Leviathan, or, The matter, forme, and power of a common wealth, ecclesiasticall and civil by Thomas Hobbes ...

OF MAN. (Book 1)

CHAP. I. Of SENSE.

COncerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first Singly, and afterwards in Trayne, or dependance upon one another. Singly, they are every one a Repre∣sentation or Apparence, of some quality, or other Acci∣dent of a body without us; which is commonly called an Object. Which Object worketh on the Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversi∣ty of Apparences.

The Originall of them all, is that which we call SENSE; (For there is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived from that originall.

To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to the business now in hand; and I have else-where written of the same at large. Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which pres∣seth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly, as in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self: which endeavour because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without. And this seeming, or fancy, is that which men call Sense; and consisteth, as to the Eye, in a Light, or Colour figured; To the Eare, in a Sound; To the Nostrill, in an Odour; To the Tongue and Palat, in a Savour; And to the rest of the body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse, and such other qualities, as we dis∣cern by Feeling. All which qualities called Sensible, are in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversly. Neither in us that are pressed, are they any thing else, but divers motions; (for motion, produceth nothing but motion.) But their apparence to us is Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming. And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the Eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their strong, though unobserved action. For if those Colours, and Sounds, were in the Bodies, or Objects that cause them, they could not bee

severed from them, as by glasses, and in Ecchoes by reflection, wee see they are; where we know the thing we see, is in one place; the ap∣parence, in another. And though at some certain distance, the reall, and very object seem inv•…•…sted with •…•…he fancy it beg•…•…ts i•…•… us; Yet still the object is one thing▪ the image or fancy is another. So that Sense in all cases, is nothing els but originall fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure, that is, by the motion, of externall things upon our Eyes, Eares, and other organs thereunto ordained.

But the Philosophy-schooles, through all the Universities of Chri∣stendome, grounded upon certain Texts of Aristotle, teach another doctrine; and say, For the cause of Vision, that the thing seen, send∣eth forth on every side a visible species (in English) a vi•…•…ble 〈◊〉〈◊〉, apparition, or aspect, or a being seen; the receiving whereof into the Eye, is Seeing. And for the cause of Hearing, that the thing heard, sendeth forth an A•…•…dible species, that is, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Audible aspe•…•…t, or Audi∣ble being seen; which entring at the Eare, maketh Hearing. Nay for the ca•…•…se of Understanding also, they say the thing Understood send∣eth forth intelligible species, that is, an intelligible being seen; which comming into the Understanding, makes us Understand. I say not this, as disapproving the use of Universities: but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Common-wealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended in them; amongst which the frequency of insignificant Speech is one.

CHAP. II. Of IMAGINATION.

THat when a thing lies still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in moti∣on, unless somewhat els stay it, though the reason be the same, (namely, that nothing can change it selfe,) is not so easily as∣sented to. For men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by themselves: and because they find themselves subject af∣ter motion to pain, and lassitude, think every thing els growes weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves, consisteth. From hence it is, that the Schooles say, Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing appetite, and Knowledge of what is good for their conser∣vation, (which is more than man has) to things inanimate, ab∣surdly.

When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els hinder it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees quite extinguish it: And as wee see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rowling for a

long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internall parts of a man, then, when he Sees, Dreams, &c. For af∣ter the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latines call Imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it Fancy; which signifies apparence, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures, aswell sleeping, as waking.

The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it, in such manner, as the light of the Sun obscureth the light of the Starres; which sta•…•…s do no less exercise their vertue by which they are visible, in the day, than in the night. But because amongst many stroaks, which our eyes, eares, and other organs receive from externall bodies, the predominant onely is sensible; therefore the light of the Sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the starrs. And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain; yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the Imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak; as the voyce of a man is in the noyse of the day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight, or Sense of any object, the weaker is the Ima∣gination. For the continuall change of mans body, destroyes in time the parts which in sense were moved: So that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a great distance of place, that which wee look at, appears dimme, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as Voyces grow weak, and inarticulate: so also after great distance of time, our imagination of the Past is weak; and wee lose (for example) of Cities wee have seen, many particu∣lar Streets; and of Actions, many particular Circumstances. This decaying sense, when wee would express the thing it self, (I mean fan∣cy it selfe,) wee call Imagination; as I said before: But when we would express the decay, and signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past, it is called Memory. So that Imagination and Memory, are but one* 1.1 thing, which for divers considerations •…•…ath divers names.

Much memory, or memory of many things, is called Experi∣ence. Againe, Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall times; The former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is simple Imagination; as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other is Compounded; as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure. So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man; as when a man imagins himselfe a Her•…•…s, or an Alexander, (which hap∣peneth often to them that are much taken with reading of Ro∣mants) it is a compound imagination, and properly but a Fiction

of the mind. There be also other Imaginations that rise in men, (though waking) from the great impression made in sense: As from gazing upon the Sun, the impression leaves an image of the Sun before our eyes a long time after; and from being long and vehe∣mently attent upon Geometricall Figures, a man shall in the dark, (though awake) have the Images of Lines, and Angles before his eyes: which kind of Fancy hath no particular name; as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into mens discourse.

The imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call Dreams.* 1.2 And these also (as all other Imaginations) have been before, ei∣ther totally, or by parcells in the Sense. And because in sense, the Brain, and Nerves, which are the necessary Organs of sense, are so benummed in sleep, as not easily to be moved by the action of Externall Objects, there can happen in sleep, no Imagination; and therefore no Dreame, but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of mans body; which inward parts, for the connex∣ion they have with the Brayn, and other Organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the Imaginations there formerly made, appeare as if a man were waking; saving that the Organs of Sense being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can master and obseure them with a more vi∣gorous impression, a Dreame must needs be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking thoughts. And hence it cometh to passe, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible to distinguish exactly between Sense and Dreaming. For my part, when I consider, that in Dreames, I do not of∣ten, nor constantly think of the same Persons, Places, Objects, and Actions that I do waking; nor remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts, Dreaming, as at other times; And be∣cause waking I often observe the absurdity of Dreames, but ne∣ver dream of the absurdities of my waking Thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not; though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake.

And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the Body; divers distempers must needs cause diffe∣rent Dreams. And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Feare, and raiseth the thought and Image of some fearfull object (the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the Brain being reciprocall:) And that as Anger causeth heat in some parts of the Body, when we are awake; so when we sleep, the over heating of the same parts causeth Anger, and raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an Enemy. In the same manner; as naturall kindness, when we are awake causeth desire; and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also, too much heat in those parts, while wee sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness s•…•…ewn. In summe, our Dreams are the reverse of our waking Imaginations; The motion when we are awake, beginning at one end; and when we Dream, at another.* 1.3

The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his waking

thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept: which is easie to happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts; and whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the circumstances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chayre. For he that taketh pains, and industriously layes himself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a Dream. We read of Marcus Brutus, (one that had his life given him by Iulius Caesar, and was also his favorite, and notwithstanding murthered him,) how at Philippi, the night before he gave battell to Augustus C•…•…sar, hee saw a fearfull apparition, which is commonly related by Historians as a Vision: but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short Dream. For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horrour of his rash act, it was not hard for him, slumbering in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him; which feare, as by degrees it made him wake; so also it must needs make the Apparition by degrees to vanish: And having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a Dream, or any thing but a Vision. And this is no very rare Accident: for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous, and supperstitious, pos∣sessed with fearfull tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies; and believe they see spirits and dead mens Ghosts walking in Church-yards; whereas it is either their Fancy onely, or els the knavery of such persons, as make use of such superstitious feare, to passe disguised in the night, to places they would not be known to haunt.

From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies, from Vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes, Nymphs, and the like; and now adayes the opinion that rude people have of Fayries, Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches. For as for Witches, I think not that their witch∣craft is any reall power; but yet that they are justly punished, for the false beliefe they have, that they can do such mischiefe, joyned with their purpose to do it if they can: their trade being neerer to a new Religion, than to a Craft or Science. And for Fayries, and walking Ghosts, the opinion of them has I think been on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy Water, and other such inventions of Ghostly men. Neverthelesse, there is no doubt, but God can make unnaturall Appa∣ritions: But that he does it so often, as men need to feare such things, more than they feare the stay, or change, of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no point of Christian faith. But evill men under pretext that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; It is the part of a wise man, to believe them no further, than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. If this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams, false Prophecies, and many other things depending thereon, by

which, crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.

And this ought to be the work of the Schooles: but they rather nourish such doctrine. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are), what they receive, they reach: some saying, that Imagi∣nations rise of themselves, and have no cause: Others that they rise most commonly from the Will; and that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man, by God; and Evill thoughts by the Divell: or that Good thoughts are powred (infused) into a man, by God, and Evill ones by the Divell. Some say the Senses receive the Species of things, and deliver them to the Common-sense; and the Com∣mon Sense delivers them over to the Fancy, and the Fancy to the Me∣mory, and the Memory to the Judgement, like handing of things from one to another, with many words making nothing under∣stood.

The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other creature in∣dued* 1.4 with the faculty of imagining) by words, or other voluntary signes, is that we generally call Understanding; and is common to Man and Beast. For a dogge by custome will understand the call, or the rating of his Master; and so will many other Beasts. That Un∣derstanding which is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely his will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and contex∣ture of the names of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech: And of this kinde of Understanding I shall speak hereafter.

CHAP. III. Of the Consequence or TRAYNE of Imaginations.

BY Consequence, or TRAYNE of Thoughts, I understand that succession of one Thought to another, which is called (to di∣stingui•…•…h it from Discourse in words) Mentall Discourse.

When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after, is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be. Not every Thought to every Thought succeeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our Senses. The reason whereof is this. All Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of those made in the Sense: And those motions that immediately succee∣ded one another in the sense, continue also together after Sense: In so much as the former comming again to take place, and be praedomi∣nant, the later followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner, as water upon a plain Table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger. But because in sense, to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to passe in •…•…ime, that in the Imagining of any thing, there is

no certainty what we shall Imagine next; Onely this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.

This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is of two sorts.* 1.5 The first is Vnguided, without Designe, and inconstant; Wherein there is no Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that fol∣low, to it self, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion: In which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent one to another, as in a Dream. Such are Commonly the thonghts of men, that are not onely without company, but also without care of any thing; though even then their Thoughts are as busie as at other times, but without harmony; as the sound which a Lute out of tune would yeeld to any man; or in tune, to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one thought upon another. For in a Dis∣course of our present civill warre, what could seem more impertinent, than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman Penny? Yet the Cohaerence to me was manifest enough. For the Thought of the warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King to his Enemies; The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the deli∣vering up of Christ; and that again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason: and thence easily followed that malicious question; and all this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick.

The second is more constant; as being regulated by some desire,* 1.6 and designe. For the impression made by such things as wee desire, or feare, is strong, and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of quick return: so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen pro∣duce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power. And because the End, by the greatnesse of the impression, comes often to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are quickly again reduced into the way: which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men this praecept, which is now worne out, Respice finem; that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.

The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of an effect imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to Man and Beast. The other is, when imagi∣ning any thing whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to say, we imagine what we can do with it, when wee have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any signe, but in man onely; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other Passion but sensuall, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In summe, the Disconrse of the Mind, when it is governed by designe, is nothing but Seeking, or the faculty of Invention, which the Latines call Sagacitas, and

Solertia; a hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein hee misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and when he had it; that is to say, to find some cer∣tain, and limited time and place, in which to begin a method of seek∣ing. Again, from thence, his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance, or Calling to mind: the Latines call it* 1.7 Reminiscentia, as it were a Re-conning of our former actions.

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof he is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell; or as a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man should run over the Alphabet, to start a rime.

Sometime a man desires to know the event of an action; and then* 1.8 he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another; supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what wil become of a Criminal, re-cons what he has seen fol∣low on the like Crime before; having this order of thoughts, The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes. Which kind of thoughts, is called Foresight, and Prudence, or Providence; and sometimes Wisdome; though such conjecture, through the diffi∣culty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of things past, than another; by so much also he is more Prudent, and his expecta∣tions the seldomer faile him. The Present onely has a being in Na∣ture; things Past have a being in the Memory onely, but things to come have no being at all; the Future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions Past, to the actions that are Present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most Ex∣perience; but not with certainty enough. And though it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whose will they are to come. From him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds Prophecy. The best Prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most Signes to guesse by.

A Signe, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and con∣trarily,* 1.9 the Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Conse∣quences have been observed, before: And the oftner they have been observed, the lesse uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has most experience in any kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guesse at the Future time; and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of busi∣ness, as not to be equalled by any advantage of naturall and extem∣porary wit: though perhaps many young men think the contrary.

Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from

beast. There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.

As Prudence is a Praesumtion of the Future, contracted from the* 1.10 Experience of time Past▪ So there is a Praesumtion of things Past taken from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into civil warre, and then to ruine; upon the sight of the •…•…ines of any other State, will guesse▪ the like warre, and the like courses have been there also. But this conjecture, has the same incertainty almost with the conjecture of the Future; both being grounded one∣ly upon Experience.

There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses. Those other Faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man onely, are acquired, and encreased by study and indu∣stry; and of most men learned by instruction, and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of Words, and Speech. For besides Sense, and Thoughts, and the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of Speech, and Method, the same Facultyes may be improved to such a height, as to distin∣guish men from all other living Creatures.

Whatsoever we imagine, is Finite. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception of any thing we call Infinite. No man can have in his mind an Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swift∣ness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signifie onely▪ that we are not able to con∣ceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no Concep∣tion of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the Name of God is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is Incompre∣hensible; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts; a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once: For none of these things ever have, or can be incident to Sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit (without any signification at all,) from deceived Philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving Schoole∣men.

CHAP. IV. Of SPEECH.

THe Invention of Printing, though ingenious, compared* 1.11 with the invention of Letters, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into Greece, men say was Cadmus, the sonne of Agenor, King of Phaenicia. A profitable Invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of man∣kind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the Earth; and with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchfull observation of the divers motions of the Tongue, Palat, Lips, and other organs of Speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters, to re∣member them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of SPEECH, consisting of Names or Appellations, and their Connexion; whereby men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation; without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. The first author of Speech was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight; For the Scrip∣ture goeth no further in this matter. But this was sufficient to direct him to adde more names, as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by de∣grees, as to make himself understood; and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he had found use for; though not so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of. For I do not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by con∣sequence can be gathered, that Adam was taught the names of all Figures, Numbers, Measures, Colours, Sounds, Fancies, Relations; much less the names of Words and Speech, as Generall, Speciall, Affirmative, Negative, Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive, all which are usefull; and least of all, of Entity, Intentionality, Quiddity, and other insignificant words of the School.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by Adam and his po∣sterity, was again lost at the tower of Babel, when by the hand of God, every man was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language. And being hereby forced to disperse them∣selves into severall parts of the world, it must needs be, that the di∣versity of Tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew every where more copious.

The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Dis∣course,* 1.12 into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that for two commodities; whereof one is, the Re∣gistring

of the Consequences of our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, and put us to a new labour, may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names, is to serve for Markes, or Notes of remembrance. Ano∣ther is, when many use the same words, to signifie (by their con∣nexion and order,) one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, feare, or have any other pas∣sion for. And for this use they are called Signes. Speciall uses of Speech are these; First, to Register, what by cogitation, wee find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect: which in summe, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to Counsell, and Teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purposes, that we may have the mutuall help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight our selves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses. First,* 1.13 when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their concep∣tions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of the con∣sequence of causes and effects, consisteth in the imposing of Names, and the Connexion of them.

Of Names, some are Proper, and singular to one onely thing; as Pe∣ter,* 1.14 Iohn, This man, this Tree: and some are Common to many things; as Man, Horse, Tree; every of which though but one Name, is ne∣vertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of all which together, it is called an Universall; there being nothing in the* 1.15 world Universall but Names; for the things named, are every one of them Individuall and Singular.

One Universall name is imposed on many things, for the•…•… similitude in some quality, or other accident: And wheras a Proper Name bring∣eth to mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.

And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent; the larger comprehending the lesse large: and some again of equall extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for ex∣ample, the Name Body is of larger signification than the word Man, and comprehendeth it; and the names Man and Rationall, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here wee

must take notice, that by a Name is not alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely Word; but sometimes by circumlocution ma∣ny words together. For all these words, Hee that in his actions ob∣serveth the Lawes of his Country, make but one Name, equivalent to this one word, Just.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter sig∣nification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things ima∣gined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences of Appel∣lations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech at all, (such, as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb,) if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are the cor∣ners of a square figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, that the three angles of that triangle, are equall to those two right angles that stand by it. But if another triangle be shewn him diffe∣rent in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equall to the same. But he that hath the use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particu∣lar thing in his triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a Triangle; will boldly conclude Universally, that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever; and register his in∣vention in these generall termes, Every triangle hath its three angles equall to two right angles. And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred and remembred, as an Universall rule; and discharges our mentall reckoning, of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true here, and now, to be true in all times and places.

But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so evident as in Numbring. A naturall foole that could never learn by heart the order of numerall words, as one, two, and three, may ob∣serve every stroak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can never know what houre it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of number were not in use; and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or both hands, to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numerall words are but ten, in any Nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, will lose himselfe, and not know when he has done: Much lesse will he be able to adde, and substract, and performe all other operations of Arithmetique. So that without words, there is no pos∣sibility of reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being of man-kind.

When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or Af∣firmation; as thus, A man is a living creature; or thus, if he be a man, he is a living creature, If the later name Living creature, signifie all that the former name Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or conse∣quence

is true; otherwise false. For True and False are attributes of Speech, not of Things. And where Speech is not, there is neither Truth nor Falshood. Errour there may be, as when wee expect that which shall not be; or suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with Untruth.

Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in* 1.16 our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise •…•…ruth, had need to remem∣ber what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime∣twiggs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which is the onely Science that it hath pleased God hi∣therto to bestow on mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of their words; which settling of significations, they call Definiti∣ons; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and ei∣ther to corr•…•…ct them, where they are negl•…•…gently set down; or to make th•…•… himselfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply them∣selves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into ab∣surdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lyes the foundation of their er∣rours. From whence it happens, that they which trust to books, do as they that cast up many little summs into a greater, without consider∣ing whether those little summes were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to cleere themselves; but spend time in flutter∣ing over their bookes; as birds that entring by the chimney, and fin∣ding themselves inclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glasse window, for want of wit to consider which way they came in. So that in the right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of Speech; which is the Acquisition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definiti∣ons, lyes the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true Sci∣ence are above it. For between true Science, and erroneous •…•…o∣ctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall sense and imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature it selfe cannot erre: and as men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary. Nor is it possible without Letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently fool•…•…h. For words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an Ari∣stotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

Subject to Names, is whatsoever can enter into, or be considered in* 1.17 an account; and be added one to another to make a summe; or substra∣cted one from another, and leave a remainder. The Latines called

Accounts of mony Rationes, and accounting, Ratiocinatio: and that which we in bills or books of account call Items, they called Nomina; that is, Names: and thence it seems to proceed, that they extended the word Ratio, to the faculty of Reckoning in all other things. The Greeks have but one word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for both Speech and Reason; not that they thought there was no Speech without Reason; but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of reasoning they called Syllogisme; which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another. And because the same things may enter into account for di∣vers accidents; their names are (to shew that diversity) diversly wre∣sted, and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to foure generall heads.

First, a thing may enter into account for Matter, or Body; as living, sensible, rationall, hot, cold, moved, quiet; with all which names the word Matter, or Body is understood; all such, being names of Matter.

Secondly, it may enter into account, or be considered, for some ac∣cident or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for being moved, for being so long, for being hot, &c; and then, of the name of the thing it selfe, by a little change or wresting, wee make a name for that acci∣dent, which we consider; and for living put into the account life; for moved, motion; for hot, heat; for long, length, and the like: And all such Names, are the names of the accidents and properties, by which one Matter, and Body is distinguished from another. These are cal∣led names Abstract; because severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties of our own bo∣dies, whereby we make such distinction: as when any thing is Seen by us, we reckon not the thing it selfe; but the sight, the Colour, the Idea of it in the fancy: and when any thing is heard, wee reckon it not; but the hearing, or sound onely, which is our fancy or concepti∣on of it by the Eare: and such are names of fancies.

Fourthly, we bring into account, consider, and give names, to Names themselves, and to Speeches: For, generall, universall, speci∣all, aequivocall, are names of Names. And Affirmation, Interrogation, Commandement, Narration, Syllogisme, Sermon, Oration, and many other such, are names of Speeches. And this is all the variety of* 1.18 Names Positive; which are put to mark somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as Bodies that are, or may be conceived to be; or of bodies, the Properties that are, or may be feigned to be; or Words and Speech.

There be also other Names, called Negative; which are notes to* 1.19 signifie that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words Nothing, no man, infinite, indocible, three want foure, and the like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, or in correcting of reckoning; and call to mind our past cogitations, though they be not names of any thing; because they make us refuse to admit of Names not rightly used.

All other Names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two* 1.20

sorts. One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by Definition; whereof there have been aboundance coyned by Schoole-men, and pusled Philosophers.

Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose signifi∣cations are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an incorpo∣reall body, or (which is all one) an incorporeall substance, and a great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is fal•…•…e, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all. For example, if it be a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round, the word round quadrangle signifies nothing; but is a meere sound. So likewise if it be false, to say that vertue can be powred, or blown up and down; the words In-Po•…•…red vertue, In-blown vertue, are as absurd and insignificant, as a round quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senslesse and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names. A French∣man seldome hears our Saviour called by the name of Parole, but by the name of Verbe often; yet Verbe and Parole differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.

When a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts* 1.21 which the words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted to signifie; Then he is said to understand it: Under∣standing being nothing else, but conception caused by Speech. And therefore if Speech be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,) then is Understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of absurd and false affirmations, in case they be universall, there can be no Un∣derstanding; though many think they understand, then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.

What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversions, and Passions of mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the Passions.

The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and* 1.22 displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men, of inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signi∣fie our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoyd diffe∣rent naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives eve∣ry thing a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reason∣ing, a man must take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth feare; and one cruelty, what another justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; and one gravity, what another stupidi∣cy, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous, because they profess thei•…•… inconstancy; which the other do not.

CHAP. V. Of REASON, and SCIENCE.

WHen a man Reasoneth, hee does nothing else but conceive* 1.23 a summe totall, from Addition of parcels; or conceive a Remainder; from Substraction of one summe from ano∣ther: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of the conse∣quence of the names of all the parts, to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides Adding and Substracting, men name other operations, as Multiplying and Dividing; yet they are the same; for Multiplication, is but Adding together of things equall; and Division, but Substracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations are not incident to Num∣bers onely, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in numbers; so the Geometricians teach the same in lines, figures (solid and superficiall,) angles, proportions, times, de∣grees of swiftnesse, force, power, and the like; The Logicians teach the same in Consequences of words; adding together two Names, to make an Affirmation; and two Affirmations, to make a Syllogisme; and many Syllogismes to make a Demonstration; and from the summe, or Conclusion of a Syllogisme, they substract one Proposition, to finde the other. Writers of Politiques, adde together Pactions, to find mens duties; and Lawyers, Lawes, and facts, to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men. In summe, in what matter soever there is place for addition and substraction, there also is place for Rea∣son; and where these have no place, there Reason has nothing at all to do.

Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what* 1.24 that is, which is meant by this word Reason, when wee reckon it amongst the Faculties of the mind. For REASON, in this sense, is no∣thing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Con∣sequences of generall names agreed upon, for the marking and signi∣fying of our thoughts; I say marking them, when we reckon by our selves; and signifying, when we demonstrate, or approve our recko∣nings to other men.

And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors* 1.25 themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other sub∣ject of Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it selfe is alwayes Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible Art: But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have una∣nimously approved it. And therfore, as when there is a controversy in

an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: And when men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be deter∣mined, by no other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play after ttump is turned, to use for trump on every occasion, that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying their want of right Rea∣son, by the claym they lay to it.

The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of the summe, and* 1.26 truth of one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definiti∣ons, and settled significations of names; but to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence to another. For there can be no cer∣tainty of the last Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affir∣mations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred. As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence, into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account; nor what it is he payes for; he advantages himself no more, than if he allowed the account in grosse, trusting to every of the accountants skill and hone∣sty: so also in Reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclu∣sions on the trust of Authors, and doth not fetch them from the first Items in every Reckoning, (which are the significations of names settled by definitions), loses his labour; and does not know any thing; but onely beleeveth.

When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done* 1.27 in particular things, (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it;) if that which he thought likely to follow, followes not; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR; to which even the most prudent men are sub∣ject. But when we Reason in Words of generall signification, and fall upon a generall inference which is false; though it be commonly called Error, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senslesse Speech. For Error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not past, or not to come; yet there was no impossibility discoverable. But when we make a generall as∣sertion, unlesse it be a true one, the possibility of it is unconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call Absurd, Insignificant, and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a round Quadrangle; or accidents of Bread in Cheese; or Immateriall Substances; or of A free Subject; A free-will; or any Free, but free from being hindred by opposition, I should not say he were in an Errour; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd.

I have said before, (in the second chapter,) that a Man did excell all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and what effects he could do with it. And now I adde this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by words reduce the consequences he findes to generall Rules, called Theoremes, or Aphorismes; that is, he can Reason, or reckon, not onely in number; but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or substracted from another.

But this privedge, is allayed by another; and that is, by the privi∣ledge of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man onely. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe Philosophy. For it is most true that Cicero sayth of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of Philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used onely in Geometry; whose Conclusions have there∣by been made indisputable.

The first cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Me∣thod;* 1.28 in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions;* 1.29 that is, from settled significations of their words: as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of the numerall words, one, two, and three.

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considera∣tions, (which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) these con∣siderations being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore

The second cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of* 1.30 names of bodies, to accidents; or of accidents, to bodies; As they do, that say, Faith is infused, or inspired; when nothing can be powred, or breathed into any thing, but body; and that, extension is body; that phantasmes are spirits, &c.

The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the accidents of* 1.31 bodies without us, to the accidents of our own bodies; as they do that say, the colour is in the body; the sound is in the ayre, &c.

The fourth, to the giving of the names of bodies, to names, or* 1.32 speeches; as they do that say, that there be things universall; that a li∣ving creature is Genus, or a generall thing, &c.

The fifth, to the giving of the names of accidents, to names and* 1.33 speeches; as they do that say, the nature of a thing is its definition; a mans command is his will; and the like.

The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetori∣call* 1.34 figures, in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for example) in common speech, the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither, The Proverb sayes this or that (whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs speak;) yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such spee∣ches are not to be admitted.

The seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up, and* 1.35

learned by rote from the Schooles, as hypostatical, transubstantiate, consubstantiate, eternal-Now, and the like canting of Schoole∣men.

To him that can avoyd these things, it is not easie to fall into any absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they have good principles. For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?

By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne* 1.36 with us; nor gotten by Experience onely, as Prudence is; but attay∣ned by Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding from the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to Syllogismes, which are the Connexions of one Assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all the Conse∣quences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE. And whereas Sense and Memory are but know∣ledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one fact upon ano∣ther: by which, out of that we can presently do, we know how to do something else when we will, or the like, another time: Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, wee see how to make it produce the like effects.

Children therefore are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come. And the most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a little way, as in numbring to some degree; yet it serves them to lit∣tle use in common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to their differences of experience, quicknesse of memory, and inclinations to severall ends; but specially according to good or evill fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for Science, or certain rules of their actions, they are so farre from it, that they know not what it is. Geometry they have thought Conju∣ring: But for other Sciences, they who have not been taught the be∣ginnings, and some progresse in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no Science, are in better, and nobler conditi∣on with their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd gene∣rall rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre out of their way, as relying on false rules, and taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.

To conclude, The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words,

but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the pace; Encrease of Science, the way; and the Benefit of man-kind, the end. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are like ignes f•…•…i; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, conten∣tention, and sedition, or contempt.

As, much Experience, is Prudence; so, is much Science, Sapience.* 1.37 For though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet the Latines did alwayes distinguish between Prudentia and Sapi∣entia; ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science. But to make their difference appeare more cleerly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired Science, of where he can offend, or be offended by his adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability of the former, would be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to Sapience; both usefull▪ but the later infallible. But they that trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the false rules of a master of Fence, ventures praesumptuously upon an adversary, that either kills, or disgraces him.

The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, un∣certain.* 1.38 Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof per∣spicuously to another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must. Signes of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe, is impossible. But in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible Science to proceed by; to forsake his own naturall judge∣ment, and be guided by generall sentences read in Authors, and sub∣ject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry. And even of those men themselves, that in Councells of the Common-wealth, love to shew their reading of Politiques and History, very few do it in their domestique affaires, where their particular interest is concerned; having Prudence enough for their private affaires: but in publique they study more the repu∣tation of their owne wit, than the successe of anothers bu∣sinesse.

CHAP. VI. Of the Interiour Beginnings of Voluntary Motions; common∣ly called the PASSIONS. And the Speeches by which they are expressed.

THere be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them:* 1.39 One called Vitall; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the course of the Bloud, the Pulse, the Breathing, the Conco∣•…•…ion, Nutrition, Excretion, &c; to which Motions there needs no help of Imagination: The other is Animall motion, otherwise called Voluntary motion; as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbes, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That Sense, is Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things we See, Heare, &c; And that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the first and second Chapters. And because going, speaking, and the like Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion. And although unstudied men, doe not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in, is (for the shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such Motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be mo∣ved over that. These small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.* 1.40

This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE; the later, being the generall name;* 1.41 and the other, often-times restrayned to signifie the Desire of Food,* 1.42 namely Hunger and Thirst. And when the Endeavour is fromward* 1.43 something, it is generally called AVERSION. These words Appetite,* 1.44 and Aversion we have from the Latines; and they both of them sig∣nifie* 1.45 the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For Na∣ture it selfe does often presse upon men those truths, which after∣wards, when they look for somewhat beyond Nature, they stumble at. For the Schooles find in meere Appetite to go, or move, no actuall Motion at all: but because some Motion they must acknowledge, they call it Metaphoricall Motion; which is but an absurd speech: for though Words may be called metaphoricall; Bodies, and Motions cannot.

That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE: and to HATE* 1.46 those things, for which they have Aversion. So that Desire, and* 1.47

Love, are the same thing; save that by Desire, we alwayes signifie the Absence of the Object; by Love, most commonly the Presence of the same. So also by Aversion, we signifie the Absence; and by Hate, the Presence of the Object.

Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appe∣tite of food, Appetite of excretion, and exoneration, (which may al∣so and more properly be called Aversions, from somewhat they feele in their Bodies;) and some other Appetites, not many. The rest, which are Appetites of particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects upon themselves, or other men. For of things wee know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast and try. But Aversion wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to* 1.48 Contemne: CONTEMPT being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy of the Heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the Heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects; or from want of experience of them.

And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mu∣tation; it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the same Appetites, and Aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in the Desire of almost any one and the same Object.

But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that* 1.49 is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate,* 1.50 and Aversion, Evill; And of his Contempt, Vile▪ and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) from the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.

The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of Good and Evill; but are not precisely the same; And those are pulchrum and Turpe. Whereof the former signifies that,* 1.51 which by some apparent signes promiseth Good; and the later, that,* 1.52 which promiseth Evil. But in our Tongue we have not so generall names to expresse them by. But for Pulchrum, we say in some things, Fayre; in others Beautifull, or Handsome, or Gallant, or Honourable, or Comely, or Amiable; and for Turpe, Foule, Deformed, Ugly, Base, Nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; All which words, in their proper places signifie nothing els, but the Mine, or Counte∣nance, that promiseth Good and Evil. So that of Good there be three kinds; Good in the Promise, that is Pulchrum; Good in Effect, as the end desired, which is called Jucundum, Delightfull; and Good* 1.53 as the Means, which is called Vtile, Profitable; and as many of Evil:* 1.54 For Evill, in Promise, is that they call Turpe; Evil in Effect, and

End, is Molestum, Vnpleasant, Troublesome; and Evill in the Means,* 1.55 Inutile, Unprofitable, Hurtfull.* 1.56

As, in Sense, that which is really within us, is (as I have sayd be∣fore) onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence; to the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill, Odour, &c: so, when the action of the same object is con∣tinued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to the Heart; the reall effect there is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object moving. But the ap∣parence, or sense of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT,* 1.57 or TROUBLE OF MIND.* 1.58

This Motion, which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it Delight, and Pleasure, seemeth to be, a corroboration of Vitall* 1.59 motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused Delight, were not improperly called Jucunda, (à Juvando,) from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, Molesta, Offensive, from* 1.60 hindering, and troubling the motion vitall.

Pleasure therefore, (or Delight,) is the apparence, or sense of Good; and Molestation or Displeasure, the apparence, or sense of Evill. And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accom∣panied with some Delight more or lesse; and all Hatred, and Aver∣sion, with more or lesse Displeasure and Offence.

Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present; And those may be called Pleasures of Sense, (The word* 1.61 sensuall, as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till there be Lawes.) Of this kind are all Onerations and Exo∣nerations of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the Sight, Hea∣ring, Smell, Tast, or Touch; Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things; whether those things in the Sense Please or Displease: And these are* 1.62 Pleasures of the Mind of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called JOY. In the like manner, Displeasures, are some* 1.63 in the Sense, and called PAYNE; others, in the Expectation of con∣sequences,* 1.64 and are called GRIEFE.* 1.65

These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy, and Griefe, have their names for divers considerations di∣versified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversly called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Third∣ly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the Alteration or succession it selfe.

For Appetite with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.* 1.66

The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE.* 1.67

Aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object, FEARE.* 1.68

The same, with hope of avoyding that Hurt by resistence, COU∣RAGE.* 1.69

Sudden Courage, ANGER.* 1.70

Constant Hope, CONFIDENCE of our selves.* 1.71

Constant Despayre, DIFFIDENCE of our selves.* 1.72

Anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done by Injury, INDIGNATION.* 1.73

Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL,* 1.74 CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.* 1.75

Desire of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used alwayes in sig∣nification* 1.76 of blame; because men contending for them, are displea∣sed with one anothers attaining them; though the desire in it selfe, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the means by which those Riches are sought.

Desire of Office; or precedence, AMBITION: a name used also* 1.77 in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.

Desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends; And fear of* 1.78 things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.

Contempt of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.* 1.79

Magnanimity, in danger of Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, FOR∣TITUDE.* 1.80

Magnanimity, in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY.* 1.81

Pusillanimity, in the same WRETCHEDNESSE, MISERABLE∣NESSE;* 1.82 or PARSIMONY; as it is liked, or disliked.

Love of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.* 1.83

Love of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, NATURALL LUST.* 1.84

Love of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is, Imagination* 1.85 of Pleasure past, LUXURY.

Love of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved,* 1.86 THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutuall, JEALOUSIE.* 1.87

Desire, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact* 1.88 of his own, REVENGEFULN•…•…SSE.

Desire, to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no li∣ving* 1.89 creature but Man: so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his Reason; but also by this singular Passion from other Animals; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by prae∣dominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and in∣defatigable generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehe∣mence of any carnall Pleasure.

Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTI∣TION.* 1.90 And when the power imagined, is truly such as we imagine,* 1.91 TRUE RELIGION.* 1.92

Feare, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIQUE* 1.93 TERROR; called so from the Fables, that make Pan the author of them; whereas in truth, there is alwayes in him that so feareth, first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by Exam∣ple; every one supposing his fellow to know why. And therefore this Passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Joy, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION; proper to* 1.94 Man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

Joy, arising from imagination of a mans own power and ability,

is that exultation of the mind which is called 〈◊〉〈◊〉: which if* 1.95 grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with Confidence: but if grounded on the flattery of others; or one∣ly supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is cal∣led VAINE-GLORY: which name is properly given; because a well* 1.96 grounded Confidence begetteth Attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called Va•…•…ne.

Griefe, from opinion of want of power, is called DEIECTION* 1.97 of mind.

The vain-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in our selves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the Histories, or Fictions of Gallant Persons▪ and is corrected oftentimes by Age, and Employment.

Sudden Glory, is the passion which maketh those Gr•…•…aces called* 1.98 LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own,* 1.99 that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some d•…•…ed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud them∣selves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves▪ who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others, is a signe of Pu∣sillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes 〈◊〉〈◊〉, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most able.

On the contrary, Sudden De•…•…ction, is the passion that causeth* 1.100 W•…•…PING; and is caused by such accidents, as su•…•…ly •…•…ake away* 1.101 some vehement hope, or some prop of their powe•…•…: And they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are▪ Women, and Children. Therefore some Weep for the losse of Friends▪ Others for their unkindnesse; others for the sudden sto•…•… made to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation. But in all cases, both Laughter, and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away. For no man Laughs at old 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪ or Weeps for an old calamity.

