Of libertie and necessitie a treatise, wherein all controversie concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, merits, reprobation, &c. is fully decided and cleared, in answer to a treatise written by the Bishop of London-derry, on the same subject / by Thomas Hobs.

RIGHT HONOURABLE

I Had once resolved to answer my Lord Bi∣shops Objections to my Book De CIVE in the first place as that which concerns me most, and after∣wards to examine his discourse of LIBERTY and NECSSI∣TY, which (because I had never uttered my opinion of it) concern∣ed me the less. But seeing it was your Lordships and my Lord Bishops de∣sire that I should begin with the latter, I was contented so to do, and here I present and submit it to your Lordships judgement.

And first I assure your Lordship

I finde in it no new argument nei∣ther from Scripture nor from Rea∣son, that I have not often heard be∣fore, which is as much as to say, I am not surprized.

The preface is a handsome one, but it appeareth even in that, that he hath mistaken the question. For whereas he sayes thus, If I be free to write this discourse, I have ob∣tained the Cause, I deny that to be true, for 'tis enough to his freedom of writing, that he had not written it unless he would himself. If he will obtain the cause, he must prove that before he writ it, it was not necessa∣ry he should 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it afterward. It may be his Lordship thinks it all one to say; I was free to write it, and It was not necessary I should write it, but I think otherwise; for he is free to do a thing that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may for∣bear, if he have the will to forbear.

And yet if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it, the action is necessarily to follow; and if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to forbear, the for∣bearing also will be necessary. The Question therefore is not whether a man be a free Agent, that is to say, whether he can write or for∣bear, speak or be silent according to his will, but whether the will to write and the will to forbear come upon him according to his will, or according to any thing else in his own power. I acknowledge this Liber∣ty that I can do if I will, but to say, I can will if I willt. I take to be an absurd speech, wherefore I cannot grant my Lord the cause upon his preface.

In the next place he maketh cer∣tain distinctions of Libertie, and saies he meaneth not Libertie from sin, nor from servitude, nor from

violence, but from Necessitie Neces∣sitation, inevitabilitie, and determi∣nation to one.

It had been better to define Liberty than thus to distinguish, for I under∣stand never the more what he means by Libertie, and though he say he means Libertie from necessitation, yet I understand not how such a Libertie can be, and tis a taking of the Question without proof, for what is else the Question between us, but whether such a Liberty be possible or not?

There are in the same place other distinctions, as a Liberty of Exercise onely (which he calls a Libertie of contradiction, namely of doing not good or evil simply, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil respestively) and a Libertie of specification and exercise also (which he calls a Liberty of contrarietie) namely a Liberty not onely to do

good or evil, but also to do or not do this or that good or evil.

And with these Distinctions his Lordship saies he clears the coast, whereas in truth, he darkneth his own meaning and the Question, not onely with the jargon of exer∣cise onely, specification also, contra∣diction, contrarietie, but also with pretending distinction where none is; For how is it possible that the Libertie of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, can consist (as he saies it does in God and good Angels) without a Liberty of doing or not doing good or evil?

The next thing his Lordship does, after clearing of the coast, is the dividing of his forces (as he calls them) into two squadrons, one of places of Scriptures, the other of Reasons, which allegory he useth I suppose, because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship, who is

military man, All that I have to say touching this is, that I observe a great part of those his forces do look and march another way, and some of them fight amongst themselves.

And the first place of Scripture taken from Numb. 30.14. Is one of those that look another way; the words are. If a wife make a vow it is left to her husbands choice either to establish it or make it void. For it proves no more but that the husband is a free and voluntary Agent, but not that his choice therein is not necessitated or not determined to what he shall choose, by precedent necessary causes.

For if there come into the hus∣bands minde greater good by esta∣blishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow necessarily, and if the evil that will follow in the husbands opinion out∣weigh the good, the contrary must

needs follow, and yet in this follow∣ing of ones hopes and fears consist∣eth the nature of Election. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this, and conse∣quently choosing and necessity are joyned together.

The second place of Scripture is Joshua 24.15. The third is 2 Sam. 24.12. whereby 'tis clearly proved, that there is election in man, but not proved, that such election was not necessitated by the hopes, and fears, and considerations of good and bad to follow, which depend not on the will, nor are subject to election. And therefore one answer serves all such places, if there were a thousand.

But his Lordship supposing, it seems, I might answer as I have done, that necessity and election might stand together, and instance in the actions of children, fools, or bruit beasts, whose fancies, I might say, are

necessitated and determined to one; before these his proofs out of Scri∣pture desires to prevent that in∣stance, and therefore saies that the actions of children, fools, mad men, and beasts, are indeed determined, but that they proceed not from election, nor from free, but from Spontaneous Agents. As for exam∣ple that the Bee, when it maketh hony, does it Spontaneously, and when the Spider makes his web, he does it Spontaneously but not by election.

Though I never meant to ground my Answer upon the experience of what Children, Fools, Mad men, and Beasts do, yet that your Lord∣ship may understand what can be meant by Spontaneous, and how it differeth from voluntary, I will answer that distinction, and shew that it fighteth against its fellow Arguments.

