The art of rhetoric, with A discourse of the laws of England by Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury.

THE WHOLE ART OF RHETORICK.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

That Rhetorick is an Art consisting not only in moving the passions of the Judge; but chiefly in Proofs. And that this Art is Profitable.

WE see that all men naturally are able in some sort to accuse and excuse: Some by chance; but some by method. This method may be discovered: and to dis∣cover Method is all one with teaching an Art. If this Art consisted in Crimi∣nations only, and the skill to stir up the Judg∣es to Anger, Envy, Fear, Pity, or other affecti∣ons;

a Rhetorician in well ordered Common∣wealths and States, where it is forbidden to digress from the cause in hearing, could have nothing at all to say. For all these perversions of the Judge are beside the que∣stion. And that which the pleader is to shew, and the Judge to give sentence on, is this only: 'Tis so: or not so. The rest hath been decided already by the Law-ma∣ker; who judging of universals, and future things, could not be corrupted. Besides, 'tis an absurd thing, for a man to make crooked the Ruler he means to use.

It consisteth therefore chiefly in Proofs; which are Inferences: and all Inferences be∣ing Syllogismes, a Logician, if he would ob∣serve the difference between a plain Syllo∣gisme, and an Enthymeme, (which is a Rhe∣toricall Syllogisme,) would make the best Rhetorician. For all Syllogismes and Inferen∣ces belong properly to Logick; whether they infer truth or probability: and because without this Art it would often come to pass, that evil men by the advantage of na∣tural abilities, would carry an evil cause a∣gainst a good; it brings with it at least this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it leaves the odds only in the merit of the cause. Besides, ordinarily those that are Judges, are neither patient, nor capa∣ble of long Scientifical proofs, drawn from

the principles through many Syllogisms; and therefore had need to be instructed by the Rhetoricall, and shorter way. Lastly, it were ridiculous, to be ashamed of being vanqui∣shed in exercises of the body, and not to be ashamed of being inferior in the vertue of well expressing the mind.

CHAP. II.

The Definition of Rhetorick.

RHetorick, is that Faculty, by which we understand what will serve our turn, concerning any Subject to win belief in the hearer.

Of those things that beget belief; some require not the help of Art; as Witnesses, Evidences, and the like, which we invent not, but make use of; and some require Art, and are invented by us.

The belief that proceeds from our Inven∣tion, comes partly from the behaviour of the speaker; partly from the passions of the hea∣rer: but especially from the proofs of what we alledge.

Proofs are, in Rhetorick, either Examples, or Enthymemes, as in Logick, Inductions, or Syllogisms. For an Example is a short Indu∣ction, and an Enthymeme a short Syllogisme;

out of which are left as superfluous, that which is supposed to be necessarily under∣stood by the hearer; to avoid prolixity, and not to consume the time of publick business needlesly.

CHAP. III.

Of the several kinds of Orations: and of the Principles of Rhetorick.

IN all Orations, the Hearer does either hear only; or judge also.

If he hear only, that's one kind of Ora∣tion, and is called Demonstrative.

If he judg, he must judg either of that which is to come; or of that which is past.

If of that which is to come, ther's ano∣ther kind of Oration, and is called Delibe∣rative.

If of that which is past; then 'tis a third kind of Oration, called Judicial.

So there are three kinds of Orations; De∣monstrative, Judicial, Deliberative.

To which belong their proper times. To the Demonstrative, the Present; To the Ju∣dicial, the Past; and to the Deliberative, the time to come.

And their proper Offices. To the Deli∣berative, Exhortation and Dehortation. To the Judicial, Accusation and Defence. And to the Demonstrative, Praising and Dis∣praising.

And their proper ends. To the Delibe∣rative, to Prove a thing Profitable, or Vn∣profitable. To the Judicial, Just, or Vnjust. To the Demonstrative, Honourable, or Dis∣honourable.

The Principles of Rhetorick out of which Enthymemes are to be drawn; are the com∣mon opinions that men have concerning Pro∣fitable, and Vnprofitable; Just, and Vnjust; Honourable, and Dishonourable; which are the points in the several kinds of Orations questionable. For as in Logick, where cer∣tain and infallible knowledg is the scope of our proof, the Principles must be all infal∣lible truths: so in Rhetorick the Principles must be common opinions, such as the Judg is already possessed with: because the end of Rhetorick is victory; which consists in ha∣ving gotten belief.

And because nothing is Profitable, Vnpro∣fitable, Just, Vnjust, Honourable or Disho∣nourable, but what has been done, or is to be done; and nothing is to be done, that is not possible: and because there be degrees of Profitable, Vnprofitable, Just, Vnjust, Ho∣nourable, and Dishonourable; an Orator must

be ready in other Principles; namely, of what is done and not done; possible and not possible, to come and not to come, and what is Greater, and what is Lesser, both in gene∣ral, and particularly applyed to the thing in question; as what is more and less, general∣ly; and what is more profitable, and less pro∣fitable, &c. particularly.

CHAP. IV.

Of the subject of Deliberatives; and the abi∣lities that are required of him that will deli∣berate of business of State.

IN Deliberatives there are to be considered the subject, wherein; and the ends whereto the Orator exhorteth, or from which he dehorteth.

The Subject is always something in our own power, the knowledg whereof belongs not to Rhetorick, but for the most part to the Politicks; and may be referred in a manner to these five heads.

1. Of levying of money. To which point he that will speak as he ought to do, ought to know before hand the revenue of the State, how much it is, and wherein it con∣sisteth: and also how great are the necessa∣ry charges and expences of the same. This

knowledge is gotten partly by a mans own experience, partly by Relations, and accounts in writing.

2. Of Peace and War. Concerning which the Counsellor or Deliberator, ought to know the strength of the Commonwealth; how much it both now is, and hereafter may be; and wherein that power Consist∣eth. Which knowledge is gotten, partly by experience, and Relations at home; and partly by the sight of Wars, and of their e∣vents abroad.

3. Of the safeguard of the Country. Where∣in he only is able to give counsell, that knows the forms, and number, and places of the Garrisons.

4. Of Provision. Wherein to speak well, it is necessary for a man to know what is sufficient to maintain the State; what Com∣modities they have at home growing; what they must fetch in through need; and what they may carry out through abundance.

5. Of making Laws. To which is neces∣sary so much Political, or Civil Philosophy, as to know what are the several kinds of Governments; and by what means, either from without or from within, each of those kinds is, preserved, or destroyed. And this knowledg is gotten, partly by observing the several Governments in times past, by History; and partly by observing the Go∣vernment

of the times present in several Na∣tions, by Travel.

So that to him that will speak in a Coun∣cell of State, there is necessary this; Histo∣ry, Sight of Wars, Travel, Knowledge of the Revenue, Expences, Forces, Havens, Garri∣sons, Wares, and Provisions in the State he lives in; and what is needful for that State, either to export, or import.

CHAP. V.

Of the ends which the Orator in Delibera∣tives, propoundeth, whereby to exhort, or dehort.

AN Orator in exhorting always propoun∣deth Felicity, or some part of Felicity to be attained by the actions he exhorteth unto: and in Dehortation the contrary.

By Felicity, is meant commonly, Prospe∣rity with vertue, or a continual content of the life with surety. And the parts of it are such things as we call good, in body, mind, or fortune; such as these that follow.

1. Nobility, which to a State or Nation is, to have been antient inhabitants; and to have had most antiently, and in most number, famous Generals in the Wars, or men famous for such things as fall under emulation. And

to a private man, to have been descended law∣fully of a Family, which hath yielded most an∣tiently, and in most number, men known to the World for vertue, riches, or any thing in ge∣neral estimation.

2. Many and good Children. Which is al∣so publick and private. Publick, when there is much youth in the State endued with vertue, (namely, of the body, stature, beauty, strength, and dexterity: Of the mind, va∣lour, and temperance) Private, when a man hath many such Children, both Male and Female. The vertues commonly respected in women, are of the body, Beauty, and Stature; Of the mind, Temperance, and Houswifery, without sordidness.

3. Riches. Which is, Money, Cattel, Lands, Houshold-stuffe; with the power to dispose of them.

4. Glory. Which is, the reputation of Vertue, or of the possession of such things as all, or most men, or wise men desire.

5. Honour. Which is the glory of benefit∣ing, or being able to benefit others. To bene∣fit others, is to contribute somewhat, not easily had, to another mans safety, or riches, The parts of Honour are, Sacrifices, Monuments, Rewards, Dedication of places, Precedence, Sepulchres, Statues, publick Pensions, Adora∣tions, Presents.

6. Health. Which is the being free from Diseases, with strength to use the body.

7. Beauty. Which is to different Ages different. To Youth, strength of body, and sweetness of aspect. To full men, strength of body fit for the Wars, and Countenance sweet, with a mixture of Terror. To old men, strength enough for necessary labours, with a Counte∣nance not displeasing.

8. Strength. Which is the ability to move any thing at pleasure of the Mover. To move, is to pull, to put off, to lift, to thrust down, to press together.

9. Stature. Which is then just, when a man in heighth, breadth, and thickness of bo∣dy doth so exceed the most, as nevertheless it be no hinderance to the quickness of his motion.

10. Good old Age. Which is, that which comes late, and with the least trouble.

11. Many and good Friends. Which is, to have many that will do for his sake that which they think will be for his good.

12. Prosperity. Which is, to have all, or the most, or the greatest of those goods which we attribute to Fortune.

13. Vertue. Which is then to be defined, when we speak of Praise.

These are the grounds from whence we exhort.

Dehortation is from the contraries of these.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Colours or common opinions concern∣ing Good and Evil.

IN Deliberatives, the Principles, or Ele∣ments from whence we draw our Proofs, are common Opinions concerning Good and Evil. And these Principles are either Abso∣lute, or Comparative. And those that are Absolute, are either Disputable, or Indispu∣table.

The Indisputable Principles are such as these;

Good, is that which we love for it self.

And that, for which we love somewhat else.

And that which all things desire.

And that to every man which his reason dictates.

And that, which when we have, we are well, or satisfied.

And that which satisfies.

And the Cause or Effect of any of these.

And that which preserves any of these.

And that which keeps off, or destroys the contrary of any of these.

Also to take the Good, and reject the Evil, is Good.

And to take the greater Good, rather than the less; and the lesser Evil, rather than the greater.

Further, all Vertues are Good.

And Pleasure.

And all things Beautiful.

And Justice, Valour, Temperance, Mag∣nanimity, Magnificence; and other like ha∣bits.

And Health, Beauty, Strength, &c.

And Riches.

And Friends.

And Honour, and Glory.

And Ability to say or do: also Towardli∣ness, Will, and the like.

And Whatsoever Art, or Science.

And Life.

And whatsoever is Just.

The Disputable Principles are such as fol∣low.

That is, Good, whose contrary is E∣vil.

And whose contrary is Good for our Ene∣mies.

And whose contrary our Enemies are glad of.

And of which there cannot be too much.

And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed.

And that which many desire.

And that which is praised.

And that which even our Enemies and evil men praise.

And what good we prefer.

And what we do advise.

And that which is possible, is Good (to undertake.)

And that which is Easie.

And that which depends on our own Will.

And that which is proper for us to do.

And what no man else can do.

And whatsoever is Extraordinary.

And what is suitable.

And that which wants a little of being at an end.

And what we hope to master.

And what we are fit for.

And what evil men do not.

And what we love to do.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Colours, or common Opinions con∣cerning Good and Evil, comparatively.

THE Colours of Good comparatively de∣pend partly upon the following De∣finitions of Comparatives.

1. More, is so much, and somewhat be∣sides.

2. Less, is that, which and somewhat else is so much.

3. Greater and more in number are said only Comparatively to Less, and Fewer in number.

4. Great and Little, Many and Few, are taken Comparatively to the Most of the same kind. So that Great and Many, is that which exceeds; Little and Few, is that which is ex∣ceeded by the Most of the same kind.

Partly from the precedent Definitions of Good absolutely.

Common Opinions concerning Good. Comparatively then are these.

Greater Good is Many, than fewer, or one of those many.

And Greater is the kind, in which the greatest is greater than the greatest of ano∣ther kind. And greater is that Good than

another good, whose kind is greater than another's kind.

And Greater is that from which another Good follows; then the Good which follows.

And of two which exceed a third, Greater is that which exceeds it most.

And that which causes the greater Good.

And that which proceeds from a greater Good.

And Greater is that which is chosen for it self, than that which is chosen from som∣what else.

And the end greater than that which is not the end.

And that which less needs other things, than that which more.

And that which is independent, than that which is dependent of another.

And the Beginning, than not the Begin∣ning.

[Seeing the Beginning is a greater Good, or Evil, than that which is not the Be∣ginning; and the End, than that which is not the End; One may argue from this Colour both ways: as Leodamas a∣gainst Chabrias, would have the Actor more to blame than the Advisor; and against Callistratus, the Advisor more than the Actor.]

And the Cause, than not the Cause.

And that which hath a greater Beginning or Cause.

And the Beginning, or Cause of a grea∣ter Good or Evil.

And that which is scarce, greater than that which is Plentiful; because harder to get.

And that which is Plentiful, than that which is scarce; because oftner in Use.

And that which is easie, than that which is Hard.

And that whose Contrary is greater.

And that whose Want is greater.

And Vertue than not Vertue, a greater Good. Vice, than not Vice, a greater Evil.

