Leviathan, or, The matter, forme, and power of a common wealth, ecclesiasticall and civil by Thomas Hobbes ...

OF COMMON-VVEALTH. (Book 2)

CHAP. XVII. Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a COMMON-WEALTH.

THe finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally* 1.1 love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introducti∣on of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own pre∣servation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of get∣ting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passi∣ons* 1.2 of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Co∣venants, and observation of those Lawes of Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy,* 1.3 and (in summe) doing to others, as wee would be done to,) of them∣selves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be ob∣served, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiali∣ty, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; eve∣ry man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have li∣ved by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one another, has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the Law of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was their honour; and men observed no other Lawes there•…•…n, but the Lawes of Honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instru∣ments of husbandry. And as small Familyes did then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their own security) enlarge their Dominions▪ upon all pretences of danger, and fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to Invaders, endea∣vour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly; and* 1.4 are remembred for it in after ages with honour.

Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions

on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encourage∣ment to an Invasion. The Multitude sufficient to confide in for our Security, is not determined by any certain number, but by compari∣son with the Enemy we feare; and is then sufficient, when the odds of the Enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment, to deter∣mine the event of warre, as to move him to attempt.

And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be* 1.5 directed according to their particular judgements, and particular ap∣petites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and applica∣tion of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another; and reduce thei•…•… strength by mutuall opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not onely subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make warre upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of Justice, and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be any Civill Government, or Common-wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.

Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all* 1.6 the time of their life, that they be governed, and directed by one judgement, for a limited time; as in one Battell, or one Warre. For though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous endeavour against a forraign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a Warre amongst themselves.

It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live soci∣ably* 1.7 one with another, (which are therefore by Aristotle numbred amongst Politicall creatures;) and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signifie to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same. To which I answer,

First, that men are conti•…•…ually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre; but amongst these not so.

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not from the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose Joy con∣sisteth in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of rea∣son, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of

their common businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Publique, bet∣ter than the rest; and these strive to reforme and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into Distraction and Ci∣vill warre.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the likenesse of Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatnesse of Good and Evill; discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their pleasure.

Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene Injury, and Dammage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not of∣fended with their fellowes: whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his Wis∣dome, and controule the Actions of them that governe the Com∣mon-wealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no won∣der if there be somwhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common Benefit.

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to* 1.8 defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may re∣duce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every one to owne, and acknowledge him∣selfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Com∣mon Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgment. This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner. This done, the Multi∣tude so united in one Person, is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength

conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to performe the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common∣wealth;* 1.9 which (to define it,) is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made them∣selves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Com∣mon Defence.

And he that carryeth this Person, is called SOVERAIGNE, and* 1.10 said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his SUB∣IECT.

The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes. One, by Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit them∣selves, and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse; or by Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is when men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This later, may be called a Politicall Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by Institution; and the former, a Common-wealth by Acquisition. And first, I shall speak of a Common-wealth by Insti∣tution.

CHAP. XVIII. Of the RIGHTS of Soveraignes by Institution.

A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of* 1.11 men do Agree, and Covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that Voted against it, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same man∣ner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.

From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the* 1.12 Rights, and Facultyes of him, or them, on whom Soveraigne Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not* 1.13 obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judge∣ments of one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst them∣selves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusi∣on of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man, or other Assembly of men: for they

are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the Soveraignty to him that beareth their Per∣son; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or punished by him for such at∣tempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the Instituti∣on, Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new Co∣venant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Cove∣nant with God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own con∣sciences, that it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.

Secondly, Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is* 1.14 given to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which is made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects before-hand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular. Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other of his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie: it returns there∣fore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the designe they had in the Institution. It is therefore in vain to grant Soveraign∣ty by way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, pro∣ceedeth from want of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, con∣strain, or protect any man, but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed hands of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and whose actions are avouched by them

all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then no man imagi∣neth any such Covenant to have past in the Institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of Rome, made a Cove∣nant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such con∣ditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman People. That men see not the reason to be alike in a Monarchy, and in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the am∣bition of some, that are kinder to the goverment of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.

Thirdly, because the major part hath by consenting voices decla∣red* 1.15 a Soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Con∣gregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared there∣by his will (and therefore tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and therefore if he refuse to stand there∣to, or make Protestation against any of their Decrees, he does con∣trary to his Covenant, and therfore unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.

Fourthly, because every Subject is by this Institution Author of* 1.16 all the Actions, and Judgments of the Soveraigne Instituted; it fol∣lowes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Sub∣jects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every particular man is Author of all the So∣veraigne doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himselfe; no nor him∣selfe of injury; because to do injury to ones selfe, is impossible. It is true that they that have Soveraigne power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper signification.* 1.17

Fiftly, and consequently to that which was sayd last, no man that hath Soveraigne power can iustly be put to death, or otherwise in a∣ny manner by his Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is Author of the actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions committed by himselfe.

And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of* 1.18 them all; and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth of Right, to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the So∣veraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatso∣ever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the pre∣serving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at home, and

Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same. And therefore,

Sixtly, it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what O∣pinions* 1.19 and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of all bookes before they be published. For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth t•…•…e well governing of mens Acti∣ons, in order to their Peace, and Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, nothing ought to be regarded but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by Peace. For Doctrine re∣pugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be against the Law of Nature. It is true, that in a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally received; the contra∣ry Truths may be generally offensive: Yet the most sudden, and rough busling in of a new Truth, that can be, does never breake the Peace, but only somtimes awake the Warre. For those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to defend, or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another; and they live as it were, in the procincts of battaile continually. It belong∣eth therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, or constitute all Judges of Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing necessary to Peace; therby to prevent Discord and Civill Warre.

Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of* 1.20 prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he may enjoy, and what Actions he may doe, without being molested by any of his fellow Subjects: And this is it men call Propriety. For before constitution of Soveraign Power (as hath already been shewn) all men had right to all things; which necessarily causeth Warre: and therefore this Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depend∣ing on Soveraign Power, is the Act of that Power, in order to the publique peace. These Rules of Propriety (or Meum and Tuum) and of Good, Evill, Lawfull, and Unlawfull in the actions of Subjects, are the Civill Lawes, that is to say, the Lawes of each Common-wealth in particular; though the name of Civill Law be now restrained to the antient Civill Lawes of the City of Rome; which being the head of a great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were in these parts the Civill Law.* 1.21

Eightly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that is to say, of hearing and deciding all Controversies, which may arise concerning Law, either Civill, or Naturall, or concerning Fact. For without the decision of Controversies, there is no protection of one Subject, against the injuries of another; the Lawes concerning Meum and Tuum are in vaine; and to every man remaineth, from the naturall and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting himselfe by his private strength, which is the condition

of Warre; and contrary to the end for which every Common∣wealth is instituted.

Ninthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the Right of making* 1.22 Warre, and Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths; that is to say, of Judging when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to le∣vy mony upon the Subjects, to defray the expences thereof. For the Power by which the people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the union of their strength under one Command; which Command the Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign. And therefore who∣soever is made Generall of an Army, he that hath the Soveraign Power is alwayes Generallissimo.

Tenthly, is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all Coun∣sellours,* 1.23 Ministers, Magistrates, and Officers, both in Peace, and War. For seeing the Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the com∣mon Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power to use such Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.

Eleventhly, to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Reward∣ing with riches, or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecu∣niary* 1.24 punishment, or with ignominy every Subject according to the Law he hath formerly made; or if there be no Law made, according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the Common-wealth, or deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.

Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves; what respect they look for from others; and how little they value other men; from whence continually arise amongst them,* 1.25 Emulation, Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre, to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It is necessary that there be Lawes of Honour, and a pub∣lique rate of the worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the Common-wealth; and that there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those Lawes in execution. But it hath already been shewn, that not onely the whole Militia, or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the Judicature of all Controversies, is an∣nexed to the Soveraignty. To the Soveraign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to appoint what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signes of respect, in pub∣lique or private meetings, they shall give to one another.

These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and* 1.26 which are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or Assembly of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. For these are incommunicable, and inseparable. The Power to coyn Mo∣ny; to dispose of the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have praeemption in Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives, may be transferred by the Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect his Sub∣jects be retained. But if he transferre the Militia, he retains the Ju∣dicature

in vain, for want of execution of the Lawes: Or if he grant away the Power of raising Mony; the Militia is in vain: or if he give away the government of Doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of Spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said Rights, we shall presently see, that the holding of all the rest, will produce no effect, in the conservation of Peace and Justice, the end for which all Common-wealths are Instituted. And this division is it, whereof it is said, a Kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand: For unlesse this division precede, division into opposite Armies can never happen. If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these Powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided, and fallen into this Civill Warre; first be∣tween those that disagreed in Politiques; and after between the Dis∣senters about the liberty of Religion; which have so instructed men in this point of Soveraign Right, that there be few now (in Eng∣land,) that do not see, that these Rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next return of Peace; and so con∣tinue, till their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vul∣gar be better taught than they have hetherto been.

And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights, it follows* 1.27 necessarily, that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be gran∣ted away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes renounced, and the name of Soveraign no more given by the Gran∣tees to him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably annexed thereunto.

This great Authority being Indivisible, and inseparably annexed* 1.28 to the Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of Soveraign Kings, though they be singulis majores, of greater Power than every one of their Subjects, yet they be Universis mino∣res, of lesse power than them all together. For if by all together, they mean not the collective body as one person, then all together, and every one, signifie the same; and the speech is absurd. But if by all together, they understand them as one Person (which person the So∣veraign bears,) then the power of all together, is the same with the Soveraigns power; and so again the speech is absurd: which absurdi∣ty they see well enough, when the Soveraignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch they see it not; and yet the power of Soveraignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.

And as the Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Sove∣raignty is the fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and Prince are his Creatures. As in the presence of the Ma∣ster, the Servants are equall, and without any honour at all; So are the Subjects, in the presence of the Soveraign. And though they shine some more, some lesse, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the Starres in presence of the Sun.

But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is very* 1.29 miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, and other irregular passi∣ons of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands. And commonly they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy; and they that live under the government of Democracy, or other Soveraign Assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of Common-wealth; whereas the Power in all formes, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same; not considering that the estate of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any forme of Government can possibly happen to the people in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; or that dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without sub∣jection to Lawes, and a coërcive Power to tye their lands from ra∣pine, and revenge: nor considering that the greatest pressure of So∣veraign Governours, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the dammage, or weakening of their Subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth their own strength and glory; but in the restiveness of themselves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it necessary for their Governours to draw from them what they can in time of Peace, that they may have means on any emergent oc∣casion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on their Enemies. For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is their Passions and Selfe-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those pro∣spective glasses, (namely Morall and Civill Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such pay∣ments be avoyded.

CHAP. XIX. Of the severall Kinds of Common-wealth by Institution, and of Succession to the Soveraigne Power.

THe difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the diffe∣rence* 1.30 of the Soveraign, or the Person representative of all and every one of the Multitude. And because the Sove∣raignty is either in one Man, or in an Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath right to en∣ter, or not every one, but Certain men distinguished from the rest; it is manifest, there can be but Three kinds of Common-wealth. For the Representative must needs be One man, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉: and if more, then it is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part. When the Representative is One man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an Assembly of All that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular Common-wealth: when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none: for either One, or More, or All, must have the Soveraign Power (which I have shewn to be indivisible) entire.

There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and* 1.31 books of Policy; as Tyranny, and Oligarchy: But 〈◊〉〈◊〉 are not the names of other Formes of Government, but of the same Formes misliked. For they that are discontented under Monarchy, call it Ty∣ranny; and they that are displeased with Aristocracy, called it Oligar∣chy: So also, they which find themselves grieved under a Democracy, call it Anarchy, (which signifies want of Government▪) and yet I think no man believes, that want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the Governours.

It is manifest, that men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they* 1.32 please, give Authority to One man, to represent them every one; as well as give such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch, as absolutely, as to any other Representative. Therefore, where there is already erected a Soveraign Power, there can be no other Representative of the same people, but onely to certain 〈◊〉〈◊〉; ends, by the Soveraign limited. For that were to erect two So∣veraigns; and every man to have his person represented by two Actors, that by opposing one another, must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace) is indivisible; and thereby reduce the Multitude into the condition of Warre, contrary to the end 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which all Soveraignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd, to think that a Soveraign Assembly, inviting the People of their Do∣minion, to send up their Deputies, with power to make known their Advise, or Desires, should therefore hold such Deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute Representative of the people: so it is ab∣surd also, to think the same in a Monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a descent of 600 years, was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty from every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their King, was notwithstanding never considered as their Representative; that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their Peti∣tions, and give him (if he permitted it) their advise. Which may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute Re∣presentative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that Office, and to take heed how they admit of any other generall Representati∣on upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 committed to them.

The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth,* 1.33 consisteth not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of Con∣venience, or Aptitude to produce the Peace, and Security of the peo∣ple; for which end they were instituted. And to compare Monarchy with the other two, we may observe; First, that whosoeuer beareth the Person of the people, or is one of that Assembly that bears it, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 also his own naturall Person. And though he be carefull in

his politique Person to procure the common interest; yet he is more or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his fami∣ly, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the publique inte∣rest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private: for the Pas∣sions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or con∣temptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious ad∣vice, a treacherous action, or a Civill warre.

Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when, and where he pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or qua∣lity soever, and as long before the time of action, and with as much secrecy, as he will. But when a Soveraigne Assembly has need of Counsell, none are admitted but such as have a Right thereto from the beginning; which for the most part are of those who have beene versed more in the acquisition of Wealth than of Knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may, and do common∣ly excite men to action, but not governe them in it. For the Under∣standing is by the flame of the Passions, never enlightned, but dazled: Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an Assemblie can receive Counsell with secrecie, because of their owne Multitude.

Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no o∣ther Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, be∣sides that of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence of a few, that would have the Resolution once taken, continue firme, (which may happen by security, negligence, or pri∣vate impediments,) or the diligent appearance of a few of the con∣trary opinion, undoes to day, all that was concluded yesterday.

Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce a Civill Warre.

Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any Sub∣ject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flat∣terer, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen, where the Soveraigne Power is in an Assembly: For their power is the same; and they are as subject to evill Counsell, and to be seduced by Ora∣tors, as a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming one an others Flat∣terers, serve one anothers Covetousnesse and Ambition by turnes. And whereas the Favorites of Monarchs, are few, and they have none els to advance but their owne Kindred; the Favorites of an Assembly,

are many; and the Kindred much more numerous, than of any Mo∣narch. Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators, that is to say, Favourites of Soveraigne Assemblies, though they have great power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse, requires lesse Elo∣quence (such is mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more resembles Justice.

Sixtly, that it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Sove∣raigntie may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne be∣tween Good and Evill: and consisteth in this, that the use of his Pow∣er, must be in the hand of another Man, or of some Assembly of men, which are to governe by his right, and in his name; as Curators, and Protectors of his Person, and Authority. But to say there is incon∣venience, in putting the use of the Soveraign Power, into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is to say that all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and Civill Warre. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must arise from the Contention of those, that for an office of so great honour, and profit, may become Competitors. To make it appear, that this inconvenience, proceed∣eth not from that forme of Government we call Monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed who shall have the Tuition of his Infant Successor, either expressely by Testament, or tacitly, by not controlling the Custome in that case received: And then such inconvenience (if it happen) is to be attributed, not to the Monarchy, but to the Ambition, and Injustice of the Subjects; which in all kinds of Government, where the people are not well instructed in their Duty, and the Rights of Soveraignty, is the same. Or else the precedent Monarch, hath not at all taken order for such Tuition; And then the Law of Nature hath provided this sufficient rule, That the Tuition shall be in him, that hath by Nature most interest in the preservation of the Authority of the Infant, and to whom least bene∣fit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit, and promotion; to put an Infant into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction, or dammage, is not Tuition, but Trechery. So that sufficient provi∣sion being taken, against all just quarrell, about the Government un∣der a Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique Peace, it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the ambition of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side, there is no great Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in a great Assembly, which is not, as to consultations of Peace, and Warre, and making of Lawes, in the same condition, as if the Go∣vernment were in a Child. For as a Child wants the judgement to dissent from counsell given him, and is thereby necessitated to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he is committed: So an Assem∣bly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the counsell of the major part, be it good, or bad. And as a Child has need of a Tutor, or Prote∣ctor, to preserve his Person, and Authority: So also (in great Com∣mon-wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly, in all great dangers and

troubles, have need of Custodes libertatis; that is of Dictators, or Protectors of their Authoritie; which are as much as Temporary Monarchs; to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exer∣cise of their Power; and have (at the end of that time) been oftner de∣prived thereof, than Infant Kings, by their Protectors, Regents, or any other Tutors.

Though the Kinds of Soveraigntie be, as I have now shewn, but three; that is to say, Monarchie, where One Man has it; or Demo∣cracie, where the generall Assembly of Subjects hath it; or Aristo∣cracie, where it is in an Assembly of certain persons nominated, or o∣therwise distinguished from the rest: Yet he that shall consider the par∣ticular Common-wealthes that have been, and are in the world, will not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other Formes, arising from these mingled together. As for example, Elective Kingdomes; where Kings have the Sove∣raigne Power put into their hands for a time; or Kingdomes, wherein the King hath a power limited: which Governments, are nevertheles by most Writers called Monarchie. Likewise if a Popular, or Aristo∣craticall Common-wealth, subdue an Enemies Countrie, and govern the same, by a President, Procurator, or other Magistrate; this may seeme perhaps at first sight, to be a Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government. But it is not so. For Elective Kings, are not Soveraignes, but Ministers of the Soveraigne; nor limited Kings Soveraignes, but Ministers of them that have the Soveraigne Power: Nor are those Provinces which are in subjection to a Democracie, or Aristocracie of another Common-wealth, Democratically, or Aristocratically governed, but Monarchically.

And •…•…irst, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to his life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day; or to cer∣taine Yeares or Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst the Ro∣mans; If he have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more Ele∣ctive but Hereditary. But if he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there is some other Man, or Assembly known, which after his decease may elect a new, or else the Common-wealth dieth, and dis∣solveth with him, and returneth to the condition of Warre. If it be known who have the power to give the Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the Soveraigntie was in them before: For none have right to give that which they have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves, it they think good. But if there be none that can give the Soveraigntie, after the decease of him that was first e∣lected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the Law of Nature, to provide, by establishing his Successor, to keep those that had trusted him with the Government, from relapsing into the miserable condi∣tion of Civill warre. And consequently he was, when elected, a Sove∣raign absolute,

Secondly, that King whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not supe∣riour, is not supreme; that is to say not Soveraign. The Soveraignty therefore was alwaies in that Assembly which had the Right to Li∣mit

him; and by consequence the government not Monarchy, but ei∣ther Democracy, or Aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta; where the Kings had a priviledge to lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the Ephori.

Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of Judea (for example) by a President; yet was not Judea therefore a Democracy; because they were not governed by any As∣sembly, into the which, any of them, had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their Election: but they were gover∣ned by one Person, which though as to the people of Rome was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to people of Judea, which had no right at all of participating in the government, was a Monarch. For though where the people are governed by an Assem∣bly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, 'tis a Monarchy; not of One man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.

Of all these Formes of Government, the matter being mortall, so* 1.34 that not onely Monarchs, but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessa∣ry for the conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, for an Ar∣tificiall Eternity of life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly, should return into the condition of Warre in every age; and they that are governed by One man, assoon as their Governour dyeth. This Artificiall Eternity, is that which men call the Right of Succession.

There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of the Succession is not in the present Soveraign. For if it be in any other particular Man, or private Assembly, it is in a person subject, and may be assumed by the Soveraign at his pleasure; and conse∣quently the Right is in himselfe. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new choyce; then is the Common-wealth dissolved; and the Right is in him that can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did Institute the Common-wealth, for their perpetuall, and not temporary security,

In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot faile, unlesse the Multitude that are to be governed faile. And therefore questions of the right of Succession, have in that forme of Government no place at all.

In an Aristocracy, when any of the Assembly dyeth, the election of another into his room belongeth to the Assembly, as the Sove∣raign, to whom belongeth the choosing of all Counsellours, and Offi∣cers. For that which the Representative doth, as Actor, every one of the Subjects doth, as Author. And though the Soveraign Assem∣bly, may give Power to others, to elect new men, for supply of their Court; yet it is still by their Authority, that the Election is made; and by the same it may (when the publique shall require it) be recalled.

The greatest difficultie about the right of Succession, is in Monar∣chy:* 1.35 And the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the question, who shall appoint the Successor, of a Monarch that hath the Soveraign Authority; that is to say, who shall determine of the right of Inheritance, (for Elective Kings and Princes have not the Soveraign Power in propriety, but in use only,) we are to consider, that either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the Succession, or else that right is again in the dissolved Multitude. For the death of him that hath the Soveraign power in propriety, leaves the Multitude without any Soveraign at all; that is, without any Representative in whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all: And therefore they are incapable of Election of any new Monarch; every man having equall right to sub∣mit himselfe to such as he thinks best able to protect him; or if he can, protect himselfe by his owne sword; which is a returne to Confusion, and to the condition of a War of every man against every man, con∣trary to the end for which Monarchy had its first Institution. Ther∣fore it is manifest, that by the Institution of Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor, is alwaies left to the Judgment and Will of the pre∣sent Possessor.

And for the question (which may arise sometimes) who it is that the Monarch in possession, hath designed to the succession and inheri∣tance of his power; it is determined by his expresse Words, and Te∣stament; or by other tacite signes sufficient.

By expresse Words, or Testament, when it is declared by him in* 1.36 life time, viva voce, or by Writing; as the first Emperours of Rome declared who should be their Heires. For the word Heire does not of it selfe imply the Children, or nearest Kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his Estate. If therefore a Monarch declare expresly, that such a man shall be his Heire, either by Word or Writing, then is that man immediatly after the decease of his Predecessor, Invested in the right of being Monarch.

But where Testament, and expresse Words are wanting, other na∣turall* 1.37 signes of the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is Custome. And therefore where the Custome is, that the next of Kindred absolutely succeedeth, there also the next of Kindred hath right to the Succession; for that, if the will of him that was in posessi∣on had been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his life time. And likewise where the Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred succeedeth, there also the right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred Male, for the same reason. And so it is if the Cu∣stome were to advance the Female. For whatsoever Custome a man may by a word controule, and does not, it is a naturall signe he would* 1.38 have that Custome stand.

But where neither Custome, nor Testament hath preceded, there it

is to be understood, First, that a Monarchs will is, that the govern∣ment remain Monarchicall; because he hath approved that go∣vernment in himselfe. Secondly, that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be preferred before any other; because men are presu∣med to be more enclined by nature, to advance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their own, rather a Male than a Female; because men, are naturally fitter than women, for actions of labour and danger. Thirdly, where his own Issue faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger; and so still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more remote; because it is alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer in affection; and 'tis evident that a man receives al∣wayes, by reflexion, the most honour from the greatnesse of his nee∣rest kindred.

But if it be lawfull for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by* 1.39 words of Contract, or Testament, men may perhaps object a great inconvenience: for he may sell, or give his Right of governing to a stranger; which, because strangers (that is, men not used to live un∣der the same government, nor speaking the same language) do com∣monly undervalue one another, may turn to the oppression of his Subjects; which is indeed a great inconvenience: but it proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection to a strangers government, but from the unskilfulnesse of the Governours, ignorant of the true rules of Politiques. And therefore the Romans when they had subdued many Nations, to make their Government digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they thought necessary, by gi∣ving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes to Principall men of every Nation they conquered, not onely the Privileges, but also the Name of Romans; and took many of them into the Senate, and Offices of charge, even in the Roman City. And this was it our most wise King, King James, aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of his two Realms of England and Scotland. Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the Civill warres, which make both those Kingdomes, at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to the people, for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by Will; though by the fault of many Princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient. Of the lawfulnesse of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by gi∣ving a Kingdome to a stranger, may arrive also by so marrying with strangers, as the Right of Succession may descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawfull.

CHAP. XX. Of Dominion PATERNALL, and DESPOTICALL.

A Common-wealth by Acquisition, is that, where the Sove∣raign* 1.40 Power is acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do authorise all the

actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his Power.

And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Sove∣raignty* 1.41 by Institution, onely in this, That men who choose their So∣veraign, do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they In∣stitute: But in this case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of. In both cases they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such Covenants, as proceed from fear of death, or vio∣lence, voyd: which if it were true, no man, in any kind of Common∣wealth, could be obliged to Obedience. It is true, that in a Common∣wealth once Instituted, or acquired, Promises proceeding from fear of death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the Lawes; But the reason is not, be∣cause it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he may lawfully performe, and doth not, it is not the Invalidity of the Covenant, that absolveth him, but the Sentence of the Soveraign. Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh: But when the So∣veraign, who is the Actor, acquitteth him, then he is acquitted by him that extorted the promise, as by the Author of such absolution.

But the Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty, are the same* 1.42 in both. His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of Injury: He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Le∣gislator; and Supreme Judge of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of Warre, and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellours, Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of Rewards, and Punishments, Honour, and Order. The reasons whereof, are the same which are alledged in the precedent Chapter, for the same Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty by Institution.

Dominion is acquired two wayes; By Generation, and by Con∣quest.* 1.43 The right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Pa∣rent hath over his Children; and is called PATERNALL. And is not so derived from the Generation, as if therefore the Parent had Do∣minion* 1.44 over his Child because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the Generation, God hath ordained to man a helper; and there be alwayes two that are equally Parents: the Dominion there∣fore over the Child, should belong equally to both; and he be equal∣ly subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two Ma∣sters. And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to the Man onely, as being of the more excellent Sex; they misreckon in it. For there is not alwayes that difference of strength, or prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War. In Common-wealths, this controversie in decided by the Civill Law: and for the most part, (but not alwayes) the sentence is in fa∣vour of the Father; because for the most part Common-wealths have

been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families. But the question lyeth now in the state of meer Nature; where there are sup∣posed no lawes of Matrimony; no lawes for the Education of Chil∣dren; but the Law of Nature, and the naturall inclination of the Sexes, one to another, and to their children. In this condition of meer Nature, either the Parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the Child by Contract; or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, the right passeth according to the Con∣tract. We find in History that the Amazons Contracted with the Men of the neighbouring Countries, to whom they had recourse for issue, that the issue Male should be sent back, but the Female re∣main with themselves: so that the dominion of the Females was in the Mother.

If there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother. For in the* 1.45 condition of meer Nature, where there are no Matrimoniall lawes, it cannot be known who is the Father, unlesse it be delared by the Mo∣ther: and therefore the right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the Infant is first in the power of the Mother, so as she may either nourish, or expose it; if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the Dominion over it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find, and nourish it, the Dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life be∣ing the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.

If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child, is in the Fathers* 1.46 power: and if the Father be the Mothers subject, (as when a Sove∣raign Queen marrieth one of her subjects,) the Child is subject to the Mother; because the Father also is her subject.

If a man and a woman, Monarches of two severall Kingdomes, have a Child, and contract concerning who shall have the Dominion of him, the Right of the Dominion passeth by the Contract. If they contract not, the Dominion followeth the Dominion of the place of his residence. For the Soveraign of each Country hath Dominion over all that reside therein.

He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also over the Children of the Child; and over their Childrens Children. For he that hath Dominion over the person of a man, hath Domini∣on over all that is his; without which, Dominion were but a Title, without the effect.

The Right of Succession to Paternall Dominion, proceedeth in the* 1.47 same manner, as doth the Right of Succession to Monarchy; of which I have already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter.

Dominion acquired by Conquest, or Victory in war, is that which some Writers call DESPOTICALL, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signifieth a Lord, or Master; and is the Dominion of the Master over his Ser∣vant.* 1.48 And this Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the

Vanquished, to avoyd the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in expresse words, or by other sufficient signes of the Will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the Victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure. And after such Covenant made, the Vanquished is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word Servant (whether it be derived from Servire, to Serve, or from Servare, to Save, which I leave to Grammarians to dispute) is not meant a Captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: (for such men, (commonly called Slaves,) have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their Master, justly:) but one, that being ta∣ken, hath corporall liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master, is trusted by him.

It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion* 1.49 over the Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged be∣cause he is Conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he commeth in, and Submitteth to the Victor; Nor is the Victor obliged by an enemies rendring himselfe, (without promise of life,) to spare him for this his yeelding to discretion; which obliges not the Victor longer, than in his own discretion hee shall think fit.

And that which men do, when they demand (as it is now called) Quarter, (which the Greeks called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, taking alive,) is to evade the present fury of the Victor, by Submission, and to compound for their life, with Ransome, or Service: and therefore he that hath Quarter, hath not his life given, but deferred till farther deliberation; For it is not an yeelding on condition of life, but to discretion. And then onely is his life in security, and his service due, when the Victor hath trusted him with his corporall liberty. For Slaves that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoyd the cruelty of their task-masters.

The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorising whatsoever the Master shall do. And in case the Master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or other∣wise punish him for his disobedience, he is himselfe the author of the same; and cannot accuse him of injury.

In summe the Rights and Consequences of both Paternall and Des∣poticall Dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign by Institution; and for the same reasons: which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter. So that for a man that is Monarch of divers Nations, whereof he hath, in one the Soveraignty by Institution of the people assembled, and in another by Conquest, that is by the Submission of each particular, to avoyd death or bonds; to demand of one Nation more than of the other, from the title of Conquest, as be∣ing a Conquered Nation, is an act of ignorance of the Rights o•…•…

Soveraignty, For the Soveraign is absolute over both alike; or else there is no Soveraignty at all; and so every man may Lawfully pro∣tect himselfe, if he can, with his own sword, which is the condition of war.

By this it appears, that a great Family if it be not part of some* 1.50 Common-wealth, is of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty, a little Monarchy; whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his chil∣dren, and servants together: wherein the Father or Master is the Soveraign. But yet a Family is not properly a Common-wealth; unlesse it be of that power by its own number, or by other oppor∣tunities, as not to be subdued without the hazard of war. For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, every one may use his own reason in time of danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to the enemy, as hee shall think best; in the same manner as a very small company of souldiers, surprised by an army, may cast down their armes, and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And thus much shall suffice; concerning what I find by speculation, and deduction, of Soveraign Rights, from the nature, need, and designes of men, in erecting of Common-wealths, and putting themselves under Monarchs, or Assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their protection.

Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point.* 1.51 To Moses, the children of Israel say thus. * 1.52 Speak thou to us, and we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye. * 1.53 This is absolute obedience to Moses. Concerning the Right of Kings, God himself by the mouth of Samuel, saith, * 1.54 This shall be the Right of the King you will have to reigne over you. He shall take your sons, and set them to drive his Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots; and gather in his harvest; and to make his engines of War, and Instruments of his chariots; and shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his Cookes, and Bakers. He shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards, and give them to his servants. He shall take the tyth of your corne and wine, and give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other ser∣vants. He shall take your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice of your youth, and employ them in his businesse. He shall take the tyth of your flocks; and you shall be his servants. This is absolute power, and •…•…ummed up in the last words, you shall be his servants. Againe, when the people heard what power their King was to have, yet they consented thereto, and say thus, * 1.55 We will be as all other na∣tions, and our King shall judge our causes, and goe before us, to con∣duct our wars. Here is confirmed the Right that Soveraigns have, both to the Militia, and to all Judicature; in which is conteined as absolute power, as one man can possibly transferre to another. Again, the prayer of King Salomon to God, was this. * 1.56 Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to di•…•…cerne between Good and Evill. It belongeth therefore to the Soveraigne to bee

Judge, and to praescribe the Rules of discerning Good and Evill: which Rules are Lawes; and therefore in him is the Legislative Power. Saul sought the life of David; yet when it was in his power to slay Saul, and his Servants would have done it, David forbad them, saying, * 1.57 God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anoynted of God. For obedience of servants St. Paul saith, * 1.58 Ser∣vants obey your masters in All things; and,* 1.59 Children obey your Parents in All things. There is simple obedience in those that are subject to Paternall, or Despoticall Dominion. Again, * 1.60 The Scribes and Pha∣risees sit in Moses chayre, and therefore All that they shall bid you ob∣serve, that observe and do. There again is simple obedience. And St Paul, * 1.61 Warn them that they▪ subject themselves to Princes, and to those that are in Authority, & obey them. This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himselfe acknowledges, that men ought to pay such taxes as are by Kings impo•…•…ed, where he sayes, Give to Caesar that which is Caesars; and payed such taxes himselfe. And that the Kings word, is sufficient to take any thing from any Subject, when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that need: For he him∣selfe, as King of the Jewes, commanded his Disciples to take the Asse, and Asses Colt to carry him into Jerusalem, saying, * 1.62 Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find a shee Asse tyed, and her Colt with her, unty them, and bring them to me. And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, Say the Lord hath need of them: And they will let them go. They will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title; nor whether he be judge of that necessity; but acqui∣esce in the will of the Lord.

To these places may be added also that of Genesis, * 1.63 You shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill. And verse 11. Who told thee that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat? For the Cognisance or Judicature of Good and Evill, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of Know∣ledge, as a triall of Adams obedience; The Divel to enflame the Am∣bition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull, told her that by tasting it, they should be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them Gods office, which is Judicature of Good and Evill; but acqui∣red no new ability to distinguish between them aright. And whereas it is sayd, that having eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place, as if they had been formerly blind, and saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakednesse (wherein it was Gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed, did tacitely censure God him∣selfe. And thereupon God saith, Hast thou eaten, &c. as if he should say, doest thou that owest me obedience, take upon thee to judge of my Commandements? Whereby it is cleerly, (though Allegorical∣ly,)* 1.64 signified, that the Commands of them that have the right to command, are not by their Subjects to be censured, nor disputed.

So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Rea∣son, and Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One

Man, as in Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The cond•…•…tion of man in this life shall never be without Inconveniences; but there happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what proceeds from the Subjects disobedi∣ence, and breach of those Covenants, from which the Common∣wealth hath its being. And whosoever thinking Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; must subject himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.

The greatest objection is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where, and when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when, or where has there been a King∣dome long free from Sedition and Civill Warre. In those Nations, whose Common-wealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by forraign warre, the Subjects never did dispute of the Soveraign Power. But howsoever, an argument from the Practise of men, that have not sifted to the bottom, and with ex∣act reason weighed the causes, and nature of Common-wealths, and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance thereof, is invalid. For though in all places of the world, men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand, it could not thence be infer∣red, that so it ought to be. The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.

CHAP. XXI. Of the LIBERTY of Subjects.

LIBERTY, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence* 1.65 of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impedi∣ments of motion;) and may be applyed no lesse to Irratio∣nall, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall. For whatso∣ever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or chayns; and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we use to say, they are not at Liberty, to move in such manner, as without those ex∣ternall impediments they would. But when the impediment of mo∣tion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power to move; as when a stone lyeth still, or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse.

And according to this proper, and generally received meaning* 1.66 of the word, A FREE-MAN, is he, that in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to. But when the words Free, and Liberty, are applyed to any thing but Bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not subject to Impediment: And therefore, when 'tis said (for example) The way is Free, no Liberty of the way is signi∣fied, but of those that walk in it without stop. And when we say a Guift is Free, there is not meant any Liberty of the Guift, but of the Giver, that was not bound by any law, or Covenant to give it. So when we speak Freely, it is not the Liberty of voice, or pronunciati∣on, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly, from the use of the word Free-will, no Liber∣ty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the Liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe.

Feare, and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his* 1.67 goods into the Sea for feare the ship should sink, he doth it never∣thelesse very willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will: It is therefore the action, of one that was free: so a man sometimes pays his debt, only for feare of Imprisonment, which because no body hindred him from detaining, was the action of a man at liberty. And generally all actions which men doe in Common-wealths, for feare of the law, are actions, which the doers had liberty to omit.

Liberty, and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath* 1.68 not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the Channel; so likewise in the Actions which men voluntarily doe: which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty; and yet, be∣cause every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes,) proceed from necessity. So that to him that could see the connexion of those causes, the necessity of all mens volunta∣ry actions, would appeare manifest. And therefore God, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God will, & no more, nor lesse. For though men may do many things, which God does not command, nor is therefore Author of them; yet they can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cause. And did not his will assure the necessity of mans will, and consequently of all that on mans will de∣pendeth, the liberty of men would be a contradiction, and impedi∣ment to the omnipotence and liberty of God. And this shall suf∣fice, (as to the matter in hand) of that naturall liberty, which only is properly called liberty.

But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of them∣selves* 1.69 thereby, have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Com∣mon-wealth; so also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Ci∣vill Lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have

fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but weak, may ne∣verthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the dif∣ficulty of breaking them.

In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of* 1.70 the Liberty of Subjects. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world, wherein there be Rules enough set down, for the regu∣lating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing im∣possible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the laws praetermitted, men have the Liberty, of doing what their own reasons shall suggest, for the most profitable to themselves. For if wee take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Againe, if we take Liberty, for an exemp∣tion from Lawes, it is no lesse absurd, for men to demand as they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to protect them, without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath praetermitted: such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; & the like.* 1.71

Neverthelesse we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or li∣mited. For it has been already shewn, that nothing the Soveraign Representative can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of Nature. And there∣fore it may, and doth often happen in Common-wealths, that a Sub∣ject may be put to death, by the command of the Soveraign Power; and yet neither doe the other wrong: As when Jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed: In which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe the action, for which he is neverthelesse, without Injury put to death. And the same holdeth also in a So∣veraign Prince, that putteth to death an Innocent Subject. For though the action be against the law of Nature, as being contrary to Equitie, (as was the killing of Uriah, by David;) yet it was not an Injurie to Uriah; but to God. Not to Uriah, because the right to doe what he pleased, was given him by Uriah himself: And yet to God, because David was Gods Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of Nature. Which distinction, David himself, when he re∣pented the fact, evidently confirmed, saying, To thee only have I sinned. In the same manner, the people of Athens, when they •…•…ani∣shed

the most potent of their Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice; and yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he would doe: Nay they com∣manded the banishment of they knew not whom; and every Citi∣zen bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actuall accusing him, sometimes banished an Aristides, for his reputation of Justice; And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as Hyperbolus, to make a Jest of it. And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of Athens wanted right to banish them; or an Athenian the Libertie to Jest, or to be Just.

The Libertie, whereof there is so frequent, and honourable men∣tion,* 1.72 in the Histories, and Philosophy of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in the writings, and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in the Politiques, is not the Libertie of Particular men; but the Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is the same with that, which every man then should have, if there were no Civil Laws, nor Common-wealth at all. And the effects of it also be the same. For as amongst masterlesse men, there is perpetuall war, of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, nor to expect from the Father; no proprie∣ty of Goods, or Lands; no security; but a full and absolute Liber∣tie in every Particular man: So in States, and Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth, (not every man) has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge (that is to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit. But withall, they live in the condition of a perpetuall war, and upon the confines of battel, with their fron∣tiers armed, and canons planted against their neighbours round a∣bout. The Athenians, and Romanes were free; that is, free Com∣mon-wealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist their own Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie to resist, or invade other people. There is written on the Turrets of the city of Luca in great characters at this day, the word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the Com∣monwealth there, than in Constantinople. Whether a Common∣wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome is still the same.

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the specious name of Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, mi∣stake that for their Private Inheritance, and Birth right, which is the right of the Publique only. And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings in this sub∣ject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romanes, that living under Popular States, derived those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their books, out of

the Practise of their own Common-wealths, which were Popular; as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of the Pra∣ctise of the time; or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of Homer and Virgil. And because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them from desire of changing their Government,) that they were Free∣men, and all that lived under Monarchy were slaves; therefore Aristo∣tle puts it down in his Politiques, (lib. 6. cap. 2.) In democracy, Liberty is to be supposed: for 'tis commonly held, that no man is Free in any other Government. And as Aristotle; so Cicero, and other Writers have grounded their Civill doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans, who were taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their Soveraign, shared amongst them the Soveraignty of Rome; and afterwards by their Successors. And by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit (un∣der a false shew of Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say, there was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latine tongues.

To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a Subject;* 1.73 that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider, what Rights we passe away, when we make a Com∣mon-wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves, by owning all the Actions (without exception) of the Man, or As∣sembly we make our Soveraign. For in the act of our Submission, consisteth both our Obligation, and our Liberty; which must there∣fore be inferred by arguments taken from thence; there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some Act of his own; for all men equally, are by Nature Free. And because such argu∣ments, must either be drawn from the expresse words, I Authorise all his Actions, or from the Intention of him that submitteth himselfe to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End for which he so submitteth;) The Obligation, and Liberty of the Sub∣ject, is to be derived, either from those Words, (or others equiva∣lent;) or else from the End of the Institution of Soveraignty; name∣ly, the Peace of the Subjects within themselves, and their Defence against a common Enemy,

First therefore, seeing Soveraignty by Institution, is by Covenant* 1.74 of every one to every one; and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent; It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred. I have shewn be∣fore in the 14. Chapter, that Covenants, not to defend a mans own body, are voyd. Therefore,

If the Soveraign command a man (though justly condemned,) to* 1.75 kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other

thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.

If a man be interrogated by the Soveraign, or his Authority, con∣cerning a crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn in the same Chapter) can be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.

Again, the Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power, is contained in these words, I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions; in which there is no restriction at all, of his own former naturall Liberty: For by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill my selfe when he commands me. 'Tis one thing to say, Kill me, or my fellow, if you please; another thing to say, I will kill my selfe, or my fellow. It fol∣loweth therefore, that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or any other man; And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the Words of our Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End thereof. When therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Li∣berty to refuse: otherwise there is.

Upon this ground, a man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight* 1.76 against the enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to pu∣nish his refusall with death, may neverthelesse in many cases refuse, without Injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Common∣wealth. And there is allowance to be made for naturall timorous∣nesse, not onely to women, (of whom no such dangerous duty is ex∣pected,) but also to men of feminine courage. When Armies fight, there is on one side, or both, a running away; yet when they do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but dishonourably. For the same reason, to avoyd battell, is not Inju∣stice, but Cowardise. But he that inrowleth himselfe a Souldier, or taketh imprest mony, taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell, but also not to run from it, without his Captaines leave. And when the Defence of the Com∣mon-wealth, requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged; because otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.

To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of ano∣ther man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Li∣berty, takes away from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting us; and is therefore destructive of the very essence of Government. But in case a great many men together, have already resisted the Sove∣raign Power unjustly, or committed some Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth death, whether have they not the Li∣berty then to joyn together, and assist, and defend one another? Certainly they have: For they but defend their lives, which the Guil∣ty

man may as well do, as the Innocent. There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all. But the offer of pardon taketh from them, to whom it is offered, the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, or defending the rest, unlawfull.

As for other Lyberties, they depend on the Silence of the Law. In* 1.77 cases where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the Liberty to do, or forbeare, according to his own discretion. And therefore such Liberty is in some places more, and in some lesse; and in some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the Soveraignty shall think most convenient. As for Example, there was a time, when in England a man might enter in to his own Land, (and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed it,) by force. But in after-times, that Liberty of Forcible Entry, was taken away by a Statute made (by the King) in Parliament. And in some places of the world, men have the Liberty of many wives: in other places, such Liberty is not allowed.

If a Subject have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of debt, or of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service re∣quired at his hands, or concerning any penalty, corporall, or pecunia∣ry, grounded on a precedent Law; he hath the same Liberty to sue for his right, as if it were against a Subject; and before such Judges, as are appointed by the Soveraign. For seeing the Soveraign demand∣eth by force of a former Law, and not by vertue of his Power; he declareth thereby, that he requireth no more, than shall appear to be due by that Law. The sute therefore is not contrary to the will of the Soveraign; and consequently the Subject hath the Liberty to demand the hearing of his Cause; and sentence, according to that Law. But if he demand, or take any thing by pretence of his Power; there ly∣eth, in that case, no action of Law: for all that is done by him in Ver∣tue of his Power, is done by the Authority of every Subject, and consequently, he that brings an action against the Soveraign, brings it against himselfe.

If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of his Subjects, which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety, the Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly renounce, or transferre the Soveraignty to another. For in that he might openly, (if it had been his will,) and in plain termes, have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it is to be understood it was not his will; but that the Grant proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy be∣tween such a Liberty and the Soveraign Power: and therefore the Soveraignty is still retayned; and consequently all those Powers, which are necessary to the exercising thereof; such as are the Power of Warre, and Peace, of Judicature, of appointing Officers, and Councellours, of levying Mony, and the rest named in the 18th Chapter.

The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to* 1.78 last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The Soveraignty is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the mem∣bers doe no more receive their motion from it. The end of Obe∣dience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own, or in anothers sword, Nature applyeth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintaine it. And though Soveraignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by forreign war; but al∣so through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of a naturall mortality, by Intestine Discord.

If a Subject be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means* 1.79 of life be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and cor∣porall Libertie given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath Libertie to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himself. The case is the same, if he be deteined on the same termes, in a forreign country. But if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the libertie of his bodie; he cannot be understood to be bound by Covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.

If a Monarch shall relinquish the Soveraignty, both for himself,* 1.80 and his heires; His Subjects returne to the absolute Libertie of Na∣ture; because, though Nature may declare who are his Sons, and who are the nerest of his Kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said in the precedent chapter,) who shall be his Heyr. If therefore he will have no Heyre, there is no Soveraignty, nor Sub∣jection. The case is the same, if he dye without known Kindred, and without declaration of his Heyre. For then there can no Heire be known, and consequently no Subjection be due.

If the Soveraign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment, he is* 1.81 not Subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to tra∣vell, is still Subject; but it is, by Contract between Soveraigns, not by vertue of the covenant of Subjection. For whosoever entreth in∣to anothers dominion, is Subject to all the Laws thereof; unlesse he have a privilege by the amity of the Soveraigns, or by speciall licence.

If a Monarch subdued by war, render himself Subject to the Victor;* 1.82 his Subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and be∣come obliged to the Victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the liberty of his own Body; he is not understood to have given a∣way the Right of Soveraigntie; and therefore his Subjects are ob∣liged to yield obedience to the Magistrates formerly placed, gover∣ning not in their own name, but in his. For, his Right remaining, the question is only of the Administration; that is to say, of the Magi∣strates

and Officers; which, if he have not means to name, he is supposed to approve those, which he himself had formerly ap∣pointed.

CHAP. XXII. Of SYSTEMES Subject, Politicall, and Private.

HAving spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of* 1.83 a Common-wealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof. And first of Systemes, which resemble the similar parts, or Muscles of a Body naturall. By SYSTEMES; I understand any numbers of men joyned in one Interest, or one Businesse. Of which, some are Regular, and some Irregular. Re∣gular are those, where one Man, or Assembly of men, is constituted Representative of the whole number. All other are Irregular.

Of Regular, some are Absolute, and Independent, subject to none but their own Representative: such are only Common-wealths; Of which I have spoken already in the 5. last precedent chapters. Others are Dependent; that is to say, Subordinate to some Sove∣raign Power, to which every one, as also their Representative is Subject.

Of Systemes subordinate, some are Politicall, and some Private. Politicall (otherwise Called Bodies Politique, and Persons in Law,) are those, which are made by authority from the Soveraign Power of the Common-wealth. Private, are those, which are constituted by Subjects amongst themselves, or by authoritie from a stranger. For no authority derived from forraign power, within the Domi∣nion of another, is Publique there, but Private.

And of Private Systemes, some are Lawfull; some Unlawfull: Lawfull, are those which are allowed by the Common-wealth: all other are Unlawfull. Irregular Systemes, are those which having no Representative, consist only in concourse of People; which if not forbidden by the Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe, (such as are conflux of People to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse end,) are Lawfull. But when the Intention is evill, or (if the number be considerable) unknown, they are Unlawfull.

In Bodies Politique, the power of the Representative is alwaies* 1.84 Limited: And that which prescribeth the Limits thereof, is the Pow∣er Soveraign. For Power Unlimited, is absolute Soveraignty. And the Soveraign, in every Commonwealth, is the absolute Repre∣sentative of all the subjects; and therefore no other, can be Repre∣sentative of any part of them, but so far forth, as he shall give leave: And to give leave to a Body Politique of Subjects, to have an abso∣lute Representative to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the government of so much of the Commonwealth, and to divide the Dominion, contrary to their Peace and Defence, which the Sove∣raign cannot be understood to doe, by any Grant, that does not

plainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection. For conse∣quences of words, are not the signes of his will, when other conse∣quences are signes of the contrary; but rather signes of errour, and misreckonning; to which all mankind is too prone.

The bounds of that Power, which is given to the Representative of a Bodie Politique, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is their Writt, or Letters from the Soveraign: the other is the Law of the Common-wealth.

For though in the Institution or Acquisition of a Common-wealth,* 1.85 which is independent, there needs no Writing, because the Power of the Representative has there no other bounds, but such as are set out by the unwritten Law of Nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such diversities of Limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times, and places, as can neither be remembred without Letters, nor taken notice of, unlesse such Letters be Patent, that they may be read to them, and withall sealed, or testified, with the Seales, or other permanent signes of the Authority Soveraign.

And because such Limitation is not alwaies easie, or perhaps pos∣sible* 1.86 to be described in writing; the ordinary Lawes, common to all Subjects, must determine, what the Representative may lawfully do, in all Cases, where the Letters themselves are silent. And therefore

In a Body Politique, if the Representative be one man, whatsoe∣ver* 1.87 he does in the Person of the Body, which is not warranted in his Letters, nor by the Lawes, is his own act, and not the act of the Bo∣dy, nor of any other Member thereof besides himselfe: Because fur∣ther than his Letters, or the Lawes limit, he representeth no mans person, but his own. But what he does according to these, is the act of every one: For of the Act of the Soveraign every one is Author, because he is their Representative unlimited; and the act of him that recedes not from the Letters of the Soveraign, is the act of the So∣veraign, and therefore every member of the Body is Author of it.

But if the Representative be an Assembly; whatsoever that As∣sembly* 1.88 shall Decree, not warranted by their Letters, or the Lawes, is the act of the Assembly, or Body Politique, and the act of every one by whose Vote the Decree was made; but not the act of any man that being present Voted to the contrary; nor of any man absent, un∣lesse he Voted it by procuration. It is the act of the Assembly, be∣cause Voted by the major part; and if it be a crime, the Assembly may be punished, as farre-forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, or forfeiture of their Letters, (which is to such artificiall, and fictitious Bodies, capitall,) or (if the Assembly have a Common stock, wherein none of the Innocent Members have propriety,) by pecuniary Mulct. For from corporall penalties Nature hath exempted all Bodies Poli∣tique. But they that gave not their Vote, are therefore Innocent, be∣cause the Assembly cannot Represent any man in things unwarranted by their Letters, and consequently are involved in their Votes.

If the person of the Body Politique being in one man, borrow* 1.89 mony of a stranger, that is, of one that is not of the same Body, (for no Letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to mens own incli∣nations

to limit lending) the debt is the Representatives. For if he should have Authority from his Letters, to make the members pay what he borroweth, he should have by consequence the Soveraignty of them; and therefore the grant were either voyd, as proceeding from Errour, commonly incident to humane Nature, and an unsuffi∣cient signe of the will of the Granter; or if it be avowed by him, then is the Representer Soveraign, and falleth not under the present question, which is onely of Bodies subordinate. No member there∣fore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the Representative himselfe: because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the Letters, and to the qualification of the Body, understandeth those onely for his debtors, that are engaged; and seeing the Representer can ingage himselfe, and none else, has him onely for Debtor; who must there∣fore pay him, out of the common stock (if there be any,) or (if there be none) out of his own estate.

If he come into debt by Contract, or Mulct, the case is the same.* 1.90

But when the Representative is an Assembly, and the debt to a stranger; all they, and onely they are responsible for the debt, that gave their votes to the borrowing of it, or to the Contract that made it due, or to the fact for which the Mulct was imposed; because eve∣ry one of those in voting did engage himselfe for the payment: For he that is author of the borrowing, is obliged to the payment, even of the whole debt, though when payd by any one, he be discharged.

But if the debt be to one of the Assembly, the Assembly onely is* 1.91 obliged to the payment, out of their common stock (if they have any:) For having liberty of Vote, if he Vote the Mony, shall be bor∣rowed, he Votes it shall be payd; If he Vote if shall not be borrow∣ed, or be absent, yet because in lending, he voteth the borrowing, he contradicteth his former Vote, and is obliged by the later, and be∣comes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man, but from the common Treasure onely; which fayling he hath no remedy, nor complaint, but against himselfe, that being privy to the acts of the Assembly, and to their means to pay, and not being enforced, did neverthelesse through his own folly lend his mony.

It is manifest by this, that in Bodies Politique subordinate, and* 1.92 subject to a Soveraign Power, it is sometimes not onely lawfull, but expedient, for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the Representative Assembly, and cause their dissent to be Registred, or to take witnesse of it; because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted, and be responsible for crimes com∣mitted by other men: But in a Soveraign Assembly, that liberty is ta∣ken away, both because he that protesteth there, denies their Sove∣raignty; and also because whatsoever is commanded by the Sove∣rign Power, is as to the Subject (though not so alwayes in the sight of God) justified by the Command; for of such command every* 1.93 Subject is the Author.

The variety of Bodies Politique, is almost infinite: for they are not onely distinguished by the severall affaires, for which they are

constituted, wherein there is an unspeakable diversitie; but also by the times, places, and numbers, subject to many limitations. And as to their affaires, some are ordained for Government; As first, the Government of a Province may be committed to an Assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on the Votes of the major part; and then this Assembly is a Body Politique, and their power li∣mited by Commission. This word Province signifies a charge, or care of businesse, which he whose businesse it is, committeth to ano∣ther man, to be administred for▪ and under him; and therefore when in one Common-wealth there be divers Countries, that have their Lawes distinct one from another, or are farre distant in place, the Ad∣ministration of the Government being committed to divers persons, those Countries where the Soveraign is not resident, but governs by Commission, are called Provinces. But of the government of a Province, by an Assembly residing in the Province it selfe, there be few examples. The Romans who had the Soveraignty of many Pro∣vinces; yet governed them alwaies by Presidents, and Praetors; and not by Assemblies, as they governed the City of Rome, and Territo∣ries adjacent. In like manner, when there were Colonies sent from England, to Plant Virginia, and Sommer-Ilands; though the go∣vernment of them here, were committed to Assemblies in London, yet did those Assemblies never commit the Government under them to any Assembly there; but did to each Plantation send one Gover∣nour; For though every man, where he can be present by Nature, desires to participate of government; yet where they cannot be pre∣sent, they are by Nature also enclined, to commit the Government of their common Interest rather to a Monarchicall, then a Popular form of Government: which is also evident in those men that have great private estates; who when they are unwilling to take the paines of administring the bu•…•…inesse that belongs to them, choose rather to trust one Servant, then an Assembly either of their friends or servants. But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose the Government of a Province, or Colony committed to an Assembly: and when it is, that which in this place I have to say, is this; that whatsoever debt is by that Assembly contracted; or whatsoever unlawfull Act is de∣creed, is the Act onely of those that assented, and not of any that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons before alledged. Also that an Assembly residing out of the bounds of that Colony whereof they have the government, cannot execute any power over the persons, or goods of any of the Colonie, to seize on them for debt, or other du∣ty, in any place without the Colony it selfe, as having no Jurisdiction, nor Authoritie elsewhere, but are left to the remedie, which the Law of the place alloweth them. And though the Assembly have right, to impose a Mulct upon any of their members, that shall break the Lawes they make; yet out of the Colonie it selfe, they have no right to execute the same. And that which is said here, of the Rights of an Assembly, for the government of a Province, or a Colony, is appli∣able also to an Assembly for the Government of a Town, an Uni∣versity, or a College, or a Church, or for any other Government over the persons of men.

And generally, in all Bodies Politique, if any particular mem∣ber conceive himself Injuried by the Body it self, the Cognisance of his cause belongeth to the Soveraign, and those the Soveraign hath ordained for Judges in such causes, or shall ordaine for that particular cause; and not to the Body it self. For the whole Body is in this case his fellow subject, which in a Soveraign Assembly, is otherwise: for there, if the Soveraign be not Judge, though in his own cause, there can be no Judge at all.

In a Bodie Politique, for the well ordering of forraigne Traf∣fique,* 1.94 the most commodious Representative is an Assembly of all the members; that is to say, such a one, as every one that adven∣tureth his mony, may be present at all the Deliberations, and Re∣solutions of the Body, if they will themselves. For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men that are Merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import their Merchandise, accor∣ding to their own discretions, doe neverthelesse bind themselves up in one Corporation. It is true, there be few Merchants, that with the Merchandise they buy at home, can fraight a Ship▪ to export it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home; and have therefore need to joyn together in one Society; where every man may either participate of the gaine; according to the proporti∣on of his adventure; or take his own, and sell what he transports, or imports, at such prices as he thinks fit. But this is no Body Po∣litique, there being no Common Representative to oblige them to any other Law, than that which is common to all other subjects. The End of their Incorporating, is to make their gaine the grea∣ter; which is done two wayes; by sole buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. So that to grant to a Company of Merchants to be a Corporation, or Body Politique, is to grant them a double Monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers; another to be sole sellers. For when there is a Company incorporate for any par∣ticular forraign Country, they only export the Commodities ven∣dible in that Country; which is sole buying at home, and sole sel∣ling abroad. For at home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: both which is gainfull to the Merchant, because thereby they buy at home at lower, and sell abroad at higher rates: And abroad there is but one buyer of forraign Merchandise, and but one that sels them at home; both which againe are gainfull to the adventurers.

Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to forraigners. For at home by their sole exportation they set what price they please on the husbandry, and handy works of the people; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all forraign commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the people. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad, and sole buying the for∣raign commodities upon the place, they raise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to the disadvantage of the forraigner: For where but one selleth, the Merchandise is the dearer; and where

but one buyeth the cheaper: Such Corporations therefore are no other then Monopolies; though they would be very profitable for a Common-wealth, if being bound up into one body in forraigne Markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and sell at what price he could.

The end then of these Bodies of Merchants, being not a Com∣mon benefit to the whole Body, (which have in this case no com∣mon stock, but what is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying, victualling and manning of Ships,) but the particular gaine of every adventurer▪ it is reason that every one be acquainted with the employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the Assembly, that shall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the Represen∣tative of such a Body must be an Assembly, where every member of the Body may be present at the consultations, if he will.

If a Body Politique of Merchants, contract a debt to a stranger by the act of their Representative Assembly, every Member is ly∣able by himself for the whole. For a stranger can take no notice of their private Lawes, but considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest: But if the debt be to one of the Company, the creditor is debter for the whole to himself, and cannot there∣fore demand his debt, but only from the common stock, if there be any.

If the Common-wealth impose a Tax upon the Body, it is un∣derstood to be layd upon every Member proportionably to his par∣ticular adventure in the Company. For there is in this case no o∣ther common stock, but what is made of their particular adven∣tures.

If a Mulct be layd upon the Body for some unlawfull act, they only are lyable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was executed; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of the Body; which if a crime, (because the Body was ordeyned by the authority of the Common-wealth,) is not his.

If one of the Members be indebted to the Body, he may 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sued by the Body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person impri∣soned by the authority of the Body; but only by Authority of the Common-wealth: for if they can doe it by their own Authori∣ty, they can by their own Authority give judgement that the debt is due, which is as much as to be Judge in their own Cause.

Those Bodies made for the government of Men, or of Traffique,* 1.95 be either perpetuall, or for a time prescribed by writing. But there be Bodies also whose times are limited, and that only by the nature of their businesse. For example, if a Soveraign Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall think fit to give command to the towns, and other severall parts of their territory, to send to him their Deputies, to enforme him of the condition, and necessities of the Subjects, or to advise with him for the making of good Lawes, or

for any other cause, as with one Person representing the whole Coun∣try, such Deputies, having a place and time of meeting assigned them, are there, and at that time, a Body Politique, representing every Sub∣ject of that Dominion; but it is onely for such matters as shall be propounded unto them by that Man, or Assembly, that by the Sove∣raign Authority sent for them; and when it shall be declared that no∣thing more shall be propounded, nor debated by them, the Body is dissolved. For if they were the absolute Representative of the peo∣ple, then were it the Soveraign Assembly; and so there would be two Soveraign Assemblies, or two Soveraigns, over the same people; which cannot consist with their Peace. And therefore where there is once a Soveraignty, there can be no absolute Representation of the people, but by it. And for the limits of how farre such a Body shall represent the whole People, they are set forth in the Writing by which they were sent for. For the People cannot choose their Depu∣ties to other intent, than is in the Writing directed to them from their Soveraign expressed.

Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constitu∣ted* 1.96 without Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common to all other Subjects. And because they be united in one Per∣son Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all Fami∣lies, in which the Father, or Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth his Children, and Servants, as farre as the Law permit∣teth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedi∣ence in those actions, which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under domestique govern∣ment, they are subject to their Fathers, and Masters, as to their im∣mediate Soveraigns. For the Father, and Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Soveraigns in their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them.

Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite them∣selves* 1.97 into one person Representative, without any publique Autho∣rity at all; such as are the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies, the better to order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of men, that by Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in anothers Dominion, for the easier pro∣pagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, against the Power of the Common-wealth.