Your Lordship therefore is to

consider, that all voluntary actions, where the thing that induceth the will is not fear, are called also spon∣taneous, and said to be done by a mans own accord. As when a man giveth money voluntarily to ano∣ther for Merchandise or out of af∣fection, he is said to do it of his own accord, which in latine is sponte, and therefore the action is sponta∣neous (though to give ones mony willingly to a thief to a void killing, or throw it into the Sea to avoid drowning, where the motive is fear, be not called spontaneous.) But every spontaneous action is not therefore voluntary, for voluntary presupposes some precedent delibe∣ration, that is to say, some conside∣ration and meditation, of what is likely to follow, both upon the do∣ing and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many acti∣ons are done of our own accord,

and are therefore spontaneous, for which nevertheless, as my Lord thinks, we never consulted nor de∣liberated in our selves. As when making no question nor any the least doubt in the world, but the thing we are about is good, we eat and walk, or in anger strike or re∣vile, which my Lord thinks spon∣taneous, but not voluntary nor ele∣ctive actions, and with such kinde of actions he saies necessitation may stand, but not with such as are vo∣luntary and proceed upon election and deliberation. Now if I make it appear to your Lordship, that those actions, which he saies, proceed from spontanity, and which he as∣cribes to Children, Fools, Madmen and Beasts, proceed from election and deliberation, and that actions inconsiderate, rash, and spontaneous are ordinarily found in those, that are by themselves and many more

thought as wise, or wiser than or∣dinarily men are, then my Lord Bishops Argument concludeth, that necessity and election may stand to∣gether, which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his Arguments to prove.

And first your Lordships own experience furnishes you with proof enough, that Horses, Doggs, and other Bruit Beasts, do demur often∣times upon the way they are to take, the Horse retiring from some strange figure that he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what else doth a man that deliberateth, but one while proceed toward acti∣on, another while retire from it, as the hope of greater good draws him, or the fear of greater evil drives him away.

A Child may be so young as to do what it does without all delibe∣ration, but that is but till it have the

chance to be hurt by doing of some∣what, or till it be of age to under∣stand the rod, for the actions, where∣in he hath once had a check, shall be deliberated on the second time.

Fools and Madmen manifestly deliberate no less than the wisest men, though they make not so good a choice, the images of things being by disease altered.

For Bees and Spiders, if my Lord Bishop had had so little to do as to be a spectatour of their actions, he would have confessed not onely ele∣ction but art, prudence and policy in them, very near equal to that of mankinde. Of Bees, Aristotle saies, their life is Civil.

Again, his Lordship is deceived if he think any spontaneous action after once being checked in it, differs from an action voluntary and elective, for even the setting of a mans foot, in the posture for walk∣ing,

and the action of ordinary eat∣ing was once deliberated of how and when it should be done, and though afterward it became easie & habitual so as to be done without fore-thought, yet that does not hin∣der but that the act is voluntary and proceedeth from election. So also are the rashest actions of cholerick per∣sons voluntary and upon delibera∣tion, for who is there but very young children, that hath not considered when and how farr he ought, or safely may strike or revile? Seeing then his Lordship agrees with me that such actions are necessitated, and the fancie of those that do them determined to the action they do, it follows, out of his Lordships own doctrine, that the liberty of election does not take away the necessitie of electing this or that individual thing. And thus one of his Argu∣ments fights against another.

The 2 Argument from Scripture consisteth in histories of men that did one thing, when if they would, they might have done another, the places are two. One is 1 Kings 3.11. where the history saies, God was pleased that Solomon, who might if he would, have asked Riches, or Revenge, did nevertheless aske wis∣dom at Gods hands; the other is the words of S. Peter to Ananias, Acts 5.4. After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?

To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former places, that they prove there is elction, but do not disprove the necessity, which I maintain of what they so elect.

The fourth Argument (for to the 3 and fifth I shall make but one answer) is to this effect. If the de∣cree of God, or his foreknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the con∣catenation of causes, or the physical or

moral efficacy of causes, or the last dictate of the understanding, or what∣soever it be, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odi.

That which I say necessitateth and determinateth every action, (that his Lordship may no longer doubt of my meaning) is the summ of all things, which being now existent, con∣duce and concurr to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced. This concourse of causes, whereof every one is determined be such as it is by a like concourse of former cau∣ses, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the Decree of God.

But that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing,

cannot be truely said, seeing fore∣knowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on the exist∣ence of the things known and not they on it.

The influence of the Starres is but a small part of the whole cause, con∣sisting of the concourse of all A∣gents.

Nor does the concourse of all cau∣ses make one simple chain or con∣catination, but an innumerable num∣ber of chains, joyned together, not in all parts, but in the first link God Almighty, and conse∣quently the whole cause of an event, doth not always depend on one single chain, but on many together.

Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary Agents and ne∣cessitates the will, and consequently the action; but for moral efficacy, I un∣derstand not what he means.

The last dictate of the judgement,

concerning the good or bad that may follow on any action, is not properly the whole cause, but the last part of it, and yet may be said to Produce the effect necessarily, in such manner as the last feather may be said to break a horses back, when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that one to do it.

Now for his Argument that if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true liberty, I deny the con∣sequence, for I make not onely the effect, but also the election of that particular effect necessary, in as much as the will it self, & each propension of a man during his deliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient cause as any thing else whatsoever. As for example, it is no more necessary that fire should burn than that a man or other creature,

whose limbs be moved by fancy, should have election, that is liberty, to do what he hath a fancy to do, though it be not in his will or power to choose his fancie, or choose his ele∣ction and will.

This doctrine, because my Lord Bishop saies he hates, I doubt had better been suppressed, as it should have been, if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.

The Arguments of greatest con∣sequence, are the third and the fifth, and they fall both into one, namely; If there be a necessity of all events, that it will follow, That praise and reprehension, and reward and punishment are all vain and un∣just, and that if God should openly forbid, and secretly necessitate the same action, punishing men for what they could not avoid, there would be no belief among them of Heaven and Hell.

To oppose hereunto I must bor∣row an answer from S. Paul, Rom. 9.11. From the 11 verse of the Chapter to the 18 is laid down the very same objection in these words. When they (meaning Esau and Ja∣cob) were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, that the pur∣pose of God according to election, not by works, but by him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said unto her (viz Rebecca) that the elder should serve the younger, &c. What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. It is not there∣fore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God that shew∣eth mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I have stirred thee up that I might shew my power in thee, and that my name might be set forth in all the earth. Therefore whom God willeth he hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he hardeneth. Thus you

see the case put by S. Paul, is the same with that of my Lord Bishop, and the same objection in these words following.