And greater Good, or Evil is that, the ef∣fects whereof are more Honourable or more Shameful.

And the effects of greater Vertues, or Vi∣ces.

And the Excess whereof is more tolera∣ble, a greater Good.

And those things which may with more honour be desir'd.

And the desire of better things.

And those things whereof the Knowledg is better.

And the Knowledge of better things.

And that which wise men prefer.

And that which is in better men.

And that which better men chuse.

And that which is more, than that which is less delightful.

And that which is more, than that which is less Honourable.

And that which we would have for our selves and Friends, a greater Good; and the contrary a greater Evil.

And that which is Lasting, than that which is not Lasting.

And that which is Firm, than that which is not Firm.

And what many desire, than what few.

And what the Adversary, or Judg confes∣seth to be greater, is greater.

And Common than not Common.

And not Common than Common.

And what is more Laudable.

And that which is more Honour'd, a grea∣ter Good.

And that which is more Punish'd, a grea∣ter Evil.

And both Good and Evil divided than un∣divided, appear greater.

And Compounded than Simple, appear greater.

And that which is done with Opportuni∣ty, Age, Place, Time, Means disadvantagi∣ous, greater than otherwise.

And that which is natural, than that which is attained unto.

And the same part of that which is great, than of that which is less.

And that which is nearest to the end de∣signed.

And that which is Good or Evil to ones self, than that which is simply so.

And Possible, than not possible.

And that which comes toward the end of our Life.

And that which we do really, than that which we do for shew.

And that which we would be, rather than what we would seem to be.

And that which is good for more purpo∣ses, is the greater Good.

And that which serves us in great ne∣cessity.

And that which is joyned with less trou∣ble.

And that which is joyned with more de∣light.

And of the two, that which added to a third, makes the whole the greater.

And that which having, we are more sen∣sible of.

And in every thing, that which we most esteem.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the several kinds of Governments.

BEcause Hortation and Dehortation con∣cern the Common-wealth, and are drawn from the Elements of Good and Evil; as we have spoken of them already in the Abstract, so we must speak of them also in the Concrete; that is, of what is Good or E∣vil to each sort of Common-wealth in spe∣cial.

The Government of a Common-wealth, is either Democracy, or Aristocracy, or Oli∣garchy, or Monarchy.

Democracy is that, wherein all men with equal right, are preferred to the highest Magistracy by Lot.

Aristocracy is that, wherein the highest Magistrate is chosen out of those, that had the best education, according to what the Laws prescribe for best.

Oligarchy is that, where the highest Ma∣gistrate is chosen for wealth.

Monarchy is that, wherein one man hath the Government of all; which Government, if he limit it by Law, is called Kingdom; if by his own will, Tyranny.

The end of Democracy, or the Peoples Go∣vernment, is Liberty.

The end of Oligarchy, is the Riches of those that Govern.

The end of Aristocracy, is good Laws, and good ordering of the City.

The end of Monarchy, or Kings, is the safety of the People, and conservation of his own Authority.

Good therefore, in each sort of Govern∣ment is that which conduceth to these their ends.

And because belief is not gotten only by proofs, but also from manners; the manners of each sort of Commonwealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to perswade, or diswade in matter of State. Their manners may be known by their de∣signs; and their designs by their ends; and their ends by what we see them take pleasure in. But of this more accurately in the Po∣liticks.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Colours of Honourable and Disho∣nourable.

IN a Demonstrative Oration, the subject whereof is Praise, or Dispraise; the proofs are to be drawn from the Elements of Ho∣nourable and Dishonourable.

In this place we anticipate the second way of getting belief; which is from the manners of the Speaker. For Praise, whe∣ther it come in as the principal business, or upon the by, depends still upon the same Principles. Which are these.

Honourable, is that, which we love for it self, and is withal laudable.

And that Good, which pleaseth us only because 'tis Good.

And Vertue.

Vertue is the faculty of getting and pre∣serving that which is Good; and the facul∣ty of doing many, and great things well.

The kinds of it are these;

1. Justice; which is a Vertue whereby every man obtains what by Law is his.

2. Fortitude; which is a Vertue by which a man carries himself Honourably, and ac∣cording to the Laws, in time of danger.

3. Temperance; which is a Vertue where∣by a man Governs himself in matter of plea∣sure according to the Law.

4. Liberality; which is a Vertue, by which we benefit others in matter of money.

5. Magnanimity; which is a Vertue, by which a man is apt to do great benefits.

6. Magnificence; which is a Vertue, by which a man is apt to be at great cost.

7. Prudence; which is an Intellectual Ver∣tue, by which a man is able to deliberate well concerning any Good leading to Feli∣city.

And Honourable, are the Causes and ef∣fects of things Honourable.

And the Works of Vertue.

And the signs of Vertue.

And those actions, the reward whereof is Honor.

And the reward whereof is rather Honor, than Money.

And that which we do not for our own sakes.

And what we do for our Countries good, neglecting our own.

And those things are Honourable, which good of themselves, are not so to the Ow∣ner.

And those things which happen to the dead, rather than to the living.

And what we do for other men, especi∣ally for Benefactors.

And bestowing of Benefits.

And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of.

And those things which men strive for earnestly, but without fear of Adver∣sary.

And of the more Honourable, and better men, the Vertues are more Honourable.

And more Honourable are the vertues that tend to other mens benefit, than those which tend to ones own.

And Honourable are those things which are Just.

And Revenge is Honourable.

And Victory.

And Honour.

And Monuments.

And those things which happen not ot the living.

And things that excell.

And what none can do but we.

And Possessions we reap no profit by.

And those things which are had in ho∣nour particularly in several places.

And the signs of praise.

And to have nothing of the servile, mer∣cenary, or Mechanick.

And that which seems Honourable; Name∣ly such as follow.

Vices confining upon Vertue.

And the extreams of Vertues.

And what the Auditors think Honour∣able.

And that which is in estimation.

And that which is done according to cu∣stom.

Besides, in a Demonstrative Oration, the Orator must shew, that he whom he prai∣seth, did what he praiseth unconstrainedly, and willingly.

And he does so, who does the same of∣ten.

Praise, is speech, declaring the magni∣tude of a Vertue, Action, or Work.

But to praise the Work from the Vertue of the Worker, is a circular proof.

To Magnifie, and to Praise, differ in them∣selves, as Felicity and Vertue. For Praise declares a mans Vertue; and Magnifying declares his Felicity.

Praise is a kind of inverted Precept. For to say, Do it because 'tis good, is a Precept. But to say, He is good because he did it, is Praise.

An Orator in Praising must also use the forms of Amplification; such as these:

He was the first that did it.

The only man that did it.

The special man that did it.

He did it with disadvantage of time.

He did it with little help.

He was the cause, that the Law ordain∣ed Rewards and Honours for such Actions.

Further, he that will praise a Man, must compare him with others; and his actions with the actions of others; especially with such as are renowned.

And Amplification is more proper to a Demonstrative Oration, than to any other. For here the Actions are confess'd; and the Orators part is only this, to contribute un∣to them Magnitude and Luster.

CHAP. X.

Of Accusation and Defence, with the Defi∣nition of Injury.

IN a Judicial Oration, which consists in Accusation and Defence, the thing to be proved is, that Injury has been done: and the heads from whence the proofs are to be drawn, are these three:

1. The causes that move to Injury.

2. The Persons apt to do Injury.

3. The Persons obnoxious, or apt to suf∣fer Injury.

An Injury is a voluntary offending of ano∣ther man contrary to the Law.

Voluntary is that which a man does with knowledg, and without compulsion.

The causes of Voluntary Actions are In∣temperance, and a Vicious disposition con∣cerning things Desirable. As the Covetous man does against the Law, out of an intem∣perate desire of Money.

All Actions proceed either from the do∣ers disposition, or not.

Those that proceed not from the Doers disposition are such as he does by Chance, by Compulsion, or by Natural necessity.

Those that proceed from the Doers dis∣position, are such as he does by Custom, or upon Premeditation, or in Anger, or out of Intemperance.

By Chance are said to be done those things whereof neither the Cause, nor the Scope is evident; and which are done neither or∣derly, nor always, nor most commonly af∣ter the same manner.

By Nature are said to be done those things, the Causes whereof are in the Do∣er; and are done orderly, and always, or for the most part after the same man∣ner.

By Compulsion are done those things, which are against the Appetite, and Ordination of the Doer.

By Custome those Actions are said to be done, the Cause whereof is this, that the Do∣or has done them often.

Vpon Premeditation are said to be done those things which are done for profit, as the End, or the way to the End.

In Anger are said to be done those things which are done with a purpose of Revenge.

Out of Intemperance are said to be done those things which are delightful.

In sum, every Voluntary Action tends ei∣ther to Profit or Pleasure.

The Colours of Profitable are already set down.

The Colours of that which is Pleasing fol∣low next.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Colours, or Common Opinions con∣cerning Pleasure.

PLeasure is a sudden and sensible motion of the Soul, towards that which is Na∣tural.

Grief is the Contrary.

Pleasant therefore is that, which is the cause of such motion.

And to return to ones own Nature.

And Customes.

And those things that are not violent.

Vnpleasant are those things, which pro∣ceed from Necessity, as Cares, Study, Con∣tentions. The contrary whereof, Ease, Re∣mission from Labour and Care: also Play, Rest, Sleep, are Pleasant.

Pleasant also is that, to which we have an appetite.

Also the appetites themselves, if they be sensual; as Thirst, Hunger, and Lust.

Also those things to which we have an appetite upon perswasion and Reason.

And those things we remember, whether they pleased, or displeased, than when they were present.

And the things we hope for.

And Anger.

And to be in Love.

And Revenge.

And Victory. Therefore

Also contentious Games; as Tables, Chess, Dice, Tennis, &c.

And Hunting.

And Suits in Law.

And Honour and Reputation amongst men in Honour and Reputation.

And to Love.

And to be Belov'd and Respected.

And to be admir'd.

And to be Flatter'd.

And a Flatterer: (for he seems both to love and admire.)

And the same thing often.

And Change, or Variety.

And what we return to afresh.

And to Learn.

And to admire.

And to do Good.

And to receive Good.

And to help up again one that's fallen.

And to finish that which is unperfect.

And Imitation.

And therefore the Art of Painting.

And the Art of Carving Images.

And the Art of Poetry.

And Pictures and Statues.

And other Mens Dangers, so they be near.

And to have escaped hardly.

And things of a kind please one another.

And every one himself.

And ones own pleases him.

And to bear Sway.

And to be thought Wise.

And to dwell upon that which he is good at.

And ridiculous actions, Sayings and Per∣sons.

CHAP. XII.

Presumptions of Injury drawn from the per∣sons that do it: or Common Opinions con∣cerning the aptitude of Persons to do Inju∣ry.

OF the Causes which move to Injury, namely, Profit and Pleasure, has been already spoken, Chap. 6. 7. 11.

It follows next to speak of the Persons, that are apt to do Injury.

The Doers of Injury are.

Such as think they can do it.

And such as think to be undiscover'd when they have done it.

And such as think, though they be dis∣cover'd, they shall not be called in question for it.

And such as think, though they be cal∣led in question for it, that their Mulct will be less than their Gain, which either them∣selves or their Friends receive by the In∣jury.

Able to do Injury are.

Such as are Eloquent.

And such as are practis'd in business.

And such as have skill in Process.

And such as have many Friends.

And Rich Men.

And such as have Rich Friends; or Rich Servants; or Rich Partners.

Vndiscover'd when they have done it, are Such are not apt to commit the crimes whereof they are accused: as Feeble Men, Slaughter: Poor, and not Beautiful Men, Adultery.

And such as one would think could not chuse but be discover'd.

And such as do Injuries, whereof there hath been no Example.

And such as have none, or many ene∣mies.

And such as can easily conceal what they do.

And such as have some body to transfer the fault upon.

They that do Injury openly, are Such, whose friends have been Injured.

And such as have the Judges for friends.

And such as can escape their Tryal at Law.

And such as can put off their Tryal.

And such as can corrupt the Judges.

And such as can avoid the payment of their Fine.

And such as can defer the payment.

And such as cannot pay at all.

And such as by the Injury get manifestly, much, and presently; when the Fine is uncertain, little, and to come.

And such as get by the Injury, money; by the penalty, shame only.

And such on the Contrary, as get honour by the Injury, and suffer the mulct of money only, or banishment, or the like.

And such as have often escaped, or been undiscovered.

And such as have often attempted in vain.

And such as consider present pleasure, more than pain to come; and so intempe∣rate men are apt to do Injury.

And such as consider pleasure to come, more than present pain; and so temperate men are apt to do Injury.

And such as may seem to have done it by Fortune, Nature, Necessity, or Custom; and by Error, rather than by Injustice.

And such as have means to get pardon.

And such as want Necessaries, as poor men: or Unnecessaries, as rich men.

And such as are of very good, or very bad Reputation.

CHAP. XIII.

Presumptions of Injury drawn from the Per∣sons that suffer, and from the matter of the Injury.

OF those that do Injury, and why they do it, it hath been already spoken.

Now of the persons that suffer, and of the Matter wherein they suffer, the common Opinions are these:

Persons obnoxious to Injury are,

Such as have the things that we want, ei∣ther as necessary, or as delightful.

And such as are far from us.

And such as are at hand.

And such as are unwary, and Credu∣lous.

And such as are Lazy.

And such as are Modest.

And such as have swallowed many In∣juries.

