The first is, that election is opposite, not onely to coaction or compulsion, but also to necessitation or determination to one. This is it he was to proove from the beginning, and therefore brin∣geth no new argument to proove it. And to those brought former∣ly, I have already answered; And in this place I deny again, that election is opposite to either, for when a man is compelled (for example, to subject himself to an enemy or to dy) he hath still electi∣on

left in him, and a deliberation to be think which of these two he can better endure; And he that is led to prison by force, hath election and may deliberate whetker he will be haled and trained on the ground, or make use of his feet.

Likewise when there is no compulsion, but the strength of temp∣tation to do an evill action, being greater than the motives to ab∣stain, necessarily determine him to the doing of it, yet he deliberates whilest sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to for∣bear, are working on him, and consequently he electeth which he will. But commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge Necessity, but when we see not, or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not Causes but Liberty that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose this, that of necessity chooseth it; but they might as well say, fire does not burn, because it burns of ne∣cessity. The second argument is not so much an argument, as a distinction, to shew in what sense it may be said, that voluntary actions are necessitated, and in what sense not. And therefore he alledgeth as from the authority of the Schools, & that which rippeth up the bottome of the question, that there is a double act of the will; The one he says, is actus Imperatus, an act done at the command of the will, by some inferiour faculty of the soul, as to open or shut ones eyes, and this act may be compelled. The other he says, is actus elicitus, an act allured, or an act drawn forth by allurement out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect: This he says cannot be compelled. Wherein letting pass that Metaphoricall speech of attributing command and subjection to the faculties of the Soul, as if they made a Common-wealth or Family among themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very impro∣per in searching the truth of the question; You may observe first, that to compel•• a voluntary act, is nothing else, but to will it; for it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of mine eyes, or the doing of any other action, and to say, I have the will to shut mine eyes. So that actus imperatus here, might as easily have been said in English, a voluntary action, but that they that invented the tearm, understood not any thing it signified. Secondly, you may observe, that actus elicitus, is exemplified by these words, to Will, to Elect, to Choose, which are all one, and so to will is here made

an act of the will; and indeed, as the will is a faculty, or power of a mans soul, so to will is an act of it, according to that power. But as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; so it is also to say, that to will, is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will, which power is commonly called, the Will. Howsoever it be, the summe of his distinction is, that a voluntary act may be done on compul∣sion, that is to say, by foul means, but to will that, or any act, can∣not be but by allurement or fair means. Now, seeing fair Means, Allurements, and Enticements, produce the action which they do produce, as necessarily as threatning and foul means, it followes, that to will▪ may be made as necessary as any thing that is done by compulsion. So that the distinction of actus imperatus, and actus elicitus, are but words, and of no effect against necessity.

J. D.

IN the next place follow two reasons of mine own against the same distinction, the one taken from the former grounds, that Election cannot consist with determination to one. To this (he saith) he hath answered already. No, truth is founded upon a Rock. He hath been so far from prevailing against it, that he hath not been able to shake it. (a) Now again, he tells us, that Election is not opposite to either, (Necessitation or Compulsion) He might even as well tell us, that a stone thrown upwards mooves naturally; Or, that a a woman can be ravished with her own will. Consent takes away the Rape. This is the strangest liberty that ever was heard of, that a man is compelled to do what he would not, and yet is free to do what he will. And this he tells us upon the old score, that he, who submits to his enemy for fear of death, chooseth to submit. But we have seen formerly, that this, which he calls compulsion, is not compulsion properly, nor that na∣tural determination of the will to one, which is opposite to true Liberty. He who submits to an enemy for saving his life, doth either onely counterfeit, and then there is no will to submit (this disguise is no more than a stepping aside, to avoid a present blow) Or else he doth sincerely will a submission, and then the will is changed; There is a vast difference between

compelling and changing the will. Either God or man may change the will of man, either by varying the condition of things, or by informing the party otherwise, but compelled it cannot be, that is, it cannot both will this, and not will this, as it is invested with the same circumstances, though, if the act were otherwise circumstantiated, it might nill that freely, which now it wills freely. (b) Wherefore this kind of actions are called mixt actions, that is partly voluntary, partly unvolun∣tary. That which is compelled in a mans present condition or distress, that is not voluntary nor chosen. That which is cho∣sen, as the remedy of its distress, that is voluntary. So hypothe∣tically, supposing a man were not in that distress, they are in∣voluntary, but absolutely without any supposition at all, ta∣king the case as it is, they are voluntary. (c) His other in∣stance of a man forced to prison, that he may choose whether he will be haled thither upon the ground, or walk upon his feet is not true. By his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it pleaseth them who have him in their power. If they will drag him, he is not free to walk; And if they give him leave to walk, he is not forced to be dragged. (d) Having laid this foundation, he begins to build upon it, that other passions do necessitate as much as fear; But he erres doubly; first, in his foundation, fear doth not determine the rational will naturally and necessarily; The last and greatest of the five terrible things is death, yet the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to do a disho∣nest action, which is worse than death. The fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three Children to worship an Idol, nor the fear of the Lions necessitate Daniel to omit his duty to God; It is our frailty, that we are more afraid of empty shadows than of substantial dangers, because they are neerer our senses, as little Children fear a Mouse or a Visard, more than fire or weather. But as a fitte of the stone takes away the sense of the gout for the present, so the greater passion doth extinguish the less. The fear of Gods wrath, and eternal tor∣ments doth expel corporal fear, fear not them who kill the body, but fear him who is able to cast both body and soul into hell▪ Luc. 7. 4. (e) Da veniam Imperator, tu carcerem, ille gehennam minatur, Excuse me, O Emperor, thou threatenest men with

prison, but he threatens me with hell. (f) Secondly, he erres in his superstruction also. There is a great difference, as to this case of justifying, or not justifying an action between force and fear, and other passions; Force doth not only lessen the sin, but takes it quite away, De••t. 22. 26. He who forced a be∣trothed Damsell was to die; but unto the Damsel (saith he) thou shalt do nothing, there is in her no fault worthy of death. Ta∣mars beauty, or Ammons love did not render him innocent, but Ammons force rendred Tamar innocent. But fear is not so prevalent as force. Indeed if fear be great, and justly grounded, such as may fall upon a constant man, though it do not dispense with the transgression of the negative Precepts of God or Na∣ture, because they bind to all times, yet it diminisheth the offence, even against them, and pleades for pardon. But it dispenseth in many cases with the trangression of the positive Law, either Divine or humane; because it is not probable, that God or the Law, would oblige man to the observation of all positive Precepts, with so great dammage as the loss of his life. The omission of Circumcision was no sin, whilst the Isralites were travelling through the wilderness. By T. H. his per∣mission. (g) I will propose a case to him. A Gentleman sends his servant with mony to buy his dinner, some Ruffians meet him by the way, and take it from him by force, The ser∣vant cryed for help, and did what he could to defend himself, but all would not serve. The servant is innocent, if he were to be tried before a Court of Areopagites. Or suppose the Ruf∣fians did not take it from him by force, but drew their swords and threatned to kill him, except he delivered it himself; no wise man will conceive, that it was either the Masters intention, or the servants duty, to hazard his life, or limbs, for saving of such a trifling sum. But on the other side suppose this servant, passing by some Cabaret, or Tennis-court, where his Camerads were drinking or playing, should stay with them, and drink or play away his mony, and afterwards plead as T. H. doth here, that he was overcome by the meer strength of tempta∣tion, I trow, neither T. H. nor any man else would admit of this excuse, but punish him for it, because, neither was he ne∣cessitated by the temptation, and what strength it had was by

his own fault, in respect of that vitious habit which he had contracted of drinking or gaming, Jam. 1. 14. Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and entised. Dis∣ordered passions of anger, hatred, lust, if they be consequent (as the case is here put by T. H.) and flow from deliberation and election, they do not only not diminish the fault, but they aggravate it, and render it much greater.

(h) He talks much of the motives to do, & the motives to forbear, how they work upon and determine a man, as if a reasonable man were no more than a Tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by the Rackets of the second causes; As if the will had no power to moove it self, but were meerly passive, like an arti∣ficiall Popingay remooved hither and thither by the bolts of the Archers, who shoot on this side and on that. What are motives but reasons or discourses framed by the understanding, and freely mooved by the will? What are the will and the understanding but faculties of the same soul? and what is li∣berty but a power resulting from them both? To say that the will is determined by these motives, is as much as to say, that the Agent is determined by himself; If there be no necessita∣tion before the judgment of right reason doth dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent, no extrinsecal necessitation at all. (i) All the world knows, that when the Agent is de∣termined by himself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause. But if he determined himself freely, then the effect is free. Motives determine not naturally, but morally; which kind of determination may consist with true liberty. But if T. H. his opinion were true, that the will were naturally de∣termined by the Physical and special influence of extrinsecal causes, not onely motives were vain, but reason it self, and deliberation were vain. No, saith he, they are not vain, be∣cause they are the means. Yes, if the means be superfluous they are vain; what needed such a circuit of deliberation to advise what is fit to be done, when it is already determined ex∣trinsecally, what must be done.

(k) He saith, that the ignorance of the true causes, and their power is the reason, why we ascribe the effect to liberty; but when we seriously consider the causes of things, we acknowledge a ne∣cessity.

No such thing, but just the contrary. The more we consider, and the cleerer we understand, the greater is the li∣berty, and the more the knowledge of our own liberty. The less we consider, and the more incapable that the understan∣ding is, the lesser is the liberty, and the knowledge of it. And where there is no consideration, nor use of reason, there is no liberty at all, there is neither moral good nor evil. Some men, by reason that their exteriour senses are not totally bound, have a trick to walk in their sleep. Suppose such an one in that case should cast himself down a pair of stairs, or from a bridge, and break his neck, or drown himself, it were a mad Jury that would find this man accessary to his own death. Why? because it was not freely done, he had not then the use of reason.

(l) Lastly, he tells us, that the will doth choose of necessity, as well as the fire burns of neoessity. If he intend no more but this, that election is the proper and natural act of the will, as burn∣ing is of the fire, or that the elective power is as necessarily in a man, as visibility, he speaks truly, but most impertinently; For, the question is not now of the elective power, in actu primo, whether it be an essential faculty of the soul, but whether the act of electing this or that particular object, be free and undetermined by any antecedent and extrinsecal causes. But if he intend it in this other sense, that as the fire hath no power to suspend its burning, nor to distinguish between those com∣bustible matters which are put unto it, but burns that which is put unto it necessarily, if it be combustible; So the will hath no power to refuse that which it wills, nor to suspend its own appetite, He erres grossely. The will hath power, either to will or nill, or to suspend, that is neither to will nor nill the same object; Yet even the burning of the fire, if it be consi∣dered as it is invested with all particular circumstances, is not otherwise so necessary an action as T. H. imagineth. (m) Two things are required to make an effect necessary. First, that it be produced by a necessary cause, such as fire is; Secondly, that it be necessarily produced. Protagoras an Atheist, began his Book thus. Concerning the Gods, I have nothing to say, whe∣ther they be, or they be not; for which his Book was condemned

by the Athenians to be burned. The fire was a necessary Agent, but the sentence or the application of the fire to the Book, was a free act; and therefore the burning of his Book was free. Much more the rational will is free, which is both a voluntary agent, and acts voluntarily.

(n) My second reason against this distinction of Liberty from Compulsion, but not from necessitation is new, and de∣monstrates cleerly, that to necessitate the will by a Physical necessity, is to compel the will so far as the will is capable of Compulsion; and that he, who doth necessitate the will to evil, after that manner is the true cause of evil, and ought ra∣ther to be blamed than the will it self. But T. H. for all he saith he is not surprised, can be contented upon better advise to steal by all this in silence; And to hide this tergiversation from the eyes of the Reader, he makes an empty shew of braving against that famous and most necessary distinction between the elicite and imperate acts of the will; first, because the terms are improper; secondly, because they are obscure. What Triviall and Grammatical objections are these, to be used against the universal current of Divines and Philosophers. Verborum ut Nummorum, It is in words, as it is in mony. Use makes them proper and current; A Tyrant at first, signified a lawful and just Prince; Now, use hath quite changed the sense of it, to denote either an Usurper, or an Oppressor. The word prae∣munire is now grown a good word in our English Laws by use and tract of time; And yet at first it was meerly mistaken for a praemonere. The names of Sunday, Munday, Tuesday, were derived at first from those Heathenish Deities, the Sun, the Moon, and the warlike God of the Germans; Now we use them for distinction sake onely, without any relation to their first original. He is too froward that will refuse a piece of coin that is current throughout the world, because it is not stamped after his own fancy. So is he that rejects a good word, because he understands not the derivation of it. We see for∣rein words are daily naturalized, and made free Denizons in every Country. But why are the tearms improper? Because, saith he, It attributes command, and subjection to the faculties of the soul▪ as if they made a Common-wealth or family among them∣selves,

and could speak one to another, Therefore he saith, (o) They who invented this tearm of Actus Imperatus, under∣stood not any thing what it signified. No, why not? It seemeth to me they understood it better than those who except against it. They knew, there are mentall tearms, which are onely con∣ceived in the mind, as well as vocal tearms, which are expressed with the tongue. They knew that howsoever a Superiour do intimate a direction to his inferiour, it is still a command. Tarquin commanded his son, by onely striking off the tops of the Poppies, and was by him both understood and obeyed. Though there be no formall Common-wealth or family either in the body, or in the soul of man, yet there is a subordina∣tion in the body of the inferiour members to the head; there is a subordination in the soul of the inferiour faculties to the ra∣tional will. Far be it from a reasonable man, so far to disho∣nour his own nature, as to equal fancy with understanding, or the sensitive appetite with the reasonable will. A power of command there is without all question, though there be some doubt in what faculty this command doth principally reside, whether in the will or in the understanding. The true resolu∣tion is, that the directive command for counsel is in the under∣standing; And the applicative command, or empire, for put∣ting in execution of what is directed, is in the will. The same answer serves for his second impropriety, about the word Eli∣cite. For, saith he, as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured, or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; So it is absurdly said, that to will or choose, is an act drawn out of the power to will. His objection is yet more improper than their expression. The art of dancing rather resembles the under∣standing, than the will. That drawing, which the Schools in∣tend, is cleer of another nature from that which he conceives; By elicitation, he understands, a perswading or enticing with flattering words, or sweet alluring insinuations, to choose this or that. But that elicitation, which the Schools intend, is a dedu∣cing of the power of the will into act; that drawing, which they mention, is meerly from the appetibility of the object, or of the end; as a man draws a Child after him with the sight of a fair Apple, or a Shepheard draws his sheep after him with the sight

of a green bough: So the end ••raw•• the will to it, by a Meta∣phorical motion. What he understands here by an ability to dance, is more than I know, or any man els, until he express himself in more proper tearms, whether he understand the lo∣comotive faculty alone, or the art, or acquired habit of dancing alone, or both of these jointly. It may be said aptly without any absurdity, that the act of dancing is drawn out (••lic••tur) of the locomotive faculty helped by the acquired habit. He who is so scrupulous about the received phrases of the Schools should not have let so many improper expressions have drop∣ped from his pen, as in this very passage he confounds the com∣pelling of a voluntary action, with the commanding of a volun∣tary action, and willing with electing, which he saith, are all one. Yet to will properly respects the end, to elect the means.

(p) His other objection against this distinction of the acts of the will into Elicite and Imperate i•• obscurity. Might it not (saith he) have been as easily said in English, a voluntary action. Yes, it might have been said as easily, but not as true∣ly, nor properly. Whatsoever hath its original from the will, whether immediatly or m••diatly, whether it be a proper act of the will it self, as to elect, or an act of the understanding, as to deliberate, or an act of the inferiour faculties, or of the mem∣bers, is a voluntary action; but neither the act of reason nor of the senses, nor of the sensitive appetite, nor of the members are the proper acts of the will, nor drawn immediatly out of the will it self, but the members and faculties are applyed to their proper and respective acts by the power of the will.

And so he comes to cast up the total sum of my second rea∣son, with the same faith, that the unjust Steward did make his accounts, Luk. 16. The sum of J. D's distinction is (saith he) that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion (just contrary to what I have maintained) that is to say, by ••oul means. But to will that, or any act cannot be but by allurement or fair means. I confess the distinction is mine, because I use it, as the Sun is mine, or the Air is mine, that is common to me, with all who treat of this subject. (q) But his mistakes are so thick▪ both in relating my mind, and his own, that the Reader may conclude, he is wandered out of his known way. I will do my duty to

shew him the right way. First, no acts, which are properly said to be compelled, are voluntary. Secondly, acts of terrour (which he calls foul means) which are sometimes in a large im∣proper sense called compulsory actions, may be, and for the most part are consistent with true liberty. Thirdly, actions proc••••••••ng from blandishments or sweet perswasions (which he calls fair means, if they be indeliberated as in children, who want the use of reason, are not presently free actions. Lastly, the strength of consequent, and deliberated desires doth nei∣ther diminish guilt, nor excuse from pun••••••ment as just fears of extream and imminent dangers thr••••t•••••• by extrinsecal agents often do, because the strength o•• the fo••mer proceeds from our own fault, and was free•••• elected in the causes of it; But neither desires nor fears, which are consequent and delibe∣rated, do absolutely necessitate the will.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb. XX.

(a) [NOw again, he tells us, that Election is not oppo∣site to either necessation or compulsion. He might even as well tell us, that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally, or that a Woman 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be ravished with her own Will. Consent takes away the R••••e, &c.] If that which I have told him again be false, why shews he not why it is false? Here is not one word of Argument against it. To say I might have said as well that a stone thrown upwards moves naturally is no refuta∣tion, but a deniall. I will not dispute with him whether a stone thrown up move naturally, or not. I shall onely say to those Rea∣ders, whose Judgements are not defaced with the abuse of Words, that as a stone moveth not upwards of it self, but by the P••••••er of the Exernal Agent, who giveth it a beginning of that motion; So also when the stone falleth, it is moved downward by the Power of some other Agent, which (though it be imper••eptible to the eye) is not imperceptible to reason. But because this is not proper discourse for the Bishop, and because I have else where discoursed thereof expressly, I shall say nothing of it h••re. And whereas he says

••••nsent takes away the Rape; It may parhap•• be ••rue, and I think it is; but here it not onely inferreth nothing, but was also needlesse, and therefore in a publick writing is an undecent instance, though sometimes not unnecessary in a Spirituall Court. In the next place he wonders how a man is compelled, and yet Free to do what he wil; that is to say, how a man is made to will, and yet Free to do what he will. I•• he had said he wondered how a man can ••e compelled to ••ill, and yet be Free to do that which he would have done, if ••e had not been compelled, it had been some∣what; as it is it is nothing; again he says, He who submits to an enemy for saving his life, doth either onely counterfeit, or else his Will is changed, &c. All which is true▪ But when he says he doth counterfeit, be doth not insinuate that he may counterfeit Lawfully; For that would pre••udice him hereafter in case he should have need of quarter. But how this maketh for him, or against me, I perceive not. There is a vast difference (saith he) between compelling, and changing the Wil. Either God or man may change the Wil of m••n, either by varying the con∣dition of things, or by informing the party otherwise; but com∣pelled it cannot be &c. I say the same, The Wil cannot be com∣pelled; but the man may be, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 then compelled when his Wil is changed by the fear o•• force, punishment, or other hurt from God or man. And when h••s Wil is changed, there is a new Wil for∣med, (Whether it be by God or by man,▪ and that necessarily; and consequently the Actions that flow from that Wil are both vo∣lunt••ry Free, and ••ecessary, notwithstanding that he was compel∣led to do them. Which maketh not for the Bishop but for me.

(b▪ [Wherefore this kind of Actions are called mixt Acti∣ons, th••t is partly voluntary, partly unvoluntary, &c▪ So sup∣posing a man were not in that distresse, they are involuntary.] That some Actions are partly voluntary partly involuntary, is not a new, but a false opinion. For one and the same Action can never be both voluntary and involuntary. If therefore the parts of an Action, be Actions, be says no more but that some Actions are volun•••••••• some involuntary; or that one multitude of Actions may be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 voluntary, partly involuntary. But that one Acti∣on should be partly voluntary partly involuntary is absurd; And it is the absurdity of those Authors which he unwarily gave credit

to. But to say, supposing the man had not been in distresse, that then the Action had been involuntary, is to say, that the throwing of a mans goods into the Sea, supposing he had not been in a storm, had been an involuntary Action; which is also an absur∣dity; for he would not have done it, and therefore it had been no Action at all, And this absurdity it his own.

(c) His other instance of a man forced to prison, that he may choose whether he will be h••••ed thither upon the ground, or walk upon his fe••t, is not true. By his leave that is not as he pleaseth, but as it pleaseth them who have him in their Power.] It is enough for the use I make of that instance, that when a man in the necessity of going to Prison, though he cannot elect nor deliberate of being Prisoner in the Jail, may neverthelesse deliberate some∣times, whether he shall walk, or be haled thither.

(d) [Having laid this foundation, he begins to build upon it, that other passions do necessitate as much as fear. But he errs doubly, &c.] First, he says, I erre in this that I say, that fear determins the rational Wil naturally and necessarily. And first, I answer, that I never used that term of rational Wil. There is no∣thing rational but God, Angels, and men. The Wil is none of these. I would not have excepted against this expression, but that every where he speaketh of the Will and other faculties as of men, or Spirits in mens bellies. Secondly, he offereth nothing to prove the contrary. For that which followeth the last and greatest of five terrible things, is death, yet the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to a dishonest Action. The fear of the fiery furnace could not compel the three Children to wor∣ship an Idol, nor the fear of the Lions necessitate Daniel to omit his duty to God, &c. I grant him that the greatest of five (or of fifteen for he had no more reason for five then fifteen) terrible things doth not alwayes necessitate a man to do a dishonest Action, and that the fear of the fiery Furnace could not compel the three Children, nor the Lions Daniel to omit their duty; for somewhat else (namely their confidence in God) did necessitate them to do their duty. That the fear of Gods wrath doth expel corporal fear, is w••ll said, and according to the Text he citeth. And proveth strongly that fear of the greater evil may necessitate in a man, a courage to endure the lesser evil.

(e) Da veniam Imperator, tu carcerem, ille gehennam mi∣natur. Excuse me, O Emperor thou threatnest men with Prison, but God threatens me with Hel.] This Sentence, and that which he saith Numb. 17. that neither the civil Judg, is the proper Judge, nor the Law of the Land is the proper Rule of sin, & divers other sayings of his to the same effect, make it impossible for any Nation in the World to preserve themselves from civil Wars. For all men living equal∣ly acknowledging that the High and Omnipotent God is to be obey'd before the greatest Emperours; every one may pretend the commandement of God to Justifie his disobedience. And if one man pretendeth that God commands one thing, and another man that he commands the contrary, what equity is there to allow the pretence of one, more then of another? Or what peace can there be if they be all allowed a like? There will therefore necessarily arise discord and civil War, unlesse there be a Judge agreed upon with Autho∣rity given to him by every one of them, to show them, and inter∣pr••t to them the Word of God, which Interpretor is alwayes the Em∣perour, King, or other Soverain person, who therefore ought to be obeyed. But the Bishop thinks that to shew us and interpret to us the Word of God, belongeth to the Clergy, wherein I cannot consent unto him; Excuse me, O Bishop, you threaten me with that you cannot do, but the Emperour threateneth me with death, and is able to do what he threateneth.

(f) [Secondly, he errs in his superstruction also. There is a great difference, as to this case of Justifying, or not Justifying an Action, between force and fear, &c. Force doth not one∣ly lessen the sin, but takes it quite away, &c.] I know not to what point of my answer, this Reply of his is to be applyed. I had said the Actions of men compelled, are neverthelesse volun∣tary. It seems that he calleth Compulsion Force; but I call it a fear of force, or of dammage to be done by force, by which fear a mans will is framed to somewhat, to which he had no will before. Force taketh away the sin, because the Action is not his that is forced, but his that forceth. It is not alwayes so in Compulsion, because in this case a man electeth the Lesse Evil under the notion of Good. But his instances of the betrothed Damsel that was forced, and of Tamar, may for any thing there appeareth in the Text, be Instances of Compulsion, and yet the Damsel and Tamar

be both innocent. In that which immediately followeth concern∣in•• how far fear may extenuate a sin, there is nothing to be answe∣red. I preceive in it, he hath some glimmering of the truth, but not of the grounds thereof. It is true, that Just ••ear dispenceth not with the precepts of God or Nature; for they are not dispensa∣ble; but it extenuateth the fault, not by di••••inishing any thing in the Action, but by being no transgressi••n. For if the fear be al∣lowed the Action it produceth is allowed also. Nor doth it disp use in any case with the Law positive, but by making the Action it self Lawful, for th•• breaking of a Law is alwayes sin; and it is certain that men are obliged to the observation of all positive Pre∣cepts, though with the losse of their lives, unlesse the right that a man hath to preserve himself, make it, in case of a just Fear, to be n•• Law. The omission of circumcision was no sin, he says, whilst the Israelites were travelling through the Wildernesse. 'T is very true, but this has nothing to do with Compulsion. And the cause why it was no sin, was this; they were ready to ob••y it, wh••nsoever God should give them leasure and rest from travel; whereby they might be cured, or at least when God, that daily spake to their Conducter in the Desert, should appoint him to renew that Sacrament.

(g) [I will propose a case to him, &c.] The case is this; a Servant, is robbed of his Masters money by the Highway, but is acquit because he was forced. Another Servant spends his Ma∣sters money in a Tavern. Why is he not acquited also seeing he was necessitated? Would (h•• saith he) T. H. admit of this ex∣cuse? I answer no: But I would do that to him, which should ne∣cessitate him to behave himself better anoth••r time, or at least ne∣cessitate another to behave himself better, by his example.

(h) He talkes much of the motives to do, an•• the m••tives to forbear, how they work upon, and determine a man; as if a reasonable man were no more then a Tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by the Rackets of the second causes; &c.] May not great things be produced by second causes as well as little? And a Foot-ball as well as a Tennis-ball? But the Bishop can never be driven from this, that the Will hath power to move it self, but says tis all one to say, that an Agent can determine it self, and that the Will is determined by motives extrinsical.

He adds, that if there be no necessitation before the Judgment of right reason doth dictate to the Will, then there is no An∣tecedent nor Extrinsecal necessitation at all. I say indeed the effect is not produced before the last dictate of the understanding; but I say not that the necessity was not before; he knows I say it is from eternity. When a Cannon is planted against a Wall, though the battery be not made till the bullet arrive, yet the necessity was present all the while the bullet was going to it, if the Wall stood still; and if it ••li••t away, the hitting of somewhat else was necessa∣ry, and that antecedently.

(i) [All the World knows, that when the Agent is deter∣mined by himself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause. Yes, wh••n the Agent is d••termined by himself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause, and so any thing else is what he will have it. But nothing is determined by it self, nor is there any man in the World that h••th any Conception answerable to those Words. But Motives (he says) determine not naturally but Morally. This also is insignificant, for all Motion is Na∣tural or Supernatural. Moral motion is a meer Word, without any Imagination of the mind correspondent to it. I have heard men talk of a Motion in a Court of Justice; perhaps this is it which he means by Moral Motion. But certainly when the tongue of the Judg, and the hands of the Clerks are thereby mov••d, the Motion is Natural, and proceed from natural causes, which causes also, were Natural Motions of the tongue of the Advocate. And whereas he adds, that if this were true then not onely Mo∣tives, but reason it self, and deliberation were vain▪ it hath been sufficiently answered before that therefore they are not vain, be∣cause by them is produced the effect. I must also note that often∣times in citing my opinion, he puts ••n instead of mine, those terms of his own, which upon all occasions I complain of for absurdity; as here he makes me to say, that which I did never say, Special in∣fluence of extrinsical causes.

(k) He saith, that the ignorance of the true causes, and their Power, is the reason why we ascribe the effect ••o Liberty; but when we seriously consider the causes of things, we acknowledge a necessity. No such thing, but just the contrary.] I••••▪ under∣stand the Authors which he readeth upon this point no better, then

he understands what I have here written, it is no wonder he un∣derstandeth not the truth of the question. I said not, that when we consider the causes of things, but when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity. No such thing (says the Bishop) but just the contrary, the more we consider, and the clearer we understand, the greater is the Li∣berty, &c. Is there any doubt if a man could foreknow, as God foreknows that which is hereafter to come to passe, but that he would also see and know she causes which shall bring it to passe, and how they work, and make the effect necessary; for necessary it is what∣soever God foreknoweth. But we that foresee them not, may con∣sider as much as w•• will, and understand as clearly as we will, but are never the neerer to the knowledge of their necessity; and that I said was the cause why we impute those events to Liberty, and not to causes.

(l) [Lastly, he tels us, that the Wil doth chose of necessity, as well as the fire burns of necessity. If he intend no more but this, that Election is the proper and natural Act of the Wil, as burning is of the fire, &c. He speaks truely, but most imper∣tinently; for the question is not now of the Elective power, in actu primo, &c.] Here again he makes me speak non sense; I said the man chooseth of necessity, he says, I say the Will chooseth of necessity; And why, but because he thinks I ought to speak as he does, and say, as he does here, that Election is the Act of the Wil. No, Election is the Act of a man, as power to Elect is the power of a man. Election and Wil are all one Act of a man, and the power to Elect, and the power to Wil one and the same power of a man. But the Bishop is confounded by the use of calling by the name of Wil, the power of willing in the future, as they also were confounded that first brought in this senselesse term of Actus pri∣mus. My meaning is, that the Election I shall have of any thing hereafter, is now as necessary, as that the fire that now is, and continueth, shall burn any combustible matter thrown into it here∣after. Or to use his own terms, the Wil hath no more power to suspend its Willing, then the burning of the fire to suspend its burn∣ing. Or rather more properly, the man hath no more power to su∣spend his Will, then the fire, to suspend his burning; Which is con∣trary to that, which he would have, namely, that a man should have

power to refuse what he Wils, and to suspend his own appetite▪ for to refuse what one willeth implyeth a contradiction; the which also is made much more absurd by his expression; for he saith, the Will hath power to refuse what it Wils, and to suspend its own Appetite, whereas the Will, and the Willing, ••••d the Appetite is the same thing. He adds that even the burning of the fire, if it be considered, as it is invested with all particular circum∣stances, is not so necessary an Action as T. H. imagineth. He doth not sufficiently understand what I imagine. For I ima∣gine, that of the fire which shall burn five hundred years hence, I may truly say now, it shall burn necessarily; and of that which shall not burn then, (for fire may sometimes not burn the combustible matter thrown into it, as in the case of the three Children) that it is necessary it shall not burn.