Thou wilt aske me then, why does God yet complain, for who hath resist∣ed his will?

To this therefore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was Gods will, or that the decree of God con∣cerning Esau was not before he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what he did; but thus; Who art thou O man that in∣terrogatest God? shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the same stuff to make one vessel to honour another to disho∣nour? According therefore to this answer of S. Paul I answer my Lords Ojection, and say, the power of God alone without other helps is suffici∣ent justification of any action he

doth. That which men make a∣mongst themselves here by pacts and covenants, and call by the name of justice, and according whereunto men are accounted and tearmed rightly just or unjust, is not that by which God Almighties actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his counsels are to be measured by humane wisdom. That which he does is made just by his do∣ing it, just I say in him, though not always just in us.

For a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hinderance of the same, if▪ he punish him that he so commandeth for not doing it, it is unjust. So also, his counsels are therefore not in vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When God afflicted Job, he did object no sin unto him, justified his afflicting of him by telling him of his power. Hast

thou, saith God, an arm like mine? Where wert thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? and the like. So our Saviour, concerning the man that was born blinde, said it was not for his sin, or for his Pa∣rents sin, but that the power of God might be shewn in him. Beasts are subject to death and torments, yet they cannot sin, it was Gods will they should be so. Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and proper∣ly, in whomsoever it be found, less power does not, and because such power is in God onely, he must needs be just in all his actions, and we, that not comprehending his Counsels call him to the Barr, com∣mit injustice in it.

I am not ignorant of the usual reply to this answer, by distinguish∣ing between will and permission, as that God Almighty does indeed sometimes permit sins, and that he

also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth shall be committed, but does not will it, nor necessitate it.

I know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying, that God Almighty does in∣deed cause the action whatsoever action it be, but not the sinfullness or irregularity of it, that is, the discordance between the action and the Law. Such distinctions as these dazle my understanding; I finde no difference between the will to have a thing done, and the permission to do it, when he that permitteth can hinder it, and knows that it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor finde I any difference between an action & the sin of that action, as for example, between the killing of Vriah, and the sin of David in killing Vriah, nor when one is cause both of the Action and of the Law, how another can, because

of the disagreement between them, no more than how one man making a longer and a shorter garment, another can make the inequality that is between them. This I know, God cannot sin, because his doing a thing makes it just and conse∣quently, no sin, as also because whatsoever can sin is subject to anothers Law, which God is not. And therefore 'tis blasphemy to say God can sin; but to say, that God can so order the world, as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such or other distinctions can make it clear, that S. Paul did not think Esaus or Pharaohs actions proceed∣ed from the will and purpose of God, or that proceeding from his will, could not therefore without in∣justice be blamed or punished, I will, assoon as I understand them,

turn unto my Lords Opinion, for I now hold nothing in all this que∣stion betwixt us, but what seemeth to me, not obscurely, but most ex∣pressely said in this place by S. Paul, And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture.

To the Arguments from Reason.

OF the Arguments from Reason, the first is that which his Lord∣ship saith is drawn from Zeno's beat∣ing of his man, which is therefore cal∣led Argumentum baculinum, that is to say, a wooden Argument. The sto∣ry is this, Zeno held, that all actions were necessary, his man therefore being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it, to avoid this excuse, his Master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating

him. So that not he that maintained, but he that derided the necessity, was beaten, contrary to that his Lordship would inferr. And the Argument was rather withdrawn than drawn from the story.

The second Argument is taken from certain inconveniences which his Lordship thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true that ill use might be made of it, and there∣fore your Lordship and my Lord Bishop, ought at my request to keep private what I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed none, and what use soever he made of truth, yet truth is truth, and now the que∣stion is not, what is fit to be preach∣ed, but what is true.

The first inconvenience he saies is this. That the Laws, which prohi∣bit any action, will be unjust.

2. That all consultations are vain.

3. That admonitions to men of

understanding, are of no more use, than to children, fools, and mad men.

4. That praise, dispraise, reward and punishment are in vain.

5.6. That Counsels, Acts, Arms, Books, Instruments, Study, Tutours, Medicines, are in vain.

To which arguments his Lord∣ship expecting I should answer, by saying, the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use the means, adds (as it were a reply to my answer foreseen) these words. A lass! how should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means? Wherein his Lord∣ship saies right, but my answer is not that which he expecteth, I answer.

First, that the necessity of an acti∣on doth not make the Laws that prohibit it unjust. To let pass that not the necessity, but the will to break the Law, maketh the action unjust, because the Law regardeth the will

and no other precedent causes of action. And to let pass, that no Law can possibly be unjust, in as much as every man maketh (by his consent) the Law he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself. I say what necessary cause soever precede an action, yet if the action be forbidden, he that doth it willingly may justly be punished. For instance, suppose the Law on pain of death prohibit stealing, and that there be a man, who by the strength of temptation is necessita∣ted to steal, and is thereupon put to death, does not this punishment deter others from Theft? is it not a cause that others steal not? Doth it not frame and make their wills to justice?

To make the Law, is therefore to make a Cause of Justice, and to ne∣cessitate Justice, and consequently

'tis no injustice to make such a Law.