Irregular Systemes, in their nature, but Leagues, or sometimes* 1.98 meer concourse of people, without union to any particular designe, not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from a si∣militude of wills and inclinations, become Lawfull, or Unlawfull, ac∣cording to the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse of every particular mans designe therein: And his designe is to be understood by the occasion.

The Leagues of Subjects, (because Leagues are commonly made for mutuall defence,) are in a Common wealth (which is no more than a League of all the Subjects together) for the most part unne∣cessary, and savour of unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Un∣lawfull,

and go commonly by the name of Factions, or Conspira∣cies. For a League being a connexion of men by Covenants, if there be no power given to any one Man, or Assembly (as in the con∣dition of meer Nature) to compell them to performance, is so long onely valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and therefore Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane Power established, to keep them all in awe, are not onely lawfull, but also profitable for the time they last. But Leagues of the Subjects of one and the same Common-wealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of the Soveraign Power, are unnecessary to the main∣taining of Peace and Justice, and (in case the designe of them be evill, or Unknown to the Common-wealth) unlawfull. For all uni∣ting of strength by private men, is, if for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the Publique, and unjustly concealed.

If the Soveraign Power be in a great Assembly, and a number of* 1.99 men, part of the Assembly, without authority, consult a part, to con∣trive the guidance of the rest; This is a Faction, or Conspiracy un∣lawfull, as being a fraudulent seducing of the Assembly for their particular interest. But if he, whose private interest is to be debated, and judged in the Assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is no Injustice; because in this case he is no part of the Assembly. And though he hire such friends with mony, (unlesse there be an expresse Law against it,) yet it is not Injustice. For sometimes, (as mens manners are,) Justice cannot be had without mony; and every man may think his own cause just, till it be heard, and judged.

In all Common-wealths, if a private man entertain more servants,* 1.100 than the government of his estate, and lawfull employment he has for them requires, it is Faction, and unlawfull. For having the pro∣tection of the Common-wealth, he needeth not the defence of pri∣vate force. And whereas in Nations not throughly civilized, severall numerous Families have lived in continuall hostility, and invaded one another with private force; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else that they had no Common-wealth.

And as Factions for Kindred, so also Factions for Government of* 1.101 Religion, as of Papists, Protestants, &c. or of State, as Patricians, and Plebeians of old time in Rome, and of Aristocraticalls and De∣mocraticalls of old time in Greece, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the Sword out of the hand of the Soveraign.

Concourse of people, is an Irregular Systeme, the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse, whereof dependeth on the occasion, and on the num∣ber of them that are assembled. If the occasion be lawfull, and ma∣nifest, the Concourse is lawfull; as the usuall meeting of men at Church, or at a publique Shew, in usuall numbers: for if the num∣bers be extraordinarily great, the occasion is not evident; and conse∣quently he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to be judged conscious of an unlawfull, and tumultuous designe. It may be lawfull for a thousand men, to joyn in a Petition to be delivered to a Judge, or Magistrate; yet if a thou∣sand

men come to present it, it is a tumultuous Assembly; because there needs but one or two for that purpose. But in such cases as these, it is not a set number that makes the Assembly Unlawfull, but such a number, as the present Officers are not able to suppresse, and bring to Justice.

When an unusuall number of men, assemble against a man whom they accuse; the Assembly is an Unlawfull tumult; because they may deliver their accusation to the Magistrate by a few, or by one man. Such was the case of St. Paul at Ephesus; where Demetrius, and a great number of other men, brought two of Pauls companions be∣fore the Magistrate, saying with one Voyce, Great is Diana of the Ephesians; which was their way of demanding Justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine, as was against their Religion, and Trade. The occasion here, considering the Lawes of that Peo∣ple, was just; yet was their Assembly Judged Unlawfull, and the Ma∣gistrate reprehended them for it, in these words, * 1.102 If Demetrius and the other work-men can accuse any man; of any thing, there be Pleas, and Deputies, let them accuse one another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an Assembly Lawfully cal∣led. For we are in danger to be accused for this dayes sedition, because, there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this Con∣course of People. Where he calleth an Assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a Sedition, and such as they could not answer for. And this is all I shall say concerning Systemes, and Assemblyes of People, which may be compared (as I said,) to the Similar parts of mans Body; such as be Lawfull, to the Muscles; such as are Un∣lawfull, to Wens, Biles, and Apostemes, engendred by the unnaturall conflux of evill humours.

CHAP. XXIII. Of the PUBLIQUE MINISTERS of Soveraign Power.

IN the last Chapter I have spoken of the Similar parts of a Com∣mon-wealth: In this I shall speak of the parts Organicall, which are Publique Ministers.

A PUBLIQUE MINISTER, is he, that by the Soveraign,* 1.103 (whether a Monarch, or an Assembly,) is employed in any affaires, with Authority to represent in that employment, the Person of the Common-wealth. And whereas every man, or assembly that hath Soveraignty, representeth two Persons, or (as the more common phrase is) has two Capacities, one Naturall, and another Politique, (as a Monarch, hath the person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of a man; and a Soveraign Assembly hath the Person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of the Assembly); they that be servants to them in their naturall Capacity, are not Publique Ministers; but those onely that serve them in the Administration of

the Publique businesse. And therefore neither Ushers, nor Sergeants, nor other Officers that waite on the Assembly, for no other purpose, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for the commodity of the men assembled, in an Aristocracy, or De∣mocracy; nor Stewards, Chamberlains, Cofferers, or any other Officers of the houshold of a Monarch, are Publique Ministers in a Monarchy.

Of Publique Ministers, some have charge committed to them of* 1.104 a generall Administration, either of the whole Dominion, or of a part thereof. Of the whole, as to a Protector, or Regent, may bee committed by the Predecessor of an Infant King, during his mino∣rity, the whole Administration of his Kingdome. In which case, every Subject is so far obliged to obedience, as the Ordinances he •…•…all make, and the commands he shall give be in the Kings name, and not inconsistent with his Soveraigne Power. Of a part, or Pro∣vince; as when either a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall give the generall charge thereof to a Governour, Lieutenant, Prae∣fect or Vice-Roy: And in this case also, every one of that Province, is obliged to all he shall doe in the name of the Soveraign, and that not incompatible with the Soveraigns Right. For such Protectors, Vice-Roys, and Governors, have no other right, but what depends on the Soveraigns Will; and no Commission that can be given them, can be interpret•…•…d for a Declaration of the will to transferre the So∣vernignty, without expresse and perspicuous words to that pur∣pose. And this kind of Publique Ministers resembleth the Nerves, and Tendons that move the severall limbs of a body naturall.

Others have speciall Administration; that is to say, charges of* 1.105 some speciall businesse, either at home, or abroad: As at home, First, for the Oeconomy of a Common-wealth, They that have Authority concerning the Treasure, as Tributes, Impositions, Rents, Fines, or whatsoever publique revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the Accounts thereof, are Publique Ministers: Ministers, because they serve the Person Representative, and can doe nothing against his Command, nor without his Authority: Publique, be∣cause they serve him in his. Politicall Capacity.

Secondly, they that have Authority concerning the Militia; to have the custody of Armes, Forts, Ports; to Levy, Pay, or Con∣duct Souldiers; or to provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by Land or Sea, are publique Ministers. But a Soul∣dier without Command, though he fight for the Common-wealth, does not therefore represent the Person of it; because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath command, represents it to them only whom he commandeth.

They also that have authority to teach, or to enable others to* 1.106 teach the people their duty to the Soveraign Power, and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to ren∣der them more apt to live in godlinesse, and in peace amongst themselves, and resist the publique enemy, are Publique Ministers: Ministers, in that they doe it not by their own Authority, but by a∣nothers; and Publique, because they doe it (or should doe it) by

no Authority, but that of the Soveraign. The Monarch, or the Soveraign Assembly only hath immediate Authority from God, to teach and instruct the people; and no man but the Soveraign, receiveth his power Dei gratiâ simply; that is to say, from the fa∣vour of none but God: All other, receive theirs from the favour and providence of God, and their Soveraigns; as in a Monarchy Dei gratiâ & Regis; or Dei providentiâ & voluntate Regis.

They also to whom Jurisdiction is given, are Publique Ministers.* 1.107 For in their Seats of Justice they represent the person of the Sove∣raign; and their Sentence, is his Sentence; For (as hath been before declared) all Judicature is essentially annexed to the Soveraignty; and therefore all other Judges are but Ministers of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power. And as Controversies are of two sorts, namely of Fact, and of Law; so are Judgements, some of Fact, some of Law: And consequently in the same controversie, there may be two Judges, one of Fact, another of Law.

And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversie between the party Judged, and the Judge; which because they be both Subjects to the Soveraign, ought in Equity to be Judged by men agreed on by consent of both; for no man can be Judge in his own cause. But the Soveraign is already agreed on for Judge by them both, and is therefore either to heare the Cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for Judge such as they shall both agree on. And this agreement is then understood to be made between them divers wayes; as first, if the Defendant be allowed to except against such of his Judges, whose interest maketh him suspect them, (for as to the Complaynant he hath already chosen his own Judge,) those which he excepteth not against, are Judges he himself agrees on. Secondly, if he appeale to any other Judge, he can appeale no further; for his appeale is his choice. Thirdly, if he appeale to the Soveraign himself, and he by himself, or by Delegates which the parties shall agree on, give Sentence; that Sentence is finall: for the Defendant is Judged by his own Judges, that is to say, by himself.

These properties of just and rationall Judicature considered, I cannot forbeare to observe the excellent constitution of the Courts of Justice, established both for Common, and also for Publique Pleas in England. By Common Pleas, I meane those, where both the Complaynant and Defendant are Subjects: and by Publique, (which are also called Pleas of the Crown) those, where the Com∣playnant is the Soveraign. For whereas there were two orders of men, whereof one was Lords, the other Commons; The Lords had this Priviledge, to have for Judges in all Capitall crimes, none but Lords; and of them, as many as would be present; which be∣ing ever acknowledged as a Priviledge of favour, their Judges were none but such as they had themselves desired. And in all controversies, every Subject (as also in civill controversies the Lords) had for Judges, men of the Country where the matter in controvesie lay; against which he might make his exceptions, till at last Twelve

men without exception being agreed on, they were Judged by those twelve. So that having his own Judges, there could be no∣thing alledged by the party, why the sentence should not be finall. These publique persons, with Authority from the Soveraign Power, either to Instruct, or Judge the people, are such members of the Common-wealth, as may fitly be compared to the organs of Voice in a Body naturall.

Publique Ministers are also all those, that have Authority from* 1.108 the Soveraign, to procure the Execution of Judgements given; to publish the Soveraigns Commands; to suppresse Tumults; to appre∣hend, and imprison Malefactors; and other acts tending to the con∣servation of the Peace. For every act they doe by such Authori∣ty, is the act of the Common-wealth; and their service, answe∣rable to that of the Hands, in a Bodie naturall.

Publique Ministers abroad, are those that represent the Person of their own Soveraign, to forraign States. Such are Ambassadors, Messengers, Agents, and Heralds, sent by publique Authoritie, and on publique Businesse.

But such as are sent by Authoritie only of some private partie of a troubled State, though they be received, are neither Publique, nor Private Ministers of the Common-wealth; because none of their actions have the Common-wealth for Author. Likewise, an Ambassador sent from a Prince, to congratulate, condole, or to as∣sist at a solemnity, though the Authority be Publique; yet because the businesse is Private, and belonging to him in his naturall capa∣city▪; is a Private person. Also if a man be sent into another Coun∣try, secretly to explore their counsels, and strength; though both the Authority, and the Businesse be Publique; yet because there is none to take notice of any Person in him, but his own; he is but a Private Minister; but yet a Minister of the Common-wealth; and may be compared to an Eye in the Body naturall. And those that are appointed to receive the Petitions or other informations of the People, and are as it were the publique Eare, are Publique Mini∣sters, and represent their Soveraign in that office.

Neither a Counsellor (nor a Councell of State, if we consider* 1.109 it with no Authority of Judicature or Command, but only of giving Advice to the Soveraign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required, is a Publique Person. For the Advice is addressed to the Soveraign only, whose person cannot in his own presence, be represented to him, by another. But a Body of Counsellors, are never without some other Authority, either of Judicature, or of im∣mediate Administration: As in a Monarchy, they represent the Mo∣narch, in delivering his Commands to the Publique Ministers: In a Democracy, the Councell, or Senate propounds the Result of their deliberations to the people, as a Councell; but when they appoint Judges, or heare Causes, or give Audience to Ambassadors, it is in the quality of a Minister of the People: And in an Aristocracy the Councell of State is the Soveraign Assembly it self; and gives counsell to none but themselves.

CHAP. XXIV. Of the NUTRITION, and PROCREATION of a Common-wealth.

THe NUTRITION of a Common-wealth consisteth, in* 1.110 the Plenty, and Distribution of Materials conducing to Life: In Concoction, or Preparation; and (when concocted) in the Conveyance of it, by convenient conduits, to the Publique use.

As for the Plenty of Matter, it is a thing limited by Nature, to those commodities, which from (the two breasts of our common Mother) Land, and Sea, God usually either freely giveth, or for la∣bour selleth to man-kind.

For the Matter of this Nutriment, consisting in Animals, Vege∣tals, and Minerals, God hath freely layd them before us, in or neer to the face of the Earth; so as there needeth no more but the labour, and industry of receiving them. Insomuch as Plenty dependeth (next to Gods favour) meerly on the labour and industry of men.

This Matter, commonly called Commodities, is partly Native, and partly Forraign: Native, that which is to be had within the Ter∣ritory of the Common-wealth: Forraign, that which is imported from without. And because there is no Territory under the Domini∣on of one Common-wealth, (except it be of very vast extent,) that produceth all things needfull for the maintenance, and motion of the whole Body; and few that produce not something more than neces∣sary; the superfluous commodities to be had within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, by importation of that which may be had abroad, either by Exchange, or by just Warre, or by Labour: for a mans Labour also, is a commodity ex∣changeable for benefit, as well as any other thing: And there have been Common-wealths that having no more Territory, than hath served them for habitation, have neverthelesse, not onely maintained, but also encreased their Power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by selling the Manifactures, whereof the Materials were brought in from other places.

The Distribution of the Materials of this Nourishment, is the con∣stitution* 1.111 of Mine, and Thine, and His; that is to say, in one word Pro∣priety; and belongeth in all kinds of Common-wealth to the Sove∣raign Power. For where there is no Common-wealth, there is (as hath been already shewn) a perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour; And therefore every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither Propriety, nor Community; but Uncertainty. Which is so evident, that even Cicero, (a passionate de∣fender of Liberty,) in a publique pleading, attributeth all Propriety to the Law Civil, Let the Civill Law, saith he, be once abandoned, or but negligently guarded▪ (not to say oppressed,) and there is nothing,

that any man can be sure to receive from his Ancestor, or leave to his Children. And again; Take away the Civill Law, and no man knows what is his own, and what another mans. Seeing therefore the Intro∣duction of Propriety is an effect of Common-wealth; which can do nothing but by the Person that Represents i•…•…, it is the act onely of the Soveraign; and consisteth in the Lawes, which none can make that have not the Soveraign Power. And this they well knew of old, who called that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, (that is to say, Distribution,) which we call Law; and defined Justice, by distributing to every man his own.

In this Distribution, the First Law, is for Division of the Land it* 1.112 selfe: wherein the Soveraign assigneth to every man a portion, accor∣ding as he, and not according as any Subject, or any number of them, shall judge agreeable to Equity, and the Common Good. The Chil∣dren of Israel, were a Common-wealth in the Wildernesse; but wanted the commodities of the Earth, till they were masters of the Land of Promise; which afterward was divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of Eleazar the Priest, and Joshua their Generall: who when there were twelve Tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph; made neverthelesse but twelve portions of the Land; and ordained for the Tribe of Levi no land; but assigned them the Tenth part of the whole fruits; which division was therefore Arbitrary. And though a Peo∣ple comming into possession of a Land by warre, do not alwaies ex∣terminate the antient Inhabitants, (as did the Jewes,) but leave to many, or most, or all of them their Estates; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the Victors distribution; as the people of England held all theirs of William the Conquerour.* 1.113

From whence we may collect, that the Propriety which a subject hath in his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them; and not to exclude their Soveraign, be it an Assembly, or a Monarch. For seeing the Soveraign, that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose Person he representeth,) is understood to do nothing but in order to the common Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be understod as done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever Distribution he shall make in preju∣dice thereof, is contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed voyd. It is true, that a Soveraign Monarch, or the greater part of a Soveraign Assem∣bly, may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their Passi∣ons, contrary to their own consciences, which is a breach of trust, and of the Law of Nature; but this is not enough to authorise any sub∣ject, either to make warre upon, or so much as to accuse of Injustice, or any way to speak evill of their Soveraign; because they have au∣thorised all his actions, and in bestowing the Soveraign Power, made them their own. But in what cases the Commands of Soveraigns are contrary to Equity, and the Law of Nature, is to be considered* 1.114 hereafter in another place.

In the Distribution of land, the Common-wealth it selfe, may b•…•…

conceived to have a portion, and possesse, and improve the same by their Representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to susteine the whole expence to the common Peace, and defence necessarily required: Which were very true, if there could be any Representative conceived free from humane passions, and infirmi∣ties. But the nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of Pub∣lique Land, or of any certaine Revenue for the Common-wealth, is in vaine; and tendeth to the dissolution of Government, and to the condition of meere Nature, and War, assoon as ever the So∣veraign Power falleth into the hands of a Monarch, or of an As∣sembly, that are either too negligent of mony, or too hazardous in en∣gaging the publique stock, into a long, or costly war. Common∣wealths can endure no Diet: For seeing their expence is not limited by their own appetite, but by externall Accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours, the Publique Riches cannot be limited by other limits, than those which the emergent occasions shall require. And whereas in England, there were by the Conquerour, divers Lands reserved to his own use, (besides Forrests, and Chases, either for his recreation, or for preservation of Woods,) and divers servi∣ces reserved on the Land he gave his Subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his Maintenance in his Publique, but in his Naturall capacity: For he, and his Successors did for all that, lay Arbitrary Taxes on all Subjects Land, when they judged it neces∣sary. Or if those publique Lands, and Services, were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the Common-wealth, it was contrary to the scope of the Institution; being (as it appeared by those en∣suing Taxes) insufficient, and (as it appeares by the late small Re∣venue of the Crown) Subject to Alienation, and Diminution. It is therefore in vaine, to assign a portion to the Common-wealth; which may sell, or give it away; and does •…•…sell, and give it away when tis done by their Representative.

As the Distribution of Lands at home; so also to assigne in what* 1.115 places, and for what commodities, the Subject shall traffique abroad, belongeth to the Soveraign. For if it did belong to private per∣sons to use their own discretion therein, some of them would bee drawn for gaine, both to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the Common-wealth, and hurt it themselves, by importing such things, as pleasing mens appetites, be neverthelesse noxious, or at least un∣profitable to them. And therefore it belongeth to the Common∣wealth, (that is, to the Soveraign only,) to approve, or disapprove both of the places, and matter of forraign Traffique.

Further, seeing it is not enough to the Sustentation of a Com∣mon-wealth,* 1.116 that every man have a propriety in a portion of Land, or in some few commodities, or a naturall property in some usefull art, and there is no art in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being almost of every particular man; it is necessa∣ry, that men distribute that which they can spare, and transferre their propriety therein, mutually one to another, by exchange, and mu∣tuall contract. And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth,

(that is to say, to the Soveraign,) to appoint in what manner, all kinds of contract between Subjects, (as buying, selling, exchan∣ging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire,) are to bee made; and by what words, and signes they shall be understood for valid. And for the Matter, and Distribution of the Nourishment, to the severall Members of the Common-wealth, thus much (con∣sidering the modell of the whole worke) is sufficient.

By Concoction, I understand the reducing of all commodities,* 1.117 which are not presently consumed, but reserved for Nourishment in time to come, to some thing of equall value, and withall so por∣table, as not to hinder the motion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in what place soever, such Nou∣rishment as the place affordeth. And this is nothing else but Gold, and Silver, and Mony. For Gold and Silver, be∣ing (as it happens) almost in all Countries of the world high∣ly valued, is a commodious measure of the value of all things else between Nations; and Mony (of what matter soever coyned by the Soveraign of a Common-wealth,) is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the Subjects of that Common-wealth. By the means of which measures, all commodities, Move∣able, and Immoveable, are made to accompany a man, to all pla∣ces of his resort, within and without the place of his ordinary re∣sidence; and the same passeth from Man to Man, within the Com∣mon-wealth; and goes round about, Nourishing (as it passeth) every part thereof; In so much as this Concoction, is as it were the Sanguification of the Common-wealth: For naturall Bloud is in like manner made of the fruits of the Earth; and circulating, nourisheth by the way, every Member of the Body of Man.

And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the mat∣ter it self; they have first this priviledge, that the value of them cannot be altered by the power of one, nor of a few Common-wealths; as being a common measure of the commodities of all places. But base Mony, may easily be enhansed, or abased. Se∣condly, they have the priviledge to make Common-wealths move, and stretch out their armes, when need is, into forraign Countries; and supply, not only private Subjects that travell, but also whole Armies with Provision. But that Coyne, which is not considera∣ble for the Matter, but for the Stamp of the place, being unable to endure change of ayr, hath its effect at home only; where also it is subject to the change of Laws, and thereby to have the value di∣minished, to the prejudice many times of those that have it.

The Conduits, and Wayes by which it is conveyed to the Pub∣lique* 1.118 use, are of two sorts; One, that Conveyeth it to the Publique Coffers; The other, that Issueth the same out againe for publique payments. Of the first sort, are Collectors, Receivers, and Trea∣surers; of the second are the Treasurers againe, and the Officers appointed for payment of severall publique or private Ministers. And in this also, the Artificiall Man maintains his resemblance with the Naturall; whose Veins receiving the Bloud from the severall

Parts of of the Body, carry it to the Heart; where being made Vitall, the Heart by the Arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and enable for motion all the Members of the same.

The Procreation, or Children of a Common-wealth, are those* 1.119 we call Plantations, or Colonies; which are numbers of men sent out from the Common-wealth, under a Conductor, or Governour, to inhabit a Forraign Country, either formerly voyd of Inhabitants, or made voyd then, by warre. And when a Colony is setled, they are either a Common-wealth of themselves, discharged of their subje∣ction to their Soveraign that sent them, (as hath been done by many Common-wealths of antient time,) in which case the Common-wealth from which they went, was called their Metropolis, or Mother, and requires no more of them, then Fathers require of the Children, whom they emancipate, and make free from their domestique go∣vernment, which is Honour, and Friendship; or else they remain uni∣ted to their Metropolis, as were the Colonies of the people of Rome; and then they are no Common-wealths themselves, but Provinces, and parts of the Common-wealth that sent them. So that the Right of Colonies (saving Honour, and League with their Metropolis,) dependeth wholly on their Licence, or Letters, by which their Sove∣raign authorised them to Plant.

CHAP. XXV. Of COUNSELL.

HOw fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the or∣dinary* 1.120 and inconstant use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the confusion of Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative manner of speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the words Doe this, are the words not onely of him that Commandeth; but also of him that giveth Coun∣sell; and of him that Exhorteth; and yet there are but few, that see not, that these are very different things; or that cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the Speech is directed, and upon what occcasion. But finding those phrases in mens writings, and being not able, or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake some∣times the Precepts of Counsellours, for the Precepts of them that Command; and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would inferre, or the actions they approve. To avoyd which mistakes, and render to those termes of Command∣ing, Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper and distinct significa∣tions, I define them thus.

COMMAND is, where a man saith, Doe this, or Doe not this, with∣out* 1.121 expecting other reason than the Will of him that sayes it. From this it followeth manifestly, that he that Commandeth, pretendeth thereby his own Benefit: For the reason of his Command is his own

Will onely, and the proper object of every mans Will, is some Good to himselfe.

COUNSELL, is where a man saith, Doe, or Doe not this, and dedu∣ceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it. And from this it is evident, that he that giveth Counsell, pretendeth onely (whatsoever he intendeth) the good of him, to whom he giveth it.

Therefore between Counsell and Command, one great difference is, that Command is directed to a mans own benefit; and Counsell to the benefit of another man. And from this ariseth another diffe∣rence, that a man may be obliged to do what he is Commanded; as when he hath covenanted to obey: But he cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled, because the hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow it, then is the Counsell turned into the nature of a Command. A third difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of another mans Counsell; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himselfe: but to demand right to Counsell another, argues a will to know his designes, or to gain some other Good to himselfe; which (as I said before) is of every mans will the proper object.

This also is incident to the nature of Counsell; that whatsoever it be, he that asketh it, cannot in equity accuse, or punish it: For to ask Counsell of another, is to permit him to give such Counsell as he shall think best; And consequently, he that giveth counsell to his So∣veraign, (whether a Monarch, or an Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished for it, whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the Proposition in de∣bate. For if the sense of the Assembly can be taken notice of, before the Debate be ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further Counsell; For the Sense of the Assembly, is the Resolution of the Debate, and End of all Deliberation. And generally he that deman∣deth Counsell, is Author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the Soveraign cannot, no man else can. But if one Subject giveth Counsell to another, to do any thing contrary to the Lawes, whether that Counsell proceed from evill intention, or from igno∣rance onely, it is punishable by the Common-wealth; because igno∣rance of the Law, is no good excuse, where every man is bound to take notice of the Lawes to which he is subject.

EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION, is Counsell, accom∣panied* 1.122 with signes in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it more briefly, Counsell vehemently pressed. For he that Exhorteth, doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tye himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning; bnt encourages him he Counselleth, to Action: As he that Dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And therefore they have in their speeches, a regard to the common Passions, and opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of Similitudes, Meta∣phors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory, to perswade their Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following their advise.

From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and De∣hortation, is directed to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, not of him that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a Counsel∣lour; who (by the definition of Counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefit, but his whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his Counsell to his own benefit, is manifest enough, by the long and ve∣hement urging, or by the artificiall giving thereof; which being not required of him, and consequently proceeding from his own occasi∣ons, is directed principally to his own benefit, and but accidentarily to the good of him that is Counselled, or not at all.

Secondly; that the use of Exhortation and Dehortation lyeth one∣ly, where a man is to speak to a Multitude; because when the Speech is addressed to one, he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously, than can be done in a Multitude; which are too ma∣ny to enter into Dispute, and Dialogue with him that speaketh indif∣ferently to them all at once.

Thirdly, that they that Exhort and Dehort, where they are requi∣red to give Counsell, are corrupt Counsellours, and as it were bribed by their own interest. For though the Counsell they give be never so good; yet he that gives it, is no more a good Counsellour, than he that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward, is a Just Judge. But where a man may lawfully Command, as a Father in his Family, or a Lea∣der in an Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations, are not onely lawfull, but also necessary, and laudable: But then they are no more Counsells, but Commands; which when they are for Execution of soure labour; sometimes necessity, and alwayes humanity requireth to be sweetned in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of Counsell, rather then in harsher language of Com∣mand.

Examples of the difference between Command and Counsell, we may take from the formes of Speech that expresse them in Holy Scripture. Have no other Gods but me; Make to thy selfe no graven Image; Take not Gods name in vain; Sanctifie the Sabbath; Honour thy Parents; Kill not; Steale not, &c. are Commands; because the reason for which we are to obey them, is drawn from the will of God our King, whom we are obliged to obey. But these words, Sell all thou hast; give it to the poore; and follow me, are Counsell; because the reason for which we are to do so, is drawn from our own benefit; which is this, that we shall have Treasure in heaven. These words, Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find an Asse tyed, and her Colt; loose her, and bring her to me, are a Command: for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their Master: but these words, Repent, and be Baptized in the Name of Jesus, are Counsell; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any benefit of God Almighty, who shall still be King in what manner soever we rebell; but of our selves, who have no other means of avoyding the punish∣ment hanging over us for our sins.* 1.123

As the difference of Counsell from Command, hath been now deduced from the nature of Counsell, consisting in a deducing of the

benefit, or hurt that may arise to him that is to be Counselled, by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the differences between apt, and inept Counsellours be de∣rived from the same. For Experience, being but Memory of the con∣sequences of like actions formerly observed, and Counsell but the Speech whereby that experience is made known to another; the Ver∣tues, and Defects of Counsell, are the same with the Vertues, and Defects Intellectuall: And to the Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him in the place of Memory, and Mentall Dis∣course. But with this resemblance of the Common-wealth, to a na∣turall man, there is one dissimilitude joyned, of great importance; which is, that a naturall man receiveth his experience, from the natu∣rall objects of sense, which work upon him without passion, or inte∣rest of their own; whereas they that give Counsell to the Represen∣tative person of a Common-wealth, may have, and have often their particular ends, and passions, that render their Counsells alwayes sus∣pected, and many times unfaithfull. And therefore we may set down for the first condition of a good Counsellour, That his Ends, and In∣terest, be not inconsistent with the Ends and Interest of him he Coun∣selleth.

Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellour, when an action comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, in such manner, as he that is Counselled may be truly and evidently informed; he ought to propound his advise, in such forme of speech, as may make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firme ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as brief∣ly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore rash, and unevident Inferences; (such as are fetched onely from Examples, or authority of Books, and are not arguments of what is good, or evill, but witnes∣ses of fact, or of opinion.) obscure, confused, and ambiguous Expressi∣ons, also all metaphoricall Speeches, tending to the stirring up of Passion, (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are usefull onely to deceive, or to lead him we Counsell towards other ends than his own) are repugnant to the Office of a Counsellour.

Thirdly, Because the Ability of Counselling proceedeth from Experience, and long study; and no man is presumed to have expe∣rience in all those things that to the Administration of a great Com∣mon-wealth are necessary to be known, No man is presumed to be a good Counsellour, but in such Businesse, as he hath not onely been much versed in, but hath also much meditated on, and considered. For seeing the businesse of a Common-wealth is this, to preserve the people in Peace at home, and defend them against forraign Invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge of the disposition of Man-kind, of the Rights of Government, and of the nature of Equity, Law, Ju∣stice, and Honour, not to be attained without study; And of the Strength, Commodities, Places, both of their own Country, and their Neighbours; as also of the inclinations, and designes of all Na∣tions that may any way annoy them. And this is not attained to, with∣out much experience. Of which things, not onely the whole summe,

but every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for Counsel, as I have said before (Chap. 8.) is Judgement. And the diffe∣rences of men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind of study, or businesse, and of others to another. When for the doing of any thing, there be Infallible rules, (as in Engines, and Edi∣fices, the rules of Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell, that has learnt, or found out the Rule. And when there is no such Rule, he that hath most experience in that particular kind of businesse, has therein the best Judgement, and is the best Counsellour.