And such as we have Injured often be∣fore.

And such as never before.

And such as are in our danger.

And such as are ill belov'd generally.

And such as are envyed.

And our Friends.

And our Enemies.

And such as, wanting friends, have no great ability either in speech or Action.

And such as shall be losers by going to Law: as Strangers, and Workmen.

And such as have done the Injuries they suffer.

And such as have committed a crime, or would have done, or are about to do.

And such as, by doing them an Inju∣ry, we shall gratifie our friends or supe∣riours.

And such, whose friendship we have new∣ly left, and accuse.

And such as another would do the Inju∣ry to, if we should not.

And such as by Injuring, we get greater means of doing good.

The Matters wherein men are obnox∣ious to Injury are,

Those things wherein all, or most men use to deal unjustly.

And those things which are easily hid, and put off into other hands, or altered.

And those things which a man is asham∣ed to have suffered.

And those things wherein prosecution of Injury, may be thought a love of contenti∣on.

CHAP. XIV.

Of those things which are necessary to be known for the Definition of Just and Unjust.

WHen the fact is evident, the next In∣quiry is, whether it be Just, or Vnjust.

For the Definition of Just and Vnjust, we must know what Law is; that is, what the Law of Nature, what the Law of Nations; what the Law Civil, what written Law, and what unwritten Law is: and what Persons, that is, what a publick Person, or the City is; and what a private Person, or Citizen is.

Vnjust in the opinion of all men, is that which is contrary to the Law of Nature.

Vnjust in the opinion of all men of those Nations which traffick and come together, is that which is contrary to the Law common to those Nations.

Vnjust only in one Common-wealth, is that which is contrary to the Law Civil, or Law of that Common-wealth.

He that is accused to have done any thing against the Publick, or a private Person, is accused to do it either ignorantly, or unwil∣lingly, or in anger, or upon premeditation.

And because the Defendant does many times confess the fact, but deny the unjustice; as that he took, but did not steal; and did, but not adultery; it is necessary to know the Definitions of Theft, Adultery, and all other crimes.

What facts are contrary to the written Laws, may be known by the Laws them∣selves.

Besides written Laws, whatsoever is Just, proceeds from Equity, or Goodness.

From Goodness proceeds that which we are praised, or honoured for.

From Equity proceed those actions, which though the written Law command not, yet being interpreted reasonably, and supplyed, seems to require at our hands.

Actions of Equity are such as these.

Not too rigorously to punish Errors, Mis∣chances, or Injuries.

To pardon the faults that adhere to Man∣kind.

And not to consider the Law so much, as the Law-makers mind; and not the Words so much, as the meaning of the Law.

And not to regard so much the Fact, as the intention of the Doer; nor part of the Fact, but the Whole; nor what the Doer is, but what he has been always, or for the most part.

And to remember better the Good receiv∣ed, than the Ill.

And to endure injuries patiently.

And to submit rather to the sentence of a Judge, than of the Sword.

And to the sentence of an Arbitrator, ra∣ther than of a Judge.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Colours or Common Opinions con∣cerning Injuries, comparatively.

COmmon Opinions concerning Injuries comparatively, are such as these:

Greater is the Injury which proceed from greater Iniquity.

And from which proceedeth greater dammage.

And of which there is no revenge.

And for which there is no remedy.

And by occasion of which, he that hath received the Injury, hath done some mis∣chief to himself.

He does the greater Injury, that does it first, or alone, or with few:

And he that does it often.

Greater Injury is that, against which Laws and Penalties were first made.

And that which is more brutal, or more approaching to the actions of beasts.

And that which is done upon more pre∣meditation.

And by which more Laws are broken.

And which is done in the place of Execu∣tion.

And which is of greatest shame to him that receives the Injury.

And which is committed against well de∣servers.

And which is committed against the un∣written Law; because good men should ob∣serve the Law for Justice, and not for fear of punishment.

And which is committed against the written Law; because he that will do Injury neglecting the penalty set down in the writ∣ten Law, is much more likely to transgress the unwritten Law, where there is no pe∣nalty at all.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Proofs Inartificial.

OF Artificial Proofs we have already spoken.

Inartificial Proofs, which we invent not, but make use of, are of five sorts.

1. Laws. And those are Civil, or written Law: the Law or Custom of Nations: and the universal Law of Nature.

2. Witness. And those are such as con∣cern Matter; and such as concern Manners. Also, they be ancient, or present.

3. Evidences, or Writings.

4. Question, or Torture.

5. Oaths. And those be either given, or taken, or both, or neither.

For Laws, we use them thus.

When the written Law makes against us, we appeal to the Law of Nature, alledging, That to be greatest Justice, which is greatest Equity.

That the Law of Nature is immutable; the written Law mutable.

That the written Law is but seeming Ju∣stice; the Law of Nature very Justice. And Justice is among those things which are, and not which seem to be.

That the Judge ought to discern between true and adulterate Justice.

That they are better men that obey un∣written, than written Laws.

That the Law against us does contradict some other Law. And when the Law has a double interpretation, that is, the true one, which makes for us.

And that the cause of the Law being abo∣lished, the Law is no more of Validity.

But when the written Law makes for us, and Equity for the Adversary, we must al∣ledge,

That a man may use Equity, not as a liberty to judg against the Law; but only as a security against being forsworn, when he knows not the Law.

That men seek not Equity because 'tis good simply, but because good for them.

That it is the same thing not to make, and not to use the Law.

That as in other Arts, and namely in Phy∣sick, Fallacies are pernitious; so in a Com∣mon-wealth 'tis pernitious to use pretexts a∣gainst the Law.

And that in Common-wealths well insti∣tuted, to seem wiser than the Laws, is pro∣hibited.

For Witnesses, we must use them thus:

When we have them not, we must stand for Presumptions, and say,

That in Equity sentence ought to be given according to the most probability.

That Presumptions are the testimony of the things themselves, and cannot be bri∣bed.

That they cannot lye.

When we have witnesses, against him that has them not, we must say,

That Presumptions, if they be false, can∣not be punished.

That if Presumptions were enough, wit∣nesses were superfluous.

For Writings, when they favour us; we must say,

That Writings are private and particular Laws; and he that takes away the use of Evidences, abolisheth the Law.

That since Contracts and Negotiations pass by Writings, he that bars their use, dis∣solves humane Society.

Against them, if they favour the Adver∣sary, we may say,

That since Laws do not bind, that are fraudulently made to pass, much less Wri∣tings.

And that the Judge being to dispense Justice, ought rather to consider what is just, than what is in the Writing.

That Writings may be gotten by fraud or force; but Justice by neither.

That the Writing is repugnant to some Law, Civil, or Natural; or to Justice; or to Honesty.

That 'tis repugnant to some other wri∣ting before, or after.

That it crosses some commodity of the Judge (which must not be said directly, but implyed cunningly.)

For the Torture, if the giving of it make for us, we must say,

That 'tis the only testimony that is cer∣tain.

But if it make for the Adversary, we may say.

That men inforced by Torture, speak as well that which is false, as that which is true.

That they who can endure, conceal the truth; and they who cannot, say that which is false to be delivered from pain.

For Oaths; he that will not put his

Adversary to his Oath, may alledge,

That he makes no scruple to be for∣sworn.

That by swearing, he will carry the cause; which not swearing, he must lose.

That he had rather trust his cause in the hand of the Judge, than of the Adversary.

He that refuseth to take the Oath, may say,

That the matter is not worth so much.

That if he had been an evil man, he had sworn, and carryed his cause.

That to try it by swearing for a Religious man against an irreligious, is as hard a match, as to set a weak man against a strong in Combate.

He that is willing to take the Oath, may pretend.

That he had rather trust himself, than his Adversary; and that 'tis equal dealing for an irreligious man to give, and for a Re∣ligious man to take the Oath.

That 'tis his duty to take the Oath, since he has required to have sworn Judges.

He that Offers the Oath may pretend,

That he does piously commit his cause to the Gods.

That he makes his Adversary himself Judge.

That 'twere absurd for him not to swear, that has required the Judges to be sworn.

And of these are to be compounded the Forms we are to use, when we would give, and not take the Oath; or take, and not give; or both give and take; or neither give nor take.

But if one have sworn contrary to a for∣mer Oath, he may pretend;

That he was forced.

That he was deceived, and that neither of these is Perjury, since Perjury is voluntary.

But if the Adversary do so, he may say; That he that stands not to what he hath sworn, subverteth humane society.

And (turning to the Judge) What reason have we to require, that you should be sworn, that judge our cause; when we will not stand to that we swear our selves.

And so much for Proofs inartificial.

BOOK. II.

CHAP. I.

The Introduction.

OF Belief proceeding from our In∣vention, that part which consist∣eth in proof, is already spoken of.

The other two parts follow; whereof one ariseth from the manners of the Spea∣ker; the other from the passions of the Hearer.

The Principles, Colours, or Common Opi∣nions upon which a mans belief is gronnded concerning the manners of him that speaks, are to be had partly out of that which hath been said before concerning Vertue, Book. 1. Chap. 9. partly out of those things which shall be said by and by, concerning the Pas∣sions. For a man is believed either for his Prudence, or for his Probity, which are Ver∣tues; or for good will: of which among the Passions.

The Principles concerning belief, arising from the passion of the Hearer, are to be ga∣ther'd from that which shall now be said of the several Passions in order.

In every one of which three things are to be considered. 1. First, how men are affected. 2. Secondly, Towards whom. 3. Thirdly, For what.

CHAP. II.

Of Anger.

ANger is desire of Revenge, joyned with grief for that he, or some of his, is, or seems to be neglected.

The object of Anger is always some par∣ticular, or individual thing.

In Anger there is also pleasure proceeding from the imagination of revenge to come.

To Neglect, is to esteem little or nothing: and of three kinds.

• 1. Contempt.
• 2. Crossing.
• 3. Contumely.

Contempt, is when a man thinks another of little worth in comparison to himself.

Crossing is the hinderance of another mans will without design to profit himself.

Contumely, is the disgracing of another for his own pastime.

The common Opinions concerning An∣ger are therefore such as follow.

They are easily Angry that think they are neglected.

That think they excell others; as the Rich with the Poor; the Noble with the Obscure, &c.

And such as think they deserve well.

And such as grieve to be hindered, op∣posed, or not assisted. And therefore sick men, poor men, Lovers, and generally all that desire, and attain not, are Angry with those that standing by, are not moved with their wants.

And such as having expected good, find evil.

Those that men are Angry with, are, Such as mock, deride, or jest at them.

And such as shew any kind of Contumely, towards them.

And such as despise those things which we spend most labour and study upon: and the more, by how much we seem the less advanced therein.

And our friends, rather than those that are not our friends.

And such as have honoured us, if they continue not.

And such as requite not our courtesie.

And such as follow contrary courses, i•• they be our inferiors.

And our friends, if they have said, or done us evil, or not good.

And such as give not eare to our intrea∣ty.

And such as are joyful, or calm in our di∣stress.

And such as troubling us, are not them∣selves troubled.

And such as willingly hear or see our dis∣graces.

And such as neglect us in the presence of our Competitors; of those we admire of those we would have admire us; of those we reverence, and of those that reverence us.

And such as should help us, and neg∣lect it.

And such as are in jest, when we are in earnest.

And such as forget us, or our Names.

An Orator therefore must so frame his Judg or Auditor by his Oration; as to make him apt to Anger: and then make his Ad∣versary appear such as men use to be Angry withal.

CHAP. III.

Of Reconciling, or Pacifying Anger.

REconciliation is the Appeasing of An∣ger.

Those to whom men are easily reconci∣led, are,

Such as have not offended out of Neg∣lect.

And such as have done it against their will.

And such as wish done the contrary of what they have done.

And such as have done as much to them∣selves.

And such as confess and repent.

And such as are humbled.

And such as do seriously the same things, that they do seriously.

And such as have done them more good heretofore, than now hurt.

And such as sue to them for any thing.

And such as are not insolent, nor mock∣ers, nor slighters of others in their own disposition.

And generally such as are of a contrary disposition to those, whom men are usually angry withal.

And such as they fear or reverence.

And such as reverence them.

And such as have offended their Anger. Reconcilable are,

Such as are contrarily affected to those whom we have said before to be easily an∣gry.

And such as play, laugh, make merry, prosper, live in plenty; and in sum, all that have no cause of grief.

And such as have given their anger time. Men lay down their Anger for these causes.

Because they have gotten the Victory.

Because the Offender has suffered more than they meant to inflict.

Because they have been revenged of a∣nother.

Because they think they suffer justly.

And because they think the revenge will not be felt, or not known that the revenge was theirs, and for such an injury.

And because the Offender is dead.

Whosoever therefore would asswage the anger of his Auditor, must make himself ap∣pear such, as men use to be reconciled unto: and beget in his Auditor such opinions, as make him reconcileable.

CHAP. IV.

Of Love and Friends.

TO Love, is to will well to another, and that for others, not for our own sake.

A Friend is he that loves, and he that is beloved.

Friends one to another, are they that na∣turally love one another.

A Friend therefore is he,

That rejoyceth at anothers Good.

And that grieves at his hurt.

And that wishes the same with us to a third, whether good, or hurt.

And that is Enemy or Friend to the same man.

We love them,

That have done good to us, or ours; e∣specially if much, readily, or in season.

That are our Friends Friends.

That are our Enemies Enemies.

That are Liberal.