Griefe, for the discovery of some defect of ability, is SHAME, or* 1.102* 1.103 the passion that discovereth it selfe in BLUSHING; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable; and in young men, is a signe of the love of good reputation; and commendable: In old men it is a signe of the same▪ but because it comes too l•…•…e, not com∣mendable.

The Contempt of good Reputation is called IMPUDENCE.* 1.104* 1.105

Griefe, for the Calamity of another, is PITTY; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and there∣fore is called also COMPASSION, and in the phrase of this present time a FELLOW-•…•…ING: And therefore for Ca•…•…y •…•…ving from great wickedness, the best men have the least Pitty; •…•…nd for the same Calamity, those have least Pitty, that think themselves least ob∣noxious to the same.

Contempt, or little sense of the calamity of others, is that which

men call CRUELTY; proceeding from Security of their own for∣tune.* 1.106 For, that any man should take pleasure in other mens great harmes, without other end of his own, I do not conceive it pos∣sible.

Griefe, for the successe of a Competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joyned with Endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equall or exceed him, is called EMULATION: But joyned with En∣deavour* 1.107 to supplant, or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.* 1.108

When in the mind of man, Appetites, and Aversions, Hopes, and Feares, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come successively into our thoughts; so that some∣times we have an Appetite to it; sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be able to do it; sometimes Despaire, or Feare to attempt it; the whole summe of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Fears, continued till the thing be either done, or thought impossible, is that we call DELIBERATION.* 1.109

Therefore of things past, there is no Deliberation; because mani∣festly impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossi∣ble, or thought so; because men know, or think such Deliberation vain. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. And it is called Deliberation; because it is a putting an end to the Liberty we had of doing, or omit∣ting, according to our own Appetite, or Aversion.

This alternate Succession of Appetites, Aversions, Hopes and Fears, is no lesse in other living Creatures then in Man: and there∣fore Beasts also Deliberate.

Every Deliberation is then sayd to End, when that whereof they Deliberate, is either done, or thought impossible; because till then wee retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our Appe∣tite, or Aversion.

In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately ad∣haering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that wee call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of Willing. And Beasts that* 1.110 have Deliberation, must necessarily also have Will. The Definition of the Will, given commonly by the Schooles, that it is a Rationall Appetite, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no Volun∣tary Act against Reason. For a Voluntary Act is that, which proceed∣eth from the Will, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall Ap∣petite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Delibera∣tion, then the Definition is the same that I have given here. Will therefore is the last Appetite in Deliberating. And though we say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to do a thing, that never∣thelesse he forbore to do; yet that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary; because the action depends not of it, but of the last Inclination, or Appetite. For if the intervenient Appetites, make any action Voluntary; then by the same Reason all intervenient Aversions, should make the same action Involuntary; and so one and the same action, should be both Voluntary & Involuntary.

By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their begin∣ning from Covetousnesse, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing propounded; but also those that have their beginning from Aversion, or Feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are voluntary actions.

The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, are* 1.111 partly the same, and partly different from those, by which wee expresse our Thoughts. And first, generally all Passions may be expressed Indicatively; as I love, I feare, I joy, I deliberate, I will, I command: but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which neverthelesse are not affirmations, unlesse it be when they serve to make other inferences, besides that of the Passion they proceed from. Deliberation is expressed Sub•…•…tively; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their consequences; as, If this be done, then this will follow; and differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in generall words; but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars. The language of Desire, and Aversion, is Imperative; as Do this, forbeare that; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbeare, is Command; otherwise Prayer; or els Counsell. The language of Vain-Glory, of Indignation, Pitty and Revengefulness, Optative: But of the Desire to know, there is a peculiar expression, called Interrogative; as, What is it, when shall it, how is it done, and why so? other lan∣guage of the Passions I find none: For Cursing, Swearing, Revi∣ling, and the like, do not signifie as Speech; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed.

These formes of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary sig∣nifications of our Passions: but certain signes they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such Passions or not. The best signes of Passions present, are either in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, and ends, or aimes, which we otherwise know the man to have.

And because in Deliberation, the Appetites, and Aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we Deliberate; the good or evill effect there∣of dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end. But for so farre* 1.112 as a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences, be greater than the Evill, the whole chaine is that which Writers call Apparent, or Seeming Good. And contrarily, when the Evill exceedeth the Good, the whole is Apparent, or Seeming Evill: so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of Conse∣quences, Deliberates best himselfe; and is able when he will, to give the best counsell unto others,

Continuall successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continuall prospering, is that men* 1.113 call FELIC•…•…TY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetual•…•… Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life it selfe is but Motion, and can never be without De•…•…re,

nor without Feare, no more than without Sense. What kind of Fe∣licity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joyes, that now are as in∣comprehensible, as the word of Schoole-men Beatificall Vision is unintelligible.

The forme of Speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse of any thing, is PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the* 1.114 power and greatnesse of any thing, is MAGNIFYING. And that* 1.115 whereby they signifie the opinion they have of a mans Felicity, is by the Greeks called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for which wee have no name in our* 1.116 tongue. And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose, to have been said of the PASSIONS.

CHAP. VII. Of the Ends, or Resolutions of DISCOURSE.

OF all Discourse, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an End, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.

If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption of it will be, or, it will not be; or it has been, or, has not been. All which is Opinion. And that which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil; the same is alternate Opinion, in the Enquiry of the truth of Past, and Futu•…•…e. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation, is called the Will; so the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is cal∣led the JUDGEMENT, or Resolute and Finall Sentence of him that* 1.117 discourseth. And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good, or Bad, is called Deliberation; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False, is called DOUBT.* 1.118

No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact, past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is origi∣nally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of Consequence, which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and that not the consequence of one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.

And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into generall Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes;

the End or last summe is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that conditionall Knowledge, or Know∣ledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called SCI∣ENCE.* 1.119 But if the first ground of such Discourse, be not Definiti∣ons; or if the Definitions be not rightly joyned together into Syllo∣gismes, then the End or Conclusion, is again OPINION, namely of* 1.120 the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being understood. When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS* 1.121 of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together. And be∣cause such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, or of a third; it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act, for any man to speak against his Conscience: or to corrupt or force another so to do: Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been alwayes hearke∣ned unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically, for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts; and therefore it is Rhetorically said, that the Conscience is a thousand witnesses. And last of all, men, vehe∣mently in love with their own new opinions, (though never so ab∣surd,) and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opini∣ons also that reverenced name of Conscience, as if they would have it seem unlawfull, to change or speak against them; and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that they think so.

When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still cal∣led Opinion; Or it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose ability to know the truth, and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; And the Resolution is called BELEEFE, and* 1.122 FAITH: Faith, in the man; Beleefe, both of the man, and of the* 1.123 truth of what he sayes. So that in Beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his vertue. To have faith in, or trust 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪ or beleeve a man, signifie the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: But to beleeve what is said, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying. But wee are to observe that this Phrase, I beleeve in; as also the Latine, Credo in; and the Greek, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 are never used but in the writings of Divines. In stead of them, in other writings are put, I beleeve him; I trust him; I have faith in him; I rely on him: and in Latin, Credo illi; fido illi: and in Greek, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: and that this singularity of the Ecclesiastique use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian Faith.

But by Beleeving in, as it is in the Creed, is meant, not trust in the Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine. For not onely Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all for truth they heare him say, whether they un∣derstand it, or not; which is all the Faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever: But they do not all believe the Do∣ctrine of the Creed.

From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it selfe, or from the principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our Faith; and the Honour done in Be∣lieving, is done to him onely. And consequently, when wee Believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate reve∣lation from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith, and Trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein. And they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto them in the name of God, take the word of the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe, touching the truth of what he relateth, whether he be a true, or a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History. For if I should not believe all that is written by Historians, of the glori∣ous acts of Alexander, or Caesar; I do not think the Ghost of Alex∣ander, or Caesar, had any just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the Historian. If Livy say the Gods made once a Cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy. So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, then what is drawn from authority of men onely, and their writings; whether they be sent from God or not, is Faith in men onely.

CHAP. VIII. Of the VERTUES commonly called INTELLECTUALL; and their contrary DEFECTS.

VERTUE generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that* 1.124 is valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by Vertues INTELLECTUALL, are alwayes un∣derstood such abilityes of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a good witte; though the same word Witte, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.

These Vertues are of two sorts; Naturall, and Acquired. By Na∣turall,* 1.125 I mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing else but Sense; wherein men differ so little one from ano∣ther, and from brute Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Ver∣tues. But I mean, that Witte, which is gotten by Use onely, and Ex∣perience; without Method, Culture, or Instruction. This NATU∣RALL* 1.126 WITTE, consisteth principally in two things; Celerity of Imagining, (that is, swift succession of one thought to another;) and steddy direction to some approved end. On the Contrary a slow Ima∣gination, maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind, which is common∣ly called DULNESSE, Stupidity, and sometimes by other names that signifie slownesse of motion, or difficulty to be moved.

And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of mens passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another; and are held to, and observe differently the things that passe through their imagination. And whereas in this succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to observe in the things they think on, but either in what they be like one another, or in what they be unlike, or what they serve for, or how they serve to such a purpose; Those that observe their simi∣litudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a Good Wit; by which, in this occasion, is meant a Good* 1.127 Fancy. But they that observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called Distinguishing, and Discerning, and Judging be∣tween thing and thing; in case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a good Judgement: and particularly in matter of conversation* 1.128 and businesse; wherein, times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue is called DISCRETION. The former, that is, Fancy,* 1.129 without the help of Judgement, is not commended as a Vertue: but the later which is Judgement, and Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without the help of Fancy. Besides the Discretion of times, places, and persons, necessary to a good Fancy, there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their End; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. This done; he that hath this Vertue, will be easily fitted with similitudes, that will please, not onely by illu∣stration of his discourse, and adorning it with new and apt meta∣phors; but also, by the rarity of their invention. But without Sted∣dinesse, and Direction to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse; such as they have, that entring into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by every thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and Parentheses, that they utterly lose themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no parti∣cular name for: but the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare, which doth not so to others: sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other men think a trifle: and whatsoever is new, or great, and therefore thought fit to be told, withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.

In a good Poem, whether it be Epique, or Dramatique; as also in Sonnets, Epigrams, and other Pieces, both Judgement and Fancy are required: But the Fancy must be more eminent; because they please for the Extravagancy; but ought not to displease by Indiscretion.

In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the goodnesse consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the actions that are most profitable to be known. Fancy has no place, but onely in adorning the stile.

In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy is praedomi∣nant; because the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour; which is done by noble, or by vile comparisons. The Judgement does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable, or cul∣pable.

In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best to the Designe in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most re∣quired.

In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth, Judgement does all; except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy. But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For •…•…eeing they openly professe deceipt; to admit them into Coun∣cell, or Reasoning, were manifest folly.

And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be apparent, how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a signe of want of wit▪ and so will it never when the Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean, obscene grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball discourse cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall approve of the Time, Place, and Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physitian may speak, or write his judgement of unclean things; because it is not to please, but profit: but for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled in∣to the dirt, should come and present himselfe before good company. And 'tis the want of Discretion that makes the difference. Again, in profest remissnesse of mind, and familiar company, a man may play with the sounds, and aequivocall significations of words; and that many times with encounters of extraordinary Fancy: but in a Ser∣mon, or in publique, or before persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no Gingling of words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is onely in the want of Discretion. So that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy that is wanting, but Discretion. Judgement therefore without Fancy is Wit, but Fancy without Judgement not.

When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, •…•…unning over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that de∣signe; or what designe they may conduce unto; if his observations be such as are not easie, or usuall, This wit of his is called PRUDENCE;* 1.130 and dependeth on much Experience, and Memory of the like things, and their consequences heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of Men, as there is in their Fancies and Judgements; Be∣cause the Experience of men equall in age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity; but lyes in different occasions; every one having his private designes. To govern well a family, and a kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence; but different sorts of businesse; no more then to draw a picture in little, or as great, or greater then the life, are different degrees of Art. A plain husband-man is more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a Privy Counseller in the affaires of another man.

To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have that Crooked Wisdome, which is called CRAFT; which is a signe of* 1.131

Pusillanimity. For Magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And that which the Latines call Versutia, (translated into English, Shifting,) and is a putting off of a present danger or incom∣modity, by engaging into a greater; as when a man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted Craft, called Versutia, from Vers•…•…a, which signisies taking mony at usurie, for the present payment of in∣terest.

As for acquired Wit, (I mean acquired by method and instructi∣on,)* 1.132 there is none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech; and produceth the Sciences. But of Reason and Science, I have already spoken in the fifth and sixth Chapters.

The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions: and the difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different Constitu∣tion of the body, and partly from different Education. For if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of Sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no lesse difference of men in their Sight, Hearing, or other Senses, than in their Fan∣cies, and Discretions. It proceeds therefore from the Passions; which are different, not onely from the difference of mens complexions; but also from their difference of customes, and education.

The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Know∣ledge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but seve∣rall sorts of Power.

And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things; but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may be so farre a good man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possi∣bly have either a great Fancy, or much Judgement. For the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things De•…•…ired: All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse; and to have Passions indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESSE, and Distraction▪ and to have stronger, and more ve∣hement* 1.133 Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call MADNESSE.* 1.134

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves. Sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from the evill constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them; and sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by the vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion. But in both cases the Madnesse is of one and the same nature.

The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either great vaine-Glory; which is commonly called Pride▪ and selfe-conceipt; or great Dejection of mind.

Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse called RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passe* 1.135

that excessive desire of Revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes Rage: That excessive love, with jealou∣sie, becomes also Rage: Excessive opinion of a mans own selfe, for divine inspiration, for wisdome, learning, forme, and the like, becomes Distraction, and Giddinesse: The same, joyned with En∣vy, Rage: Vehement opinion of the truth of any thing, contradicted by others, Rage.

Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse commonly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners;* 1.136 as in haunting of solitudes, and graves; in superstitious behaviour; and in fearing some one, some another particular thing. In summe, all Passions that produce strange and unusuall behaviour, are called by the generall name of Madnesse. But of the severall kinds of Madnesse, he that would take the paines, might enrowle a legion. And if the Excesses be madnesse, there is no doubt but the Passions themselves, when they tend to Evill, are degrees of the same.

(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are pos∣sessed of an opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man, by any very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such Passion; yet when many of them conspire together, the Rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat lesse than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their life-time before, they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be Madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured, that part contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea, as any other part, of the same quantity: so also, though wee perceive no great unquietnesse, in one, or two men; yet we may be well assu∣red, that their singular Passions, are parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation. And if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse; yet that very arrogating such inspiration to them∣selves, is argument enough. If some man in Bedlam should enter∣taine you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his Madnesse.

This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit, be∣gins very often, from some lucky finding of an Errour generally held by others; and not knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct of reason, they came to so singular a truth, (as they think it, though it be many times an untruth they light on,) they presently admire them∣selves; as being in the speciall grace of God Almighty, who hath •…•…evealed the same to them supernaturally, by his Spirit.

Again, that Madnesse is nothing else, but too much appearing Passion, may be gathered out of the effects of Wine, which are the same with those of the evill disposition of the organs. For the varie∣ty

of behaviour in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that of Mad-men: some of them Raging, others Loving, others Laughing, all extravagantly, but according to their severall domi∣neering Passions: For the effect of the wine, does but remove Dissi∣mulation; and take from them the sight of the deformity of their Passions. For, (I believe) the most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwil∣ling the vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publiquely seen: which is a confession, that Passions un∣guided, are for the most part meere Madnesse.

The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages, concer∣ning the cause of madnesse, have been two. Some, deriving them from the Passions; some, from Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possesse him, and move his organs in such strange, and uncouth manner, as mad-men use to do. The former sort therefore, called such men, Mad-men: but the Later, called them sometimes Daemoniacks, (that is, possessed with spirits;) sometimes Energumeni, (that is, agitated, or moved with spirits;) and now in Italy they are called not onely Pazzi, Mad∣men; but also Spiritati, men possest.

There was once a great conflux of people in Abdera, a City of the Greeks, at the acting of the Tragedy of Andromeda, upon an ex∣tream hot day: whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling in∣to Fevers, had this accident from the heat, and from the Tragedy to∣gether, that they did nothing but pronounce Iambiques, with the names of Perseus and Andromeda; which together with the Fever, was cured, by the comming on of Winter: And this madnesse was thought to proceed from the Passion imprinted by the Tragedy. Likewise there raigned a fit of madnesse in another Graecian City, which seized onely the young Maidens; and caused many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of the Divel. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might proceed from some Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not con∣temne also their honour, gave counsell to the Magistrates, to strip such as so hang'd themselves, and let them hang out naked. This the sto∣ry sayes cured that madnesse. But on the other side, the same Grae∣cians, did often ascribe madnesse, to the operation of the Eumenides, or Furyes; and sometimes of Ceres, Phoebus, and other Gods: so much did men attribute to Phantasmes, as to think them aëreal living bodies; and generally to call them Spirits. And as the Romans in this, held the same opinion with the Greeks: so also did the Jewes; For they called mad-men Prophets, or (according as they thought the spirits good or bad) Daemoniacks; and some of them called both Prophets, and Daemoniacks, mad-men; and some called the same man both Daemoniack, and mad-man. But for the Gentiles, 'tis no wonder; because Diseases, and Health; Vices, and Vertues; and many naturall accidents, were with them termed, and worshipped as Dae∣mons. So that a man was to understand by Daemon, as well (some∣times) an Ague, as a Divell. But for the Jewes to have such opini∣on,

is somewhat strange. For neither Moses, nor Abraham preten∣ded to Prophecy by possession of a Spirit; but from the voyce of God; or by a Vision or Dream: Nor is there any thing in his Law, Morall, or Ceremoniall, by which they were taught, there was any such Enthusiasme; or any Possession. When God is sayd, Numb. 11. 25. to take from the Spirit that was in Moses, and give to the 70. El∣ders, the Spirit of God (taking it for the substance of God) is not divided. The Scriptures by the Spirit of God in man, mean a mans spirit, enclined to Godlinesse. And where it is said Exod. 28. 3. Whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdome to make garments for Aaron, is not meant a spirit put into them, that can make garments; but the wisdome of their own spirits in that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean actions, is ordinarily called an unclean spirit; and so other spirits, though not alwayes, yet as often as the vertue or vice so stiled, is extraordinary, and Eminent. Neither did the other Prophets of the old Testament pretend En∣thusiasme; or, that God spake in them; but to them by Voyce, Vision, or Dream; and the Burthen of the Lord was not Possession, but Com∣mand. How then could the Jewes fall into this opinion of possession? I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men; name∣ly, the want of curiosity to search naturall causes; and their placing Felicity, in the acquisition of the grosse pleasures of the Senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto. For they that see any strange, and unusuall ability, or defect in a mans mind; unlesse they see withall, from what cause it may probably proceed, can hard∣ly think it naturall; and if not naturall, they must needs thinke it su∣pernaturall; and then what can it be, but that either God, or the Di∣vell is in him? And hence it came to passe, when our Saviour Mark 3. 21.) was compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted he was mad, and went out to hold him: but the Scribes said he had Belzebub, and that was it, by which he cast out divels; as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser. And that (John 10. 20.) some said, He hath a Divell, and is mad; whereas others holding him for a Prophet, sayd, These are not the words of one that hath a Divell. So in the old Testament he that came to anoynt Jehu, 2 Kings 9. 11. was a Prophet; but some of the company asked Jehu, What came that mad-man for? So that in summe, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himselfe in extraordinory manner, was thought by the Jewes to be possessed either with a good, or evill spirit; except by the Sadduces, who erred so farre on the other hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits, (which is very neere to direct Atheisme;) and thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to terme such men Daemoniacks, rather than mad-men.

