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CHAP. VII. The ignorant Natural Philosophy of Aristotle and Galen. (Book 7)

1. Aristotle is altogether ignorant of Nature. 2. That thing is proved. 3. What Nature is, among Christians. 4. The same thing is again confirmed by thirteen other Reasons. 5. In Nature, there is the Agent, the matter, the disposing of instruments, and the effect, or thing produced. 6. That heat is not an agent in seminal generation. 7. Why Aristotle hath not known the truth of Nature. 8. His Books of natural Philosophy, con∣tain onely tristes. 9. How young men are to be instructed in the place or room of Schoole-Philosophy. 10. Into what great Apolloes young men might climbe. 11. The Prerogatives of the fire. 12. What a young man so instructed, might judge. 13. Privations do not succeed in the flowing of Seeds to generation. 14. There is no form of a dead Carcase. 15. That generation and corruption do not receive each other. 16. The Vulcan of life, vanisheth, without the corrupting of it self. 17. Death is not the corruption of life. 18. The distinction of privation and corruption. 19. Of forms there is no corruption. 20. The ignorance of Galen. 21. His ridiculous Volumes concerning the decrees of Hipocrates and Plato. 22. His books of preserving of health are foolish.

THE Schooles have so sworn constancy, and their end to their Aristotle, that even to this day, they (by putting one name for another) do call him [the Philosopher] whom notwithstanding. I certainly finde to be altogether ignorant of Nature, and it grieveth me not to write down some causes, which have enforced me hereunto, and that for no other end, than that hereafter, as well Professors, as young beginners, may not through an aptness to believe, and a custome of assenting, be made to wander

out of the way, nor may suffer themselves hence-forward, to be led by a blinde man into the ditch. For otherwise I tell no mans tale; nor am I more displeased with Aristotle, than with a (non ens) or [a non-being].

Therefore first of all, Aristotle defineth Nature. It is the Principle, or beginning of motion, as also of rest in Bodies, in whom it is in, by it self, and not by accident. Wherein I finde more errours and ignorances of the definer, than words. First there∣fore [unspec 2] the word [it is in] sheweth that he speaketh of a Body really existing, but not of his impossible matter. 2. He denotes, that such Bodies, are not of the number, or sup∣posed things of Nature. For truly it belongeth not to Bodies to be in Bodies by it self, and not by accident. 3. He takes away any accidents from the Catalogue of Nature, as if they were without, besides, and above Nature, because accidents are in by ac∣cident. 4. He sets down, that Bodies which have motion, or rest by accident, are likewise without Nature. 5. That the Being of things is in Nature, in Nature it self, before the day, or motion, or rest of the same. Because it must needs be, that some∣thing first be, before that it move, be moved, or doth rest. And so the Principle of Being, goes before the beginning of moving, or resting: notwithstanding, Nature cannot be, before its existence. For if the beginning of motion or rest, should be latter, or an effect as to their Being: Nature should be an effect, as to its being a natural thing. 6. What if God after Creation, had enjoyned neither motion nor rest (rest indeed according to Aristotle, presupposeth the bound of motion) there had now been a Creature, and not Nature. For God, in the beginning, created the Heaven and the Earth. Now Nature was not understood by Aristotle, to wit, there was sometimes a Creature, and it actually existed, before, or on this side Nature, here defined. 7. Bo∣dies, in which the beginning of motion is external, and by accident (suppose thou, when 〈◊〉〈◊〉 heat of the Sun moves the Seed, to increase, or a Woman with Childe, by acci∣dent, transforms the imperfect Infant, by her own Imagination) should not be un∣der Nature, as neither that accidental beginning. 8. To rest, is not, not to be moved, but to cease from motion, and so not to be moved is more general than rest. There∣fore Nature absolutely taken, should be onely after the existence of Nature. 9. If the beginning of motion in a moveable thing, be Nature, and the efficient cause be pro∣perly called the beginning of motion, (as he saith heat not elementary to be) there∣fore it must needs be, that the efficient cause is inward (which is against Aristotle) or that Nature, in as much as it is the beginning of motion, is not in Bodies most neerly or inwardly by it self. 10. Every outward efficient cause, is the beginning of motion in a thing, by accident. But every efficient cause, according to Aristotle, is external: therefore no efficient cause external, is natural, which is contrary to his second Book of Physicks. 11. Whatsoever things are moved by the Mathematicks, and also a Mill moved by the Winde, or a stream, should not be moved by Nature.