Fourthly, to be able to give Counsell to a Common-wealth, in a businesse that hath reference to another Common-wealth, It is necessary to be acquainted with the Intelligences, and Letters that come from thence, and with all the records of Treaties, and other transactions of State between them; which none can doe, but such as the Representative shall think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not called to Counsell, can have no good Counsell in such cases to obtrude.

Fifthly, Supposing the number of Counsellors equall, a man is better Counselled by hearing them apart, then in an Assembly; and that for many causes. First, in hearing them apart, you have the advice of every man; but in an Assembly many of them deliver their advise with I, or No, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of another, or for feare of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole Assembly, by con∣tradiction; or for feare of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an Assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose inte∣rests are contrary to that of the Publique; and these their Interests make passionate, and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence drawes others into the same advice. For the Passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in Assembly are like many brands, that enflame one another, (especially when they blow one another with Orations) to the setting of the Common-wealth on fire, under pretence of Counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine (when there is need) the truth, or pro∣bability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advise he gives, by frequent interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an Assembly, where (in every difficult question) a man is rather astonied and dazled with the variety of discourse upon it, than in∣formed of the course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many, called together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also lear∣ned in the Politiques; and give not their advice with care of the bu∣sinesse propounded, but of the applause of their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 orations, made of the divers colored threds, or shreds of Authors; which is an Impertinence at least, that takes away the time of serious Con∣sultation, and in the secret way of Counselling apart, is easily a∣voided.

Fourthly, in Deliberations that ought to be kept secret, (whereof there be many occasions in Publique Businesse,) the Coun∣sells of many, and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And there∣fore great Assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.

To conclude, who is there that so far approves the taking of Counsell from a great Assembly of Counsellours, that wisheth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of mar∣rying his Children, disposing of his Lands, governing his House∣hold, or managing his private Estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his busi∣nesse by the help of many and prudent Counsellours, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth able Seconds at Tennis play, placed in their proper stations. He does next best, that useth his own Judgement only; as he that has no Second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his businesse in a fra∣med Counsell, which cannot move but by the plurality of consen∣ting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly (out of envy, or interest) retarded by the part dissenting, does it worst of all, and like one that is carried to the ball, though by good Players, yet in a Wheele-barrough, or other frame, heavy of it self, and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgements, and endeavours of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him lose. And though it be true, that many eys see more then one; yet it is not to be understood of many Coun∣sellours; but then only, when the finall Resolution is in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to misse their marke, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never ayme but with one; And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was ever kept up; but either by a for∣raign Enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some one eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions; and not by the open Consultations of the Assembly. And as for very little Common∣wealths, be they Popular, or Monarchicall, there is no humane wisdome can uphold them, longer then the Jealousy lasteth of their potent Neighbours.

CHAP. XXVI. Of CIVILL LAWES.

BY CIVILL LAWES, I understand the Lawes, that* 1.124 men are therefore bound to observe, because they are Mem∣bers, not of this, or that Common-wealth in particular, but of a Common-wealth. For the knowledge of particular Lawes

belongeth to them, that professe the study of the Lawes of their severall Countries; but the knowledge of Civill Law in generall. to any man. The antient Law of Rome was called their Civil Law, from the word Civitas, which signifies a Common-wealth: And those Countries, which having been under the Roman Empire, and go∣verned by that Law, retaine still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the Civill Law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own Civill Lawes. But that is not it I intend to speak of here; my designe being not to shew what is Law here, and there; but what is Law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of the study of the Law.

And first it is manifest, that Law in generall, is not Counsell, but Command; nor a Command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose Command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as for Civill Law, it addeth only the name of the person Commanding, which is Persona Civitatis, the Person of the Common-wealth.

Which considered, I define Civill Law in this manner. CIVILL LAW, Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath Commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use of, for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule.

In which definition, there is nothing that is not at first sight e∣vident. For every man seeth, that some Lawes are addressed to all the Subjects in generall; some to particular Provinces; some to particular Vocations; and some to particular Men; and are there∣fore Lawes, to every of those to whom the Command is directed; and to none else. As also, that Lawes are the Rules of Just, and Un∣just; nothing being reputed Unjust, that is not contrary to some Law. Likewise, that none can make Lawes but the Common-wealth; be∣cause our Subjection is to the Common-wealth only: and that Commands, are to be signified by sufficient Signs; because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them. And therefore, whatso∣ever can from this definition by necessary consequence be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it this that followeth.

1 The Legislator in all Common-wealths, is only the Soveraign,* 1.125 be he one Man, as in a Monarchy, or one Assembly of men, as in a Democracy, or Aristocracy. For the Legislator, is he that maketh the Law. And the Common-wealth only, praescribes, and com∣mandeth the observation of those rules, which we call Law: Therefore the Common-wealth is the Legislator. But the Common∣wealth is no Person, nor has capacity to doe any thing, but by the Representative, (that is, the Soveraign;) and therefore the Sove∣raign is the sole Legislator. For the same reason, none can abrogate a Law made, but the Soveraign; because a Law is not abrogated, but by another Law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution.

2 The Soveraign of a Common-wealth, be it an Assembly, or* 1.126 one Man, is not Subject to the Civill Lawes. For having power to

make, and repeale Lawes, he may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from that subjection, by repealing those Lawes that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he was free before. For he is free, that can be free when he will: Nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himselfe; because he that can bind, can release; and there∣fore he that is bound to himselfe onely, is not bound.

3. When long Use obtaineth the authority of a Law, it is not the* 1.127 Length of Time that maketh the Authority, but the Will of the Sove∣raign signified by his silence, (for Silence is sometimes an argument of Consent;) and it is no longer Law, then the Soveraign shall be silent therein. And therefore if the Soveraign shall have a question of Right grounded, not upon his present Will, but upon the Lawes formerly made; the Length of Time shal bring no prejudice to his Right; but the question shal be judged by Equity. For many unjust Actions, and unjust Sentences, go uncontrolled a longer time, than any mancan remember. And our Lawyers account no Customes Law, but such as are reaso∣nable, and that evill Customes are to be abolished: But the Judgement of what is reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the Law, which is the Soveraign Assembly, or Monarch.

4. The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, contain each other,* 1.128 and are of equall extent. For the Lawes of Nature, which consist in Equity, Justice, Gratitude, and other morall Vertues on these de∣pending, in the condition of meer Nature (as I have said before in the end of the 15th Chapter,) are not properly Lawes, but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience. When a Common∣wealth is once settled, then are they actually Lawes, and not before; as being then the commands of the Common-wealth; and therefore also Civill Lawes: For it is the Soveraign Power that obliges men to obey them. For in the differences of private men, to declare, what is Equity, what is Justice, and what is morall Vertue, and to make them binding, there is need of the Ordinances of Soveraign Power, and Punishments to be ordaine d for such as shall break them; which Ordinances are therefore part of the Civill Law. The Law of Na∣ture therefore is a part of the Civill Law in all Common-wealths of the world. Reciprocally also, the Civill Law is a part of the Dictates of Nature. For Justice, that is to say, Performance of Covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a Dictate of the Law of Nature. But every subject in a Common-wealth, hath covenanted to obey the Civill Law, (either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common Representative, or with the Representative it selfe one by one, when subdued by the Sword they promise obedience, that they may receive life;) And therefore Obedience to the Civill Law is part also of the Law of Nature. Civill, and Naturall Law are not diffe∣rent kinds, but different parts of Law; whereof one part being writ∣ten, is called Civill, the other unwritten, Naturall. But the Right of Nature, that is, the naturall Liberty of man, may by the Civill Law be abridged, and restrained: nay, the end of making Lawes, is no other, but such Restraint; without the which there cannot possibly be any Peace. And Law was brought into the world for nothing else,

but to limit the naturall liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and joyn together against a common Enemy.

5. If the Soveraign of one Common-wealth, subdue a People* 1.129 that have lived under other written Lawes, and afterwards go∣vern them by the same Lawes, by which they were governed before; yet those Lawes are the Civill Lawes of the Victor, and not of the Vanquished Common-wealth. For the Legislator is he, not by whose authority the Lawes were first made▪ but by whose authority they now continue to be Lawes. And therefore where there be divers Provinces, within the Dominion of a Common-wealth, and in those Provinces diversity of Lawes, which commonly are called the Cu∣stomes of each severall Province, we are not to understand that such Customes have their force, onely from Length of Time; but that they were antiently Lawes written, or otherwise made known, for the Constitutions, and Statutes of their Soveraigns; and are now Lawes, not by vertue of the Praescription of time, but by the Constitutions of their present Soveraigns. But if an unwritten Law, in all the Pro∣vinces of a Dominion, shall be generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that Law can be no other but a Law of Na∣ture, equally obliging all man-kind.

6. Seeing then all Lawes, written, and unwritten, have their Au∣thority,* 1.130 and force, from the Will of the Common-wealth; that is to say, from the Will of the Representative; which in a Monarchy is the Monarch, and in other Common-wealths the Soveraign Assem∣bly; a man may wonder from whence proceed such opinions, as are found in the Books of Lawyers of eminence in severall Common∣wealths, directly, or by consequence making the Legislative Power depend on private men, or subordinate Judges. As for example, That the Common Law, hath no Controuler but the Parlament; which is true onely where a Parlament has the Soveraign Power, and can∣not be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own discretion. For if there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to controule them, and consequently to controule their controulings. And if there be no such right, then the Controuler of Lawes is not Parlamentum, but Rex in Parlamento. And were a Parlament is So∣veraign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men, from the Countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man will believe, that such an Assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves a Legislative Power. Item, that the two arms of a Com∣mon-wealth, are Force, and Justice; the first whereof is in the King; the other deposited in the hands of the Parlament. As if a Common∣wealth could consist, where the Force were in any hand, which Ju∣stice had not the Authority to command and govern.

7. That Law can never be against Reason, our Lawyers are agreed; and that not the Letter, (that is, every construction of it,) but that which is according to the Intention of the Legislator, is the Law. And it is true: but the doubt is, of whose Reason it is, that shall be received for Law. It is not meant of any private Reason; for

then there would be as much contradiction in the Lawes, as there is in the Schooles; nor yet, (as Sr. Ed. Coke makes it,) an Artificiall* 1.131 perfection of Reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, (as his was.) For it is possible long study may encrease, and confirm erroneous Sentences: and where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruine: and of those that stu∣dy, and observe with equall time, and diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and therefore it is not that Juris prudentia, or wisedome of subordinate Judges; but the Reason of this our Artificiall Man the Common-wealth, and his Command, that maketh Law: And the Common-wealth being in their Representative but one Person, there cannot easily arise any con∣tradiction in the Lawes; and when there doth, the same Reason is able, by interpretation, or alteration, to take it away. In all Courts of Justice, the Soveraign (which is the Person of the Common∣wealth,) is he that Judgeth: The subordinate Judge, ought to have regard to the reason, which moved his Soveraign to make such Law, that his Sentence may be according thereunto; which then is his So∣veraigns Sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.

8. From this, that the Law is a Command, and a Command con∣sisteth* 1.132 in declaration, or manifestation of the will of him that com∣mandeth, by voyce, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may understand, that the Command of the Common∣wealth, is Law onely to those, that have means to take notice of it. Over naturall fooles, children, or mad-men there is no Law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just, or unjust; because they had never power to make any covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorise the actions of any Soveraign, as they must do that make to themselves a Common-wealth. And as those from whom Nature, or Accident hath taken away the notice of all Lawes in generall; so also every man, from whom any accident, not procee∣ding from his own default, hath taken away the means to take notice of any particular Law, is excused, if he observe it not; And to speak properly, that Law is no Law to him. It is therefore necessary, to con∣sider in this place, what arguments, and signes be sufficient for the knowledge of what is the Law; that is to say, what is the will of the Soveraign, as well in Monarchies, as in other formes of go∣vernment.

And first, if it be a Law that obliges all the Subjects without ex∣ception,* 1.133 and is not written, nor otherwise published in such places as they may take notice thereof, it is a Law of Nature. For whatsoever men are to take knowledge of for Law, not upon other mens words, but every one from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable to the reason of all men; which no Law can be, but the Law of Nature. The Lawes of Nature therefore need not any publishing, nor Pro∣clamation; as being contained in this one Sentence, approved by all the world, Do not that to another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thy selfe.

Secondly, if it be a Law that obliges only some condition of men, or one particular man, and be not written, nor published by word, then also it is a Law of Nature; and known by the same arguments, and signs, that distinguish those in such a condition, from other Sub∣jects. For whatsoever Law is not written, or some way published by him that makes it Law, can be known no way, but by the rea∣son of him that is to obey it; and is therefore also a Law not only Civill, but Naturall. For Example, if the Soveraign employ a Publique Minister, without written Instructions what to doe; he is obliged to take for Instructions the Dictates of Reason; As if he make a Judge, The Judge is to take notice, that his Sentence ought to be according to the reason of his Soveraign, which being alwaies understood to be Equity, he is bound to it by the Law of Nature: Or if an Ambassador, he is (in all things not conteined in his writ∣ten Instructions) to take for Instruction that which Reason dictates to be most conducing to his Soveraigns interest; and so of all other Ministers of the Soveraignty, publique and private. All which In∣structions of naturall Reason may be comprehended under one name of Fidelity; which is a branch of naturall Justice.

The Law of Nature excepted, it belongeth to the essence of all other Lawes, to be made known, to every man that shall be obli∣ged to obey them, either by word, or writing, or some other act, known to proceed from the Soveraign Authority. For the will of another, cannot be understood, but by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope and purpose; which in the person of the Common-wealth, is to be supposed alwaies consonant to E∣quity and Reason. And in antient time, before letters were in com∣mon use, the Lawes were many times put into verse; that the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might the more easily reteine them in memory. And for the same reason Solomon adviseth a man, to bind the ten Commandements* 1.134 upon his ten fingers. And for the Law which Moses gave to the people of Israel at the renewing of the Covenant, * he biddeth them to teach it their* 1.135 Children, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon the way; at going to bed, and at rising from bed; and to write it upon the posts, and dores of their houses; and* 1.136 to assemble the people, man, wo∣man, and child, to heare it read.

Nor is it enough the Law be written, and published; but also that there be manifest signs, that it proceedeth from the will of the Sove∣raign.* 1.137 For private men, when they have, or think they have force enough to secure their unjust designes, and convoy them safely to their ambitious ends, may publish for Lawes what they please, without, or against the Legislative Authority. There is therefore requisite, not only a Declaration of the Law, but also sufficient signes of the Author, and Authority. The Author, or Legislator is supposed in every Common-wealth to be evident, because he is the Soveraign, who having been Constituted by the consent of every one, is supposed by every one to be sufficiently known. And though the ig∣norance, and security of men be such, for the most part, as that when

the memory of the first Constitution of their Common-wealth is worn out, they doe not consider, by whose power they use to be defended against their enemies, and to have their industry prote∣cted, and to be righted when injury is done them; yet because no man that considers, can make question of it, no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the Soveraignty is placed. And it is a Dictate of Naturall Reason, and consequently an evident Law of Nature, that no man ought to weaken that power, the protection whereof he hath himself demanded, or wittingly received against others. Therefore of who is Soveraign, no man, but by his own fault, (whatsoever evill men suggest,) can make any doubt. The difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the Authority derived from him; The removing whereof, dependeth on the knowledge of the publique Registers, publique Counsels, publique Ministers, and publique Seales; by which all Lawes are sufficiently verified; Ve∣rifyed,* 1.138 I say, not Authorised: for the Verification, is but the Te∣stimony and Record; not the Authority of the Law; which con∣sisteth in the Command of the Soveraign only.

If therefore a man have a question of Injury, depending on the* 1.139 Law of Nature; that is to say, on common Equity; the Sentence of the Judge, that by Commission hath Authority to take cogni∣nisance of such causes, is a sufficient Verification of the Law of Na∣ture in that individuall case. For though the advice of one that professeth the study of the Law, be usefull for the avoyding of con∣tention; yet it is but advice: tis the Judge must tell men what is Law, upon the hearing of the Controversy.

But when the question is of injury, or crime, upon a written Law;* 1.140 every man by recourse to the Registers, by himself, or others, may (if he will) be sufficiently enformed, before he doe such injury, or commit the crime, whither it be an injury, or not: Nay he ought to doe so: For when a man doubts whether the act he goeth about, be just, or injust; and may informe himself, if he will; the doing is unlawfull. In like manner, he that supposeth himself injured, in a case determined by the written Law, which he may by himself, or others see and consider; if he complaine before he consults with the Law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth a disposition rather to vex other men, than to demand his own right.

If the question be of Obedience to a publique Officer; To have* 1.141 seen his Commission, with the Publique Seale, and heard it read; or to have had the means to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient Verification of his Authority. For every man is obliged to doe his best endeavour, to informe himself of all written Lawes, that may concerne his own future actions.

The Legislator known; and the Lawes, either by writing, or by* 1.142 the light of Nature, sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another very materiall circumstance to make them obligatory. For it is not the Letter, but the Intendment, or Meaning; that is to say, the au∣thentique Interpretation of the Law (which is the sense of the Le∣gislator,) in which the nature of the Law consisteth; And therefore

the Interpretation of all Lawes dependeth on the Authority Sove∣raign; and the Interpreters can be none but those, which the So∣veraign, (to whom only the Subject oweth obedience) shall appoint. For else, by the craft of an Interpreter, the Law may be made to beare a sense, contrary to that of the Soveraign; by which means the Interpreter becomes the Legislator.

All Laws, written, and unwritten, have need of Interpretation.* 1.143 The unwritten Law of Nature, though it be easy to such, as with∣out partiality, and passion, make use of their naturall reason, and therefore leaves the violaters thereof without excuse; yet conside∣ring there be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self love, or some other passion, it is now become of all Laws the most obscure; and has consequently the greatest need of able Interpreters. The written Laws, if they be short, are easily mis-interpreted, from the divers significations of a word, or two: if long, they be more obscure by the diverse significations of many words: in so much as no written Law, delivered in few, or many words, can be well understood, without a perfect understanding of the finall causes, for which the Law was made; the knowledge of which finall causes is in the Legislator. To him therefore there can not be any knot in the Law, insoluble; either by finding out the ends, to undoe it by; or else by making what ends he will, (as A∣lexander did with his sword in the Gordian knot,) by the Legisla∣tive power; which no other Interpreter can doe.

The Interpretation of the Lawes of Nature, in a Common∣wealth,* 1.144 dependeth not on the books of Morall Philosophy. The Au∣thority of writers, without the Authority of the Common-wealth, ma∣keth not their opinions Law, be they never so true. That which I have written in this Treatise, concerning the Morall Vertues, and of their necessity, for the procuring, and maintaining peace, though it bee evident Truth, is not therefore presently Law; but because in all Common-wealths in the world, it is part of the Civill Law: For though it be naturally reasonable; yet it is by the Soveraigne Power that it is Law: Otherwise, it were a great errour, to call the Lawes of Nature unwritten Law; whereof wee see so many volumes publi∣shed, and in them so many contradictions of one another, and of themselves.

The Interpretation of the Law of Nature, is the Sentence of the* 1.145 Judge constituted by the Soveraign Authority, to heare and de∣termine such controversies, as depend thereon; and consisteth in the application of the Law to the present case. For in the act of Judicature, the Judge doth no more but consider, whither the de∣mand of the party, be consonant to naturall reason, and Equity; and the Sentence he giveth, is therefore the Interpretation of the Law of Nature; which Interpretation is Authentique; not because it is his private Sentence; but because he giveth it by Authority of the Soveraign, whereby it becomes the Soveraigns Sentence; which is Law for that time, to the parties pleading.

But because there is no Judge Subordinate, nor Soveraign, but may* 1.146 erre in a Judgement of Equity; if afterward in another like case he find it more consonant to Equity to give a contrary Sentence, he is obliged to doe it. No mans error becomes his own Law; nor obliges him to persist in it. Neither (for the same reason) becomes it a Law to other Judges, though sworn to follow it. For though a wrong Sentence given by authority of the Soveraign, if he know and allow it, in such Lawes as are mutable, be a constitution of a new Law, in cases, in which every little circumstance is the same; yet in Lawes immutable, such as are the Lawes of Nature, they are no Lawes to the same, or other Judges, in the like cases for ever after. Princes suc∣ceed one another; and one Iudge passeth, another commeth; nay, Heaven and Earth shall passe; but not one title of the Law of Nature shall passe; for it is the Eternall Law of God. Therefore all the Sentences of precedent Judges that have ever been, cannot all together make a Law contrary to naturall Equity: Nor any Examples of former Judges, can warrant an unreasonable Sentence, or discharge the present Judge of the trouble of studying what is Equity (in the case he is to Judge,) from the principles of his own naturall reason. For example sake, 'Tis against the Law of Na∣ture, To punish the Innocent; and Innocent is he that acquitteth him∣selfe Judicially, and is acknowledged for Innocent by the Judge. Put the case now, that a man is accused of a capitall crime, and seeing the power and malice of some enemy, and the frequent corruption and par•…•…iality of Judges, runneth away for feare of the event, and afterwards is taken, and brought to a legall triall, and maketh it suf∣ficiently appear, he was not guilty of the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is neverthelesse condemned to lose his goods; this is a ma∣nifest condemnation of the Innocent. I say therefore, that there is no place in the world, where this can be an interpretation of a Law of Nature, or be made a Law by the Sentences of precedent Judges, that had done the same. For he that judged it first, judged unjustly; and no Injustice can be a pattern of Judgement to succeeding Judges. A written Law may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be pu∣nished for flying: But that flying for feare of injury, should be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime Judicially, is contrary to the nature of a Presumption, which hath no place after Judgement given. Yet this is set down by a great Lawyer for the common Law of England. If a man (saith he) that is Innocent, be accused of Felony, and for feare flyeth for the same; albeit he judicially acquitteth himselfe of the Felony; yet if it be found that he fled for the Felony, he shall notwithstanding his Innocency, Forfeit all his goods, chattells, debts, and duties. For as to the Forfei∣ture of them, the Law will admit no proofe against the Presumption in Law, grounded upon his flight. Here you see, An Innocent man, Ju∣dicially acquitted, notwithstanding his Innocency, (when no written Law forbad him to fly) after his acquitall, upon a Presumption in Law, condemned to lose all the goods he hath. If the Law ground upon his flight a Presumption of the fact, (which was Capitall,) the Sen∣tence

ought to have been Capitall: if the Presumption were not of •…•…he Fact, for what then ought he to lose his goods? This therefore is no Law of England; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a Presumption of Law, but upon the Presumption of the Judges. It is also against Law, to say that no Proofe shall be admitted against a Presumption of Law. For all Judges, Soveraign and subordinate, if they refuse to heare Proofe, refuse to do Justice: for though the Sen∣tence be Just, yet the Judges that condemn without hearing the Proofes offered, are Unjust Judges; and their Presumption is but Pre∣judice; which no man ought to bring with him to the Seat of Justice, whatsoever precedent judgements, or examples he shall pretend to follow. There be other things of this nature, wherein mens Judge∣ments have been perverted, by trusting to Precedents: but this is enough to shew, that though the Sentence of the Judge, be a Law to the party pleading, yet it is no Law to any Judge, that shall succeed him in that Office.

In like manner, when question is of the Meaning of written Lawes, he is not the Interpreter of them, that writeth a Commentary upon them. For Commentaries are commonly more subject to cavill, than the Text; and therefore need other Commentaries; and so there will be no end of such Interpretation. And therefore unlesse there be an Interpreter authorised by the Soveraign, from which the subordinate Judges are not to recede, the Interpreter can be no other than the or∣dinary Judges, in the same manner, as they are in cases of the unwrit∣ten Law; and their Sentences are to be taken by them that plead, for Lawes in that particular case; but not to bind other Judges, in like cases to give like judgements. For a Judge may erre in the Interpre∣tation even of written Lawes; but no errour of a subordinate Judge, can change the Law, which is the generall Sentence of the Sove∣raigne.

In written Lawes, men use to make a difference between the Let∣ter,* 1.147 and the Sentence of the Law: And when by the Letter, is meant whatsoever can be gathered from the bare words, 'tis well distingui∣shed. For the significations of almost all words, are either in them∣selves, or in the metaphoricall use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to make many senses; but there is onely one sense of the Law. But if by the Letter, be meant the literall sense, then the Letter, and the Sentence or intention of the Law, is all one. For the literall sense is that, which the Legislator intended, should by the letter of the Law be signified. Now the Intention of the Legis∣lator is alwayes supposed to be Equity: For it were a great contume∣ly for a Judge to think otherwise of the Soveraigne. He ought there∣fore, if the Word of the Law doe not fully authorise a reasonable Sentence, to supply it with the Law of Nature; or if the case be dif∣ficult, to respit Judgement till he have received more ample autho∣rity. For Example, a written Law ordaineth, that he which is thrust out of his house by force, shall be restored by force: It happens that a man by negligence leaves his house empty, and returning is kept out by force, in which case there is no speciall Law ordained. It is evi∣dent,

that this case is contained in the same Law: for else there is no remedy for him at all; which is to be supposed against the Intention of the Legislator. Again, the word of the Law, commandeth to Judge according to the Evidence: A man is accused falsly of a fact, which the Judge saw himself done by another; and not by him that is accused. In this case neither shall the Letter of the Law be follow∣ed to the condemnation of the Innocent, nor shall the Judge give Sentence against the evidence of the Witnesses; because the Letter of the Law is to the contrary: but procure of the Soveraign that a∣nother be made Judge, and himself Witnesse. So that the incom∣modity that follows the bare words of a written Law, may lead him to the Intention of the Law, whereby to interpret the same the better; though no Incommodity can warrant a Sentence against the Law. For every Judge of Right, and Wrong, is not Judge of what is •…•…ommodious, or Incommodious to the Common-wealth.

The abilities required in a good Interpreter of the Law, that is* 1.148 to say, in a good Judge, are not the same with those of an Advocate; namely the study of the Lawes. For a Judge, as he ought to take notice of the Fact, from none but the Witnesses; so also he ought to take notice of the Law, from nothing but the Satutes, and Constitu∣tions of the Soveraign, alledged in the pleading, or declared to him by some that have authority from the Soveraign Power to declare them; and need not take care before-hand, what hee shall Judge; for it shall bee given him what hee shall say concerning the Fact, by Witnesses; and what hee shall say in point of Law, from those that shall in their pleadings •…•…hew it, and by authority in∣terpret it upon the place. The Lords of Parlament in England were Judges, and most difficult causes have been heard and determined by them; yet few of them were much versed in the study of the Lawes, and fewer had made profession of them: and though they consulted with Lawyers, that were appointed to be present there for that pur∣pose; yet they alone had the authority of giving Sentence. In like manner, in the ordinary trialls of Right, Twelve men of the com∣mon People, are the Judges, and give Sentence, not onely of the Fact, but of the Right; and pronounce simply for the Complaynant, or for the Defendant; that is to say, are Judges not onely of the Fact, but also of the Right: and in a question of crime, not onely deter∣mine whether done, or not done; but also whether it be Murder, Ho∣micide, Felony, Assault, and the like, which are determinations of Law: but because they are not supposed to know the Law of them∣selves, there is one that hath Authority to enforme them of it, in the particular case they are to Judge of. But yet if they judge not accor∣ding to that he tells them, they are not subject thereby to any penal∣ty; unlesse it be made appear, they did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward.

The things that make a good Judge, or good Interpreter of the Lawes, are, first, A right understanding of that principall Law of Nature called Equity; which depending not on the reading of other mens Writings, but on the goodnesse of a mans own naturall

Reason, and Meditation, is presumed to be in those most, that have had most leisure, and had the most inclination to meditate thereon. Secondly, Contempt of unnecessary Riches, and Preferments. Third∣ly, To be able in judgement to devest himselfe of all feare, anger, ha∣tred, love, and compassion. Fourthly, and lastly, Patience to heare; diligent attention in hearing; and memory to retain, digest and apply what he hath heard.

The difference and division of the Lawes, has been made in divers* 1.149 manners, according to the different methods, of those men that have written of them. For it is a thing that dependeth not on Nature, but on the scope of the Writer; and is subservient to every mans proper method. In the Institutions of Justinian, we find seven sorts of Ci∣vill Lawes. 1. The Edicts, Constitutions, and Epistles of the Prince, that is, of the Emperour; because the whole power of the people was in him. Like these, are the Proclamations of the Kings of England.

2. The Decrees of the whole people of Rome (comprehending the Senate,) when they were put to the Question by the Senate. These were Lawes, at first, by the vertue of the Soveraign Power residing in the people; and such of them as by the Emperours were not abro∣gated, remained Lawes by the Authority Imperiall. For all Lawes that bind, are understood to be Lawes by his authority that has power to repeale them. Somewhat like to these Lawes, are the Acts of Parliament in England.

3. The Decrees of the Common people (excluding the Senate,) when they were put to the question by the Tribune of the people. For such of them as were not abrogated by the Emperours, remained Lawes by the Authority Imperiall. Like to these, were the Orders of the House of Commons in England.

4. Senatûs consulta, the Orders of the Senate; because when the people of Rome grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to assem∣ble them; it was thought fit by the Emperour, that men should Con∣sult the Senate, in stead of the people: And these have some resem∣blance with the Acts of Counsell.

5. The Edicts of Praetors, and (in some Cases) of the Aediles: such as are the Chiefe Justices in the Courts of England.

6. Responsa Prudentum; which were the Sentences, and Opinions of those Lawyers, to whom the Emperour gave Authority to interpret the Law, and to give answer to such as in matter of Law demanded their advice; which Answers, the Judges in giving Judgement were obliged by the Constitutions of the Emperour to observe: And should be like the Reports of Cases Judged, if other Judges be by the Law of England bound to observe them. For the Judges of the Com∣mon Law of England, are not properly Judges, but Juris Consulti; of whom the Judges, who are either the Lords, or Twelve men of the Country, are in point of Law to ask advice.

7. Also, Unwritten Customes, (which in their own nature are an imitation of Law,) by the tacite consent of the Emperour, in case they be not contrary to the Law of Nature, are very Lawes.

Another division of Lawes, is into Naturall and Positive. Natu∣r•…•…ll

are those which have been Lawes from all Eternity; and are cal∣led not onely Naturall, but also Morall Lawes; consisting in the Mo∣rall Vertues, as Justice, Equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to Peace, and Charity; of which I have already spoken in the four∣teenth and fifteenth Chapters.

Positive, are those which have not been from Eternity; but have been made Lawes by the Will of those that have had the Soveraign Power over others; and are either written, or made known to men, by some other argument of the Will of their Legislator.