(m) [Two things are required to make an Effect necessa∣ry. First, that it be produced by a necessary cause, &c. Se∣condly, that it be necessarily produced, &c.] To this I say no∣thing but that I understand not how a cause can be necessary, and the Effect not be necessarily produced.

(n) [My second reason against this distinction of Liberty from compulsion, but not from necessitation, is new, and de∣monstrates cleerly, that to necessitate the Wil by a Physical necessity, is to compel the Wil, so far as the Wil is capable of compulsion; and that he, who doth necessitate the Wil to evil after that manner, is the true cause of evil, &c.] By this second reason, which he says is new and demonstrates, &c. I can∣not find what reason he means; for there are but two, whereof the later is in these Words; Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this business, this I take to be the clear resolution of the Schools; There is a double Act of the Wil, the one more remote called Imperatus, &c. The other Act is nearer, called Actus Elici∣tus, &c. But I doubt whether this be it he means or no. For this being the resolution of the Schools, is not new; and being a distin∣ction onely, is no demonstration; though ••erhaps he may use the word demonstration, as every unlearned man now a days does, to signifie any Argument of his own. As for the distinction it self, because the terms are Latine, and never used by any Author of the Latine tongue, to shew their impertinence, I expounded them in

English, and left them to the Readers judgement, to find the ab∣surdity of them himself. And the Bishop in this part of his Reply, indeavours to defend them. And first he calls it a Trivial and Grammatical objection, to say they are improper and obscure. Is there any thing lesse be seeming a Divine, or a Philosopher, then to speak improperly and obscurely, where the truth is in questi∣on. Perhaps it may be tollerable in one that Divineth, but not in him that pretendeth to demonstrate. It is not the universal current of Divines, and Philosophers, that giveth Words their Autho∣rity, but the generality of them who acknowledge, that they under∣stand them. Tyrant and Praemunire, though their signification be changed, yet they are understood; and so are the names of the Days. Sunday, Munday, Tuesday. And when English Rea••ers not engaged in School Divinity shall find Imperate & Elicite Acts as intelligible as those, I will confesse I had no reason to find fault.

But my braving against that famous, and most necessary distin∣ction, between the Elicite and Imperate Acts of the Wil, he says was onely to hide from the eyes of the Reader a tergiversation in not answering this Argument of his; he who doth necessitate the Wil to evil, is the true cause of evil; But God is not the cause of evil; Therefore he does not necessitate the Wil to evil. This Argument is not to be found in this Numb. 20. to which I here answered; nor had I ever said that the Wil was compelled. But he taking all necessitation for Compulsion, doth now in this place from necessitation simply, bring in this Inference con∣cerning the cause of evill, and thinks he shall force me to say, that God is the cause of sin. I shall say onely what is said in the Scrip∣ture, Non est malum, quod ego non feci. I shall say what Micaiah saith to Ahab, 1 Kings 22. 23. Behold the Lord hath put a lying Spirit into the mouth of all these thy Pro∣phets. I shall say that that is true, which the Prophet David saith, 2 Sam. 16. 10. Let him curse, because the Lord hath said unto him, curse David. But that which God himself saith of him∣self, 1 Kings 12. 15. The King hearkned not to the people, for the cause was from the Lord, I will not say, least the Bishop ex∣claim against me, but leave it to be interpreted by those that have authority to interpret the Scriptures. I say further, that to cause sin is not always sin, nor can be sin in him that is not subject

to some higher Power; but to use so unseemly a Phrase as to say that God is the cause of sin, because it soundeth so like to saying that God sinneth, I can never be forced by so weak an argument as this of his. Luther says we act necessarily, necessarily by ne∣cessity of immutability, not by necessity of constraint, that is in plain English necessarily, but not against our wills. Zan∣chius says Tract. Theol. cap. 6. Thes. 1. The freedom of our will doth not consist in this, that there is no necessity of our sinning; but in this, that there is no constraint. Bucer. Lib. de Concordia. Whereas the Catholicks say, man has Free Will, we must understand it of freedom from constraint, and not freedom from necessity. Calvin. Inst. Cap. 2. §. 6. And thus shall man be said to have Free Will, not because he hath equall freedom to do good and evill, but because he does the evill he does not by constraint but willingly. Monsr. du Mou∣••in, in his Buckler of the Faith, Article 9 The necessity of sinning is not repugnant to the freedom of the Will. Witness the Devils who are necessarily wicked, and yet sin freely with∣out constraint. And the Synod of Dort. Liberty is not oppo∣site to all kinds of necessity and determination. It is indeed op∣posite to the necessity of constraint but standeth well enough with the necessity of infallibility. I could add more. For all the famous Doctors of the Reformed Churches, and with them St. Au∣gustine are of the same opinion. None of these denied that God is the cause of al Motion & Action, or that God is the cause of al Laws; and yet they were never forced to say that God is the cause of sin.

(o) They who invented this term of Actus Imperatus under∣stood not (he saith) any thing what it signified. No? Why not? It seemeth to me they understood it better then those who ex∣cept against it. They knew there are mentall terms which are only conceived in the mind, as well as vocal terms, which are expressed with the tongue, &c. In this place the Bishop hath discovered the ground of all his errors in Philosophy, which is this, that he thinketh, when he repeateth the words of a propo∣sition in his mind, that is, when he fancieth the words without speaking them, that then hee conceiveth the things which the words signifie, and this is the most general cause of false opi∣nions. For men can never be deceived in the conceptions of

things, though they may, and are most often deceived by giving unto them wrong terms or appellations, different from those which are commonly used, and constituted to signifie their conceptions. And therefore they that study to attain the certain knowledge of truth, do use to set down before hand all the terms they are to expresse themselves by, and declare in what sense they shall use them constantly. And by this means, the Reader having an Idea of every thing there named, cannot conceive amisse. But when a man from the hearing of a word hath no Idea of the thing signified, but onely of the sound, and of the Letters whereof the word is made (which is that he here calleth Mentall terms) it is impossible he should conceive aright, or bring forth any thing but absurdity; as he doth here, when he says, that when Tarquin delivered his commands to his Son, by onely striking off the tops of the Poppies, he did it by Mental terms. As if to strick off the head of a Poppy were Mental term. It is the sound and the Letters that maketh him think Elicitus and Imperatus somewhat. And it is the same that makes him say (for think it he cannot) that to Wil, or choose, is drawn, or allured, or fetch't out of the power to Wil. For drawing cannot be imagined but of bodys; and there∣fore to Will, to speak, to write, to dance, to leape, or any way to be moved, cannot be said intelligibly to be drawn, much lesse to be drawn out of a Power, that is to say, out of an ability; for what∣soever is drawn out, is drawn out of one place into another. He that can discourse in this manner in Philosophy, cannot probably be thought able to discourse rationally in any thing.

(p) [His other objection against this distinction of the Acts of the Will into Elicite and Imperate is obscurity. Might it not (saith he) have been as easily said in English, a voluntary Action? Yes, it might have been said as easily, but not as tru∣ly, nor as properly.] He says, that Actus Imperatus is when a man opens or shuts his eyes at the command of the Wil. I say when a man opens and shuts his eyes according to his Wil, that it is a voluntary Action; and I believe we mean one and the same thing. Whether of us speak more properly, or more truly, let the Reader Judge.

(q) [But his mistakes are so thick, &c. I will do my duty to shew him the right way. First, no Acts which are pro∣perly

said to be compelled, are voluntary. Secondly▪ Acts of of terrour, &c.] This is nothing but Tohu and Bohu.

J. D.

THE rest are umbrages quickly dispelled; first, the Astro∣loger* 1.38 steps up, and subjects Liberty to the motions of Heaven, to the aspects and ascensions of the Starrs,

—Plus etenim fati valet hora benigni. Quam si nos Veneris commendet Epistola Marti.

I stand not much upon them who cannot see the fishes swim∣ming besides them in the rivers, yet believe they see those which are in Heaven. Who promise great treasures to others, and beg a groat for themselves. The Starrs at the most do but incline, they cannot necessitate.

Secondly, the Physitian subjects liberty to the complexion and temperature of the body. But yet this comes not home to a necessity. Socrates, and many others by assiduous care have corrected the pernicious propensions, which flowed from their temperatures.

T. H.

IN the rest of his discourse he reckoneth up the opinions of cer∣tain professions of men, touching the causes, wherein the necessi∣ty of things, which they maintain, consisteth. And first he saith, the Astrologer deriveth his necessity from the Starrs. Secondly, that the Physician attributeth it to the temper of the body. For my part, I am not of their opinion, because neither the Starrs alone, nor the temperature of the Patient alone is able to produce any effect without the concurrence of all other Agents. For, there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not whatsoever is in rerum natura. Which because it is a great Paradox, and depends on many antecedent speculati∣ons I do not press in this place.

J. D.

TOwards the later end of my discourse I answered some specious pretences against liberty, The two first were of the Astrologer and the Physician. The one subjecting liberty

to the motions and influences of the heavenly bodies; The other to the complexions of men. (a) The sum of my answer was, that the Stars and complexions do incline, but not at all necessitate the will. To which all judicious Astronomers and Physicians do assent. And T. H. himself doth not dissent from it. So as to this part there needs no reply.

(b) But whereas he mentions a great paradox of his own that there is hardly any one action to the causing of which concurres not whatsoever is in rerum natura, I can but smile to see with what ambition our great undertakers do affect to be accounted the first founders of strange opinions, as if the devising of an ill grounded Paradox were as great an honour as the invention of the needle, or the discovery of the new World. And to this Paradox in Particular, I meddle not with natural actions, be∣cause the subject of my discourse is moral liberty; But if he in∣tend not only the kinds of things, but every individuall crea∣ture, and not onely in natural but voluntary actions, I desire to know how Prester John, or the great Mogol, or the King of China, or any one of so many millions of their subjects do con∣cur to my writing of this reply. If they do not, among his other speculations concerning this matter, I hope he will give us some restrictions. It were hard to make all the Negroes ac∣cessary to all the murthers that are committed in Europe.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply. Numb. XXI.

THere is not much in this part of his Reply, that needeth Ani∣madversion. But I must observe where he saith.

(a) [The sum of my answer was that the Stars and complections do incline, but not at all necessitate the Will.] He answereth nothing at all to me, who attribute not the necessi∣tation of the Will to the Stars and Complections, but to the ag∣gregate of all things together that are in motion. I do not say that the Stars or Complections of themselves do incline men to Wil; but when men are inclined, I must say that that inclination, was ne∣cessitated by some causes or other.

(b) [But whereas he mentions a great Paradox of his own; that there is hardly any one Action, to the causing of which con∣curres not whatsoever is in rerum natura. I can but smile to see with what ambition our great undertakers do affect to be ac∣counted the first founders of strange opinions, &c.] The Bishop speaks often of Paradoxes which such scorn or detestation, that a simple Reader would take a Paradox either for Felony, or some other hainous crime, or else for some rediculous turpitude; whereas perhaps a Judicious Reader knows what the word signifies. And that a Paradox is an opinion not yet generally re∣ceived. Christian Religion was once a Paradox; and a great many other opinions which the Bishop now holdeth, were formerly Para∣doxes. Insomuch as when a man calleth an opinion Paradox, he doth not say it is untrue, but signifieth his own ignorance; for if he understood it, he would call it either a truth or an errour. He ob∣serves not, that but for Paradoxes, we should be now in that sa∣vage ignorance which those men are in▪ that have not, or have not long had Laws and Common-wealth, from whence porceedeth Science and Civility. There was not long since a Scholler, that maintained that if the least thing that had waight should be laid down upon the hardest body that could be, supposing it an Anvill of Diamant, it would at the first accesse make it yeeld. This I thought, and much more the Bishop would have thought a Para∣dox. But when he told me, that either that would do it, or all the waight of the World would not doe it, because if the whole waight did it, every the least part thereof would do its part, I saw no rea∣son to dissent. In like manner when I say there is hardly any one Action to the causing of which concurs not whatsoever is in rerum natura; It seems to the Bishop a great Paradox; and if I should say that all Action is the effect of Motion, and that there cannot be a Motion in one part of the World, but the same must also be communicated to all the rest of the World, he would say that this were no lesse a Paradox. But yet if I should say, that if a lesser body, as a concave Sphere or Tun, were filled with air or other liquid matter, and that any one little particle thereof were moved, all the rest would be moved also, he would conceive it to be true, or if not he, a judicious reader would. It is not the greatness of the Tun that altereth the case; and therefore the same would be true

also, if the whole World were the Tun; for tis the greatness of this Tun that the Bishop comprohendeth not. But the truth is compre∣hensible enough, and may be said without ambition of being the founder of strange opinions. And though a Grave man may smile at it, he that is both Grave and wise will not.

J. D.

THirdly, the moral Philosopher tells us how we are haled hi∣ther* 1.39 and thither with outward objects. To this I answer.

First, that the power, which outward objects have over us, is for the most part by our own default, because of those viti∣ous habits which we have contracted. Therefore, though the actions seem to have a kind of violence in them, yet they were free and voluntary in their first originals. As a paralitick man, to use Aristotles comparison, shedding the liquor deserves to be punished, for though his act be unwilling, yet his imtempe∣rance was willing, whereby he contracted this infirmity.

Secondly, I answer, that concupiscence, and custome, and bad company, and outward objects do indeed make a procli∣vity, but not a necessity. By Prayers, Tears, Meditations, Vowes, Watchings, Fastings, Humi-cubations, a man may get a contrary habit, and gain the victory, not onely over outward objects but also over his own corruptions, and become the King of the little world of himself.

Si metuis, si prava cupis, si duceris irà, Servitii patiere jugum, tol••rabis iniquas Interius leges. Tunc omnia jure tenebis, Cum poteris rex esse t••••.

Thirdly, a resolved mind, which weighs all things judiciously, and provides for all occurrences, is not so easily surprised with∣outward objects. Onely Ulysses wept not at the meeting with ••is wife and son. I would beat thee (said the Philosopher) but that I am angry. One spake lowest when he was most mooved. Another poured out the water when he was thirsty. Another made a Covenant with his eyes. Neither opportunity nor entisement could prevail with Joseph. Nor the Musick, nor

the fire with the three Children. It is not the strength of the wind, but the lightness of the chaff, which causeth it to be blown away. Outward objects do not impose a moral, much less a Physical necessity, they may be dangerous, but cannot be destructi e to true liberty.

T. H.

THirdly, he disputeth against the opinion of them that say, ex∣ternal objects present••d to men of such and such t••mperatures, do make their actions necessary. And sayes, the po••••er that such objects have over us, proceed from our own fault; But that is nothing to the purpose, if such ••ault of ours proceedeth from causes, not in our own power. And therefore that opinion may ••old true fo•••• all this answer: Further he saith, Prayer, Fasting, &c. may alter our habits. 'T is true, but when they do so, they are causes of the contrary habit, and make it necessary; as the for∣mer habit had been necessary, i•• Prayer, Fasting, &c. had not been. Besides we are not mooved, nor disposed to prayer, or any ot er action but by outward objects, as pious company, godly preachers, or something equivalent. Thirdly, he saith, a resolved mind is not easily surprised. As the mind of Ulysses, who when others wept, he alone wept not. And of the Philosopher that ab∣stained from striking, because he found himself angry. And of him that poured out the water when he was thirsty; And the like. Such things I confess have, or may have been done, and do prove onely that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to we••p, nor for the Philosopher to strike, nor for ••hat other ma•• to drink, but it does not prove that it was not necessary for Ulysses then to ab••••ain, as he did from weeping, nor the Philosopher to abstain as he did from striking; Nor the other man to forbear drinking. And yet that was the thing he ought to have prov••d.

Lastly, he confesseth, that the disposition of objects may be dangerous to liberty, but cannot be destructive. To which I answer, t•••• impossible; For, liberty is never in any other danger than to be lost. And if 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cannot be lost, which he confesseth, I may in••er it can be in no danger at all.

J. D.

(a) THe third pretense was out of moral Philosophy misun∣derstood, that outward objects do necessitate the will. I shall not need to repeat what he hath omitted, but onely to satisfie his exceptions; (b) The first is, that it is not material, though the power of outward objects do proceed from our own faults, if such faults of ours proceed not from causes in our own power. Well, but what if they do proceed from causes that are in our own power, as in truth they do, then his answer is a meer sub∣terfuge. If our faults proceed from causes that are not, and were not in our own power, then they are not our faults at all. It is not a fault in us not to do those things, which never were in our power to do. But they are the faults of these causes fr••m whence they do proceed. (c) Next he confesseth, that it ••••••n our power by good endeavours, to alter those vitious habits which we had contracted, and to get the contrary habit. True (saith he) but then the contrary habit doth necessitate the one way, as well as the former habit did the other way. By which very con∣sideration it appears, that that which he calls a necessity is no more but a proclivity. If it were a true necessity, it could not be avoided, nor altered by our endeavours. The truth is Ac∣quired habits do help and assist the faculty; but they do not necessitate the faculty. He who hath gotten to himself an habit of temperance, may yet upon occasion commit an in∣temperate act. And so on the contrary. Acts are not op∣posed to habits, but other habits. (d) He adds, that we are not mooved to prayer or any other action but by outward objects, as pions company, godly Preachers or something equivalent. Where∣in are two other mistakes, first▪ to make godly Preachers, and pious company, to be outward objects, which are outward Agents. Secondly to affirm that the will is not moved but by outward objects. The will is mooved by it self, by the under∣standing, by the sensitive passions by Angels good a••d bad, by men, and most effectually by acts or habits infused by God, whereby the will is excited extraordinarily indeed, but effi∣caciously and determinately. This is more than equivalent with outward objects.

Another branch of mine answer was, that a resolved and prepared mind is able to resist both the app••tibility of ob∣jects, and the unruliness of passions; As I shewed by exam∣ples. (e) He answers that I prove Ulysses was not necessita∣ted to weep, nor the Philosopher to strike, but I do not prove that they were not necessitated to forbear. He saith true. I am not now proving, but answering. Yet my answer doth sufficiently prove that which I intend. That the rational will hath power, both to sleight the most appetible objects, and to control the most unruly passions. When he hath given a clear solution to those proofs which I have produced, then it will be time for him to cry for more work.

Lastly, whereas I say, that outward objects may be dange∣rous, but cannot be destructive to true liberty. He catcheth at it, and (f) objects, that liberty is in no danger, but to be lost, but I say, it cannot be lost, therefore (he infers) that it is in no danger at all. I answer; First, that liberty is in more danger to be abused than to be lost. Many more men do abuse their wits than lose them. Secondly, liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened or diminished, as when it is clogged by vicious habits contracted by our selves, and yet it is not totally lost. Thirdly, though liberty cannot be totally lost out of the world, yet it may be totally lost to this or that particular man, as to the exercise of it. Reason is the root of liberty, and though nothing be more natural to a man than reason, yet many by excess of study, or by continual gurmandizing, or by some ex∣travagant passion, which they have cherished in themselves, or by doting too much upon some affected object, do be∣come very sorts, and deprive themselves of the use of rea∣son, and consequently of Liberty. And when the benefit of liberty is not thus universally lost, yet it may be lost re∣spectively to this or that particular occasion. As he who makes choise of a bad wife, hath lost his former liberty to chose a good one.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply Numb. XXII.

(a) [THe third pretence was out of Moral Philosophy mis∣understood, that outward objects do necessitate the Will.] I cannot imagine how the question, whether outward ob∣jects do necessitate, or not necessitate the Wil••, can any ••ay be re∣ferred to Moral Philosophy. The principles ••f moral Philosophy are the Laws, wherewith outward objects have little to do, as being for the most part inanimate, & which follow alwayes the force of nature without respect to moral Laws. Nor can I conceive what purpose he had to bring this into his Reply to my answer, wherein I attribute nothing in the Action of outward objects to Morallity.

(b) [His first exception is, that it is not material that the power of outward objects do proceed from our own faults, if such faults of ours proceed not from causes in our own power. Well, but what if they do proceed from causes, that are in our own power, as in truth they do, then his answer is a meer subter∣fuge. But how pr••v••s he that in truth they do? Because else, saith he, they are not our faults at all.] Very well reasoned. A Horse is lame from a cause that was not in his power, therefore the lame∣ness is no fault in the Horse. But his meaning is, t••s no injustice unlesse the causes were in his own power; as if it were not injustice whatsoever is willingly done against the Law, whatsoever it be that is the cause o•• the Wil to do it.

(c) [Next he confesseth, that it is in our power by good endeavours to alter those vicious habits which we had con∣tracted, and to get the contrary habits.] There is no such con∣fession in my answer. I said, Prayer, Fasting, &c. May alter our habits. But I never said that the Will to Pray, Fast &c. is in our own power. True (saith he) but then the contrary habit doth necessitate the on•• way, as well as the former habit did the other way. By which very consideration it appears, that that which he calls a necessity, is no more but a Proclivity. If it were a true necessity, it could not be avoided, nor altered by our endeavours.] Again he mistakes, for I said that Prayer, Fa∣sting,

&c. when they alter our habits do necessarily cause the contrary habits; which is not to say that the habit necessitates but is necessitated But this is Common with him to make me say that which out of readin••, n••t out of Meditation he useth to say hi••••••••. B••t how doth it ap••••ar, that Prayer and Fasting &c. make but a Proclivity in men to do what they do for if it ••ere but a Proclivity, then what they do, they do not. Therefore they either necessitate the Will, or the Will followeth n••t; I contend for the truth of this onely, that when the W••ll followeth them they necessi∣tate the will; and when a ••r••climity followeth they necessitate the proclimity. But the Bishop thin••s I maintain that that also is pro∣duced necessiarily, which is not produced at a••.

(d) [He adds, that we are not moved to Prayer, or any other Action, but by outward objects, as pio••s company, and Godly Preachers, or something equivalent Wherein are two other mistake••; first, to make Godly Preachers, and pious company, to be outward objects, which are outward Agents. Secondly, to affirm that the Will is not moved but by outward objects. The W••l is moved by it self, &c.] The first mistake, he urgeth that I call Preachers and company objects. Is not the Preacher to the hearer the object of his hearing? No, perhaps he will say it is the voyce which is the object, and that we hear not the Preacher, but his voyce, as before he said the object of sight, was not the cause of sight. I must therefore once more make him smile with a great Paradox which is this, that in all th•• senses he Object is the Agent; And that it is, when we hear a Preacher, the Prea∣cher that we hear, and that his voyce is the same thing with the hearing and a fancy in the hearer, though the motion o•• the Lips, and other organs of spe••ch be his that speaketh. But of this I have written more largely in a mo••e proper place.

My second mistake, in affirming that the Will is not moved but by outward objects, is a mistake of his own. For I said not the Will is not moved, but we ate not moved, for I alwayes avoid attributing motion to any thing but Body. The Will is produced, generated, formed, and created in su••h ••ort as accidents are effected in a corp••real subject, but moved it cannot be, because it goeth not ••rom place to place. And whereas h•• saith the Will is moved by it self, if he had spoken properly as he ought to do,

and said, the Will is made or created by it self, he would presently have acknowledged that it was impossible. So that it is not with∣out cause men use improper Language, when they mean to keep their errours from being detected. And because nothing can move that is not it self moved, it is untruly said that either the Will or any thing else is moved by it self, by the understanding, by the sensitive passions, or by Acts or habits, or that Acts or habits are infused by God, for infusion is motion, and nothing is moved but bodys.

(e) [He answers that I prove Ulysses was not necessitated to weep nor the Philosopher to strik, but I do not prove that they were not necessitated to forbear. He saith true; I am not now proving, but answering.] By his favour, though he be an∣swering now, he was proving then. And what he answers now maketh nothing more toward a proof then was before. For these words, the rational Wil hath Power to sleight the most appeti∣ble objects, and to controle, the most unruly passions, are no more, (being reduced into proper terms) then this, the appetite hath power to be without appetite towards most appetible ob∣jects, and to Will contrary to the most unruly Will; which is Jargon.

(f) [He objects that Liberty is in no danger, but to be lost; but I say it cannot be lost, therefore (he inferrs) that it is in no danger at all. I answer, First, that Liberty is in more danger to be abu∣sed then lost, &c. Secondly, Liberty is in danger likewise to be weakened by vic••ous habits. Thirdly, it may be totally lost.] It is true that a man hath more liberty one time then another, and in one place then another, which is a difference of liberty 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to the Body. But as to the liberty of doing what we will, in those things we are able to do, it cannot be greater one time then another. Consequently outward objects can 〈◊〉〈◊〉 wayes endanger liberty fur∣ther then it destroyeth it. And his answer that liberty is in more danger to be abused then lost, is not to the question, but a meer shift to be thought not silenced. And whereas he says liberty is di∣minished by vitious habits, it cannot be understood otherwise then that vicious habits make a man the lesse free to do vicious actions; which I believe is not his meaning. And lastly, whereas he says that Liberty is lost, when reason is lost, and that they who by

expresse of Study, or by continuall gurmandising, or by extra∣vagant passion, &c. do become sots, have consequently lost their liberty, it requireth proof; for for any thing that I can ob∣serve, mad men and fools have the same liberty that other men have, in those things that are in their power to do.

J. D.

FOurthly, the natural Philosopher doth teach, that the will* 1.40 doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the understan∣ding. It is true indeed the will should follow the directi∣on of the understanding, but I am not satisfied that it doth evermore follow it. Sometimes this saying hath place, Video m••liora proboque, Deteriora sequor. As that great Roman said of two Sailers that the one produced the better reasons, but the other must have the office. So reason often lies dejected at the feet of affection. Things neerer to the senses moove more powerfully. Do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his child, than for the sin of his soul; Yet appreciative∣ly in the estimation of judgment, he accounts the offence of God, a greater evill than any temporal loss.

Next, I do not believe that a man is bound to weigh the ex∣pedience or inexpedience of every ordinary trivial action to the least grain in the ballance of his understanding, or to run up into his Watch-Tower with his perspective to take notice of every Jack-daw that flies by, for fear of some hidden danger. This seems to me to be a prostitution of reason to petit ob∣servations as concerning every rag that a man wears each drop of drink, each morsel of bread that he eates, each pace that he walks. Thus many steps must he go, not one more, nor one less, under pain of mortal sin. What is this but a Rack and a Gibbet to the Conscience? But God leaves many things in∣different, though man be so curious he will not. A good Ar∣chitect will be sure to provide sufficient materials for his buil∣ding, but what particular number of stones, or trees, he trou∣bles not his head. And suppose he should weigh each action thus, yet he doth not, so still there is liberty. Thirdly, I con∣ceive it is possible in this mist and weakness of human appre∣hension, for two actions to be so equally circumstantiated, that

no discernable difference can appear between them upon dis∣cussion A•• suppose a Chirurgion should give two plaisters to his Patient, and ••id him apply either o•• them to his wound, what can induce his reason more to the one than to the other, but that he may refer it to chance whether he will use? But leaving these probable speculations which I submit ••o better judgments. I answer the Philosopher briefly thus; Admitting that the will did necessarily follow the last dictare of the under∣standing as certainly in many things it doth. Yet,

First, this is no extrins••••al determination from without, and a mans own resolution is not destructive to his own liberty, but depends upon it. So the person is still free.

Secondly, this determination is not antecedent, but joyned with the Action. The understanding and the will, are not different Agents, but distinct faculties of the same soul. Here is an infallibility, or an hypothetical necessity, as we say, Quic∣quid est quando est, necess•• est esse: A necessity of consequence, but not a necessity of consequent. Though an Agent have cer∣tainly determined, and so the Action be become infallible, yet if the Agent did determine freely, the Action likewise is free.

T. H.

THE fourth opinion which he r••jecteth, is of them that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understan∣ding but it seems he understands; that Tenet in another sense than I do. For he speaketh as if they that held it did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every astion they do, great and small, to the least grain, which it a thing that he thinks with reason to be un∣true. But I understand it to signifie, that th•• will followes the last opinion or judgment immediatly proceding th•• action, concerning whether it be good to do it or not, whether he hath weighed it long before or not at all. And that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it. As for example, when a man strikes, his will to strike followes necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroke immediately before the liftin•• of his hand. N••w i•• it be under∣stood in that sense, the last dictate of the understanding does ••er∣tainly necessitate the action, though not as the whole cause, yet as

the last cause, as the last feather necessitates the breaking of an horses back, when there are so many laid on before, as there needeth but the addition o•• that one to make the weight sufficient. That which he alledgeth against this, is first, out of a Poet, who in the person of Medea sayes Video Meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor•• But the saying (as pr••try as it is) 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not true; for though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her Children, yet the last dictate of her judgment was, that the present revenge on her husband outweighed them all, and thereupon the wicked action followed necessarily. Then the story of the Roman, that of two competitors, said one had the better reasons, but the o•• her must have the office. This also maketh against him, for the last dictate of his judgment, that had the bestowing of the office was this, that it was better to take a great bribe, than reward a great merit. Third∣ly, he objects that things neerer the senses moove more powerfully than reason. What followeth thence but this, That the sense of the present good is commonly more immediate to the Action, than the foresight of the evill consequents to come? Fourthly▪ whereas he sayes, that do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his son, than for the sin of his soul; it makes nothing to the last dictate of the understanding, but it argues plainly, that sorrow for sin is not voluntary. And by consequence repentance proceedeth from causes.