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they were possest; and not as if they were mad? To which I can give no other kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the Earth. The Scripture was written to shew unto men the king∣dome of God, and to prepare their mindes to become his obedient

subjects; leaving the world, and the Philosophy thereof, to the dis∣putation of men, for the exercising of their naturall Reason. Whe∣ther the Earths, or Suns motion make the day, and night; or whether the Exorbitant actions of men, proceed from Passion, or from the Divell, (so we worship him not) it is all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to God Almighty; which is the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the di∣sease, as to a person; it is the usuall phrase of all that cure by words onely, as Christ did, (and Inchanters pretend to do, whether they speak to a Divel or not.) For is not Christ also said (Math. 8. 26.) to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also (Luk. 4. 39.) to rebuke a Fever? Yet this does not argue that a Fever is a Divel. And where∣as many of those Divels are said to confesse Christ; it is not necessa∣ry to interpret those places otherwise, than that those mad-men con∣fessed him. And whereas our Saviour (Math. 12. 43.) speaketh of an unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandreth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none; and returning into the same man, with seven other spirits worse than himselfe; It is manifestly a Parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven times worse than he was. So that I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a beliefe, that Daemoniacks were any other thing but Mad-men.

There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men; which* 1.137 may also be numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse; namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the Name of Absurdity. And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have re∣ceived, and repeat by rote; by others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the Schoole-men; or in questions of abstruse Philosophy. The common sort of men sel∣dome speak Insignificantly, and are therefore, by those other Egre∣gious persons counted Idiots. But to be assured their words are with∣out any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some Examples; which if any man require, let him take a Schoole∣man into his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter con∣cerning any difficult point; as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ; Transubstantiation; Free-will, &c. into any of the moderne tongues, so as to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latine, such as they were acquainted withall, that lived when the La∣tine tongue was Vulgar. What is the meaning of these words. The first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the Essentiall subordination of the second causes, by Which it may help it to worke? They are the Translation of the Title of the sixth chapter of Suarez first Booke, Of the Concourse, Motion, and Help of God. When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad, or intend to make others so? And particularly, in the question

of Transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken, they that say, the White nesse, Round nesse, Magnitude, Quality, Corruptibility, all which are incorporeall, &c. go out of the Wafer, into the Body of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those Nessles, Tudes, and Ties, to be so many spirits possessing his body? For by Spirits, they mean alwayes things, that being incorporeall, are neverthelesse move∣able from one place to another. So that this kind of Absurdity, may rightly be numbred amongst the many sorts of Madnesse; and all the time that guided by clear Thoughts of their worldly lust, they forbear disputing, or writing thus, but Lucide Intervals. And thus much of the Vertues and Defects Intellectuall.

CHAP. IX. Of the Severall SUBIECTS of KNOWLEDGE.

THere are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is Know∣ledge of Fact: the other Knowledge of the Consequence of one Affirmation to another. The former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is Absolute Knowledge; as when we see a Fact doing, or remember it done: And this is the Knowledge required in a Witnesse. The later is called Science; and is Conditio∣nall; as when we know, that, If the figure showne be a Circle, then any straight line through the Center shall divide it into two equall parts. And this is the Knowledge required in a Philosopher; that is to say, of him that pretends to Reasoning.

The Register of Knowledge of Fact is called History. Whereof there be two sorts: one called Naturall History; which is the History of such Facts, or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans Will; Such as are the Histories of Metalls, Plants, Animals, Regions, and the like. The other, is Civill History; which is the History of the Voluntary Actions of men in Common-wealths.

The Registers of Science, are such Books as contain the Demon∣strations of Consequences of one Affirmation, to another; and are commonly called Books of Philosophy; whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity of the Matter; And may be divided in such manner as I have divided them in the following Table.

• SCIENCE, that is, Knowledge of Consequences; which is called also PHILO∣SOPHY.
• ...
  • Consequences from the Accidents of Bodies Naturall; which is called NATURALL PHILOSOPHY.
  • ...
    • Consequences from the Accidents common to all Bodies Naturall; which are Quantity, and Motion.
    • ...
      • Consequences from Quantity, and Motion indeterminate; which being the Prin∣ciples, or first foundation of Philosophy, is called Philosophia Prima.
      • ...
        • PHILOSOPH PRIMA.
      • Consequences from Motion, and Quan∣tity determined.
      • ...
        • Consequences from Quantity, and Mo∣tion determined
        • ...
          • By Figure, . . . . .
          • ...
            • ...Mathematiques,
            • ...
              • GEOMETRY.
              • ARITHMETI QU
          • By Number,. . . .
          • ...
            • ...Mathematiques,
            • ...
              • GEOMETRY.
              • ARITHMETI QU
        • Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of Bo∣dies in speciall.
        • ...
          • Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of the great parts of the World, as the Earth and Starres,
          • ...
            • ...Cosmography,
            • ...
              • ASTRONOMY.
              • GEOGRAPHY.
          • Consequences from the Motion of Spe∣ciall kinds, and Fi∣gures of Body,
          • ...
            • ...Mechaniques,
            • ...
              • Science of EN NEERS.
              • ARCHITECTUR
              • NAVIGATION.
            • Doctrine of Weight,
    • PHYSIQUES, or Consequences frō Qualities.
    • ...
      • Consequences from the Qualities of Bodyes Transient, such as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish, . . . . . . . . . . . . METEOROLOG
      • Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Perma∣nent.
      • ...
        • Consequences from the Qualities of the Starres.
        • ...
          • Consequences from the Light of the Starres. Out of this, and the Motion of the Sunne, is made the Science of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SCIOGRAPHY.
          • Consequences from the Influence of the Starres, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ASTROLOGY.
        • Consequences of the Qualities from Liquid Bodies that fill the space between the Starres; such as are the Ayre, or substance aetheriall.
        • Consequences from the Qualities of Bo∣dies Terrestriall.
        • ...
          • Consequences from the parts of the Earth, that are without Sense,
          • ...
            • Consequences from the Qualities of Minerals, as Stones, Metalls, &c.
            • Consequences from the Qualities of Vegetables.
          • Consequences from the Qualiti•…•…s of Animals.
          • ...
            • Consequences from the Qualities of A∣nimals in generall
            • ...
              • Consequences from Vision, . . . . OPTIQUES.
              • Consequences from Sounds, . . . . MUSIQUE.
              • Consequences from the rest of the Senses.
            • Consequences from the Qualities of Men in speciall
            • ...
              • Consequences from the Passions of Men, . . . . . . . . . . . . ETHIQUES.
              • Consequences from Speech,
              • ...
                • In Magnifying, Vilifying, &c. POETRY.
                • In Perswadi•…•…g, . . RHETHORI QU
                • In Reasoning, . . . LOGIQUE.
                • In Contracting, . . The Science of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and UNIUST.
  • Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies; which is called POLITIQUES, and CIVILL PHILOSOPHY.
  • ...
    • 1. Of Consequences from the Institution of COMMON-WEALTHS, to the Rights, and Duties of the Body Politique, or Soveraig•…•….
    • 2. Of Consequences from the same, to the Duty, and Right of the Subjects.

Place this Table between folio 40. and 41.

CHAP. X. Of POWER, WORTH, DIGNITY, HONOUR, and WORTHINESSE.

THe POWER of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his pre∣sent* 1.138 means, to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Originall, or Instrumentall.

Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind: as extraordinary Strength, Forme, Prudence, Arts, Elo∣quence, Liberality, Nobility. Instrumentall are those Powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and Instruments to ac∣quire more: as Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the secret working of God, which men call Good Luck. For the nature of Power, is in this point, like to Fame, increasing as it proceeds; or like the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more hast.

The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or Civill, that has the use of all their Powers depending on his will; such as is the Power of a Common-wealth: Or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the Power of a Faction, or of di∣vers factions leagued. Therefore to have servants, is Power; To have friends, is Power: for they are strengths united.

Also Riches joyned with liberality, is Power; because it procu∣reth friends, and servants: Without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend not; but expose men to Envy, as a Prey.

Reputation of power, is Power; because it draweth with it the ad∣haerence of those that need protection.

So •…•…s Reputation of love of a mans Country, (called Popularity,) for the same Reason.

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of ma∣ny; or the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means to have the assistance, and service of many.

Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wis∣dome, or good fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power; because it gaineth love.

Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Pow∣er; because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more willingly than to others.

Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common∣wealths, where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their Power.

Eloquence is power; because it is seeming Prudence.

Forme is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recom∣mendeth

men to the favour of women and strangers.

The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and there∣fore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attay∣ned it.

Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines, and other Instruments of War; because they conferre to Defence, and Victory, are Power: And though the true Mother of them, be Sci∣ence, namely the Mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the Light, by the hand of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Mid∣wife passing with the vulgar for the Mother,) as his issue.

The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price;* 1.139 that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another. An able conductor of Souldiers, is of great Price in time of War present, or imminent; but in Peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of Peace; but not so much in War. And as in other things, so in men, not the sel∣ler, but the buyer determines the Price. For let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves at the highest Value they can; yet their true Va∣lue is no more than it is esteemed by others.

The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which is commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring. To Value a man at a high rate, is to Honour him; at a low rate, is to Dishonour him. But high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by compa∣rison to the rate that each man setteth on himselfe.

The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY.* 1.140 And this Value of him by the Common-wealth, is understood, by offices of Command, Judicature, publike Employment; or by Names and Titles, introduced for distinction of such Value.

To pray to another, for ayde of any kind, is to HONOUR; be∣cause* 1.141 a signe we have an opinion he has power to help; and the more difficult the ayde is, the more is the Honour.

To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeyes them, whom they think have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to Dishonour.

To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him; because 'tis buying of Protection, and acknowledging of Power. To give little gifts, is to Dishonour; because it is but Almes, and fignifies an opinion of the need of small helps.

To be sedulous in promoting anothers good; also to flatter, is to Honour; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde. To neglect, is to Dishonour.

To give way, or place to another, in any Commodity, is to Ho∣nour; being a confession of greater power. To arrogate, is to Dis∣honour.

To s•…•…w any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour;

for both to love, and to feare, is to value. To contemne, or lesse to love or feare, then he expects, is to Dishonour; for 'tis undervaluing.

To praise, magnifie, or call happy, is to Honour; because nothing but goodnesse, power, and felicity is valued. To revile, mock, or pitty, is to Dishonour.

To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency, and humility, is to Honour him; as signes of fear to of∣fend. To speak to him rashly, to do any thing before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to Dishonour.

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; signe of opinion of his vertue and power. To distrust, or not believe, is to Dishonour,

To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to Honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.

To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Ho∣nour, or which the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because in approving the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to Dis∣honour.

To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of appro∣ving his judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour▪ and an upbraiding of errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.

To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve. To imitate ones Enemy, is to Dishonour.

To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of approbation of his judgement. To honour his Enemies, is to Disho∣nour him.

To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour; as a signe of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. To deny em∣ployment in the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.

All these wayes of Honouring, are naturall; and as well within, as without Common-wealths. But in Common-wealths, where he, or they that have the supreme Authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand for signes of Honour, there be other Honours.

A Soveraigne doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, o•…•… Office, or Employment, or Action, that he himselfe will have taken for a signe of his will to Honour him.

The King of Persia, Honoured Mordecay, when he appointed he should be conducted through the streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of the Kings Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him, proclayming, Thus shall it be done to him that the King will honour. And yet another King of Persia, or the same another time, to one that demanded for some great service, to weare one of the Kings robes, gave him leave so to do; but with this addition, that he should weare it as the Kings foole; and then it was Dishonour. So that of Civill Honour, the Fountain is in the person of the Com∣mon-wealth, and dependeth on the Will of the Soveraigne; and is therefore temporary, and called Civill Honour; such as are Magi∣stracy,

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Offices, Titles; and in some places Coats, and Scutchions painted: and men Honour such as have them, as having so many signes of favour in the Common-wealth; which favour is Power.

Honourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argu∣ment* 1.142 and signe of Power.

And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Ho∣nourable; as arguments of Power. To be Honoured of few or none,* 1.143 Dishonourable.

Dominion, and Victory is Honourable; because acquired by Power; and Servitude, for need, or feare, is Dishonourable.

Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God. Ill fortune, and losses, Dishonourable. Riches, are Honou∣rable; for they are Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality, Hope, Courage, Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from the conscience of Power. Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are Dishonourable.

Timely Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dan∣gers. And Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a signe of too much va∣luing of little impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is Pusillanimity.

All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable; For all these are Powers. Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or Folly, Dishonourable.

Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employ∣ed on some thing else, is Honourable; because employment is a signe of Power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is Dishonourable. For the gravity of the former, is like the steddi∣nesse of a Ship laden with Merchandise; but of the later, like the steddinesse of a Ship ballasted with Sand, and other trash.

To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, Office, great Actions, or any eminent Good, is Honourable; as a signe of the power for which he is conspicuous. On the contrary, Obscurity, is Dishonourable.

To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; be∣cause they the more easily attain the aydes, and friends of their An∣cestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.

Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honoura∣ble; as signes of Magnanimity: for Magnanimity is a signe of Power. On the contrary, Craft, Shifting, neglect of Equity, is Dishonou∣rable.

Covetousnesse of great Riches, and ambition of great Honours, are Honourable; as signes of power to obtain them. Covetousnesse, and ambition, of little gaines, or preferments, is Dishonourable.

Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be

great and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or unjust: for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power. Therefore the ancient Heathen did not thinke they Dishonoured, but greatly Honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their Poems, committing Rapes, Thefts, and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: In so much as nothing is so much celebrated in Jupiter, as his Adulteries; nor in Mercury, as his Frauds, and Thefts: of whose praises, in a hymne of Homer, the greatest is this, that being born in the morning, he had invented Musique at noon, and before night, stolne away the Cattell of Apollo, from his Herdsmen.

Also amongst men, till there were constituted great Common∣wealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe; but rather a lawfull Trade▪ not onely amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other Nations; as is manifest by the Histories of antient time. And at this day, in this part of the world, private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable, though unlawfull, till such time as there shall be Honour ordained for them that refuse, and Ignomi∣ny for them that make the Challenge. For Duels also are many times effects of Courage; and the ground of Courage is alwayes Strength or Skill, which are Power; though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in one, or both the Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are driven into the Lists to avoyd disgrace.

Scutchions, and Coats of Armes haereditary, where they have any* 1.144 eminent Priviledges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Pow∣er consisteth either in such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some such thing as is equally honoured in other men. This kind of Honour, commonly called Gentry, has been derived from the Antient Ger∣mans. For there never was any such thing known, where the Ger∣man Customes were unknown. Nor is it now any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The antient Greek Com∣manders, when they went to war, had their Shields painted with such Devises as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted Buckler was a signe of Poverty, and of a common Souldier: but they transmitted not the Inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families: but they were the Images, not the Devises of their Ancestors. Amongst the people of Asia, Afrique, and America, there is not, nor was ever, any such thing. The Germans onely had that custome; from whom it has been derived into England, France, Spain and Italy, when in great numbers they either ayded the Ro∣mans, or made their own Conquests in these Westerne parts of the world.

For Germany, being antiently, as all other Countries, in their be∣ginnings, divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords, or Ma∣sters of Families, that continually had wars one with another; those Masters, or Lords, principally to the end they might, when they were Covered with Arms, be known by their followers; and partly for ornament, both painted their Armor, or their Scutchion, or Coat, with the picture of some Beast, or other thing; and also put some eminent▪

and visible mark upon the Crest of their Helmets. And this orna∣ment both of the Armes, and Crest, descended by inheritance to their Children; to the eldest pure, and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the Old master, that is to say in Dutch, the Here-alt thought fit. But when many such Families, joyned together, made a greater Monarchy, this duty of the Herealt, to distinguish Scutchi∣ons, was made a private Office a part. And the issue of these Lords, is the great and antient Gentry; which for the most part bear living creatures, noted for courage, and rapine; or Castles, Battlements, Belts, Weapons, Bars, Palisadoes, and other notes of War; nothing being then in honour, but vertue military. Afterwards, not onely Kings, but popular Common-wealths, gave divers manners of Scut∣chions, to such as went forth to the War, or returned from it, for en∣couragement, or recompence to their service. All which, by an ob∣serving Reader, may be found in such antient Histories, Greek and Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners, in their times.

Titles of Honour, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron,* 1.145 are Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by the Sove∣raigne Power of the Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in old time titles of Office, and Command, derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans, and French. Dukes, in Latine Duces, being Generalls in War: Counts, Comites, such as bare the Generall com∣pany out of friendship; and were left to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified: Marquises, Marchiones, were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds of the Empire. Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the Empire, about the time of Constantine the Great, from the customes of the German Militia. But Baron, seems to have been a Title of the Gaules, and signifies a Great man; such as were the Kings, or Princes men, whom they em∣ployed in war about their persons; and seems to be derived from Vir, to Ber, and Bar, that signified the same in the Language of the Gaules, that Vir in Latine; and thence to Bero, and Baro: so that such men were called Berones, and after Barones; and (in Spanish) Varones. But he that would know more particularly the originall of Titles of Honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. Seldens most excellent Treatise of that subject. In processe of time these offices of Honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peaceable go∣vernment, were turned into meer Titles; serving for the most part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the Common-wealth: and men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises, and Barons of Places, wherein they had neither possession, nor com∣mand: and other Titles also, were devised to the same end.

WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of* 1.146* 1.147 a man; and also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a parti∣cular power, or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular ability, is usually named FITNESSE, or Aptitude.

For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have any other charge, that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the

well discharging of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has the qua∣lities most requisite for the well using of them: any of which quali∣ties being absent, one may neverthelesse be a Worthy man, and valu∣able for some thing else. Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches, Office, and Employment, that neverthelesse, can plead no right to have it before another; and therefore cannot be said to merit or de∣serve it. For Merit, praesupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: Of which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of Contracts.

CHAP. XI. Of the difference of MANNERS.

BY MANNERS, I mean not here, Decency of behaviour; as how one man should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the Small Moralls; But those qualities of man-kind, that* 1.148 concern their living together in Peace, and Unity. To which end we are to consider, that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the re∣pose of a mind satisfied. For there is no such Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers. Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and Imagi∣nations are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the Object of mans desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men, tend, not onely to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a contented life; and differ one∣ly in the way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.

So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all man∣kind,* 1.149 a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath pre∣sent, without the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by Lawes, or abroad by Wars: and when that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of Fame from new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of the mind.* 1.150

Competition of Riches, Honour, Command, or other power, en∣clineth

to Contention, Enmity, and War: Because the way of one Competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the other. Particularly, competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of Antiquity. For men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may ob∣scure the glory of the other.

Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey a com∣mon* 1.151 Power: Because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the pro∣tection might be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour. Fear of Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same reason.* 1.152 On the contrary, needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of Military command, are enclined to continue the causes of warre; and to stirre up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour Military but by warre; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.

Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a* 1.153 common Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure; and consequently protection from some other Power than their own.

Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them* 1.154 whose judgement they value; for of those men whom we contemn, we contemn also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us on Earth, as being joyes, that are either swallowed up in the un∣speakable joyes of Heaven, or extinguished in the extreme torments of Hell: yet is not such Fame vain; because men have a present de∣l•…•…ght therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may re∣do•…•…nd thereby to their posterity: which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.

To have received from one, to whom we think our selves equall,* 1.155 greater benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to counterfeit love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a des∣perate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitely wi∣shes him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits ob∣lige; and obligation is thraldome; and unrequitable obligation, perpetuall thraldome; which is to ones equall, hatefull. But to have received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge for superiour, enclines to love; because the obligation is no new depression: and cheerfull acceptation, (which men call Gratitude,) is such an honour done to the obliger, as is taken generally for retribution. Also to re∣ceive benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as long as there is hope of requitall, disposeth to love: for in the intention of the recei∣ver, the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall; from whence pro∣ceedeth an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is plea∣sed with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.* 1.156

To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to ex∣piate, enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer. For he must expect re∣venge,

or forgivenesse; both which are hatefull.

Feare of oppression, disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek ayd* 1.157 by society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.

Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition,* 1.158 better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wife, or crafty. For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be circum∣vented,) to strike first. And in sedition, men being alwayes in the procincts of battell, to hold together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtilty of Wit.

Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves* 1.159 of great sufficiency, delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are enclined onely to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when dan∣ger or difficulty appears, they look for nothing but to have their in∣sufficiency discovered.

Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency by the flatte∣ry of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without as∣sured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are enclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficul∣ty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.

Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of* 1.160 government, are disposed to Ambition. Because without publique Employment in counsell or magistracy, the honour of their wisdome is lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined to Ambition; for Eloquence seemeth wisedome, both to themselves and others.

Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently to* 1.161 lose the occasions, and fittest opportunities of action. For after men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach, if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, 'tis a signe, the difference of Motives, the one way and the other, are not great: Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; which is Pusillanimity.

Frugality, (though in poor men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to atchieve such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: For it weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by Reward.

Eloquence, with flattery, disposeth men to confide in them that* 1.162 have it; because the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming Kindnesse. Adde to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to adhaere, and subject themselves to those men that have them. The two former, having given them caution against danger from him; the later gives them caution against danger from others.

Want of Science, that is, Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather* 1.163 constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. For all men whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and see not why he should deceive them.

Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of under∣standing,* 1.164 disposeth men to take on trust, not onely the truth they know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust: For neither Error, nor non-sense, can without a per∣fect understanding of words, be detected.

From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: As they that approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that mislike it, Haeresie: and yet haeresie signifies no more than private opinion; but has onely a greater tincture of choler.

From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without study and great understanding, between one action of many men, and many actions of one multitude; as for example, between the one action of all the Senators of Rome in killing Catiline, and the many actions of a number of Senators in killing Caesar; and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people, that which is a mul∣titude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the perswasion of one.

Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of Right, Equi∣ty,* 1.165 Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and Example the rule of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust which it hath been the custome to punish; and that Just, of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an Example, or (as the Law∣yers which onely use this false measure of Justice barbarously call it) a Precedent; like little children, that have no other rule of good and evill manners, but the correction they receive from their Parents, and Masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas men are not so; because grown strong, and stubborn, they appeale from custome to reason, and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn; receding from custome when their interest requires it, and setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against them: Which is the cause, that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually dis∣puted, both by the Pen and the Sword: Whereas the doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is not so; because men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing that crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion, or to the interest of men that have dominion, That the three Angles of a Triangle, should be equall to two Angles of a Square; that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.

Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events,* 1.166 to the causes immediate, and Instrumentall: For these are all the cau∣ses they perceive. And hence it comes to passe, that in all places, men that are grieved with payments to the Publique, discharge their an∣ger upon the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers, Collectors, and other Officers of the publique Revenue; and adhaere to such as find fault with the publike Government; and thereby, when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon the Supreme

Authority, for feare of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.

Ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as to* 1.167 believe many times impossibilities: For such know nothing to the con∣trary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the Impossibi∣lity. And Credulity, because men love to be hearkened unto in compa∣ny, disposeth them to lying: so that Ignorance it selfe without Ma∣lice, is able to make a man both to believe lyes, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them.

Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the cau∣ses* 1.168 of things: because the knowledge of them, maketh men the bet∣ter able to order the present to their best advantage.

Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from* 1.169 consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternall; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any pro∣found enquiry into naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe there is one God Eternall; though they cannot have any Idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himselfe, there is somewhat there, which men call Fire, and is the cause of the heat he feeles; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an Idea, or Image of him in his mind.

And they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of things, yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distresse to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good successe, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their Gods. By which means it hath come to passe, that from the innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of Gods. And this Feare of things invisible, is the naturall Seed of that, which every one in himself calleth Religi∣on; and in them that worship, or feare that Power otherwise than they do, Superstition.

And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some of those that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse, and forme it into Lawes; and to adde to it of their own inven∣tion, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should best be able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers.

CHAP. XII. OF RELIGION.

SEeing there are no signes, nor fruit of Religion, but in Man* 1.170 onely; there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of Religion, is also onely in Man; and consisteth in some peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree therof, not to be found in other Living creatures.

And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive into* 1.171 the Causes of the Events they see, some more, some lesse; but all men so much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evill fortune.

Secondly, upon the sight of any thing that hath a Beginning, to* 1.172 think also it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather than sooner or later.

Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the en∣joying* 1.173 of their quotidian Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little, or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and me∣mory of the order, consequence, and dependance of the things they see; Man observeth how one Event hath been produced by another; and remembreth in them Antecedence and Consequence; And when he cannot assure himselfe of the true causes of things, (for the causes of good and evill fortune for the most part are invisible,) he suppo∣ses causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trust∣eth to the Authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himselfe.

The two first, make Anxiety. For being assured that there be causes* 1.174 of all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure him∣selfe against the evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come; So that every man, especially those that are over provident, are in an estate like to that of Prometheus. For as Prometheus, (which interpreted, is, The prudent man,) was bound to the hill Caucasus, a place of large pro∣spect, where, an Eagle feeding on his liver, devoured in the day, as much as was repayred in the night: So that man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.

This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ig∣norance* 1.175 of causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evill fortune, but some Power, or Agent Invisible: In which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets said, that the Gods were at first created by humane Feare: which spoken of the Gods, (that is to say, of the many Gods

of the Gentiles) is very true. But the acknowledging of one God Eternall, Infinite, and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their severall vertues, and operations; than from the feare of what was to be fall them in time to come. For he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plonge himselfe pro∣foundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one First Mo∣ver; that is, a First, and an Eternall cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: And all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both enclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things; and there∣by gives occasion of feigning of as many Gods, as there be men that feigne them.

And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fan∣cyed;* 1.176 they could not by naturall cogitation, fall upon any other con∣ceipt, but that it was the same with that of the Soule of man; and that the Soule of man, was of the same substance, with that which appear∣eth in a Dream, to one that sleepeth; or in a Looking-glasse, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are no∣thing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall, and externall Substances; and therefore call them Ghosts; as the Latines called them Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aëreall bodies; and those Invisible Agents, which they feared, to bee like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeall, or Immateriall, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as Spirit, and Incorporeall; yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them: And therefore, men that by their own me∣ditation, arrive to the acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternall God, choose rather to confesse he is Incomprehensible, and above their understanding; than to define his Nature by Spirit Incorporeall, and then confesse their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not Dogmatically, with intention to make the Divine Nature understood; but Piously, to honour him with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossenesse of Bodies Visible.

Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agents* 1.177 wrought their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in bringing things to passe, men that know not what it is that we call causing, (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guesse by, but by observing, and remembring what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent Event, any dependance or connexion at all: And therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good or evill luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it: As the Athenians

did for their war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; The Pompei∣an faction for their warre in Afrique, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them; as Charm∣ing, and Conjuring (the Leiturgy of Witches;) insomuch as to be∣lieve, they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or any thing, into any thing.

Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibite to Powers* 1.178 invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they would use towards men; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submissi∣on of Body, Considerate Addresses, sober Behaviour, premeditated Words, Swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises,) by invoking them. Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.

Lastly, concerning how these Invisible Powers declare to men the* 1.179 things which shall hereafter come to passe, especially concerning their good or evill fortune in generall, or good or ill successe in any parti∣cular undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save that using to conjecture of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not onely to take casuall things, after one or two encounters, for Prognostiques of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like Prognostiques from other men, of whom they have once con∣ceived a good opinion.

And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second* 1.180 causes, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Ca∣suall for Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of Religion; which by reason of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions of severall men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.

For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One* 1.181 sort have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, accord∣ing to their own invention. The other, have done it, by Gods com∣mandement, and direction: but both sorts have done it, with a pur∣pose to make those men that relyed on them, the more apt to Obedi∣ence, Lawes, Peace, Charity, and civill Society. So that the Religi∣on of the former sort, is a part of humane Politiques; and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings require of their Subjects. And the Religion of the later sort is Divine Politiques; and containeth Precepts to those that have yeelded themselves subjects in the King∣dome of God. Of the former sort, were all the founders of Common-wealths, and the Law-givers of the Gentiles: Of the later sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour; by whom have been derived unto us the Lawes of the Kingdome of God.

And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in opinions con∣cerning* 1.182 the nature of Powers Invisible, there is almost nothing that has a name, that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, in one

place or another, a God, or Divell; or by their Poets feigned to be inanimated, inhabited, or possessed by some Spirit or other.

The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of Chaos.

The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, were so many Gods.

Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dogge, a Snake, an Onion, a Leeke, De•…•…fied. Besides, that they filled almost all places, with spirits called Daemons: the plains, with Pan, and Panises, or Satyres; the Woods, with Fawnes, and Nymphs; the Sea, with Tritons, and other Nymphs; every River, and Fountayn, with a Ghost of his name, and with Nymphs; every house, with its Lares, or Familiars; every man, with his Genius; Hell, with Ghosts, and spirituall Offi∣cers, as Charon, Cerberus, and the Furies; and in the night time, all places with Larvae, Lemures, Ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdome of Fayries, and Bugbears. They have also ascribed Divi∣nity, and built Temples to meer Acciden•…•…s, and Qualities; such as are Time, Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love, Contention, Vertue, Ho∣nour, Health, Rust, Fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if there were Ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or withholding that Good, or Evill, for, or against which they prayed. They invoked also their own Wit, by the name of Muses; their own Ignorance, by the name of Fortune; their own Lust, by the name of Cupid; their own Rage, by the name Furies; their own privy members by the name of Pria∣pus; and attributed their pollutions, to •…•…ncubi, and Succubae: inso∣much as there was nothing, which a Poet could introduce as a person in his Poem, which they did not make either a God, or a Divel.

The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the second ground for Religion, which is mens Ignorance of causes; and thereby their aptnesse to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was no dependance at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, in stead of second causes, a kind of second and mi∣nisteriall Gods; ascribing the cause of Foecundity, to Venus; the cause of Arts, to Apolla; of Subtilty and Craft, to Mercury; of Tempests and stormes, to Aeolus; and of other effects, to other Gods: inso∣much as there was amongst the Heathen almost as great variety of Gods, as of businesse.

And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to bee used towards their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest formerly named; the same Legislators of the Gentiles have added their Images, both in Picture, and Sculpture; that the more ignorant sort, (that is to say, the most part, or generality of the peo∣ple,) thinking the Gods for whose representation they were made, were really included, and as it were housed within them, might so much the more stand in feare of them: And endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart from all other humane uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy to those their Idols; as Caverns, Groves, Woods, Mountains, and whole Ilands; and

have attributed to them, not onely the shapes, some of Men, some of Beasts, some of Monsters; but also the Faculties, and Passions of men and beasts; as Sense, Speech, Sex, Lust, Generation, (and this not onely by mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of Gods; but also by mixing with men, and women, to beget mongrill Gods, and but inmates of Heaven, as Bacchus, Hercules, and others;) besides, Anger. Revenge, and other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from them, as Fraud, Theft, Adultery, Sodo∣mie, and any vice that may be taken for an effect of Power, or a cause of Pleasure; and all such Vices, as amongst men are taken to be against Law, rather than against Honour.

Lastly, to the Prognostiques of time to come; which are naturally, but Conjectures upon the Experience of time past; and supernatural∣ly, divine Revelation; the same authors of the Religion of the Gen∣tiles, partly upon pretended Experience, partly upon pretended Reve∣lation, have added innumerable other superstitious wayes of Divina∣tion; and made men believe they should find their fortunes, some∣times in the ambiguous or senslesse answers of the Priests at Delphi, Delos, Ammon, and other famous Oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous by designe, to own the event both wayes; or ab∣surd, by the intoxicating vapour of the place, which is very frequent in sulphurous Cavernes: Sometimes in the leaves of the Sibills; of whose Prophecyes (like those perhaps of Nostradamus; for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman Republiques Sometimes in the insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to be possessed with a divine Spirit; which Possession they called Enthusi∣asme; and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted Theo∣mancy, or Prophecy: Sometimes in the aspect of the Starres at their Nativity; which was called Horoscopy, and esteemed a part of judi∣ciary Astrology: Sometimes in their own hopes and feares, called Thumomancy, or Presage: Sometimes in the Prediction of Wit∣ches, that pretended conference with the dead; which is called Ne∣cromancy, Conjuring, and Witchcraft; and is but juggling and con∣federate knavery: Sometimes in the Casuall flight, or feeding of birds; called Augury: Sometimes in the Entrayles of a sacrificed beast; which was Aruspicina: Sometimes in Dreams: Sometimes in Croaking of Ravens, or chattering of Birds: Sometimes in the Li∣neaments of the face; which was called Metoposcopy; or by Palmi∣stry in the lines of the hand; in casuall words, called Omina: Some∣times in Monsters, or unusuall accidents; as Ecclipses, Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births, and the like, which they called Portenta, and Ostenta, because they thought them to portend, or foreshew some great Calamity to come: Somtimes, in meer Lottery, as Crosse and Pile; counting holes in a sive; dipping of Verses in Homer, and Virgil; and innumerable other such vaine conceipts. So easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as have gotten credit with them; and can with gentlenesse, and dexterity, take hold of their fear, and ignorance.

And therefore the first Founders, and Legislators of Common∣wealths* 1.183 amongst the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, have in all places taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a beliefe, that those precepts which they gave concerning Religion, might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some God, or other Spi∣rit; or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortalls, that their Lawes might the more easily be received: So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the Ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans, from the Nymph Egeria: and the first King and founder of the Kingdome of Peru, pretended himselfe and his wife to be the children of the Sunne: and Mahomet, to set up his new Religion, pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in forme of a Dove. Secondly, they have had a care, to make it be∣lieved, that the same things were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Lawes. Thirdly, to prescribe Ceremonies, Supplications, Sacrifices, and Festivalls, by which they were to believe, the anger of the Gods might be appeased; and that ill suc∣cess in War, great contagions of Sicknesse, Earthquakes, and each mans private Misery, came from the Anger of the Gods; and their Anger from the Neglect of their Worship, or the forgetting, or mi∣staking some point of the Ceremonies required. And though a∣mongst the antient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in the Poets is written of the paines, and pleasures after this life; which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have in their Harangues openly derided; yet that beliefe was alwaies more cherished, than the contrary.

And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtayned in order to their end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or errour in their Ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the lawes, were the lesse apt to mut•…•…ny against their Governors. And being entertained with the pomp, and pastime of Festivalls, and publike Games, made in honour of the Gods, needed nothing else but bread, to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and com∣motion against the State. And therefore the Romans, that had con∣quered the greatest part of the then known World, made no scru∣ple of tollerating any Religion whatsoeuer in the City of Rome it selfe; unlesse it had somthing in it, that could not consist with their Civill Government; nor do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jewes; who (being the peculiar King∣dome of God) thought it unlawfull to acknowledge subjection to any mortall King or State whatsoever. And thus you see how the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.

But where God himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation, planted* 1.184 Religion; there he also made to himselfe a peculiar Kingdome; and gave Lawes, not only of behaviour towards himselfe; but also towards one another; and thereby in the Kingdome of God, the Policy, and lawes Civill, are a part of Religion; and therefore the

distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall Domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is King of all the Earth: Yet may he be King of a peculiar, and chosen Nation. For there is no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the generall command of the whole Army, should have withall a peculiar Regiment, or Com∣pany of his own. God is King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his chosen people, he is King by Covenant. But to speake more largly of the Kingdome of God, both by Nature, and Cove∣nant, I have in the following discourse assigned an other place.* 1.185

From the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understand* 1.186 the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or princi∣ples; which are only an opinion of a Deity, and Powers invisible, and supernaturall; that can never be so abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions may againe be made to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as for such purpose are in reputation.