But I believe, that Nature is the Command of God, whereby a thing is that which it is, and doth that which it is commanded to do or act. This is a Christian definition, taken out of the holy Scriptures. 12. But Aristotle, contrary to his own [unspec 3] Precepts of a definition, takes the difference, which he thinketh to be constitutive, for the general kinde of the thing defined in Nature: to wit, the formall beginning of motion and rest. But for the constitutive difference, he takes the matter, or Body, wherein the said beginning of motion is. But Christians are held to believe, Nature to be every Creature, to wit, a Body, and accidents, no lesse, than the beginning of motion it self. 13. Death also, although it be the beginning, by it self, of rest in a dead Carcase, yet Christians do believe it not to be created by the Lord, and so nei∣ther to be Nature: and although it may light naturally on it, yet that happens not by reason of the death, but of its natural Causes.

But Aristotle in another place, a like stumblingly touching on Nature, saith:

Every power of the Soul seemeth to be a partaker of some other certain Body (for neither dares he positively and simply to affirm it) than those which are called Elements. [unspec 4] For even as Souls do differ, so also the Nature of that Body doth differ: the Seed contains the cause of fruitfulness, to wit, heat: which is not fiery, but a spirit or breath in the froathy body of the Seed, and the Nature which is in that Spirit, answereth in proportion to the Element of the Stars.

This Precept, praised by the Schooles, con∣taineth almost as many Errours as Syllables. And at length, this Writer of natural instruction, being exceeding doubtful, knowes not, what he may call or ought to call Nature. For first he saith it to be, a Corporeal power of the Soul, and therefore he banisheth the understanding out of the powers of the Soul. 2. He saith, the power