Again, of Positive Lawes some are Humane, some Divine: And* 1.150 of Humane positive lawes, some are Distributive, some Penal. Di∣stributive are those that determine the Rights of the Subjects, de∣claring to every man what it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands, or goods, and a right or liberty of action: and these speak to all the Subjects. Penal are those, which declare, what Penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the Law; and speak to the Ministers and Officers ordained for execution. For though every one ought to be informed of the Punishments ordained before∣hand for their transgression; neverthelesse the Command is not ad∣dressed to the Delinquent, (who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himselfe,) but to publique Ministers appointed to see the Pe∣nalty executed. And these Penal Lawes are for the most part writ∣ten together with the Lawes Distributive; and are sometimes called Judgements. For all Lawes are generall Judgements, or Sentences of the Legislator; as also every particular Judgement, is a Law to him, whose case is Judged.

Divine Positive Lawes (for Naturall Lawes being Eternall, and* 1.151 Universall, are all Divine,) are those, which being the Commande∣ments of God, (not from all Eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but onely to a certain people, or to certain persons,) are de∣clared for such, by those whom God hath authorised to declare them. But this Authority of man to declare what be these Positive Lawes of God, how can it be known? God may command a man by a supernaturall way, to deliver Lawes to other men. But because it is of the essence of Law, that he who is to be obliged, be assured of the Authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot naturally take notice to be from God, How can a man without supernaturall Re∣velation be assured of the Revelation received by the declarer? and how can he be bound to obey them? For the first question, how a man can be assured of the Revelation of another, without a Revelation particularly to himselfe, it is evidently impossible: For though a man may be induced to believe such Revelation, from the Miracles they see him doe, or from seeing the Extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from seeing the Extraordinary wisedome, or Extraordinary felicity of his Actions, all which are marks of God extraordinary favour; yet they are not assured evidences of speciall Revelation. Miracles are Marvellous workes: but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible feli∣cities of this world, are most often the work of God by Naturall,

and ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by na∣turall reason, that another has had a supernaturall revelation of Gods will; but only a beliefe; every one (as the signs thereof shall ap∣pear greater; or lesser) a firmer, or a weaker belief.

But for the second, how he can be bound to obey them; it is not so hard. For if the Law declared, be not against the Law of Na∣ture (which is undoubtedly Gods Law) and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act; bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it: for mens beliefe, and interiour cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but only to the operation of God, ordi∣nary, or extraordinary. Faith of Supernaturall Law, is not a ful∣filling, but only an assenting to the same; and not a duty that we exhibite to God, but a gift which God freely giveth to whom he plea∣seth; as also Unbelief is not a breach of any of his Lawes; but a reje∣ction of them all, except the Laws Naturall. But this that I say, will be made yet cleerer▪ by the Examples, and Testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture. The Covenant God made with Abraham (in a Supernaturall manner) was thus, This is the Covenant which* 1.152 thou shalt observe between Me and Thee and thy Seed after thee. Abra∣hams Seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the Covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for Gods Law; which they could not be, but in vertue of the obedience they owed to their Parents; who (if they be Subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham) have Soveraign power over their children, and servants. Againe, where God saith to Abraham, In thee shall all Nations of the earth be blessed: For I know thou wilt command thy children, and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to observe Righ∣teousnesse and Judgement, it is manifest, the obedience of his Fa∣mily, who had no Revelation, depended on their former obligati∣on to obey their Soveraign. At Mount Sinai Moses only went up to God; the people were forbidden to approach on paine of death; yet were they bound to obey all that Moses declared to them for Gods Law. Upon what ground, but on this submission of their own, Speak thou to us, and we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye? By which two places it sufficiently appeareth, that in a Common-wealth, a subject that has no certain and assured Re∣velation particularly to himself concerning the Will of God, is to obey for such, the Command of the Common-wealth: for if men were at liberty, to take for Gods Commandements, their own dreams, and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is Gods Commandement; and yet in respect of them, every man would despise the Comman∣dements of the Common-wealth. I conclude therefore, that in all things not contrary to the Morall Law, (that is to say, to the Law of Nature,) all Subjects are bound to obey that for divine Law, which is declared to be so, by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. Which also is evident to any mans reason; for whatsoever is not▪ against the Law of Nature, may be made Law in the name of them

that have the Soveraign power; and there is no reason men should be the lesse obliged by it, when tis propounded in the name of God. Besides, there is no place in the world where men are permit∣ted to pretend other Commandements of God, than are decla∣red for such by the Common-wealth. Christian States punish those that revolt from Christian Religion, and all other States, those that set up any Religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever is not regulated by the Common-wealth, tis Equity (which is the Law of Na∣ture, and therefore an eternall Law of God) that every man equally enjoy his liberty.

There is also another distinction of Laws, into Fundamentall, and* 1.153 not Fundamentall: but I could never see in any Author, what a Fundamentall Law signifieth. Neverthelesse one may very rea∣sonably distinguish Laws in that manner.

For a Fundamentall Law in every Common-wealth is that, which* 1.154 being taken away, the Common-wealth faileth, and is utterly dis∣solved; as a building whose Foundation is destroyed. And there∣fore a Fundamentall Law is that, by which Subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the Soveraign, whether a Mo∣narch, or a Soveraign Assembly, without which the Common∣wealth cannot stand; such as is the power of War and Peace, of Ju∣dicature, of Election of Officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the Publique good. Not Fundamentall is that, the abrogating whereof, draweth not with it the dissolution of the Common-Wealth; such as are the Lawes concerning Controversies between subject and subject. Thus much of the Division of Lawes.

I find the words Lex Civilis, and Jus Civile, that is to say, Law* 1.155 and Right Civil, promiscuously used for the same thing, even in the most learned Authors; which neverthelesse ought not to be so. For Right is Liberty, namely that Liberty which the Civil Law leaves us: But Civill Law is an Obligation; and takes from us the Liberty which the Law of Nature gave us. Nature gave a Right to every man to secure himselfe by his own strength, and to invade a suspected neigh∣bour, by way of prevention: but the Civill Law takes away that Liberty, in all cases where the protection of the Law may be safely stayd for. Insomuch as Lex and Jus, are as different as Obligation and Liberty.

Likewise Lawes and Charters are taken 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for the* 1.156 same thing. Yet Charters are Donations of the Soveraign; and not Lawes, but exemptions from Law. The phrase of a Law is Jubeo, Injungo, I Command, and Enjoyn: the phrase of a Charter is Dedi, Concessi, I have Given, I have Granted: but what is given or granted, to a man, is not forced upon him, by a Law. A Law may be made to bind All the Subjects of a Common-wealth: a Liberty, or Charter is only to One man, or some One part of the people. For to say all the people of a Common-wealth, have Liberty in any case whatsoever; is to say, that in such case, there hath been no Law made; or else having been made, is now abrogated.

CHAP. XXVII. Of CRIMES, EXCUSES, and EXTENUATIONS.

A Sinne, is not onely a Transgression of a Law, but also any* 1.157 Contempt of the Legislator. For such Contempt, is a breach of all his Lawes at once. And therefore may con∣sist, not onely in the Commission of a Fact, or in the Speak∣ing of Words by the Lawes forbidden, or in the Omission of what the Law commandeth, but also in the Intention, or purpose to trans∣gresse. For the purpose to breake the Law, is some degree of Con∣tempt of him, to whom it belongeth to see it executed. To be de∣lighted in the Imagination onely, of being possessed of another mans goods, servants, or wife, without any intention to take them from him by force, or fraud, is no breach of the Law, that sayth, Thou shalt not covet: nor is the pleasure a man may have in imagining, or dreaming of the death of him, from whose life he expecteth nothing but dammage, and displeasure, a Sinne; but the resolving to put some Act in execution, that tendeth thereto. For to be pleased in the ficti∣on of that, which would please a man if it were reall, is a Passion so adhaerent to the Nature both of man, and every other living crea∣ture, as to make it a Sinne, were to make Sinne of being a man. The consideration of this, has made me think them too severe, both to themselves, and others, that maintain, that the First motions of the mind, (though checked with the fear of God) be Sinnes. But I con∣fesse it is safer to erre on that hand, than on the other.

A CRIME, is a sinne, consisting in the Committing (by Deed, or* 1.158 Word) of that which the Law forbiddeth, or the Omission of what it hath commanded. So that every Crime is a sinne; but not every sinne a Crime. To intend to steale, or kill, is a sinne, though it never ap∣peare in Word, or Fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge: but till it appear by some thing done, or said, by which the intention may be argued by a humane Judge, it hath not the name of Crime: which distinction the Greeks observed, in the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; wherof the former, (which is trans∣lated Sinne,) signifieth any swarving from the Law whatsoever; but the two later, (which are translated Crime,) signifie that sinne onely, whereof one man may accuse another. But of Intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there is no place for humane accusation. In like manner the Latines by Peccatum, which is Sinne, signifie all manner of deviation from the Law; but by Crimen, (which word they derive from Cerno, which signifies to perceive,) they mean onely such sinnes, as may be made appear before a Judge; and therfore are not meer Intentions.* 1.159

From this relation of Sinne to the Law, and of Crime to the Ci∣vill Law, may be inferred, First, that where Law ceaseth, Sinne cea∣seth.

But because the Law of Nature is eternall, Violation of Cove∣nants, Ingratitude, Arrogance, and all Facts contrary to any Morall vertue, can never cease to be Sinne. Secondly, that the Civill Law cea∣sing, Crimes cease: for there being no other Law remaining, but that of Nature, there is no place for Accusation; every man being his own Judge, and accused onely by his own Conscience, and cleared by the Uprightnesse of his own Intention. When therefore his Intention is Right, his fact is no Sinne: if otherwise, his fact is Sinne; but not Crime. Thirdly, That when the Soveraign Power ceaseth, Crime also ceaseth: for where there is no such Power, there is no protecti∣on to be had from the Law; and therefore every one may protect himself by his own power: for no man in the Institution of Soveraign Power can be supposed to give away the Right of preserving his own body; for the safety whereof all Soveraignty was ordained. But this is to be understood onely of those, that have not themselves con∣tributed to the taking away of the Power that protected them: for that was a Crime from the beginning.

The source of every Crime, is some defect of the Understanding;* 1.160 or some errour in Reasoning; or some sudden force of the Passions. Defect in the Understanding, is Ignoran•…•…e; in Reasoning, Erroneous Opinion. Again, Ignorance is of three sorts; of the Law, and of the Soveraign, and of the Penalty. Ignorance of the Law of Nature Excuseth no man; because every man that hath attained to the use of Reason, is supposed to know, he ought not to do to another, what he would not have done to himselfe. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do any thing contrary to that Law, it is a Crime. If a man come from the Indies hither, and perswade men here to receive a new Religion, or teach them any thing that tendeth to disobedience of the Lawes of this Country, though he be never so well perswaded of the truth of what he teacheth, he commits a Crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not onely because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he would not approve in another, namely, that comming from hence, he should en∣deavour to alter the Religion there. But ignorance of the Civill Law, shall Excuse a man in a strange Country, till it be declared to him; because, till then no Civill Law is binding.* 1.161

In the like manner, if the Civill Law of a mans own Country, be not so sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the A∣ction against the Law of Nature; the Ignorance is a good Excuse: In other cases Ignorance of the Civill Law, Excuseth not.

Ignorance of the Soveraign Power, in the place of a mans ordina∣ry* 1.162 residence, Excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the Power, by which he hath been protected there.

Ignorance of the Penalty, where the Law is declared, Excuseth* 1.163 no man: For in breaking the Law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were not a Law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all the known consequences of it; but Punish∣ment is a known consequence of the violation of the Lawes, in every

Common-wealth; which punishment, if it be determined already by the Law, he is subject to that; if not, then is he subject to Arbitrary punishment. For it is reason, that he which does Injury, without other limitation than that of his own Will, should suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of his Will whose Law is there∣by violated.

But when a penalty, is either annexed to the Crime in the Law it* 1.164 selfe, or hath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the Delin∣quent is Excused from a greater penalty. For the punishment fore∣known, if not great enough to deterre men from the action, is an invitement to it: because when men compare the benefit of their In∣justice, with the harm of their punishment, by necessity of Nature they choose that which appeareth best for themselves: and therefore when they are punished more than the Law had formerly determi∣ned, or more than others were punished for the same Crime; it is the Law that tempted, and deceiveth them.

No Law, made after a Fact done, can make it a Crime: because if* 1.165 the Fact be against the Law of Nature, the Law was before the Fact; and a Positive Law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore cannot be Obligatory. But when the Law that forbiddeth a Fact, is made before the Fact be done; yet he that doth the Fact, is lyable to the Penalty ordained after, in case no lesser Penalty were made known before, neither by Writing, nor by Example, for the reason immediatly before alledged.

From defect in Reasoning, (that is to say, from Errour,) men are* 1.166 prone to violate the Lawes, three wayes. First, by Presumption of false Principles: as when men from having observed how in all pla∣ces, and in all ages, unjust Actions have been authorised, by the force, and victories of those who have committed them; and that potent men, breaking through the Cob-web Lawes of their Country, the weaker sort, and those that have failed in their Enterprises, have been esteemed the onely Criminals; have thereupon taken for Principles, and grounds of their Reasoning, That Justice is but a vain word: That whatsoever a man can get by his own Industry, and hazard, is his own: That the Practice of all Nations cannot be unjust: That Examples of former times are good Arguments of doing the like again; and ma∣ny more of that kind: Which being granted, no Act in it selfe can be a Crime, but must be made so (not by the Law, but) by the suc∣cesse of them that commit it; and the same Fact be vertuous, or vi∣cious, as Fortune pleaseth; so that what Marius makes a Crime, Sylla shall make meritorious, and Caesar (the same Lawes standing) turn* 1.167 again into a Crime, to the perpetuall disturbance of the Peace of the Common-wealth.

Secondly, by falsé Teachers, that either mis-interpret the Law of Nature, making it thereby repugnant to the Law Civill; or by teaching for Lawes, such Doctrines of their own, or Traditions of* 1.168 former times, as are inconsistent with the duty of a Subject.

Thirdly, by Erroneous Inferences from True Principles; which happens commonly to men that are hasty, and praecipitate in conclu∣ding,

and resolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great opinion of their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature require not time and study, but onely common experi∣ence, and a good naturall wit; whereof no man thinks himselfe un∣provided: whereas the knowledge, of Right and Wrong, which is no lesse difficult, there is no man will pretend to, without great and long study. And of those defects in Reasoning, there is none that can Excuse (though some of them may Extenuate) a Crime, in any man, that pretendeth to the administration of his own private busi∣nesse; much lesse in them that undertake a publique charge; because they pretend to the Reason, upon the want whereof they would ground their Excuse.

Of the Passions that most frequently are the causes of Crime, one,* 1.169 is Vain-glory, or a foolish over-rating of their own worth; as if dif∣ference of worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches, or bloud, or some other naturall quality, not depending on the Will of those that have the Soveraign Authority. From whence proceedeth a Pre∣sumption that the punishments ordained by the Lawes, and extended generally to all Subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they are inflicted on poore, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the name of the Vulgar.

Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves* 1.170 by the greatnesse of their wealth, adventure on Crimes, upon hope of escaping punishment, by corrupting publique Justice, or obtaining Pardon by Mony, or other rewards.

And that such as have multitude of Potent Kindred; and popular* 1.171 men, that have gained reputation amongst the Multitude, take cou∣rage to violate the Lawes, from a hope of oppressing the Power, to whom it belongeth to put them in execution.

And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own* 1.172 Wisedome, take upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in que∣stion the Authority of them that govern, and so to unsettle the Lawes with their publique discourse, as that nothing shall be a Crime, but what their own designes require should be so. It happeneth also to the same men, to be prone to all such Crimes, as consist in Craft, and in deceiving of their Neighbours; because they think their designes are too subtile to be perceived. These I say are effects of a false pre∣sumption of their own Wisdome. For of them that are the first mo∣vers in the disturbance of Common-wealth, (which can never hap∣pen without a Civill Warre,) very few are left alive long enough, to see their new Designes established: so that the benefit of their Crimes, redoundeth to Posterity, and such as would least have wished it: which argues they were not so wise, as they thought they were. And those that deceive upon hope of not being observed, do com∣monly deceive themselves, (the darknesse in which they believe they lye hidden, being nothing else but their own blindnesse;) and are no wiser than Children, that think all hid, by hiding their own eyes.

And generally all vain-glorious men, (unlesse they be withall

timorous,) are subject to Anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for contempt, the ordinary liberty of conversation: And there are few Crimes that may not be produced by Anger.* 1.173

As for the Passions, of Hate, Lust, Ambition, and Covetousnesse, what Crimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every mans experience and understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and all other living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindred, but by extraordinary use of Reason, or a constant severity in punishing them. For in those things men hate, they find a continu∣all, and unavoydable molestation; whereby either a mans patience must be everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that which molesteth him: The former is difficult; the later is many times impossible, without some violation of the Law. Ambition, and Covetousnesse are Passions also that are perpetually incumbent, and pressing; whereas Reason is not perpetually present, to resist them: and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects proceed. And for Lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easie, or uncertain punishments.

Of all Passions, that which enclineth men least to break the Lawes,* 1.174 is Fear. Nay, (excepting some generous natures,) it is the onely thing, (when there is apparence of profit, or pleasure by breaking the Lawes,) that makes men keep them. And yet in many cases a Crime may be committed through Feare.

For not every Fear justifies the Action it produceth, but the fear onely of corporeall hurt, which we call Bodily Fear, and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted, fears present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by wounding him that assaulteth him; If he wound him to death, this is no Crime; because no man is supposed at the making of a Common-wealth, to have abandoned the defence of his life, or limbes, where the Law cannot arrive time enough to his assistance. But to kill a man, because from his actions, or his threatnings, I may argue he will kill me when he can, (seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from the Soveraign Power,) is a Crime. Again, a man receives words of disgrace, or some little injuries (for which they that made the Lawes, had assigned no punishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of Reason, to take notice of,) and is afraid, unlesse he revenge it, he shall fall into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries from others; and to avoyd this, breaks the Law, and protects himselfe for the future, by the terrour of his private revenge. This is a Crime: For the hurt is not Corporeall, but Phantasticall, and (though in this corner of the world, made sensible by a custome not many years since begun, amongst young and vain men,) so light, as a gallant man, and one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice of. Also a man may stand in fear of Spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much credit given to other men, that tell him of strange▪

Dreams and Visions; and thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for doing, or omitting divers things, which neverthelesse, to do, or omit, is contrary to the Lawes; And that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be Excused by this fear; but is a Crime. For (as I have shewn before in the second Chapter) Dreams be natural∣ly but the fancies remaining in sleep, after the impressions our Sen∣ses had formerly received waking; and when men are by any acci∣dent unassured they have slept, seem to be reall Visions; and there∣fore he that presumes to break the Law upon his own, or anothers Dream, or pretended Vision, or upon other Fancy of the power of Invisible Spirits, than is permitted by the Common-wealth, leaveth the Law of Nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of his own, or another private mans brain, which he can never know whether it signifieth any thing, or nothing, nor whether he that tells his Dream, say true, or lye; which if every private man should have leave to do, (as they must by the Law of Nature, if any one have it) there could no Law be made to hold, and so all Com∣mon-wealth would be dissolved.

From these different sources of Crimes, it appeares already, that* 1.175 all Crimes are not (as the Stoicks of old time maintained) of the same allay. There is place, not only for EXCUSE, by which that which seemed a Crime, is proved to be none at all; but also for EXTE∣NUATION, by which the Crime, that seemed great, is made lesse. For though all Crimes doe equally deserve the name of Injustice, as all deviation from a strait line is equally crookednesse, which the Stoicks rightly observed; yet it does not follow that all Crimes are equally unjust, no more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked; which the Stoicks not observing, held it as great a Crime, to kill a Hen, against the Law, as to kill ones Father.

That which totally Excuseth a Fact, and takes away from it the* 1.176 nature of a Crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the obligation of the Law. For the fact committed once against the Law, if he that committed it be obliged to the Law, can be no other than a Crime.

The want of means to know the Law, totally Excuseth: For the Law whereof a man has no means to enforme himself, is not ob∣ligatory. But the want of diligence to enquire, shall not be consi∣dered as a want of means; Nor shall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the Government of his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the Lawes of Nature; because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only Children, and Madmen are Excu∣sed from offences against the Law Naturall.

Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy, (and he is then in the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is so,) if it be without his own fault, the Obligation of the Law ceaseth; because he must obey the enemy, or dye; and con∣sequently such obedience is no Crime: for no man is obliged (when the protection of the Law faileth,) not to protect himself, by the best means he can.

If a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact against the Law, he is totally Excused; because no Law can ob∣lige a man to abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a Law were obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, If I doe it not▪ I die presently; if I doe it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is time of life gained; Nature therefore compells him to the fact.

When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve himselfe any other way, but by some fact against the Law; as if in a great famine he take the food by force, or stealth, which he cannot obtaine for mony▪ nor charity; or in defence of his life, snatch away another mans Sword, he is totally Excused, for the reason next before alledged.

Again, Facts done against the Law, by the authority of another;* 1.177 are by that authority Excused against the Author; because no man ought to accuse his own fact in another, that is but his instrument: but it is not Excused against a third person thereby injured; because in the violation of the Law, both the Author, and Actor are Crimi∣nalls. From hence it followeth that when that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a former Law, the doing of it is totally Excused: For he ought not to condemn it himselfe, because he is the Author; and what cannot justly be condemned by the Soveraign, cannot justly be punished by any other. Besides, when the Soveraign commandeth any thing to be done against his own former Law, the Command, as to that particular fact, is an abrogation of the Law.

If that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, dis∣claime any Right essentiall to the Soveraignty, whereby there acc•…•…∣eth to the Subject, any liberty inconsistent with the Soveraign Pow∣er, that is to say, with the very being of a Common-wealth, if the Subject shall refuse to obey the Command in any thing, contrary to the liberty granted, this is neverthelesse a Sinne, and contrary to the duty of the Subject: for he ought to take notice of what is inconsi∣stent with the Soveraignty, because it was erected by his own con∣sent, and for his own defence; and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through ignorance of the evill consequence thereof. But if he not onely disobey, but also resist a publique Mini∣ster in the execution of it, then it is a Crime; because he might have been righted, (without any breach of the Peace,) upon com∣plaint.

The Degrees of Crime are taken on divers Scales, and measured, First, by the malignity of the Source, or Cause: Secondly, by the contagion of the Example: Thirdly, by the mischiefe of the Ef∣fect; and Fourthly, by the concurrence of Times, Places, and Persons.

The same Fact done against the Law, if it proceed from Presump∣tion* 1.178 of strength, riches, or friends to resist those that are to execute the Law, is a greater Crime, than if it proceed from hope of not being discovered, or of escape by flight: For Presumption of impu∣nity

by force, is a Root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon all temptations, a contempt of all Lawes; whereas in the later case, the apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders him more obedient for the future. A Crime which we know to be so, is greater than the same Crime proceeding from a false perswasion that it is lawfull: For he that committeth it against his own conscience, presumeth on his force, or other power, which encourages him to commit the same again: but he that doth it by errour, after the er∣rour shewn him, is conformable to the Law.

Hee, whose errour proceeds from the authority of a Teacher, or* 1.179 an Interpreter of the Law publiquely authorised, is not so faulty, as he whose errour proceedeth from a peremptory pursute of his own principles, and reasoning: For what is taught by one that teacheth by publique Authority, the Common-wealth •…•…eacheth, and hath a re∣semblance of Law, till the same Authority controuleth it; and in all Crimes that contain not in them a denyall of the Soveraign Power, nor are against an evident Law, Excuseth totally: whereas he that groundeth his actions, on his private Judgement, ought according to the rectitude, or errour thereof, to stand, or fall.

The same Fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, is* 1.180 a greater Crime, than if there have been many precedent Examples of impunity. For those Examples, are so many hopes of Impunity, given by the Soveraign himselfe: And because he which furnishes a man with such a hope, and presumption of mercy, as encourageth him to offend, hath his part in the offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole.

A Crime arising from a sudden Passion, is not so great, as when the* 1.181 same ariseth from long meditation: For in the former case there is a place for Extenuation, in the common infirmity of humane nature: but he that doth it with praemeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye, on the Law, on the punishment, and on the consequence thereof to humane society; all which in committing the Crime, hee hath contemned, and postposed to his own appetite. But there is no suddennesse of Passion sufficient for a totall Excuse: For all the time between the first knowing of the Law, and the Commission of the Fact, shall be taken for a time of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the Law, to rectifie the irregularity of his Passions.

Where the Law is publiquely, and with assiduity, before all the people read, and interpreted; a fact done against it, is a greater Crime, than where men are left without such instrustion, to enquire of it with difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their Callings, and be informed by priuate men: for in this case, part of the fault is discharged upon common infirmity; but in the former, there is ap∣parent negligence, which is not without some contempt of the Sove∣taign Power.

Those facts which the Law expresly condemneth, but the Law∣maker* 1.182 by other manifest signes of his will tacitly approveth, are lesse Crimes, than the same facts, condemned both by the Law, and Law∣maker. For seeing the will of the Law-maker is a Law, there appear

in this case two contradictory Lawes; which would totally Excuse, if men were bound to take notice of the Soveraigns approbation, by other arguments, than are expressed by his command. But because there are punishments consequent, not onely to the transgression of his Law, but also to the observing of it▪ he is in part a cause of the trans∣gression, and therefore cannot reasonably impute the whole Crime to the •…•…quent. For example, the Law condemneth Duells; the pu∣nishment is made capitall▪ On the contrary part, he that refuseth Du∣ell, is subject to contempt and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, without remedy; and some∣times by the Soveraign himselfe thought unworthy to have any charge, or preferment in Warre: If thereupon he accept Duell, con∣sidering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of them that have the Soveraign Power, he ought not in reason to be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 punished; seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the punisher: which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges, or any other kind of disobedience; but a care in Governours, not to countenance any thing obliquely, which directly they forbid. The examples of Princes, to those that see them, are, and ever have been, more potent to govern their actions, than the Lawes themselves. And thought it be our duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty never be performed, till it please God to give men an extraordinary, and supernaturall grace to follow that Precept.

Again, if we compare Crimes by the mischiefe of their Effects,* 1.183 First, the same fact, when it redounds to the dammage of many, is greater, than when it redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth, not onely in the present, but also, (by example) in the future, it is a greater Crime, than if it hurt onely in the present: for the former, is a fertile Crime, and multiplyes to the hurt of ma∣ny; the later is barren. To maintain doctrines contrary to the Reli∣gion established in the Common-wealth, is a greater fault, in an au∣thorised Preacher, than in a private person: So also is it, to live pro∣phanely, incontinently, or do any irreligious act whatsoever. Like∣wise in a Professor of the Law, to maintain any point, or do any act, that tendeth to the weakning of the Soveraign Power, is a greater Crime, than in another man: Also in a man that hath such reputation for wisedome, as that his counsells are followed, or his actions imi∣tated by many, his fact against the Law, is a greater Crime, than the same fact in another: For such men not onely commit Crime, but teach it for Law to all other men. And generally all Crimes are the greater, by the scandall they give; that is to say, by becomming stumbling-blocks to the weak, that look not so much upon the way they go in, as upon the light that other men carry before them.

Also Facts of hostility against the present state of the Common∣wealth,* 1.184 are greater Crimes, than the same acts done to private men: For the dammage extends it selfe to all: Such are the betraying of the strengths, or revealing of the secrets of the Common-wealth to an Enemy▪ also all attempts upon the Representative of the Common∣wealth, be it a Monarch, or an Assembly; and all endeavours by

word, or deed to diminish the Authority of the same, either in the present time, or in succession: which Crimes the Latines understand by Crimina laesae Majestatis, and consist in designe, or act, contrary to a Fundamentall Law.

Likewise those Crimes, which render Judgements of no effect, are* 1.185 greater Crimes, than Injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to re∣ceive mony to give False judgement, or testimony, is a greater Crime, than otherwise to deceive a man of the like, or a greater summe; be∣cause not onely he has wrong, that falls by such judgements; but all Judgements are rendered uselesse, and occasion ministred to force, and private revenges.

Also Robbery, and Depeculation of the Publique treasure, or Re∣venues,* 1.186 is a greater Crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a Private man; because to robbe the publique, is to robbe many at once.

Also the Counterfeit usurpation of publique Ministery, the Coun∣terfeiting* 1.187 of publique Seales, or publique Coine, than counterfeiting of a private mans person, or his seale; because the fraud thereof, ex∣tendeth to the dammage of many.

Of facts against the Law, done to private men, the greater Crime,* 1.188 is that, where the dammage in the common opinion of men, is most sensible. And therefore

To kill against the Law, is a greater Crime, than any other injury, life preserved.

And to kill with Torment, greater, than simply to kill.

And Mutilation of a limbe, greater, than the spoyling a man of his goods.

And the spoyling a man of his goods, by Terrour of death, or wounds, than by clandestine surreption.

And by clandestine Surreption, than by consent fraudulently ob∣tained.

And the violation of chastity by Force, greater, than by flattery.

And of a woman Married, than of a woman not married.

For all these things are commonly so valued; though some men are more, and some lesse sensible of the same offence. But the Law regardeth not the particular, but the generall inclination of man∣kind.

And therefore the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or gesture, when they produce no other harme, than the present griefe of him that is reproached, hath been neglected in the Lawes of the Greeks, Romans, and other both antient, and moderne Common∣wealths; supposing the true cause of such griefe to consist, not in the contumely, (which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own vertue,) but in the Pusillanimity of him that is offended by it.

Also a Crime against a private man, is much aggravated by the person, time, and place. For to kill ones Parent, is a greater Crime, than to kill another: for the Parent ought to have the honour of a Soveraign, (though he have surrendred his Power to the Civill Law,) because he had it originally by Nature. And to Robbe a poore

man, is a greater Crime, than to robbe a rich man; because 'tis to the poore a more sensible dammage.

And a Crime committed in the Time▪ or Place appointed for Devo∣tion, is greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds from a greater contempt of the Law.

Many other case•…•… of Aggravation, and Extenuation might be ad∣ded: but by these I have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude of any other Crime proposed.

Lastly, because in almost all Crimes there is an Injury done, not* 1.189 onely to some Private men, but also to the Common-wealth; the same Crime, when the accusation is in the name of the Common∣wealth, is called Publique Crime; and when in the name of a Private man, a Private Crime; And the Pleas according thereunto called Publique, Judicia Publica, Pleas of the Crown; or Private Pleas. As in an Accusation of Murder, if the accuser be a Private man, the plea is a Private plea; if the accuser be the Soveraign, the plea is a Publique plea.

CHAP. XXVIII. Of PUNISHMENTS, and REWARDS.