The intention of the Law is not to grieve the Delinquent for that which is past, and not to be undone, but to make him and others just, that else would not be so, and respecteth not the evil act past, but the good to come, in so much as without the good intention for the future, no past act of a Delinquent could justi∣fie his killing in the sight of God. But you will say how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what were done were necessary? To this I answer, that men are justly killed, not for that their actions are not necessitated, but because they are noxious, and they are spared and preserved whose actions are not noxious. For where there is no Law, there no killing nor any thing else can be unjust, and by the right of nature, we destroy (without being unjust) all that is noxious both

Beasts and Men, and for Beasts we kill them justly when we do it in order to our own preservation, and yet my Lord himself confesseth, that their actions, as being onely spon∣taneous, and not free, are all necessi∣tated and determined to that one thing they shall do. For men, when we make Societies or Common-Wealths we lay not down our right to kill, excepting in certain cases, as murther, theft or other offensive action; so that the right, which the Common-Wealth hath to put a man to death for crimes is not created by the Law, but remains from the first right of nature, which every man hath to preserve himself, for that the Law doth not take the right away in the case of Criminals, who were by the Law excepted. Men are not therefore put to death, or pu∣nished for that their theft proceed∣eth from election, but because it was

noxious and contrary to mens pre∣servation, and the punishment con∣ducing to the preservation of the rest, in as much as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and none else, frameth and maketh mens wills such as men would have them. And thus it is plain, that from the necessity of a voluntary action, can∣not be inferred the injustice of the Law that forbiddeth it, or the Ma∣gistrate that punisheth it.

Secondly, I deny that it maketh con∣sultations to be in vain, 'tis the con∣sultation that causeth a man, & neces∣sitateth him to choose to do one thing rather than another, so that unless a man say that that cause is in vain which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his Lordships reasons thus, If I must do this rather than

that, I shall do this rather than that, though I consult not at all, which is a false proposition and a false con∣sequence, and no better than this, if I shall live till to morrow, I shall live till to morrow, though I run my self through with a sword to day. If there be a necessity that an action shall be done, or that any ef∣fect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing necessarily requisite as a means to bring it to pass, and there∣fore when it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before ano∣ther, 'tis determined also for what cause it shall so be chosen, which cause, for the most part, is deliberatiō or consultation, and therefore consul∣tation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain by how much the electi∣on is more necessitated, if more and less had any place in necessity.

The same answer is to be given

to the third supposed inconveni∣ence, namely that admonitions are in vain, for the Admonitions are parts of consultation, the admonitor being a Councellour for the time to him that is admonished.

The fourth pretended inconve∣ence is, that praise, dispraise, reward and punishment will be in vain. To which I answer, that for praise and dispraise, they depend not at all on the necessity of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to praise, but to say a thing is good? good I say for me, or for some body else, or for the State and Common-Wealth? And what is it to say an action is good, but to say it is as I would wish? Or as another would have it, or according to the will of the State? that is to say, according to the Law. Does my Lord think that no action can please me, or him, or the Common-Wealth that

should proceed from necessity? things may be therefore necessary, and yet praise worthy, as also necessary, and yet dispraised, and neither of them both in vain, because praise and dis∣praise, and likewise Reward and Punishment, do by example make and conform the will to good and evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, where he saies that he was good by nature, Et quia aliter esse non potuit.

To the fifth and sixth inconve∣niences, that Counsels, Arts, Arms, Instruments, Books, Study, Medi∣cines and the like would be superflu∣ous, the same answer serves as to the former, that is to say, that this con∣sequence, If the effect shall necessa∣rily come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its causes is a false one, and those things named Coun∣sels, Arts, Arms, &c. are the causes of these effects.

His Lordships third Argument consisteth in other inconveniences, which he saith will follow, namely Impiety and negligence of religious duties, as Repentance, and Zeal to Gods service, &c.

To which I answer as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the greatest part of Mankinde, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth, or preferment, or whom the appe∣tite of sensual delights, or the im∣patience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong principles have made unapt to discuss the truth of things, I must I say confess, that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety, and there∣fore if his Lordship had not desired this answer, I should not have writ∣ten it, nor do I write it but in hopes your Lordship and his will keep it

private. Nevertheless in very truth, the necessity of events does not of it self draw with it any impiety at all. For piety consisteth onely in two things; one that we honour God in our hearts, which is, that we think as highly of his power as we can, (for to honour any thing is nothing else but to think it to be of great power.) The other is, that we signifie that honour and esteem by our words and actions, which is called▪ Cultus, or worship of God. He therefore that thinketh that all things proceed from Gods eternal will, and consequently are necessary, does he not think God Omnipotent? Does he not esteem of his power as highly as is possible? which is to honour God as much as may be in his heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by external acts and words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? yet is

this external acknowledgement the same thing which we call worship. So that this opinion fortifies piety in both kinds, external and inter∣nal, therefore is far from destroying it. And for Repentance, which is no∣thing else but a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way; though the cause that made him go astray were ne∣cessary, yet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and again though the cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remained still the causes of joy. So that the necessity of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of Repentance, grief for the errour, and joy for returning.

And for prayer, whereas he saith that the necessity of things destroy prayer, I deny it, for though prayer be none of the causes that move Gods will (his will being unchan∣geable)

yet since we finde in Gods word, he will not give his blessings but to those that aske, the motive of prayer is the same. Prayer is the gift of God no less than the blessing, and the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the bles∣sing is decreed. 'Tis manifest that Thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing past, and that which is past is sure and necessary, yet even a∣mongst men thanks is in use as an acknowledgement of the benefit past, though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but thanksgiving for Gods blessings in general, and though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a signi∣fication that we expect nothing but from God, in such manner, as he, not as we, will, and our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray thy will,

not our will, be done, and by example teaches us the same, for he prayed thus, Father if it be thy will let this cup pass, &c. The end of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not to move but to honour God Almighty, in acknow∣ledging that what we ask can be effected by him onely.

The fourth Argument from Rea∣son is this, The order, beauty and perfe∣ction of the world requireth that in the universe should be Agents of all sorts; some necessary▪ some free, some con∣tingent. He that shall make all things necessary, all things free, or all things contingent doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world.