That are Valiant.

That are Just.

And that we would have love us.

And good Companions.

And such as can abide Jests.

And such as break Jests.

And such as praise us, especially for somewhat that we doubt of in our selves.

And such as are neat.

And such as upbraid us not with our vices, or with their own benefits.

And such as quickly forget injuries.

And such as least observe our Errors.

And such as are not of ill Tongue.

And those that are ignorant of our Vi∣ces.

And such as cross us not when we are bu∣sie, or angry.

And such as are officious towards us.

And those that are like us.

And such as follow the same course or trade of life, where they impeach not one another.

And such as labour for the same thing, when both may be satisfied.

And such as are not ashamed to tell us freely their faults, so it be not in contempt of us, and the faults such, as the World, rather than their own Consciences Con∣demns.

And such as are ashamed to tell us of their very faults.

And such as we would have honour us, and not envie, but imitate us.

And such as we would do good to, ex∣cept with greater hurt to our selves.

And such as continue their Friendship to the dead.

And such as speak their mind.

And such as are not terrible.

And such as we may rely on.

The several kinds of friendship, are Soci∣ety, Familiarity, Consanguinity, Affinity, &c.

The things that beget love, are,

The bestowing of Benefits.

• Gratis.
• Vnasked.
• Privately.

CHAP. V.

Of Enmity and Hatred.

THE Colours, or Common Opinions con∣cerning Hatred are to be taken from the contrary of those, which concern Love and Friendship.

Hatred differs from Anger in this,

That Anger regards only what is done to ones self; but Hatred not.

And in this, that Anger regards particu∣lars only; the other universals also.

And in this, that Anger is curable, Ha∣tred not.

And in this, that Anger seeks the vexa∣tion, Hatred the dammage of ones Adver∣sary.

That with Anger there is always joyned Grief; with Hatred not always.

That Anger may at length be satiated, but Hatred never.

Hence it appears how the Judge or Au∣ditor may be made Friend or Enemy to us; and how our Adversary may be made ap∣pear Friend or Enemy to the Judge; and how we may answer to our Adversary, that would make us appear Enemies to him.

CHAP. VI.

Of Fear.

FEar is a trouble, or vexation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of an e∣vil at hand, which may hurt or destroy.

Danger is the nearness of the evil fear∣ed.

The things to be Feared, are, Such as have power to hurt.

And the signs of will to do us hurt, as Anger and Hatred of powerful men.

And Injustice joyned with power.

And Valour provoked, joyned with power.

And the fear of powerful men.

The men that are to be feared, are, Such as know our faults.

And such as can do us Injury.

And such as think they are injured by us.

And such as have done us Injury.

And our Competitors in such things as cannot satisfie both.

And such as are feared by more power∣ful men than we are.

And such as have destroyed greater men than we are.

And such as use to invade their inferi∣ours.

And men not passionate, but dissemblers, and crafty, are more to be feared than those that are hasty and free.

The things especially to be feared, are,

Such, wherein if we err, the error can∣not be repaired; at least, not according to ours, but our Adversaries pleasure.

And such as admit either none, or not easie help.

And such as being done, or about to be done to others, make us pitty them.

They that fear not, are,

Such as expect not evil; or not now; or not this; or not from these.

And therefore men fear little in pro∣sperity.

And men fear little that think they have suffered already.

An Orator therefore that wouldput Fear into the Auditor, must let him see that he is obnoxious; and that greater than he do suffer, and have suffer'd from those, and at those times they least thought.

CHAP. VII.

Of Assurance.

ASsurance is hope, arising from an ima∣gination that the help is near, or the evil afar off.

The things therefore that beget Assu∣rance are,

The remoteness of those things that are to be feared, and the nearness of their con∣traries.

And the facility of great, or many helps or remedies.

And neither to have done; nor received Injury.

And to have no Competitors or not great ones, or if great ones, at least friends; such as we have obliged, or are obliged to.

And that the danger is extended to more, or greater than us.

Assured, or Confident, are, They that have oft escaped danger.

And they to whom most things have succeeded well.

And they that see their Equals, or inferi∣ours not afraid.

And they that have wherewith to make themselves feared, as wealth, strength, &c.

And such as have done others no wrong.

And such as think themselves in good terms with God Almighty.

And such as think they will speed well, that are gone before.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Shame.

SHame is a perturbation of the Mind a∣rising from the apprehension of Evil, past, present, or to come, to the prejudice of a mans own, or his friends reputation.

The things therefore which men are a∣shamed of are those Actions which proceed from Vice, as,

To throw away ones Arms; to run away, signs of Cowardliness.

To deny that which is committed to ones trust, a sign of Injustice.

To have lyen with whom, where, and when we ought not, signs of Intempe∣rance.

To make gain of small and base things; not to help with money whom and how much we ought; to receive help from mean∣er men; to ask money at use from such as one thinks will borrow of him; to borrow of him that expects payment of somewhat before lent; and to redemand what one has lent, of him that one thinks will borrow more; and so to praise, as one may be thought to ask; signs of Wretchedness.

To praise one to his face; to praise his vertues too much, and colour his vices; Signs of Flattery.

To be unable to indure such labours as men indure that are elder, tenderer, grea∣ter in quality, and of less strength than he, signs of Effeminacy.

To be beholden often to another; and to upbraid those that are beholding to him, signs of Pusillanimity.

To speak and promise much of ones self more than his due, signs of Arrogance.

To want those things which ones Equals, all, or most of them have attained to, is al∣so a thing to be ashamed of.

And to suffer things ignominious, as to serve about anothers person; or to be im∣ployed in his base actions.

In Actions of Intemperance, whether willingly, or unwillingly committed; there is shame in Actions of Force, only when they are done unwillingly.

The men before whom we are ashamed, are such as we respect; namely,

Those that admire us.

And those whom we desire should admire us.

And those whom we admire.

Those that contend with us for Ho∣nour.

Those whose opinion we contemn not.

And therefore men are most ashamed in the presence.

Of old and well bred men.

Of those we are always to live with.

Of those that are not guilty of the same fault.

Of those that do not easily pardon.

And of those that are apt to reveal our faults; such as are men injured, Backbiters, Scoffers, Comick Poets.

And of those before whom we have had always good success.

And of those who never asked any thing of us before.

And of such as desire our Friendship.

And of our familiars, that know none of our Crimes.

And of such as will reveal our faults to any of those that are named before.

But in the presence of such whose judg∣ment most men despise, men are not asham∣ed.

Therefore we are ashamed also in the pre∣sence

Of those whom we reverence.

And of those who are concerned in our own, or Ancestors, or Kinsfolks actions or misfortunes, if they be shameful.

And of their Rivals.

And of those that are to live with them that know their disgrace.

The Common Opinions concerning Impu∣dence are taken from the contrary of these.

CHAP. IX.

Of Grace, or Favour.

GRace is that Vertue, by which a man is said to do a good turn, or do ser∣vice to a man in need; not for his own but for his cause to whom he does it.

Great Grace is when the need is great; or when they are hard, or difficult things that are conferr'd, or when the time is sea∣sonable, or when he that conferr's the fa∣vour is the only, or first man that did it.

Need, is a desire joyned with grief for the absence of the thing desired.

Grace therefore it is not, if it be not done to one that needs.

Whosoever therefore would prove that he has done a Grace, or Favour, must shew that he needeth it to whom it was done.

Grace it is not,

Which is done by Chance.

Nor which is done by Necessity.

Nor which has been requited.

Nor that which is done to ones Ene∣my.

Nor that which is a trifle.

Nor that which is nought, if the Giver know the fault.

And in this manner a man may go over the Praedicaments, and examine a benefit, whether it be a Grace for being This, or for being so Much, or for being Such, or for being Now, &c.

CHAP. X.

Of Pity, or Compassion.

PIty is a perturbation of the mind, ari∣sing from the apprehension of hurt o•• trouble to another that doth not deserve it, and which he thinks may happen to him∣self, or his.

And because it appertains to Pity, it think that he, or his may fall into the mi∣sery he pities in others, it follows that they be most compassionate,

Who have passed through Misery.

And old Men.

And weak Men.

And timorous Men.

And learned Men.

And such as have Parents, Wife, and Children.

And such as think there be honest Men. And that they are Iess Compassio∣nate.

Who are in great despair.

Who are in great prosperity.

And they that are Angry; for they consi∣der not.

And they that are very confident; for they also consider not.

And they that are in the Act of contume∣ly; for neither do these consider.

And they that are astonished with fear. And they that think no Man honest.

The things to be pitied are, Such as grieve, and withal hurt. Such as destroy.

And Calamities of fortune, if they be great: as none or few friends, deformity, weakness, lameness, &c.

And evil that arrives where good is ex∣pected.

And after extream Evil, a little Good.

And through a Mans life to have no good offer it self; or being offer'd, not to have been able to enjoy it.

Men to be pitied are,

Such as are known to us, unless they be so near to us, as their hurt be our own.

And such as be of our own years.

Such as are like us in manners.

Such as are of the same, or like stock.

And our Equals in dignity.

Those that have lately suffer'd, or are shortly to suffer injury: and those that have the marks of injury past.

And those that have the words or actions of them that be in present misery.

CHAP. XI.

Of Indignation.

OPposite in a manner to Pity in good Men, is Indignation, which is grief for the prosperity of a Man unworthy.

With Indignation there is always joyned a joy for the prosperity of a Man worthy, as Pity is always with contentment in the adversity of them that deserve it.

In wicked Men the opposite of pity is, Envy; as also the companion thereof, de∣light in the harm of others, which the Greeks in one word have called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. But of these in the next Chapter.

Men conceive Indignation against others, not for their vertues, as Justice, &c.

For these make Men worthy; and in In∣dignation we think Men unworthy.

But for those goods which men indued with vertue, and noble Men, and handsome Men are worthy of.

And for newly gotten power and riches, rather than for antient, and especially if by these he has gotten other goods, as by Riches, Command. The reason why we conceive greater Indignation against new than antient Riches, is, that the former seem

to possess that which is none of theirs. But the antient seem to have but their own. For with common people, to have been so long, is to be so by Right.

And for the bestowing of goods incongru∣ously: as when the arms of the most vali∣ant Achilles were bestowed on the most elo∣quent Vlysses.

And for the comparison of the Inferiour in the same thing, as when one Valiant is compared with a more Valiant; or whether absolutely Superiour, as when a good Scho∣ler is compared with a good Man.

Apt to Indignation are,

They that think themselves worthy of the greatest goods, and do possess them.

And they that are good.

And they that are ambitious.

And such as think themselves deserve better what another possesseth, than he that hath it.

Least apt to Indignation are,

Such as are of a poor, servile, and not ambitious Nature.

Who they are, that Rejoyce, or Grieve not at the Adversity of him that suffers worthily, and in what occasions, may be gathered from the contrary of what has been already said.

Whosoever therefore would turn away the compassion of the Judge, he must make him apt to Indignation; and shew that his Adversary is unworthy of the Good, and worthy of the Evil which happens to him.

CHAP. XII.

of Envy.

ENvy is grief, for the prosperity of such as our selves, arising not from any hurt that we, but from the good that they re∣ceive.

Such as our selves, I call those that are equal to us in blood, in age, in abilities, in glory, or in means.

They are apt to Envy,

That are within a little of the highest.

And those that are extraordinarily ho∣noured for some quality that is singular in them, especially Wisdom or good Fortune.

And such as would be thought wise.

And such as catch at glory in every acti∣on.

And Men of poor spirits: for every thing appears great to them.

The things which Men Envy in others are,

Such as bring Glory.

And goods of Fortune.

And such things as we desire for our selves.

And things in the possession whereof we exceed others, or they us a little.

Obnoxious to Envy are,

Men of our own time, of our own Coun∣trey, of our own Age, and Competitors of our Glory.

And therefore,

Those whom we strive with for Honour.

And those that covet the same things that we do.

And those that get quickly, what we hardly obtain, or not at all.

And those that attain unto, or do the things that turn to our reproach, not being done by us.

And those that possess what we have possessed heretofore. So old and decayed Men Envy the young and lusty.

And those that have bestowed little, are subject to be Envyed by such as have be∣stowed much upon the same thing.

From the contraries of these may be de∣rived the Principles concerning Joy for o∣ther Mens hurt.

He therefore that would not have his E∣nemy prevail, when he craves pity, or other favour; must dispose the Judge to Envy;

and make his Adversary appear such, as are above described, to be subject to the Envy of others.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Emulation.

EMulation is grief arising from that our Equals possess such goods as are had in honour, and whereof we are capable, but have them not; not because they have them, but because not we also.

No Man therefore Emulates another in things whereof himself is not capable.

Apt to Emulate are,

Such as esteem themselves worthy of more than they have.

And Young and Magnanimous Men.

And such as already possess the goods for which Men are honoured: for they measure their worth by their having.

And those that are esteemed worthy by others.

And those whose Ancestors, Kindred, Fa∣miliars, Nation, City, have been eminent for some good, do Emulate others for that good.

Objects of Emulation are, for things; Vertues.

And things whereby we may profit o∣thers.

And things whereby we may please o∣thers.

For Persons,

They that possess such things.

And such as many desire to be friends or acquainted with, or like unto.

And they whose praises flie abroad,

The contrary of Emulation is Contempt.

And they that Emulate such as have the goods aforementioned, Contemn such as have them not: and thence it is, that Men who live happily enough, unless they have the goods which Men honour, are nevertheless Contemned.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the Manners of Youth.

