But I do not heed the hurtings of Functions for the Essence of a Disease, but the ope∣rative disturbances extended on the Archeus, do I contemplate of, in Diseases. For he doth often die without a sense of action, being hurt, who indeed suddainly falls down, being in the mean time long diseasie; or he that perisheth only by a defect of Nature: Wherefore also, I reckon it among other impertinencies, to have tied up the Essence of Diseases unto the hurtings of the functions, seeing that is accidental and latter to Diseases, but not alwayes a concomitant.
Yea truly, because a voluntary restoring of the enfeebled faculties, doth follow health; hence the Schooles have measured the Essence of a Disease, to owe an unseparable respect [unspec 65] unto the hurting, and things hurting of Functions; So indeed, that these Essences of Diseases should be included therein: Because they have thought, that the whole hinge of healing was rowled about contraries; when as otherwise, it is wholly by accident, if in Dis∣eases, Functions are hurt; otherwise, whoever was he, who denied a Disease not really to be present in the silence of a quartane Ague, the falling sickness, madness, and Gout? When notwithstanding no hurting of Functions is seen? who is he, which doth not now and then observe in a person recovering, greater hindrances of actions and weaknesses, than in the flaming beginning of Diseases? It hath therefore alwaies seemed a blockish thing to me, for a thing to be essentially defined by later and separable effects. And seeing a Disease is primarily made by the Archeus which maketh an assault, (yet by an erring one) certainly the action hereof shall be much nearer into the faculties themselves than into the actions of the same; especially because, as long as the facul∣ties are as yet (in one that is in recovery) as it were vanquished and sore shaken, there are indeed impediments of the faculties present, likewise a hurting and suppression of actions, yet no Disease surviving. And seeing that I have elsewhere sufficiently demon∣strated, that both causes in natural things, do not differ in supposition from the very thing it self constituted: Therefore if a disease should be the cause of the hurting of an action, as the constitutive difference of the same; it should also of necessity be, that a disease it self, is not any thing diverse from an action being hurt; which thing is already manifest to be false. It should also be false, that the cause and the disease, should by the one onely title of the hurter of an action, be undistinctly comprehended, or the Schooles do badly decree, that the hurter of action is the cause of a disease it self. But the hurting of the action, should be the disease, and the action hurt, the symptome it self; for that is also a devise too childish.
For First, A Disease should be a meer being of Reason, mentally arising from a disposition of the tearms of the Cause unto the Effect; To wit, of the Hurter, and the thing Hurt.
And then, an Error is discerned in the definition of a Disease delivered by the Schooles; To wit, That a Disease is a Disposition, primarily hurting an Action: Because it is that which should define the Cause, and not the Disease it self, or the Effect of the Cause.
Thirdly, If a Remedy ought to remove that it self which hurteth the Action; that shall either have a singular Monarchy, whereby it may call forth, and shake off the Hurter it self, or the Remedy shall joyn it self to Nature her self, and that so most unitingly, that their forces being conjoyned, and they being now as it were one united thing, doth set it self in an opposite term, a∣gainst the Hurter it self.
But the first of these is not true. Because the Remedy should be as forreign unto Na∣ture, as is otherwise the Disease it self; by reason of a particular direction, and arbitri∣ment of motions despised by our Archeus. For if it ought to help, it should have a pow∣er superiour to man's Nature, in such a manner, that it should obey, neither the Lawes of things causing Diseases, nor bringing Death: And so it should expel the Cause which bringeth the Disease, as well from a dead Carcass, as from a languishing person. Neither likewise hath the later, place. Because, if the Remedy should be united to nature, radi∣cally, and by an unitive mixture, it should have a priviledge above the condition of nou∣rishment. A hurting therefore of Action it self, doth not fall into the definition of a Dis∣ease: Especially, because a Remedy doth not respect so much the occasional Cause, as the internal efficient Cause of a Disease it self. Whence that Maxime is verified; That Natures themselves are the Curesses of Diseases, as the Effectresses thereof.
They indeed do on both sides confound the Disease with the Symptom, to the destructi∣on of those that are to be cured, seeing curing is seated oftentimes in the removal of the occasional Cause, but never in the removing of Symptomes. And because the removal of the occasional cause is thought to be an eduction or drawing out of matter: nothing but