For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they be∣lieve not only to be a wise man, and to labou•…•… to procure their hap∣piness, but also to be a holy man, to whom God himselfe vouch∣safeth to declare his will supernaturally; It followeth necessarily, when they that have the Government of Religion, shall come to have either the wisedome of those men, their sincerity, or their love suspected; or that they shall be unable to shew any probable token of Divine Revelation; that the Religion which they desire to uphold, must be suspected likewise; and (without the feare of the Civill Sword) contradicted and rejected.

That which taketh away the reputation of Wisedome, in him that* 1.187 formeth a Religion, or addeth to it when it is allready formed, is the enjoyning of a beliefe of contradictories: For both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true: and therefore to enjoyne the beleife of them, is an argument of ignorance; which detects the Author in that; and discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernaturall: which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing a∣gainst naturall reason.

That which taketh away the reputation of Sincerity, is the do∣ing,* 1.188 or saying of such things, as appeare to be signes, that what they require other men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings, or sayings are therefore called Scandalous, because they be stumbling blocks, that make men to fall in the way of Religion: as Injustice, Cruelty, Prophanesse, Avarice, and Luxury. For who can believe, that he that doth ordinarily such actions, as pro∣ceed from any of these rootes, believeth there is any such Invi∣sible Power to be feared, as he affrighteth other men withall, for lesser faults?

That which taketh away the reputation of Love, is the being dete∣cted of private ends: as when the beliefe they require of others, conduceth or seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of Dominion, Ri∣ches,

Dignity, or secure Pleasure, to themselves onely, or specially. For that which men reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others.

Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine Calling, can* 1.189 be no other, than the operation of Miracles; or true Prophecy, (which also is a Miracle;) or extraordinary Felicity. And therefore, to those points of Religion, which have been received from them that did such Miracles; those that are added by such, as approve not their Calling by some Miracle, obtain no greater beliefe, than what the Custome, and Lawes of the places, in which they be educated, have wrought into them. For as in naturall things, men of judge∣ment require naturall signes, and arguments; so in supernaturall things, they require signes supernaturall, (which are Miracles,) be∣fore they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.

All which causes of the weakening of mens faith, do manifestly appear in the Examples following. First, we have the Example of the children of Israel; who when Moses, that had approved his Cal∣ling to them by Miracles, and by the happy conduct of them out of Egypt, was absent but 40. dayes, revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to them by him; and setting up * 1.190 a Golden Calfe for their God, relapsed into the Idolatry of the Egyptians; from whom they had been so lately delivered. And again, after Mo∣ses, Aaron, Joshua, and that generation which had seen the great works of God in Israel, * 1.191 were dead; another generation arose, and served Baal. So that Miracles fayling, Faith also failed.

Again, when the sons of Samuel, * 1.192 being constituted by their father Judges in Bersabee, received bribes, and judged unjustly, the people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their King, in other manner than he was King of other people; and therefore cryed out to Samuel, to choose them a King after the manner of the Nations. So that Justice fayling, Faith also fayled: Insomuch, as they depo∣sed their God, from reigning over them.

And whereas in the planting of Christian Religion, the Oracles ceased in all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Chri∣stians encreased wonderfully every day, and in every place, by the preaching of the Apostles, and Evangelists; a great part of that suc∣cesse, may reasonably be attributed, to the contempt, into which the Priests of the Gentiles of that time, had brought themselves, by their uncleannesse, avarice, and jugling between Princes. Also the Religion of the Church of Rome, was partly, for the same cause abo∣lished in England, and many other parts of Christendome; inso∣much, as the fayling of Vertue in the Pastors, maketh Faith faile in the People: and partly from bringing of the Philosophy, and do∣ctrine of Aristotle into Religion, by the Schoole-men; from whence there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the Clergy into a reputation both of Ignorance, and of Fraudulent inten∣tion; and enclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of their own Princes, as in France, and Holland; or with their will, as in England.

Lastly, amongst the points by the Church of Rome declared neces∣sary for Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope, and of his spirituall subjects, residing in the territories of other Christian Princes, that were it not for the mutuall emulation of those Princes, they might without warre, or trouble, exclude all for∣raign Authority, as easily as it has been excluded in England. For who is there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it believed, that a King hath not his Authority from Christ, unlesse a Bishop crown him? That a King, if he be a Priest, cannot Marry? That whether a Prince be born in lawfull Marriage, or not, must be judged by Authority from Rome? That Subjects may be freed from their Alleageance, if by the Court of Rome, the King be judged an Heretique? That a King (as Chilperique of France) may be deposed by a Pope (as Pope Zachary,) for no cause; and his Kingdome given to one of his Subjects? That the Clergy, and Regulars, in what Country soever, shall be exempt from the Jurisdiction of their King, in cases criminall? Or who does not see, to whose profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and Vales of Purgatory; with other signes of private interest, enough to mortifie the most lively Faith, if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate, and Custome did not more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the Sanctity, Wisdome, or Probity of their Teachers? So that I may attribute all the changes of Religion in the world, to one and the same cause; and that is, unpleasing Priests; and those not onely amongst Catholiques, but even in that Church that hath presumed most of Reformation.

CHAP. XIII. Of the NATURALL CONDITION of Mankind, as concernîng their Felicity, and Mis•…•…ry.

NAture hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and* 1.193 mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then ano∣ther; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the fame danger with himselfe.

And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and infallible rules, called Science; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) I find yet a grea∣ter equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in

those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which almost all men think they have in a grea∣ter degree, than the Vulgar; that is, than all men but them∣selves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that how∣soever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than that eve∣ry man is contented with his share.

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the* 1.194 attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principal∣ly their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepa∣red with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.

And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for a∣ny* 1.195 man to secure himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally al∣lowed. Also because there be some, that taking pleasure in contem∣plating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by stand∣ing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans con∣servation, it ought to be allowed him.

Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.

The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, to make them∣selves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a dif∣ferent opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a com∣mon* 1.196 Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fight∣ing; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time, is to be consi∣dered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposi∣tion thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where* 1.197 every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigati∣on, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to in∣vade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with him∣selfe, when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this when he knowes there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words? But neither of us accuse mans nature in it. The Desires, and other Passi∣ons of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them: which till Lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it.

It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the govern∣ment of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what man∣ner of life there would be, where there were no common Power to feare; by the manner of life, which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to degenerate into, in a civill Warre.

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Inde∣pendency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.

To this warre of every man against every man, this also is conse∣quent;* 1.198 that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. Where there is no com∣mon Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice. Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues. Justice, and In∣justice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is consequent also to the same con∣dition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason.

The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; De∣sire* 1.199 of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth conveni∣ent Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature: whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two follow∣ing Chapters.

CHAP. XIV. Of the first and s•…•…cond NATURALL LAWES, and of CONTRACTS.

THe RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call* 1.200 Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.

By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification* 1.201 of the word, the absence of externall Impediments: which Impedi∣ments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, accor∣ding as his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.

A LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis,) is a Precept, or generall* 1.202 Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preser∣ving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to con∣found Jus, and Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distingui∣shed; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare;* 1.203 Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the* 1.204 precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against eve∣ry one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one ano∣thers body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Na∣ture ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a pre∣cept, or generall rule of Reason, That every man, ought to endeavour* 1.205 Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre. The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first, and Fundamentall Law of Nature; which is, to seek Peace, and follow it. The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, By all means we can, to defend our selves.

From this Fundamentall Law of Nature, by which men are com∣manded* 1.206 to endeavour Peace, is derived this second Law; That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and

defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe. For as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of Warre. But if other men will not lay down their Right, as well as he; then there is no Reason for any one, to devest himselfe of his: For that were to expose himselfe to Prey, (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himselfe to Peace. This is that Law of the Gospell; Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them. And that Law of all men, Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.

To lay downe a mans Right to any thing, is to devest himselfe of* 1.207 the Liberty, of hindring another of the benefit of his own Right to the same. For he that renounceth, or passeth away his Right, giveth not to any other man a Right which he had not before; because there is nothing to which every man had not Right by Nature: but onely standeth out of his way, that he may enjoy his own originall Right, without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the efect which redoundeth to one man, by another mans defect of Right, is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own Right originall.

Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by Trans∣ferring* 1.208 it to another. By Simply RENOUNCING; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By TRANSFERRING;* 1.209 when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person, or per∣sons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to* 1.210 hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he Ought, and it is his DUTY, not to make* 1.211 voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is IN∣IUSTICE, and INIURY, as being Sine Jure; the Right being be∣fore* 1.212 renounced, or transferred. So that Injury, or Injustice, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the disputations of Scholers is called Absurdity. For as it is there called an Absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the Beginning: so in the world, it is called Injustice, and Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply Renounceth, or Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration, or Signification, by some voluntary and suffi∣cient signe, or signes, that he doth so Renounce, or Transferre; or hath so Renounced, or Transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these Signes are either Words onely, or Actions onely; or (as it hap∣peneth most often) both Words, and Actions. And the same are the BONDS, by which men are bound, and obliged: Bonds, that have their strength, not from their own Nature, (for nothing is more easi∣ly broken then a mans word,) but from Feare of some evill conse∣quence upon the rupture.

Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it* 1.213 is either in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to

himselfe; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good to himselfe. And therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned; or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; be∣cause he cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to him∣selfe. The same may be sayd of Wounds; and Chayns, and Impri∣sonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such pati∣ence; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of Right is introduced, is nothing else but the security of a mans person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of the End, for which those signes were intended; he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and acti∣ons were to be interpreted.

The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call CON∣TRACT.* 1.214

There is difference, between transferring of Right to the Thing; and transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the Thing it selfe. For the Thing may be delivered together with the Translation of the Right; as in buying and selling with ready mony; or exchange of goods, or lands: and it may be delivered some time after.

Again, one of the Contractors, may deliver the Thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some deter∣minate time after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the Con∣tract on his part, is called PACT,▪ or COVENANT: Or both parts* 1.215 may contract now, to performe hereafter: in which cases, he that is to performe in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called Keeping of Promise, or Faith; and the fayling of performance (if it be voluntary) Violation of Faith.

When the transferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of Charity, or Magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; This is not Contract, but GIFT, FREE-GIFT, GRACE: which words signifie one and the* 1.216 same thing.

Signes of Contract, are either Expresse, or by Inference.* 1.217 Expresse, are words spoken with understanding of what they signi∣fie: And such words are either of the time Present, or Past; as, I Give, I Grant, I have Given, I have Granted, I will that this be yours: Or of the future; as, I will Give, I will Grant: which words of the future, are called PROMISE.* 1.218

Signes by Inference, are sometimes the consequence of Words;

sometimes the consequence of Silence; sometimes the consequence of Actions; somtimes the consequence of Forbearing an Action: and ge∣nerally a signe by Inference, of any Contract, is whatsoever suffici∣ently argues the will of the Contractor.

Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare* 1.219 promise, are an insufficient signe of a Free-gift and therefore not ob∣ligatory. For if they be of the time to Come, as, To morrow I will Give, they are a signe I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till I transferre it by some other Act. But if the words be of the time Present, or Past, as, I have gi∣ven, or do give to be delivered to morrow, then is my to morrows Right given away to day; and that by the vertue of the words, though there were no other argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the signification of these words; Volo hoc tuum esse cras, and Cras dabo; that is, between I will that this be thine to morrow, and, I will give it thee to morrow: For the word I will, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will Present; but in the later, it fignifies a promise of an act of the will to Come: and therefore the former words, being of the Present, transferre a future right; the later, that be of the Future, transferre nothing. But if there be other signes of the Will to transferre a Right, besides Words; then, though the gift be Free, yet may the Right be understood to passe by words of the future: as if a man propound a Prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, The gift is Free; and though the words be of the Fu∣ture, yet the Right passeth: for if he would not have his words so be understood, he should not have let them runne.

In Contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of* 1.220 the time Present, or Past; but also where they are of the Future: be∣cause all Contract is mutuall translation, or change of Right; and therefore he that promiseth onely, because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he inten∣ded the Right should passe: for unlesse he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of Contract, a Promise is equivalent to a Covenant; and therefore obligatory.

He that performeth first in the case of a Contract, is said to ME∣RIT* 1.221 that which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath it as Due. Also when a Prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him onely that winneth; or mony is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a Free gift; yet so to Win, or so to Catch, is to Merit, and to have it as DUE. For the Right is transferred in the Propounding of the Prize, and in throwing down the mony; though it be not determined to whom, but by the Event of the contention. But there is between these two sorts of Merit, this difference, that In Contract, I Merit by vertue of my own power, and the Contractors need; but in this case of Free gift, I am enabled to Merit onely by the benignity of the Giver: In Contract, I merit at the Contractors hand that hee

should depart with his right; In this case of Gift, I Merit not that the giver should part with his right; but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than anothers. And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the Schooles, between Meritum con∣grui, and Meritum condigni. For God Almighty, having promised Paradise to those men (hoodwinkt with carnall desires,) that can walk through this world according to the Precepts, and Limits prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall Merit Paradise Ex con∣gruo. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own Righ∣teousnesse, or any other power in himselfe, but by the Free Grace of God onely; they say, no man can Merit Paradise ex condigno. This I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because Dispu∣ters do not agree upon the signification of their own termes of Art, longer than it serves their turn; I will not affirme any thing of their meaning: onely this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth Meriteth, and may claime the Prize as Due.

If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties performe* 1.222 presently, but trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of Warre of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspition, it is Voyd: But if there be a common Power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compell performance; it is not Voyd. For he that performeth first, has no as∣surance the other will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Pas∣sions, without the feare of some coerceive Power; which in the con∣dition of meer Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therfore he which performeth first, does but betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the Right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.

But in a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the Covenant is to per∣form first, is obliged so to do.

The cause of feare, which maketh such a Covenant invalid, must be alwayes something arising after the Covenant made; as some new fact, or other signe of the Will not to performe: else it cannot make the Covenant voyd. For that which could not hinder a man from pro∣mising, ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.

He that transferreth any Right, transferreth the Means of enjoying* 1.223 it, as farre as lyeth in his power. As he that selleth Land, is under∣stood to transferre the Herbage, and whatsoever growes upon it; Nor can he that sells a Mill turn away the Stream that drives it. And they that give to a man the Right of government in Soveraignty, are un∣derstood to give him the right of levying mony to maintain Souldi∣ers; and of appointing Magistrates for the administration of Justice.

To make Covenants with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not* 1.224 understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any

translation of Right; nor can translate any Right to another: and without mutuall acceptation, there is no Covenant.

To make Covenant with God, is impossible, but by Mediation of* 1.225 such as God speaketh to, either by Revelation supernaturall, or by his Lieutenants that govern under him, and in his Name: For otherwise we know not whether our Covenants be accepted, or not. And there∣fore they that Vow any thing contrary to any law of Nature, Vow in vain; as being a thing unjust to pay such Vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the Law of Nature, it is not the Vow, but the Law that binds them.

The matter, or subject of a Covenant, is alwayes something that* 1.226 falleth under deliberation; (For to Covenant, is an act of the Will; that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is there∣fore alwayes understood to be something to come; and which is jud∣ged Possible for him that Covenanteth, to performe.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be Impossible, is no Covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible, the Covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the thing it selfe,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible: for to more no man can be obliged.

Men are freed of their Covenants two wayes; by Performing; or* 1.227 by being Forgiven. For Performance, is the naturall end of ob∣ligation; and Eorgivenesse, the restitution of liberty; as being a re∣transferring of that Right, in which the obligation consisted.

Covenants entred into by fear, in the condition of meer Nature,* 1.228 are obligatory. For example, if I Covenant to pay a ransome, or service for my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it. For it is a Con∣tract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive mony, or service for it; and consequently, where no other Law (as in the condition, of meer Nature) forbiddeth the performance, the Covenant is valid. Therefore Prisoners of warre, if trusted with the payment of their Ransome, are obliged to pay it: And if a wea∣ker Prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for feare; he is bound to keep it; unlesse (as hath been sayd before) there ari∣seth some new, and just cause of feare, to renew the war. And even in Common-wealths, if I be forced to redeem my selfe from a Theefe by promising him mony, I am bound to pay it, till the Civill Law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without Obligati∣on, the same I may lawfully Covenant to do through feare: and what I lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break.

A former Covenant, makes voyd a later. For a man that hath pas∣sed* 1.229 away his Right to one man to day, hath it not to passe to morrow to another: and therefore the later promise passeth no Right, but is null.

A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is al∣wayes* 1.230 voyd. For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his Right to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment, (the avoyding whereof is the onely End of laying

down any Right, and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging. For though a man may Covenant thus, Unlesse I do so, or so, kill me; he cannot Covenant thus, Unlesse I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me. For man by nature chooseth the lesser evill, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and pre∣sent death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead Criminals to Execution, and Prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such Criminals have consented to the Law, by which they are condemned.

A Covenant to accuse ones selfe, without assurance of pardon, is* 1.231 likewise invalide. For in the condition of Nature, where every man is Judge, there is no place for Accusation: and in the Civill State, the Accusation is followed with Punishment; which being Force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is also true, of the Accusation of those, by whose Condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a Father, Wife, or Benefactor. For the Testimony of such an Accu∣ser, if it be not willingly given, is praesumed to be corrupted by Na∣ture; and therefore not to be received: and where a mans Testimony is not to be credited, he is not bound to give it. Also Accusations upon Torture, are not to be reputed as Testimonies. For Torture is to be used but as means of conjecture, and light, in the further exa∣mination, and search of truth: and what is in that case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is Tortured; not to the informing of the Torturers: and therefore ought not to have the credit of a suffici∣ent Testimony: for whether he deliver himselfe by true, or false Ac∣cusation, he does it by the Right of preserving his own life.

The force of Words, being (as I have formerly noted) too weak* 1.232 to hold men to the performance of their Covenants; there are in mans nature, but two imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a Feare of the consequence of breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to need to breake it. This later is a Generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of Wealth, Command, or sensuall Pleasure; which are the greatest part of Mankind. The Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear; whereof there be two very generall Objects: one, The Power of Spi∣rits Invisible; the other, The Power of those men they shall therein Offend. Of these two, though the former be the greater Power, yet the feare of the later is commonly the greater Feare. The Feare of the former is in every man, his own Religion: which hath place in the nature of man before Civill Society. The later hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their promises; because in the condition of meer Nature, the inequality of Power is not discerned, but by the event of Battell. So that before the time of Civill Socie∣ty, or in the interruption thereof by Warre, there is nothing can strengthen a Covenant of Peace agreed on, against the temptations of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or other strong desire, but the feare of that Invisible Power, which they every one Worship as God; and Feare as a Revenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can be done

between two men not subject to Civill Power, is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth: Which Swearing, or OATH, is a* 1.233 Forme of Speech, added to a Promise; by which he that promiseth, •…•…g∣nisieth, that unlesse he performe, he renounceth the mercy of his God, or calleth to him for vengeance on himselfe. Such was the Heathen Forme, Let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this Beast. So is our Forme, I shall do thus, and thus, so help me God. And this, with the Rites and Ceremonies, which every one useth in his own Religi∣on, that the feare of breaking faith might be the greater.