In which Argument I observe first a Contradiction, for seeing he that maketh any thing in that he maketh it, maketh it to be necessary, it followeth that he that maketh all things, maketh all things necessarily to be; As if a work-man make a gar∣ment

the garment must necessarily be, so if God make every thing, eve∣ry thing must necessarily be. Per∣haps the beauty of the world requi∣reth (though we know it not) that some Agents should work without deliberation (which his Lordship calls necessary Agents) and some Agents with deliberation (and those both he and I call free Agents) and that some Agents should work, and we not know how (and their effects we both call Contingents) but this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his election ne∣cessarily determined to one by for∣mer causes, and that which is con∣tingent and imputed to fortune, be nevertheless necessary and depend on precedent necessary causes. For by contingent, men do not mean that which hath no cause, but that which hath not for cause any thing that we perceive; As for example,

when a Traveller meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause sufficient to produce it, but because the journey caused not the rain, nor the rain the journey, we say they were conting∣ent one to another. And thus you see that though there be three sorts of events, necessary, contingent, and free, yet they may be all necessary with∣out destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe.

To the first Argument from Rea∣son, which is, that if liberty be taken away, the nature and formel reason of sin is taken away, I answer by denying the consequence; The na∣ture of sin consisteth in this, that the action done proceed from our will and be against the Law. A Judge in judging whether it be sin or no which is done against the Law, looks at no higher cause of the action, than the will of the doer.

Now when I say the action was ne∣cessary, I do not say it was done against the will of the doer, but with his will, and necessarily, because mans will, that is every volition or act of the will and purpose of man had a sufficient, and therefore a necessary cause, and consequently every voluntary action was neces∣sitated. An action therefore may be voluntary and a sin, and neverthe∣less be necessary, and, because God may afflict by a right derived from his Omnipotence, though sin were not, and because the example of punishment on voluntary sinners, is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less frequent, for God to punish such sinners (as I have said before) is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his Lordships Objections both out of Scripture and from Reason.

Certain Distinctions which his Lordship supposing might be brought to evade his Arguments are by him removed.

HE saies a man may perhaps an∣swer, that the necessity of things held by him, is not a Stoicall necessi∣ty, but a Christian necessity, &c. But this distinction I have not used, nor indeed ever heard before, nor could I think any man could make Stoicall and Christian two kindes of necessi∣ty, though they may be two kindes of Doctrine. Nor have I drawn my Answer to his Lordships Arguments from the authority of any Sect, but from the nature of the things them∣selves.

But here I must take notice of certain words of his Lordships in this place, as making against his own Tenet. Where all the causes, saith he

being joyned together and subordinate one to another do make but one total cause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series or sub∣ordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt maketh the effect necessary. For that which I call the necessary cause of any effect, is the joyning together of all causes subordinate to the first into one total cause. If any of these saith he, especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, then all the rest are determined. Now it is manifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it, and therefore by his Lordships own reason all effects are necessary.

Nor is that distinction of neces∣sary in respect of the first cause, and necessary in respect of Second causes mine, it does (as his Lord∣ship well notes) imply a contra∣diction.

But the distinction of free into free from compulsion and free from Necessitation, I acknowledge, for to be free from compulsion is to do a thing so as terror be not the cause of his will to do it; for a man is then onely said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to it. As when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to his enemie for fear of be∣ing killed. Thus all men that do a∣ny thing for love, or revenge, or lust are free from compulsion, and yet their actions may be as necessarie as those that are done by compulsi∣on; for sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear. But free from Necessitation. I say, no man can be, and 'tis that which his Lord∣ship undertook to disprove.

This distinction, his Lordship says, uses to be fortified by two reasons (but they are not mine.) The first

he says, is, that it is granted by all Divines, that an Hypothetical neces∣sitie, or Necessitie upon supposition, may stand with Libertie. That you may understand this, I will give you an example of Hypothetical necessity. If I shall live, I shall eat. This is an Hypothetical necessitie. Indeed it is a necessarie proposition, that is to say, it is necessarie that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered, but 'tis not the necessitie of the thing, nor is it therefore necessarie that the man should live, nor that the man should eat. I do not use to fortifie my distinctions with such reasons, let his Lordship confute them how he will, it contents me; but I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how easie and plain a thing, (but withal false) with the grave usage of such terms as Hy∣pothetical necessitie, and Necessitie upon supposition, and such like terms

of School-men may be obscured and made to seem profound learning.

The second reason that may con∣firm the distinction of free from compulsion, and free from necessitati∣on, he says is, that God and good Angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. This reason, though I had no need of, yet I think it so farforth good, as it is true that God and good Angels do good ne∣cessarily, and yet are free; but be∣cause I find not in the Articles of our Faith, nor in the decrees of our Church, set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good An∣gels to work by necessitie, or in what sence they work Freely, I sus∣pend my sentence in that point, and am content that there be a freedom from Compulsion, and yet no freedom from Necessitation, as hath been pro∣ved, in that a man may be necessi∣tated to some action without threats

and without fear of danger. But how my Lord can avoid the consist∣ing together of freedom and necessi∣tie, supposing God and good An∣gels are freer than men, and yet do good necessarily, that we must exa∣min. I confess, saith he, that God & good Angels are more free than we, that is, intensively in degree of Free∣dom, not extensively in the latitude of the object, according to a libertie of exercise, not of specification.

Again, we have here two distin∣ctions that are no distinctions, but made to seem so by terms invented by I know not whom, to cover ig∣norance, and blind the understand∣ing of the Reader: For it cannot be conceived that there is any libertie greater, than for a man to do what he will. One heat may be more in∣tensive than another, but not one libertie than another; he that can do what he will, hath all libertie possi∣ble,

and he that cannot hath none at all. Also Libertie (as his Lord∣ship says the Schools call it) of ex∣ercise, which is as I have said before, a libertie to do or not to do, cannot be without a Libertie (which they call) of Specification, that is to say, a libertie to do, or not to do this or that in particular. For how can a man conceave he hath libertie to do any thing, that hath not libertie to do this, or that, or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this, and that, and e∣very other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a libertie to eat flesh, more than he that hath no licence at all? You may by this again see the vanitie of distinctions used in the Schools, and I do not doubt but that the impo∣sing of them, by Authoritie of Do∣ctors in the Church, hath been a great cause that men have labored,

though by Sedition and evil courses, to shake them off, for nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannizing over mens reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the Scriptures, but by the pretence of Learning, and more judgement than that of other men.