APUNISHMENT, is an Evill inflicted by publique Au∣thority,* 1.190 on him that hath done, or omitted that which is Jud∣ged by the same Authority to be a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.

Before I inferre any thing from this definition, there is a question* 1.191 to be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the Right, or Authority of Punishing in any case, came in. For by that which has been said before, no man is supposed bound by Covenant, not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a Common-wealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but not of defending himselfe. Also he obligeth himselfe, to assist him that hath the Soveraignty, in the Pu∣nishing of another; but of himselfe not. But to covenant to assist the Soveraign, in doing hurt to another, unlesse he that so covenanteth have a right to doe it himselfe, is not to give him a Right to Punish. It is manifest therefore that the Right which the Common-wealth (that is, he, or they that represent it) hath to Punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the Subjects. But I have also shewed formerly, that before the Institution of Common-wealth, every man had a right to every thing, and to do whatsoever he thought necessa∣ry to his own preservation; subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto. And this is the foundation of that right of Punishing,

which is exercised in every Common-wealth. For the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that right; but onely in laying down theirs, strengthned him to use his own, as he should think fit, for the preser∣vation of them all: so that it was not given▪ but left to him, and to him onely; and (excepting the limits set him by naturall Law) as en∣tire, as in the condition of meer Nature, and of warre of every one against his neighbour.

•…•…rom the definition of Punishment, I inferre, First, that neither* 1.192 private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be stiled Punishment; because they proceed not from publique Authority.

Secondly, that to be neglected, and unpreferred by the publique* 1.193 favour, is not a Punishment; because no new evill is thereby on any man Inflicted; he is onely left in the estate he was in before.

Thirdly, that the evill inflicted by publique Authority, without* 1.194 precedent publique condemnation, is not to be stiled by the name of Punishment; but of an hostile act; because the fact for which a man is Punished, ought first to be Judged by publique Authority, to be a transgression of the Law.

Fourthly, that the evill inflicted by usurped power, and Judges* 1.195 without Authority from the Soveraign, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because the acts of power usurped, have not for Au∣thor, the person condemned; and therefore are not acts of publique Authority.

Fifthly, that all evill which is inflicted without intention, or possi∣bility* 1.196 of disposing the Delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the Lawes, is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; be∣cause without such an end, no hurt done is contained under that name.

Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by Nature,* 1.197 divers hurtfull consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himselfe slain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sicknesse by the doing of some unlawfull act; such hurt, though in respect of God, who is the author of Nature, it may be said to be inflicted, and there∣fore a Punishment divine; yet it is not contaned in the name of Pu∣nishment in respect of men, because it is not inflicted by the Autho∣rity of man.

Seventhly, If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, or con∣tentment* 1.198 that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition; and is rather the Price, or Redemption, than the Punishment of a Crime: Because it is of the nature of Pu∣nishment, to have for end, the disposing of men to obey the Law; which end (if it be lesse than the benefit of the transgression) it at∣taineth not, but worketh a contrary effect.* 1.199

Eighthly, If a Punishment bè determined and prescribed in the Law it selfe, and after the crime committed, there be a greater Pu∣nishment inflicted, the excesse is not Punishment, but an act of hosti∣lity. For seeing the aym of Punishment is not a revenge, but ter∣rour; and the terrour of a great Punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration of a lesse, the unexpected addition is no part of

the Punishment. But where there is no Punishment at all determined by the Law, there whatsoever is inflicted, hath the nature of Punish∣ment. For he that goes about the violation of a Law, wherein no penalty is determined, expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary Punishment.

Ninthly, Harme inflicted for a Fact done before there was a Law* 1.200 that forbad it, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: For before the Law, there is no transgression of the Law: But Punishment sup∣poseth a fact judged, to have been a transgression of the Law; There∣fore Harme inflicted before the Law made, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility.

Tenthly, Hurt inflicted on the Representative of the Common∣wealth,* 1.201 is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to be inflicted by publique Authority, which is the Authority only of the Representative it self.

Lastly, Harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals* 1.202 not under the name of Punishment: Because seeing they were either never subject to the Law, and therefore cannot transgresse it; or ha∣ving been subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by con∣sequence deny they can transgresse it, all the Harmes that can be done them, must be taken as acts of Hostility. But in declared Ho∣stility, all infliction of evill is lawfull. From whence it followeth, that if a subject shall by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberatly deny the authority of the Representative of the Common-wealth, (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for Treason,) he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the Representative will: For in denying subjection, he denyes such Punishment as by the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the Com∣mon-wealth; that is, according to the will of the Representative. For the Punishments set down in the Law, are to Subjects, not to Enemies; such as are they, that having been by their own act Subjects, deli∣berately revolting, deny the Soveraign Power.

The first, and most generall distribution of Punishments, is into Divine, and Humane. Of the former I shall have occasion, to speak, in a more convenient place hereafter.

Humane, are those Punishments that be inflicted by the Com∣mandement of Man; and are either Corporall, or Pecu•…•…ary, or Ig∣nominy, or Imprisonment, or Exile, or mixt of these.* 1.203

Corporall Punishment is that, which is inflicted on the body directly, and according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are stripes, or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as were before lawfully enjoyed.

And of these, some be Capitall, some Lesse than Capitall. Capi∣tall,* 1.204 is the Infliction of Death; and that either simply, or with tor∣ment. Lesse than Capitall, are Stripes, Wounds, Chains, and any o∣ther corporall Paine, not in its own nature mortall. For if upon the Infliction of a Punishment death •…•…ollow not in the intention of the Inflicter, the Punishment is not to bee esteemed Capitall, though the harme prove mortall by an accident not to be fore∣seen;

in which case death is not inflicted, but hastened.

Pecuniary Punishment, is that which consisteth not only in the deprivation of a Summe of Mony, but also of Lands, or any other goods which are usually bought and sold for mony. And in case the Law, that ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to ga∣ther mony, from such as shall transgresse the same, it is not proper∣ly a Punishment, but the Price of priviledge, and exemption from the Law, which doth not absolutely forbid the fact, but only to those that are not able to pay the mony: except where the Law is Naturall, or part of Religion; for in that case it is not an exempti∣on from the Law, but a transgression of it. As where a Law exa∣cteth a Pecuniary mulct, of them that take the name of God in vaine, the payment of the mulct, is not the price of a dispensation to sweare, but the Punishment of the transgression of a Law undispensable. In like manner if the Law impose a Summe of Mony to be payd, to him that has been Injured; this is but a satisfaction for the hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured, not the crime of the offender.

Ignominy, is the infliction of such Evill, as is made Dishonorable;* 1.205 or the deprivation of such Good, as is made Honourable by the Common-wealth. For there be some things Honorable by Na∣ture; as the effects of Courage, Magnamity, Strength, Wisdome, and other abilities of body and mind: Others made Honorable by the Common-wealth; as Badges, Titles, Offices, or any other sin∣gular marke of the Soveraigns favour. The former, (though they may faile by nature, or accident,) cannot be taken away by a Law; and therefore the losse of them is not Punishment. But the later, may be taken away by the publique authority that made them Honora∣ble, and are properly Punishments: Such are degrading men con∣demned, of their Badges, Titles, and Offices; or declaring them uncapable of the like in time to come.

Imprisonment, is when a man is by publique Authority deprived* 1.206 of liberty; and may happen from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe custody of a man accused; the other is the inflicting of paine on a man condemned. The former is not Punishment; because no man is supposed to be Punisht, before he be Judicially heard, and declared guilty. And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds, or restraint, before his cause be heard, over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody, is against the Law of Nature. But the later is Punishment, because Evill, and infli∣cted by publique Authority, for somewhat that has by the same Authority been Judged a Transgression of the Law. Under this word Imprisoment, I comprehend all restraint of motion, caused by an externall obstacle, be it a House, which is called by the ge∣neral name of a Prison; or an Iland, as when men are said to be confi∣ned to it; or a place where men are set to worke, as in old time men have been condemned to Quarries, and in these times to Gallies; or be it a Chaine, or any other such impediment.

Exile, (Banishment) is when a man is for a crime, con∣demned* 1.207

to depart out of the dominion of the Common-wealth, or out of a certaine part thereof; and during a prefixed time, or for ever, not to return into it: and seemeth not in its own nature, with∣out other circumstances, to be a Punishment; but rather an escape, or a publique commandement to avoid Punishment by flight. And Cicero sayes, there was never any such Punishment ordained in the City of Rome; but cals it a refuge of men in danger. For if a man banished, be neverthelesse permitted to enjoy his Goods, and the Revenue of his Lands, the meer change of ayr is no Punishment; nor does it tend to that benefit of the Common-wealth, for which all Punishments are ordained, (that is to say, to the forming of mens wils to the observation of the Law;) but many times to the dammage of the Common-wealth. For a Banished man, is a lawfull enemy of the Common-wealth that banished him; as being no more a Mem∣ber of the same. But if he be withall deprived of his Lands, or Goods, then the Punishment lyeth not in the Exile, but is to be reckoned amongst Punishments Pecuniary.

All Punishments of Innocent subjects, be they great or little, are* 1.208 against the Law of Nature: For Punishment is only for Transgres∣sion of the Law, and therefore there can be no Punishment of the In∣nocent. It is therefore a violation, First, of that Law of Nature, which forbiddeth all men, in their Revenges, to look at any thing but some future good: For there can arrive no good to the Com∣mon-wealth, by Punishing the Innocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth Ingratitude: For seeing all Soveraign Power, is origi∣nally given by the consent of every one of the Subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be protected thereby; the Punishment of the Innocent, is a rendring of Evill for Good. And thirdly, of the Law that commandeth Equity; that is to say, an e∣quall distribution of Justice; which in Punishing the Innocent is not observed.

But the Infliction of what evill soever, on an Innocent man, that* 1.209 is not a Subject, if it be for the benefit of the Common-wealth, and without violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature. For all men that are not Subjects, are either Enemies, or else they have ceased from being so, by some precedent covenants. But against Enemies, whom the Common-wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawfull by the originall Right of Nature to make warre; wherein the Sword Judgeth not, nor doth the Victor make distinction of Nocent, and Innocent, as to the time past; nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to the good of his* 1.210 own People. And upon this ground it is, that also in Subjects, who deliberatly deny the Authority of the Common-wealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to the Fathers, but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being, and conse∣quently innocent of the fact, for which they are afflicted: because the nature of this offence, consisteth in the renouncing of subjection; which is a relapse into the condition of warre, commonly called Rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer not as Subjects,

but as Enemies. For Rebellion, is but warre renewed.

REWARD, is either of Gift, or by Contract. When by Con∣tract,* 1.211 it is called Salary, and Wages; which is benefit due for ser∣vice performed, or promised. When of Gift, it is benefit pro∣ceeding from the grace of them that bestow it, to encourage, or enable men to do them service. And therefore when the Sove∣raign of a Common wealth appointeth a Salary to any publique Of∣fice, he that receiveth it, is bound in Justice to performe his office; otherwise, he is bound onely in honour, to acknowledgement, and an endeavour of requitall. For though men have no lawfull remedy, when they be commanded to quit their private businesse, to serve the publique, without Reward, or Salary; yet they are not bound there∣to, by the Law of Nature, nor by the Institution of the Common∣wealth, unlesse the service cannot otherwise be done; because it is supposed the Soveraign may make use of all their means, insomuch as the most common Souldier, may demand the wages of his warre∣fare, as a debt.

The benefit which a Soveraign bestoweth on a Subject, for fear of* 1.212 some power, and ability he hath to do hurt to the Common-wealth, are not properly Rewards; for they are not Salaryes; because there is in this case no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the Common-wealth disservice: nor are they Graces; be∣cause they be extorted by fear, which ought not to be incident to the Soveraign Power: but are rather Sacrifices, which the Soveraign (considered in his naturall person, and not in the person of the Com∣mon-wealth) makes, for the appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himselfe; and encourage not to obedience, but on the contrary, to the continuance, and increasing of further extortion.

And whereas some Salaries are certain, and proceed from the pub∣lique* 1.213 Treasure; and others uncertain, and casuall, proceeding from the execution of the Office for which the Salary is ordained; the la∣ter is in some cases hurtfull to the Common-wealth; as in the case of Judicature. For where the benefit of the Judges, and Ministers of a Court of Justice, ariseth for the multitude of Causes that are brought to their cognisance, there must needs follow two Inconveniences: One, is the nourishing of sutes; for the more sutes, the greater be∣nefit: and another that depends on that, which is contention about Jurisdiction; each Court drawing to it selfe, as many Causes as it can. But in offices of Execution there are not those Inconveniences; because their employment cannot be encreased by any endeavour of their own. And thus much shall suffice for the nature of Punishment, and Reward; which are, as it were, the Nerves and Tendons, that move the limbes and joynts of a Common-wealth.

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and other Passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to Govern∣ment;) together with the great power of his Governour, whom I compared to Leviathan, taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one and fortieth of Job; where God having set forth the great power of Leviathan, calleth him King of the Proud. There

is nothing, saith he, on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid. Hee seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the children of pride. But because he is mortall, and subject to decay, as all other Earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, (though not on earth) that he should stand in fear of, and whose Lawes he ought to obey; I shall in the next following Chap∣ters speak of his Diseases, and the causes of his Mortality; and of what Lawes of Nature he is bound to obey.

CHAP. XXIX. Of those things that Weaken, or tend to the DISSOLU∣TION of a Common-wealth.

THough nothing can be immortall, which mortals make;* 1.214 yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internall diseases. For by the nature of their Institution, they are designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or as the Lawes of Nature, or as Justice it selfe, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by externall violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is not in men, as they are the Matter; but as they are the Makers, and orderers of them. For men, as they become at last weary of irregular justling, and hewing one another, and desire with all their hearts, to conforme themselves into one firme and last∣ing edifice; so for want, both of the art of making fit Lawes, to square their actions by, and also of humility, and patience, to suffer the rude and combersome points of their present greatnesse to be ta∣ken off, they cannot without the help of a very able Architect, be compiled, into any other than a crasie building, such as hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity.

Amongst the Infirmities therefore of a Common-wealth, I will reckon in the first place, those that arise from an Imperfect Institu∣tion, and resemble the diseases of a naturall body, which proceed from a Defectuous Procreation.

Of which, this is one, That a man to obtain a Kingdome, is some∣times* 1.215 content with lesse Power, than to the Peace, and defence of the Common-wealth is necessarily required. From whence it commeth to passe, that when the exercise of the Power layd by, is for the pub∣lique safety to be resumed, it hath the resemblance of an unjust act; which disposeth great numbers of men (when occasion is presented) to rebell; In the same manner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents, are subject either to untimely death, or to purge the ill quality, derived from their vicious conception, by breaking out into biles and scabbs. And when Kings deny themselves some such necessary Power, it is not alwayes (though sometimes) out of igno∣rance of what is necessary to the office they undertake; but many

times out of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure: Wherein they reason not well; because such as will hold them to their promises, shall be maintained against them by forraign Common∣wealths; who in order to the good of their own Subjects let slip few occasions to weaken the estate of their Neighbours. So was Thomas Becket Archbishop of Canterbury, supported against Henry the Se∣cond, by the Pope; the subjection of Ecclesiastiques to the Common∣wealth, having been dispensed with by William the Conquerour at his reception, when he took an Oath, not to infringe the liberty of the Church. And so were the Barons, whose power was by William Ru∣fus (to have their help in transferring the Succession from his Elder brother, to himselfe,) encreased to a degree, inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, maintained in their Rebellion against King John, by the French.

Nor does this happen in Monarchy onely. For whereas the stile of the antient Roman Common-wealth, was, The Senate, and People of Rome; neither Senate, nor People pretended to the whole Power; which first caused the seditions, of Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Grac∣chus, Lucius Saturninus, and others; and afterwards the warres be∣tween the Senate and the People, under Marius and Sylla; and again under Pompey and Caesar, to the Extinction of their Democraty, and the setting up of Monarchy.

The people of Athens bound themselves but from one onely Acti∣on; which was, that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the warre for the Island of Salamis; And yet thereby, if Solon had not caused to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of a mad-man, and in verse, propounded it to the People that flocked about him, they had had an enemy perpetual∣ly in readinesse, even at the gates of their Citie; such dammage, or shifts, are all Common-wealths forced to, that have their Power ne∣ver so little limited.

In the second place, I observe the Diseases of a Common-wealth,* 1.216 that proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines; whereof one is, That every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions. This is true in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes; and also under Civill Government, in such cases as are not determined by the Law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the mea∣sure of Good and Evill actions, is the Civill Law; and the Judge the Legislator, who is alwayes Representative of the Common∣wealth. From this false doctrine, men are disposed to debate with themselves, and dispute the commands of the Common-wealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgements they shall think fit. Whereby the Common-wealth is distracted and Weakened.

Another doctrine repugnant to Civill Society, is, that whatsoever* 1.217 a man does against his Conscience, is Sinne; and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of Good and Evill. For a mans Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judge∣ment, so also the Conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, thought

he that is subject to no Civill Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own rea∣son; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; be∣cause the Law is the publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private opinions, the Common∣wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the Sove∣raign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.

It hath been also commonly taught, That Faith and Sanctity, are* 1.218 not to be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernaturall Inspiration, or Infusion. which granted, I see not why any man should render a reason of his Faith; or why every Christian should not be also a Pro∣phet; or why any man should take the Law of his Country, rather than his own Inspiration, for the rule of his action. And thus wee fall again into the fault of taking upon us to Judge of Good and Evill; or to make Judges of it, such private men as pretend to be supernaturally Inspired, to the Dissolution of all Civill Government. Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us; which accidents are all contrived by God Almighty; and yet are not supernaturall, but one∣ly, for the great number of them that concurre to every effect, unob∣servable. Faith, and Sanctity, are indeed not very frequent; but yet they are not Miracles, but brought to passe by education, discipline, correction, and other naturall wayes, by which God worketh them in his elect, at such time as he thinketh fit. And these three opinions, pernicious to Peace and Government, have in this part of the world, proceeded chiefly from the tongues, and pens of unlearned Divines; who joyning the words of Holy Scripture together, other∣wise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that Sanctity and Naturall Reason, cannot stand tog•…•…ther.

A fourth opinion, repugnant to the nature of a Common-wealth,* 1.219 is this, That he that hath the Soveraign Power, is subject to the Civill Lawes. It is true, that Soveraigns are all subject to the Lawes of Nature; because such lawes be Divine, and cannot by any man, or Common-wealth be abrogated. But to those Lawes which the Sove∣raign himselfe, that is, which the Common-wealth maketh, he is not subject. For to be subject to Lawes, is to be subject to the Common∣wealth, that is to the Soveraign Representative, that is to himselfe; which is not subjection, but freedome from the Lawes. Which errour, because it setteth the Lawes above the Soveraign, setteth also a Judge above him, and a Power to punish him; which is to make a new So∣veraign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the Confusion, and Dissolution of the Common-wealth.

A Fif•…•…h doctrine, that tendeth to the Dissolution of a Common∣wealth,* 1.220 is, That every private man has an absolute Propriety in his Goods; such, as excludeth the Right of the Soveraign. Every man has indeed a Propriety that excludes the Right of every other Subject: And he has it onely from the Soveraign Power; without the prote∣ction

whereof, every other man should have equall Right to the same. But if the Right of the Soveraign also be excluded, he cannot per∣forme the office they have put him into; which is, to defend them both from forraign enemies, and from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a Common-wealth.

And if the Propriety of Subjects, exclude not the Right of the Soveraign Representative to their Goods; much lesse to their offices of Judicature, or Execution, in which they Represent the Soveraign himselfe.

There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence* 1.221 of a Common-wealth; and 'tis this, That the Soveraign Power may be divided. For what is it to divide the Power of a Common-wealth, but to Dissolve it; for Powers divided mutually destroy each other. And for these doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making profession of the Lawes, endeavour to make them de∣pend upon their own learning, and not upon the Legislative Power.

And as False Doctrine, so also often-times the Example of diffe∣rent* 1.222 Government in a neighbouring Nation, disposeth men to altera∣tion of the forme already setled. So the people of the Jewes were stirred up to reject God, and to call upon the Prophet Samuel, for a King after the manner of the Nations: So also the lesser Cities of Greece, were continually disturbed, with seditions of the Aristocrati∣call, and Democraticall factions; one part of almost every Com∣mon-wealth, desiring to imitate the Lacedaemonians; the other, the Athenians. And I doubt not, but many men, have been contented to see the late troubles in England, out of an imitation of the Low Countries; supposing there needed no more to grow rich, than to change, as they had done, the forme of their Government. For the constitution of mans nature, is of it selfe subject to desire novelty: When therefore they are provoked to the same, by the neighbour∣hood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost impos∣sible for them, not to be content with those that solicite them to change; and love the first beginnings, though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder; like hot blouds, that having gotten the itch, tear themselves with their own nayles, till they can endure the smart no longer.

And as to Rebellion in particular against Monarchy; one of the* 1.223 most frequent causes of it, is the Reading of the books of Policy, and Histories of the antient Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men, and all others that are unprovided of the Antidote of solid Reason, receiving a strong, and delightfull impression, of the great exploits of warre, atchieved by the Conductors of their Ar∣mies, receive withall a pleasing Idea, of all they have done besides; and imagine their great prosperity, not to have proceeded from the aemulation of particular men, but from the vertue of their popular forme of government: Not considering the frequent Seditions, and Civill warres, produced by the imperfection of their Policy. From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latine writers, in their books, and

discourses of Policy, make it lawfull, and laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant. For they say not Regicide, that is, killing of a King, but Tyrannicide, that is, killing of a Tyrant is lawfull. From the same books, they that live under a Monarch conceive an opinion, that the Subjects in a Popular Com∣mon-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves. I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opi∣nion; not they that live under a Popular Government: for they find no such matter. In summe, I cannot imagine, how any thing can be more prejudiciall to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publikely read, without present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their Venime: Which Ve∣nime I will not doubt to compare to the biting of a mad Dogge, which is a disease the Physicians call Hydrophobia, or fear of Water. For as he that is so bitten, has a continuall torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; and is in such an estate, as if the poyson endeavou∣red to convert him into a Dogge: So when a Monarchy is once bit∣ten to the quick, by those Democraticall writers, that continually snarle at that estate; it wanteth nothing more than a strong Monarch, which neverthelesse out of a certain Tyrannophobia, or feare of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhorre.

As there have been Doctors, that hold there be three Soules in a man; so there be also that think there may be more Soules, (that is, more Soveraigns,) than one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a Supremacy against the Soveraignty, Canons against Lawes; and a Ghostly Authority against the Civill; working on mens minds, with words and distin∣ctions, that of themselves signifie nothing, but bewray (by their ob∣scurity) that there walketh (as some think invisibly) another King∣dome, as it were a Kingdome of Fayries, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest, that the Civill Power, and the Power of the Common∣wealth is the same thing; and that Supremacy, and the Power of mak∣ing (anons, and granting Faculties, implyeth a Common-wealth; it followeth, that where one is Soveraign, another Supreme; where one can make Lawes, and another make Canons; there must needs be two Common-wealths, of one & the same Subjects; which is a Kingdome divided in it selfe, and cannot stand. For notwithstanding the insignifi∣cant distinction of Temporall, and Ghostly, they are still two King∣domes, and every Subject is subject to two Masters. For seeing the Ghostly Power challengeth the Right to declare what is Sinne, it chal∣lengeth by consequence to declare what is Law, (Sinne being nothing but the transgression of the Law;) and again, the Civill Power challenging to declare what is Law, every Subject must obey two Masters, who both will have their Commands be observed as Law; which is impossible. Or, if it be but one Kingdome, either the Ci∣vill, which is the Power of the Common-wealth, must be subordi∣nate to the Ghostly, and then there is no Soveraignty but the Ghostly; or the Ghostly must be subordinate to the Temporall, and then there is no Supremacy but the Temporall. When therefore these two Powers oppose one another, the Common-wealth cannot but be in great

danger of Civill warre, and Dissolution. For the Civill Autho∣rity being more visible, and standing in the cleerer light of naturall reason cannot choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable part of the people: And the Spirituall, though it stand in the dark∣nesse of Schoole distinctions, and hard words; yet because the fear of Darknesse, and Ghosts, is greater than other fears, cannot want a party sufficient to Trouble, and sometimes to Destroy a Common∣wealth. And this is a Disease which not unfitly may be compared to the Epilepsie, or Falling-sicknesse (which the Jewes took to be one kind of possession by Spirits) in the Body Naturall. For as in this Disease, there is an unnaturall spirit, or wind in the head that ob∣structeth the roots of the Nerves, and moving them violently, taketh away the motion which naturally they should have from the power of the Soule in the Brain, and thereby causeth violent, and irregular motions (which men call Convulsions) in the parts; insomuch as he that is seized therewith, falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into the fire, as a man deprived of his senses; so also in the Body Politique, when the Spirituall power, moveth the Members of a Common-wealth, by the terrour of punishments, and hope of rewards (which are the Nerves of it,) otherwise than by the Civill Power (which is the Soule of the Common-wealth) they ought to be moved; and by strange, and hard words suffocates their under∣standing, it must needs thereby Distract the people, and either Over∣whelm the Common-wealth with Oppression, or cast it into the Fire of a Civill warre.

Sometimes also in the meerly Civill government, there be more* 1.224 than one Soule: As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the Nutritive faculty,) has depended on a generall Assembly; the Power of conduct and command, (which is the Motive faculty,) on one man; and the Power of making Lawes, (which is the Rationall faculty,) on the accidentall consent, not onely of those two, but also of a third; This endangereth the Common-wealth, somtimes for want of consent to good Lawes; but most often for want of such Nourish∣ment, as is necessary to Life, and Motion. For although few perceive, that such government, is not government, but division of the Com∣mon-wealth into three Factions, and call it mixt Monarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent Common-wealth, but three in∣dependent Factions; nor one Representative Person, but three. In the Kingdome of God, there may be three Persons independent, with∣out breach of unity in God that Reigneth; but where men Reigne, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And there∣fore if the King bear the person of the People, and the generall Assembly bear also the person of the People, and another Assembly bear the person of a Part of the people, they are not one Person, nor one Soveraign, but three Persons, and three Soveraigns.

To what Disease in the Naturall Body of man, I may exactly com∣pare this irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that had another man growing out of his side, with an head, armes, breast; and stomach, of his own: If he had had another

man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.

Hitherto I have named such Diseases of a Common-wealth, as* 1.225 are of the greatest, and most present danger. There be other, not so great; which neverthelesse are not unfit to be observed. As first, the difficulty of raising Mony, for the necessary uses of the Com∣mon-wealth; especially in the approach of warre. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that every Subject hath of a Propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the Soveraigns Right to the use of the same. From whence it commeth to passe, that the Soveraign Power, which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the Common∣wealth, (finding the passage of mony to the publique Treasure ob∣structed, by the tenacity of the people,) whereas it ought to extend it selfe, to encounter, and prevent such dangers in their beginnings, contracteth it selfe as long as it can, and when it cannot longer, strug∣gles with the people by stratagems of Law, to obtain little summes, which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for present supply, or Perish; and being put often to these extremities, at last reduceth the people to their due temper; or else the Common∣wealth must perish. Insomuch as we may compare this Distemper very aptly to an Ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter obstructed; the Veins which by their naturall course empty themselves into the Heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplyed from the Arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction, and trembling of the limbes; and afterwards a hot, and strong endeavour of the Heart, to force a passage for the Bloud; and before it can do that, contenteth it selfe with the small refreshments of such things as coole for a time, till (if Nature be strong enough) it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venome into sweat; or (if Nature be too weak) the Patient dyeth.

Again, there is sometimes in a Common-wealth, a Disease, which* 1.226 resembleth the Pleurisie; and that is, when the Treasure of the Common-wealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered toge∣ther in too much abundance, in one, or a few private men, by Mono∣polies, or by Farmes of the Publique Revenues; in the same man∣ner as the Blood in a Pleurisie, getting into the Membrane of the breast, breedeth there an Inflammation, accompanied with a Fever, and painfull stitches.

Also, the Popularity of a potent Subject, (unlesse the Common∣wealth* 1.227 have very good caution of his fidelity,) is a dangerous Di∣sease; because the people (which should receive their motion from the Authority of the Soveraign,) by the flattery, and by the reputa∣tion of an ambitious man, are drawn away from their obedience to the Lawes, to follow a man, of whose vertues, and designes they have no knowledge. And this is commonly of more danger in a Popular Government, than in a Monarchy, because an Army is of so great force, and multitude, as it may easily be made believe, they are the People. By this means it was, that Julius Caesar, who was

set up by the People against the Senate, having won to himselfe the affections of his Army, made himselfe Master, both of Senate and People. And this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men, is plain Rebellion; and may be resembled to the effects of Witch∣craft.

Another infirmity of a Common-wealth, is the immoderate* 1.228 greatnesse of a Town, when it is able to furnish out of its own Cir∣cuit, the number, and expence of a great Army: As also the great number of Corporations; which are as it were many lesser Com∣mon-wealths in the bowels of a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man. To which may be added, the Liberty of Disputing* 1.229 against absolute Power, by pretenders to Politicall Prudence; which though bred for the most part in the Lees of the people; yet anima∣ted by False Doctrines, are perpetually medling with the Fundamen∣tall Lawes, to the molestation of the Common-wealth; like the little Wormes, which Physicians call Ascarides.

We may further adde, the insatiable appetite, or Bulimia, of en∣larging Dominion; with the incurable Wounds thereby many times received from the enemy; And the Wens, of ununited conquests, which are many times a burthen, and with lesse danger lost, than kept; As also the Lethargy of Ease, and Consumption of Riot and Vain Expence.

Lastly, when in a warre (forraign, or intestine,) the enemies get a* 1.230 finall Victory; so as (the forces of the Common-wealth keeping the field no longer) there is no farther protection of Subjects in their loyaly▪ then is the Common-wealth DISSOLVED, and every man at liberty to protect himselfe by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him. For the Soveraign, is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth; which expiring, the Members are governed by it no more, than the Carcasse of a man, by his departed (though Immortall) Soule. For though the Right of a Soveraign Monarch cannot be extinguished by the act of another; yet the Obligation of the members may. For he that wants protecti∣on, may seek it any where; and when he hath it, is obliged (without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe out of fear,) to protect his Protection as long as he is able. But when the Power of an Assembly is once suppressed, the Right of the same perisheth ut∣terly; because the Assembly it selfe is extinct; and consequently, there is no possibility for the Soveraignty to re-enter.

CHAP. XXX. Of the OFFICE of the Soveraign Representative.

THe OFFICE of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an* 1.231 Assembly,) consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people; to which he is obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the Author of that Law, and to none but him. But by Safety here, is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other Contentments of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, or hurt to the Common∣wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.