By this it appears, that an Oath taken according to any other* 1.234 Forme, or Rite, then his, that sweareth, is in vain; and no Oath: And that there is no Swearing by any thing which the Swearer thinks not God. For though men have sometimes used to swear by their Kings, for feare, or flattery; yet they would have it thereby under∣stood, they attributed to them Divine honour. And that Swearing unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning of his name: and Swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is not Swearing, but an impious Custome, gotten by too much vehemence of talking.

It appears also, that the Oath addes nothing to the Obligation. For* 1.235 a Covenant, if lawfull, binds in the sight of God, without the Oath, as much as with it: if unlawfull, bindeth not at all; though it be con∣firmed with an Oath.

CHAP. XV. Of other Lawes of Nature.

FRom that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to transferre* 1.236 to another, such Rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of Mankind, there followeth a Third; which is this, That men performe their Covenants made: without which, Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still in the condition of Warre.

And in this law of Nature, consisteth the Fountain and Originall* 1.237 of JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be Unjust. But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: And the definition of INIUSTICE, is no other than the not Performance of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust, is Just.

But because Covenants of mutuall trust, where there is a feare of not* 1.238 performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former Chap∣ter,) are invalid; though the Originall of Justice be the making of Covenants; yet Injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such feare be taken away; which while men are in the naturall condition of Warre, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be some coërcive Power, to compell men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the terrour of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect

by the breach of their Covenant; and to make good that Propriety, which by mutuall Contract men acquire, in recompence of the uni∣versall Right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a Common-wealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles: For they say, that Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man his own. And therefore where there is no Own, that is, no Propriety, there is no In∣justice; and where there is no coërceive Power erected, that is, where there is no Common-wealth, there is no Propriety; all men having Right to all things: Therefore where there is no Common∣wealth, there nothing is Unjust. So that the nature of Justice, con∣sisteth in keeping of valid Covenants: but the Validity of Cove∣nants begins not but with the Constitution of a Civill Power, suffici∣ent to compell men to keep them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.

The Foole hath fayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice;* 1.239 and sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging, that every mans conservation, and contentment, being committed to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to make, or not make; keep, or not keep Covenants, was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit. He does not therein deny, that there be Covenants; and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such breach of them may be called Injustice, and the obser∣vance of them Justice: but he questioneth, whether Injustice, taking away the feare of God, (for the same Foole hath said in his heart there is no God,) may not sometimes stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a condition, to neg∣lect not onely the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of other men. The Kingdome of God is gotten by violence: but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? and if it be not against Reason, it is not against Justice: or else Justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this, Succesfull wickednesse hath obtained the name of Vertue: and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of Faith; yet have allowed it, when it is for the getting of a Kingdome. And the Heathen that believed, that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed neverthelesse the same Jupiter to be the avenger of Injustice: Somewhat like to a piece of Law in Cokes Commentaries on Litleton; where he sayes, If the right Heire of the Crown be attainted of Treason; yet the Crown shall descend to him, and eo instante the Atteynder be voyd: From which instances a man will be very prone to inferre; that when the Heire apparent of a Kingdome, shall kill him that is in possession, though his father; you may call it Injustice, or by what other name you will; yet it can never be against Reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most Reasonable, that conduce most to their

ends. This specious reasoning is neverthelesse false.

For the question is not of promises mutuall, where there is no se∣curity of performance on either side; as when there is no Civill Power erected over the parties promising; for such promises are no Covenants: But either where one of the parties has performed al∣ready; or where there is a Power to make him performe; there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to performe, or not. And I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation whereof, we are to consider; First, that when a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding any thing can be fore∣seen, and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect, arriving may turne it to his benefit; yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of Warre, wherein every man to every man, for want of a common Power to keep them all in awe, is an Enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himselfe from destruction, without the help of Confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the Confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares he thinks it rea∣son to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single Power. He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any Society, that unite themselves for Peace and Defence, but by the errour of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retay∣ned in it, without seeing the danger of their errour; which errours a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his secu∣rity: and therefore if he be left, or cast out of Society, he perisheth; and if he live in Society, it is by the errours of other men, which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction, forbear him onely out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.

As for the Instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity of Heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imagi∣nable; and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant.

And for the other Instance of attaining Soveraignty by Rebelli∣on; it is manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, Keeping of Covenant, is a Rule of Reason, by which we are forbid∣den to do any thing destructive to our life; and consequently a Law of Nature.

There be some that proceed further; and will not have the Law of Nature, to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on earth; but to the attaining of an eternall felicity after death; to which they think the breach of Covenant may conduce; and conse∣quently be just and reasonable; (such are they that think it a work of

merit to kill, or depose, or rebell against, the Soveraigne Power constituted over them by their own consent.) But because there is no naturall knowledge of mans estate after death; much lesse of the re∣ward that is then to be given to breach of Faith; but onely a beliefe grounded upon other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally; Breach of Faith cannot be called a Precept of Rea∣son, or Nature.

Others, that allow for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith, do* 1.240 neverthelesse make exception of certain persons; as Heretiques, and such as use not to performe their Covenant to others: And this also is against reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our Covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been suffici∣ent to have hindred the making of it.

The names of Just, and Injust, when they are attributed to Men,* 1.241 signifie one thing; and when they are attributed to Actions, another. When they are attributed to Men, they signifie Conformity, or In∣conformity of Manners, to Reason. But when they are attributed to Actions, they signifie the Conformity, or Inconformity to Reason, not of Manners, or manner of life, but of particular Actions. A Just man therefore, is he that taketh all the care he can, that his Acti∣ons may be all Just: and an Unjust man, is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often in our Language stiled by the names of Righteous, and Unrighteous; then Just, and Unjust; though the meaning be the same. Therefore a Righteous man, does not lose that Title, by one, or a few unjust Actions, that proceed from sudden Pas∣sion, or mistake of Things, or Persons: nor does an Unrighteous man, lose his character, for such Actions, as he does, or forbeares to do, for feare: because his Will is not framed by the Justice, but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do. That which gives to hu∣mane Actions the relish of Justice, is a certain Noblenesse or Gal∣lantnesse of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of pro∣mise. This Justice of the Manners, is that which is meant, where Ju∣stice is called a Vertue; and Injustice a Vice.

But the Justice of Actions denominates men, not Just, but Guilt∣lesse: and the Injustice of the same, (which is also called Injury,) gives them but the name of Guilty.

Again, the Injustice of Manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to* 1.242 do Injurie; and is Injustice before it proceed to Act; and without supposing any individuall person injured. But the Injustice of an Action, (that is to say Injury,) supposeth an individuall person Inju∣red; namely him, to whom the Covenant was made: And therefore many times the injury is received by one man, when the dammage redoundeth to another. As when the Master commandeth his ser∣vant to give mony to a stranger; if it be not done, the Injury is done to the Master, whom he had before Covenanted to obey; but the dammage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no Obligation; and therefore could not Injure him. And so also in Common∣wealths,

private men may remit to one another their debts; but not robberies or other violences, whereby they are endammaged; be∣ca•…•…se the detaining of Debt, is an Injury to themselves; but Robbery and Violence, are Injuries to the Person of the Common-wealth.

Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own Will signi∣ed* 1.243 to the doer, is no Injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed away his originall right to do what he please, by some Ante∣cedent Covenant, there is no breach of Covenant; and therefore no Injury done him. And if he have; then his Will to have it done being signified, is a release of that Covenant: and so again there is no Injury done him.

Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided into Commutative, and* 1.244 Distributive: and the former they say consisteth in proportion Arithmeticall; the later in proportion Geometricall. Commutative therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for; And Distributive, in the distribution of equall benefit, to men of equall merit. As if it were Injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give. And Merit (besides that which is by Covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under Justice Commutative, not Distributive,) is not due by Justice; but is rewarded of Grace onely. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, Commutative Justice, is the Justice of a Contractor; that is, a Performance of Covenant, in Buying, and Selling; Hiring, and Letting to Hire; Lending, and Borrowing; Exchanging, Bartering, and other acts of Contract.

And Distributive Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator; that is to say, the act of defining what is Just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that make him Arbitrator,) if he performe his Trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own: and this is indeed Just Distributi∣on, and may be called (though improperly) Distributive Justice; but more properly Equity; which also is a Law of Nature, as shall be shewn in due place.

As Justice dependeth on Antecedent Covenant; so does GRATI∣TUDE* 1.245 depend on Antecedent Grace; that is to say, Antecedent Free∣gift: and is the fourth Law of Nature; which may be conceived in this Forme, That a man which receiveth Benefit from another of meer Grace, Endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. For no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himselfe; because Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to every man his own Good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutuall help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of War; which is contrary to the first and Fundamentall Law of Na∣ture, which commandeth men to Seck Peace. The breach of this Law,

is called Ingratitude; and hath the same relation to Grace, that Inju∣stice hath to Obligation by Covenant,

A fifth Law of Nature, is COMPLEASANCE; that is to say, That* 1.246 every man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest. For the under∣standing whereof, we may consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to Society; a diversity of Nature, rising from their diversity of Affecti∣ons; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an Aedifice. For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregula∣rity of Figure, takes more room from others, than it selfe fills; and for the hardnesse, cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and trouble∣some: so also, a man that by asperity of Nature, will strive to retain those things which to himselfe are superfluous, and to others necessa∣ry; and for the stubbornness of his Passions, cannot be corrected, is to be left, or cast out of Society, as combersome thereunto. For seeing every man, not onely by Right, but also by necessity of Nature, is sup∣posed to endeavour all he can, to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation; He that shall oppose himselfe against it, for things su∣perfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow; and there∣fore doth that, which is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature, which commandeth to seek Peace. The observers of this Law, may be called SOCIABLE, (the Latines call them Commodi;) The contrary, Stubborn, Insociable, Froward, Intractable.

A sixth Law of Nature, is this, That upon caution of the Future time,* 1.247 a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it. For PARDON, is nothing but granting of Peace; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not Peace, but Feare; yet not granted to them that give caution of the Future time, is signe of an aversion to Peace; and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.

A seventh is, That in Revenges, (that is, retribution of Evil for Evil,)* 1.248 Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the greatnesse of the good to follow. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other designe, than for correction of the offender, or direction of others. For this Law is consequent to the next before it, that comman∣deth Pardon, upon security of the Future time. Besides, Revenge with∣out respect to the Example, and profit to come, is a triumph, or glory∣ing in the hurt of another, tending to no end; (for the End is alwayes somewhat to Come;) and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and con∣trary to reason; and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the introdu∣ction of Warre; which is against the Law of Nature; and is com∣monly stiled by the name of Cruelty.

And because all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight;* 1.249 insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged; we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature, set down this Precept, That no man by deed, word, countenance, or ge∣sture, declare Hatred, or Contempt of another. The breach of which Law, is commonly called Contumely.

The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of* 1.250 meer Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall.

The inequallity that now is, has bin introduced by the Lawes civill. I know that Aristotle in the first booke of his Politiques, for a foun∣dation of his doctrine, maketh men by Nature, some more worthy to Command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;) others to Serve, (meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not Philosophers as he;) as if Master and Servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of Wit: which is not only against reason; but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish, that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others: Nor when the wise in their own concei•…•…, contend by force, with them who distrust their owne wisdome, do they alwaies, or often, or almost at any time, get the Victory. If Na∣ture therefore have made men equall, that equalitie is to be acknow∣ledged: or if Nature have made men unequall; yet because men that think themselves equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon Equall termes, such equalitie must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth law of Nature, I put this, 'That every man acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature. The breach of this Precept is Pride.

On this law, dependeth another, That at the entrance into conditi∣ons* 1.251 of Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest. As it is neces∣sary for all men that seek peace, to lay down certaine Rights of Na∣ture; that is to say, not to have libertie to do all they list: so is it ne∣cessarie for mans life, to retaine some; as right to governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water, motion, waies to go from place to place; and all things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well. If in this case, at the making of Peace, men require for themselves, that which they would not have to be granted to others, they do con∣trary to the precedent law, that commandeth the acknowledgment of naturall equalitie, and therefore also against the law of Nature. The observers of this law, are those we call Modest, and the breakers Arrogant men. The Greeks call the violation of this law 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; that is, a desire of more than their share.

Also if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a pre∣cept* 1.252 of the Law of Nature, that he deale Equally between them. For without that, the Controversies of men cannot be determined but by Warre. He therefore that is partiall in judgment, doth what in him lies, to deterre men from the use of Judges, and Arbitrators; and con∣sequently, (against the fundamentall Lawe of Nature) is the cause of Warre.

The observance of this law, from the equall distribution to each man, of that which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and (as I have sayd before) distributive Justice: the violation, Accep∣tion of persons, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

And from this followeth another law, That such things as cannot* 1.253 be divided, be enjoyed in Common, if it can be; and if the quantity of the thing permit, without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the number of them that have Right. For otherwise the distribution is Unequall, and contrary to Equitie.

But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed* 1.254 in common. Then, The Law of Nature, which prescribeth Equity, requireth, That the Entire Right; or else, (making the use alternate,) the First Possession, be determined by Lot. For equall distribution, is of the Law of Nature; and other means of equall distribution cannot be imagined.

Of Lots there be two sorts, Arbitrary, and Naturall. Arbitrary, is* 1.255 that which is agreed on by the Competitors: Naturall, is either Pri∣mogeniture, (which the Greek calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signifies, Given by Lot▪) or First Seisure.

And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor; and in some cases to the First-Borne, as acquired by Lot.

It is also a Law of Nature, That all men that mediate Peace, be al∣lowed* 1.256 safe Conduct. For the Law that commandeth Peace, as the End, commandeth Intercession, as the Means; and to Intercession the Means is safe Conduct.

And because, though men be never so willing to observe these* 1.257 Lawes, there may neverthelesse arise questions concerning a mans action; First, whether it were done, or not done; Secondly (if done) whether against the Law, or not against the Law; the former where∣of, is called a question Of Fact; the later a question Of Right; there∣fore unlesse the parties to the question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as farre from Peace as ever. This other, to whose Sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, That they that are at contro∣versie, submit their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator.

And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his* 1.258 own benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: and if he were never so fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one be admitted to be Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the contro∣versie, that is, the cause of War, remains, against the Law of Nature.

For the same reason no man in any Cause ought to be received for* 1.259 Arbitrator, to whom greater profit, or honour, or pleasure apparent∣ly ariseth out of the victory of one party, than of the other: for hee hath taken (though an unavoydable bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversie, and the condition of War remaineth, contrary to the Law of Nature.

And in a controversie of Fact, the Judge being to give no more cre∣dit* 1.260 to one, than to the other, (if there be no other Arguments) must give credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: For else the question is undecided, and left to force, contrary to the Law of Nature.

These are the Lawes of Nature, dictating Peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes; and which onely concern the do∣ctrine of Civill Society. There be other things tending to the destru∣ction of particular men; as Drunkenness, and all other parts of In∣temperance; which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the Law of Nature hath forbidden; but are not neces∣sary

to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place.

And though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the Lawes of* 1.261 Nature, to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busie in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all men unexcusable, they have been contracted into one easie sum, intelligible, even to the meanest capacity; and that is, Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe; which sheweth him, that he has no more to do in learning the Lawes of Na∣ture, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the ballance, and his own into their place, that his own passions, and selfe-love, may adde nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these Lawes of Nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable.

The Lawes of Nature oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind* 1.262 to a desire they should take place: but in foro externo; that is, to the putting them in act, not alwayes. For he that should be modest, and tractable, and performe all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man els should do so, should but make himselfe a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruine, contrary to the ground of all Lawes of Nature, which tend to Natures preservation. And again, he that having sufficient Security, that others shall observe t•…•…e same Lawes towards him, observes them not himselfe, seeketh not Peace, but War; & consequently the destruction of his Nature by Violence.

And whatsoever Lawes bind in foro interno, may be broken, not onely by a fact contrary to the Law, but also by a fact according to it, in case a man think it contrary. For though his Action in this case, be according to the Law; yet his Purpose was against the Law; which where the Obligation is in foro interno, is a breach.

The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall; For Injustice,* 1.263 Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawfull. For it can never be that Warre shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it.

The sames Lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and en∣deavour,* 1.264 I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfil∣leth the Law, is Just.

And the Science of them, is the true and onely Moral Philosophy.* 1.265 For Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and Evill, in the conversation, and Society of man-kind. Good, and Evill, are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversi∣ons; which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers men, differ not onely in their Judgement, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the tast, smell, hea∣ring, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagree∣able to Reason, in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himselfe; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil:

From whence arise Disputes, Controversies, and at last War. And therefore so long a man is in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill: And consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, Morall Vertues; and their contrarie Vices, Evill. Now the science of Vertue and Vice, is Morall Philosophie; and therfore the true Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie. But the Writers of Morall Philoso∣phie, though they acknowledge the same Vertues and Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted their Goodnesse; nor that they come to be praised, as the meanes of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living; place them in a mediocrity of passions: as if not the Cause, but the De∣gree of daring, made Fortitude; or not the Cause, but the Quantity of a gift, made Liberality.

These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes, but improperly: for they are but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves; wher∣as Law, properly is the word of him, that by right hath command o∣ver others. But yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes.

CHAP. XVI. Of PERSONS, AUTHORS, and things Personated.

A PERSON, is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his* 1.266 own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction.

When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall* 1.267 Person: And when they are considered as representing the words and actions of an other, then is he a Feigned or Artificiall person.

The word Person is latine: insteed whereof the Greeks have 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.268 which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and som∣times more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth another, is said to beare his Person, or act in his name; (in which sence Cicero useth it where he saies, Unus sustineo tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis, I beare three Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges;) and is cal∣led

in diverse occasions, diversly; as a Representer, or Representative, a Lieutenant, a Vicar, an Attorney, a Deputy, a Procurator, an Actor, and the like.