of the Soul which he afterwards calleth heat, is a partaker of another Body than those that are called Elements. As if it were a partaker onely of a Body above an Elemen∣tated one, and heavenly. 3. It is absolutely false, and an ignorant thing, that any power of the Soul is a partaker of the body, although it be tied to the body. For e∣very power is an accident; and no accident, or quality can be a partaker of a Body: but on the contrary, a Body is a partaker of accidents. 4. That souls do not differ, but in respect of that body (which at length he calleth meer heat) notwithstanding that all Souls are a power, partaking of a heavenly Body: therefore Souls do not differ in respect of that Body, in which he hath said, they all do agree: or if there be any difference between Souls, let it be in respect of the matter of a Body, or of an unnamed Client or retainer, being neglected by, and plainly unknown to Aristotle. And so, in so great a dress of words, he hath spoken nothing but trifles. 5. If Souls do differ onely for that bodies sake: the act shall be now limited by the power, the Species or particular kinde, by the matter, not by the form. 6. The Seed contains the cause of fruitfulness; it is a Childish and triflous thing: because the Seed ceaseth to be Seed, if it be without the cause of fruitfulness. 7. Every power of the Soul, is a partaker of some other body, than those which are called the Elements. Yet he would have the bodies of all soulified or living Creatures, to be of necessity mixt, of non: but actual Elements. 8. The Seed is not fruitful, but by heat. As though Fishes were not more fruitfull than four footed Beasts; and as though Fishes were not actually cold. 9. He knew not another moderate heat, from live Coals, which nourisheth Eggs, even unto a Chick. And he knowes not that all heat is in one onely most special kinde of quality, being distinguished, onely by degree. 10. He is igno∣rant, that heat, onely makes hot by it self, and that it should make fruitful by acci∣dent. And therefore, although that heat be the principle of motion, and the power of the Soul (that is, Nature) by it self; yet as it should make the Seeds fruitful by ac∣cident, it should be the beginning of motion by accident. Therefore in respect of the same Nature, it should be a beginning by it self, and by accident, or with relation to the same Nature, it should be Nature, and not Nature. 11. He confoundeth the quality of heats, with the spirit, and air of the froathy Seed, which notwithstanding, do differ no lesse than in predicaments. 12. Heat is the spirit of the froathy body, and the nature which is in that spirit, is heat. Therefore the spirit shall be in the spirit. 13. Nature is in that spirit, and that spirit is not nature defined by Aristotle for the subject of natural Philosophy (yet that spirit is the Principle of motion in the Seed, and of life, in living Creatures) and he much more strictly denies, the froathy body of the Seed, to be of the account of nature (as though the seed of things were a froath, and not the more inward invisible kernel, in a corporeal seed) but that onely the power of Souls (which with him, is nothing but heat) were nature. 14. Because every power of the Soul is encompassed with heat, he excludes out of the account of nature, any other bodies and accidents. 15. That power of Souls, for whose sake, Souls do differ, is onely heat, not indeed a fiery one, but agreeing in proportion with the Element of the Stars, that is, it hath not been understood by Aristotle, nor is it to be any way to be understood by the Schooles, how heat doth agree with a body, & with an Element: what agreement there can be, between such various dependants of predicaments. 16. He denieth this power of Souls, to be of the race of Elements. That plural num∣ber, rejecteth not onely one Element: but by reason of the strength of negatives, all Elements. 17. Every power of the Soul is, a meer heat, not indeed answering to the heat of the Element of the Stars, but altogether to the Element it self. 18. For truly he acknowledgeth no other heat, than that of fire: nor any other Element of fire, than that which is of the kitchin, (because he distinguisheth Elementary heat, from the Element of the Stars) yet by his own authority, he hath inclosed fire that is not of the kitchin, between the Heaven and the Air. 19. At length, as oft as he was positively to tell what nature was, the privy shifter saith, sometimes that it is the power of the Soul, sometimes the fruitfulness of the Seed: and at last, he neither perceived, nor ever knew, what the heat not fiery was, and makes a fifth Element of the Firma∣ment of the Stars, after he hath cast away the other four, by denying them. There∣fore he runs about in denying, by far fetched speeches, and least he should be laid hold on, he denyeth nature to be of the race of Elements. As if it were enough to have said, there is a Chymera, or certain fabulous Monster, not of the Elements, but of the fifth Element of the Stars. It is not a body, not an accident: but a heat answering to the Element of the Heavens, not to the heat of the same. 20. And he would not say