J. D.

THE fourth pretense alledged against Liberty was, that the will doth necessarily follow the last dictate of the under∣standing, This objection is largely answered before in several places of this Reply, and particularly, Numb. 7. In my for∣mer discourse, I gave two answers to it: The one certain and undoubted, That (a) supposing the last dictate of the under∣standing did alwayes determine the will, yet this determination being not antecedent in time, nor proceeding from extrinsecal causes, but from the proper resolution of the Agent, who had now freely determined himself, it makes no absolute necessity, but onely hypothetical, upon supposion that the Agent hath determined his own will, after this or that manner. Which being the main answer, T. H. is so far from taking it away,

that he takes no notice of it. The other part of mine answer was probable; That it is not alwayes certain, that the will doth alwayes actually follow the last dictate of the understan∣ding, though it alwayes ought to follow it. (b) Of which I gave then three reasons, one was, that actions may be so equal∣ly circumstantiated, or the case so intricate, that reason can∣not give a positive sentence, but leaves the election to liberty or chance. To this he answers not a word. Another of my reasons was, because reason doth not weigh, nor is bound to weigh the convenience or inconvenience of every individual action to the uttermost grain in the balance of true judgement. The truth of this reason is confessed by T. H. though he might have had more abetters in this than in the most part of his dis∣course, that nothing is indifferent, that a man cannot stroak his beard on one side, but it was either necessary to do it, or sinful to omit it, from which confession of his▪ it follows, that in all those actions, wherein reason doth not define what is most convenient▪ there the will is free from the determina∣tion of the understanding, and by consequence the last fea∣ther is wanting to break the horses back. A third reason was, because passions and affections sometimes prevail against judg∣ment, as I prooved by the example of Medea and Caesar, by the neerness of the objects to the senses, and by the estimation of a temporal loss more than sin. Against this reason, his whole answer is addressed. And first, (c) he explaineth the sense of the assertion by the comparison of the last feather, wherewith he seems to be delighted, seeing he useth it now the second time. But let him like it as he will, it is improper, for three reasons; First, the determination of the judgment is no part of the weight, but is the sentence of the trier. The under∣standing weigheth all Things, Objects, Means, Circumstances, Convenience, Inconvenience, but it self is not weighed. Se∣condly, the sensitive passion in some extraordinary cases, may give a counterfeit weight to the object, if it can detein or divert reason from the ballance, but ordinarily the Means, Circum∣stances, and Causes concurrent they have their whole weight from the understanding. So as they do not press the horses back at all until reason lay them on. Thirdly, he conceives

that as each feather hath a certain natural weight, whereby it concurs not arbitrarily, but necessarily towards the over∣charging of the horse; So all objects and causes have a natu∣rall efficiency whereby they do Physically determin the will, which is a great mistake. His Objects, his Agents, his Motives, his Passions, and all his concurrent causes▪ ordinarily do one∣ly moove the will morally, not determine it naturally. So as it hath in all ordinary actions a free dominion over it self.

His other example of a man that strikes, whose will to strike followeth necessarily that thought he had of the sequell of this stroke immediately before the lifting up of his hand) as it confounds passionate, indeliberate thoughts, with the dictates of right reason, so it is very uncertain; for between the cup and the lip between the lifting up of the hand and the blow, the will may alter, and the judgment also. And lastly, it is im∣pertinent, for that necessity of striking proceeds from the free determination of the Agent, and not from the special influence of any outward determining causes. And so it is onely a ne∣cessity upon supposition.

Concerning Medeas choise, the strength of the argument doth not lye either in the fact of Medea, which is but a ficti∣on, or in the authority of the Poet, who writes things rather to be admired than believed, but in the experience of all men, who find it to be true in themselves, That sometimes reason doth shew unto a man the exorbitancy of his passion, that what he desires is but a pleasant good, that what he loseth by such a choise is an honest good, That that which is honest is to be preferred before that which is pleasant, yet the will pursues that which is pleasant, and neglects that which is honest. St. Paul saith as much in earnest as is feined of Medea, That he approoved not that which he did and that he did that which he hated, Rom. 7. 15. The Roman Story is mistaken; There was no bribe in the case but affection. Whereas I urge that those things, which are neerer to the senses do moove more power∣fully, he layes hold on it; and without answering to that for which I produced it, infers, That the sense of present good is more immediate to the action than the foresight of evil consequents. Which is true, but it is not absolutely true by any antecedent

necessity. Let a man do what he may do, and what he ought to do, and sensitive objects will lose that power which they have by his own fault, and neglect. Antecedent or indelibe∣rate concupiscence doth sometimes (but rarely) surprise a man, and render the action not free. But consequent and deliberated concupiscence, which proceeds from the rational will ••oth render the action more free, not less free, and intro∣duceth onely a necessity upon supposition.

Lastly, he saith, that a mans mourning more for the loss of his Child than for his sin, makes nothing to the last dictate of the un∣derstanding. Yes, very much. Reason dictates, that a sin committed, is a greater evil than the loss of a Child, and ought more to be lamented for, yet we see daily how affection pre∣vailes against the dictate of reason; That which he inferrs from hence, that sorrow for sin is not voluntary, and by conse∣quence that repentance proceedeth from causes, is true, as to the latter part of it, but not in his sense. The causes from whence repentance doth proceed are Gods grace preventing, and mans will concurring. God prevents freely, man concurs freely. Those inferiour Agents, which sometimes do concur as subor∣dinate to the grace of God, do not, cannot, determine the will naturally. And therefore the former part of his inference, that sorrow for sin is not voluntary, is untrue, and altogether groundless. That is much more truely, and much more pro∣perly said to be voluntary, which proceeds from judgment, and from the rational will, than that which proceeds from passion, and from the sensitive will. One of the main grounds of all T. H. his errours in this question is, that he acknowledgeth no efficacy, but that which is natural. Hence is this wild conse∣quence, Repentance hath causes, and therefore it is not volun∣tary. Free effects have free causes, necessary effects necessary causes, voluntary effects have sometimes free, sometimes ne∣cessary causes.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply. Numb. XXIII.

(a) [SUpposing the last dictate of the understanding did alwayes determine the Wil, yet this determination, being not antecedent in time, nor proceeding from extrinse∣call causes, but from the proper resolution of the Agent, who had now freely determined himself, makes no absolute necessi∣ty, but onely Hypothetical, &c.] This is the Bishops answer to the necessity inferred from that, that the Wil necessarily fol∣loweth the last dictate of the understanding; which answer he thinks is not sufficiently taken away, because the last act of the understan∣ding is in time together with the Wil it self, and therefore not an∣tecedent. It is true, that the Wil is not produced, but in the same Instant with the last dictate of the understanding; but the necessity of the Wil, and the necessity of the last dictate of the understanding may have been antecedent. For that last dictate of the understanding was produced by causes antecedent, and was then necessary though not yet produced; as when a stone is falling, the necessity of touching the earth is antecedent to the touch it self. For all motion through any determined space, necessarily makes a motion through the next space, unlesse it be hindered by some contrary external motion, and then the stop is as necessary, as the proceeding would have been. The Argument therefore from the last dictate of the understanding sufficiently inferreth an antecedent necessity, as great as the ne∣cessity that a stone shall fall when it is already falling. As for his other answer, that the Wil does not certainly follow the last dictate of the understandig though it alwayes ought to follow it, he himself says it is but probable; but any man that speaks not by rote, but thinks of what he says, will presently find it false; and that it is impossible to will any thing that appears not first in his understanding to be good for him. And whereas he says, the Wil ought to follow the last dictate of the understanding, unlesse he mean that the man ought to follow it, it is an insignificant speech (for duties are the mans not the Wils duties) and if he means so, then tis false; for a man ought not to follow the dictate of the un∣derstanding when it is erroneous.

(b) [Of which I gave then three reasons, one was, that actions may be so equally circumstantiated, that reason cannot give a positive sentence, but leaves the election to liberty or chance. To this he answers not a word.] There was no need of answer, for he hath very often in this discourse contradicted it him∣self, in that he maketh Reason to be the true root of liberty, and men to have more or lesse liberty as they have more or lesse Reason. How then can a man leave that to liberty when his Reason can give no sentence? And for his leaving it to chance, if by chance he mean that which hath no causes, he destroyeth Pro∣vidence, and if he mean that which hath causes, but unknown to us, he leaveth it to necessity. Besides, it is false that actions may be so equally circumstantiated, that Reason cannot give a po∣sitive sentence. For though in the things to be elected there may be an exact equality, yet there may be circumstances in him that is to elect, to make him resolve upon that of the two which he consi∣dereth for the present, and to break of all further deliberation for this cause, that he must not (to use his own instance) by spending time in vain apply neither of the plaisters, which the Chirurgion gives him, to his wound. Another of his reasons was, because Reason doth not weigh every individual action to the utter∣most grain. True; But does it therefore follow, a man gives no sentence? The Wil therefore may follow the dictate of the judg∣ment, whether the man weigh, or not weigh all that might be weighed. His third reason was, because Passions and Affections sometime prevail against Judgment. I consesse they prevail often against Wisdome, which is it he means here by Judgment. But they prevail not against the dictate of the understanding, which he knows is the meaning of Judgment in this place. And the Wil of a passionate and peevish fool, doth no lesse follow the dictate of that little understanding he hath, then the Wil of the wisest man followeth his wisedome.

(c) [He explaineth the sense of the assertion by the com∣parison of the last feather, wherewith he seems to be delighted, seeing he useth it now the second time. But let him like it as he Wil, it is improper, for three Reasons.] To me this compari∣son seemeth very proper, and therefore I made no scruple, (though not much delighted with it, as being no new comparison) to use it

again when there was need again. For in the examination of truth I search rather for perspicuity, then elegance. But the Bishop with his School terms is far from perspicuity. How neer he is to elegence, I shall not forget to examine in due time. But why is this comparison improper? First, because the determination of the Judgment is no part of the weight, for the understanding weigheth all things, Objects, Means, Circumstances, Conve∣nience, Inconvenience, but it self is not weighed. In this comparison, the Objects, Means, &c. are the weights, the man is the scale, the understanding of a Convenience, or Inconvenience, is the pressure of those weights, which incline him, now one way, now another, and that inclination is the Wil. Again the Ob∣jects, Means, &c. are the feathers that presse the Horse, the feeling of that pressure is understanding, and his patience or im∣patience, the Wil to bear them, if not too many, or if too many to lye down under them. Tis therefore to little purpose that he saith the understanding is not weighed. Secondly, he says the compari∣son is improper, because ordinarily the Means Circumstances, and Causes concurrent, have their whole weight from the un∣derstanding, so as they do not presse the Horses back at all, until Reason lay them on. This and that which followeth, that my Objects, Agents, Motives Passions, and all my concurrent Causes, ordinarily do onely move the Will morally, not deter∣mine it naturally, so as it hath in all ordinary actions a Free dominion over it self, is all non sense; for no man can understand that the understanding maketh any alteration in the Object in Weight or lightnesse; nor that Reason lays on Objects upon the understanding; nor that the Wil is moved, nor, that any motion is moral; nor that these Words the Wil hath a Free dominion over it self, signifie any thing. With the rest of this Reply I shall trust the Reader, and onely note the last Words, where he makes me say, Repentance hath causes and therefore it is not voluntary; but I said, repentance hath causes, and that it is not voluntary; he chops in, and therefore and makes an absurd consequence, which he would have the Reader believe was mine, and then c••n••utes it with these senselesse words▪ Free effects have Free causes necessary effects necessary causes, Voluntary effects have sometimes Free, sometimes necessary

causes. Can any man but a Schoolman think the Wil is vo∣luntary? But yet the Wil is the cause of voluntary actions.

J. D.

FIftly, and lastly, the Divine labours to find out a way how* 1.41 liberty may consist with the prescience and decrees of God. But of this I had not very long since occasion to write a full discourse, in answer to a Treatise against the prescience of things contingent. I shall for the present only repeat these two things. First, we ought not to desert a certain truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner. God should be but a poor God, if we were able perfectly to com∣prehend all his Actions and Attributes.

Secondly, in my poor judgment, which I ever do and ever shall submit to better, the readiest way to reconcile Contin∣gence and Liberty, with the decrees and prescience of God, and most remote from the altercations of these times, is to subject future contingents to the aspect of God, according to that presentiality which they have in eternity. Not that things future, which are not yet existent are co-existent with God, but because the infinite knowledge of God, incircling all times in the point of eternity, doth attain to their future Being, from whence proceeds their objective and intelligible Being. The main impediment which keeps men from subscribing to this way is, because they conceive eternity to be an everlasting suc∣cession, and not one indivisible point. But if they consider, that whatsoever is in God is God; That there are no accidents in him, for that which is infinitely perfect cannot be further perfected; That as God is not wise but Wisedom it self, not just but Justice it self, so he is not eternal but Eternity it self; They must needs conclude that therefore this eternity is indi∣visible, because God is indivisible, and therefore not suc∣cessive, but altogether an infinite point, comprehending all times within it self.

T. H.

THE last part of this discourse conteineth his opinion about reconciling Liberty with the Prescience, and Decrees of God, otherwise than some Divines have done, against whom he had for∣merly

written a Treatise, out of which he only repeateth two things. One is, that we ought not to desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend the certain manner of it. And I say the same, as for example, that he ought not to desert this certain truth; That there are certain and necessar•• causes, w••i••h make ev••ry man to will what he will••th, though he do not yet conceive in what manner the will of man is caus••d. And yet I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive, seeing that we see daily, that praise, dispraise, reward, punishment, good and evil sequels of m••ns actio••s ••••tained in memory ••o frame and make us to the election of whatsoever it be that we el••ct. And ••••a•• the memory of such things proceeds from the senses, and sense from the operation of the objects of sense, which are external to us, and governed onely by God Almighty. And by consequence, all actions, even of free and vo∣luntary Agents ••re necessary.

The other thing he repeateth is, that the best way to reconcile Contingency and Liberty with the prescience and Decrees of God, is to subject future contingents to the aspect of God. The same is also my opinion, but cont••ary to what he hath all this while labou∣red to prove. For, ••itherto he held liberty and necessity, that is to say, libert•• and the decrees of God irreconcilable, unless the aspect of God which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signifie somewhat else besides Gods will and decree, which I cannot understand. Bu•• he adds, that we must subject them according to that presentiality which they have in eternity, which he says can∣not be done by them that conceive eternity to be an everlasting suc∣cession, but onely by them that conceive it an indivisible poi••t. To this I answer, that as soon as I can conceive Eternity to be an indi∣visible point, or any thing, but an everl••sting succession, I wil•• re∣nounce all I have written in this subject. I know St. Thomas Aquinas calls eternity Nunc stans, an ever abid••ng now which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, I never could conceive it. They that can, are more hap••y than I. But in the mean time he alloweth hereby all men to be of my opinion, save onely those that conceive in their minds a nunc stans, which I think are none▪ I und••rstand as little how it can be true that God is not just, but Justice it self, not wise but Wisedom it self, not eternal but Eter∣nity it self. Nor how he concludes thence, that Eternity is a point

indivisible, and not a succession. Nor in what sense it can be said, that an infinite point, &c. wherein is no succession, can comprehend all times, though time be su••cessive.

These phrases I find not in the Scripture. I wonder therefore, what was the d••sign of the School-men, to bring them up, unless they th••ught a man could not be a true Christian, unless his understan∣standing be first strangled with such hard sayings.

And thus much in answer to his discourse, wherein I think not onely his squadrons, but also his reserves of distinctions are de∣feated. And now your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the s••me question, with my reasons for i••, positively and briefly as I can, without any tearms of Art in plain English.

J. D.

(a) THat poor discourse which I mention, was not written against any Divines, but in way of examination of a French Treatise, which your Lordships Brother did me the honour to shew me at York; (b) My assertion is must true, that we ought not to desert a certain truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner. Such a truth is that which I maintain, that the will of man in ordinary actions is free from extrinsecal determination. A truth demonstrable in reason, received and believed by all the world. And there∣fore though I be not able to comprehend or express exactly the certain manner how it consists together with Gods Eter∣nall Prescience, and Decrees, which exceed my weak capacity, yet I ought to adhere to that truth, which is manifest. But T. H. his opinion of the absolute necessity of all events, by reason of their antecedent determination in their extrinsecal and necessary causes, is no such certain Truth, but an innova∣tion, a strange paradox, without probable grounds, rejected by all Authours, yea, by all the world. Neither, is the man∣ner how the second causes do operate so oscure, or so transcen∣dent above the reach of reason, as the Eternal Decrees of God are. And therefore in both these respects he cannot challenge ••••e same priviledge. I am in possession of an old truth derived by inheritance or succession from mine ancestors. And there∣fore, though I were not able to clear every quirk in Law, yet

I might justly hold my possession until a better title were shewed for another. He is no old Possessor, but a new Pre∣tender, and is bound to make good his claime by evident proofs, not by weak and inconsequent suppositions, or induce∣ments, such as those are which he useth here, of praises, disprai∣ses, rewards, punishments, the memory of good and evil sequels, and events, which may incline the will, but neither can nor do necessitate the will. Nor by uncertain and accidental inferen∣ces such as this, The memory of praises, dispraises, rewards, punish∣ments, good and evil sequels do make us (he should say dispose us) to elect what we elect; but the memory of these things is from the sense, and the sense from the o••••ration of the external ob••ects, and the Agency of external obj••cts 〈…〉〈…〉 from God therefore all actions, even of free and vol••nt••ry Agents, are nec••ss••ry. (c) To pass by all the other great imperfections, which are to be sound in this Sorite. It is just like that old Sophistical piece: He that drinks well sleeps well, ••e that sleeps well thinks no hurt, he that thinks no hurt lives 〈…〉〈…〉, therefore he that drinks well lives well.

(d) In the very last passage of my discourse, I proposed mine own private opinion, how it might be made appear, that the Eternal Prescience and Decrees of God are consistent with true liberty and contingency. And this I set down, in as plain terms as I could, or as so profound a speculation would permit, which is almost wholly misunderstood by T. H. and many of my words wrested to a wrong sense. As first, where I speak of the aspect of God, that is his view, his knowledge, by which the most free and contingent actions were manifest to him from eternity, Heb. 4. 11. All things are naked and open to his eyes, and this not discursively, but intuitively, not by external species, but by his internal Essence; He confounds this with the Wil, and the Decrees of God: Though he found not the word Aspect before in this discourse, he might have found prescience. (e) Secondly, he chargeth me that hither to I have maintained, that Liberty and the Decrees of God, are irre∣cilable. If I have said any such thing, my heart never went along with my pen. No, but his reason why he chargeth me on this manner, is because I have maintained, that Liberty and

the absolute necessity of all things are irreconciliable. That is true indeed. What then? W••y (saith he) Necessity and Gods Decrees are all one. How all one? that were strange indeed. Necessity may be a consequent of Gods Decrees, it cannot be the Decree it self. (f) But to cut his argument short. God hath decreed all effects which come to pass in time, yet not all after the same manner, but according to the distinct natures, capacities and conditions of his creatures, which he doth not destroy by his Decree; Some he acteth, with some he coopera∣teth by special influence, and some he onely permitteth Yet this is no idle or bare permission, seeing he doth concur both by way of general influence, giving power to act, and also by disposing all events necessary, free, and contingent to his own glory. (g) Thirdly, he chargeth me, that I allow all men to be of his opinion, save onely those that conceive in their minds a Nunc stans, or how eternity is an indivisible point, rather than an everlasting succession. But I have given no such allowance. I know, there are many other wayes proposed by Divines, for reconciling the Eternal Prescience, and Decrees of God, with the Liberty and Contingency of second causes, some of which may please other judgments better than this of mine. How∣soever, though a man could comprehend none of all these wayes, yet remember what I said, that a certain truth ought not to be rejected, because we are not able, in respect of our weakness, to understand the certain manner, or reason of it. I know, the Load-stone hath an attractive power to draw the Iron to it; And yet I know not how it comes to have such a power.

But the chiefest difficulty which offers it self in this Section is, whether Eternity be an indivisible point (as I maintain it) or an everlasting succession, as he would have it. According to his constant use, he gives no answer to what was urged by me, but pleads against it from his own incapacity. I never could conc••ive, saith he, how eternity should be an indivisible point. I believe, that neither we nor any man else can comprehend it so cleerly, as we do these inferiour things. The neerer that any thing comes to the essence of God, the more remote it is from our apprehension. But shall we therefore make potentia••ities,

and successive duration, and former and later, or a part with∣out a part (as they say) to be in God? Because we are not able to understand cleerly the Divine perfection, we must not there∣fore attribute any imperfection to him.

(h) He saith moreover, that he understands as little how it can be true which I say, that God is not just but Justice it self, not eternal but Eternity it self. It seems howsoever he be versed in this question, that he hath not troubled his head overmuch with reading School-Divines, or Metaphysicians, if he make faculties or qualities to be in God, really distinct from his essence. God is a most simple or pure act, which can admit no composition of substance and accidents. Doth he think that the most perfect Essence of God cannot act sufficiently without faculties and qualities? The infinite perfection of the Divine essence, excludes all passive or receptive powers, and cannot be perfected more than it is by any accidents. The attri∣butes of God, are not divers vertues, or qualities in him, as they are in the creatures, but really one and the same with the Di∣vine Essence, and among themselves. They are attributed to God to supply the defect of our capacity, who are not able to understand that which is to be known of God, under one name, or one act of the understanding.

Furthermore he saith, that he understands not how I conclude from hence, that Eternity is an indivisible point, and not a suc∣cession. (i) I will help him. The Divine Substance is indivi∣sible; But Eternity is the Divine Substance. The Major is evident, because God is actus simplicissimus, a most simple act, wherein there is no manner of composition, neither of matter and form, nor of subject and accidents, nor of parts, &c. and by consequence no divisibility. The minor hath been cleerly demonstrated in mine answer to his last doubt, and is confessed by all men, that whatsoever is in God, is God.

Lastly he saith. He conceives not how it can be said, that an infinite point, wherein is no succession, can comprehend all time which is successive. I answer, that it doth not comprehend it formally as time is successive, but eminently and virtually, as Eternity is infinite. To day all Eternity is coexistent with this day. To morrow all Eternity will be coexistent with to mor∣row,

and so in like manner with all the parts of time, being it self without parts. He saith, He finds not these phrases in the Scripture. No, but he may find the thing in the Scripture, that God is infinite in all his attributes, and not capable of any imperfection.

And so to shew his antipathy against the School-men, that he hath no liberty or power to contain himself, when he meets with any of their phrases or tenets, he falls into another pa∣roxisme or fit of inveighing against them; And so concludes his answer with a plaudite to himself, because he had de∣feated both my squadrons of arguments, and reserves of di∣stinctions,

Dicitè Io Paean, & Io bis dicite Paean.

But because his eye-sight was weak, and theit backs were towards him, he quite mistook the matter. Those whom he saw routed and running away were his own scattered forces.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Reply, Numb. XXIV.

(a) [THat poor discourse which I mention, was not written against any Divines, but in way of examination of a French Treatise, &c. This is in Reply to those words of mine, this discourse containeth his opinion about reconciling Liberty with the Prescience, and Decrees of God, otherwise then some Divines have done, against whom he had formerly written a Treatise.] If the French Treatise were according to his mind, what need was there that the examination should be written? If it were not to his mind, it was in confutation of him, that is to say, written against the Author of it, unlesse perhaps the Bishop thinks that he writes not against a man, unlesse he charge him with blasphemy and Atheism, as he does me.

(b) [My assertion is most true that we ought not to desert a certain truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner.] To this I answered that it was true, and, as he alledged it for a reason why he should not be of my opinion, so I

alledged it for a reason why I should not be of his, but now in his Reply, he saith that his opinion is a truth demonstrable in rea∣son, received and believed by all the World. And therefore though he be not able to comprehend or expresse exactly the certain manner, how this Liberty of Wil consists with Gods eternal Prescience, and Decrees, yet he ought to adhere to that truth, which is manifest. But why should he adhere to it, unlesse it be manifest to himself? And if it be manifest to him∣self, why does he deny that he is able to comprehend it? And if he be not able to comprehend it, how knows he that it is domonstrable? Or why says he that so confidently, which he does not know? Me thinks that which I have said, (namely, that that which God foreknows shall be hereafter, cannot but be hereafter, and at the same time that he foreknew it should be. But that which cannot but be, is necessary. Therefore what God foreknows shall be necessarily, and at the time foreknown.) This I say looketh somewhat liker to a demonstration than any thing that he hath hitherto brought to prove Free Wil. Another reason, why I should be of his opinion, is that he is in possession of an old truth derived to him by inheritance or succession from his Ance∣stors. To which I answer, first, that I am in possession of a truth derived to me from the light of reason. Secondly, that whereas he knoweth not, whether it be the truth that he possesseth or not, be∣cause he confesseth he knows not how it can consist with Gods Pres∣cience and Decrees, I have sufficiently shewn that my opinion of ne∣cessity not onely agrees with, but necessirily followeth from the eternal Prescience and Decrees of God. Besides it is an unhan∣some thing for a man to derive his opinion concerning truth by suc∣cession from his Ancestors; For our Ancestors, the first Christians derived not therefore their truth from the Gentils because they were their Ancestors.

(c) [To passe by all the other great imperfections, which are to be found in this Sorite, it is just like that old Sophistical piece: he that drinks well sleeps well; he that sleeps well thinks no hurt; he that thinks no hurt lives well; therefore he that drinks well, lives well. My argument was thus, Electi∣on is alwayes from the Memory of good and evil sequels; Me∣mory is alway from the Sense; and Sense alwayes from the

Action of external bodys; and all Action from God; there∣fore all Actions even of Free and Voluntary Agents are from God, and consequently necessary. Let the Bishop compare now his scurrilous Argumentation with this of mine, and tell me, whe∣ther he that sleeps well, doth all his life time think no hurt.

(d) [In the very last passage of my discourse, I proposed my own private opinion, how it might be made appear, that the eternal Prescience and Decrees of God are consistent with true liberty and contingency, &c.] If he had meant by Liberty, as other men do the Liberty of Action, that is, of things which are in his power, to doe which he will, it had been an easie matter to recon∣cile it with the Prescience and Decrees of God; But meaning the Liberty of Wil, it was impossible. So likewise if by contingency he had meant simply comming to passe, it had been reconcilable with the Decrees of God; but meaning comming to passe with∣out necessity, it was impossible. And therefore, though it be true he says, that he set it down in as plain terms as he could, yet it was impossible to set it down in plain terms. Nor ••ought he to charge me with misunderstanding him, and wresting his words to a wrong sense. For the truth is, I did not understand them at all, nor thought he understood them himself; but was willing to give them the best imterpretation they would bear; which he calls wresting them to a wrong sense. And first, I understood not what he meant by the Aspect of God. For if he had meant his foreknow∣ledge, (which word he had often used before) what needed he in this one place onely to call it Aspect? Or what need he here call it his View? Or say that all things are open to the eyes of God, not discursively, but intuitively, which is to expound Eyes in that Text, Hebr. 4. 11. not figuratively but littera••ly, neverth••l••sse excluding external Species, which the School-men say are the cause of seeing. But it wat well done to exclude such insignifi∣cant speeches, upon every occasion whatsoever. And though I do not hold the foreknowledge of God to consist in Discourse, yet I shall be never driven to say it is by Intuition, as long as I know that even a man hath foreknowledge of all those things which he inten∣deth himself to do, not by discourse but by knowing his own purpose, saving that man hath a superiour power over him that can change his purpose, which God hath not. And whereas he says, I confound

this Aspect with the Wil and Decrees of God••, ••he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 wrongifully. For how could I so confound it, when I understood not what it meant?

(e) [Secondly, he chargeth me▪ that hitherto I have main∣tained, that Liberty and the Decrees of God are ••rreconcileable; and the reason why I do so is because he maintained▪ that Liberty, and the absolute necessity of all things, are ••rreconcileable.] If Liberty cannot stand with necessity, it cannot stand with the Decrees of God; of which Decrees, necessity is a Consequent; I needed not to say, nor did say, that Necessity and Gods Decrees are all one, though if I had said it, it had not been without Autho∣rity of learned men, in whose writings are often found this sen∣tence, Voluntas Dei, Necessitas rerum.

(f) [But to cut his Argument short. God hath Decreed all effects which come to passe in time, yet not all after the same manner, but according to the distinct natures, capacities and conditions of his creatures, which he doth not destroy by his Decree; Some he acteth. Hitherto true; then he addeth, with some he cooperateth by special influence, and some he onely permitteth. Yet this is no idle or bare permission.] This is false. For nothing operateth by its own original power, but God himself: Man operateth not but by special power, (I say special power not special influence) derived from God. Nor is it by Gods permission onely as I have often already shown, and as the Bishop here contradicting his former words confesseth; for to permit one∣ly, and barely to permit, signifie the same thing; And that which he says that God concurs by way of general influence, is Jargon. For every concurrence is one singular and individual concurrence; and nothing in the World is general; but the signification of words and other signs.