In the next place his Lordship bringeth two Arguments against distinguishing between free from compulsion and free from necessitation.

The first is, that election is op∣posite not onely to Coaction or compulsion, but also Necessita∣tion or determination to one. This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new Argument to prove it, and so those brought formerly I have already answered. And in this place I deny again, that election is op∣posite to either, For, when a man is compelled for example to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath

••till election left him, and a delibe∣ration to bethink which of the two he can better endure. And he that ••••led to prison by force hath election ••nd may deliberate whether he will ••e hal'd and traind on the ground, ••r make use of his own feet: Like∣wise when there is no compulsion, but the strength of temptation to do ••n evil action, being greater than ••he motives to abstain, it necessari∣ly determines him to the doing of it, ••et he deliberates while sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear are working on ••im, and consequently he electeth which he will. But commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity; but when we see not or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not causes but liberty that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose this that of ne∣cessity

choose it, but they might as well say, fire doth not burn because it burns of necessity.

The second Argument is not so much an argument as a distinction, to shew in what sence it may be said that voluntary actions are necessi∣tated and in what sence not. And therefore his Lordship alledgeth as from the authority of the Schools (and that which rippeth up the bot∣tom of the Question) that there is a double act of the will. The one he says is Actus imperatus, an act done at the command of the will, by some inferiour faculty of the soul; As to open or shut ones eyes, and this act may be compell'd, the other he saies, is Actus elicitus, an act allured or drawn forth by al∣lurement out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect, this he saies can∣not be compelled. Wherein (let∣ting pass that metaphorical speech

of attributing command and subje∣ction to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a Common-Wealth or family within themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of a question) you may ob∣serve, first, that to compel a vo∣luntary act, is nothing else but to will it, for it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of my eyes, or the doing of any other action, and to say, I have the will to shut my eyes; so that Actus impe∣ratus, here, might as easily have been said in English a voluntry a∣ction, but that they that invented the term understood not any thing it signified.

Secondly, you may observe, that Actus elicitus, is exemplified by these words, to will, to elect, to choose, which are all one, and so to will is here made an act of the will; and

indeed as the will is a faculty or power in a mans soul, so to will is an act of it according to that power; but as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance, so is it also to say, so that to will is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will, which pow∣er is commonly called the will. How∣soever it be, the sum of his Lord∣ships distinction, is, that a volunta∣ry act may be done by compulsion, that is to say, by foul means, but to will that or any act cannot be but by allurement, or fair means. Now seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements produce the action which they do produce, as necessari∣ly as foul means and threatening, it follows, that to will may be made as necessarie as any thing that is done by compulsion. So that the di∣stinction of Actus imperatus, and

Actus elicitus are but words, and of no effect against necessitie.

His Lordship in the rest of his discourse, reckoneth up the opini∣on of certain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the ne∣cessitie of things (which they main∣tain) consisteth. And first he saith, the Astrologer deriveth his necessitie from the stars; Secondly, that the Physitian attributeth it to the tem∣per of the bodie. For my part, I am not of their opinion, because, nei∣ther the stars alone, nor the tempe∣rature of the Patient alone is able to produce any effect, without the concurrence of all other Agents. For there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not what∣soever is in rerum natura, which be∣cause it is a great paradox, and de∣pends on many antecedent specula∣tions, I do not press in this place.

Thirdly, he disputeth against the o∣pinion of them that say, external ob∣jects presented to men of such and such temparatures, do make their actions necessarie, and says, the power such objects have over us, proceeds from our own fault, but that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power, and therefore that opinion may hold true for all that answer.

Further he says, Prayer, Fasting, &c. may alter our habits; 'tis true, but when they do so, they are causes of the contrarie habit, and make it necessarie, as the former habit had been necessarie if Prayer, Fasting, &c. had not been. Besides, we are not moved or disposed to prayer or any other action, but by outward objects, as pious company, godly preachers, of something equivolent. Fourthly, he says a resolved mind is

not easily surprised, as the mind of Vlysses, who when others wept, a∣lone wept not, and of the Phyloso∣sopher, that abstained from striking, because he found himself angrie; and of him that poured out the water when he was thirstie, and the like. Such things I confess have, or may have been done, and do prove onely that it was not necessarie for Vlysses then to weep, nor for that Philoso∣pher to strike, nor for that other man to drink, but it does not prove that it was not necessarie for Vlysses then to abstain (as he did) from weeping, nor for the Philosopher to abstain (as he did) from striking, nor for the other man to forbear drinking, and yet that was the thing his Lordship ought to have proved. Lastly, his Lordship confesses, that the dispositions of objects may be dangerous to libertie, but cannot be destructive. To which I answer, it

is impossible; for libertie is never in any other danger than to be lost, and if it cannot be lost (which he confesses) I may infer it can be in no danger at all.

The fourth opinion his Lordship rejecteth, is of them that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding; but it seems his Lordship understands that Tenet in another sence than I do; for he speaketh as if they that held it, did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every action they do, great and small, to the least grain, which is a thing his Lordship (with reason) thinks untrue. But I understand it to signifie, that the will follows the last opinion or judgement immedi∣ately proceding the action, concern∣ing whether it be good to do it or not, whether he have weighed it long before, or not at all, and that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it. As for example, when

a man strikes, his will to strike fol∣lows necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroak, immedi∣ately before the lifting up of his hand. Now if it be understood in that sence, the last dictate of the understanding does necessitate the action, though not as the whole cause, yet as the last cause, as the last feather necessitates the breaking of a horses back, when there are so many laid on before, as there needed but the addition of one to make the weight sufficient.