that indeed; these things are so, bur that they seem to him to be so. Seeing that ac∣cording to the same man, many things may seem to be, which yet are not. 21. And if thou wilt not believe it, go to see, or expect it for ever. 22. As though the whole action of nature were made by heat. 23. Also that Mettalls, which elsewhere, he writeth to be co-thickned or condensed by their own cold, because they do abound with heat, should now be out of nature. 24. And as though the seeds of Vegetables, because they are not froathy, should not be endowed with fruitfulnesses, or should not contain nature in themselves. 25. Therefore he denieth the heat of living Creatures actually hot, to be Elementary (the which notwithstanding, I shall at sometime, in its own place, prove to be true) being unmindeful of his own maxim; that the cause is of the same particular kinde, with its thing caused. He knowes not, I say, that our heat doth make any other things to be hot, by a naked Elementary heat. And like∣wise, that since not onely Elementary heat (which he placeth in the sublunary fire, distinct from the common or kitchin fire) but also the kitchin fire, do heat us in a degree fitted to us: Therefore they ought to be of one and the same species, or parti∣cular kinde. 26. At length he rashly affirmeth, that nature, or the power of the Soul, or seminal truths, are nothing, besides that heavenly heat. 27. Therefore, he acknowledgeth heat, actually cold in Fishes, to be the cause of fruitfulness, seeing it distributes from every power of the Soul. For that is to have sold trifles, instead of Phylosophy. And as oft as he feareth, his toyes are not saleable, he provokes us to the Element of the Stars: after that, he had provoked us, (it seemes) by one affir∣mative, and many trifles of denyalls, to the proportion of the Element of the Stars. Surely it is a shame for Christians, as yet, to follow that Patron in natural Philoso∣phy; seeing that we believe by Faith, that Plants budded forth by a seminal virtue, before the Stars arose. For in Nature, there is alway found the Agent, the matter, and thing brought forth, or the effect, the instrument, and the disposition, But every A∣gent, [unspec 5] measureth his instrument, and fits the dispositions, unto the end or finishing of the thing produced. But heat, whether thou wilt have it Elementary, or heavenly, may indeed be a disposition brought forth by the Seed, and likewise the Instrument thereof: but it can by no meanes be a seminal Agent, measuring, and squaring its [unspec 6] dispositive Instruments. For neither is the operation of heat, any other than to make hot, whether that thing be called Elementarily, or Firmamentarily. Therefore the operation of heat in generation, is not ordained for the end of specifical dispositions, and much lesse is it directed to the bringing in of a specifical thingliness. For if that heat should be this seminal Agent, or the nature of Seeds, besides that, it being one, hath so many specifical differences, as there are kindes of things generated in Nature; it ought to have, without it self, an Instrument (seeing that it is not granted to be, without essential properties) measured, and manifestly limited, to the bringing in of any kinde of specifical thingliness: but no such Instrument, or mean, is pre∣sent with heat: therefore the co-measuring of every Instrument, according to quan∣tity, manner, motion, figure, durance, and the appointments of any operations what∣soever, dependeth on the seminal Agent, in which such kindes of co-measuring know∣ledges of proportions are, and no way on heat.

For seeing the knowledge of natural truth, doth necessarily depend on nature, and the essence thereof, Aristotle, who was ignorant of the thingliness of nature, also [unspec 7] knew not the truth thereof, and so prostituted nought but his own dreams to be di∣ligently taught in Schooles. Truly the operation of generation depends on nature, and its proper Instruments. He therefore that looks on heat, for every Instrument of nature, and accounts this very Instrument for the seminal and vitall nature: he sup∣poseth one of the Kings Guard, to be the King, or the File to be the Workman. Yea heat, as heat, is not indeed the Instrument proper to nature: but a common adjacent, concomitant, and accidental thing produced in hot things onely: but the knowledge of nature, and essence, is not taken from improper, adjacent, and accidental effects: but from the knowing of Principles, which hitherto (even as it plainly appeares) the Schoole of the Peripateticks hath been ignorant of. I say the Principles of nature are the matter and the Agent. But the Principles of Bodies are water, and the seed, or vulcane, things answering to both Sexes: which thing I will by and by, teach in its place.

Wherefore since Aristotle knowes not the nature, properties, and likewise the cau∣ses, and thingliness of generations, who shall not shew, that the Schooles have hither∣to drawn the waters of Philosophy out of dry Cisterns? For his eight Books of na∣tural [unspec 8]

Instructions, do expound Dreams, and privations, instead of the knowledge of nature. I say they do suppose a matter, or impossible corporeity or bodyliness, with Mathematical abstraction, for the principle, prop, and seminary of nature: The which, as it never existeth: neither shall it have the efficacy of beginning, or of causing.

Likewise privation is given to be drunk down as another Principle, which the Schooles themselves do rashly confess to be a meer [non ens,] or a non-Being. And at length they diligently teach, surely by an over rash dotage, the form, which is the end, top, and utmost aim of appointment, and the thing it self produced, for a begin∣ning of nature: to wit, they place the effect in the room of a Beginning. But in another Book, he sets to sale the causes of nature, for Principles: to wit, the matter and form, privation being omitted. As I shall sometimes shew, concerning causes. As though they were the Principles of nature, or could principia••e by causing. But fortune and chance, as if they were the proper passions of nature, are handled in a particular Book. For events do not deserve a place in the contemplation and Do∣ctrine of nature.