(g) [Thirdly, he chargeth me, that I allow all men to be of his opinion▪ save onely those that conceive in their minds a Nunc stans▪ or how eternity is an indivisible point, rather then an ever∣lasting succession. But I have given no such allowance.] Surely if the reason, wherefore my opinion is false, proceed from this, that I conceive not eternity to be Nunc stans, but an everlasting successi∣on, I am allowed to hold my opinion till I can conceive eternity otherwise; at least he allows men not till then to be of his opinion;

for the hath said, that the main impediment which keeps men from subscribing to that way of his, is because they conceive eternity, to be an everlasting succession, and not one indivisi∣ble point. As for the many other wayes which he says are pro∣posed by Divines for reconciling the eternal Prescience and Decrees of God with the Liberty and Contingency of second causes▪ if they mean such Liberty and Contingency as the Bishop meaneth, they are proposed in vain; for Truth and Errour can n••ver be r••conciled. But however, (saith he) though a man could comprehend none of all these wayes, yet we must re∣member, that a certain Truth ought not to be rejected, because we are not able to understand the reason of it. For he knows (••e says▪ the load-stone hath an attractive power to draw the Iron to it, and yet he knoweth not how it cometh to have such a power. I know the load-stone hath no such attractive power; and yet I know that the Iron cometh to it, or it to the Iron; and therefore wonder not that the Bishop knoweth not how it cometh to have that power. In the next place he sayeth I bring nothing to prove that Eternity is not an indivisible point, but my own inca∣pacity that I cannot conceive it. The truth is, I cannot dispute neither for, nor against (as he can do) the positions I understand not. Nor do I understand what der••gation it can be to the Divine perfection, to attribute to it Potentiality, that is (in English) Power, and successive Duration; for such Attributes are often given to it in the Scripture.

(h) [He saith moreover, that he understands as little how it can be true which I say, that God is not Just, but Justice it self, nor Eternal, but Eternity it self It seems howsoever he be versed in this question, that he hath not troubled his head over much wi••h reading School-Divines, or Metaphysicians.] They are unseemly word to be said of God, (I will not say) blasp••emous and ath••istic••l▪ which are the attributes he gives to my opinions because I do not think them spoken out of an evil mind, but out of Errour, they are I say unseemly words to be said of God, that he is not just, that he is not Eternal, and (as he also said) that he is not Wise, and cannot be excused by any following But, especially when the But is followed by that which is n••t to be understood. Can any man understand ••ow Justice is just, or Wisdome Wise? and whereas

Justice is an Accident, one of the Moral vertues, and Wisdome another, how God is an Accident or Moral vertue? Tis more then the School-men or Metaphysicians can understand; whose writings have troubled my head more then they should have done, if I had known that amongst so many senselesse disput••s, there had been so f••w lucide internall••. But I have considered since, where men will undertake to reason out of natural Philosophy, of the In∣comprehensible Nature of God, that it is impossible they should sp••ak intelligibly, or in other Language then Metaphysique; wherein they may contradict themselves▪ and n••t perceave it; as he does here, when he says, the Attributes of God are not di∣ver••e Vertues or Qualities in him, as they are in the Creatures, but really one and the same with the Divine Essence, and amongst themselves, and attributed to God to supply the de∣fect of our capacity. Attributes are na••••s and therefore it is a contradiction, ••o say they are really one and the same with the Divine Essence. But if he mean ••h•• Ve••tues signified by the At∣tributes, as Justice, Wisedome, Eternity, Divinity, &c. So also they are Vertues, and not n•• Vertue, (which is still a contra∣diction,) and we give those Attributes to God, not to shew that we apprehend how they are in him, but to signifie how we think it best to honour him.

(i) [In the next place he will help me to understand (he says) how Eternity is an indivisible point. The Divine substance is in∣divisible; But Eternity is the Divine substance. The Major is evident▪ because God is actus simplicissimus; The Minor hath been clearly demonstrated in my answer to his last doubt; and is confessed by all men, that whatsoever is attri∣buted to God is God.] The Major is so far from being evident, that actus simplicissimus signi••••eth nothing. The Minor, is said by some men, thought by no man; for whatsoever is thought, is understood; And all that he hath else where and here dilated upon it, is as perfect non-sense, as any man ever writ on purpose to make merry with. And so is that whereby he answers to my ob∣jection▪ that a point cannot comprehend all time, which is successive; Namely, his distinction. That a point doth not comprehend, all Time forma••••y▪ as Time is successive; but eminently and Vir∣tually, as Eternity is infinite. And this, To day all Eternity

is coexistent with this day, and to morrow all Eternity will be coexistent with to morrow. It is well that his Eternity is now come from a Nunc stans to be a Nunc fluens▪ flowing from this day to the next, and so on. This kind of Language is never found in the Scripture; No, but the thing (saith he) is found there; Name∣ly, that God is infinite in all his Attributes. I would he could shew me the place where God is said to be infinite in all his Attri∣butes. There be places enough to shew that God is infinite in Power▪ in Wisdome, Mercy, &c. but neither is he said to be infinite in Names, (which is the English of Attributes) nor th••t he is an indivisible Point, nor that a Point doth comprehend Time eminent∣ly, and Vertually; Nor that to day all Eternity, is coexistent which to day, &c. And thus much in answer to his Reply upon my an∣swer. That which remaineth, is my Reply upon his answer to my positive Doctrine on this subject.

T. H.

My▪ opinion about Liberty and Necessity.

FIrst, I conceive that when it cometh into a mans mind, to do or* 1.42 not to do some certain action, if he have▪ no time to deliberat▪ the doing or abstaining necessarily followeth the present thought he had of the good or evil consequence thereof to himself. As for example, in suddain anger the action shall follow the though•• of revenge, in suddain fear the thought of escape. Also when a man hath time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never any thing appeared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action followes his opinion of the goodness or harm of it. Thes•• actions I call voluntary. He, if I understand him aright, call•• them Spontaneous, I call them voluntary, because those actions that follow immediately the last appetite are voluntary. And here where there is one onely appetite, that one is the last.

Besides, I see tis reasonable to punish a rash action; which could not be justly done by man, unless the same w••re voluntary: For no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so suddain, because tis supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a suddain passion

of anger, shall nevertheless be justly pu•• to death, because all t•••• time wherein he was able to consider, whether to kill were good or evill, shall be held for one continual deliberation, and consequently▪ the killing shall be judged to proceed from election.

J. D.

THis part of T. H. his discourse hangs together like a sick∣mans dreams. (a) Even now he tells us, that a man may▪ have time to deliberate, yet not deliberate; By and by he saith, that no action of a man, though never so suddain, can be said to be▪ without deliberation. He tells us Numb. 33. that the scope of this section is to shew what is spontaneous: Howbeit he sheweth onely what is voluntary; (b) So making voluntary and spon∣taneous to be all one, whereas before he had told us, that every spontaneous action is not voluntary, because indeliberate. Nor every voluntary action spontaneous, if it proceed from fear▪ (c) Now he tells us, that those actions, which follow the last ap∣petite, are voluntary, and where there is one onely appetite, that is the last. But before he told us, that voluntary presuppa∣seth some precedent deliberation and Meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the doing and abstaining from the action▪ (d) He defines Liberty, Numb. 29. to be the absence of all extrinsecal impediments to action. And yet in his whole dis∣course he laboureth to make good, that whatsoever is not done, is therefore not done, because the Agent was necessita∣ted by extrinsecal causes not to do it. Are not extrinsecal causes, which determine him not to do it, extrinsecal impedi∣ments to action? So no man shall be free to do any thing, but that which he doth actually. He defines a free Agent to be him, who hath not made an end of deliberating, Numb. 28. And yet defines liberty to be an absence of outward impediments. There may be outward impediments, even whilst he is delibe∣rating. As a man deliberates whether he shall play at Tennis, and at the same time the door of the Tennis-court is fast locked against him. And after a man hath ceased to deliberate, there may be no outward impediments, as when a man resolves not to play at Tennis, because he finds himself ill disposed, or be∣cause he will not hazard his mony. So the same person, at

the same time, should be free & not free, not free and free. And as he is not firm to his own grounds, so he confounds al things, the mind and the will, the estimative faculty and the understan∣ding imagination with deliberation, th•• end with the means, hu∣mane ••il with the sensitive appetite, rational hope or fear, with ir∣rational possions inclinations with intentions, A beginning of Being with a beginning of working, Sufficiency with efficiency. So as the greatest difficulty is to find out what he aimes at. So as I had once resolved not to answer this part of his discourse, yet upon better advise, I will take •• brief survey of it also; and shew how far I assent unto, or dissent from that which I con∣ceive to be his meaning.

And first, concerning suddain passions, as Anger or the like; (e) That which he saith, that the action doth necessarily follow the thought, is thus far true that those actions, which are alto∣gether undeliberated and do proceed from suddain and violent passions, or motus primo primi, which surprise a man, and give him no time to advise with reason, are not properly and actual∣ly in themselves free, but rather necessary actions, as when a man runs away from a Cat or a Custard, out of a secret antipathy.

(f) Secondly, as for those actions wherein actual delibera∣ti••n seems not necessary, because never any thing appeared that could make a man doubt of the consequence. I do confess, that actions done by vertue of a precedent deliberation, without any actual deliberation in the present, when the act is done, may notwithstanding be truly, both voluntary and free acts, yea, in some cases, and in some sense more free, than if they were actually deliberated of in present. As one who hath ac∣quired by ••ormer deliberation and experience, an habit to play upon the Virginals, needs not deliberate what man, or what Jack he must touch, nor what finger of his hand he must move to play such a lesson; Yea, if his mind should be fixed, or in∣tent to every motion of his hand, or every touch of a string, it would hinder his play, and render the action more trouble∣some to him. Wherefore I believe, that not onely his playing in general, but every motion of his hand, though it be not pre∣sently deliberated of, is a free act, by reason of his precedent deli∣beration.

So then (saving improprieties of speech, as calling that voluntary which is free, and limiting the will to the last ap∣petite, and other mistakes, as that no act can be said to be without deliberation) we agree also for the greater part in this second observation.

(g) Thirdly, whereas he saith, that some suddain acts proceeding from violent passions, which surprise a man, are justly punished, I grant they are so sometimes, but not for his reason, because they have been formerly actually deliberated of, but because they were virtually deliberated of, or because it is our faults, that they were not actually deliberated of, whether it was a fault of pure negation that is, of not doing our duty onely, or a fault of bad disposition also, by reason of some vitious habit, which we had contracted by our former actions. To do a necessary act is never a fault, nor justly punishable, when the necessity is inevitably imposed upon us by extrinsecal causes. As if a Child before he had the use of reason shall kill a man in his passion, yet because he wanted malice to incite him to it, and reason to restrain him from it, he shall not dye for it in the strict rules of particular Justice, unless there be some mixture of publick Justice in the case.

(h) But if the necessity be contracted by our selves, and by our own faults, it is justly punishable. As he who by his wan∣ton thoughts in the day-time, doth procure his own nocturnal pollution. A man cannot deliberate in his sleep, yet it is ac∣counted a sinful act, and consequently, a free act, that is not actually free in its self, but virtually free in its causes, and though it be not expresly willed and chosen, yet it is tacitely and implicitely willed and chosen, when that is willed and chosen from whence it was necessarily produced. By the Levi∣tical Law, if a man digged a pit, and left it uncovered, so that his neighbours Oxe, or his Asse, did fall into it, he was bound to make reparation, not because he did chose to leave it unco∣vered on purpose that such a mischance might happen, but be∣cause he did freely omit, that which he ought to have done, from whence this dammage proceeded to his neighbour. Last∣ly, there is great difference between the first motions, which sometimes are not in our power, and subsequent acts of killing

or stealing, or the li••••, which alwayes are in our power, if we have the use of r••••so••, or else it is our own fault, that they are not in our power. Yet to such hasty acts done in hot blood, the Law is not so severe, as to those which are done upon long deliberation, and prepensed malice, unless (as I said) there be some mixture of publick Justice in it. He that steals an Horse deliberately may be more punishable by the Law, than he that kills the owner by Chance-medley. Yet the death of the owner was more no••ious (to use his phrase) and more dammageable to the family, than the stealth of the Horse. So far was T. H. mistaken in that also, that the right to kill men, doth proceed meerly from their being noxious, Numb. 14.

Animadversions upon the Bishops Answer to my opinion about Liberty and Necessity. Numb. XXV.

(a) [EVen now he tells us, that a man may have time to deliberate, yet not deliberate. By and by he saith, that no action of a man, though never so sudden, can be said to be without deliberation.] He thinks he hath here oatcht me in a con∣tradiction. But he is mistaken; and the cause is, that he observed not that there may be a difference between deliberation, and that which shall be constr••ed for deliberation by a Judge. For a man may do •• rush ast suddenly without deliberation; yet because he ought to have deliberated, and had time enough to deliberate whe∣ther the action were Lawful or not, it shall not be said by the Judge that it was without deliberation, who supposeth that after the Law known, all the time following was time of deliberation. It is there∣fore ••o contradiction to say a man deliberates not, and that he shall be said to deliberate, by him that is the Judge of vol••ntary actions.

(b) [Again, where he says, he maketh Voluntary and

Spontaneous to be alone, wher as before he had told us that eve∣ry Spontaneous Action is not Voluntary, because indeliberate, Nor every Voluntary Action Spontaneous, if it proceed from fear.] He thinks he hath espied another contradiction. It is no wonder if speaking of Spontaneous which signifieth nothing else in Latin (for English it is not) but that which is done deliberately or indeliberately without compulsion, I seem to the Bish••p who hath never given any definition of that word, not to use it as he would have me. And tis easy for him to give it any signification he please as the occasion shall serve, to charge me with contradiction. In what sense I have used that word once, in the same I have used it alwayes, calling that Spontaneous which is without co-action▪ or compulsion by tenrour.

(c) [Now he tells us, that those actions which follow the last Appetite are Voluntary, and where there is on•• onely Appetite that's the last. But before he told ••s, that Voluntary presuppo∣seth some precedent deliberation and meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the doing, and abstaining from the Action.] This is a third contradiction he supposeth he hath found; but is again mistaken. For when men are to judge of actions, whether they be Voluntary or not, they cannot call that action Voluntary, which followed not the last Appetite. But the same men, though there were no deliberation shall judge there was, because it ought to have been, and that from the time that the Law was known to the time of the action it self. And therefore both are true, that Volun∣tary may be without, and yet presupposed in the Law, not to be without deliberation.

(d) [He defines Liberty, Numb. 29. to be the absence of all extrinsical impediments to action. And yet in his whole discourse, he laboureth to make good, that whatsoever is not done, is therefore not done, because the Agent was necessita∣ted by extrinsecal causes, not to do it. Are not extrinsecal causes which determine him not to do it, extrinsecal impedi∣ments to Action?] This definition of Liberty, that it is the ab∣sence of all extrinsecal impediments to action, he thinkes he hath sufficiently confuted by asking whether the extrinsecal causes which determine a man not to do an action, be not extrinsecal im∣pediments to action. It seems by his question he makes no doubt

but they are; but is deceived by a too shallow consideration, of what the word Impediment signi••eth. For Impediment or hinde∣rance signifieth an opposition to endeavour. And therefore if a man be necessitated by extrinsecal causes not to endeavour an acti∣on, those causes do ••ot oppose his endeavour to do it, because he has no such endeavour to be opposed; and consequently extrinsecal causes that take away endeavour, are not to be called impedi∣ments; nor can any man be said to be hundred from doing that which he had no purpose at all to do. So that this objection of his proceedeth onely from this, that he understandeth not sufficiently, the English Tongue. From the same proceedeth also, that he thinketh it a contradiction, to call a Free Agent him that hath not yet made an end of deliberating, and to call liberty an absence of outward impediments. For (saith he) there may be out∣ward impediments, even while he is deliberating. Wherein he is deceived. For though he may deliberate of that which is im∣possible for him to do, as in the example he alledgeth of him that de∣liberateth, whether he shall play at Tennis, not knowing that the door of the Tennis-Court in shut against him; yet it is no impedi∣ment to him that the door is shut, till he have a will to play, which he hath not till he hath done deliberating whether he shall play or not. That which followeth of my confounding mind and will; the estimative faculty, and the understanding; the imagination and deliberation; the end and the means; the humane will and the sensitive appetite; rational hope or fear, and irrational passi∣ons; inclinations and intentions, a beginning of being, and a beginning of working; sufficiency and efficiency, I do not find in any thing that I have written, any impropriety in the use of these or any other English words; nor do I doubt but an English Reader, who hath not lost himself in School Divinity, will very easily conceive what I have said But this I am sure, that I never confounded beginning of being, with beginning of wor∣king, nor sufficiency with efficiency, nor ever used these words Sensitive Appetite, Rational hope, or Rational fear, or Irratio∣nall Passions. It is therefore impossible I should confound them. But the Bishop is either mistaken, or else he makes no scruple to say that which he knows to be false, when he thinks it will serve his turne.

(e) [That which he saith, that the action doth necessarily follow the thought, is thus far true, that those actions which are altogether undeliberated, and do proceed from violent passi∣ons, &c. are not properly, and actually in themselves free, but rather necessary actions; as when a man runs away from a Cat or a custard] Thus far he says is true. But when he calls sudden passions motus primo primi, I cannot tell whether he says true or not, because I do not understand him, nor find how he makes his meaning ever the clearer by his example of a Cat and a Cu∣stard; because I know not what he means by a secret Antipathie. For what that Antipathy is he explaineth not by calling it secret, but rather confesseth he knows not how to explain it. And because he saith it is thus far true, I expect he should tell me also how far it is false.

(f) [Secondly, as for those actions, wherein actual delibe∣ration seems not necessary, because never any thing appeared that could make a man doubt of the consequence, I do confesse, that Actions done by vertue of a precedent deliberation, with∣out any actual deliberation for the present, may notwithstan∣ding be truely, voluntary and free Acts.] In this he agrees with me. But where he adds, yea, in some cases, and in some sense more free, then if they were actually deliberated of in present, I do not agree with him. And for the instance he bringeth to prove it, in the man that playeth on an i••strument with his hand it maketh nothing for him; for it proveth onely that the Ha∣bit maketh the motion of his hand, more ready and quick; but it proveth not that it maketh it more voluntary, but rather lesse, be∣cause the rest of the motions follow the first, by an easinesse acquired from long custome; in which motion the Wil doth not accompany all the strokes of the hand, but gives a beginning to them onely in the first. Here is nothing as I expected of how far that which I had said, namely, that the action doth necessarily follow the thought, is false, unlesse it be improprieties of speech, as calling that volun∣tary which is free, and limitting the will to the last appetite; and other mistakes, as, that no act can be said to be without deliberation. For improprieties of speech, I will not contend w••th one, that can use motus primo primi, practice practicum, actus elicitus, and many other phrases of the same kind. But so say that

Free actions are voluntary; and that the Wil, which oauseth a voluntary action is the last appetite, and that that appetite, was immediately followed by the action; and that no action of a man can be said in the judgement of the Law, to be without delibera∣tion, are no mistakes for any thing that he hath proved to the con∣trary.

(g) [Thirdly, whereas he saith, that some sudden acts; pro••••e∣ceeding from violent passions, which surprise a man are justly pu∣nished, I grant they are so sometimes, but not for his reason, &c.] My reason was, because he had time to deliberate from the instant that he knew the Law, to the instant of his action, and ought to have deliberated, that therefore he may be justly pu∣nished. The Bishop grants they▪ are justly punished, and his rea∣son is, because they were vertually deliberated of, or because it is our fault they were not actually deliberated of. How a man does deliberate, and yet not actually deliberate, I understand not. If vertual deliberation, be not actual deliberation, it is no delibe∣ration. But he calleth vertual deliberation, that which ought to have been, and was not, and says the same that he condemnes in me. And his other reason, namely, because it is our fault that we deli∣berated not, is the same that I said, that we ought to have delibera∣ted, and did not. So that his reprehension here, is a reprehension of himself proceeding from that the custome of School Language hath made him forget the Language of his Country. And to that which he adds, that a necessary act is never a fault nor justly punish∣able, when the necessity is inevitably imposed upon us by ex∣trinsecal causes, I have sufficiently answered before in divers places, shewing that a fault▪ may be necessary from extrinsecal causes, and yet voluntary; and that voluntary faults are justly punishable.

(h) [But if the necessity be contracted by our selves, it is justly punishable. As he who by his wanton though in the day time, doth procure his own nocturnal pollution.] This in∣stance because it maketh not against any thing, I have held, and partly also, because it is a stinking passage, (for surely if as he that ascribing eyes to the understanding allowes me to say, it hath a nose, it stinketh to the nose of the understanding, This sentence I passe over, observing only▪ the canting terms, not actually free

in it self, but vertually free in its causes. In the rest of his answer to this Number 25. I find nothing alledged in confutation of any thing I have said, saving that his last words are, that T. H. is mistaken, in that also, that the right to kill men, doth proceed meerly from their being noxious, Numb. 14. But to that I have in the same Numb. 14. already answered. I must not passe over, that a little before, he hath these words. If a Child before he have the use of reason shall kill a man in his passion, yet because he wanted malice to incite him to it, and reason to restrain him from it, he shall not dye for it, in the strict rules of particular Justice, unlesse there be some mixture of publique Justice in the case. The Bishop would make but an ill Judge of innocent Children, (for such are they that for want of age have not use enough of reason to abstain from killing.) for the want of reason proceeding from want of age, does therefore take away tho punishment because it taketh away the crime, and makes them in∣nocent. But he introduceth another Justice which he calleth pu∣blick, whereas he called the other particular; and by this publick Justice, he saith the Child though innocent may be put to death. I hope we shall never have the administration of publick Justice, in such hands as his, or in the hands of such as shall take counsel from him. But the distinction he makes is not by himself under∣stood. There are publick causes and private causes, private are those, where the parties to the cause, are both private men. Pu∣blick are those, where one of the parties is the Common-wealth, or the person that representeth it, and the cause criminal. But there is no distinction of Justice into Publick, and Private. We may reade of men that having Soverain Power, did sometimes put an Innocent to death, either upon a vow, as ••••pthah did, in sacrifi∣cing his Daughter; or when it hath been thought fit, that an innocent person should be put to death to save a great number of people. But to put to death a Child not for reason of State, which he improperly calls Publick Justice, but for killing a man, and at the same time to acknowledge such killing to be no crime, I think was never heard of.

T. H.

SEcondly, I conceive when a man deliberates whether he shall* 1.43 do a thing or not do a thing, that he does nothing else but con∣sider, whether it be better for himself to do it, or not to do it. And to consider an action, is to imagine the consequences of it, both good and evil, from whence is to be inferred, that deliberation is nothing but alternate imagination, of the good and evil sequells of an action, or (which is the same thing) alternate hope and fear or al∣ternate appetite to do, or acquit the action of which he deliberateth.

J. D.

(a) IF I did not know what deliberation was, I should be little relieved in my knowledge by this description. Sometimes he makes it to be a consideration, or an act of the understan∣ding, sometimes an imagination, or an act of the fancy, some∣times he makes it to be an alternation of passions, hope & fear. Sometimes he makes it concern the end, sometimes to con∣cern the means. So he makes it I know not what. The truth is this in brief. Deliberation is an inquiry made by reason, whe∣ther this or that definitely considered be a good and fit means, or indefinitely what are good and fit means to be chosen for attaining some wished end.

Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb. XXVI.

(a) [IF I did not know what Deliberation was, I should be little relieved in my knowledge by this description. Sometimes he makes it to be a consideration, or an act of the understanding, sometimes an imagination, or an act of the fancy, &c. So he makes it I know not what.] If the Bishop had observed what he does himself, when he Deliberates, reasons, understands, or imagins, he would have known what to make of all that I have said in this Number. He would have known that con∣sideration, understanding, reason, and all the passions of the mind; are imaginations. That to consider a thing, is to imagine it; that

to understand a thing is to imagine it; that to hope and fear are to imagine the things hoped for and feared. The difference between them is, that when we imagine the consequence of any thing, we are said to consider that thing; and when we have imagined any thing from a sign, and especially from those signs, we call names, we are said to understand his meaning that maketh the sign; and when we reason, we imagine the consequence of affirmations, and negations joyned together; and when we hope or fear, we imagine things good or hurtful to our selves; insomuch as all these are but imaginations, diversly named, from different circumstances, as any man may perceive as easily as he can look into his own thoughts. But to him that thinketh not himself upon the things where of, but upon the words where with he speaketh, and taketh those words on trust from pushed Schoolmen, it is not onely hard, but impossible to be known. And this is the reason that maketh him say, I make Deliberation he knows not what. But how is deliberation defined by him. It is (saith he) an inquiry made by reason, whether this or that definitely considered, be a good and fit means; or in∣definitely, what are good and fit means to be chosen for attain∣ing some wished end, If it were not his custome to say, the under∣standing understandeth, the Wil willeth, and so of the rest of the fa∣culties. I should have believed that when he says deliberation is an inquiry made by reason, he meaneth an inquiry made by the man that reasoneth; for so it will be sense: But the reason which a man useth in deliberation, being the same thing that is called Delibe∣ration, his Definition, that Deliberation is an inquiry made by reason, is no more then if he had said, Deliberation is an inquiry, made by Deliberation; a Definition good enough to be made by a School-man. Nor is the rest of the Definition altogether as it should be; for there is no such thing as an indefinite considerati∣on of what are good and fit means; but a man imagining first one thing, then another, considereth them successively and singly each one, whether it conduceth to his ends or not.

T. H.

THirdly, I conceive, that in all deliberations, that is to say, in all alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we cal the Wil, & is immediatly before the doing of the acti∣on,

or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other ap∣petites to do and to quit, that come upon a man during his delibe∣ration, are usually called intentions, and inclinations, but not wills, there being but one will, which also in this case may be called last will, though the intention change often.

J. D.

(a) STill here is nothing but confusion, he confounds the fa∣culty of the will, with the act of volition; he makes the wil to be the last part of deliberation; he makes the intention, which is a most proper and elicite act of the will, or a willing of the end, as it is to be attain•••• by certain means, to be no willing at all, but onely some antecedaneous inclination or propension. He might as well say, that the uncertain agitation of the needle hither and thither, to find out the Pole, & the resting or fixing of it self di∣rectly towards the Pole, were both the same thing. But the gros∣sest mistake is, that he will acknowledge no act of a mans will, to be his will, but onely the last act, which he calls the last will. If the first were no will, how comes this to be the last will? According to this doctrine, the will of a man should be as un∣changeable as the Will of God, at least so long as there is a possibility to effect it. (b) According to this doctrine con∣cupiscence with consent should be no sin, for that which is not truely willed is not a sin; Or rather should not be at all, un∣less either the act followed, or were rendred impossible by some intervening circumstances. According to this Doctrine no man can say, this is my will, because he knowes not yet, whether it shall be his last appeal. The truth is, there be many acts of the will, both in respect of the means, and of the end. But that act, which makes a mans actions to be truely free, is Election, which is the deliberate chosing or refusing, of this or that means, or the acceptation of one means before another, where divers are represented by the understanding.

Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb. XXVII.

(a) [STill here is nothing but confusion, he con founds the faculty of the Wil, with the act of Volition; he makes the Wil to be the last part of Deliberation; he makes the intention, which is a most proper and elicite act of the Wil to be no Willing at all, but onely some anteced••n••ous (he might as well have said antecedent) inclination.] To confound the fa∣culty of the Wil with the Wil, were to confound a Wil, with no Wil; for the faculty of the Wil is no Wil; the Act onely which he calls Volition is the Wil. As a man that sle••peth hath the Power of seeing, and seeth not, nor hath for that time any sight; so also he hath the power of Willing, but Willeth nothing, nor hath for that time any Wil. I must therefore have departed very much from my own Principles, if I have confounded the faculty of the Wil, wi••h the Act of Volition. He should have done well to have shown where I confound••d them. It is true, I make the Wil to be the last part of Deliberation. But it is that Wil, which maketh the Action voluntar••; and therefore needs must be the last; But for the preceding vari••tions of the Wil, to do and not to do, though they be so many several Wills, contrary to, and destroying one ano∣ther, they usually are called Intentions; And therefore they are nothing to the Wil of which we dispute) that maketh an Action voluntary. And though a man have in every long deliberation a great many Wills and Nills, they use to be called inclinations, and the last on••ly Wil which is immediately foll••wed by the voluntary Action But nevertheless both he that hath those intentions, and God that s••eth them, reckoneth them for so many Wills.

(b) [According to this Doctrine, concupiscence with con∣sent, should be no sin, for that which is not truely Willed is not a sin.] This is no consequent to my Doctrine, for I hold that they are in the sight of God, so many consents so many willings, which would have been followed by Actions, if the Actions had been in their po••••er. It had been fitter for a man in whom is required gravity, and sanctity more then ordinary, to have chosen some other kind of instance. But what meaneth he by concupiscence with con∣sent?

Can there be concupiscence without consent? It is the consent it self. There may be also a Lawful concupiscence with consent. For concupiscence makes not the sin, but the unlawful∣ness of satisfying such concupiscence; and not the consent, but the Wil and design to prosecute that which a man knoweth to be un∣lawful. An appetite to another mans bread is concupiscence; and though it be with consent to eat, tis no sin; but the design to take it from the other, notwithstanding that he may fail in his design, that's the sin. And this instance might have served his turn, as well as the other; and for consent (if he had understood the truth) he might have p••t design.

T. H.

FOurthly, that those actions, which man is said to do upon deli∣beration,* 1.44 are said to be voluntary, and done upon choise and election. So that voluntary action, and action proceeding from ele∣ction, is the same thing. And that of a voluntary Agent, tis all one to say he is free, and to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating.

J. D.

(a) THis short Section might pass without an animadver∣sion but for two things. The one is, that he confounds a voluntary act with a free act. A free act is onely that which proceeds from the free election of the rational will after deli∣beration, but every act that proceeds from the sensitive appe∣tite of man or beast, without deliberation or election, is truely voluntary. (b) The other thing observable is his conclusion, that it is all one to say, a man is free, and to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating. Which confession of his, overturns his whole structure of absolute necessity; for if every Agent be ne∣cessitated to act what he doth act by a necessary and natural flux of extrinsecal causes, then he is no more free before he deliberates, or whilest he deliberates, than he is after; but by T. H. his confession here, he is more free, whilest he delibe∣rates, than he is after▪ And so after all his flourishes, for an absolute or extrinsecal necessity, he is glad to sit himself down, and rest contented with an hypothetical necessity, which no

man ever denied or doubted of; ascribing the necessitation of a man in free acts to his own deliberation, and in indeliberate acts to his last thought, Numb. 25. What is this to a natural and special influence of extrinsecal causes? (c) Again, Liberty (saith he) is an absence of extrinsecal impediments, but delibera∣tion doth produce no new extrinsecal impediment, therefore (let him chose which part he will) either he is free after delibe∣ration, by his own Doctrine, or he was not free before. Our own deliberation, and the direction of our own understanding, and the election of our own will, do produce an hypothetical necessity, that the event be such as the understanding hath di∣rected, and the will elected. But for as much as the understan∣ding might have directed otherwise, and the will have elected otherwise, this is far from an absolute necessity. Neither doth liberty respect onely future acts, but present acts also. Other∣wise God did not freely create the world. In the same instant wherein the will elects it is free, according to a priority of Na∣ture, though not of time, to elect otherwise. And so in a di∣vided sense, the will is free, even whilest it acts, though in a compounded seuse it be not free. Certainly, deliberation doth constitute, not destroy liberty.

Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb. XXVIII.

(a) [THis short section might passe, but for two things; one is, that he confounds a voluntary act with a free act.] I do indeed t••ke all voluntary acts to be free, and all free acts to be voluntary, but withal that all acts whether free or voluntary, if they be acts, were necessary before they were acts. But where is the errour? A free act (saith he) is onely that which proceeds from the free election of the rational Wil, after deliberation; but every act that proceeds from the sensitive appetite of man or beast without Deliberation or Election, is truely voluntary. So that my errour lies in this that I distin∣guish not between a rational Wil, and a sensitive appetite in the

same man. As if the Appetite and Wil in man or beast were not the same thing, or that sensual men and beasts did not delibe∣rate, and chuse one thing before another, in the same manner, that wise men do. Nor can it be said of Wills, that one is rational, the other sensitive; but of men. And if it be granted that delibera∣tion is alwayes (as it is not) there were no cause to ca•••• men ratio∣nall more then beasts. For it is manifest by continual experience, that beasts do Deliberate.

(b) The other thing observeable is his conclusion, that it is all one to say, a man is free, and to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating. Which confession of his, overturns his whole structure of absolute necessity. Why so? Because (saith he) if every Agent be necessitated to act what he doth act by ex∣trinsical causes, then he is no more free before he Deliberates, or whilst he Deliberates, then he is after. But this is a false con∣sequence; he should have inferred thus, then he is no lesse necessi∣ated, before he Deliberates, then he is after; Which is true, ••nd yet neverthelesse he is more free. But taking necessity to be inconsistent with Liberty (which is the question between us) in stead of necessitated he puts in not free. And therefore to say, a man is free till he hath made an end of Deliberating, is no con∣tradiction to absolute and antecedent necessity. And whereas he adds presently after, that I ascribe the necessitation of a man in ••ree acts to his own deliberation, and in indeliberate acts to his last thoughts, he mistakes the matter; for I ascribe all necessity, to the universal Series or Order of causes, depending on the first cause eternal. Which the Bishop underst••ndet••, as if I had said in his Phrase to a special influence of extrinsecal causes, that is, under∣standeth it not at all.

(c) [Again, Liberty (saith he) is an absence of extrinsecal impe••iment••, but Deliberation doth produce no new extrinse∣call impediment; therefore either he is free after Deliberation, or he was not free before] I can••ot perceive in these words any more force of inference, then of so many other words whatso∣ever put together at adventure. But be his meaning what he Wil, I say not that deliberation, porduceth any impediments, (for there are no impediments, but to the Action, ••hilst we are endeavouring to do it, which is not till we have done deliberating.) But during

the Deliberation, there arise thoughts in him that deliberateth, concerning the consequence of the action whereof he deliberateth, which cause the action following, which are not impediments to that which was not done, but the causes of that which was done: That which followeth in this Number, is not intelligible, by reason of the insignificance of these words understanding directeth; Will ele∣cteth, hypothetical necessity, which are but Jargon, and his divided sense, and compounded sense non sense. And this also Liberty respecteth not future acts onely, but present acts also, is unintelli ible. For how can a man have Liberty to do, or not to do that which is at the same instant already done. For where he addeth otherwise God did not freely create the World, it proves nothing, because he had the Liberty to create it, before it was crea∣ted. Besides, it is a p••rphancing of the name of God, to make in∣stances of his incomprehensible working, in a question as this is meerly natural.

T. H.

FIftly, I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner.* 1.45 Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action, that are not contained in the nature, and in the intrinsecal quality of the Agent. As for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the Chanel of the River, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the liberty to ascend, but the faculty or power, because the impediment is in the nature of the water and intrinsecall. So also we say, he that is tied wants the liberty to go, because the im∣pediment is not in him, but in his bon••s, whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, b••cause the impediment is in himself.

J. D.

(a) HOw that should be a right definition of liberty which comprehends neither the Genus nor the Difference, neither the Matter nor the Form of liberty, which doth not so much as accidentally describe liberty by its marks and tokens. How a real faculty or the Elective power should be defined by a negation, or by an absence, is past my understanding and con∣trary

to all the rules of right Reason, which I have learned. Negatives cannot explicate the nature of things defined. By this definition, a stone hath liberty to ascend into the aire, be∣cause there is no outward impediment to hinder it, and so a violent act may be a free act. Just like his definit on are his instances of the liberty of the water to descend down the Chan∣nell, and a sick or a lame mans liberty to go. The later is an impotence and not a power or a liberty. The former is so far from being a free act, that it is scarce a natural act. Certainly, the proper natural motion of water, as of all heavy bodies, is to descend directly downwards towards the center, as we see in rain, which falls down perpendicularly. Though this be far from a free act, which proceeds from a rational appetite, yet it is a natural act, and proceeds from a natural appetite, and hath its reason within in it self. So hath not the current of the river in its Channel, which must not be ascribed to the proper nature of the water, but either to the general order of the universe, for the better being and preservation of the creatures (other∣wise the waters should not moove in Seas and Rivers as they do, but cover the face of the earth, and possess their proper place between the aire and the earth, according to the degree of their gravity.) Or to an extrinsecal principle, whilst one particle of water thrusteth and forceth forward another, and so comes a current, or at least so comes the current to be more impetuous, to which motion the position of the earth doth contribute much, both by restraining that fluid body with its banks from dispersing it self, and also, by affording way for a fair and easy descent by its proclivity. He tells us sadly that the water wants liberty to go over the banks, because there is an ex∣trinsecal impediment, But to ascend up the channel it wants not liberty, but power. Why? Liberty is a power, if it want power to ascend, it wants liberty to ascend. But he makes the reason why the water ascends not up the channel, to be intrinsecal, and the reason why it ascends not over the banks to be extrinsecal, as if there were not a rising of the ground up the channel, as well as up the banks, though it be not so discernable, nor al∣wayes so sudden. The natural appetite of the water is as much against the ascending over the banks, as the ascending up the

channel. And the extrinsecal impediment is as great in ascen∣ding up the channel as over the banks, or rather greater, be∣cause there it must moove, not onely against the rising soil, but also against the succeeding waters, which press forward the former. Either the River wants liberty for both, or else it wants liberty for neither.

But to leave his metaphorical faculties, and his Catachresti∣cal Liberty. How far is his discourse wide from the true moral liberty, which is in question between us. His former descrip∣tion of a free Agent, that is, he who hath not made an end of de∣liberating, though it was wide from the mark, yet it came much neerer the truth than this difinition of Liberty, unless perhaps he think that the water hath done deliberating, whether it will go over the banks, but hath not done deliberating, whether it will go up the channel.

Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb. XXIX.

(a) [HOw that should be a right definition of Liberty, which comprehends neither the Genus nor the Difference, neither the Matter, nor▪ the Form, of Liberty, &c. How a reall faculty, or the elective power should be defined by a negation, or by an absence; is past my understanding; and contrary to all the rules of right reason, which I have learned.] A right d••••nition is, that which determineth the signification of the word defined, to the end that in the discourse where it is used, the meaning of it may be constant and without equivocation. This is the measure of a definition and intelligible to an English Reader. But the Bishop that measures it by the Genus and the Difference, thinks (it seems) though he write English, he writes not to an English Reader, unlesse he also be a School-man. I confesse the rule is good that we ought to define when it can be done▪ by using first so••e more general term, and then by r••straining, the signifi∣cation of that general term till it b•• th•• same with that of the word defin••d. And this general term, the Sc••ool calls Genus, and the restraint Difference; This I say is a good rule where it can be

done; for some words are so general that they cannot admit a more general in their definition. But why, this ought to be a Law of de∣finition, I doubt it would trouble him to find the reason; and there∣fore I referr him, (he shall give me leave sometimes to cite, as well as he) to the 14. and 15. Articles of the 6 Chapter, of my Book De Corpore. But it is to little purpose that he requires in a definition, so exactly the Genus, and the Difference, se••ing he does not know them when they are there. For in this my definition of Liberty the Genus is absence of impediments to action; and the difference or Restricti••n is, that they be not contained in the na∣ture of the Agent. The Bishop therefore though he talk of Genus and Difference▪ understands not what they are, but requires the matter and Form, of the thing in the Definition Matter is body, that is to say corporeal substance, and subject to dimension, such as are the Elements, and the things compounded of the Elements. But it is impossible that Matter should be part o•• a Definition, whose parts are onely words, or to put the name of Matter into the Defi∣nition of Liberty, which is immaterial. How a reall faculty can be defined, by an absence, is (saith he) past my understanding. Unlesse he mean by reall Faculty▪ a very Faculty, I know not how a Faculty is reall. If he mean so, then a very absence, is as reall, as a very Faculty. And if the word defined signifie an absence, or Negation, I hope he would not have me define it, by a presence, or affrmation. Such a word is Liberty, for it signifieth Freedome from impediments, which is all one with the absence of impediments as I have defined it. And if this be contrary to all the rules of right reason, (that is to say of Logic) that he hath learned, I should advise him to read some other Logic, then he hath yet read, or con∣sider better those he did read, when he was a young man, and could lesse understand them. He adds that by this Definition, a stone hath Liberty to ascend into the aire, because there is no out∣ward impediment to hinder it. How know he, whether there be impediments to hinder it or not? Certainly if a stone were thrown upwards, it would either go upwards eternally, or it must be stopped by some outward impediment or it must stop it self. He hath confessed that nothing can moove it self, I doubt not therefore but he will confess also that it cannot stop it self. But stopped we see it is; it is therefore stopped by impediments external. He hath

in this part of his Answer ventured a little too far▪ in speaking of Definition, and of Jmpediments, and Motion, and bew••ayed too much his ignorance in Logick and Philosophy; and talketh so absurdly of the current of Rivers, and of the motion of the Seas, and of the weight of Water, that it cannot be corrected otherwise then by blotting it all out.

T. H.

SIxtly, I conceive, nothing taketh beginning from it self, but* 1.46 from the action of some other immediate Agent without it self. And that therefore when first a man had an appetite or will, to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is not the will it self, but something else, not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversie that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause; and by this which is said the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are necessitated.

J. D.

THis sixt point doth not consist in explicating of tearms, as the former, but in two proofs, that voluntary actions are necessitated▪ The former proof stands thus, Nothing takes beginning from it self, but from some Agent without it self, which is not in its own disposing, therefore, &c. concedo omnia. (a) I grant all he saith, The will doth not take beginning from it self. Whether he understand by will the faculty of the will, which is a power of the reasonable soul, it takes not beginning from it self, but from God, who created and infused the Soul into man, and endowed it with this power: Or whether he understand by will, the act of willing, it takes not beginning from it self, but from the faculty, or from the power of wil∣ling, which is in the Soul. This is certain, finite and partici∣pated things cannot be from themselves, nor be produced by themselves. What would he conclude from hence? that there∣fore the act of willing takes not its beginning from the faculty of the will? Or that the faculty is alwayes determined antece∣dently, extrinsecally to will that which it doth will? He may as

soon draw water out of a pumice, as draw any such conclusion out of these premisses. Secondly, for his taking a beginning, Either he understands a beginning of being, or a beginning of working and acting. If he understand a beginning of being, he saith most truly, that nothing hath a beginning of being in time from it self, But this is nothing to his purpose. The question is not between us whether the Soul of man or the will of man be eternal, But if he understand a beginning of working or moo∣ving actually, it is a gross errour. All men know that when a stone descends, or fire ascends▪ or when water, that hath been heated returns to its former temper, the beginning or reason is intrinsecal, and one and the same thing doth moove and is mooved in a diverse respect. It mooves in respect of the form, and it is mooved in respect of the matter. Much more man, who hath a perfect knowledge and prenotion of the end, is most properly said to moove himself▪ Yet I do not deny but that there are other beginnings of humane actions, which do concur with the will, some outward▪ as the first cause by general influence, which is evermore requisite, Angels or men by per∣swading, evill spirits by tempting, the object or end by its ap∣petibility, the understanding by directing▪ So passions and acquired habits. But I deny that any of these do necessitate or can necessitate the will of man by determining it Physically to one, except God alone, who doth it rarely in extraordinary cases. And where there is no antecedent determination to one, there is no absolute necessity but true Liberry.

(b) His second argument is ex concessis▪ It is out of controversie (saith he) that of voluntary actions the will is a necessary cause. The argument may be thus reduced. Necessary causes produce necessary effects, but the Will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions. I might deny his major; Necessary causes do not al∣wayes produce necessary effects except they be also necessarily produ••ed, as I have shewed before in the burning of Protagoras his book. But I answer cleerly to the minor, that the will is not a necessary cause of what it wills in particular actions. It is without controversie indeed, for it is without all probability. That it wills, when it wills, is necessary, but that it wills this or that, now or then, is free. More expresly, the act of the will

may be considered three wayes▪ Either in respect of its nature, or in respect of its exercise, or in respect of its object. First, for the nature of the act; That which the will wills is necessarily voluntary, because the will cannot be compelled. And in this sense, it is out of controversie, that the will is a necessary cause of voluntary actions. Secondly, for the exercise of its acts, that is not necessary. The will may either will or suspend its act. Thirdly, for the object that is not necessary but free, the will is not extrinsecally determined to its objects. As for example, The Cardinalls meet in the conclave to chose a Pope, whom they chose he is necessarily Pope. But it is not necessary that they shall chose this or that day. Before they were assembled they might defer their assembling, when they are assembled, they may suspend their election for a day or a week. Lastly, for the person whom they will choose, it is freely in their own power, otherwise if the election were not free, it were void, and no election at all. So that which takes its beginning from the will, is necessarily voluntary▪ but it is not necessary that the will shall will this or that in particular, as it was necessary, that the person freely elected should be Pope, but it was not ne∣cessary, either that the election should be at this time, or that this man should be elected. And therefore voluntary acts in particular, have not necessary causes, that is, they are not necessitated.

Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb. XXX.

I Had said, that nothing taketh beginning from it self, and that the cause of the Will is not the Will it self, but something else which it disp••seth not of. Answering to thi•• he endeavours to she•• us the cause of the Will.

(a) [I grant (saith he) that the Will doth not take begin∣ning from it self, for that the faculty of the Wil••, takes begin∣ning from God, who created the soul, and powred it into man, and endowed it with this power; and for that the act of willing takes not beginning from it self, but from the faculty, or from

the power of willing, which is in the soul. This is certain, finite and participated things cannot be from themselves, nor be pro∣duced by themselves. What would he conclude from hence? That therefore the Act of willing, takes not its beginning, from the faculty of the Wil?] It is well that he grants finite things (as for his participated, it signifies nothing here) cannot be pro∣duced by themselves. For out of this I can conclude that the Act of willing is not produced by the faculty of willing. He that hath the faculty of willing, hath the faculty of willing something in parti∣cular. And at the same time he hath the faculty of nilling the same. If therefore the faculty of willing be the cause he willeth any thing whatsoever, for the same reason the faculty of nilling, will be the cause at the same time of nilling it, and so he shall will and nill the same thing at the same time, which is absurd. It seems the Bishop had forgot that Matter and Power are indiffe∣rent to contrary Forms and contrary Acts. It is somewhat besides the Matter that d••termineth it to a certain form; and somewhat besides the Power, that produceth a certain Act; and thence it is, that is inferred this that he granteth, that nothing can be produced by it self, which neverthelesse he presently contradicteth, in saying, that, all men know when a stone descends, the beginning is in∣trinsecal, and that the stone mooves in respect of the Form; and is moved in respect of the Matter. Which is as much to say that the Form moveth the Matter, or that the stone moveth it self, which before he denied. When a stone ascends, the beginning of the stones motion, was in it self, that is to say intrinsecal, because it is not the stones motion, till the store begins to be moved; but the motion that caused it to begin to ascend, was a precedent and ex∣trinsecal motion of the hand, or other engine that threw it upward. And so when it descends, the beginning of the stones motion is in the stone; but neverthelesse, there is a former motion in the am∣bient Body, aire or water, that causeth it to descend. But be∣cause no man can see it, most men think there is none; though Rea∣son, wherewith the Bishop, (as relying onely upon the Authority of Books) troubleth not himself, co••vince that there is.

(b) [His second Argument is, ex concessis; It is out of con∣troversy, that of voluntary Actions, the Wil is a necessary cause. The Argument may be thus reduced. Necessary causes pro∣duce

necessary effects; but the Wil is a necessary cause of vo∣luntary Actions. I might deny his Major; necessary causes do not alwayes produce necessary effects, except they be also necessarily produced.] He has reduced the Argument to non∣sense, by saying necessary causes produce not necessary effects. For necessary effects, unlesse he mean such effects as shall necessarily be produced, is insignificant. Let him consider therefore with what grace he can say, necessary causes do not alwayes produce their effects, except those effects be also necessarily produced. But his an∣swer is chiefly to the Minor, and denies that the Wil is not a ne∣cessary cause of what it wills in particular Actions. That it wills, when it wills (saith he) is necessary, but that it wills this or that, is free. Is it possible for any man to conceive that he that willeth can will any thing but this or that particular thing? It is therefore manifest▪ that either the Wil is a necessary cause of this or that or any other particular Action, or not the necessary cause of any voluntary Action at all. For universal Actions there be none. In that which followeth, he undertaketh to make his doctrine more expressly understood by considering the Act of the will three ways. In respect of its nature, in respect of its Exercise; and in respect of its object. For the nature of the Act (be saith) that That which the will wills is necessarily volunrary, and that in this sense, he grants it is out of controversy, that the will is a necessary cause of voluntary Actions. Instead of that which the will wills, to make it sense, read that which the man wills, and then if the mans will be as he confesseth a necessary cause of volun∣tary Actions, it is no lesse a necessary cause that they are Acti∣ons, then that they are voluntary. For the Exercise of the Act, he saith that the will may either will, or suspend its Act, This is the old canting which hath already been sufficiently detected. But to make it somewhat let us reade it thus, the man that willeth, may either will or suspend his will, and thus it is intelligible but false; for how can he that willeth, at the same time suspend his will? And for the object he says, that it is not necessary but Free, &c. His reason is because he says it was not necessary (for example) in choosing a Pope, to choose him this or that day, or to chuse this or that man. I would be glad to know by what Argu∣ment ••e can prove the Election not to have been necessitated; For

it is not enough for him to say, I perceive no necessity in it; nor to say they might have chosen another, because he knows not whether they might or not; nor to say if he had not been freely elected, the Election had been void or none. For though that be true, it does not follow that the Election was not necessary; for there is no re∣pugnance▪ to necessity, either in Election, or in Freedome. And whereas he concludeth, therefore voluntary Acts in particular are not necessitated; I would have been glad he had set down what voluntary Acts there are, not particular, which by his re∣striction of voluntary Acts he grants to be necessitated.

T. H.

SEventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause to which nothing* 1.47 is wanting that is needful to the producing of the effect. The same is also a necessary cause, for if it be possible, that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanted somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient. But if it be impossible that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a necessary cause, (for that is said to produce an effect necessarily, that cannot but produce it) Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced necessarily, for whatsoever is produced hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been. And therefore also voluntary actions are necessitated.

J. D.

THis section contains a third Argument to proove that all effects are necessary; for clearing whereof it is needfull to consider how a cause may be said to be sufficient or insufficient.

First, several causes singly considered may be insufficient, and the same taken conjointly be sufficient to produce an effect. As (a) two Horses jointly are sufficient to draw a Coach, which either of them singly is insufficient to do. Now to make the effect, that is the drawing of the Coach necessary, it is not onely required, that the two Horses be sufficient to draw it, but also that their conjunction be necessary, and their habitude such as they may draw it. If the owner of one of these Horses will not suffer him to draw, If the Smith have

shod the other in the quick, and lamed him; If the Horse have cast a shoe, or be a resty jade, and will not draw but when he list, then the effect is not necessarily produced, but contingent∣ly more or less, as the concurrence of the causes is more or less contingent.

(b) Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either be∣cause* 1.48 it produceth that effect which is intended, as in the gene∣ration of a man, or else, because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced, as in the generation of a Monster. The former is properly called a sufficient cause, the later a weak and insufficient cause. Now, if the debility of the cause be not necessary, but contingent, then the effect is not necessary, but contingent. It is a rule in Logick, that the conclusion al∣wayes follows the weaker part. If the premises be but proba∣ble, the conclusion cannot be demonstrative. It holds as well in causes as in propositions. No effect can exceed the vertue of its cause. If the ability or debility of the causes be contingent, the effect cannot be necessary.

Thirdly, that which concerns this question of Liberty from necessity most neerly is. That (c) a cause is said to be sufficient* 1.49 in respect of the ability of it to act, not in respect of its will to act. The concurrence of the will is needful to the production of a free effect. But the cause may be sufficient, though the will do not concur. As God is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds, but it doth not follow from thence, either that he hath produced them, or that he will produce them. The blood of Christ is a sufficient ransome for all mankind, but it doth not follow therefore, that all mankind shall be actually saved by vertue of his Blood. A man may be a sufficient Tutour, though he will not teach every Scholler, and a sufficient Physician, though he will not administer to every patient. For as much therefore as the concurrence of the will is needful to the pro∣duction of every free effect▪ and yet the cause may be suffi∣cient, in sensu-divi'so, although the will do not concur, it fol∣lowes evidently, that the cause may be sufficient, and yet some∣thing, which is needful to the production of the effect, may be wanting, and that every sufficient cause is not a necessary cause.

Lastly, if any man be disposed to wrangle against so clear light, and say, that though the free Agent be sufficient in sensu diviso, yet, he is not sufficient, in sensu composito, to produce the effect without the concurrence of the will, he saith true, but first, he bewrayes the weakness and the fallacy of the former argument, which is a meer trifling between sufficiency in a di∣vided sense, and sufficiency in a compounded sense. And seeing the concurrence of the will is not predetermined, there is no antecedent necessity before it do concur; and when it hath concurred, the necessity is but hypothetical, which may consist with liberty.

Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb. XXXI.

IN this place he disputeth against my definition of a sufficient cause, namely, that cause to which nothing is wanting need∣full to the producing of the effect. I thought this definition could have been mistiked by no man that had English enough, to know that a sufficient cause, and cause enough signifieth the same thing. And no man wil say that that is cause enough to produce an effect, to which any thing is wanting needful to the producing of it. But the Bishop thinks, if he set down what he understands by sufficient, it would serve to confute my definition. And there∣fore says;

(a) [Two Horses joyntly are sufficient to draw a Coach, which either of them singly is insufficient to do; Now to make the effect that is, the drawing of the Coach necessary, it is not onely required that the two Horses be sufficient to draw it, but also that it be necessary they shall be joyned, and that the owner of the Horses will let them draw, and that the Smith hath not lamed them, and they be not resty, and list not to draw, but when they list, otherwise the effect is contingent.] It seems the Bishop thinks two Horses may be sufficient to draw a Coach, though they will not draw, or though they be lame, or though they be never put to draw; and I think they can never produce the effect of drawing, without those needful circumstances of being

strong, obedient, and having the Coach some way or other fastened to them. He calls it a sufficient cause of drawing, that they be Coach ho••ses, though they be lame, or wi•••• not draw. But I say they are not sufficient absolutely; but conditionally, if they be not lame, nor resty. L••t the read r judge, whether my sufficient cause or his may properly be called cause enough.

(b) [Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either because it produceth that effect which is intended, as in the generation of a man, or else, because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced, as in the generation of a Monster; the former is properly called a sufficient cause, the latter a weak and insufficient cause.] In these few lines he hath said the cause of the generation of a Monster is sufficient to produce a Monster, and that it is insufficient to produce a Monster. How soo•• may a man forget his words that doth n••t understand the••••. This term of in∣sufficient cause, which also the School calls Deficient that they may rime to efficient, is not inte••••e••ible, but a word devised like Hocus Pocus to juggle a difficulty out of sight. That which is sufficient to produce a Monster; is not therefore to be called an in∣sufficient cause to produce a m••n, no more then that which is suffi∣cient to produce a man, is to be called an insufficient cause to pro∣duce a Monster.

(c) [Thirdly, a cause is said to be sufficient in respect of the ability of it to act, not in respect of its will to act, &c. As God is sufficient to produce a thousand Worlds.] He understands little, wh••n ••en say, God is sufficient to produce many worlds, if he understand not the meaning to be, that he is sufficient to prod••ce them if he will. Without this s••pposition, It he will, a man is not sufficient to produce any voluntary action, not so much as to walk, though he be inh••alth, and at Liberty. The will is as much a sufficient cause without the strength to do, as the strength without the Wil▪ To that which he adds, that my Definition is a meer tri∣fling between a sufficiency in a divided sense, and a sufficiency in a compounded sense, I can make no answer, because I under∣stand no more, what he means by sufficiency in a divided sense, and sufficiency in a compounded sense, then if he had said suffi∣ciency in a divided non-sense, and sufficiency in a compounded non-sense.

T. H.

LAstly, I hold that the ordinary definition of a free Agent, name∣ly* 1.50 that a free Agent is, that, which when all things are present, which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not pro∣duce it, implies a contradiction, and is non-sense, being as much as to say, the cause may be sufficient, that is, necessary, and yet the effect not follow.

J. D.

THis last point is but a Corollary, or an Inference from the former doctrine, that every sufficient cause produceth its effect necessarily, which pillar being taken away the super∣structure must needs fall to the ground, having nothing left to support it. Lastly, I hold (saith he) what he is able to proove is something. So much reason, so much trust; but what he holds concerns himself not others. But what holds he? I hold (saith he) that the ordinary definition of a free Agent implies a contra∣diction, and is non-sense. That which he calls the ordinary defini∣tion of liberty is the very definition which is given by the much greater part of Philosophers and School-men. And doth he think that all these spake non-sense? or had no more judgment than to contradict themselves in a definition? He might much better suspect himself, than censure so many. Let us see the definition i•• self: A free Agent is that, which when all things are present, that are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it. I acknowledge the old definition of Liberty, with little variation. But I cannot see this non-sense, nor dis∣cover this contradiction. For (a) in these words all things need∣full or all things requisite, the actual determination of the will is not included. But by all things needful or requisite, all ne∣cessary power either operative or elective, all necessary instru∣ments and adjuments extrinsecall and intrinsecall, and all con∣ditions are intended. As he that hath pen and ink, and paper, a table, a desk, and leisure, the art of writing, and the free use of his hand, hath all things requisite to write if he will, and yet he may forbear, if he will. Or as he that hath men and mony, and arms, and munition, and ships, and a just cause, hath all

things requisite for war, yet he may make peace, if he will. Or as the King proclaimed in the Gospel, Matth. 2••. 4. •• h••ve prepared my dinner, my oxen and my fatlings are killed, all things are ready, come unto the marriage. According to T. H his doctrine, the guests might have told him that he said not tru∣ly, for their own wills were not read••. (b) And indeed if the will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated extrinsecally to every act of willing, if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth will, nor to will what it doth not will, then if the will were wanting, something requisite to the producing of the effect was wanting. But now when Science and conscience, reason and Religion, our own and other mens experience doth teach us, that the will hath a dominion over its own acts to will, or nill without extrinsecal necessitation, if the power to will be present in act•• primo, determinable by our selves, then there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the pro∣ducing of the effect.

Secondly, these words ••o act or not to act, to w••rk or not to work, to produce or n••t to produce, have reference to the effect, not as a thing which is already done, or doing, but as a thing ••o be done. They imply not the actual production but the produci∣bility of the effect. But when once the will hath actually con∣curred with all other causes and conditions, and circumstances, then the effect is no more possible, or producible, but it is in being, and actually produced. Thus he takes away the subject of the question. The question is whether effects producible be free from necessity. He shuffles out effects producible, and thrusts in their places effects produced, or which are in the act of production Wherefore I conclude, that it is neither non▪ sense nor contradiction to say, that a free Agent, when all things re∣quisite to produce the effect are present, may nevertheless not produce it.

Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb. XXXII.

THe question is here whether these words, a free Agent is that, which when all things needfull to the production of the effect are present, can nevertheless not produce it, ••••mply a contradiction, as I say it does. To make it appear no contradicti∣on, he saith

(a) [In these words, all things needful or all things requi∣site, the actual determination of the Will is not included,] as if the Will were not needful nor requisite to the producing of a vo∣luntary Action. For to the production of any Act whatsoever, there is needful, not onely those things which proceed from the Agent, but also those that consist in the disposition of the patient? And to use his own instance, it is necessary to writing, not onely that there be p••n, ink, paper, &c. but also a will to write. He that hath the former hath all things requisite to write if he will, but not all things necessary to writing. And so in his other instances, he that hath men and money, &c. (without that which he putteth in for a requisite) hath all things requisite to make War if he Will, but not simply to make War. And he in the Gospel that had pre∣pared his Dinner, had all things requisite for his guests if they came, but not all things requisite to make them come. And there∣fore all things requisite, is a term ill defined by him.