And this is intended should be done, not by care applyed to Indi∣vidualls,* 1.232 further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain; but by a generall Providence, contained in publique In∣struction, both of Doctrine, and Example; and in the making, and executing of good Lawes, to which individuall persons may apply their own cases.

And because, if the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty (specified* 1.233 before in the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the Common∣wealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condi∣tion, and calamity of a warre with every other man, (which is the greatest evill that can happen in this life;) it is the Office of the So∣veraign, to maintain those Rights entire; and consequently against his duty, First, to transferre to another, or to lay from himselfe any of them. For he that deserteth the Means, deserteth the Ends; and he deserteth the Means, that being the Soveraign, acknowledgeth himselfe subject to the Civill Lawes; and renounceth the Power of Supreme Judicature; or of making Warre, or Peace by his own Authority; or of Judging of the Necessities of the Common∣wealth; or of levying Mony, and Souldiers, when, and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary; or of making Officers, and Ministers both of Warre, and Peace; or of appointing Teachers, and examining what Doctrines are conformable, or contrary to the Defence, Peace, and Good of the people. Secondly, it is against his* 1.234 Duty, to let the people be ignorant, or mis-informed of the grounds, and reasons of those his essentiall Rights; because thereby men are easie to be seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the Common∣wealth shall require their use and exercise.

And the grounds of these Rights, have the rather need to be dili∣gently, and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any Civill Law, or terrour of legall punishment. For a Civill Law, that shall forbid Rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty,) is not (as a Civill Law) any obligation,

but by vertue onely of the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth the vio∣lation of Faith; which naturall obligation if men know not, they cannot know the Right of any Law the Soveraign maketh. And for the Punishment, they take it but for an act of Hostility; which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour by acts of Hostility, to avoyd.

As I have heard some say, that Justice is but a word, without sub∣stance;* 1.235 and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himselfe, (not onely in the condition of warre, but also in a Com∣mon-wealth,) is his own, which I have already shewed to be false: So there be also that maintain, that there are no grounds, nor Princi∣ples of Reason, to sustain those essentiall Rights, which make Sove∣raignty absolute. For if there were, they would have been found out in some place, or other; whereas we see, there has not hitherto been any Common-wealth, where those Rights have been acknowledged, or challenged. Wherein they argue as ill, as if the Savage people of America, should deny there were any grounds, or Principles of Rea∣son, so to build a house, as to last as long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built. Time, and Industry, produce every day new knowledge. And as the art of well building, is deri∣ved from Principles of Reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind began (though poorly) to build: So, long time after men have begun to constitute Common∣wealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may, Principles of Reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution (excepting by externall violence) everlasting And such are those which I have in this discourse set forth: Which whether they come not into the fight of those that have Power to make use of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very little. But supposing that these of mine are not such Principles of Reason; yet I am sure they are Principles from Authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when I shall come to speak of the Kingdome of God, (administred by Moses,) over the Jewes, his peculiar people by Covenant.

But they say again, that though the Principles be right, yet Com∣mon* 1.236 people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I should be glad, that the Rich, and Potent Subjects of a King∣dome, or those that are accounted the most Learned, were no lesse incapable than they. But all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine, proceed not so much from the difficulty of the mat∣ter, as from the interest of them that are to learn. Potent men, di∣gest hardly any thing that setteth up a Power to bridle their affecti∣ons; and Learned men, any thing that discovereth their errours, and thereby lesseneth their Authority: whereas the Common-peoples minds, unlesse they be tainted with dependance on the Potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole Nations be brought to acquiescé

in the great Mysteries of Christian Religion, which are above Reason; and millions of men be made believe, that the same Body may be in innumerable places, at one and the same time, which is against Reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching, and preaching, protected by the Law, to make that received, which is so consonant to Reason, that any unprejudicated man, needs no more to learn it, than to hear it? I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall Rights (which are the Naturall, and Fundamentall Lawes) of Soveraignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a Soveraign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to cause them so to be instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, and Security, against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.

And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First,* 1.237 that they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own; nor (what∣soever present prosperity they behold in Nations that are otherwise governed than they,) to desire change. For the prosperity of a People ruled by an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly, com∣meth not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obe∣dience, and Concord of the Subjects: nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of the People,) and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than reforme the Common∣wealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daugh∣ters of Peleus (in the fable;) which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit Father, did by the Counsell of Medea, cut him in pieces, and boyle him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of change, is like the breach of the first of Gods Commandements: For there God sayes, Non habebis Does alienos; Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations; and in ano∣ther place concerning Kings, that they are Gods.

Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led with* 1.238 admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow Subjects, how high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the Com∣mon-wealth; nor of any Assembly, (except the Soveraign Assem∣bly,) so as to deferre to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the Soveraign onely, whom (in their particular stations) they represent; nor to receive any influence from them, but such as is con∣veighed by them from the Soveraign Authority. For that Soveraign, cannot be imagined to love his People as he ought, that is not Jealous of them, but suffers them by the flattery of Popular men, to be sedu∣ced from their loyalty, as they have often been, not onely secretly, but openly, so as to proclaime Marriage with them in facie Ecclesiae by Preachers; and by publishing the same in the open streets: which

may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the ten Commandements.

Thirdly, in consequence to this, they ought to be informed, how* 1.239 great a fault it is, to speak evill of the Soveraign Representative, (whether One man, or an Assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute his Power, or any way to use his Name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into Contempt with his People, and their Obedience (in which the safety of the Common-wealth consisteth) slackened. Which doctrine the third Commandement by resemblance point∣eth to.

Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught this, nor when 'tis taught,* 1.240 remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the Soveraign Power is placed, without setting a part from their ordinary labour, some certain times, in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them; It is necessary that some such times be determined, wherein they may assemble together, and (after prayers and praises given to God, the Soveraign of Sove∣raigns) hear those their Duties told them, and the Positive Lawes, such as generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the Authority that maketh them Lawes. To this end had the Jewes every seventh day, a Sabbath, in which the Law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they were put in mind, that their King was God; that having created the world in six dayes, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from their la∣bour, that that God was their King, which redeemed them from their servile, and painfull labour in Egypt, and gave them a time, after they had rejoyced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by lawfull recreation. So that the first Table of the Commandements, is spent all, in setting down the summe of Gods absolute Power; not onely as God, but as King by pact, (in peculiar) of the Jewes; and may therefore give light, to those that have Soveraign Power conferred on them by the consent of men, to see what doctrine they Ought to teach their Subjects.

And because the first instruction of Children, dependeth on the* 1.241 care of their Parents; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them, whilest they are under their tuition; and not onely so, but that also afterwards (as gratitude requireth,) they acknowledge the be∣nefit of their education, by externall signes of honour. To which end they are to be taught, that originally the Father of every man was also his Soveraign Lord, with power over him of life and death; and that the Fathers of families, when by instituting a Common∣wealth, they resigned that absolute Power, yet it was never intended, they should lose the honour due unto them for their education. For to relinquish such right, was not necessary to the Institution of Sove∣raign Power; nor would there be any reason, why any man should desire to have children, or take the care to nourish, and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them, than from other men. And this accordeth with the fifth Comman∣dement.

Again, every Soveraign Ought to cause Justice to be taught, which* 1.242 (consisting in taking from no man what is his) is as much asto say, to cause men to be taught not to deprive their Neighbours, by violence, or fraud, of any thing which by the Soveraign Authority is theirs. Of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life, & limbs; and in the next degree, in most men,) those that concern conjugall affection; and after them riches and means of living. There∣fore the People are to be taught, to abstain from violence to one ano∣thers person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugall honour; and from forcible rapine, and fraudulent surreption of one anothers goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be shewed the evill consequences of false Judgement, by corruption either of Jud∣ges or Witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and Justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandements.

Lastly, they are to be taught, that not onely the unjust facts, but* 1.243 the designes and intentions to do them, (though by accident hin∣dred,) are Injustice; which consisteth in the pravity of the will, as well as in the irregularity of the act. And this is the intention of the tenth Commandement, and the summe of the second Table; which is reduced all to this one Commandement of mutuall Charity, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe: as the summe of the first Table is reduced to the love of God; whom they had then newly received as their King.

As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive* 1.244 this Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so many Opinions, contrary to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles, have neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those, which I have in the precedent Chapter specified: as That men shall Judge of what is lawfull and unlawfull, not by the Law it selfe, but by their own Consciences; that is to say, by their own private Judge∣ments: That Subjects sinne in obeying the Commands of the Com∣mon-wealth, unlesse they themselves have first judged them to be lawfull: That their Propriety in their riches is such, as to exclude the Dominion, which the Common-wealth hath over the same: That it is lawfull for Subjects to kill such, as they call Tyrants: That the Soveraign Power may be divided, and the like; which come to be instilled into the People by this means. They whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth attent on their trades, and labour; and they, on the other side, whom superfluity, or sloth carrieth after their sen∣suall pleasures, (which two sorts of men take up the greatest part of Man-kind,) being diverted from the deep meditation, which the learning of truth, not onely in the matter of Naturall Justice, but also of all other Sciences necessarily requireth, receive the Notions of their duty, chiefly from Divines in the Pulpit, and partly from such of their Neighbours, or familiar acquaintance, as having the Faculty of discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in cases of Law, and Conscience, than themselves. And the Divines, and such others as make shew of Learning, derive their

knowledge from the Universities, and from the Schooles of Law, or from the Books, which by men eminent in those Schooles, and Uni∣versities have been published. It is therefore manifest, that the In∣struction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right teaching of Youth in the Universities. But are not (may some man say) the Uni∣versities of England learned enough already to do that? or is it you will undertake to teach the Universities? Hard questions. Yet to the first, I doubt not to answer; that till towards the later end of Henry the eighth, the Power of the Pope, was alwayes upheld against the Power of the Common-wealth, principally by the Universities; and that the doctrines maintained by so many Preachers, against the Soveraign Power of the King, and by so many Lawyers, and others, that had their education there, is a sufficient argument, that though the Universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to plant the tru•…•…. For in such a contradiction of Opi∣nions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently instru∣cted; and 'tis no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that subtile li∣quor, wherewith they were first seasoned, against the Civill Autho∣rity. But to the later question, it is not fit, nor needfull for me to say either I, or No: for any man that sees what I am doing, may easily perceive what I think.

The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that have the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally ad∣ministred to all degrees of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the great, may have no greater hope of impunity, when they doe violence, dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these, does the like to one of them: For in this consisteth Equity; to which, as being a Precept of the Law of Nature, a Soveraign is as much subject, as any of the mea∣nest of his People. All breaches of the Law, are offences against the Common-wealth: but there be some, that are also against private Persons. Those that concern the Common-wealth onely, may with∣out breach of Equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is done against himselfe, according to his own diseretion. But an of∣fence against a private man, cannot in Equity be pardoned, without the consent of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.

The Inequality of Subjects, proceedeth from the Acts of Sove∣raign Power; and therefore has no more place in the presence of the Soveraign; that is to say, in a Court of Justice, then the Inequality between Kings, and their Subjects, in the presence of the King of Kings. The honour of great Persons, is to be valued for their bene∣ficence, and the aydes they give to men of inferiour rank, or not at all. And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do, are not ex∣tenuated, but aggravated by the greatnesse of their persons; because they have least need to commit them. The consequences of this par∣tiality towards the great, proceed in this manner. Impunity maketh Insolence; Insolence Hatred; and Hatred, an Endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatnesse, though with the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Common wealth.

To Equall Justice, appertaineth also the Equall imposition of* 1.245 Taxes; the Equality whereof dependeth not on the Equality of ri∣ches, but on the Equality of the debt, that every man oweth to the Common-wealth for his defence. It is not enough, for a man to la∣bour for the maintenance of his life; but also to fight, (if need be,) for the securing of his labour. They must either do as the Jewes did after their return from captivity, in re-edifying the Temple, build with one hand, and hold the Sword in the other; or else they must hire others to fight for them. For the Impositions that are layd on the People by the Soveraign Power, are nothing else but the Wages, due to them that hold the publique Sword, to defend private men in the exercise of severall Trades, and Callings. Seeing then the be∣nefit that every one receiveth thereby, is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor, and rich; the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his life, is the same which a rich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not onely for their own persons, but for many more. Which considered, the Equality of Imposition, consisteth ra∣ther in the Equality of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reasonis there, that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consu∣meth little, should be more charged, then he that living idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more prote∣ction from the Common-wealth, then the other? But when the Im∣positions, are layd upon those things which men consume, every man payeth Equally for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth de∣frauded, by the luxurious waste of private men.

And whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable* 1.246 to maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the Charity of private persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth as the necessities of Nature require, by the Lawes of the Common∣wealth. For as it is Uncharitablenesse in any man, to neglect the im∣potent; so it is in the Soveraign of a Common-wealth, to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain Charity.

But for such as have strong bodies, the case is otherwise: they are* 1.247 to be forced to work; and to avoyd the excuse of not finding em∣ployment, there ought to be such Lawes, as may encourage all man∣ner of Arts; as Navigation, Agriculture, Fishing, and all manner of Manifacture that requires labour. The multitude of poor, and yet strong people still encreasing, they are to be transplanted into Countries not sufficiently inhabited: where neverthelesse, they are not to exterminate those they find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not range a great deal of ground, to snatch what they find; but to court each little Plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance in due season. And when all the world is over∣chargd with Inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is Warre; which provideth for every man, by Victory, or Death.

To the care of the Soveraign, belongeth the making of Good* 1.248 Lawes. But what is a good Law? By a Good Law, I mean not a.

Just Law: for no Law can be Unjust. The Law is made by the Sove∣raign Power, and all that is done by such Power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in the Lawes of a Common∣wealth, as in the Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever the Gamesters all agree on, is Injustice to none of them. A good Law is that, which is Needfull, for the Good of the People, and withall Perspicuous.

For the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not to* 1.249 bind the People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt themselves by their own impe∣tuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion; as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but to keep them in the way. And therefore a Law that is not Needfull, having not the true End of a Law, is not Good. A Law may be conceived to be Good, when it is for the benefit of the Soveraign; though it be not Necessary for the People; but it is not so. For the good of the Soveraign and People, cannot be sepa∣rated. It is a weak Soveraign, that has weak Subjects; and a weak People, whose Soveraign wanteth Power to rule them at his will. Unnecessary Lawes are not good Lawes; but trapps for Mony: which where the right of Soveraign Power is acknowledged, are superfluous; and where it is not acknowledged, unsufficient to defend the People.

The Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law* 1.250 it selfe, as in a Declaration of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was made. That is it, that shewes us the meaning of the Legislator; and the meaning of the Legislator known, the Law is more easily understood by few, than many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity; and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the Law, is multiplication of ambiguity: Besides it seems to imply, (by too much diligence,) that whosoever can evade the words, is with∣out the compasse of the Law. And this is a cause of many unneces∣sary Processes. For when I consider how short were the Lawes of antient times; and how they grew by degrees still longer; me thinks I see a contention between the Penners, and Pleaders of the Law; the former seeking to circumscribe the later; and the later to evade their circumscriptions; and that the Pleaders have got the Victory. It belongeth therefore to the Office of a Legislator, (such as is in all Common-wealths the Supreme Representative, be it one Man, or an Assembly,) to make the reason Perspicuous, why the Law was made; and the Body of the Law it selfe, as short, but in as proper, and significant termes, as may be.

It belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right* 1.251 application of Punishments, and Rewards. And seeing the end of punishing is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the offender, or of others by his example; the severest Pu∣nishments are to be inflicted for those Crimes, that are of most Dan∣ger to the Publique; such as are those which proceed from malice to the Government established; those that spring from contempt of Justice; those that provoke Indignation in the Multitude; and those,

which unpunished, seem Authorised, as when they are committed by Sonnes, Servants, or Favorites of men in Authority: For Indigna∣tion carrieth men, not onely against the Actors, and Authors of In∣justice; but against all Power that is likely to protect them; as in the case of Tarquin; when for the Insolent act of one of his Sonnes, he was driven out of Rome, and the Monarchy it selfe dissolved. But Crimes of Infirmity; such as are those which proceed from great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the Fact be a great Crime, or not, there is place many times for Lenity, without prejudice to the Common-wealth; and Lenity when there is such place for it, is required by the Law of Nature. The Punishment of the Leaders, and teachers in a Commotion; not the poore seduced People, when they are punished, can profit the Common-wealth by their example. To be severe to the People, is to punish that ignorance, which may in great part be imputed to the Soveraign, whose fault it was, they were no better instructed.

In like manner it belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Sove∣raign,* 1.252 to apply his Rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them benefit to the Common-wealth: wherein consisteth their Use, and End; and is then done, when they that have well served the Com∣mon-wealth, are with as little expence of the Common Treasure, as is possible, so well recompenced, as others thereby may be encou∣raged, both to serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it better. To buy with Mony, or Preferment, from a Popular ambitious Subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions in the mindes of the People, has nothing of the nature of Reward; (which is ordained not for disservice, but for service past;) nor a signe of Gratitude, but of Fear: nor does it tend to the Benefit, but to the Dammage of the Pub∣lique. It is a contention with Ambition, like that of Hercules with the Monster Hydra, which having many heads, for every one that was vanquished, there grew up three. For in like manner, when the stub∣bornnesse of one Popular man, is overcome with Reward, there arise many more (by the Example) that do the same Mischiefe, in hope of like Benefit: and as all forts of Manifacture, so also Malice en∣creaseth by being vendible. And though sometimes a Civill warre, may be differred, by such wayes as that, yet the danger growes still the greater, and the Publique ruine more assured. It is therefore against the Duty of the Soveraign, to whom the Publique Safety is committed, to Reward those that aspire to greatnesse by disturbing the Peace of their Country, and not rather to oppose the begin∣nings of such men, with a little danger, than after a longer time with greater.

Another Businesse of the Soveraign, is to choose good Counsel∣lours;* 1.253 I mean such, whose advice he is to take in the Government of the Common-wealth. For this word Counsell, Consilium, corrup∣ted from Considium, is of a large signification, and comprehendeth all Assemblies of men that sit together, not onely to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also to judge of Facts past, and of Law

for the present. I take it here in the first sense onely: And in this sense, there is no choyce of Counsell, neither in a Democracy, nor Aristocracy; because the persons Counselling are members of the person Counselled. The choyce of Counsellours therefore is proper to Monarchy; In which, the Soveraign that endeavoureth not to make choyce of those, that in every kind are the most able, dischar∣geth not his Office as he ought to do. The most able Counsellours, are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evill Counsell, and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the Peace, and De∣fence of the Common-wealth. It is a hard matter to know who ex∣pecteth benefit from publique troubles; but the signes that guide to a just suspicion, is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expences, and may easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it. But to know, who has most knowledge of the Publique affaires, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them a great deale the lesse. For to know, who knowes the Rules almost of any Art, is a great degree of the know∣ledge of the same Art; because no man can be assured of the truth of anothers Rules, but he that is first taught to understand them. But the best signes of Knowledge of any Art, are, much conversing in it, and constant good effects of it. Good Counsell comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore there is no more reason to expect good Advice from the rich, or noble, in matter of State, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortresse; unlesse we shall think there needs no method in the study of the Politiques, (as there does in the study of Geometry,) but onely to be lookers on; which is not so. For the Politiques is the harder study of the two. Whereas in these parts of Europe, it hath been taken for a Right of certain per∣sons, to have place in the highest Councell of State by Inheritance; it is derived from the Conquests of the antient Germans; wherein many absolute Lords joyning together to conquer other Nations, would not enter in to the Confederacy, without such Priviledges, as might be marks of difference in time following, between their Poste∣rity, and the Posterity of their Subjects; which Priviledges being inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, by the favour of the Sove∣raign, they may seem to keep; but contending for them as their Right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour, then adhaereth naturally to their abilities.

And how able soever be the Counsellours in any affaire, the be∣nefit of their Counsell is greater, when they give every one his Ad∣vice, and the reasons of it apart, than when they do it in an Assembly, by way of Orations; and when they have praemeditated, than when they speak on the sudden; both because they have more time, to sur∣vey the consequences of action; and are lesse subject to be carried away to contradiction, through Envy, Emulation, or other Passions arising from the difference of opinion.

The best Counsell▪ in those things that concern not other Nations, but onely the ease, and benefit the Subjects may enjoy, by Lawes

that look onely inward, is to be taken from the generall informati∣ons, and complaints of the people of each Province, who are best acquainted with their own wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing in derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveraign∣ty, to be diligently taken notice of. For without those Essentiall Rights, (as I have often before said,) the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.

A Commander of an Army in chiefe, if he be not Popular, shall* 1.254 not be beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his Army; and con∣sequently cannot performe that office with good successe. He must therefore be Industrious, Valiant, Affable, Liberall and Fortunate, that he may gain an opinion both of sufficiency, and of loving his Souldiers. This is Popularity, and breeds in the Souldiers both desire, and courage, to recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of the Generall, in punishing (when need is) the Muti∣nous, or negligent Souldiers. But this love of Souldiers, (if cauti∣on be not given of the Commanders fidelity,) is a dangerous thing to Soveraign Power; especially when it it is in the hands of an As∣sembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the safety of the Peo∣ple, both that they be good Conductors, and faithfull Subjects, to whom the Soveraign Commits his Armies.

But when the Soveraign himselfe is Popular; that is, reverenced and beloved of his People, there is no danger at all from the Popu∣larity of a Subject. For Souldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with their Captain; though they love him, against their Sove∣raign, when they love not onely his Person, but also his Cause. And therefore those, who by violence have at any time suppressed the Power of their lawfull Soveraign, before they could settle them∣selves in his place, have been alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their Titles, to save the People from the shame of receiving them. To have a known Right to Soveraign Power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to go∣vern his own Family: Nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disban∣ding of their Armies. For the greatest and most active part of Man∣kind, has never hetherto been well contented with the present.

Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the Law of Nations, I need not say any thing in this place; because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. And every So∣veraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body. And the same Law, that di•…•…tateth to men that have no Civil Government, what they ought to do, and what to avoyd in regard of one another, dictateth the same to Common-wealths, that is, to the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, and Soveraign Assemblies; there being no Court of Naturall Justice, but in the Conscience onely; where not Man, but God raigneth; whose Lawes, (such of them as oblige all Mankind,) in respect of God, as he is the Author of

Nature, are Naturall; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of Kings, are Lawes. But of the Kingdome of God, as King of Kings, and as King also of a peculiar People, I shall speak in the rest of this discourse.

CHAP. XXXI. Of the KINGDOME OF GOD BY NATURE.

THat the condition of meer Nature, that is to say, of abso∣lute* 1.255 Liberty, such as is theirs, that neither are Soveraigns, nor Subjects, is Anarchy, and the condition of Warre: That the Praecepts, by which men are guided to avoyd that condition, are the Lawes of Nature: That a Common-wealth, without Soveraign Power, is but a word, without substance, and cannot stand: That Subjects owe to Soveraigns, simple Obedience, in all things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the Lawes of God, I have sufficiently proved, in that which I have already written. There wants onely, for the entire knowledge of Civill du∣ty, to know what are those Lawes of God. For without that, a man knows not, when he is commanded any thing by the Civill Power, whether it be contrary to the •…•…aw of God, or not: and so, either by too much civill obedience, offends the Divine Majesty, or through feare of offending God, transgresses the commandements of the Common-wealth. To avoyd both these Rocks, it is necessary to know what are the Lawes Divine. And seeing the knowledge of all Law, dependeth on the knowledge of the Soveraign Power; I shall say something in that which followeth, of the KINGDOME OF GOD.

God is King, let the Earth rejoyce, saith the Psalmist. And again,* 1.256 God is King though the Nations be angry; and he that sitteth on the* 1.257 Cherubins, though the earth be moved. Whether men will or not,* 1.258 they must be subject alwayes to the Divine Power. By denying the Existence, or Providence of God, men may shake off their Ease, but not their Yoke. But to call this Power of God, which extendeth it selfe not onely to Man, but also to Beasts, and Plants, and Bodies inanimate, by the name of Kingdome, is but a metaphoricall use of the word. For he onely is properly said to Raigne, that governs his Subjects, by his Word, and by promise of Rewards to those that obey it, and by threatning them with Punishment that obey it not. Subjects therefore in the Kingdome of God, are not Bodies Inani∣mate, nor creatures Irrationall; because they understand no Precepts as his: Nor Atheists; nor they that believe not that God has any care of the actions of mankind; because they acknowledge no Word for his, nor have hope of his rewards, or fear of his threatnings. They therefore that believe there is a God that goeverneth the

world, and hath given Praecepts, and propounded Rewards, and Pu∣nishments to Mankind, are Gods Subjects; all the rest, are to be un∣derstood as Enemies.

To rule by Words, requires that such Words be manifestly made* 1.259 known; for else they are no Lawes: For to the nature of Lawes belongeth a sufficient, and clear Promulgation, such as may take away the excuse of Ignorance; which in the Lawes of men is but of one onely kind, and that is, Proclamation, or Promulgation by the voyce of man. But God declareth his Lawes three wayes; by the Dictates of Naturall Reason, by Revelation, and by the Voyce of some man, to whom by the operation of Miracles, he procureth cre∣dit with the rest. From hence there ariseth a triple Word of God, Rational, Sensible, and Prophetique: to which Correspondeth a triple Hearing; Right Reason, Sense Supernaturall, and Faith. As for Sense Supernaturall, which consisteth in Revelation, or Inspiration, there have not been any Universall Lawes so given, because God speaketh not in that manner, but to particular persons, and to divers men di∣vers things.

From the difference between the other two kinds of Gods Word,* 1.260 Rationall, and Prophetique, there may be attributed to God, a two∣fold Kingdome, Naturall, and Prophetique: Naturall, wherein he governeth as many of Mankind as acknowledge his Providence, by the naturall Dictates of Right Reason; And Prophetique, wherein having chosen out one peculiar Nation (the Jewes) for his Subjects, he governed them, and none but them, not onely by naturall Reason, but by Positive Lawes, which he gave them by the mouths of his holy Prophets. Of the Naturall Kingdome of God I intend to speak in this Chapter.

The Right of Nature, whereby God reigneth over men, and pu∣nisheth* 1.261 those that break his Lawes, is to be derived, not from his Creating them, as if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits; but from his Irresistible Power. I have formerly shewn, how the Soveraign Right ariseth from Pact: To shew how the same Right may arise from Nature, requires no more, but to shew in what case it is never taken away. Seeing all men by Nature had Right to All things, they had Right every one to reigne over all the rest. But because this Right could not be obtained by force, it con∣cerned the safety of every one, laying by that Right, to set up men (with Soveraign Authority) by common consent, to rule and de∣fend them: whereas if there had been any man of Power Irresisti∣ble; there had been no reason, why he should not by that Power have ruled, and defended both himselfe, and them, according to his own discretion. To those therefore whose Power is irresistible, the domi∣nion of all men adhaereth naturally by their excellence of Power; and consequently it is from that Power, that the Kingdome over men, and the Right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth Natu∣rally to God Almighty; not as Creator, and Gracious; but as Om∣nipotent. And though Punishment be due for Sinne onely, because by that word is understood Affliction for Sinne; yet the Right of

Afflicting, is not alwayes derived from mens Sinne, but from Gods Power.

This question, Why Evill men often Prosper, and Good men suffer* 1.262 Adversity, has been much disputed by the Antient, and is the same with this of ours, by what Right God dispenseth the Prosperities and Adversities of this life; and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken the faith, not onely of the Vulgar, but of Philosophers, and which is more, of the Saints, concerning the Divine Providence. How Good* 1.263 (saith David) is the God of Israel to those that are Upright in Heart; and yet my feet were almost gone, my treadings had well-nigh slipt; for I was grieved at the Wicked, when I saw the Ungodly in such Pro∣sperity. And Job, how earnestly does he expostulate with God, for the many Afflictions he suffered, notwithstanding his Righteousnesse? This question in the case of Job, is decided by God himselfe, not by arguments derived from Job's Sinne, but his own Power. For whereas the friends of Job drew their arguments from his Affliction to his Sinne, and he defended himselfe by the conscience of his In∣nocence, God himselfe taketh up the matter, and having justified the Affliction by arguments drawn from his Power, such as this, Where* 1.264 wast thou when I layd the foundations of the earth, and the like, both approved Job's Innocence, and reproved the Erroneous do∣ctrine of his friends. Conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of our Saviour, concerning the man that was born Blind, in these words, Neither hath this man sinned, nor his fathers; but that the works of God might be made manifest in him. And though it be said, That Death entred into the world by sinne, (by which is meant that if Adam had never sinned, he had never dyed, that is, never suffered any se∣paration of his soule from his body,) it follows not thence, that God could not justly have Afflicted him, though he had not Sinned, as well as he afflicteth other living creatures, that cannot sinne.

Having spoken of the Right of Gods Soveraignty, as grounded* 1.265 onely on Nature; we are to consider next, what are the Divine Lawes, or Dictates of Naturall Reason; which Lawes concern either the naturall Duties of one man to another, or the Honour naturally due to our Divine Soveraign. The first are the same Lawes of Nature, of which I have spoken already in the 14. and 15. Chapters of this Treatise; namely, Equity, Justice, Mercy, Humility, and the rest of the Morall Vertues. It remaineth therefore that we consider, what Praecepts are dictated to men, by their Naturall Reason onely, without other word of God, touching the Honour and Worship of the Divine Majesty.

Honour consisteth in the inward thought, and opinion of the* 1.266 Power, and Goodnesse of another: and therefore to Honour God, is to think as Highly of his Power and Goodnesse, as is possible. And of that opinion, the externall signes appearing in the Words, and Actions of men, are called Worship; which is one part of that which the Latines understand by the word Cultus: For Cultus signifieth properly, and constantly, that labour which a man bestowes on any thing, with a purpose to make benefit by it. Now those things

whereof we make benefit, are either subject to us, and the profit they yeeld, followeth the labour we bestow upon them, as a naturall effect; or they are not subject to us, but answer our labour, accord∣ing to their own Wills. In the first sense the labour bestowed on the Earth, is called Culture; and the education of Children a Culture of their mindes. In the second sense, where mens wills are to be wrought to our purpose, not by Force, but by Compleasance, it signi∣fieth as much as Courting, that is, a winning of favour by good offi∣ces; as by praises, by acknowledging their Power, and by whatsoe∣ver is pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit. And this is properly Worship: in which sense Publicola, is understood for a Worshipper of the People; and Cultus Dei, for the Worship of God.