Lastly, a Vacuum or emptiness, and an Infinite, things not belonging to the knowledge of nature, and well high privative things, or plainly negative, have ob∣tained his treatises. But time and place, the Schooles do no lesse ignorantly, than im∣pertinently, reckon among the lessons of nature. And last of all they bring in locall motion, as it serves to Science Mathematical or Learning by demonstration, alike foolishly, and with an undistinct indiscretion, into nature.

Certainly I could wish, that in so short a space of life, the Spring of young men, [unspec 9] might not be hereafter seasoned with such trifles, and no longer with lying Sophistry. Indeed they should learn in that unprofitable three years space, and in the whole se∣ven years, Arithmetick, the Science Mathematical, the Elements of Euclide, and then Geographie, with the circumstances of Seas, Rivers, Springs, Mountains, Pro∣vinces, and Minerals. And likewise, the properties, and Customs of Nations, Wa∣ters, Plants, living Creatures, Minerals, and places. Moreover, the use of the Ring, and of the Astrolabe. And then, let them come to the Study of Nature, let them learn to know and seperate the first Beginnings of Bodies. I say, by working, to have known their fixedness, volatility or swiftness, with their seperation, life, death, interchangea∣ble course, defects, alteration, weakness, corruption, transplanting, solution, coagula∣tion or co-thickning, resolving. Let the History of extractions, dividings, conjoyn∣ings, ripenesses, promotions, hinderances, consequences, lastly, of losse and profit, be added. Let them also be taught, the Beginnings of Seeds, Ferments, Spirits, and Tinctures, with every flowing, digesting, changing, motion, and disturbance of things to be altered.

And all those things, not indeed by a naked description of discourse, but by handi∣craft demonstration of the fire. For truly, nature measureth her works by distilling, [unspec 10] moystening, drying, calcining, resolving, plainly by the same meanes, whereby glasses do accomplish those same operations. And so the Artificer, by changing the operations of nature, obtains the properties and knowledge of the same. For however natural a wit, and sharpness of judgement the Philosopher may have, yet he is never admit∣ted [unspec 11] to the Root, or radical knowledge of natural things, without the fire. And so every one is deluded with a thousand thoughts or doubts, the which he unfoldeth not to himself, but by the help of the fire. Therefore I confess, nothing doth more fully bring a man that is greedy of knowing, to the knowledges of all things knowable, than the fire. Therefore a young man at length, returning out of those Schooles, truly it is a wonder to see, how much he shall ascend above the Phylosophers of the Univer∣sity, and the vain reasoning of the Schooles.

First of all, he shall account it a shameful thing, for the Schooles to be ignorant (for [unspec 12] example) in an Egge, that in that space of time, while it comes to be a Bird, a thou∣sand dispositions do succeed each other in the way, and all of them to be external, and accidentary to the Seed: neither that in the mean time, it ceaseth to hasten to the aims of its appointment. For the figure of the yolk of the Egge, together with acci∣dentary dispositions succeeding each other, do passe over it indeed: yet there is not a new generation of the form of that puttified Egge, present at every disposure of the putrifaction. Indeed, one onely vitall form of the Chick being excepted, there comes [unspec 13] to it no other: which by degrees is stirred up by foregoing dispositions, and at length, the ripeness of dispositions being attained, floweth into it. For neither when the Bird

dyeth, is there a certain essential form, and generation of the dead Carcase. Because all generation in nature, is enclosed in an essential form, which a dead Carcase want∣eth, even as also a seed, and an Archeus, the Governour, as shall be shewed in its place. Even as the essence begins him with the Vulcan of the Seed, and the same es∣sence continues with the product, or thing generated: so the same product failing, the same essence perisheth. But the essence perishing, the form, the Governour or President thereof, also goes to ruine. For the Vulcan or Master-Workman forsaking the body, the flesh, heart, veins, &c. do begin to putrifie, for that they are now de∣prived of the vital Balsam their leader. For under life, the flesh, and the bone, &c. were distinguished. In its particular kinde, and proper form, the flesh was flesh, and was formally severed from the bone, in which form, in the dead Carcase, they do forthwith appear. And so, through death, no form, or essential thingliness, comes upon the dead Carcase, in the whole, or in any particular parts. Onely that which was vitall, is seperated.