OF Passions we have already spoken. We are next to speak of Manners. Manners are distinguished by Passions; Ha∣bits, Ages, and Fortunes.

What kind of Manners proceed from Pas∣sions, and from Vertues and Vices (which are Habits,) hath been already shewed.

There remains to be spoken of the Man∣ners, that are peculiar to several Ages and Fortunes.

The Ages are Youth, Middle-Age, Old Age.

And first of Youth.

Young Men are,

Violent in their desires.

Prompt to execute their desires.

Incontinent.

Inconstant, easily forsaking what they desired before.

Longing mightily, and soon satisfied.

Apt to anger, and in their anger Vio∣lent: and ready to execute their anger with their hands.

Lovers of Honour, and of Victory more than Money, as having not been yet in Want.

Well natured, as having not been ac∣quainted with much malice.

Full of hope, both because they have not yet been often frustrated, and because they have by natural heat that disposition that other Ages have by Wine; Youth being a kind of natural drunkenness. Besides, Hope is of the time to come, whereof Youth hath much, but of the time past little.

Credulous, because not yet often de∣ceived.

Easily deceived, because full of Hope.

Valiant, because apt to Anger and full of Hope; whereof this begets confidence, the other keeps off Fear.

Bashful, because they estimate the Ho∣nour of Actions by the precepts of the Law.

Magnanimous, because not yet dejected by the misfortunes of humane life.

And lovers of Honour more than of Pro∣fit, because they live more by Custom than by Reason; and by Reason we acquire Pro∣fit, but Vertue by Custom.

Lovers of their Friends and Compani∣ons.

Apt to err in the excese, rather than the defect, contrary to that precept of Chilon, Ne quid nimis; for they overdo every thing: they Love too much, and Hate too much, because thinking themselves wise, they are obstinate in the opinion they have once delivered.

Doers of Injury rather for Contumely than for dammage.

Mercifull, because measuring others by their own Innocence, they think them bet∣ter than they be, and therefore less to me∣rit what they suffer; which is a cause of Pity.

And Lovers of Mirth, and by consequence such as love to jest at others.

Jesting is witty Contumely.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Manners of Old Men.

THe Manners of Old Men are in a man∣ner the contraries of those of Youth. They determine nothing: they do every thing less vehemently than is fit: they ne∣ver say they know; but to every thing they say, perhaps and peradventure; which comes to pass from that having lived long, they have often mistaken and been de∣ceived.

They are peevish because they interpret every thing to the worst.

And suspicious through Incredulity, and Incredulous by reason of their Experi∣ence.

They Love and Hate, as if they meant to continue in neither.

Are of poor spirits, as having been hum∣bled by the chances of life.

And Covetous, as knowing how easie 'tis to lose, and hard to get.

And Timorous, as having been cooled by years.

And greedy of life: for good things seem greater by the want of them.

And Lovers of themselves out of Pusilla∣••imity.

And seek Profit more than Honour, be∣cause they love themselves; and Profit is among the goods that are not simply good, but good for ones self.

And without bashfulness, because they despise seeming.

And hope little; knowing by Experi∣ence that many times good Counsel has been followed with ill event, and because also they be timorous.

And live by Memory rather than Hope; for Memory is of the time past, whereof Old Men have good store.

And are full of Talk, because they de∣light in their Memory.

And Vehement in their anger; but not stout enough to execute it.

They have weak, or no desires; and thence seem Temperate.

They are slaves to Gain.

And live more by reason than Custom; because reason leads to Profit, as Custom to that which is Honourable.

And do Injury to indammage, and not in Contumely.

And are merciful by Compassion, or ima∣gination of the same Evils in themselves which is a kind of Infirmity, and not Hu∣manity, as in Young Men, proceeding from

a good opinion of those that suffer Evil.

And full of complaint, as thinking them∣selves not far from Evil, because of their Infirmity.

Seeing then every Man loves such Men, and their discourses, which are most agree∣able to their own Manners; 'tis not hard to collect, how the Orator, and his Oration may be made acceptable to the Hearer, whe∣ther Young or Old.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Manners of Middle-aged men.

THe Manners of Middle-aged men, are between those of Youth, and Old Men, and therefore,

They neither dare, nor fear too much: but both as is fit.

They neither believe all; nor reject all; but judge.

They seek not only what is Honourable, nor only what is Profitable; but both.

They are neither Covetous, nor Prodi∣gal; but in the mean.

They are neither easily angry; nor yet stupid: but between both.

They are Valiant, and withal Tempe∣rate.

And in general, whatsoever is divided in Youth, and Old Men: is compounded in Mid∣dle-age.

And whereof the Excess, or Defect is in Youth or Old Men; the Mediocrity is in those of Middle-age.

Middle-age for the Body, I call the time from thirty to five and thirty years: for the Mind, the nine and fortieth, or therea∣bouts.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Manners of the Nobility.

OF Manners that proceed from the seve∣ral Ages we have already spoken.

We are next to speak of those that rise from several Fortunes.

The Manners of the Nobility are,

To be Ambitious.

To undervalue their Ancestors Equals. For the goods of Fortune seem the more pre∣cious for their Antiquity.

Nobility is the Vertue of a Stock.

And Generosity, is not to degenerate from the vertue of his Stock.

For as in Plants; so in the Races of Men, there is a certain progress; and they grow better and better to a certain point; and

change, viz. Subtil Wits into Madness; and staid wits into stupidity and Blockish∣ness.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the Manners of the Rich.

RIch Men are Contumelious, and Proud. This they have from their Riches. For seeing every thing may be had for Mo∣ney, having Money, they think they have all that is good.

And Effeminate; because they have wherewithal to subminister to their Lust.

And Boasters of their Wealth: and speak in high terms foolishly. For Men willing∣ly talk of what they love and admire; and think others affect the same that they do: and the truth is, all sorts of Men submit to the Rich.

And think themselves worthy to com∣mand, having that by which Men attain Command.

And in general, they have the Manners of Fortunate Fools.

They do Injury, with intention not to hurt, but to disgrace; and partly also through Incontinence.

There is a difference between New and Ancient Riches: for they that are newly come to Wealth have the same faults in a greater degree: for New Riches are a kind of rude∣ness and apprentiship of Riches.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Manners of Men in Power, and of such as prosper.

THe Manners of Men in Power, are the same, or better than those of the Rich.

They have a greater sense of Honour than the Rich; and their Manners are more Manly.

They are more Industrious than the Rich: for Power is sustained by Industry.

They are Grave, but without Austere∣ness: for being in place conspicuous, they carry themselves the more modestly; and have a kind of gentle and comely Gravity, which the Greeks call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

When they do Injuries, they do great ones.

The Manners of Men that prosper, are compounded of the Manners of the Nobili∣ty, the Rich, and those that are in Power, for to some of these all Prosperity appertains.

Prosperity in Children, and goods of the Body, make Men desire to exceed others in the goods of Fortune.

Men that Prosper have this ill, to be more proud, and inconsiderate than o∣thers.

And this good; that they worship God, trusting in him, for that they find them∣selves to receive more good than proceeds from their Industry.

The Manners of Poor Men, Obscure Men, Men without Power, and Men in Adversity, may be collected from the Contrary of what has been said.

CHAP. XX.

Common Places or Principles concerning what May be Done, what Has been Done, and what Shall be Done; or of Fact Possi∣ble, Past and Future. Also of Great and Little.

WE have hitherto set down such Prin∣ciples as are peculiar to several kinds of Orations.

Now we are to speak of such Places as are Common to them all; as these, Possible, Done, or Past, Future, Great, Small.

Possible is that,

The Gontrary whereof is Possible.

And the like whereof is Possible.

And then which some harder thing is Possible.

And the beginning whereof is Possi∣ble.

And the end whereof is Possible.

And the usual consequent whereof is Pos∣sible.

And whatsoever we desire.

And the beginning whereof is in the power of those whom we can either com∣pell or perswade.

And part whereof is Possible.

And part of the whole that is possible.

And the General if a Particular.

And a Particular if the General.

And of Relatives, if one, the other.

And that which without Art and Indu∣stry is Possible, is much more so with Art and Industry.

And that which is Possible to Worse, Weak∣er, and Unskilfuller Men, is much more so to Better, Stronger, and more Skilful.

The Principles concerning Impossible are the Contraries of these.

That Has been done,

Then which a harder thing has been Done.

And the Consequent whereof has been done.

And that which being Possible, he had a will to, and nothing hindered.

And that which was Possible, to him in his Anger.

And that which he longed to do.

And that which was before upon the point of doing.

And whose antecedent has been Done; or that, for which it uses to be Done.

And if that, for whose cause we do this, than this.

The Principles concerning Not done are the Contraries of these.

That Shall be done.

Which some Man can, and means to do.

And which some Man can, and desires to do.

And which is in the way, and upon the point to be done.

And the antecedents whereof are past.

And the Motive whereof is past.

Of Great and Small, More and Less, see Chap. 7. Book. 1.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Example, Similitude, and Fables.

OF the Principles both general and spe∣cial from whence Proofs are to be drawn, has been already spoken.

Now follow the Proofs themselves which are Examples or Enthymemes.

An Example is either an Example proper∣ly so called (as some Action past:) or a Si∣militude (which also is, called a Parable:) or a Fable (which contains some Action feigned.)

An Example properly so called, is this; Darius came not into Greece, till he had first subdued Aegypt. Xerxes also conquered Ae∣gypt first; then afterwards crossed the Helle∣spont. We ought therefore to hinder the King of Persia from conquering Aegypt.

A Similitude, or Parable, is such as follow∣eth: They who choose their Magistrates by Lot, are like them that choose for their Cham∣pions those on whom the Lot shall fall, rather than those who have the greatest strength; and for their Pilot, not him that hath skill; but him whose name is drawn out of the Vrne.

A Fable is in this manner. The Horse desiring to drive out the Stag from his common 〈2 pages missing〉〈2 pages missing〉

Such as are not manifest; are either Con∣clusions of Enthymemes; as

He that's wise will not suffer his Children, &c.

Or else are Enthymematical; that is; have in themselves the force of an Enthy∣meme; as

Mortal Men ought not to carry Immortal Anger.

A Sentence not Manifest, ought to be ei∣ther Inferr'd, or Confirm'd.

Inferr'd thus.

'Tis not good to be effeminately minded, nor to be envyed by ones fellow Citizens. A wise Man therefore will not have his Children over∣learned.

Confirm'd thus.

A wise Man will not have his Children over∣learned, seeing too much Learning both softens a Mans mind, and procures him envy among his fellow Citizens.

If a reason be added to a manifest Sentence let it be short.

Sentences become not every Man; but on∣ly old Men, and such as be well versed in business. For to hear a young Man speak Sentencee, is ridiculous; and to hear an ig∣norant Man speak Sentences, is absurd.

Sentences generally received, when they are for our purpose, ought not to be negle∣cted, because they pass for truths. And

yet they may be denyed, when any lauda∣ble custom, or humour may thereby be made appear in the Denyer.

The commodities of Sentences, are two.

One proceeding from the Vanity of the Hearer, who takes for true universally af∣firmed, that which he has found for true only in some particular; and therefore a Man ought to consider in every thing what opinion the Hearer holds.

Another is, that Sentences do discover the manners and disposition of the speaker; so that if they be esteemed good Sentences, he shall be esteemed a good Man; and if evil, an evil Man.

Thus much of Sentences, what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they become; and what is their profit.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the Invention of Enthymemes.

SEeing an Enthymeme differs from a Lo∣gical Syllogisme, in that it neither con∣cludes out of every thing, nor out of remote Principles; the Places of it, from whence a Man may argue ought to be certain, and determinate.

And because whosoever makes a Syllo∣gisme Rhetorical, or other, should know all, or the most part of that which is in question; as, whosoever is to advise the Athenians in the question, whether they are to make War or no, must know what their Revenues be; what, and what kind of power they have: and he that will praise them, must know their acts at Salamis, Ma∣rathon, &c. It will be necessary for a good speaker to have in readiness the choicest particulars of whatsoever he foresees he may speak of.

He that is to speak ex tempore, must com∣prehend in his speech as much as he can of what is most proper in the matter in hand.

Proper, I call those things which are least common to others; as, he that will praise Achilles, is not to declare such things

as are common both to him, and Diomedes; as that he was a Prince, and Warred against the Trojans; but such things as are proper only to Achilles; as that he killed Hector and Cygnus; went to the War young, and Voluntary.

Let this therefore be one general Place, from that which is proper.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the Places of Enthymemes Ostensive.

FOrasmuch as Enthymemes either infer truly, or seem only so to do; and they which do infer indeed, be either Ostensive; or such as bring a Man to some impossibility; we will first set down the Places of Enthy∣memes Ostensive.

And Ostensive Enthymeme is, wherein a Man concludes the question from somewhat granted.

That Enthymeme which brings a Man to an impossibility, is an Enthymeme wherein from that which the Adversary maintain∣eth, we conclude that which is manifestly impossible.

All Places have been already set down in a manner in the precedent Propositions of Good, Evil, Just, Vnjust, Honourable and

Dishonourable: namely, they have been set down as applyed to particular Subjects, or in Concrete.

Here they are to be set down in another manner; namely in the Abstract or Vniver∣sal.