(b) [And indeed if the will were (as he conceives it is) ne∣cessitated extrinsecally to every act of willing, if it had no power to forbear willing, what it doth will, nor to will what it does not will, then if the will were wanting, something requisite to the produceing of the effect were wanting. But now when Science and Conscience, Reason and Religion, our own and other mens experience doth teach us▪ that the Will hath a Do∣minion over its own Acts to Will, or Nill, without extrinsecal necessitation, if the power to will be present in actu primo, de∣terminable by our selves, then there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of the effect.] These

words, the will hath power to forbear willing what it doth will, and these, the Wil hath a Dominion over its own Acts, and these, the power to Will is present in actu primo, determinable by our selves, are as wild as ever were any spoken with in the Walls of Bedlam; and if Science, Conscience, Reason and Reli∣gion, teach us to speak thus, they make us mad. And that which followeth is false to Act or not to Act, to work or not to work, to produce or not to produce, have reference to the effect, not as a thing which is already done, or doing, but as a thing to be done. For, to act, to work, to produce, are the same thing with to be doing. It is not the act but the power that hath refe∣rence to the future, for act and power differ in nothing but in this, that the former, signifieth the time present, the latter, the time to come. And whereas he adds, that I shuffle out effects producible, and thrust into their places effects produced, I must take it for an untruth, till he cite the place wherein I have done so.

T. H.

FOr my first five points where it is explicated; First, what* 1.51 Spontaneity is, Secondly, what Deliberation is, Thirdly, what Will, Propension and Appetite is, Fourthly, what a free Agent is, Fiftly, what Liberty is, There can be no other proof offered, but every mans own experience, by reflecting on himself, and remem∣bring what he useth to have in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth, when he saith, an action is spontaneous, A man delibe∣rates, such is his will, That Agent, or that action is free. Now, he that so reflecteth on himself cannot but be satisfied, that deli∣beration is the considering of the good and evil sequells of the acti∣on to come▪ That by Spontaneity, is meant inconsiderate procee∣ding, (for else nothing is meant by it.) That will is the last act of our Deliberation. That a free Agent, is he that can do, if he will, and forbear, if he will. And that Liberty is the absence of exter∣nall impediments; But to those that out of custome speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains to consider what they think, when they hear such words, no argument can be sufficient, because experience, and matter of fact is not verified by other mens Arguments, but by every m••ns own sense, and memory. For example, how can it be prooved, that

to love a thing, and to think it good are all one, to a man that does not mark his own meaning by those words. Or how can it be prooved that Eternity is not nunc Stans, to a man that sayes these words by c••sto••••e, and never considers how he can conceive the thing it self in his mind. Also the sixt point, that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a cause, can no other way be made known but by trying how he can imagine it. But if he try, he shall find as much reason (if there be no cause of the thing) to conceive, it should begin at one time as another, that is, he hath equall reason to think, it should begin at all times, which is impossible. And therefore he must think there was some special cause, why it began then ra∣ther than sooner or later, or else, that it began never, but was Eternal.

J. D.

NOw at length he comes to his main proofs; He that hath so confidently censured the whole current of School∣men and Philosophers of non-sense, had need to produce strong evidence for himself. So he calls his reasons, Numb. 36. demon∣strative proofs. All demonstrations are either from the cause or the effect, not f••om private notions and conceptions, which we have in our minds. That which he calls a demonstration de∣serves not the name of an intimation. He argues thus; That which a man conceives in his mind, by these words Spontaneity▪ Deliberation, &c. that they are. This is his proposition which I deny. (a) The true natures of things are not to be judged by the private ideas, or conceptions of men, but by their causes and formal reasons. Ask an ordinary person what upwards sig∣nifies, and whether our Antipodes have their heads upwards or downwards; And he will not stick to tell you, that if his head be upwards, theirs must needs be downwards. And this is because he knows not the formal reason thereof; that the Heavens incircle the earth, and what is towards Heaven is up∣wards. This same erroneous notion of upwards and downwards before the true reason was fully discovered, abused more than ordinary capacities, as appears by their arguments of penduli homines, and pendulae arbores. Again, what do men conceive or∣dinaryly by this word empty, as when they say an empty vessel,

or by this word Body, as when they say, there is no body in that room, they intend not to exclude the aire, either out of the vessel, or out of the room. Yet reason tells us, that the vessel is not truly empty, and that the aire is a true body. I might give an hundred such like instances. He, who leaves the conduct of his understanding to follow vulgar notions, shall plunge himself into a thousand errours, like him who leaves a certain guide to follow an ignis fatuus, or a Will with the wispe. So his proposition is false. (b) His reason, That matter of fact is not verified by other mens Arguments, but by every mans own sense and memory, is likewise maimed on both sides, whether we hear such words, or not, is matter of fact, and sense is the proper judge of it. But what these words do, or ought truely to signifie, is not to be judged by sense but by reason. Secondly, reason may, and doth oftentimes correct sense, even about its proper object. Sense tells us that the Sun is no bigger than a good Ball, but reason demonstrates, that it is many times greater than the whole Globe of the earth. As to his instance. How can it be proved, that to love a thing, and to think it good is al one to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by these words, I confess, it cannot be proved, for it is not true. Beauty and likeness, and love do conciliate love as much as goodness, Cos amoris amor. Love is a passion of the will, but to judge of goodness is an act of the understanding. A Father may love an ungracious Child, and yet not esteem him good. A man loves his own house better than another mans, yet he cannot but esteem many others better than his own. His other instance, How can it be proved that eternity is not nunc stans, to a man that says these words by custome, and never considers how he can conceive the thing it self in his minde, is just like the former, not to be proved by reason, but by fancy, which is the way he takes. And it is not unlike the counsel, which one gave to a Novice about the choise of his wife, to advice with the Bels, as he fancied so they sounded, either take her, or leave her.

(c) Then for his assumption it is as defective as his propo∣sition, That by these words spontaneity, &c. men do understand as he conceives. No rational man doth conceive a spontaneous action, and an indeliberate action to be all one, every indelibe∣rate

action is not spontaneous. The fire considers not whether it should burn, yet the burning of it is not spontaneous. Neither is ev••ry spontaneous action indeliberate, a man may deliberate what he will eat, and yet eat it spontaneously. (d) Neither doth deliberation properly signifie the considering of the good and evil sequels of an action to come. But the considering whe∣ther this be a good and fit means, or the best, and fittest means for obtaining such an end. The Physician doth not deliberate whether he should cure his Patient, but by what means he should cure him. Deliberation is of the means not of the end. (e) Much less doth any man conceive with T. H. that delibe∣ration is an imagination, or an act of fancy not of reason, com∣mon to men of discretion with mad men, and natural fools and children, and bruit beasts. (f) Thirdly, neither doth any understanding man conceive, or can conceive, that the will is an act of our deliberation. The understanding and the will are two distinct faculties, or that onely the last appetite is to be called our will. So no man should be able to say this is my will, because he knows not whether he shall persevere in it or not. (g) Concerning the fourth point we agree that he is a free Agent that can do, if he will, and forbear if he will. But I won∣der how this dropped from his pen, what is now become of his absolute necessity of all things, if a man be free to do and to forbear any thing? Will he make himself guilty of the non-sense of the School-men; and run with them into contradictions for company? It may be he will say he can do if he will, and for∣bear if he will, but he cannot will if he will. This will not serve his turn, for if the cause of a free action, that is, the will to be determined, then the effect, or the action it self is likewise de∣termined, a determined cause cannot produce an undetermined effect, either the Agent can will, and forbear to will, or else he cannot do, and forbear to do. (h) But we differ holy about the fifth point. He who conceives liberty aright, conceives both a liberty in the subject to will, or not to will, and a liberty to the object to will this, or that, and a liberty from impediments. T. H. by a new way of his own cuts off the liberty of the subject, as if a stone was free to ascend, or descend, because it hath no outward impediment. And the liberty towards the object, as if

the Needle touched with the Load-stone were free to point, either towards the North, or towards the South, because there is not a Barricado in its way to hinder it; yea, he cuts off the liberty from inward impediments also: As if an Hawk were at liberty to fly when her wings are plucked, but not when they are tied. And so he makes liberty from extrinsecal impediments to be compleat liberty; so he ascribes liberty to bruit beasts, and liberty to Rivers, and by consequence makes Beasts and Rivers to be capeable of sin and punishment. Assuredly, Xerxes, who caused the Hellespont to be beaten with so many stripes, was of this opinion. Lastly, T. H. his reason that it is ••ustome, or want of ability, or negligence which makes a m••n c••nceive other∣wise, is but a begging of that which he should prove. Other men consider as seriously as himself, with as much judgement as himself, with less prejudice than himself, and yet they can ap∣prehend no suchsense of these words Wouldhe have other men feign that they see fiery Dragons in the Air, because he affirms confidently that he sees them, and wonders why others are so blind as not to see them?

(i) The reason for the sixth point is like the former, a phan∣tastical, or imaginative reason. How can a man imagine any thing to begin without a cause, or if it should begin without a cause, why it should begin at this time rather than at that time? He saith truely, noth••••g can begin without a cause, that is to be, but it may begin to act of it self without any other cause. Nothing can begin without a cause, but many things may begin, and do begin without necessary causes. A free cause may as well choose his time when he will begin, as a necessary cause be determined extrins••cally when it must begin. And although free effects cannot be foretold, because they are not certainly predetermi∣ned in their causes, yet when the free causes do determine themselves, they are of as great certainty as the other. As when I see a Bell ringing. I can conceive the cause of it as well why it rings now, as I know the interposition of the earth to be the cause of the Eclipse of the Moon, or the most certain occurrent in the nature of things.

(k) And now that I have answered T. H. his Arguments drawn from the private conceptions of men concerning the

sense of words, I desire him seriously without prejudice to exa∣mine himself, and those natural notions which he finds in him∣self, not of words, but of things, these are from nature, those are by imposition, whether he doth not find by experience that he doth many things which he might have left undone if he would, and omits many things which he might have done if he would, whether he doth not somethings out of meer ani∣mosity, and will, without either regard to the direction of right reason or serious respect of what is honest, or profitable, onely to shew that he will have a dominion over his own actions, as we see ordinarily in Children, and wise men find at sometimes in themselves by experience. And I apprehend this very defence of necessity against liberty to be partly of that kind. Whether he is not angry with those who draw him from his study, or cross him in his desires; if they be necessitated to do it, why should he be angry with them, any more than he is angry with a sharp winter, or a rainy day that keeps him at home against his antecedent wil. Whether he doth not sometime blame him∣self, and say, O what a fool was I to do thus and thus, or wish to himself, O that I had been wise, or, O that I had not done such an act. If he have no dominion over his actions, if he be irres••∣stibly necessitated to all things that he doth, he might as well wish, O that I had not breached, or blame himself for growing old, O what a fool was I to grow old.

Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb. XXXIII.

I Have said in the beginning of this Number, that to define what spontan••iry is, what deliberation is, what Will, Propension, Ap∣petite, a free Agent, and Liberty is, and to prove they are well defined, there can be no other proof offered, but every mans own ex∣perience and memory of what he meaneth by such words. For de∣finitions being the beginning of all demonstration, cannot them∣selves be demonstrated, that is, proved to another man; All that can be done, is either to put him in mind, what th••se words signifie commonly in the matter whereof they tre••t, or if the words b•• un∣usual

to make, the Definitions of them true by mutual consent in their signification. And though this be manifestly true, yet there is nothing of it amongst the School-men, whouse to argue▪ not by rule, but as Fencers teach to hardle weapons, by quickness ••n••ly of the hand and eye. The Bishop therefore boggles at this kind of proof, and says,

(a) The true natures of things, are not to be judged by the private Ideas, or conceptions of men▪ but by their causes and formall reasons Aske an ordinary person, what upwards sig∣nifies &c.] But what will ••e answer if I should aske him how he will judge o•• the causes of things, whereof he hat•• no I••ea or con∣cepti••n in his own ••ind? It is therefore impossible to give a true definition of any word, without the Idea, of the thing which that word signifieth, or not ac••o••••ing to that Idea or conception. Here again he discovereth the true cause, why he and other School-men so often speak absurd••y. For they speak without conception of the things, and by rote, one receiving what he saith from another by tradition, from some pust 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or Philosopher, that to decline a•• difficulty, speakes in such manner, as not to be understood. And whereas he bidds us as••e an ordinary person, what upwards signi∣fieth, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dare Answer for that ordinary person, he will tell us as significantly as any Scholler, and say it is towards Heaven, and as so•••• as he knows the earth is r••und makes no scruple to believe there are Antipodes, being wiser in that point then were those, which he saith, to have been of more then ordinary capacities. Again, ordinary men understand not he saith the words, empty and Body; yes, but they do just as well as learned men. When they hear named an empty vessel, the learned as well as the un∣learned mean and understand the same thing, namely, that there is nothing in it that can be seen; and whether it be truely empty, the Plough-man, and the School man know a like. I might give he says an hundred such like instances. That true; a man may give a thousand foolish and impertinent instances of men ignorant in such questions of Philosophy concerning Emptiness, Body, Up∣wards, and Downwards and the like; But the question is not whether such and such tenets be true, but whether such and such words can be well defined, without thinking upon the things they signifiet as the Bishop thinks they may, when he concludeth with

these words, So his proposition is salfe.

(b) [His reason, that matter of fact is not verified by other mens Arguments, but by every mans own sense and memory, is likewise maimed on both sides. Whether we hear such words, or not, is matter of fact, and sense is the proper Judge of it; but what these words do, or ought truely to signifie, is not to be judged by sense, but by reason.] A man is borne with a ca∣pacity after due time and experience to reason truely; to which capacity of nature, if there be added no Discipline at all, yet, as far as he reasoneth he will reason truely, though by a right Discipline, he may reason truely in more numerous and various matters. But he that hath lighted on deceiving or deceived masters, that teach for truth all that hath been dictated to them by their own interest, or hath been cried up by other such teachers before them, have for the most part their natural reason as far as concerneth the truth of Doctrine quite defaced or very much weakened, becoming change∣lings through the inchantments of words not understood. This cometh into my mind from this saying of the Bishop, that matter of fact, is not verified by sense and memory, but by Arguments. How is it possible that without Discipline a man should come to think that the estimony of a witness, which is the onely verifier of matter of fact should consist, not in sense and memory, so as he may say he saw and remembers the thing done, but in Arguments or S••lle∣gismes? Or how can an unlearn••d man be brought to think the words he speaks, ought to signifie, (when he speaks sincerely) any thing else, but that which himself meant by them? Or how can any man without learning take the question whether the Sun be no bigger then a ball, or bigger then the Earth, to be a question of fact? Nor do I think that any man is so simple as ••••t to find that to be good which he loveth, good I say so far forth, as it maketh him to love it; or is there any unl••arned man, so st••pid as to think Eternity is this present instant of time standing still, and the same Eternit to be the very next instant after, an consequently, that there be so many eternities ••a•• there can be instants of time suppo∣sed? No, there is Sc••olastic•• learning required in some measure to make one mad.

(c) [Then for his assumption, it is as defective as his pro∣position, That by these words spontaneity, &c. Men do under∣stand

as he conceives, &c. No rational man doth conceive a spontaneous Action and an indeliberate Action to be all one; Every indeliberate Action is not spontaneous, &c. Nor every spontaneous Action indeliberate.] This I get by striving to make sense of that which he strives to make non-sense. I never thought the word spontaneity English. Yet because he used it, I made such meaning of it as it would bear, and said it meant inconsiderate proceeding or nothing. And for this my too much officio••snesse I r••ceive the reward of b••ing thought by him not to be a rati nal man. I know that in the Latine of all Authors but School-men. Actio spontanea signifies that Action, whereof there is no ap∣parent cause derived further th••n from the Agent it self, and is in all things that have sense, the same with voluntary whether deli∣berated or not d••liberated. And therefore where he distinguished it from voluntary, I thought he might mean indeliberate; but let it signifie what it will, provided it be intelligible, it would make against him.

(d) [Neither doth deliberation properly signifie the consi∣doring of the good ••nd evil sequells, of an Action to come; but the considering whether this be a good and fit means, or the best, and fittest means for obtaining such an end] If the Bi••••ops words proceeded not from hearing and readi••g of others, but from his own thoughts, he could never have reprehended this ••efinition of Deliberation especia••••y in the manner he doth it; for he says it is the consi••••ring whether this or that be a good and fit means, for obtaining such an end; as if considering whether a means be good or not, were n••t all ••n••, with considering whether the s••quei of using those means be good or evil.

(e) [Much lesse doth any man conceive with T. H. that deliberation is an Act o•• Fancie, not of Reason, common to men of discretion with mad men natural fools, children, and brute beasts] I do indeed conceive that d••liberation is an Act of Imagination or Fancie, ••ay more, that Reason and Understan∣ding also, are A••••s of the Imagination, that is to say, they are Imaginations. I find it so by considering my own▪ Ratio••••nation; and he might find it so i•• his, i•• he did consider his own thoughts, and not speak as he does by rote; by rote I say when he disputes; not by rote, when he is about those tris••••s, he ca••••eth businesses; then

when he speaks he thinks of (that is to say he Imagins) his business; but here he thinks onely upon the words of other men that have gone before him in th•••• question, transcribing their conclusions and ar∣guments, not his o••n thoughts.

(f) [Thirdly, neither doth any understanding man conceive, or can conceive, either that the Will is an Act of our Delibera∣tion, the Understanding and the Will are two distinct faculties; or that onely the last appetite, is to be called our Wi••••.] Though the understanding and the Will were two distinct faculties, yet follow their not that the Will and the Deliberation are two distinct facul••i••s; for the whole Deliberation is nothing else, but so many Wills, alternatively chang••d, according as a man understandeth or fancieth, the good and evil sequels of the thing concerning which he deliberateth whether he shall purs••e it, or of the means wh••ther they conduce or not to that end whatsoever it be he seeketh to ob∣tain. So that in deliberation there be many wills whereof net any is the cause of a voluntary action but the last, as I have said before answering this objection in another place.

(g) Concerning the fourth point we agree▪ that he is a free Agent, that can do if he Will, and forbear if he Will. But I won∣der how this dropped from his Pen? &c. It may be he will say he can do if he will, and forbear if he will, but he cannot will if he will. He has no reason to wonder ••ow this dropped from my Pen. He sound it in my Answer. Numb. 3. and has been all his while about to confute it, so long indeed that he had forget I said it. And now agai•• brings another Argument to pr••v•• a man is free to Will, which ••••th; either the Agent can Will, and forbear to Will, or else be cannot do, and forbear to do. There is no doubt a man can Will one thing or other, and forbear to will it. For men if they be awake ••re alwayes willing one thing or other. But put the case a man h••s a Will today to do a certain Action to▪ morrow, is he sure to have the same Will tomorrow when he is to do it? Is he free to day to chuse tomorrows Will? This is it thats now in question, and this Argument maketh nothing for the assir∣mative or negative.

(h) [But we differ wholy about the fifth point. He who conceives Liberty aright, conceives both a Liberty in the subject to Will or not to Will, and a Liberty to the object to Will

this, or that, and a Liberty from impediments. T. H. by a new way of his own cuts of the ••iberty of the subject, as if a stone were free to ascend, or descend, because it hath no outward impediment; And the Liberty towards the object, as if the needle touched with the Load-stone were free to point▪ either towards the North or towards the South, because there is not a Bari∣cado in its way.] How does it appear that he who conceives Li∣berty aright, conceives a Liberty in the subject to Will or no•• to Will, unlesse he mean Liberty to d•• if he Will, or not to do if he wi••l not, which was never denied? Or how does it follow that a stone is as free to ascend, as desc••nd, u••le••••e he prove there is no outward impe••iment to its ascent. Which cannot be proved; for the con∣trary is true. Or how proveth he, that there is no outward impedi∣ment to keep that point of the Load stone which placeth it self to∣ward the North, from turning to the South? His ignorance of the causes external is n••t a sufficient argument that there are none. And whereas he saith, that according to my definition of Liber••y, a Hauk were at Liberty to fly when her wings are pluckt, but not when they are tyed. I answer, that she is not at Liberty to fly when her wings are ty••d; but to say, when her wings are pl••ckt, that she wanted the Liberty to fly, were to speak improp••rly and ab∣surdly; for in that case, men that speak English use to say she can∣not fly And for his reprehension of my attributing Lib••rty to brute beasts, and rivers, I would be glad to know whether it be improper language to say a bird ••r beast▪ may be s••t at Liberty from the cage wherein they were ••mprisoned, or to say that a river which was stopped, hath recovered its free course, and how it follows, that a beast or river recovering this freedome, must needs therefore be capable of sin and punishment.

(i) ▪The reason for the sixt point, is like the former, a Phantastical or Imaginative reason. How can a man imagine any thing to begin without a cause; or if it should begin without a cause, why it should begin at this time, rather then at that time? He saith truely, nothing can begin without a cause, that is to be, but it may, begin to Act of it self without any other cause. No∣thing can begin without a cause, but many things may begin without an••cess••ry cause] He granteth nothing ca•• begin without a cause, & he hath granted formerly that nothing can cause it self.

And now he saith it may begin to Act of it self. The action therefore begins to be without any cause which he said nothing could do, contradicting what he had said but in the line before. And ••or that that he saith, that many things may begin not without cause, but without a necessary cause. It hath b••en argu••d before; and all causes have been proved, (if entire and suffici••nt causes) to be n••cessary, and that which he repeat••th here, namely, that a free cause may choose his time when he will begin to work, and that although free effects, cannot be foretold, because they are not certainly predetermined in their causes, yet when the free causes do determine themselves, they are of as great certainty as the other, it has been made appear sufficiently before, that it is but Jargon, the words free cause, and determining themselves being insignificant, and having nothing in the mind of man naswer∣able to them.

(k) [And now that I have answered T. H. his arguments drawn from the private conceptions of men concerning the sense of words, I desire him seriously to examine himself, &c.] One of his interrogatories is, this, whether I find not by expe∣rience that I do many things which I might have left undone if I would. This question was needl••sse, because all the way I have granted him that men have libe••ty to do many things if they will, which they left und••ne, because they had not the Will to do them. Another interrogatory is this, whether I do not some things without regard to the direction of right reason, or serious re∣spect of what is honest or pr••fitable. This question was in vain, unlesse he think himself my Confessour. Another is▪ whether I writ not this defence against Liberty, onely to show I will have a Dominion over my own actions. To this I answer, no; but to show I have no Dominion over my will, and this also at his re∣quest; But all these questions serve in this place for nothing else, but to deliver him of a jest he was in labour with all, and therefore his last question is, whether I do not sometimes say; Oh what a fool was I to do thus and thus; or Oh that I had been wise; or Oh what a fool was I to grow old. Subtil questions, and full of Episcopal gravity, I would he had left out charging me with blasphemous, desperate, destructive, and Atheistecal opinions. I should then have pardon••d him, his calling me fool, both because

I do many things foolishly, and because in this question disputed be∣tween us, I think he will appear a greater fool then I.

T. H.

FOr the seventh point, that all events have necessary causes, it is* 1.52 there proved in that they have sufficient causes. Further, Let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual at for exam∣ple, the throwing Ambs-ace upon a paire of Dice, and see if it must not have been necessary before it was thrown; for, seeing it was thrown, it had a beginning, and consequently a sufficient cause to produce it, consisting partly in the Dice, partly in the ou••ward things, as the posture of the parties hand, the measure of force ap∣plied by the caster, the posture of the parts of the Table, and the like; In sum, there was not••ing wanting that was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast, and consequently, that cast was necessarily thrown. For i•• it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been sufficient. In the like manner it may be proved that every other accident, how conting••nt so••ver it seem, or how voluntary soever it be, is produced nec••ssarily; which is that J. D. dis••utes against. The same also may be proved in this manner, Let the case be put for example) of the weather, Tis ne∣cessary that to morrow it shall rain, or not rain. If therefore it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain. Otherwise it is not necessary that the proposition, It shall rain, or it shall not rain, should be true. I know there are some that say, it may necessarily be true, that one of the two shall come to pass, but not singly that it shall rain, or it shall not rain. Which is as much as to say, One of them is necessary, yet neither of them is necessary; And therefore to seem to avoid, that absurdity they make a distin∣ction that neither of them is true determinatè but indeterminatè; Which distinction, either signifies no more than this, One of them is true, but we know not which, and so the necessity remains, though we know it not: Or if the meaning of the distinction be not that, it has no meaning. And they might as well have said, One of them is true Tytyrice, but neither of them Tupatulice.

J. D.

(a) HIs former proof, that all sufficient causes are necessary causes is answered before. Numb. 31. (b) And his two instances of casting Ambs-ace, and raining to morrow, are altogether impertinent to the question now agitated between us, for two reasons. First, our present controversie is con∣cerning free actions, which proceed from the liberty of mans will, both his instances are of contingent actions, which proceed from the indetermination, or contingent concurrence of natu∣rall causes. First, that there are free actions, which proceed meerly from election▪ without any outward necessitation is a truth so evident, as that there is a Sun in the Heavens, and he that doubteth of it may as well doubt whether there be a shell without the Nut, or a stone within the Olive. A man propor∣tions his time each day, and allots so much to his Devotions, so much to his Study▪ so much to his Diet, so much to his Recrea∣tions, so much to necessary, or civil visits, so much to his rest, he who will seek for I know not what causes of all this without himself, except that good God who hath given him a reason∣able Soul, may as well seek for a cause of the Egyptian Pyra∣mides among the Crocodiles of Nilus. (c) Secondly, for mixt actions which proceed from the concurrence of free and natu∣ral Agents, though they be not free, yet they are not necessary, as to keep my former instance, a man walking though a street of a Citie to do his occasions, a Tile falls from an House and breaks his head, the breaking of his head was not necessary, for he did freely choose to go that way without any necessitation, neither was it free, for he did not deliberate of that accident, therefore it was contingent, and by undoubted consequence there are contingent ac••••ons in the World which are not free. Most certainly by the concurrence of free causes, as God, the good and bad Angels, and men, with natural Agents sometimes on purpose, and sometimes by accident many events happen, which otherwise had never hapned; many effects are produ∣ced which otherwise had never been produced. And admitting such things to be contingent not necessary, all their consequent effects, not onely immediate, but med••ate must likewise be con∣ting••••••,

that is to say, such as do not proceed from a continued connexion and succession of necessary causes, which is directly contrary to T. H. his opinion.

(d) Thirdly, for the actions of bruit beasts, though they be not free, though they have not the use of reason to restrain their appetites from that which is sensitively good, by the con∣sideration of what is rationally good, or what is ho••est, and though their fancies be determined by nature to some kinds of work, yet to think that every individual action of theirs, and each animal motion of theirs, even to the least murmure, or ge∣sture is bound by the chain of unalterable necessity to the ex∣trinsecal causes or objects, I see no ground for it. Christ saith one of these Sparrows doth not fall to the gound without your Hea∣venly Father, that is without an influence of power from him, or exempted from his disposition, he doth not say which your Heavenly Father casteth not down. Lastly, for the natural actions of inanimate Creatures, wherein there is not the least concurrence of any free, or voluntary Agents, the question is yet more doubtful; for many things are called contingent in respect of us, because we know not the cause of them, which really and in themselves are not contingent, but necessary. Also many things are contingent in respect of one single cause, either actually hindred, or in possibility to be hindred, which are ne∣cessary in respect of the joynt concurrence of all collateral causes. (e) But whether there be a necessary connexion of all natural causes from the beginning so as they must all have con∣curred as they have done, and in the same degree of power, and have been deficient as they have been in all events whatso∣ever, would require a further examination if it were pertinent to this question of liberty; but it is not. It is sufficient to my purpose to have shewed that all elective actions are free from absolute ne••essity. And more-over, that the concurrence of voluntary▪ a••d free Agents with natural causes, both upon purpose and accidentally hath helped them to produce many effects, which otherwise they had not produced, and hindred them from producing many effects, which otherwise they had produced. And that if this intervention of voluntary and free Agents had been more frequent than it hath been, (as without

doubt it might have been) many natural events had been otherwise than they are. And therefore he might have spared his instances of casting Ambs-ace and raining to morrow. And first for his casting Ambs-ace. If it be thrown by a fair Game∣ster with indifferent Dice, it is a mixt action, the casting of the Dice is free, but the casting of Ambs-ace is contingent, a man may deliberate whether he will cast the Dice, or not, but it were folly to deliberate whether he will cast Ambs-ace, or not, because it is not in his power, unless he be a cheater that can cogge the Dice, or the Dice be false Dice, and then the contingency, or the degree of contingency ceaseth, according∣ly as the Caster hath more, or less cunning, or as the figure or making of the Dice doth incline them to Ambs-ace more than to another cast, or necessitate them to this cast and no other. Howsoever so far as the cast is free, or contingent, so far it is not necessary. And where necessity begins there liberty and contingency do cease to be: Likewise his other instance of raining, or not raining to morrow, is not of a free elective act, nor alwayes of a contingent act. In some Countries as they have their stati venti their certain winds at set seasons, so they have their certain and set rains. The Aethiopian rains are supposed to be the cause of the certain inundation of Nilus. In some eastern Countries they have rain onely twice a year, and those constant, which the Scriptures call the former and the later rain. In such places not onely the causes do act deter∣minately and necessarily, but also the determination, or necessi∣ty of the event is fore-known to the inhabitants. In our Cli∣mate the natural causes coelestial and sublunary do not produce rain so necessarily at set times, neither can we say so certainly and infallibly, it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to morrow. Neverthelesse, it may so happen that the causes are so disposed and determined, even in our climate, that this pro∣position, it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to morrow, may be necessary in it self, and the Prognosticks, or tokens may be such in the sky, in our own bodies, in the creatures, animate and inanimate, as weather-glasses, &c. that it may become probably true to us that it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to morrow. But ordinarily it is a contingent proposition

to us, whether it be contingent also in it self, that is, whether the concurrence of the causes were absolutely necessary, whe∣ther the vapours, or matter of the rain may not yet be disper∣sed, or otherwise consumed, or driven beyond our coast, is a speculation which no way concerns this question. So we see one reason why his two instances are altogether impertinent, because they are of actions which are not free, nor elective, nor such as proceed from the liberty of mans will.