That which his Lordship allead∣geth against this, is, First out of a Poet, who in the person of Medea says,

— Video meliora, probo{que} Deteriora sequor.

but that saying (as prettie as it is) is not true: for though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her judgement was, that the present re∣venge on her husband out-weighed them all, and thereupon the wicked

action necessarily followed. Then the story of the Roman, who of two competitors, said, one had the bet∣ter reason, but the other must have the office. This also maketh against his Lordship, for the last dictate of his judgement that had the bestow∣ing of the office, was this, That it was better to take a great bribe, than reward a great merit.

Thirdly, he objects that things nearer the sence move more power∣fully than reason; what followeth thence but this, the sence of the present good is commonly more im∣mediate to the action than the fore∣sight of the evil consequence to come? Fourthly, whereas his Lord∣ship saies that do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his Son than for the sin of his soul, makes nothing to the last di∣ctate of the understanding, but it argues plainly that sorrow for sin is not voluntary, and by consequence,

that Repentance proceedeth from Causes.

The last part of this discourse containeth his Lordships opinion a∣bout reconciling liberty with the prescience and decree of God, other∣wise than some Divines have done, against whom, he saies, he had for∣merly written a Treatise, out of which he repeateth onely two things. One is, that we ought not to desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend the certain man∣ner of it. And I say the same, as for example, that his Lordship ought not to desert this certain truth, That there are certain and necessary causes which make every man to will what he willeth, though he do not yet con∣ceive in what manner the will of man is caused. And yet I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive, seeing we see daily, that praise, dispraise, reward and punish∣ment, good and evil sequels of mens

actions retained in memory, do frame and make us to the election of what∣soever it be that we elect, and that the memory of such things pro∣ceeds from the sences, and sence from the operation of the objects of sence (which are external to us and go∣verned onely by God Almighty) and by consequence all actions, even of free and voluntary Agents are necessary.

The other thing that he repeateth is, that the best way to reconcile con∣tingence and liberty with Prescience and the decrees of God, is to subject future contingencies to the Aspect of God. The same is also my opinion, but cōtrary to what his Lordship all this while laboured to prove. For hither∣to he held liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty and the decrees of God irreconcileable, unless the A∣spect of God (which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signifie somewhat else besides Gods

will and decree, which I cannot un∣derstand. But he adds that we must subject them, according to that presentiality which they have in eter∣nity, which he saies cannot be done by them that conceive Eternity to be an everlasting succession, but onely by them, that conceive it as an Indivisible point. To which I answer, that assoon as I can con∣ceive Eternity to be an Indivisible point, or any thing, but an everlast∣ing succession, I will renounce all, that I have written on this subject. I know S. Thomas Aquinas calls Eternity, Nunc. stans., an▪ ever-abi∣ding now, which is easie enough to say, but though I fain would, yet I could never conceive it, they that can, are more happy than I. But in the mean time his Lordship alloweth all men to be of my opinion save onely those that can conceive in their minds a nunc stans, which I think are none. I understand as lit∣tle

how it can be true his Lordship saies, that God is not just but justice it self, not wise, but wisdom it self, not Eternal, but Eternity it self, nor how he concludes thence that Eter∣nity is a point indivisible, and not a succession, nor in what sence it can be said, that an infinite point, and wherein is no succession, can com∣prehend all time, though time be successive. These phrases I finde not in the Scripture, I wonder there∣fore what was the design of the School-men to bring them up, un∣less they thought a man could not be a true Christian unless his un∣derstanding be first strangled with such hard sayings. And thus much for answer to his Lordships dis∣course, wherein I think not onely his Squadrons of Arguments, but also his Reserve of Distinctions are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question, with my Rea∣sons

for it, positively, and as briefly as I can, without any terms of Art in plain English.

My Opinion about LIBERTIE and NECESSITIE.

FIrst I conceive, that when it cometh into a mans mind to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to deliberate, the do∣ing it or abstaining necessarily follow the present thought he hath of the good or evil conse∣quence thereof to himself. As for example, In sudden anger, the action shall follow the thought of revenge, in sudden fear the thought of escape. Al∣so

when a man hath time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never any thing ap∣peared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm of it. These actions I call VOLUN∣TARY, (my Lord) if I under∣stand him aright that calls them SPONTANEOUS. I call them voluntarie, because those actions that follow immediate∣ly the last appetite are volun∣tarie, and here where is one onely appetite, that one is the last. Besides, I see 'tis reason∣able to punish a rash Action, which could not be justly done by man to man, unless the same were voluntarie. For no action of a man can be said to

be without deliberation, though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to deli∣berate all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of Anger, shall nevertheless be justly put to death, because all the time, wherein he was able to consi∣der whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual deliberation, and con∣sequently the killing shall be judged to proceed frō election.

Secondly, I conceive when a man deliberates, whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to

do it. And to consider an acti∣on, is to imagine the consequen∣ces of it both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that Deliberation is nothing else but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or (which is the same thing) alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberateth.

Thirdly, I conceive that in all deliberations, that is to say, in at alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the WILL, & is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it be∣come impossible. All other Appetites to do, and to quit,

that come upon a man during his deliberations, are called In∣tentions, & Inclinations, but not Wills, there being but one will, which also in this case may be called the last will, though the Intentions change often.

Fourthly, I conceive that those actions, which a man is said to do upon deliberation, are said to be voluntarie, and done upon choice and election, so that voluntarie action, and action proceeding from electi∣on is the same thing, and that of a voluntarie Agent, it is all one to say, he is free, and to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating.