From internall Honour, consisting in the opinion of Power and* 1.267 Goodnesse, arise three Passions; Love, which hath reference to Goodnesse; and Hope, and Fear, that relate to Power: And three parts of externall worship; Praise, Magnifying, and Blessing: The subject of Praise, being Goodnesse; the subject of Magnifying, and Blessing, being Power, and the effect thereof Felicity. Praise, and Magnifying are signified both by Words, and Actions: By Words, when we say a man is Good, or Great: By Actions, when we thank him for his Bounty, and obey his Power. The opinion of the Hap∣pinesse of another, can onely be expressed by words.

There be some signes of Honour, (both in Attributes and Acti∣ons,)* 1.268 that be Naturally so; as amongst Attributes, Good, Just, Libe∣rall, and the like; and amongst Actions, Prayers, Thanks, and Obe∣dience. Others are so by Institution, or Custome of men; and in some times and places are Honourable; in others Dishonourable; in others Indifferent: such as are the Gestures in Salutation, Prayer, and Thanksgiving, in different times and places, differently used. The former is Naturall; the later Arbitrary Worship.

And of Arbitrary Worship, there bee two differences: For* 1.269 sometimes it is a Commanded, sometimes Voluntary Worship: Commanded, when it is such as hee requireth, who is Worship∣ped: Free, when it is such as the Worshipper thinks fit. When it is Commanded, not the words, or gesture, but the obedience is the Worship. But when Free, the Worship consists in the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by which we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely; they are no Worship; because no signes of Honour; and no signes of Honour; because a signe is not a signe to him that giveth it, but to him to whom it is made; that is, to the spectator.

Again, there is a Publique, and a Private Worship. Publique, is* 1.270 the Worship that a Common-wealth performeth, as one Person. Pri∣vate, is that which a Private person exhibiteth. Publique, in respect of the whole Common-wealth, is Free; but in respect of Particular men it is not so. Private, is in secret Free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is never without some Restraint, either from the Lawes, or from the Opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty.

The End of Worship amongst men, is Power. For where a man* 1.271

seeth another worshipped, he supposeth him powerfull, and is the readier to obey him; which makes his Power greater. But God has no Ends: the worship we do him, proceeds from our duty, and is di∣rected according to our capacity, by those rules of Honour, that Rea∣son dictateth to be done by the weak to the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of dammage, or in thankfulnesse for good already received from them.

That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light* 1.272 of Nature, I will begin with his Attributes. Where, First, it is ma∣nifest, we ought to attribute to him Existence: For no man can have the will to honour that, which he thinks not to have any Beeing.

Secondly, that those Philosophers, who sayd the World, or the Soule of the World was God, spake unworthily of him; and denyed his Existence: For by God, is understood the cause of the World; and to say the World is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.

Thirdly, to say the World was not Created, but Eternall, (seeing that which is Eternall has no cause,) is to deny there is a God.

Fourthly, that they who attributing (as they think) Ease to God, take from him the care of Man-kind; take from him his Honour: for it takes away mens love, and fear of him; which is the root of Honour.

Fifthly, in those things that signifie Greatnesse, and Power; to say he is Finite, is not to Honour him: For it is not a signe of the Will to Honour God, to attribute to him lesse than we can; and Finite, is lesse than we can; because to Finite, it is easie to adde more.

Therefore to attribute Figure to him, is not Honour; for all Fi∣gure is Finite:

Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an Idea of him, in our mind: for whatsoever we conceive is Finite:

Nor to attribute to him Parts, or Totality; which are the Attri∣butes onely of things Finite:

Nor to say he is in this, or that Place: for whatsoever is in Place, is bounded, and Finite:

Nor that he is Moved, or Resteth: for both these Attributes ascribe to him Place:

Nor that there be more Gods than one; because it implies them all Finite: for there cannot be more than one Infinite:

Nor to ascribe to him (unlesse Metaphorically, meaning not the Passion, but the Effect) Passions that partake of Griefe; as Repen∣tance, Anger Mercy: or of Want; as Appetite, Hope, Desire; or of any Passive faculty: For Passion, is Power limited by somewhat else.

And therefore when we ascribe to God a Will, it is not to be un∣derstood, as that of Man, for a Rationall Appetite; but as the Power, by which he effecteth every thing.

Likewise when we attribute to him Sight, and other acts of Sense; as also Knowledge, and Understanding; which in us is nothing else, but a tumult of the mind, raised by externall things that presse the organicall parts of mans body: For there is no such thing in God; and being things that depend on naturall causes, cannot be attributed to him.

Hee that will attribute to God, nothing but what is warranted by naturall Reason, must either use such Negative Attributes, as Infi∣nite, Eternall, Incomprehensible; or Superlatives, as Most High, most Great, and the like; or Indefinite, as Good, Just, Holy, Creator; and in such sense as if he meant not to declare what he is, (for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our Fancy,) but how much wee admire him, and how ready we would be to obey him; which is a signe of Humility, and of a Will to honour him as much as we can: For there is but one Name to signifie our Conception of his Nature, and that is, I AM: and but one Name of his Relation to us, and that is God; in which is contained Father, King, and Lord.

Concerning the actions of Divine Worship, it is a most generall* 1.273 Precept of Reason, that they be signes of the Intention to Honour God; such as are, First, Prayers: For not the Carvers, when they made Images, were thought to make them Gods; but the People that Prayed to them.

Secondly, Thanksgiving; which differeth from Prayer in Divine Worship, no otherwise, than that Prayers precede, and Thanks suc∣ceed the benefit; the end both of the one, and the other, being to acknowledge God, for Author of all benefits, as well past, as future.

Thirdly, Gifts; that is to say, Sacrifices, and Oblations, (if they be of the best,) are signes of Honour: for they are Thanksgivings.

Fourthly, Not to swear by any but God, is naturally a signe of Ho∣nour: for it is a confession that God onely knoweth the heart; and that no mans wit, or strength can protect a man against Gods venge∣ance on the perjured.

Fifthly, it is a part of Rationall Worship, to speak Considerately of God; for it argues a Fear of him, and Fear, is a confession of his Power. Hence followeth, That the name of God is not to be used rashly, and to no purpose; for that is as much, as in Vain: And it is to no purpose, unlesse it be by way of Oath, and by order of the Common∣wealth, to make Judgements certain; or between Common-wealths, to avoyd Warre. And that disputing of Gods nature is contrary to his Honour: For it is supposed, that in this naturall Kingdome of God, there is no other way to know any thing, but by naturall Rea∣son; that is, from the Principles of naturall Science; which are so farre from teaching us any thing of Gods nature, as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest creature li∣ving. And therefore, when men out of the Principlès of naturall Reason, dispute of the Attributes of God, they but dishonour him: For in the Attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider the signification of Philosophicall Truth; but the signification of Pi∣ous Intention, to do him the greatest Honour we are able. From the want of which consideration, have proceeded the volumes of dispu∣tation about the Nature of God, that tend not to his Honour, but to the honour of our own wits, and learning; and are nothing else but inconsiderate, and vain abuses of his Sacred Name.

Sixthly, in Prayers, Thanksgiving, Offerings and Sacrifices, it is a Dictate of naturall Reason, that they be every one in his kind the

best, and most significant of Honour. As for example, that Prayers, and Thanksgiving, be made in Words and Phrases, not sudden, nor light, nor Plebeian; but beautifull, and well composed; For else we do not God as much honour as we can. And therefore the Hea∣thens did absurdly, to worship Images for Gods: But their doing it in Verse, and with Musick, both of Voyce, and Instruments, was reasonable. Also that the Beasts they offered in sacrifice, and the Gifts they offered, and their actions in Worshipping, were full of submission, and commemorative of benefits received, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to honour him.

Seventhly, Reason directeth not onely to worship God in Secret; but also, and especially, in Publique, and in the sight of men: For without that, (that which in honour is most acceptable) the procu∣ring others to honour him, is lost.

Lastly, Obedience to his Lawes (that is, in this case to the Lawes of Nature,) is the greatest worship of all. For as Obedience is more acceptable to God than Sacrifice; so also to set light by his Com∣mandements, is the greatest of all contumelies. And these are the Lawes of that Divine Worship, which naturall Reason dictateth to private men.

But seeing a Common-wealth is but one Person, it ought also to* 1.274 exhibite to God but one Worship; which then it doth, when it com∣mandeth it to be exhibited by Private men, Publiquely. And this is Publique Worship; the property whereof, is to be Uniforme: For those actions that are done differently, by different men, cannot be said to be a Publique Worship. And therefore, where many sorts of Worship be allowed, proceeding from the different Religions of Pri∣vate men, it cannot be said there is any Publique Worship, nor that the Common-wealth is of any Religion at all.

And because words (and consequently the Attributes of God)* 1.275 have their signification by agreement, and constitution of men; those Attributes are to be held significative of Honour, that men intend shall so be; and whatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men, where there is no Law but Reason, may be done by the will of the Common-wealth, by Lawes Civill. And because a Common∣wealth hath no Will, nor makes no Lawes, but those that are made by the Will of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power; it fol∣loweth, that those Attributes which the Soveraign ordaineth, in the Worship of God, for signes of Honour, ought to be taken and used for such, by private men in their publique Worship.

But because not all Actions are signes by Constitution; but some are* 1.276 Naturally signes of Honour, others of Contumely, these later (which are those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reve∣rence) cannot be made by humane power a part of Divine worship; nor the former (such as are decent, modest, humble Behaviour) ever be separated from it. But whereas there be an infinite number of Actions, and Gestures, of an indifferent nature; such of them as the Common-wealth shall ordain to be Publiquely and Universally in use, as signes of Honour, and part of Gods Worship, are to be taken

and used for such by the Subjects. And that which is said in the Scripture, It is better to obey God than men, hath place in the king∣dome of God by Pact, and not by Nature.

Having thus briefly spoken of the Naturall Kingdome of God, and* 1.277 his Naturall Lawes, I will adde onely to this Chapter a short decla∣ration of his Naturall Punishments. There is no action of man in this life, that is not the beginning of so long a chayn of Consequences, as no humane Providence, is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end. And in this Chayn, there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; in such manner, as he that will do any thing for his pleasure, must engage himselfe to suffer all the pains annexed to it; and these pains, are the Naturall Punishments of those actions, which are the beginning of more Harme than Good. And hereby it comes to passe, that Intemperance, is naturally punished with Disea∣ses; Rashnesse, with Mischances; Injustice, with the Violence of Enemies; Pride, with Ruine; Cowardise, with Oppression; Neg∣ligent government of Princes, with Rebellion; and Rebellion, with Slaughter. For seeing Punishments are consequent to the breach of Lawes; Naturall Punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the Lawes of Nature; and therfore follow them as their naturall, not arbitrary effects.

And thus farre concerning the Constitution, Nature, and Right of* 1.278 Soveraigns; and concerning the Duty of Subjects, derived from the Principles of Naturall Reason. And now, considering how different this Doctrine is, from the Practise of the greatest part of the world, especially of these Western parts, that have received their Morall learning from Rome, and Athens; and how much depth of Morall Philosophy is required, in them that have the Administration of the Soveraign Power; I am at the point of believing this my labour, as uselesse, as the Common-wealth of Plato; For he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of State, and change of Go∣vernments by Civill Warre, ever to be taken away, till Soveraigns be Philosophers. But when I consider again, that the Science of Na∣turall Justice, is the onely Science necessary for Soveraigns, and their principall Ministers; and that they need not be charged with the Sci∣ences Mathematicall, (as by Plato they are,) further, than by good Lawes to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither Plato, nor any other Philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently, or probably proved all the Theoremes of Morall do∣ctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey; I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any interessed, or envious Interpreter; and by the exercise of entire Sove∣raignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The End of Common∣we•…•…th, par∣ticular Secu∣rity:
• * 1.2

  Chap. 13.
• * 1.3

  Which is not to be had from the Law of Na∣ture:
• * 1.4

  Nor from the conjun∣ction of a few men or fami∣lyes:
• * 1.5

  Nor from a great Mul∣titude, unlesse directed by one judge∣ment:
• * 1.6

  And that continually.
• * 1.7

  Why certain creatures without rea∣son, or speech, do neverthe∣lesse live in Society, with∣out any c•…•…r∣cive Power.
• * 1.8

  The Genera∣tion of a Common∣wealth.
• * 1.9

  The Definiti∣on of a Com∣mon-wealth.
• * 1.10

  Soveraigne, and Subje•…•…t, what.
• * 1.11

  The act of Instituting a Common∣wealth, what.
• * 1.12

  The Conse∣quences to such Institu∣tion, are
• * 1.13

  1. The Sub∣jects cannot change the forme of go∣vernment.
• * 1.14

  2. Soveraigne Power can∣not be forfei∣ted.
• * 1.15

  3 No man can without injustice protest a∣gainst the Institution of the Sove∣raigne de∣clared by the major part.
• * 1.16

  4 The Sove∣raigns Acti∣ons cannot be justly accus∣ed by the Sub∣ject
• * 1.17

  5. What soe∣ver the So∣veraigne doth, is un∣punishable by the Subject.
• * 1.18

  6. The Sove∣raigne is judge of what is necessary for the Peace and Defence of his Sub∣jects.
• * 1.19

  And Iudge of what Doct∣rines are fit to be taught them.
• * 1.20

  7 The Right of making Rules, where∣by the Sub∣jects may eve∣ry man know what is so his owne, as no o∣ther Subject can without injustice take it from him.
• * 1.21

  8 To •…•…im al∣so belongeth the Right of all Judicature and decision of Contro∣versise:
• * 1.22

  9. And of making War, and Peace, as he shall think best:
• * 1.23

  10. And of choosing all Counsellours, and Mini∣sters; both of Peace, and Warre:
• * 1.24

  11. And of Rewarding, and Punish∣ing, and that (where no former Law hath deter∣mined the measure of it) arbitrary:
• * 1.25

  12. And of Honour and Order.
• * 1.26

  These Rights are indivisi∣ble.
• * 1.27

  And can by no Grant passe away without di∣rect renoun∣cing of the Soveraign Power.
• * 1.28

  The Power and Honour of Subjects vanisheth in the presence of the Power Soveraign.
• * 1.29

  Soveraigne Power not so hurtfull as the want of it, and the hurt proceeds for the greatest part from not submitting readily, to a lesse.
• * 1.30

  The different Formes of Common∣wealths but three.
• * 1.31

  Tyranny and Oligarchy, but different names of Monarchy, and Aristo∣cracy.
• * 1.32

  Subordinate Representa∣tives dange∣rous.
• * 1.33

  Comparison of Monar∣chy, with So∣veraign As∣semblyes.
• * 1.34

  Of the Right of Succession.
• * 1.35

  The present Monarch hath Right to dispose of the Succ•…•…ssim.
• * 1.36

  Succession passeth by ex∣presse Words;
• * 1.37

  Or, by not controlling a Custome;
• * 1.38

  Or, by pre∣sumption of naturall af∣fec•…•….
• * 1.39

  To dispose of the Successi∣on though to a King of a∣nother Nati∣on, not un∣lawfull.
• * 1.40

  A Common∣wealth by Acquisition.
• * 1.41

  Wherein 〈◊〉〈◊〉 from a Common∣wealth by In∣s•…•…on.
• * 1.42

  The Rights of Soveraign∣ty the same in both.
• * 1.43

  Dominion Paternall how attained.
• * 1.44

  Not by G•…•…∣neration, but by Contract;
• * 1.45

  Or Educati∣on;
• * 1.46

  Or Precedent subjection of one of the Parents to the other.
• * 1.47

  The Right of Succession followeth the Rules of the Right of Pos∣session.
• * 1.48

  Despoticall Dominion how attained.
• * 1.49

  Not by the Victory, but by the Con∣sent of the Vanquished.
• * 1.50

  Difference between a Family and a Kingdom.
• * 1.51

  The Rights of Monarchy from Scrip∣ture.
• * 1.52

  Exod. 20. 19.
• * 1.53

  Exod. 20. 19.
• * 1.54

  1 Sam. 8. 11, 12, &c.
• * 1.55

  Verse. 10.
• * 1.56

  1 Kings 3. 9.
• * 1.57

  1 Sam. 24. 9.
• * 1.58

  Coll. 3. 20.
• * 1.59

  Verse 22.
• * 1.60

  Math. 23. 2, 3.
• * 1.61

  Tit. 3. 2.
• * 1.62

  Mat. 21. 2, 3.
• * 1.63

  Gen. 3 5.
• * 1.64

  Soveraign Power ought in all Com∣mon-wealths to be abso∣lute.
• * 1.65

  Liberty what.
• * 1.66

  What it is to be Free.
• * 1.67

  Feare and Liberty con∣sistent.
• * 1.68

  Liberty and Necessity Consistent.
• * 1.69

  Artificiall Bonds, or Co∣venants.
• * 1.70

  Liberty of Subjects consisteth in Liberty from cove∣nants.
• * 1.71

  Liberty of the Subject consistent with the un∣limited pow∣er of the So∣veraign.
• * 1.72

  The Liberty which wri∣ters praise, is the Liber∣ty of Sove∣raigns▪ not of Private men.
• * 1.73

  Liberty of Subjects how to be measu∣red.
• * 1.74

  Subjects have Liberty to defend their own bodies, even against them that lawsully in∣vade them;
• * 1.75

  Are not bound to hurt themselves;
• * 1.76

  Nor to war∣fare, unlesse they volunta∣rily under∣take it.
• * 1.77

  The Greatest Liberty of Subjects, de∣pendeth on the Silence of the Law.
• * 1.78

  In what Ca∣ses Subjects are absolved of their obe∣dience to their Sove∣raign.
• * 1.79

  In case of Captivity.
• * 1.80

  In case the Soveraign cast off the government from himself and his Heyrs.
• * 1.81

  In case of Banishment.
• * 1.82

  In case the Soveraign render him∣self Subject to another.
• * 1.83

  The divers sorts of Sy∣stemes of People.
• * 1.84

  In all Bo∣dies Politique the power of the Repre∣sentative is Limited.
• * 1.85

  By Letters Patents:
• * 1.86

  And the Lawes.
• * 1.87

  When the Re∣presentative is one man, his unwar∣ranted Acts are his own onely.
• * 1.88

  When it is an Assembly, it is the act of them that as∣sented onely.
• * 1.89

  When the Re∣presentative is one man, if he borrow mony, or owe it, by Con∣tract; he is ly∣able onely, the members not.
• * 1.90

  When it is an Assembly, they onely are liable that have assen∣ted.
• * 1.91

  If the debt be to one of the Assem∣bly, the Body onely is ob∣liged.
• * 1.92

  Protestation against the Decrees of Bodies Poli∣tique some∣times lawful; but against Soveraign Power never.
• * 1.93

  Bodies Poli∣tique for Go∣vernment of a Province, Colony, or Town.
• * 1.94

  Bodies Poli∣tique for or∣dering of Trade.
• * 1.95

  A Bodie Po∣litique for Counsel to be given to the Soveraign.
• * 1.96

  A Regular Private Bo∣dy, Lawfull, as a Family.
• * 1.97

  Private Bo∣dies Regular, but Unlaw∣full.
• * 1.98

  Systemes Ir∣regular, such as are Pri∣vate Leagues
• * 1.99

  Secret Ca∣bals.
• * 1.100

  Feuds of pri∣vate Fami∣lies.
• * 1.101

  Factions for Government.
• * 1.102

  Acts 19. 40.
• * 1.103

  Publique Minister Who.
• * 1.104

  Ministers for the gene∣rall Admi∣nistration.
• * 1.105

  For speciall Admini∣stration, as for Oeco•…•…∣my.
• * 1.106

  For instru∣ction of the People.
• * 1.107

  For Judi∣cature.
• * 1.108

  For 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.109

  Counsellers without other employment then to Ad∣vise are not Publique Ministers.
• * 1.110

  The Nou∣rishment of a Common-wealth con∣sisteth in the Commodities of Sea and Land:
• * 1.111

  And the right Distri∣bution of them.
• * 1.112

  All private Estates of land proceed originally from the Ar∣bitrary Di∣stribution of the Sove∣raign.
• * 1.113

  Propriety of a Subject ex∣cludes not the Dominion of the Sove∣raign, but onely of ano∣ther Subject.
• * 1.114

  The Pub∣lique is not to be dieted.
• * 1.115

  The Places and matter of Traffique depend, as their Distri∣bution, on the Sove∣raign.
• * 1.116

  The Laws of transferring propriety be∣long also 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Sove∣raign.
• * 1.117

  Mony the Bloud of a Common-wealth.
• * 1.118

  The Con∣duits and Way of mony to the Pub∣lique use.
• * 1.119

  The Chil∣dren of a Common-wealth Colo∣nies.
• * 1.120

  Counsell wha•…•….
• * 1.121

  Differences between Command. and Counsell▪
• * 1.122

  Exhortation and Dehorta∣tion what.
• * 1.123

  Differennce•…•… of fit and un∣fit Counsel∣lours.
• * 1.124

  Civill Law what.
• * 1.125

  The Sove∣raign is Le∣gistator:
• * 1.126

  And not Subject to Civill Law.
• * 1.127

  Use, a Law not by vertue of Time, but of the Sove∣raigns con∣sent.
• * 1.128

  The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law contain each other.
• * 1.129

  Provinciall Lawes are not made by Custome, but by the Sove∣raign Power▪
• * 1.130

  Some foolish opinions of Lawyers con∣cerning the making of Lawes.
• * 1.131

  Sir Edw. Coke, upon L•…•…tleton, Lib. 2. Ch. 6. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 97. b.
• * 1.132

  Law made, •…•…f not also made known, is no Law.
• * 1.133

  Unwritten Lawes are all of them Lawes of Nature.
• * 1.134

  Prov. 7. 3.
• * 1.135

  Deut. 11. 19.
• * 1.136

  Deut. 31. 12.
• * 1.137

  Nothing is Law where the Legisla∣tor cannot be known.
• * 1.138

  Difference between Ve∣rifying and Authorising
• * 1.139

  The Law Verifyed by the subordi∣nate Judge.
• * 1.140

  By the Pub∣lique Regi∣sters.
• * 1.141

  By Letters Patent, and Publique Seale.
• * 1.142

  The Inter∣pretation of the Law de∣pendeth on the Sove∣raign Power.
• * 1.143

  All Law•…•… need Inter∣pretation.
• * 1.144

  The A•…•…∣thenticall Interpreta∣tion of Law is not that of writers.
• * 1.145

  The Inter∣preter of the Law is the Judge gi∣ving sentence vivâ▪ voce in every par∣ticular case.
• * 1.146

  The Sentence of a Judge, does not bind him, or ano∣ther Judge to give like Sentence in like Cases ever after.
• * 1.147

  The diffe∣rence between the Letter and Sentence of the Law.
• * 1.148

  The abilities required in a Judge.
• * 1.149

  Divisions of Law.
• * 1.150

  Another Division of Law.
• * 1.151

  Divine Posi∣tive Law how made known to be Law.
• * 1.152

  Gen. 17. 10.
• * 1.153

  Another di∣vision of Lawes.
• * 1.154

  A Funda∣mentall Law what.
• * 1.155

  Difference between Law and Right:
• * 1.156

  And between a Law and a Charter.
• * 1.157

  Sinne what.
• * 1.158

  A Crime what.
• * 1.159

  Where no Ci∣vill Law is, there is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Crime.
• * 1.160

  Ignorance of the Law of Nature ex∣cuseth no man.
• * 1.161

  Ignorance of the Civill Law excu∣seth some∣times.
• * 1.162

  Ignorance of the Sove∣raign excu∣seth not.
• * 1.163

  Ignorance of the Penalty excuseth not.
• * 1.164

  Punishments declared be∣fore the Fact, excuse from greater pu∣nishments af∣ter it.
• * 1.165

  Nothing can be made a Crime by a Law made after the Fact.
• * 1.166

  False Princi∣ples of Right and Wrong causes of Crime.
• * 1.167

  False Teach∣ers mis-in∣terpreting the Law of Nature,
• * 1.168

  And false Inferences from true 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 Teachers.
• * 1.169

  By their Passions;
• * 1.170

  Presumption of Riches,
• * 1.171

  And Friēds;
• * 1.172

  Wisedome.
• * 1.173

  Hatred, Lust, Am∣bition, Cove∣tousnesse, cau∣ses of Crime.
• * 1.174

  Fear some∣times cause of Crime, as when the danger is neither pre∣sent, nor cor∣poreall.
• * 1.175

  Crimes not equall.
• * 1.176

  Totall Ex∣cuses.
• * 1.177

  Excuses a∣gainst the Author.
• * 1.178

  Preseumption of Power, aggravateth.
• * 1.179

  Evill Tea∣chers, Exte∣nuate.
• * 1.180

  Examples of Impunity, Extenuate.
• * 1.181

  Praemedita∣tion, Aggra∣vateth.
• * 1.182

  Tacite appro∣bation of the Soveraign, Extenuates.
• * 1.183

  Comparison of Crimes from their Effects.
• * 1.184

  Laesa Ma∣jestas.
• * 1.185

  Bribery and False testi∣mony.
• * 1.186

  Depeculati∣on.
• * 1.187

  Counterfeit∣ing Authori∣ty.
• * 1.188

  Crimes a∣gainst pri∣vate men compared.
• * 1.189

  Publique Crimes what.
• * 1.190

  The definiti∣on of Punish∣ment.
• * 1.191

  Right to Pu∣nish whence derived.
• * 1.192

  Private in∣juries, and re∣venges no Punishments:
• * 1.193

  Nor denyall of prefer∣ment:
• * 1.194

  Nor pain in∣flicted with∣out publique hearing:
• * 1.195

  Nor pain in∣flicted by U∣surped pow∣er:
• * 1.196

  Nor pain in∣flicted with∣out respect to to the future good.
• * 1.197

  Naturall e∣vill conse∣quences, no Punishments.
• * 1.198

  Hurt infli∣cted, if lesse than the bene∣fit of trans∣gressing, is not Punish∣ment.
• * 1.199

  Where the Punishment is annexed to the Law, a greater hurt is not Pu∣nishment, but 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.200

  Hurt in∣flicted for a fact done be∣fore the Law, no Punish∣ment.
• * 1.201

  The Repre∣sentative of the Common∣wealth Unpu∣nishable.
• * 1.202

  Hurt to Re∣volted Sub∣jects is done by right of War, not by way of Pu∣nishment.
• * 1.203

  Punishments Corporall.
• * 1.204

  Capitall.
• * 1.205

  Ignominy.
• * 1.206

  Imprison∣ment.
• * 1.207

  Exile.
• * 1.208

  The Punish∣ment of In∣nocent Sub∣jects is con∣trary to the Law of Na∣ture.
• * 1.209

  But the Harme done to Innocents in War, not so:
• * 1.210

  Nor that which is done to declared Rebels.
• * 1.211

  Reward is ei∣ther Salary, or Grace.
• * 1.212

  Benefits be∣stowed for fear, are not Rewards.
• * 1.213

  Salaries Certain and Casuall.
• * 1.214

  Dissolution of Common∣wealths pro∣ceedeth from their Imper∣fect Institu∣tion.
• * 1.215

  Want of Ab∣solute power.
• * 1.216

  Private Judgement of Good and Evill.
• * 1.217

  Erroneous conscience.
• * 1.218

  Pretence of Inspiration.
• * 1.219

  Subjecting the Sove∣raign Power to Civill Lawes.
• * 1.220

  Attributing of absolute Propri•…•…ty to 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.221

  Dividing of the Sove∣raign Power.
• * 1.222

  Imitatio•…•… of Neighbour Natiou•…•….
• * 1.223

  Imitation of the Gre•…•…ks, and Romans.
• * 1.224

  Mixt Go∣vernment.
• * 1.225

  Want of Mony.
• * 1.226

  Monopolies and abuses of Publicans.
• * 1.227

  Popular men.
• * 1.228

  Excessive greatnesse of a •…•…own, mul∣titude of Cor∣porations.
• * 1.229

  Liberty of disputing a∣gainst Sove∣raign Power.
• * 1.230

  Dissolution of the Com∣mon-wealth.
• * 1.231

  The Procu∣ration of the Good of the People.
• * 1.232

  By Instr•…•…cti∣on & Lawes.
• * 1.233

  Against the duty of a So∣veraign to relinquish any Essentiall Right of So∣veraignty:
• * 1.234

  Or not to se•…•… the people taught the grounds of them.
• * 1.235

  Objection of those that say there are no Principles of Reason for absolute So∣veraig•…•…ty.
• * 1.236

  Objection from the In∣capacity of the vulgar.
• * 1.237

  Subjects are to be taught, not to affect change of Government:
• * 1.238

  Nor adhere (against the Soveraign) to Popular men▪
• * 1.239

  Nor to Dis∣pute the So∣veraign Power:
• * 1.240

  And to have dayes set a∣part to learn their Duty:
• * 1.241

  And to Ho∣nour their Parents.
• * 1.242

  And to a∣voyd doing of Injury:
• * 1.243

  And to do all this sincerely from the heart.
• * 1.244

  The use of U•…•…iversities▪
• * 1.245

  Equall •…•…xes.
• * 1.246

  Publique Charity.
• * 1.247

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Idlenesse.
• * 1.248

  Go•…•… Lawe•…•… wh•…•…t.
• * 1.249

  Such as are Necessary.
• * 1.250

  Such as are Perspicuous.
• * 1.251

  Punishments.
• * 1.252

  Rewards.
• * 1.253

  Counsellours.
• * 1.254

  Comman∣ders.
• * 1.255

  The scope of the following Chapters.
• * 1.256

  Psal. 96 1.
• * 1.257

  Psal. 98. 1.
• * 1.258

  Who are sub∣jects in the kingdome of God.
• * 1.259

  A Three∣fold Word of God, Reason, Revelation, Proph•…•…y.
• * 1.260

  A twofold Kingdome of God, Naturall and Prophe∣tique.
• * 1.261

  The Right of Gods Sove∣raignty is de∣rived from his Omnipo∣tence.
• * 1.262

  Sinne not the cause of all Affliction.
• * 1.263

  Psal. 72. ver. 1, 2, 3.
• * 1.264

  Job 38. v. 4.
• * 1.265

  Divine Lawes.
• * 1.266

  Honour and Worship what.
• * 1.267

  Severall signes of Honour.
• * 1.268

  Worship Na∣turall and Arbitrary.
• * 1.269

  Worship Commanded and Free.
• * 1.270

  Worship Pub∣lique and Private.
• * 1.271

  The End of Worship.
• * 1.272

  Attributes of Divine Honour.
• * 1.273

  Actions that are signes▪ of Divine Ho∣nour.
• * 1.274

  Publique Worship con∣sisteth in Uniformity.
• * 1.275

  All Attri∣butes depend on the Lawes Civill.
• * 1.276

  Not all Actions.
• * 1.277

  Naturall Punishments.
• * 1.278

  The Conclu∣sion of the Se∣cond Part.