Therefore let it be an erroneous thing: That the corruption of one thing is the genera∣tion [unspec 15] of another. Because the corruption of life happens onely through the quench∣ing of the vitall Balsam, or form, therefore without a new generation of a Creature. Therefore no privation happens in things that have life, and so neither can privation there, have the force of a Principle: Seeing that from the seed, even unto the vitall being, there is but one progress, promotion, and ripeness; about the end whereof, the form is given. Therefore also, generation doth reciprocally or cursarily happen, without any corruption, as often as the matter being now brought to the ripeness of its appointment, by the seminal Vulcan, hath obtained a form coming to it from elsewhere. Yea that Vulcan through the departure of life, departs, flies away, and vanisheth, without any corrupting of it self, no otherwise, than as light perisheth [unspec 16] without the corrupting of it self. Indeed life vanisheth, after the manner of light perish∣ing. And the Vulcan, seeing it is a certain vitall Air, fleeth away. Both of them, with∣out the corruption of themselves; and the body, which is deprived of life, properly (for that very cause) is not corrupted: although through the failing of the vitall Balsam, corruption doth soon succeed. Which thing sufficiently appeareth in Mum∣mies, and also in Vegetables, which being dry, and deprived of life, are kept for u∣ses, yea they do very often, drive away all corruption. So far of is it, that their life perishing, for that very cause they should be corrupted. Therefore death in things [unspec 17] that have life, is not the corruption of their own life, as neither of that which lives: but the extinguishing of life. And although in some things, the corruption of the body may follow: truly that is to life, and the body by accident: which thing is manifest. For truly, dead Carcases are preserved from corruption by art. Therefore now Aristotle, confounds privation with corruption, and doth not distinguish his [unspec 18] own Principle [non ens] or a non-being, from the [Being,] corruption.

Lastly, the forms of things are not subject to corruption, and therefore neither are they corrupted: but annihilated or brought to nothing. Wherefore neither can the [unspec 19] withdrawing, or the extinguishing of the form, include any corruption on behalf of the form. Furthermore, I have hated Metaphors, or figurative Translations of words from their proper signification to another, in the History of nature, and Family of essential things: because they are those things, which have introduced the errours of the Schooles, brawls of disputing, and religious Worship given to Aristotle. But besides, if Aristotle be unskilful in nature, and ignorant of all natural Philosphy, truly Galen hath hitherto, every where manifested a greater ignorance.

For first of all, I will make it manifest, that there is not a quaternary, or a fourfold kinde of Elements, nor a congress or conjunction of these, for bodies which are be∣lieved [unspec 20] to be mixt: much less a strife, or fighting of qualities or Complexions, or for the Causes of Diseases. And so that neither doth the Treatise of the Elements pro∣perly belong to Medicine. Truly I finde Galen diligent in opinions, and a boasting Writer, without judgement, or discretion. For neither hath he better perceived of Nature, Diseases, Causes, and defects, than of the decrees of Hipocrates and Plato. For I profess, I have twice read over those Volumes of Galen with attention, but I [unspec 21] have found the poverty and undistinct ignorance of Galen, to fight with his rashness. For truly those Books, do touch at nothing lesse than the Doctrine of Hipocrates or Plato. Neither also hath Hipocrates any thing common with Plato. And so that I have not found any one, who hath judged them worthy of a Commentary, as nei∣ther to have been written concerning the preserving of health. This one thing is al∣way

to be found in Galen, that the names of Authours being suppressed, he hath willingly snatched the Inventions of others to himself; a man wholly scanty, or very poor in judgement, as oft as he hath expressed the conceptions of his own judge∣ment. I ought to declare these things concerning the two Standard-Defenders of natural Philosophy: that the Schooles may abstain from worshipping these Masters.