Fifthly, I conceive Libertie to be rightly defined in this manner; Libertie is the absence

of all the impediments to Action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsecal qualitie of the Agent. As for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have libertie to de∣scend by the channel of the ri∣ver, because there is no impe∣diment that way, but not a∣cross, because the banks are impediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the li∣bertie to ascend, but the faculty or power, because the impedi∣ment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsecal. So also we say, he that is tied wants the libertie to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in his bands, whereas we say not so of him that is sick or

lame, because the impediment is in himself.

Sixthly, I conceive that no∣thing taketh beginning from it self, but from the Action of some other immediate Agent without it self. And that there∣fore, when first a man hath an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will, is not the will it self, but something else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controver∣sie, that of voluntarie actions the will is the necessarie cause, and by this which is said, the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that volunta∣rie actions have all of them

necessarie causes, and therefore are necessitated.

Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to which no∣thing is wanting that is need∣full to the producing of the ef∣fect. The same also is a neces∣sarie cause. For if it be possi∣ble that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanteth somewhat which was needfull to the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient, but if it be impossi∣ble that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a ne∣cessary cause (for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it.) Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced is produced neces∣sarily,

for whatsoever is pro∣duced hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been, and therefore al∣so voluntarie actions are neces∣sitated

Lastly, should that Ordina∣ry Definition of a free Agent, namely, That a free Agent is that, which, when all things are present which are needfull to produce the effect, can never∣theless not produce it, implies a contradiction, and is non-sence, being as much as to say, The cause may be sufficient, that is to say, necessarie, and yet the effect shall not follow.

My Reasons.

FOr the first five points, wherein it is explicated 1. what Spon∣tanity is. 2. what Deliberation is. 3. what Will, propension and appe∣tite is. 4. what a free Agent is. 5. what Liberty is, there can no other proof be offered but every mans own experience, by reflection on himself, and remembring what he useth in his minde, that is, what he himself meaneth when he saith an action is Spontaneous, a man deli∣berates; such is his will, that Agent or that action is free, Now he that, reflecteth so on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that Deliberation, is the consideration of the good and evil se∣quels of an action to come; that by Spontanity is meant inconsiderate action (or else nothing is meant by it) that will is the last act of our De∣liberation, that a free Agent is he that can do if he will, and forbear if

he will, and that Liberty is, the ab∣sence of external impediments. But, to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains to consider what they think when they hear such words, no Argument can be sufficient, be∣cause experience and matter of fact is not verified by other mens Argu∣ments, but by every mans own sence and memory. For example, how can it be proved that to love a thing and to think it good is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own mean∣ing by those word? Or how can it be proved that Eternity is not nunc stans to a man that saies those words by custom, and never consider how he can conceive the thing in his minde?

Also the sixth point, that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a cause, can no other way be made known, but by trying how

he can imagine it, but if he try, he shall finde as much reason (if there be no cause of the thing) to con∣ceive it should begin at one time as another, that, he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times which is impossible, and therefore he must think there was some spe∣cial cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later; or else that it began never, but was eternal.

For the seventh point, which is that all events have necessary causes, it is there proved in that they have sufficient causes. Further let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual, as the throwing (for ex∣ample.) Ames Ace upon a pair of dice, and see, if it must not have been necessary before 'twas thrown. For seeing it was thrown it had a beginning, and consequently a suffi∣cient cause to produce it, consisting partly in the dice, partly in out∣ward things, as the posture of the

parts of the hand, the measure of force applied by the caster, the posture of the parts of the Table, and the like. In sum there was nothing want∣ing which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast, and consequently the cast was necessarily thrown, for if it had not been thrown, there had wanted som∣what requisite to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been suffi∣cient. In the like manner it may be proved that every other ac••ident how contingent soever it seem, or how voluntary soever it be, is produced necessarily, which is that that my L. Bishop disputes against. The same may be proved also in this manner. Let the case be put, for example, of the weather. 'Tis necessary that to mor¦row it shall rain or not rain. If there∣fore it be not necessary it shall rain, it is necessary it shall not rain, other∣wise there is no necessity that the proposition, It shall rain or not rain,

should be true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass▪ but not, singly that it shall rain, or that it shall not rain, which is as much as to say, one of them is necessary, yet neither of them is ne∣cessary, and therefore to seem to a∣void that absurdity, they make a di∣stinction, that neither of them is true determinate, but indeterminate, which distinction either signifies no more but this, One of them is true but we know not which, and so the necessi∣ty remains, though we know it not, or if the meaning of the distinction be not that, it hath no meaning, and they might as well have said, One of them is true Titirice but neither of them, Tu patulice.

The last thing in which also con∣sisteth the whole controversie, name¦ly that there is no such thing as an Agent, which when all things requi∣site to action are present, can neverthe∣less

forbear to produce it, or (which is all one) that there is no such thing as freedom from necessity, is easily inferred from that which hath been before alledged. For if it be an Agent it can work, and if it work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action, and consequently the cause of the action is sufficient, & if sufficient, then also necessary, as hath been proved before.

And thus you see how the incon∣veniences, which his Lordship ob∣jecteth must follow upon the hold∣ing of necessity, are avoided, and the necessity it self demonstratively pro∣ved. To which I could add, if I thought it good Logick, the inconve∣nience of denying necessity, as that it destroyeth both the decrees and the prescience of God Almighty; for what∣soever God hath purposed to bring to pass by man, as an instrument, or foreseeth shall come to pass, a man,

if he have Liberty (such as his Lord∣ship affirmeth) from necessitation, might frustrate and make not to come to pass, and God should either not foreknow it, and not decree it, or he should foreknow such things shall be, as shall never be, and decree that which shall never come to pass.

This is all hath come into my minde touching this question since I last considered it. And I humbly beseech your Lordship to commu∣nicate it onely to my Lord Bishop. And so praying God to prosper your Lordship in all your designes, I take leave and am,

My most Noble and most ob∣liged Lord

Your most humble servant Thomas Hobbs.

Roven Aug. 20. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

FINIS.