The first Place then let be from Contra∣ries, which in the Concrete or Particulars is exemplified thus. If Intemperance be hurt∣ful, Temperance is profitable: and if Intempe∣rance be not hurtful; neither is Temperance profitable.

Another Place may be from Cognominati∣on or affinity of words: as in this Particu∣lar. If what is Just be Good; then what is Justly is well: but Justly to die is not well: therefore not all that is Just is Good.

A third from Relatives; as, This Man has Justly Done, therefore the other has Justly suffered. But this Place sometimes deceives for a Man may suffer justly, yet not from him.

A fourth from Comparison, three ways.

From the Great to the Less; as, He has stricken his Father; and therefore this Man.

From the Less to the Greater: as, The Gods know not all things; much less Man.

From Equality: as, If Captains be not al∣ways the worse esteemed for losing a Victory; why should Sophisters?

Another from the Time: as Philip to the Thebans: If I had required to pass through your Country with my Army, before I had ••ayded you against the Phocaeans, there is no doubt but you would have promised it me. It is absurd therefore to deny it me now, after I have trusted you:

A Sixth from what the adversary says of himself: as, Iphicrates asked Aristophon, whe∣ther he would take a Bribe to betray the Army: and he answering no; What (says he) is it likely that Iphicrates would betray the Army; and Aristophon not?

This Place would be ridiculous, where the Defendant were not in much more esti∣mation than the accuser.

A seventh from the Definition; as that of Socrates; A Spirit is either God, or the Crea∣ture of God: and therefore he denies not that there is a God, that confesses there are Spi∣rits.

An eighth from the distinction of an am∣biguous word.

A Ninth from Division: as, If all Men do what they do for one of three causes, where∣of two are impossible; and the Accuser charge not the Defendant with the third; it follows that he has not done it.

A Tenth from Induction: as, At Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, &c. And therefore eve∣ry where.

An Eleventh from Authority, or precedent sentence; as that of Sappho, that Death is evil, for that the Gods have judged it so, in exempting themselves from mortality.

A Twelfth from the Consequence: as, 'Tis not good to be envied; Therefore neither to be Learned. 'Tis good to be wise, therefore also to be instructed.

A Thirteenth from two contrary Conse∣quences; as, 'Tis not good to be an Orator, be∣cause if he speak the truth, he shall displease Men: If he speak falsely, he shall displease God.

Here is to be noted, that sometimes this argument may be retorted: as thus, If you speak truth, you shall please God; if you speak untruth you shall please Men; therefore by all means be an Orator.

A Fourteenth from the quality that Men have to praise one thing, and approve another▪ as, We ought not to War against the Athe∣nians upon no precedent injury; for all Men discommend injustice. Again, We ought to War against the Athenians; for otherwise our Liberty is at their mercy, that is, is no Liber∣ty: but the preservation of Liberty is a thing that all Men will approve.

A Fifteenth from Proportion: as, seeing we naturalize strangers for their virtues, why should we not Banish this stranger for his vi∣ces?

A Sixteenth from the similitude of Conse∣quents: as, He that denies the immortality of the Gods, is no worse than he that has Writ∣ten the generation of the Gods. For the same Consequence follows of both, that sometimes there are none.

A Seventeenth from that, that Men change their mind: as, If when we were in Banish∣ment, we fought to recover our Countrey, why should we not fight now to retain it?

An Eighteenth from a fained end: as, that Diomedes chose Ulysses to go with him, not as more Valiant than another; but as one that would partake less of the Glory.

A Nineteenth from the Cause; as if he would infer he did it from this, that he had cause to do it.

A Twentieth from that which is Incredi∣ble, but True: as, that Laws may need a Law to mend them; as well as Fish Bred in the salt Water, may need salting.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Places of Enthymemes that lead to I••∣possibility.

LEt the first Place be from inspection 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Times, Actions, or Words, either of the Adversary, or of the Speaker, or Both. O•• the Adversary; as, He says, he loves the Peo∣ple, and yet he was in the conspiracy of the Thirty. Of the Speaker; as, He says, I am contentious, and yet I never began Suit. Of Both; as He never conferr'd any thing to the benefit of the Commonwealth, whereas I have ransomed divers Citizens with mine own Mo∣ney.

A Second from shewing the cause of that which seemed amiss, and serves for Men of good reputation that are accused; as, The Mother that was accused of Incest for being seen Imbracing her Son, was absolved as soon as she made appear, that she imbraced him upon his arrival from far, by way of Salutation.

A Third, from rendring of the cause; as, Leodamas. to whom it was objected, that he had, under the Thirty Tyrants, defaced the Inscription (which the People had set up in a Pillar) of his Ignominy; answer∣ed,

He had not done it; because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand; thereby to indear himself to the Tyrants, by the Testimony of the Peoples hatred.

A Fourth from better Counsel; as, He might have done better for himself; therefore he did not this. But this Place deceives, when the better Counsel comes to mind after the Fact.

A Fifth, from the Incompatibility of the things to be done; as, They that did delibe∣rate whether they should both Mourn and Sacrifice at the Funeral of Leucothea, were told, that if they thought her a Goddess, they ought not to Mourn; and if they thought her a Mortal, they ought not to Sacrifice.

A Sixth (which is proper to Judicial O∣rations) from an Inference of Errour; as, If he did it not, he was not wise, therefore he did it.

Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility, please more than Ostensive: for they compare, and put contraries together, whereby they are the better set off, and more conspicuous to the Auditor.

Of all Enthymemes, they be best, which we assent to as soon as hear. For such con∣sent pleaseth us; and makes us favourable to the speaker.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes.

OF seeming Enthymemes, one Place may be from the Form of speaking; as when a Man has repeated divers Sentences, he brings in his Conclusion, as if it follow'd necessarily, though it do not.

A Second from an ambiguous word.

A Third from that which is true divided, to that which is false joyned; as that of Orestes, It was justice that I should Revenge my Fa∣thers death, and it was justice my Mother should die for killing my Father, therefore I justly killed my Mother. Or from that which is true joyned, to that which is false divided; as, one cup of Wine, and one cup of Wine, are hurtful; therefore one cup of Wine is hurt∣ful.

A Fourth from Amplification of the Crime. For neither is the Defendant likely to have committed the Crime he amplifies; nor does the Accuser seem, when he is Passionate, to want ground for his Accusation.

A Fifth from signs; as, when a Man con∣cludes the doing of the Fact from the man∣ner of his life.

A Sixth from that which comes by chance, as if from this, that the Tyranny of Hippar∣thus came to be overthrown from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmodius, a Man should conclude, that in a free Commonwealth loving of Boyes were profitable.

A Seventh from the Consequence, as Banish∣ment is to be desired, because a Banish'd Man has choice of places to dwell in.

An Eighth from making that the cause which is not; as, In Demosthenes his Go∣vernment, the War began; therefore Demost∣henes Governed well. With the Peloponne∣sian War began the Plague, therefore Peri∣cles that perswaded that War, did ill.

A Ninth from the Omission of some circum∣stance, as, Helen did what was Lawful, when she ran away with Paris, because she had her Fathers consent to choose her own Husband; which was true only during the time that she had not chosen.

A Tenth, from that which is probable in some case, to that mhich is probable simply; as, 'Tis probable, he fore-saw, that if he did it, he should be suspected; therefore 'tis probable he did it not.

From this Place one may infer both ways that he did it not. For if he be not likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not: a∣gain, if he were likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not, for this, that he knew he should be suspected.

Upon this Place was grounded the Art which was so much detested in Protagor••••, of making the better cause seem the worse▪ and the worse the better.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of the wayes to answer the Arguments of the Adversary.

AN Argument is answered by an opposite Syllogisme, or by an Objection.

The Places of opposite Syllogismes are the same with the Places of Syllogismes, or En∣thymemes: for a Rhetorical Syllogisme is an Enthymeme.

The Places of Objections are four.

First, from the same, as, To the Adversa∣ry that proves Love to be good by an Enthy∣meme, may be objected, that no want is good, and yet Love is want; or particularly thus; The Love of Myrrha to her Father was not good.

The Second from Contraries: as, if the Adversary say, A good Man does good to his friends, an Objection might be made, that then an evil Man will do also evil to his friends.

The Third From Similitude: as thus, if the Adversary say, all Men that are injured,

do hate those that have injured them, it may be Objected, that then, all Men that had received Benefits should love their Benefactors, that is to say, be grateful.

The Fourth from the authority of famous Men; as when a Man shall say, that drun∣ken Men ought to be pardoned those Acts they do in their drunkenness, because they know not what they do; the Objection may be, that Pittacus was of another mind, that appointed for such Acts a double punishment; one for the Act, another for the Drunkenness.

And forasmuch as all Enthymemes are drawn from Probability, or Example, or from a Sign Fallible, or from a Sign infallible: an Enthymeme from Probability may be confu∣ted Really, by shewing that for the most part it falls out otherwise; but Apparantly, or Sophistically, by shewing only that it does not fall out so alwayes; whereupon the Judge thinks the Probability not sufficient to ground his Sentence upon.

[The Reason whereof is this, That the Judge, while he hears the Fact pro∣ved Probable, conceives it as true. For the Understanding has no Object but Truth. And therefore by and by, when he shall hear an Instance to the contrary; and thereby find that he had no necessity to think it true, presently changes his o∣pinion, and thinks it false, and conse∣quently

not so much as Probable. For he cannot at one time think the same thing both Probable and False: and he that says a thing is Probable, the meaning is, he thinks it True, but finds not arguments enough to prove it.]

An Enthymeme from a fallible sign, is an∣swered, by shewing the sign to be fallible.

An Enthymeme from an Example, is an∣swered, as an Enthymeme from Probability; Really, by shewing more Examples to the contrary; Apparently, if he bring Examples enough to make it seem not necessary.

If the Adversary have more Examples than we, we must make appear, that they are not applycable to the Case.

An Enthymeme from an infallible Sign, if the Proposition be true, is unanswerable.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Amplification and Extenuation are not Com∣mon Places. Enthymemes by which Argu∣ments are answered, are the same with those by which the matter in question is proved, or disproved. Objections are not Enthymemes.

THe first, that Amplification and Exte∣nuation are not Common Places, ap∣pears by this, that Amplification, and Extenua∣tion

do prove a fact to be great, or little; and are therefore Enthymemes, to be drawn from Common Places, and therefore are not the Places themselves.

The Second, that Enthymemes, by which Arguments are answered, are of the same kind with those by which the matter in question is proved, is manifest by this, that these infer the opposite of what was pro∣ved by the other.

The Third, that an Objection is no Enthy∣meme, is apparent by this, that an Objection is no more but an Opinion, Example, or other Instance, produced to make appear, that the Adversaries Argument does not con∣clude.

Thus much of Examples, Sentences, En∣thymemes, and generally of all things that belong to Argumentation; from what Places they may be drawn, or answered.

There remains Elocution, and Disposition to be spoken of in the next Book.

BOOK. III.

CHAP. I.

Of the Original of Elocution and Pronunti∣ation.

THree things being necessary to an Oration, namely Proof, Elocution and Disposition; we have done with the first, and shall speak of the other two in that which follows.

As for Action, or Pronunciation, so much as is necessary for an Orator, may be fetcht out of the Book of the Art of Poetry, in which we have treated of the Action of the Stage.

For Tragedians were the first that invented such Action, and that but of late; and it consisteth in governing well the Magnitude, Tone, and Measure of the Voice; a thing less subject to Art, than is either Proof, or Elocution.

And yet there have been Rules delivered concerning it, as far forth as serve for Poe∣try.

But Oratorical Action has not been hither∣to reduced to Art.

And Orators in the beginning, when they saw that the Poets in barren and feigned Arguments, nevertheless attained great Re∣putation; supposing it had proceeded from the choice, or connexion of words, fell in∣to a Stile, by imitation of them, approach∣ing to Verse, and made choice of words.

But when the Poets changed their Stile, and laid by all words that were not in com∣mon use, the Orators did the same, and lighted at last upon words, and a Govern∣ment of the Voice and Measures proper to themselves.

Seeing therefore Pronuntiation, or Action are in some degree necessary also for an Ora∣tor, the Precepts thereof are to be fetcht from the Art of Poetry.

[In the mean time this may be one ge∣neral Rule. If the Words, Tone, Greatness of the Voice, Gesture of the Body and Countenance, seem to proceed all from one Passion, then 'tis well pronounced. Otherwise not.

For when there appear more passions than one at once, the mind of the Speak∣er appears unnatural and distracted. O∣therwise, as the mind of the Speaker, so the mind of the Hearer always.]

CHAP. II.

Of the choise of Words and Epithets.

THe Vertues of a Word are two; the first, that it be perspicuous; the se∣cond, that it be decent; that is, neither a∣bove, nor below the thing signified; or, nei∣ther too humble, nor too fine.

Perspicuous are all Words that be Proper.

Fine Words are those, that are borrowed, or Translated from other significations; of which in the Art of Poetry.

The reason why borrowed Words please, is this. Men are affected with Words, as they are with Men, admiring in both that which is Forreign and New.

To make a Poem graceful, many things help; but few an Oration.

For to a Poet it sufficieth with what Words he can to set out his Poem: but an Orator must not only do that: but also seem not to do it: for else he will be thought to speak unnaturally, and not as he thinks; and thereby be the less believed; whereas belief is the scope of his Oration.

The Words that an Orator ought to use are of three sorts. Proper; Such as are Re∣ceived; and Metaphors.