Secondly, our dispute is about absolute necessity, his proofs extend onely to Hypothetical necessity. Our question is; whether the concurrence and determination of the causes were necessary before they did concur, or were determined. He proves that the effect is necessary after the causes have concur∣red, and are determined. The freest actions of God, or man, are necessary by such a necessity of supposition, and the most contingent events that are, as I have shewed plainly, Numb. 3. where his instance of Ambs-ace is more fully answered. So his proof looks another way from his proposition. His propo∣sition is, that the casting of Ambs-ace was necessary before it was thrown. His proof is that it was necessary when it was thrown; examine all his causes over and over, and they will not afford him one grain of antecedent necessity. The first cause is in the Dice: True, if they be false Dice there may be something in it, but then his contingency is destroyed. If they be square Dice, they have no more inclination to Ambs-ace, than to Cinque and Quater, or any other cast. His second cause is the posture of the parties hand: But what necessity was there that he should put his hand into such a posture? None at all. The third cause is the measure of the force applied by the caster. Now for the credit of his cause let him but name, I will not say a convincing reason nor so much as a probable reason, but even any pretence of reason, how the Caster was necessitated from without himself to apply just so much force, and neither more nor lesse. If he cannot, his cause is desperate, and he may hold his peace for ever. His last cause is the posture of the Table. But tell us in good earnest, what necessity there was why the Caster must throw into that Table rather than the other, or that the Dice must fall just upon that part of the Table, before the cast

was thrown: He that makes these to be necessary causes, I do not wonder if he make all effects necessary effects. If any one of these causes be contingent, it is sufficient to render the cast contingent; and now that they are all so contingent, yet he will needs have the effect to be necessary. And so it is when the cast is thrown, but not before the cast was thrown, which he undertook to prove. Who can blame him for being so angry with the School-men▪ and their distinctions of necessity into absolute and hypothetical, seeing they touch his freehold so nearly?

But though his instance of raining to morrow be imperti∣nent, as being no free action, yet because he triumphs so much in his argument, I will not stick to go a little out of my way to meet a friend. For I confess, the validity of the reason had been the same, if he had made it of a free action, as thus: Either I shall finish this reply to morrow, or I shall not finish this reply to morrow, is a necessary proposition. But because he shall not complain of any disadvantage in the alteration of his terms; I will for once adventure upon his shower of rain. And first, I readily admit his major that this proposition (either it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to morrow, is necessa∣rily true, for of two contradictory propositions, the one must of necessity be true, because no third can be given. But his minor, that it could not be necessarily true, except one of the Mem∣bers were necessarily true, is most false. And so is his proof like∣wise, that if neither the one nor the other of the Members be ne∣cessarily true, it cannot be affirmed that either the one, or the other is true. A conjunct proposition may have both parts false, and yet the proposition be true, as if the Suu shine, it is day, is a true proposition at midnight. And T. H. confesseth as much, Numb. 19. If I shall live I shall eat, is a necessary proposition, that is to say, it is necessary that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered. But it is not the necessity of the thing, nor is it therefore necessary that the man shall live, or that the man shall eat. And so T. H. proceeds, I do not use to fortifie my distincti∣ons with such reasons. But it seemeth he hath forgotten him∣self, and is contented with such poor fortifications. And though both parts of a disjunctive proposition cannot be false, because

if it be a right disjunction, the Members are repugnant, where∣of one part is infallibly true, yet vary but the proposition a little to abate the edge of the disjunctions, and you shall finde that which T. H. saith to be true, that it is not the necessity of the thing which makes the proposition to be true. As for example vary it thus: I know that either 〈◊〉〈◊〉 will rain to morrow, or that it will not rain to morrow is a true proposition: But it is not true that I know it will rain to morrow, neither is it true that I know it will not rain to morrow; wherefore the certain truth of the proposition doth not prove, that either of the Members is determinately true in present. Truth is a confor∣mity of the understanding to the thing known, whereof speech is an interpreter. If the understanding agree not with the thing it is an errour, if the words agree not with the understanding it is a lie. Now the thing known is known either in it self, or in its causes. If it be known in it self, as it is, then we expresse our apprehension of it in words of the present tence, as the Sun is risen. If it be known in its cause, we expresse our selves in words of the future tense, as to morrow will be an Eclipse of the Moon. But if we neither know it in its self, nor in its causes, then there may be a foundation of truth, but there is no such determinate truth of it, that we can reduce it into a true propo∣sition, we cannot say it doth rain to morrow, or it doth not rain to morrow. That were not onely false but absurd, we can∣not positively say it will rain to morrow, because we do not know it in its causes, either how they are determined, or that they are determined, wherefore the certitude and evidence of the disjunctive proposition is neither founded upon that which will be actually to morrow, for it is granted that we do not know that; nor yet upon the determination of the causes, for then we would not say indifferently, either it will rain, or it will not rain, but positively it will rain, or positively it will not rain. But it is grounded upon an undeniable principle, that of two contradictory propositions, the one must necessarily be true. (f) And therefore to say, either this, or that will infal∣libly be, but it is not yet 〈…〉〈…〉 whether this, or that shall be, is no such senselesse 〈…〉〈…〉 tha•• ••t deserved a ••ytyrice T••∣patulice, but an ev•…•…th which no man that hath his eyes in his head can d••••bt o••▪

(g) If all this will not satisfie him, I will give one of his own kind of proofs; that is an instance. That which necessitates all things according to T. H. is the decree of God, or that or∣der which is set to all things by the eternal cause (Numb. 11.) Now God himself, who made this necessitating decree, was not subjected to it in the making thereof, neither was there any former order to oblige the first cause necessarily to make such a decree; therefore this decree being an act ad extra was freely made by God without any necessitation. Yet nevertheless, this disjunctive proposition is necessarily true. Either God did make such a decree, or he did not make such a decree. Again, though T. H. his opinion were true that all events are necessary, and that the whole Christian world are deccived, who believe that some events are free from necessity, yet he will not deny, but if it had been the good pleasure of God, he might have made some causes free from necessity, seeing that it neither argues any imperfection, nor implies any contradiction. Supposing there∣fore that God had made some second causes free from any such antecedent determination to one, yet the former disjunction would be necessarily true. Either this free undetermined cause will act after this manner, or it will not act after this manner. Wherefore the necessary truth of such a disjunctive propositi∣on doth not prove, that either of the members of the dis∣junction singly considered, is determinately true in present, but onely that the one of them will be determinately true to morrow.

Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb. XXXIV.

(a) [HIs former proof; that all sufficient causes, are ne∣cessary causes, is answered before Numb. 31.] When he shall have read my Animadversions upon that Answer of his he will think otherwise whatsoever he will confesse.

(b) [And his two instances of casting Ambs-ace, and of raining to morrow, are altogether impertinent to the question, for two reasons. His first reason is, because (he saith) our pre∣sent

controversy is concerning free actions, which proceed from the Liberty of mans Will, and both his instances are of contingent actions, which proceed from the indetermination, or contingent concurrence, of natural causes] He knows that this part of my discourse which beginneth at Numb. 25. is no dispute with him at all, but a bare se••ting down of my opinion con∣cerning the natural necessity of all things; which is opposite, not onely to the Liberty of Will; but also to all contingence that is not necessary. And therefore these instances were not impertinent to my purpose; and if they be impertinent to his opinion of the Liberty of mans Will, he does impertinently to meddle with them. And yet for all he pretends here, that the question is onely ab ut Liberty of the Will. Yet in his first discourse Number the 16. he maintains that the order, beauty, and perfection of the world doth require, that in the Universe should be Agents of all sorts, some necessa∣ry, some Free, some contingent. And my purpose here is to shew by those instances, that those things which we esteem most contingent are neverthelesse necessary. Besides, the controversy is not whe∣ther free actions, which proceed from the Liberty of mans Will be necessary or not; for I know no action, which proceedeth from the Liberty of mans Will. But the question is, whether those actions which proceed from the mans Will, be necessary. The mans Will is something; but the Liberty of his Will is nothing. Again, the question is not, whether contingent actions, which proceed from the indetermination or contingent concurrence of natural causes, (for there is nothing that can proceed from indetermination,) but whe∣ther contingent actions be necessary before they be done, or whether the concurrence of natural causes, when they happen to concur, were not necessitated so to happen; or whether whatsoever chanceth be not necessitated so to chance. And that they are so necessitated, I have proved already with such arguments as the Bishop, for ought I see cannot answer. For to say (as he doth) that there are free actions which proceed meerly from Election, without any outward necessitation, is a truth so evident, as that there is a Sun in the Heavens, is no proof. 'Tis indeed as cleer as the Sun, that there are free actions proceeding from Election; but that there is Ele∣ction without any outward necessitation, is dark enough.

(c) [Secondly, for mixt actions, which proceed from the

concurrence of free and natural Agents, though they be not free, yet they are not necessary, &c.] For proof of this, he in∣stanceth in a Tile that falling from an house, breaks a mans head, neither necessarily, nor freely, and therefore contingently. Not ne∣cessarily, for (saith he) he did freely choose to go that way without any necessitation. Which is as much as taking the question it self for a proof. For what is else the question, but whether a man be necessitated to choose what he chooseth? Again (saith he) it was not Free, because he did not deliberate whether his head should be broken or not; and con••ludes, therefore it was contingent; and by undoubted consequence, there are contingent actions in the world, which are not free. This is true and denied by none; but he should have proved, that such contingent actions are not ante∣cedently necessary by a concurrence of natural causes, (though a little before he granteth they are.) For whatsoever is produced by concurrence of natural causes, was antecedently determined in the cause of such concurrence, though as he calls it contingent concur∣rence, not perceiving that concurrence, and contingent concur∣rence, are all one, and suppose a continued connection, and successi∣on of causes, which make the effect necessarily future. So that hitherto he hath proved no other contingence, then that which is necessary.

(d) [Thirdly, for the actions of brute beasts, &c. To think each animal motion of theirs is bound by the chain of unalter∣able necessity, I see no ground for it.] It maketh nothing against the truth, that he sees no ground for it. I have pointed out the ground in my former discourse, and am not bound to find him eyes. He himself immediately citeth a place of Scripture that proveth it, where Christ saith, one of these sparrows doth not fall to the ground, without your heavenly father; which place if there were n•• more, were a sufficient ground for the assertion of t••e necessity of all those changes of animal motion; in birds and other living creatures, which seem to us so uncertain. But when a man is dizzy with in∣fluence of power, elicite acts, permissive will, Hypothetical ne∣cessity, and the like unintelligible terms▪ the ground goes from him. By and by after he confesseth that many things are called contingent in respect of us, because we know not the cause o•• t••em▪ which really and in themselves are not contingent, bu

necessary, and err•• therein the other way; for he says in effect that many things are, which are not; for it is all one to say they are not contingent, and they are not. He should have said there be many things, the necessity of whose contingence, we cannot or do not know.

(e) [But whether there be a necessary connection of all na∣tural causes from the beginning, so as they must all have con∣curred as they have done, &c. Would require a further exami∣nation, if it were pertinent to this question of Liberty; but it is not. It is sufficient to my purpose to have shewed, &c.] If there be a necessary connection o•• all natural causes from the be∣ginning, ••hen there is no doubt but ••hat all things happen necessa∣rily which is that, that I have all this while maintained. But whether there be or no, he says it requires a further exa••inatio••. Hitherto therefore; he knows ••ot whether it be true or no, and co••se∣qu••n••l•• all his arguments hitherto have been ••f no effect▪ nor hath he shewed an•• thing to prov (what he purposed) that elective Acti∣ons are n••t necessitated▪ And whereas a little before he says, that to my Arguments, to prove that sufficient causes are necessary, he hath already answered, it seemeth he distrusteth his own answer, and answers again to the two instances of casting Ambs••ace, and raining or not raining to morrow; but brings no other Argu∣ment to prove the cast thrown not to be necessarily thrown, but this, that he doe not deliberate whether he shall throw that cast or not. Which Argument may perhaps prove that the casting of it pro∣ceedeth not from free will, but proves not any thing against the antecedent, necessity of it. And to prove that it is not necessary, that it should rain or not rain to morrow, after telling us that the Aethiopian rains cause the inundation of Nilus; that in some Eastern Countries they have rain onely twice a year, which the Scripture (he saith) calleth the former and the latter rain. (I thought he had known it by the experience of some Travellers, but I see he onely gathereth it from that Phrase in Scripture of former and latter rain) I say after he has told us this, to prove that it is not necess••ry it should rain or not rain to morrow, he saith that in our Climate, the natural causes celestial and sublunary do not produce rain so necessarily at set times, as in the Eastern Coun∣tries; neither can we say so certainly and infallibly, it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to morrow. By this Argument, a

man may take the height of the Bishops Logick. In our Climate the natural causes do not produce rain so necessarily at set times as in some Eastern Countries. Therefore they do not produce rain necessarily in our Climate, then when they do produce it. And again we cannot say so certainly and infalli∣bly, it will rain to morrow, or it will not rain to morrow, therefore it is not necessary either that it should rain, or that it should not rain to morrow; as if nothing were necessary the necessity whereof we know not. Another reason he saith, why my instances are impertinent, is because they extend onely to an Hypothetical necessity, that is, that the necessity is not in the antecedent causes, and thereupon challengeth me for the credit of my cause, to name some reason, how the caster was necessitated from without himself to apply just so much force to the cast, and neither more nor lesse; or what necessity there was why the caster must throw into that Table rather then the other, or that the Dice must fall just upon that part of the Table, before the cast was thrown. Here again from our ignorance of the particular causes that concurring make the necessity, he inferreth that there was no such necessity at all; which indeed is that which hath in all this question deceived him and all other men, that attribute events to fortune. But I suppose he will not deny that event to be necessa∣ry where all the causes of the cast, and their concurrence, and the cause of that concurrence are foreknown, and might be told him, though I cannot tell him. Seeing therefore God foreknows them all, the cast was necessary, ▪and that from antecedent causes from eternity, which is no Hypothetical necessity.

And whereas my argument to prove, that raining to morrow, if it shall then rain, and not raining to morrow if it shall then not rain, was herefore necessary because otherwise this disjun∣tive proposition, it shall rain or not rain to morrow, is not ne∣cessary, he answereth that a conjunct proposition, may have both parts false and yet the proposition be true, as if the Sun shine it is day, is a true proposition at midnight. What has a conjunct proposition to do with this in question, which is disiunctive? Or what be the parts of this proposition, if the Sun shine it is day? It is not made of two propositions, as a disjunctive is; but is one s••••ple proposition, namely this, the shining of the Sun is day. Either

he has no Logick at all, or thinks they have no reason at all that are his readers. But he has a trick he saith to abate the edge of the dis∣junction, by varying the proposition thus, I know that it will rain to morrow, or that it will not rain to morrow, is a true propo∣sition; and yet saith he, it is neither true, that I know it will rain to morrow; neither is it true, that I know it will not rain to morrow. What childish deceit, or childish ignorance is this, when he is to prove that neither of the members is determinately true in a disjunctive proposition, to bring for instance a proposition not dis∣junctive? It had been disjunctive if it had gone thus, I know that it will rain to morrow, or I know that it will not rain to morrow; but then he had certainly known determinately one of the two.

(f) [And therefore to say either this or that will infallibly be, but it is not yet determined whether this or that shall be, is no such senselesse assertion, that it deserved a Tity ricè Tupatu∣licè.] But it is a senselesse assertion (whatsoever it deserve) to say that this proposition, it shall rain or not rain is true indeter∣minedly, and neither of them true determinedly; and little better as he hath now qualified it, That it will infallibly be, though it be not yet determined whether it shall be or no.

(g) [If all this will not satisfie him, I will give him one of his own kinds of proof, that is an instance. That which ne∣cessitates all things according to T. H. is the decree of God, &c. His instance is, that God himself made this necessitating de∣cree, and therefore this decree being an act ad extra was freely made by God, without any necessitation.] I do believe the Bishop himself believeth that all the Decrees of God have been from all eternity, and therefore he will not stand to this that Gods Decrees were ever made; for whatsoever hath been made, hath had a be∣ginning. Besides Gods Decree is his Will; and the Bishop hath said formerly that the Will of God is God, the Justice of God, God, &c. If therefore God made a Decree (according to the Bishops opinion) God made himself. By which we may see what fine stuffe it is that proceedeth from disputing of Incomprehensibles. Again he says, if it had been the good pleasure of God, he might have made some causes free from necessity, seeing that it nei∣ther argues any imperfection, nor implies any contradiction. If God had made either causes or effects free from necessity, he had

made the•••• free from his own Praescience, which had been imper∣fection. Perhaps he will say, that in these words of his, the de∣cree being an act ad extra was freely made by God, I take no notice of that act ad extra, as being too hot for my fingers. There∣fore now I take notice of it, and say, that it is neither Lati••, nor English, nor Sense.

T. H.

THe last thing▪ in which also consisteth the whole controversy,* 1.53 Namely, that there is no such thing as an Agent, which when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it, or (which is all one, that there is no such thing as freedom from necessity, is easily inferred from that which hath been before alledged. For, if it be an Agent, it can work, And if it work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action, and consequently▪ the cause of the action is sufficient. And if sufficient, then also necessary, as hath been proved before.

J. D.

I Wonder that T. H. should confess, that the whole weight of this controversy doth rest upon this proposition. That there is no such thing as an Agent, which, when all things requi∣site to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to act; And yet bring nothing but such poor Bull-rushes to support it. (a)▪ If it be an Agent (saith he) it can work, what of this? A posse ad esse non valet argumentum, from can work, to will work, is a weak inference. And from will work, to doth work upon ab∣solute necessity, is another gross inconsequence. He proceeds thus, I•• it work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action. True, there wants nothing to produce that which is produced, but there may want much to produce that which was intended, One horse may pull his heart out, and yet not draw the Coach whither it should be, if he want the help or concurrence of his fellows. And consequently (saith he) the cause of the action is sufficient. Yes sufficient to do what it doth, though perhaps with much prejudice to it self, but not alwayes sufficient to do what it should do, or what it would do. As he that begets a Monster should beget a man, and would beget a

man, if he could: The last link of his argument follows; (b) And if sufficient, then also necessary. Stay there; by his leave there is no necessary connexion between sufficiency and effi∣ciency, otherwise God himself should not be All-sufficient▪ Thus his Argument is vanished: But I will deal more favoura∣bly with him, and grant him all that, which he labours so much in vain to prove, That every effect in the world hath sufficient causes: Yea more▪ that supposing the determination of the free and contingent causes, every effect in the world is necessa∣ry. (c) But all this will not advantage his cause the black of a bean, for still it amounts but to an hypothetical necessity▪ and differs as much from that absolute necessity, which he main∣tains, as a Gentleman, who travels for his pleasure, differs from a banished man, or a free Subject from a slave.

Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb. XXXV.

(a) [IF it be an Agent (saith he) it can work, what of this? A posse ad esse non valet argumentum from can work to will work is a weak inference. And from will work, to doth work upon absolute necessity, is another grosse inconse∣quence.] Here he has gotten a just advantage, for I should have said, if it be an Agent it worketh, not it can work▪ But it is an advantage, which profiteth little to his cause; for if I repeate my argument again in this manner, that which is an Agent worketh; that which worketh wanteth nothing requisite to produce the action▪ or the effect it produceth; and consequently is thereof a sufficient cause; and if a sufficient cause, then also a necessary cause, his answer will be nothing to the purpose. For whereas to these words, that which worketh wanteth nothing requisite to produce the action or the effect it produceth, he answereth, it is true, but there may want much to produce that which was in∣tended, it is not contrary to any thing that I have said. For I never maintained that whatsoever a man intendeth is necessarily performed; but this, whatsoever a man performeth i•• necessarily performed, and what he intendeth, necessarily intended and that,

from causes antecedent. And therefore to say as he doth, that the cause is sufficient to do what it doth, but not alwayes sufficient to do what a man should or would do, is to say the same that I do. For I say not that the cause that bringeth forth a Monster, is sufficient to bring forth a man, but that every cause is sufficient to produce onely the effect it produceth. And if sufficient, then also ne∣cessary.

(b) [And if sufficient, then also necessary; stay there, by his leave there is no necessary connection between sufficiency, and efficiency, otherwise God himself should not be All sufficient.] All sufficiency signifieth no more, when it is attributed to God then Omnipotence, and Omnipotence signifieth no more then the Power to do all things that he will. But to the production of any thing that is produced, the Will of God is as requisite, as the rest of his Power and sufficiency. And consequently, his all sufficiency signifieth not a sufficiency or Power to do those thing he will not. But he will deal he says so favourably with me, as to grant me all this, which I labour he saith so much in vain to prove, and adds▪

(c) [But all this will not advantage his cause the black of a Bean, for still it amounts but to an Hypothetical necessity.] If it prove no more; it proves no necessity at all; for by Hypothe∣tical necessity he means the necessity of this proposition, the effect is, then when it is, whereas necessity is onely said truely of some∣what in future. For necessary is that which cannot possibly be other∣wise, and possibility is alwayes understood of some future time. But seeing he granteth so favourably, that sufficient causes are necessary causes, I shall easily conclude from it, that whatsoever those causes do cause, are necessary antecedently. For if the necessity of the thing produced, when produced, be in the same instant of time, with the existence of its immediate cause, then also that immediate cause was in the same instant with the cause by which it was immediately produced; the same may be said of the cause of this cause, and so backward eternally; from whence it will follow that all the con∣nection of the causes of any effect from the beginning of the World, were altogether existent in one and the same instant, and conse∣quently all the time from the beginning of the World or from Eter∣nity to this day is but one instant, or a Nunc stans, which he knows, by this time is not so.

T. H.

AND thus you see how the inconveniences, which he ob∣jecteth* 1.54 must follow upon the holding of necessity, are avoided, and the necessity it self demonstratively proved. To which I could add, if I thought it good Logick, the inconvenience of denying ne∣cessity, as that it destroyes both the Decrees and Prescience of God Almighty; for whatsoever God hath purposed to bring to pass by man as an instrument, or foreseeth shall come to passe, A man, if he have Liberty, such as he affirmeth from necessitation, might fru∣strate, and make not to come to pass. And God should either not foreknow it, and not Decree it, or he should foreknow such things shall be as shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass.

J. D.

THus he hath laboured in vain to satisfie my reasons, and to prove his own assertion. But for demonstration there is nothing like it among his Arguments. Now he saith, (a) he could add other Arguments, if he thought it good Logick. There is no impediment in Logick, why a man may not press his Adversary with those absurdities which flow from his opi∣on, Argumentum ducens ad impossible, or, ad absurdum, is a good form of reasoning. But there is another reason of his forbearance, though he be loth to express it.—Haeret lateri laethal•••• arund••. The Arguments drawn from the attributes of God do stick so close in the sides of his cause, that he hath no mind to treat of that subject. By the way take notice of his own confession, that he could add oth••r reasons, if he thought it good Logick. If it were predetermined in the outward causes, that ••e must make this very defence and no other, how could it be in his power to add or substract any thing. Just as if a blind∣man should say in earnest, I could see, if I had mine eyes: Truth often breaks out, whilst men s••e•• to smother it. (b) But let us view his Argument: If a man have liberty from necessitation, he may frustrate the Decrees of God, and make his prescience false. First, for the Decrees of God▪ This is his Decree, that man should be a free Agent; If he did consider God, as a most

simple Act without priority, or posteriority of time, or any composition, He would not conceive of his Decrees, as of the Laws of the Modes and Persians, long since enacted, and passed before we were born, but as coexistent with our selves, and with the acts which we do, by vertue of those Decrees. De∣crees and Attributes are but notions to help the weakness of our understanding to conceive of God. The Decrees of God, are God himself, and therefore justly said to be before the foundation of the world was laid. And yet coexistent with our selves, because of the Infinite and Eternal being of God. The summe is this, The Decree of God, or God himself Eternally constitutes or ordaines all effects which come to pass in time, according to the distinct natures or capacities of his creatures. An Eternal Ordination, is neither past nor to come, but al∣wayes present. So free actions do proceed, as well from the Eternal Decree of God, as necessary; and from that order which he hath set in the world.

As the Decree of God is Eternal, so is his Knowledge. And therefore to speak truely and properly, there is neither fore∣knowledge nor after-knowledge in him. The Knowledge of God comprehends all times in a point by reason of the emi∣nence and vertue of its infinite perfection. And yet I confess, that this is called fore knowledge, in respect of us. But this fore-knowledge doth produce no absolute necessity. Things are not therefore, because they are fore known, but therefore they are fore-known, because they shall come to pass. If any thing should come to pass otherwise than it doth, yet Gods knowledge could not be irritated by it, for then he did not know that it should come to pass, as now it doth. Because every knowledge of vision necessarily presupposeth its object. God did know, that Judas should betray Christ; but Judas was not necessitated to be a traitor by Gods knowledge. If Judas had not betrayed Christ, then God had not fore-known that Judas should betray him. The case is this; A watch-man stand∣ing on the steeples-top, ••as it is the use in Germany, gives no∣tice to them below (who see no such things) that company are coming, and how many; His prediction is most certain, for he sees them. What a vain collection were it for one below

to say, what if they do not come, then a certain prediction may fail. It may be urged, that there is a difference between these two cases. In this case the coming is present to the Watch∣man, but that which God fore-knows is future. God knows what shall be; The Watch-man onely knows what is. I an∣swer, that this makes no difference at all in the case, by reason of that disparity which is between Gods knowledge and ours▪ As that coming is present to the Watch-man, which is future to them who are below: So all those things, which are future to us, are present to God, because his Infinite and Eternal know∣ledge doth reach to the future being of all Agents and events. Thus much is plainly acknowledged by T. H. Numb. 11. That fore-knowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on the exi∣stence o•• the things known, and not they on it. To conclude, the prescience of God doth not make things more necessary, than the production of the things themselves; But if the Agents were free Agents, the production of the things doth not make the events to be absolutely necessary, but onely upon supposi∣tion that the causes were so determined. Gods prescience pro∣veth a necessity of infallibility, but not of antecedent extrinse∣call determination to one. If any event should not come to pass, God did never foreknow, that it would come to pass. For every knowledge necessarily presupposeth its object.

Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb. XXXVI.

(a) [HE could add he saith other Arguments, if he thought it good Logick, &c. There is no impedi∣ment in Logick, why a man may not presse his adversary with those absurdities which flow from his opinion.] Here he miss re∣cites my words, which are I could add, if I thought it good Lo∣gick, the inconvenience of denying necessity, as that it destroys both the Decrees, and Prescience of God Almighty. But he makes me say I could add other Arguments; then inferrs▪ that there is no impediment in Logick, why a man may not presse his adversary with the absurdities that flow from his opinion, because

Argumentum ducèns ad impossibile, is a good form of reason∣ing; making no difference, between absurdities which are impossi∣bilities, and inconveniences, which are not onely possible but fre∣quent. And though it be a good form of reasoning to argue from absurdities, yet it •• no good form of reasoning, to argue from in∣conveniences; for inconvenience may stand well enough with truth.

(b) [But let us view his Argument; If a man have Liberty from necessitation, he may frustrate the Decrees of God, and make his Praescience false. This is his Decree, that man should be a free Agent. If he did consider God as a most simple Act with∣out priority or posteriority of time, or any composition, he would not conceive of his Decrees, as long since enacted, but as coexistent with our selves.] Here again, he would have me conceive eternity to be Nunc stans, that is an instant of time, and that instant of time to be God, which neither he nor I can conceive, nor can without impiety say, as he doth here, that the Decrees of God are God; In which consisteth all the rest of his Answer to this Number, saving that he putteth in sometimes, that the fore∣knowledge of God produceth not necessity, which is granted him; but that any thing can be foreknown, which shall not necessa∣rily c••me to passe, which was not granted, ••e proveth no otherwise then by his assertion, that every instant of time is God; which is denyed him.

T. H.

THis is all that hath come in••o my mind touching this question,* 1.55 since I last considered it And I ••umbly bes••ech your ••ord∣sh••p ••o communicat it onely to J. D. And so praying Goa to pro∣sper your Lordship in all your designs, I take leave and am my most Noble and obliging Lord.

Your most humble Servant T. H.

J. D.

HE is very careful to have this discourse kept secret, as ap∣pears in this Section, and in the 14. and 15. Sections, If his

answer had been kept private, I had saved the labour of a Re∣ply. But hearing that it was communicated, I thought my self obliged to vindicate, both the truth and my self. I do not blame him to be cautious, for in truth, this assertion is of desperate consequence, and destructive to piety, policy, and morality. (a) If he had desired to have kept it secret, the way had been to have kept it secret himself. It will not suffice to say as Numb. 14. that Truth is Truth; This the common plea of all men. Neither is it sufficient for him to say, as Numb. 15. That it was desired by me, long before that he had discovered his opi∣nion by word of mouth. And my desire was to let some of my noble friends see the weakness of his grounds, and the perni∣cious consequences of that opinion. (b) But if he think that this ventilation of the question between us two may do hurt, truely I hope not. The edge of his discourse is so abated, that it cannot easily hurt any rational man, who is not too much possessed with prejudice.

Animadversions upon the Answer to Numb. XXXVII.

IN this place I said nothing, but that I would have my L. of N. to communicate it onely to the Bishop. And in his answer he says.