Of Persons Artificiall, some have their words and actions Owned by those whom they represent. And then the Person is the Actor;* 1.269 and he that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which* 1.270 case the Actor acteth by Authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an Owner, and in latine Dominus, in Greeke 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; speaking of Actions, is called Author. And as the Right of possession, is called Dominion; so the Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY. So that by Authority, is alwayes* 1.271 understood a Right of doing any act: and done by Authority, done by Commssiion, or Licence from him whose right it is.

From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenant* 1.272 by Authority, he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if he had made it himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And therfore all that hath been said formerly, (Chap. 14.) of the nature of Covenants between man and man in their naturall capacity, is true also when they are made by their Actors, Represen∣ters, or Procurators, that have authority from them, so far-forth as is in their Commission, but no farther.

And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, or Re∣presenter, not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own pe∣rill. For no man is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; nor consequently by a Covenant made against, or beside the Autho∣rity he gave.

When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by* 1.273 command of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to o∣bey him, not he, but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the Action be against the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily, to refuse to do it, is against the Law of Nature, that for∣biddeth breach of Covenant.

And he that maketh a Covenant with the Author, by mediation of* 1.274 the Actor, not knowing what Authority he hath, but onely takes his word; in case such Authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: For the Covenant made with the Au∣thor, is not valid, without his Counter-assurance. But if he that so Covenanteth, knew before hand he was to expect no other assurance, than the Actors word; then is the Covenant valid; because the Actor in this case maketh himselfe the Author. And therefore, as when the Authority is evident, the Covenant obligeth the Author, not the Actor; so when the Authority is feigned, it obligeth the Actor one∣ly; there being no Author but himselfe.

There are few things, that are uncapable of being represented by* 1.275 Fiction. Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be Personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inani∣mate, cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their A∣ctors: Yet the Actors may have Authority to procure their mainte∣nance,

given them by those that are Owners, or Governours of those things. And therefore, such things cannot be Personated, before there be some state of Civill Government.

Likewise Children, Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Rea∣son,* 1.276 may be Personated by Guardians, or Curators; but can be no Authors (during that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they shall recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give Authority to the Guardian. But this again has no place but in a State Civill, because before such estate, there is no Do∣minion of Persons.

An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, may be Personated; as* 1.277 were the Gods of the Heathen; which by such Officers as the State appointed, were Personated, and held Possessions, and other Goods, and Rights, which men from time to time dedicated, and consecra∣ted unto them. But Idols cannot be Authors: for an Idol is nothing. The Authority proceeded from the State: and therefore before in∣troduction of Civill Government, the Gods of the Heathen could not be Personated.

The true God may be Personated. As he was; first, by Moses;* 1.278 who governed the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,) not in his own name, with Hoc dicit Moses; but in Gods Name, with Hoc dicit Dominus. Secondly by the Son of man, his own Son, our Blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jewes, and in∣duce all Nations into the Kingdome of his Father; not as of him∣selfe, but as sent from his Father. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not of himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.

A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one* 1.279 man, or one Person, Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Mul∣titude.

And because the Multitude naturally is not One, but Many; they* 1.280 cannot be understood for one; but many Authors, of every thing their Representative saith, or doth in their name; Every man giving their common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre he shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him commission to Act.

And if the Representative consist of many men, the voyce of the* 1.281 greater number, must be considered as the voyce of them all. For if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in the Negative, there will be Negatives more than

enough to destroy the Affirmatives; and thereby the excesse of Ne∣gatives, standing uncontradicted, are the onely voyce the Represen∣tative hath.

And a Representative of even number, especially when the num∣ber* 1.282 is not great, whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall, is therefore oftentimes mute, and uncapable of Action. Yet in some cases contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine a question; as in condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemne not, do absolve; but not on the contrary con∣demne, in that they absolve not. For when a Cause is heard; not to condemne, is to absolve: but on the contrary, to say that not absol∣ving, is condemning, is not true. The like it is in a deliberation of ex∣ecuting presently, or deferring till another time: For when the voyces are equall, the not decreeing Execution, is a decree of Dilation.

Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, (men, or assemblies;)* 1.283 whereof every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away the effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number is no Representative; because by the diversity of Opinions, and Interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest conse∣quence, a mute Person, and unapt, as for many things else, so for the government of a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.

Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have before defined to be him, that owneth the Action of another simply. The second is he, that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these Authors conditionall, are generally called SURETYES, in Latine Fidejusso∣res, and Sponsores; and particularly for Debt, Praedes; and for Appea∣rance before a Judge, or Magistrate, Vades.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Memory.
• * 1.2

  Dreams.
• * 1.3

  Apparitions or Visions.
• * 1.4

  Understan∣ding.
• * 1.5

  Trayne of Thoughts unguided.
• * 1.6

  Trayne of Thoughts re∣gulated.
• * 1.7

  Remem∣brance.
• * 1.8

  Prudence.
• * 1.9

  Signes.
• * 1.10

  Con•…•…ecture of the time past.
• * 1.11

  Originall of Speech.
• * 1.12

  The use of Speech.
• * 1.13

  Abuses of Speech.
• * 1.14

  Names Pro∣per & Com∣mon.
• * 1.15

  Universall.
• * 1.16

  Necessity of D•…•…ons.
• * 1.17

  Subject to Names▪
• * 1.18

  Use of Names Positive.
• * 1.19

  Negative Names with their Vses.
• * 1.20

  Words insig∣nificant.
• * 1.21

  Understand∣ing.
• * 1.22

  Inconstant names.
• * 1.23

  Reason what it is.
• * 1.24

  Reason defi∣ned.
• * 1.25

  Right Reason where.
• * 1.26

  The use of Reason.
• * 1.27

  Of Error and Absur∣dity.
• * 1.28

  Causes of ab∣surditie.
• * 1.29

  1.
• * 1.30

  2.
• * 1.31

  3.
• * 1.32

  4.
• * 1.33

  5.
• * 1.34

  6.
• * 1.35

  7.
• * 1.36

  Science.
• * 1.37

  Prudence & Sapience, with their difference.
• * 1.38

  Signes of Science.
• * 1.39

  Motion Vi∣tall and A∣nimal.
• * 1.40

  Endeavour.
• * 1.41

  Appetite.
• * 1.42

  Desire.
• * 1.43

  Hunger.
• * 1.44

  Thirst.
• * 1.45

  Aversion.
• * 1.46

  Love.
• * 1.47

  Hate.
• * 1.48

  Contempt.
• * 1.49

  Good.
• * 1.50

  Evill.
• * 1.51

  Pulchrum.
• * 1.52

  Turpe.
• * 1.53

  Delightfull.
• * 1.54

  Profitable.
• * 1.55

  〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.56

  Unprofitable.
• * 1.57

  Delight.
• * 1.58

  Displeasure.
• * 1.59

  Pleasure.
• * 1.60

  Offence.
• * 1.61

  Pleasures of sense.
• * 1.62

  Pleasures of the Mind
• * 1.63

  Joy.
• * 1.64

  Paine.
• * 1.65

  Griefe.
• * 1.66

  Hope.
• * 1.67

  Despaire.
• * 1.68

  Feare.
• * 1.69

  Courage.
• * 1.70

  Anger.
• * 1.71

  Confidence.
• * 1.72

  Diffid•…•…nce.
• * 1.73

  Indignation.
• * 1.74

  Benevolence.
• * 1.75

  Good Na∣ture.
• * 1.76

  Covetousnesse
• * 1.77

  Ambition.
• * 1.78

  Pusillanimi∣ty.
• * 1.79

  Magnani∣mity.
• * 1.80

  Valour.
• * 1.81

  Liberality.
• * 1.82

  Miserable∣nesse.
• * 1.83

  Kindnesse.
• * 1.84

  Naturall Lust.
• * 1.85

  Luxury.
• * 1.86

  The passion of Love.
• * 1.87

  Jealousie.
• * 1.88

  Revengeful∣nesse.
• * 1.89

  Curiosity.
• * 1.90

  Religion.
• * 1.91

  Superstition.
• * 1.92

  True Religi∣on.
• * 1.93

  Panique Terrour.
• * 1.94

  Admiration.
• * 1.95

  Glory.
• * 1.96

  Vain-glory.
• * 1.97

  Dejection.
• * 1.98

  Sudden Glo∣ry.
• * 1.99

  Laughter.
• * 1.100

  Sudden De∣jection.
• * 1.101

  Weeping.
• * 1.102

  Shame.
• * 1.103

  Blushing.
• * 1.104

  Impudence.
• * 1.105

  Pitty.
• * 1.106

  Cruelty.
• * 1.107

  Emulation.
• * 1.108

  Envy.
• * 1.109

  Deliberati∣on.
• * 1.110

  The Will.
• * 1.111

  Formes of Speech, in Passion.
• * 1.112

  Good and E∣vill apparent.
• * 1.113

  Felicity.
• * 1.114

  Praise.
• * 1.115

  Magnifica∣tion.
• * 1.116

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.117

  Judgement, or Sentence •…•…inal.
• * 1.118

  Doubt.
• * 1.119

  Science.
• * 1.120

  Opinio•…•….
• * 1.121

  Consci•…•…ce.
• * 1.122

  Beliefe.
• * 1.123

  Faith.
• * 1.124

  Intellectuall Vertue de∣fined.
• * 1.125

  Wit, Natu∣rall, or Ac∣quired.
• * 1.126

  Naturall Wit.
• * 1.127

  Good Wit, or Fancy.
• * 1.128

  Good Judge∣ment.
• * 1.129

  Discretion.
• * 1.130

  Prudence.
• * 1.131

  Craft.
• * 1.132

  Acquired Wit.
• * 1.133

  Giddinesse.
• * 1.134

  Madnesse.
• * 1.135

  Rage.
• * 1.136

  Melancholy.
• * 1.137

  Insignificant Speech.
• * 1.138

  Power.
• * 1.139

  Worth.
• * 1.140

  Dignity.
• * 1.141

  To Honour and Disho∣nour.
• * 1.142

  Honourable.
• * 1.143

  Dishonoura∣ble.
• * 1.144

  Coats of Armes.
• * 1.145

  Titles of Ho∣nour.
• * 1.146

  Worthinesse.
• * 1.147

  Fitnesse.
• * 1.148

  What is here meant by Manners.
• * 1.149

  A restlesse desire of Power, in all men.
• * 1.150

  Love of Con∣tention from Competition.
• * 1.151

  Civil obedi∣ence from love of Ease.
• * 1.152

  From feare of Death, or Wounds.
• * 1.153

  And from love of Arts.
• * 1.154

  Love of Ver∣tue, from love Praise.
• * 1.155

  Hate, from difficulty of Requiting great Bene∣fits.
• * 1.156

  And from Conscience of deserving to 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉.
• * 1.157

  Promptnesse to hurt, from Fear.
• * 1.158

  And from di∣strufl of their own wit▪
• * 1.159

  Vain under∣taking from Vain-glory.
• * 1.160

  Ambition, from opinion of sufficiency.
• * 1.161

  Irresolution, from too great valu∣ing of small matters.
• * 1.162

  Con•…•…idence in others •…•…rom Ignorance of the marks of Wisdome and Kindnesse.
• * 1.163

  And from Ignorance of naturall causes.
• * 1.164

  And from want of Un∣derstanding.
• * 1.165

  Adhaerence to Custome, from Igno∣rance of the nature of Right and Wrong.
• * 1.166

  Adhaerence to private men, From ignorance of the Causes of Peace.
• * 1.167

  Credulity from Igno∣rance of na∣ture.
• * 1.168

  Curiosity to know, from Care of fu∣ture time.
• * 1.169

  Naturall Re ligion, from the same.
• * 1.170

  Religion, in Man onely.
• * 1.171

  First, from his desire of knowing Cau∣ses.
• * 1.172

  From the consideration of the Begin∣ing of thing•…•….
• * 1.173

  From his ob∣servation of the Sequell of things.
• * 1.174

  The naturall Cause of Re∣ligion, the Anxiety of the time to come.
• * 1.175

  Which makes them fear the Power of Inuisible things.
• * 1.176

  And suppose them Incor∣poreall.
• * 1.177

  But know not the way how they effect a∣ny thing.
• * 1.178

  But honour them as they honour m•…•…n.
• * 1.179

  And attri∣bute to them all extraordi∣nary events.
• * 1.180

  Foure things, Naturall seeds of Reli∣gion.
• * 1.181

  Mide dif∣ferent by Cul∣ture.
• * 1.182

  The absurd opinion of Gentilisme.
• * 1.183

  The designes of the Au∣thors of the Religion of the Heathen.
• * 1.184

  The true Re∣ligion, and the lawes of Gods king∣dome the same.
• * 1.185

  Chap. 35.
• * 1.186

  The causes of Change in Religion.
• * 1.187

  Injoyning be∣leefe of Im∣possibilities.
• * 1.188

  Doing con∣trary to the Religion they establish.
• * 1.189

  Want of the testimony of Miracles.
• * 1.190

  Exod. 32. 1, 2.
• * 1.191

  Judges 2. 11.
• * 1.192

  1 Sam. 8. 3.
• * 1.193

  Men by na∣ture Equall.
• * 1.194

  From Equ•…•…∣lity proce•…•…ds Di•…•…idence.
• * 1.195

  From Diffi∣dence Warre.
• * 1.196

  Out of Civil States, there is alwayes Warre of e∣very one a∣gainst every one.
• * 1.197

  The Incom∣modities of such a War.
• * 1.198

  In such a Warre, no∣thing is Un∣just.
• * 1.199

  The Passions that incline men to Peace.
• * 1.200

  Right of Nature what.
• * 1.201

  Liberty what.
• * 1.202

  A Law of Nature what.
• * 1.203

  Difference of Right and Law.
• * 1.204

  Naturally e∣very man has Right to eve∣rything.
• * 1.205

  The Funda∣mentall Law of Nature.
• * 1.206

  The seoond Law of Na∣ture.
• * 1.207

  What it is to lay down a Right.
• * 1.208

  Renouncing a Right what it is.
• * 1.209

  Transferring Right what.
• * 1.210

  Obligation.
• * 1.211

  Duty.
• * 1.212

  Injustice.
• * 1.213

  Not all Rights are alienable.
• * 1.214

  Contract what.
• * 1.215

  Covenant what.
• * 1.216

  Free-gift.
• * 1.217

  Signes of Contract Ex∣presse.
• * 1.218

  Signes of Contract by Inference.
• * 1.219

  Free gift passeth by words of the Present or Past.
• * 1.220

  Signes of Contract are words both of the Past, Pre∣sent, and Fu∣ture.
• * 1.221

  Merit what.
• * 1.222

  Covenants of Mutuall trust, when Invalid.
• * 1.223

  Right to the End, Contain∣eth Right to the Means.
• * 1.224

  No Cove∣nant with Beasts.
• * 1.225

  Nor with God wit•…•…out speciall Re∣velation.
• * 1.226

  No Cove∣nant, but of Possible and Future.
• * 1.227

  Covenants how made voyd.
• * 1.228

  Covenants extorted by feare are va∣lide.
• * 1.229

  The former Covenant to one, makes voyd the later to another.
• * 1.230

  A mans Co∣venant not to defend him∣selfe, is voyd.
• * 1.231

  No man ob∣liged to ac∣cuse himself.
• * 1.232

  The End of an Oath.
• * 1.233

  The forme of an Oath.
• * 1.234

  No Oath, but by God.
• * 1.235

  An Oath addes no∣thing to the Obligation.
• * 1.236

  The third Law of Na∣ture, Justice.
• * 1.237

  Justice and Jnjustice what.
• * 1.238

  Justice and Propriety be∣gin with the Constitution of Common∣wealth.
• * 1.239

  Justice not Contrary to Reason.
• * 1.240

  Covenants not dischar∣ged by the Vice of the Person to whom they are made.
• * 1.241

  Justice of Men, & Iu∣stice of Acti∣ons what.
• * 1.242

  Iustice of Manners, and Iustice of Actions.
• * 1.243

  Nothing done to a man, by his own consent can be Inju∣ry.
• * 1.244

  Justice Com∣mutative, and Distributive.
• * 1.245

  The fourth Law of Na∣ture, Grati∣tude.
• * 1.246

  The fifth, Mutuall ac∣commodeti∣on, or Com∣pleasance.
• * 1.247

  The sixth, Facility to Pardon.
• * 1.248

  The seventh, that in Re∣venges, men respect onely the future good.
• * 1.249

  The eighth, against Con∣tumely.
• * 1.250

  The ninth, a∣gainst 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.251

  The tenth against Ar∣rogance.
• * 1.252

  The elev•…•…nth Equity.
• * 1.253

  The twelfth, Equall use of things Com∣mon.
• * 1.254

  The thir∣teenth, of Lot.
• * 1.255

  The four∣teenth, of Pri∣mogeniture, and First sei∣sing.
• * 1.256

  The •…•…fteenth, of Media∣tors.
• * 1.257

  The six∣teenth, of Sub∣mission to Arbitre∣ment.
• * 1.258

  The seven∣teenth, No man is his own Judge.
• * 1.259

  The eigh∣teenth, no man to be Judge, that has in him a natural cause of Partiality.
• * 1.260

  The nine∣teenth, of Witnesses.
• * 1.261

  A Rule, by which the Laws of N•…•…∣ture may e•…•…∣sily be exami∣ned.
• * 1.262

  The Lawes of Nature ob∣lige inConsci∣ence alwayes, but in Effect then onely when there is Security.
• * 1.263

  The Laws of Nature are Eternal;
• * 1.264

  And yet Ea∣sie.
• * 1.265

  The Science of these Lawes, is the true Morall Philosophy.
• * 1.266

  A Person what.
• * 1.267

  Person Na∣turall, and Artificiall.
• * 1.268

  The word Person, whence.
• * 1.269

  Actor.
• * 1.270

  Author,
• * 1.271

  Authority.
• * 1.272

  Covenants by Authority, bind the Author.
• * 1.273

  But not the Actor.
• * 1.274

  The Autho∣rity is to be shewne.
• * 1.275

  Things per∣sonated, Ina∣nimate.
• * 1.276

  Irrational;
• * 1.277

  False Gods;
• * 1.278

  The true God.
• * 1.279

  A Multi∣tude of men, how one Per∣son.
• * 1.280

  Every one is Author.
• * 1.281

  An Actor may be Many men made One by Plu∣r•…•…lity of Voy∣•…•…▪
• * 1.282

  Representa∣tives, when the number is even, unpro∣fitable.
• * 1.283

  Negativ•…•… voyce.