Words taken from Forraign Languages, Words compounded, and Words new coyn∣ed are seldom to be used.

Synonimaes belong to Poets, and Equivocal words to Sophisters.

An Orator, if he use Proper words, and Received, and good Metaphors, shall both make his Oration beautiful, and not seem to intend it; and shall speak perspicuously. For in a Metaphor alone there is perspicuity, No∣vity, and Sweetness.

Concerning Metaphors the Rules are these.

1. He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his Metaphor from somewhat that is better. As for Example, let him call a Crime, an Error. On the other side, when he would make the worst of it, let him draw his Metaphor from somewhat worse, as, calling Error, Crime.

2. A Metaphor ought not to be so far fetcht, as that the Similitude may not easily appear.

3. A Metaphor ought to be drawn from the noblest things, as the Poets do that choose rather to say, Rosy-finger'd; then Red finger'd Aurora.

In like manner the Rule of Epithets is,

That he that will adorn, should use those of the better sort; and he that will disgrace

should use those of the worse: as Simonides be∣ing to Write an Ode in honour of the Victo∣ry gotten in a Course by certain Mules, be∣ing not well paid, called them by their name [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] that signifies their propinquity to Asses: but having received a greater reward, Stiles them the Sons of swift footed Cour∣sers.

CHAP. III.

Of the things that make an Oration Flat.

THe things that make an Oration flat, or insipide, are four.

1. Words Compounded; [and yet a Man may Compound a word, when the Compo∣sition is necessary, for want of a simple word; and easie, and seldom used.]

2. Forraign Words. As for Example, such as are newly derived from the Latine; which though they were proper among them whose tongue it is, are Forraign in another Language: and yet these may be used, so it be moderately.

3. Long, impertinent, and often Epithets,

4. Metaphors, indecent, and obscure. Ob∣scure they are, when they are far fetcht. In∣decent when they are ridiculous, as in Co∣medies; or too grave, as in Tragedies.

CHAP. IV.

Of a Similitude.

A Similitude differs from a Metaphor on∣ly by such Particles of Comparison as these, As; Even as; So; Even so, &c.

A Similitude therefore is a Metaphor dila∣ted; and a Metaphor is a Similitude Contra∣cted into one Word.

A Similitude does well in an Oration, so it be not too frequent; for 'tis Poetical.

An Example of a Similitude, is this of Pericles; that said in his Oration, that the Baeotians were like to so many Oaks in a Wood, that did nothing but beat one another.

CHAP. V.

Of the Purity of Language.

FOur things are necessary to make Lan∣guage Pure.

1. The right rendring of those Particles which some antecedent particle does require: As to a Not only, a Not also; and then they are rendered right, when they are not sus∣pended too long.

2. The use of proper Words, rather than Circumlocutions, unless there be motive to make one do it of purpose.

3. That there be nothing of double con∣struction, unless there be cause to do it of pur∣pose. As the Prophets (of the Heathen) who speak in general terms, to the end they may the better maintain the truth of their Prophesies; which is easier maintained in generals, than in particulars. For 'tis easier to divine, whether a number be even or odd, than how many; and that a thing will be, than what it will be.

4. Concordance of Gender, Number, and Person; as not to say Him for Her; Man for Men; Hath for Have.

In Summ; a Mans Language ought to be easie for another to read, pronounce, and point.

Besides, to divers Antecedents, let divers Relatives, or one Common to them all, be correspondent: as, He saw the Colour; He heard the Sound; or he perceived both Colour and Sound: but by no means, He heard or saw both.

Lastly, that which is to be interposed by Parenthesis, let it be done quickly: as, I pur∣posed, having spoken to him (to this, and to this purpose) afterward to be gone. For to put it off thus; I resolved, after I had spoken to him, to be gone; but the subject of my

speech was to this and this Purpose, is vi••••ous.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Amplitude and Tenuity of Language.

A Man shall add Amplitude, or Dignity to his Language, but by such means as these.

1. By changing the Name with the Defi∣nition, as occasion shall serve. As, whe•• the Name shall be indecent, by using the Definition; or Contrary.

2. By Metaphors.

3. By using the plural Number for the singular.

4. By privative Epithets.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Convenience or Decency of Elocution.

ELocutions are made Decent,

1. By speaking Feelingly; that is, with such Passion as is fit for the matter he is in; as Angerly in matter of Injury.

2. By speaking as becomes the Person of the Speaker; as for a Gentleman to speak E∣ruditely.

3. By speaking proportionably to the mat∣ter; as of great affairs to speak in a high; and of mean, in a low Stile.

4. By abstaining from Compounded, and from Out-landish Words; unless a Man speak Passionately, and have already moved, and, as it were, inebriated his Hearers. Or Iro∣nically.

It confers also to perswasion very much, to use these ordinary Forms of speaking, All Men know; 'Tis confessed by all; No Man will deny, and the like. For the Hearer consents, surprized with the fear to be esteemed the only Ignorant Man.

'Tis good also, having used a word that signifies more than the matter requires, to abstain from the Pronunciation and Counte∣nance that to such a word belongs; that the Disproportion between it and the matter may the less appear. And when a Man has said too much, it will shew well to correct him∣self: For he will get belief by seeming to consider what he says.

[But in this a Man must have a care not to be too precise in shewing of this Consideration. For the oftentation of Carefulness is an argument oftentimes of lying; as may be observed in such as tell particularities not easily observed, when they would be thought to speak more precise truth than is required.]

CHAP. VIII.

Of two sorts of Stiles.

THere be two sorts of Stiles.

The one continued or to be compre∣hended at once; the other divided, or distin∣guished by Periods.

The first sort was in use with ancient Writers; but is now out of date.

An Example of this Stile is in the Histo∣ry of Herodotus; wherein there is no Peri∣od till the end of the whole History.

In the other kind of Stile, that is distin∣guished by Periods, a Period is such a Part as is perfect in it self; and has such length, as may easily be comprehended by the un∣derstanding.

This later kind is pleasant; the former unpleasant, because this appears finite, the other infinite: in this the Hearer has always somewhat set out, and terminated to him; in the other he fore-sees no end, and has no∣thing finished to him: this may easily be committed to memory, because of the mea∣sure and cadence (which is the cause that Verses be easily remembred;) the other not.

Every Sentence ought to end with the period, and nothing to be interposed.

Period is either simple, or divided into Parts.

Simple is that which is Indivisible; as, I wonder you fear not their ends, whose actions you imitate.

A Period divided, is that which not only has perfection and length convenient: for respiration, but also Parts. As, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, seeing you imi∣tate their actions: where in these words, I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, is one Colon, or Part; and in these, Seeing you Imi∣tate their Actions, another: and both toge∣ther make the Period.

The parts, or members, and periods of speech ought neither to be too long, nor too short.

Too long are they, which are produced beyond the expectation of the Hearer.

Too short, are they that end before he ex∣pects it.

Those that be too long, leave the Hearer behind, like him that walking, goes be∣yond the usual end of the Walk, and there∣by out-goes him that walks with him.

They that be too short, make the Hearer stumble; for when he looks far before him, the end stops him before he be aware.

A period that is divided into Parts, is ei∣ther divided only; or has also an Opposition of the parts one to another.

Divided only is such as this; This the Se∣nate knows; the Consul sees; and yet the Man lives.

A Period with Opposition of Parts, called also Antithesis, and the parts Antitheta, is when contrary parts are put together; or also joyned by a third.

Contrary parts are put together, as here, The one has obtained Glory, the other Riches; both by my benefit.

Antitheta are therefore acceptable; be∣cause not only the parts appear the better for the opposition; but also for that they carry with them a certain appearance of that kind of Enthymeme, which leads to Impossibility.

Parts, or Members of a Period, are said to be equal, when they have altogether, or al∣most equal Number of Syllables.

Parts, or Members of a period, are said to be like, when they begin, or end alike: and the more Similitudes, and the greater equali∣ty there is of Syllables, the more graceful is the Period.

CHAP. IX.

Of those things that grace an Oration, and make it delightful.

FOrasmuch as there is nothign more de∣lightful to a Man, than to find that he apprehends and learns easily; it necessa∣rily follows, that those Words are most grate∣ful to the Ear, that make a Man seem to see before his Eyes the things signified.

And therefore Forraign Words are unplea∣sant, because Obscure; and Plain Words, be∣cause too Manifest, making us learn nothing new: but Metaphors please; for they beget in us by the Genus, or by some common thing to that with another, a kind of Science: as when an Old Man is called Stubble; a Man suddainly learns that he grows up, flourish∣eth, and withers like Grass, being put in mind of it by the qualities common to Stub∣ble, and to Old Men.

That which a Metaphor does, a Similitude does the same; but with less grace, because with more prolixity.

Such Enthymemes are the most graceful, which neither are presently very Manifest, nor yet very hard to be understood; but are comprehended, while they are uttering,

or presently after, though not understood before.

The things that make a speech graceful, are these; Antitheta, Metaphors, and Ani∣mation.

Of Anitheta, and Antithesis hath been spoken in the precedent Chapter.

Of Metaphors the most graceful is that which is drawn from Proportion.

[Aristotle (in the 12 Chapter of his Poetry) defines a Metaphor to be the translation of a name from one signifi∣cation to another; whereof he makes four kinds, 1. From the General to the Particular, 2. From the Particular to the General. 3. From one Particular to another. 4. From Proportion.]

A Metaphor from Proportion is such as this, A State without Youth, is a Year without a Spring.

Animation is that expression which makes us seem to see the thing before our eyes; as he that said, The Athenians powred out their City into Sicily, meaning, they sent thither the greatest Army they could make; and this is the greatest grace of an Oration.

If therefore in the same Sentence there concur both Metaphor, and this Animation, and also Antithesis, it cannot choose but be very graceful.

That an Oration is graced by Metaphor, A∣nimation and Antithesis, hath been said: but how 'tis graced, is to be said in the next Chapter.

CHAP. X.

In what Manner an Oration is graced by the things aforesaid.

TIs graced by Animation, when the a∣ctions of living Creatures are attri∣buted to things without life; as when the Sword is said to devour.

Such Metaphors as these come into a Mans mind by the observation of things that have similitude and proportion one to another. And the more unlike, and unproportiona∣ble the things be otherwise, the more grace hath the Metaphor.

A Metaphor without Animation, adds grace then, when the Hearer finds he learns some∣what by such use of the word.

Also Paradoxes are graceful, so Men in∣wardly do believe them: for they have in them somewhat like to those jests that are grounded upon the similitude of words, which have usually one sense, and in the pre∣sent another; and somewhat like to those

jests which are grounded upon the deceiving of a Mans expectation.

And Paragrams; that is, allusions of words are graceful, if they be well placed; and in Periods not too long; and with An∣tithesis: for by these means the Ambiguity is taken away.

And the more of these; namely, Me∣taphor, Animation, Antithesis, Equality of Members a Period hath, the more graceful it is.

Similitudes grace an Oration, when they contain also a Metaphor.

And Proverbs are graceful, because they are Metaphors, or Translations of words from one species to another.

And Hyperboles, because they also are Metaphors: but they are youthful, and be∣wray vehemence; and are used with most grace by them that be angry; and for that cause are not comely in Old Men.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Difference between the Stile to be used in Writing, and the Stile to be used in Pleading.

THe Stile that should be Read ought to be more exact and accurate.

But the Stile of a Pleader ought to be suted to Action and Pronuntiation.

Orations of them that Plead, pass away with the Hearing.

But those that are Written, Men carry a∣bout them, and are considered at Leasure; and consequently must endure to be sifted and examined.

Written Orations appear flat in Pleading.

And Orations made for the Barr, when the Action is away, appear in Reading insi∣pide.

In Written Orations Repetition is justly condemned.

But in Pleadings, by the help of Action, and by some change in the Pleader, Repe∣tition becomes Amplification.

In Written Orations Disjunctives do ill; as, I came, I found him, I asked him: for they seem superfluous, and but one thing, be∣cause they are not distinguished by Action.

But in Pleadings 'tis Amplification; be∣cause that which is but one thing, is made to seem many.

Of Pleadings, that which is Judicial ought to be more accurate, than that which is before the people.

And an Oration to the people ought to be more accommodate to Action, than a Ju∣dicial.

And of Judicial Orations, that ought to be more accurate, which is uttered to few Judges; and that ought to be more accom∣modate to Action, which is uttered to Ma∣ny. As in a Picture, the farther he stands off that beholds it, the less need there is that the Colours be fine: so in Orations, the farther the Hearer stands off, the less need there is for his Oration to be Elegant.

Therefore Demonstrative Orations are most proper for Writing, the end whereof is to be Read.

CHAP. XII.

Of the parts of an Oration, and their Order.

THe necessary Parts of an Oration are but two; Propositions, and Proof; which are as it were the Probleme, and De∣monstration.

The Proposition is the explication, or o∣pening of the Matter to be proved.

And Proof is the Demonstration of the Matter propounded.

To these necessary parts, are sometimes added two other, tho Proeme and the Epi∣logue, neither of which are any proof.

So that in some, there be four parts of an Oration; the Proeme, the Proposition, or (as others call it) the Narration, the Proofs (which contain Confirmation, Confutation, Amplification, and Diminution;) and the Epilogue.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Proem.

THe Proem is the Beginning of an Ora∣tion, and, as it were, the preparing of the way before one enter into it.