(a) [If I had desired to have it kept secret, the way had been to have kept it secret my self] My desire was it should not be communicated by my L. of N. to ••ll men indifferently. But I barred not my sel•• from showin it priv••t••ly t•• my friends; though to publish it was never my intention▪ till new provo••ed by the ••nci∣v••l•• tri••nphing of the Bishop, in his own errours to my disad∣vantage

(b) [But if he think that this ventilation of the question may do hurt, truely I hope not. The edge of his discourse i•• so abated, that it cannot easily hurt any rational man, who is not too much possessed w••••h prejudice.] It is confidently said but not very pertinently to the h••rt I thou•••••• might proceed from a discourse of this nature. For I nevrr thought it could do hurt ••o a

rational man, but onely to such men as cannot reason in those points which are of difficult contemplation; for a rational man will say with himself, they whom God will b••ing to a blessed and happy end, those he will put into an humble, pious and Righteous way; and of those whom he will destroy, he will harden the hearts; and there∣upon examining himself, whether he be in such a way or not, the examination it self would (if elected) be a necessary cause of wor∣king out his salvation with fear and trembling. But the men who I thought might take hurt thereby, are such as reason erroneously, saying with themselves, if I shall be saved, I shall be saved whe∣ther I walk uprightly or no, and consequently thereunto shall be have themselves negligently, and pursue the pleasant way o•• the sins they are in love with. Which inconvenience is not abated by this discourse of the Bishop, because they understand not the grounds he goeth on, of Nunc stans, motus primo primi, Elicite Acts, Im∣perate Acts, and a great many other such unintelligible words.

T. H.

POstscript. Arguments seldom work on men of wit and learn∣ing,* 1.56 when they have once ingaged themselves in a contrary opi∣nion. If any thing do it, it is the shewing of them the causes of their errours, which is this; Pious men attribute to God Almighty for honour sake, whatsoever they see is honourable in the World, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, Justice, Wisedom, &c. But deny him such poor things as eyes, ears, brains, and other organs, without which, we worms, neither have, nor can conceive such faculties to be; and so far they do well. But when they dispute of Gods actions Philosophically, then they consider them again, as if he had such faculties, and in that manner, as we have them. This is not well; and thence it is they fall into so many difficulties. We ought n••t to dispute of Gods Nature, he is no fit subject of our Philosophy. True Religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's Lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their several ••ieu enancies shall ordain.

J. D.

THough Sophistical captions do seldom work on men of wit and learning, because by constant use they have their senses exercised to discern both good and evill, Heb. 5. 14. Yet (a) so∣lide and substantial reasons work sooner upon them than upon weaker judgments. The more exact the balance is, the sooner it discovers the reall weight that is put into it. Especially if the proofs be proposed without passion or opposition. Let Sophi∣sters and seditious Orators apply themselves to the many headed multitude, because they despair of success with men of wit and learning. Those whose gold is true, are not afraid to have it tryed by the touch. Since the former way hath not succeeded, T. H. hath another to shew, as the causes of our errours, which he hopes will prove more successful. When he sees he can do no good by fight, he seeks to circumvent us, under colour of curtesy, Fistula dulce canit volucrem dum decipit auceps. As they, who behold themselves in a glass, take the right hand for the left, and the left for the right, (T. H. knows the comparison) so we take our own errours to be truths, and other mens truths to be errours. (b) If we be in an errour in this, it is such an errour as we sucked from nature it self, such an errour as is confirmed in us by reason and experience, such an errour as God himself in his sacred Word hath revealed, such an errour as the Fathers and Doctors of the Church in all ages have delivered, Such an errour wherein we have the concur∣rence of all the best Philosophers, both Natural and Moral, such an errour as bringeth to God, the glory of Justice, and Wisedom, and Goodness, and Truth, such an errour as renders men more devour, more pious, more industrious more humble, more penitent for their sins. Would he have us resign up all these advantages to dance blindfold after his pipe. No, he perswades us too much to our loss. But let us see what is the imaginary cause of our imaginary errour. Forsooth, because we attribute to God whatsoever is honourable in the World, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, Justice, Wisedom, but deny him such poor things, as eyes, ears, brains, and so far he saith we do well. He hath reason, for since we are not able

to conceive of God as he is, the readiest way we have, is by re∣mooving all that imperfection from God, which is in the crea∣tures. So we call him Infinite, Immortal, Independent. Or by attributing to him all those perfections, which are in the creatures after a most eminent manner, so we call him Best, Greatest, most Wise, most Just, most Holy. (c) But saith he, When they dispute of Gods actions Philosophically, then they consi∣der them again, as if he had such faculties, and in the manner as we have them.

And is this the cause of our errour? That were strange in∣deed, for they who dispute Philosophically of God, do neither ascribe faculties to him in that manner that we have them, Nor yet do they attribute any proper faculties at all to God. Gods Understanding, and his Will is his very Essence, which for the eminency of its infinite perfection, doth perform all those things alone, in a most transcendent manner, which reasonable creatures do perform imperfectly, by distinct faculties Thus to dispute of God with modesty, and reverence, and to clear the Deity from the imputation of tyranny, injustice, and dissi∣mulation, which none do throw upon God with more pre∣sumption, than those who are the Patrons of absolute necessi∣ty, is both comely and Christian.

It is not the desire to discover the original of a supposed er∣rour, which drawes them ordinarily into these exclamations against those who dispute of the Deity. For some of them∣selves dare anatomise God, and publish his Eternal Decrees with as much confidence, as if they had been all their lives of his cabinet councel. But it is for fear, lest those pernicious consequences, which flow from that doctrine essentially, and reflect in so high a degree upon the supreme goodness▪ should be laid open to the view of the world; Just as the Turks do, first establish a false Religion of their own devising, and then forbid all men upon pain of death to dispute upon Religion; Or as the Priests of ••olech, the Abhomination of the Ammo∣nites) did, make a noise with their timbrells all the while the poor Infants were passing through the fire in Tophet, to keep their pitiful cries from the ears of their Parents: So (d) they make a noise with their declamations against those, who dare

dispute of the Nature of God▪ that is, who dare set forth ••••s Justice, and his goodness, and his truth, and his Philanthropy, onely to deaf the ears, and dim the eyes of the Christian world, lest they should hear the lamentable ejulations and howlings, or see that rueful spectacle of millions of souls tormented for evermore (e) in the flames of the true Tophet, that is Hell, onely for that which according to T. H. his doctrine was never in their power to shun, but which they were ordered and inevita∣bly necessitated to do, onely to express the omnipotence and dominion, and to satisfie the pleasure of him, who is in truth the Father of all mercies, and the God o•• all consolation. (f) This is life eternal (saith our Saviour)▪ to know the onely true God and Jesus Christ, whom he hath sent, Joh. 17. 3. Pure Reli∣gion and und filed before God, and the Father, is this, to visite the fatherless and widowes in their affliction, and to keep himself un∣spotted from the world, saith S••. James▪ Jam. 1. 27. Fear God and ke••p his Commandments, for this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the whole duty of man, saith Solomon, ••c••les. 12. 13. But T. H. hath found out a more compendious way to heaven: True Religion (saith he) consi∣steth in obedience to Christs Lieutenants, and giving God such ho∣nou•• both in attributes and ••••••ions, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 they in their several Lieute∣nanc•••••• sha•• ordain That is to say, ••e of the Religion of every Christian Country where you come▪ To make the Ci∣vill Magistrate to be Christs Lieutenant upon earth, for matters of Religion▪ And to make him to be Supreme Judge in all controversies, whom all must obey▪ is a Doctrine so strange, and such an uncouth phrase to Christian ears, that I should have missed his meaning, but that I consulted with his Book, De Civ. c. 15. Sect. 16. and c. 17. Sect. 28. What if the Magistrate shall be no Christiam himself? What if he shall command contrary to the Law of God, or Nature, Must we obey him rather than God? Act. 14. 19. Is the Civill Magistrate become now the onely ground and pillar of Truth? I demand then why T. H. is of a different mind from his Soveraign, and from the Laws of the Land con∣cerning the Attributes of God and his Decrees? This is a new Paradox, and concerns not this question of liberty, and necessity? Wherefore I forbear to prosecute it fur∣ther,

and so conclude my reply with the words of the Chri∣stian Poet.

Caesaris jussum est ore Galieni Princeps quod colit ut colimus omnes. Aeternum colemus Principem dierum, Factorem Dominum{que} Galieni.

Animadversions upon the Answer to the Postscript Numb. XXXVIII.

HE taketh it ill that I say that Arguments do seldome work on men of wit and learning, when they have once engaged themselves in a contrary opinion Neverthelesse it is not onely cer∣tain by experience, but also there is reason for it, and that grounded upon the natural disposition of mankind. For it is natural to all men to defend those opinions, which they have once publickly enga∣ged themselves to maintain, because to have that detected for er∣rour, which they have publickly maintained for truth, is never without some dishonour more or lesse; and to find in themselves that they have spent a great deal of time and labour, in deceiving them∣selves, is so uncomfortable a thing, as it is no wonder, if they imploy their wit and learning, if they have any, to make good their er∣rours. And therefore where he saith,

(a) [Solid and substantial reasons work sooner upon them, then upon weaker judgments. And that the more exact the ballance is, the sooner it discovers the real weight that is put into it.] I confess the more solid a mans wit is, the better will solid reasons work upon him. Bu if he add to i•• that which he calls learning, that is to say, much reading of other mens Doctrines, without weighing them with his own thoughts, then their judge∣ments become weaker, and the ballance lesse exact. And whereas he saith, that they whose Gold is true are not afraid to have it tryed by the touch, he speaketh as if •• had been afraid to have my Do∣ctrine tryed by the touch of men of wit and learning; wherein he is not much mistaken, meaning by men of learning (as I said before)

such as had read other men, but not themselves. For by reading others, men commonly obstruct the w••y to their own exact and na∣tural judgement, and use their wit both to deceive themselves with Fallac••s & ••or quite those who endeavour (at their own intreaty) to instruct them, with revilings.

(b) [If we be in an errour, it is such an errour as is sucked from nature; as is confirmed by Reason, by Experience and by Scripture; as the Fathers and Doctors of the Church of all ages have delivered; an errour wherein we have the concur∣rence of all the best Philosophers, an errour that bringeth to God the Glory of Justice, &c. that renders men more devout, more plous, more humble, more industrious, more penitent for their sins.] All this is b••t said; and what heretofore hath been offered in proof for it, hath been sufficiently refuted, and the contrary proved; namely, that it is an errour contrary to the na∣ture of the Will; repugnant to reason and experience; repugnant to the Scripture; repugnant to the Doctrine of St. Paul, and tis p••••ty that the Fathers and Dictors of the Church have not followed St. Paul therein; an errour not maintained by the best Philoso∣phers, (for they are not th•• b••st Philosophers which the Bishop thinketh so) an errour that ta••••t•• from God the Glory of his Prae∣science, nor bringeth to him the glory of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 other Attribute; an errour that maketh men, by imagining they can repent when they will, neglect their duties, ••n that maketh m••n ••nt••an ful for Gods graces, by thinking them to proceed from the natural ability of their own will.

(c) But saith he when they dispute of Gods Actions Philosophi∣cally, then they consider them again, as if he had such faculties, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 such manner as we have them. And is this the cause of our errour? That were strange indeed; for they who dispute Philosophically of God, do neither ascribe faculties to him▪ in that manner that we have them, No•• yet do they attribute any proper faculties at all to God. Gods understanding and his will is his very essence, &c. Me thinks he should have known at these years that to dispute Philosophically is to dispute by natu∣rall reason, and from principles evident by the light of •…•…re, and to dispute of the faculties and proprieties of the subject w••••reo•• they treat. It is therefore unskilfully said by him, that they who dispute

Philosophically of God, ascribe unto him no proper faculties. If 〈…〉〈…〉▪ proper faculties, I would fain know of him what improper faculties▪ he ascribes to God. I guesse he will make the understanding and the Will, and his other Attributes to be in God improper faculties▪ because he cannot properly call them faculties, that is to say he knows not how to make it good that they are faculties, and yet he will have these words, Gods▪ Understanding and his Will are his very Essence, to passe for an Axiome of Philosophy; And Where∣as I had said, we ought not to dispute of Gods nature, and that he is no ••it subject of our Philosophy, he den••es it not, but says I say it,

(d) [With a purpose to make a noise with declaiming against those, who dare dispute of the nature of God▪ that is, who dare set forth his Justice; and his goodness, &c. The Bishop will have much a do to make good, that to dispute of the nature of God, is alone with setting forth his Justice, and his goodness. He taketh n•• notice of these words of mine, pi••••s men attribute to God. Almighty for honours sake, whatsoever they see is▪ honourable in the World; and yet this is setting forth Gods Justice, Goodness, &c. without disputing of Gods nature.

(e) [In the flames of the true Tophet, that is Hell.] The true Tophet was a place not far from the Walls of Jerusalem, and consequently on the Earth; I cannot imagine what he will say to this in his Answer to my Leviathan, if there he find the same, un∣lesse he say that in this place by the true Tophet, he meant a not true Tophet.

(f) [This is life eternal (saith our Saviour) to know the onely true God, and Jesus Christ, &c.] This which followeth to the end of his Answer and of the Book, is a reprehension of me, for saying that true Religion consisteth in obedience to Christs Lieutenants. If it be Lawful for Christians to institute amongst themselves a Common wealth, and Magistrates, whereby they may be able to live in peace one with another, and unite themselves in defence against a forraign enemy, it will certainly be necessary to make to themselves some supreme Judge in all controversies to whom they ought all to give obedience, and this is no such strange Doctrine, nor so uncouth a Phrase to Christian ears, as the Bishop makes it, whatsoever it be to them, that would make themselves Judges of the supreme Judge himself. No, but (saith he) Christ

is the supreme Judge, and we are not to obey men rather than God▪ Is there any Christian m••n, that do••s not acknowledge that we are to be judged by Christ▪ or that we ought not to obey him rather then any man, that shall be his Lieutenant upon earth? The question therefore is, not of who is to be obeyed, but of what be his com∣mands. If the Scripture contain his commands, then may every Christian know by them what they are; and what has the Bishop to do with what God says to me when I read them, more then I have to do with what God says to him when he reads them, unlesse he have Authority given him by him whom Christ hath constituted his Lieutenant? This Lieutenant upon earth I say is the supreme ci∣vill Magistrate, to whom belongeth the care and charge of seeing that no Doctrine may be thaught the people, but such as may con∣sist with the general Peace of them all, and with the obedience, that is due to the civil Soveraign. In whom would the Bishop have the Authority reside of prohibiting seditious opinions, when they are taught (as they are often) in Divinity Books, and from the Pul∣pit? I could hardly guesse, but that I remember that there have been Books written to intitle the Bishops to a Divine right, unde∣rived from the civil Soveraign. But because he maketh it so ••ay∣nous a matter, that the supreme civil Magistrate should be Christs Lieutenant upon earth, let us suppose that a Bishop, or a Synode of Bishops should be set up (which I hope never shall) for our civil Soveraign; then that which he objecteth here; I could object in the same words against himself. For I could say in his o••n words, This is life eternal to know the onely true God, and Jesus Christ, Joh. 17. 3. Pure Religion, and undefiled before God is this, to visit the Fatherless, &c. James 1. 27. Fear God and keep his Commandments, Eccles. 12. 13. But the Bishop hath found a more compendious way to Heaven, namely, that true Reli∣gion consisteth in obedience to Christs, Lieutenants that is (now by supposition) to the Bishops; That is to say, that every Christian of what nation soever, coming into the Country which the Bishop•• governe, should be of their Religion. He would make the civil Magistrate to be Christs Lieutenant upon earth for matters of Re∣ligion, and supreme Judge in all controversies, and say they ought to be obeyed by al, how strange soever and uncouth it seem to him now, the Soveraignity being in others. And I may say to him, what

if the Magistrate himself, I mean by supposition the Bishops should be wicked 〈…〉〈…〉▪ What if they should command as much contrary to the •…•…w of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 o•• nature as every any Christian King did (which is very possible) must▪ we obey them rather then God? Is the ci∣vill Magistrate become now the onely ground and p••••lar of truth? No.

Synedri jussum est voce Episcoporum Ipsum quod colit ut colamus omnes. Aeternum colemus Principem dierum Factorem Dominum{que} Epilcoporum.

And thus the Bishop▪ may see, there is 〈…〉〈…〉 difference between his▪ Ode and my ••arode to it, and that both of them are of equal force 〈◊〉〈◊〉 conclud nothin••.

The Bishop knows that the Kings of England since the time of Henry the 8. have been 〈…〉〈…〉 by 〈…〉〈…〉 Parliament supream Governors o•• the Church of England▪ in 〈…〉〈…〉 both civil and Ecclesiastical▪ that is to say 〈…〉〈…〉 matters both Ecclesiastical and civil, an•• consequently o•• this Church, Supreme head on Earth, though perhaps he will not allow that 〈…〉〈…〉 me of H••••d. I should won∣der therefore whom the Bishop would have to be Christs Lieute∣nant here in England for matters of Religion▪ if not the supreme Governor ••nd Head of the Church of England, 〈…〉〈…〉 Man or Women whosoever he be▪ that hath the Soveraign Power but that I know he challenges it to the Bishops and thinks tha•• King Henry the 8. took the Ecclesiastical Power away from the Pope, to settle it not in himself but them. But he ought to have known that what 〈…〉〈…〉, or Power o•• Ordai••ing 〈…〉〈…〉, the Pop••s had here in the time of the Kings Predecessours til Henry the 8. they derived it all from the Kings Power▪ though they did not acknowledge it, and the Kings connived at it, either not knowing their own right, or not daring to challenge it, til such ti••e as the behaviour of the Romane Clergie had undeceived the people which otherwise would have sided with them. Nor was it unlawful for the King to take from them, the Authority he had given them, as being Pope enough in his own Kingdome, without depending on a forraign one, nor is it to be called Schisme unlesse it be Schisme also in the head of a

Family to discharge as often 〈◊〉〈◊〉 he shall see cause, the School-Ma∣sters he enter ••ineth to teach his Children. If the Bishop and Dr. Hammond when they did write in defence of the Church of Eng∣land against imputation of Schisme, quitting their own pretences of jurisdiction and Jus divinum, had gone upon these principles of mine, they had not been so shrewdly handled as they have been by an English Papist, that wrote against them. And now I have done answering to his Arguments. I shall here ••n the end of all taee that Liberty of censuring his while Book, which he hath taken, in the beginning, of censuring mine. I have saith he Numb. 1. perused T. H. his answers, considered his reasons▪ and conclude he hath missed, and mi••••aid the question, that his answers are evasions, that his Arguments are ••aralogismes, and that the opinion of ab∣solute and universal necessity is but a 〈…〉〈…〉 some groundless, and ill chosen Principles. And now it is my turn to censure. And first, ••o•• the strength of his discourse, and knowledge of the point in question, I think it much inferiour, to that which might have been written by any man living, that had no other learn∣ing besides the ability to wri••e his mind; but as well perhaps as the same man would have done it if to the ability of writing his mind, he had added the study of School-Divinity. Secondly, for the man∣ners of it (for to a publick writing there belongeth good manners) it consisteth in railing and exclaiming and scurrilous jesting, with now and then an unclean, and mean instance. And lastly for his elocution, the vertue whereof lieth not in the flux of words but in perspicuity, it is the same Language with that of the Kingdome of Darkness. One shall find in it, especially where ••e should speak most closely to the question, such words as these; Divided sense, Compounded sense, Hypothetical necessity, Liberty of Exer∣cise, Liberty of specification, Liberty of contradiction, Liber∣ty of contrariety, Knowledge of approbation, Practical know∣ledge, General influence, Special influence, Instinct, Qualities infused, Efficatious election, Moral efficacy, Moral motion, Metaphorical motion, Practice practicum, Motus primo primi; Actus eliciti, Actus imperati, Permissive will, Consequent will, Negative obduration, Deficient cause▪ Simple act Nunc stans, & other like words of non-sense divided besides many propositions such as th••se, The Will is the Mistris of humane Actions, The under∣standing

i•• her counseller, The Will chuseth, The Will willeth, The Will suspends its own Act, The Understanding understan∣deth (I wonder how he mist saying, The Understanding suspendeth its own Act) The Will applies the understanding to delibe∣rate; The Will requires of the Understanding a riview, The Wil determines it self, A change may be Willed without chang∣ing of the Will, Man concurrs with God in causing his own Will, The Will causeth willing, Motives determine the Will not naturally but morally, The same Action may be both future and not future, God is not Just but Justice, not eternal but eter∣nity, Eternity is Nunc stans▪ Eternity is an infinite point which comprehendeth al time not formally but eminently▪ Al eternity is coexistent with to day, and the same coexistent with to morrow, and many other like speeches of non-sense compounded; Which the truth can never stand in need of. Perhaps the Bishop will say these Terms and Phrases are intelligible enough; for he hath said in his Reply to Numb. 24. that his opinion is demonstrable in rea∣son, though he be not able to comprehend, how i•• consisteth together with Gods eternal Prescience▪ and though it exceed his weak capa∣citie, yet he ought to adhere to that truth which is manifest▪ so that to him, that truth is manifest, ••nd demonstrable by reason, which is beyond his capacity, so that words beyond capacity are with him in∣telligible enough.

But the Reader is to be Judge of that. I could add many other passages that discover both his little Logick (as taking t•••• insig∣nificant word above recited for Terms of Art) a••d hi•• no Philoso∣phy▪ in distinguishing between moral and ••••tur••l•• m••tion▪ and by calling some motions Metaphorical, and his th••r offers at the causes of sight, and of the descent of heavy lies, and his talk of the inclination of the L••ud-stone, and diverse other places of his Book.

But to make an end I shall briefly draw up the sum of what we have both said. That which I have maintained is, that no man hath his future will in his own present power. That it may be changed by others, and by the change of things without him▪ and when it is changed, it is not changed, nor determined to any thing by it self; and that when it is undetermined it is no Will; because every one that willeth willeth something in particular; That deliberation is

common to men with beasts, as being alternate appetite, and not ra∣tiocination, and the last act or appetite therein, and which is imme∣diately followed by the action, the onely will that can be taken no∣tice of by others, and which onely maketh an action in publick judg∣ment voluntary; That to be free is no more then to do if a man will, and if he will to forbear, and consequently that this freedome is the freedome of the man and not of the Will; That the Will is not free, but subject to change by the operation of external causes; That all external causes depend necessarily on the first eternal cause God Almighty▪ who worketh in us both to Will and to do by the media∣tion of second causes; That seeing neither man nor any thing else can work upon it self, it is impossible that any man in the framing of his own Will should concur with God, either as an Actor or as an Instrument; That there is nothing brought to passe by fortune as by a cause, nor any thing without a cause or concurrence of causes sufficient to bring it so to passe, and that every such cause, and their concurrence do proceed from the providence, good pleasure, and working of God, and consequently though I do with others call many events Contingent, and say they happen, yet because they had every of them their several sufficient causes, and those causes again their former causes, I say they happen necessarily; And though we perceive not what they are, yet there are of the most Contingent events as necessary causes as of those events whose causes we per∣ceive, or else they could not possibly be foreknown, as they are by him that foreknoweth all things. On the contrary the Bishop main∣taineth; That the Will is free from necessitation, and in order thereto that the Judgment of the understanding is not alwayes practice practicum, nor of such a nature in it self as to oblige and determine the Will to one, though it be true that Spontaneity and determina∣tion to one may consist together; That the Will determineth it self, and that external things when they change the Will do work upon it, not naturally but morally, not by natural motion but by moral and Metaphorical motion; That when the Will is determined natu∣rally, it is not by Gods general influence, whereon depend all second causes, but by special influence, God concurring and powring some∣thing into the Will; That the Will when it suspends not its Act, makes the Act necessary, but because it may suspend and not assent it is not absolutely necessary; That sinful acts proceed not from

Gods Will, but are willed by him by a permissive Will not an operative Will, and hardeneth the heart of man by a negative ob∣duration; That mans Will is in his own power, but his motus primo primi not in his own power, nor necessary save onely by a Hypothetical necessity; That the Will to change is not always a change of Wil; That not all things which are produced are produced from sufficient, but some things from deficient causes; That if the Power of the Will be present in actu primo, then ther•• is nothing wanting to the production of the effect; That a cause may be suffi∣cient for the production of an effect though it want something ne∣cessary to the production thereof, because the Will may be wanting; That a necessary cause doth not alwayes necessarily produce its effect, but onely then when the effect is necessarily produced. He proveth also, that the Will is free, by that universal notion which the World hath of election; For when of the six electors the votes are divided equally, the King of Bohemia hath a casting voyce; That the Prescience of God supposeth no necessity of the future exi∣stence of the things foreknown, because God is not eternal but eter∣nity, and eternity is as standing Now, without succession of time, and therefore God foresees all things intuitively by the presenti∣allity they have in Nunc stans, which comprehendeth in it all time past, present, and to come, not formally but eminently and vertu∣ally; That the Will is free even then when it acteth, but that is in a compounded, not in a divided sense; That to be made, and to be eternal, do consist together because Gods Decrees are made and are nevertheless eternal; That the order, beauty, and perfection of the World doth require that in the universe there should be Agents of all sorts, some necessary, some free, some contingent; That though it be true that to morrow it shall rain or not rain, yet neither of them is true determinatè; That the Doctrine of necessity is a blasphemous desperate and destructive doctrin••; That it were better to be an Atheist that then to hold it, & he that maintaineth it is fit∣ter to be refuted with Rodds then with Arguments [And now whe∣ther this his Doctrine or mine be the more intelligible, more rational, or more co••••ormable to Gords Word, I leave it to the Judgment of the Reader.

But whatsoever be the truth of the disputed Question the Reader

may peradventure think I have not used the Bishop with that re∣spect I ought, or without disadvantage of my cause I might have done; for which I am to make a short Apologie. A little before the last Parliament of the ••••te King, when every man 〈…〉〈…〉 free∣ly against the then present Government, I thought it worth my study to consider the grounds and consequences of such behaviour, and whether it were conformable or contrary to reason and to the Word of God; and after some time, I did put in order and publish my thoughts thereof, first in Latine, and then again the same in English, where I endeavoured to prove both by reason and Scrip∣ture, That they who have once submitted themselves to any So∣veraign Governour, either by express acknowledgment of his power, or by receiving protection from his Laws, are obliged to be true and faithful to him, and to acknowledge no other supreme power but him in any matter, or question whatsoever, either civill or Eccle∣siastical. In which Books of mine I pursued my subject, without taking notice of any particular man that held any opinion contra∣ry to that which I then writ; onely in general I maintained that the office of the Clergy in respect of the supreme civil power, was not Magisterial, but Ministerial; and that their teaching of the People was founded up n••o other Authority then that of the civil Soveraign; and all this without any word tending to the disgrace either of Episcopacy or of Presbytery. Nevertheless I find since, that divers of them, whereof th•• Bishop of Derry is one, have taken offence especially at two things, one, that I make the supremacy in matters of Religion to resid•• in the civil Soveraign; the other, that being no Clergy-man I deliver Doctrines, and ground them u••on Words of the Scripture, which Doctrines they being by profession Divines have never taught. And in this their displeasure divers of them in their Books and Sermons, without answering any of my Arguments, have not onely excl••i••ed against my Doctrine but reviled me and endeavoured to make me hateful 〈…〉〈…〉 things, for which (if they kn••w their own and the Publick good) they ought to have given me thanks. There is also one of them that ta∣king offence at me for blaming in part the Discipline instituted heretofore, and regulated by the Authority of the Pope in the Uni∣versities, not onely ranks me amongst thos•• men that would have the Revenue of the Universities diminished, and sayes plainly I

have no Religion, but also thinks me so simple and ignorant of the World, as to believe that our Universities maintain Popery. And this is the Author of the Book called Vindiciae Academiarum. If either of the Universities had thought it self injured, I believe it could have Authorised or appointed some member of theirs (whereof there be many abler men then he) to have made their vin••ication. But this Vindex (as little Doggs, to pl••ase their Masters use to bark, in token of their sedulity, indifferently at strangers till they be rated off) unprovoked by me, hath fallen upon me without bidding. I have been publiquely injured by many of whom I took no notice, supposing that that humour would spend it self, but seeing it last, and grow higher in this writing I now answer, I thought it necessa∣ry at last to make of some of them, and first of this Bishop, an Example.

FINIS.

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Notes

• * 1.1

  Numb. 1.
• * 1.2

  Numb. ••.
• * 1.3

  Numb. 3.
• * 1.4

  Numb. 4.
• * 1.5

  Numb. 5.
• * 1.6

  Numb. 6. 1.
• * 1.7

  Arg. 1.
• * 1.8

  1.
• * 1.9

  2.
• * 1.10

  3.
• * 1.11

  Numb 7.
• * 1.12

  1.
• * 1.13

  2.
• * 1.14

  3.
• * 1.15

  4.
• * 1.16

  5.
• * 1.17

  Numb. 8.
• * 1.18

  4.
• * 1.19

  6.
• * 1.20

  7.
• * 1.21

  8.
• * 1.22

  Numb. 10. Arg. 3.
• * 1.23

  Numb. 11. Arg. 4.
• * 1.24

  Numb. 12. Arg. 5.
• * 1.25

  1.
• * 1.26

  2.
• * 1.27

  3.
• * 1.28

  Numb. 13. Arg. 1.
• * 1.29

  Numb. 14. Arg. 2.
• * 1.30

  Numb. 15. Arg. 3.
• * 1.31

  Numb. 16. Arg. 4.
• * 1.32

  Numb. 17. Arg. 5.
• * 1.33

  Numb. 18.
• * 1.34

  1.
• * 1.35

  2.
• * 1.36

  Numb. 19.
• * 1.37

  Num. 20.
• * 1.38

  Num. 21.
• * 1.39

  Num. 22.
• * 1.40

  Num. 23.
• * 1.41

  Num. 24.
• * 1.42

  Num. 25.
• * 1.43

  Num. 26.
• * 1.44

  Num. 28.
• * 1.45

  Num. 29.
• * 1.46

  Num. 30.
• * 1.47

  Num. 31.
• * 1.48

  2.
• * 1.49

  3.
• * 1.50

  Num. 32.
• * 1.51

  Num. 33.
• * 1.52

  Num. 34.
• * 1.53

  Num. 35.
• * 1.54

  Num. 36.
• * 1.55

  Num. 37.
• * 1.56

  Num. 38.