In some kinds of Orations it resembles the Prelude of Musicians, who first play what they list, and afterwards the Tune they intended.

In other kinds it resembles the Prologue of a Play, that contains the Argument.

Proems of the first sort, are most proper for Demonstrative Orations; in which a Man is free to fore-tell, or not, what points he will insist upon; and for the most part 'tis better not: because when a Man has not obliged himself to a certain matter, Digres∣sion will seem Variety: but if he have in∣gaged himself, Variety will be accounted Digression.

In Demonstratives the matter of the Pro∣em consisteth in the Praise or Dispraise of some Law or Custom, or in Exhortation, or Dehortation; or in something that serves to incline the Hearer to the purpose.

Proems of the second kind are most pro∣per for Judicial Orations. For as the Pro∣logue

in a Dramatick, and the Exordium in an Epique Poem, setteth first in few words the Argument of the Poem: so in a Judici∣al Oration the Orator ought to exhibit a Mo∣del of his Oration, that the mind of the Hea∣rer may not be suspended, and for want of fore-sight, err or wander.

Whatsoever else belongs to a Proem, is drawn from one of these four; From the Speaker, From the Adversary, From the Hear∣er, or from the Matter.

From the Speaker and Adversary are drawn into Proems such Criminations and Purga∣tions as belong not to the cause.

To the Defendant 'tis necessary in the Proem to answer to the accusations of his Adversary; that those being cleared, he may have a more favourable entrance to the rest of his Oration.

But to the Plaintife 'tis better to cast his Criminations all into the Epilogue, that the Judge may the more easily remember them.

From the Hearer and from the Matter are drawn into the Proem such things as serve to make the Hearer favourable, or angry; attentive, or nor attentive, as need shall re∣quire.

And Hearers use to be attentive to persons that are reputed good; to things that are of great Consequence, or that concern thomselves, or that are strange, or that delight.

But to make the Hearer attentive, is not the part of the proeme only, but of any other part of the Oration, and rather of any o∣ther part, than of the proeme. For the Hear∣er is every where more remiss than in the beginning. And therefore wheresoever there is need, the Orator must make appear both the probity of his own person, and that the matter in hand is of great Consequence; or that it concerns the Hearer; or that it is new; or that it is delightful.

He that will have the Hearer attentive to him, but not to the Cause, must on the o∣ther side make it seem that the matter is a trifle, without relation to the Hearer, com∣mon, and tedious.

That the Hearer may be favourable to the Speaker, one of two things is required; that he love him, or that he pity them.

In Demonstrative Orations, he that praises shall have the Hearer favourable if he think himself, or his own manners, or course of life, or any thing he loves, comprehended in the same praise.

On the contrary, he that dispraises, shall be heard favourably, if the Hearer find his Enemies, or their courses, or any thing he hates, involv'd in the same dispraise.

The Proeme of a Deliberative Oration is taken from the same things, from which are taken the Proemes of Judicial Orations.

For the matter of a Deliberative Oration needeth not that natural proeme, by which is shewn what we are to speak of; for that is already known: the proeme in these, being made only for the Speakers, or Adversaries sake; or to make the Matter appear great, or little, as one would have it, and is there∣fore to be taken from the persons of the Plaintif or Defendant; or from the Hearer, or from the Matter, as in Orations Judi∣cial.

CHAP. XIV.

Places of Crimination, and Purgation.

1. ONe is from the removal of ill Opini∣on in the Hearer, imprinted in him by the Adversary, or otherwise.

2. Another from this, That the thing done is not hurtful, or not to him, or not so much, or not unjust, or not great, or not di∣shonourable.

3. A Third from the Recompence, as, I did him harm, but withal I did him honour.

4. A Fourth from the Excuse; as, It was Errour, Mischance, or Constraint.

5. A Fifth from the Intention; as, One thing was done, another meant.

6. A Sixth from the Comprehension of the Accuser; as, What I have done, the Accuser has done the same; or his Father, Kinsman, or Friend.

7. From the Comprehension of those that are in Reputation; as, What I did, such, and such have done the same, who nevertheless are good Men.

8. From Comparison with such as have been falsly accused, or wrongfully suspected, and nevertheless found upright.

9. From Recrimination; as, The Accuser is a man of ill life, and therefore not to be be∣lieved.

10. From that the Judgment belongs to a∣nother Place, or Time; as, I have already an∣swered, or am to answer else-where to this Mat∣ter.

11. From Crimination of the Crimination; as, It serves only to ••e••vert Indgment.

12. A Twelfth, which is common both to Crimination and Purgation, and is taken from some sign; as Teucer is not to be belie∣ved, because his Mother was Priam's Sister. On the other side, Teucer is to be believed, because his Father was Priam's Enemy.

13. A Thirteenth, proper to Crimination only, from praise and dispraise mixt; as, To praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise in many words, and blame with effectual ones; or to praise many things

that are good, and then add one evil, but a great one.

14. A Fourteenth, comming both to Cri∣mination and Purgation, is taken from the interpretation of the fact: for he that pur∣geth himself interpreteth the fact always in the best sense; and he that Criminates, al∣ways in the worst; as when Vlysses said, Diomedes chose him for his Companion, as the most able of the Grecians, to aid him in his exploit: but his Adversary said, He chose him for his cowardize, as the most unlikely to share with him in the Honour.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Narration.

THe Narration is not always continued and of one Piece; but sometimes, as in Demonstratives, interrupted, and disper∣sed through the whole Oration.

For there being in a Narration something that falls not under Art; as namely, the Actions themselves, which the Orator in∣venteth not; he must therefore bring in the Narration of them where he best may. As for Example, if being to praise a Man, you would make a Narration of all his Acts im∣mediately from the beginning, and without

interruption, you will find it necessary af∣terwards to repeat the same Acts again, while from some of them you praise his Va∣lour, and from others his Wisdom; where∣by your Oration shall have less variety, and shall less please.

'Tis not necessary always that the Narra∣tion be short. The true measure of it must be taken from the matter that is to be laid open.

In the Narration, as oft as may be, 'tis good to insert somewhat commendable in ones self, and blameable in ones Adversary: As, I advised him, but he would take no Coun∣sel.

In Narrations, a Man is to leave out what∣soever breeds compassion, indignation in the Hearer besides the purpose; as Vlysses in Ho∣mer, relating his Travels to Alcinous, to move compassion in him, is so long in it, that it consists of divers Books: but when he comes home, tells the same to his Wife in thirty Verses, leaving out what might make her sad.

The Narration ought also to be in such words as argue the Manners; that is, some virtuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although it be not exprest; As, setting his Arms a kenbold, he answered, &c. by which is insinuated the Pride of him that so answered.

In an Oration a Man does better to shew his affection than his Judgment: this is, 'Tis better to say, I like this; than to say, This is better. For by the one you would seem wise, by the other good. But favour follows Goodness; whereas Wisdom procures Envy.

But if this Affection seem incredible, then either a reason must be rendered, as did An∣tigone. For when she had said, She loved her Brother better than her Husband, or Chil∣dren; she added, for Husband and Children I may have more; but another Brother I can∣not, my Parents being both dead. Or else a Man must use this form of speaking; I know this affection of mine seems strange to you; but nevertheless it is such. For 'tis not easi∣ly believed, that any Man has a mind to do any thing that is not for his own good.

Besides in a Narration, not only the A∣ctions themselves; but the Passions, and signs that accompany them, are to be dis∣covered.

And in his Narration a Man should make himself and his Adversary be considered for such, and such, as soon, and as covertly as he can.

A Narration may have need sometimes not to be in the beginning.

In Deliberative Orations; that is, where soever the question is of things to come; a

Narration, which is always of things past, has no place: and yet things past may be re∣counted, that Men may Deliberate better of the future: But that is not as Narration, but Proof; for 'tis Example.

There may also be Narration in Delibera∣tives in that part where Crimination and Praise come in: But that part is not Delibe∣rative, but Demonstrative.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Proof, or Confirmation, and Refutation.

PRoofs are to be applyed to something Controverted.

The Controversie in Judicial Orations is, Whether it has been done; whether it has been hurtful; whether the matter be so great, and whether it be Just, or no.

In a question of Fact, one of the Parties of necessity is faulty (for ignorance of the Fact is no excuse) and therefore the Fact is chiefly to be insisted on.

In Demonstratives, the Fact for the most part is supposed: but the honour and profit of the Fact are to be proved.

In Deliberatives, the question is, Whe∣ther the thing be like to be, or likely to be so

Great; or whether it be Just; or whether it be profitable.

Besides the application of the proof to the question, a Man ought to observe, whe∣ther his Adversary have lyed in any point without the Cause. For 'tis a sign he does the same in the Cause.

The Proofs themselves are either Exam∣ples, or Enthymemes.

A Deliberative Oration, because 'tis of things to come, requireth rather Examples, than Enthymemes.

But a Judicial Oration, being of things past, which have a necessity in them, and may be concluded Syllogistically, requireth rather Enthymemes.

Enthymemes ought not to come too thick together: for they hinder one anothers force by confounding the Hearer.

Nor ought a Man endeavour to prove eve∣ry thing by Enthymeme, least like some Phi∣losophers, he collect what is known, from what is less known.

Nor ought a Man to use Enthymemes, when he would move the Hearer to some affection: For seeing divers Motions do mu∣tually destroy or weaken one another, he will lose either the Enthymeme, or the affe∣ction that he would move.

For the same reason, a Man ought not to use Enthymemes when he would express Man∣ners.

But whether he would move affection, or insinuate his Manners, he may withal use Sentences.

A Deliberative Oration is more difficult than a Judicial, because 'tis of the future, whereas a Judicial is of that which is past, and that consequently may be known; and because it has principles, namely the Law; and it is easier to prove from principles, than without.

Besides, a Deliberative Oration wants those helps of turning to the Adversary, of speaking of himself; of raising passion.

He therefore that wants matter in a De∣liberative Oration, let him bring in some per∣son to praise or dispraise.

And in Demonstratives he that has nothing to say in commendation or discommendation of the principal party, let him praise or dispraise some body else, as his Father, or Kinsman, or the very vertues or vices themselves.

He that wants not Proofs, let him not only prove strongly, but also insinuate his Manners: but he that has no proof, let him nevertheless insinuate his Manners. For a good man is as acceptable, as an exact Ora∣tion.

Of Proofs, those that lead to an absurdity, please better than those that are direct or ostensive; because from the comparison of Contraries, namely, Truth and Falsity, the

force of the Syllogisme does the better ap∣pear.

Confutation is also a part of proof.

And he that speaks first, puts it after his own proofs, unless the Controversie contain many and different matters. And he that speaks last, puts it before.

For 'tis necessary to make way for his own Oration, by removing the Objections of him that spake before. For the mind ab∣hors both the Man, and his Oration, that is damned before hand.

If a Man desire his Manners should appear well, (least speaking of himself he become odious, or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtrectation; or speaking of another, he seem contumelious, or scurrilous) let him introduce another person.

Last of all, least he cloy his Hearer with Enthymemes, let him vary them sometimes with Sentences; but such as have the same force. As here is an Enthymeme. If it be then the best time to make peace when the best conditions of peace may be had, than the time is now, while our Fortune is entire. And this is a Sentence of equal force to it. Wise Men make peace, while their Fortune is en∣tire.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Interrogations, Answers, and Jests.

THe times wherein 'tis fit to ask ones Adversary a question are chiefly four.

1. The first is, when of two Propositi∣ons that conclude an Absurdity, he has al∣ready uttered one; and we would by In∣terrogation draw him to confess the other.

2. The Second, when of two Propositi∣ons that conclude an Absurdity, one is ma∣nifest of it self, and the other likely to be fetch'd out by a question; then the Interro∣gation will be seasonable; and the absurd Conclusion is presently to be inferr'd, with∣out adding that Proposition which is ma∣nifest.

3. The third, when a Man would make appear that his Adversary does contradict himself.

4. The Fourth, when a Man would take from his Adversary such shifts as these, In some sort 'tis so; In some sort 'tis not so.

Out of these Cases 'tis not fit to Interro∣gate. For he whose question succeeds not, is thought vanquished.

To equivocal questions a Man ought to answer fully, and not to be too brief.

To Interrogations which we fore-see tend to draw from us an Answer, contrary to our purpose, we must, together with our Answer, presently give an Answer to the ob∣jection which is implyed in the question.

And where the question exacteth an an∣swer that concludeth against us, we must together with our answer presently distin∣guish.

Jests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse: and grave discourse is deluded by Jests.

The several kinds of Jests are set down in the Art of Poetry.

Whereof one kind is Ironia, and tends to please ones self.

The other is Scurrility, and tends to please others.

The latter of these has in it a kind of baseness: the former may become a Man of good breeding.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the Epilogue.

THe Epilogue must consist of one of these four things.

Either of inclining the Judg to favour his own, or disfavour the Adversaries side: For then when all is said in the cause, is the best season to praise, or dispraise the Parties.

Or of Amplification or Diminution. For when it appears what is good or evil, then is the time to shew how great, or how little that good or evil is.

Or in moving the Judge to Anger, Love, or other Passion. For when 'tis manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, then it will be opportune to excite the Judge.

Or of Repetition, that the Judge may re∣member what has been said.

Repetition consisteth in the matter, and the manner. For the Orator must shew, that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his Oration, and how: Name∣ly, by comparing his Arguments one by one with his Adversaries, repeating them in the same order they were spoken.

FINIS.