in generation: but the matter, or subject of generation, as it is in act; so also its act, is an inward worker or Agent, the efficient, or Archeus or chief Workman. Therefore it is false, that by how much the more a thing hath of the form, by so much the more it hath of the act, of the Entity or Beingness of vertue and operation.
Because the form is not gotten or possessed by parts or degrees: neither therefore [unspec 7] are Beings more or lesse capable to receive from the form: yea, although they were more capable to receive, yet the activeness of the Agent, is not of the form it self; but of the Master-workman, or Archeus, of whom by and by.
Therefore the form cannot be divided. For whatsoever Aristotle hath attributed to [unspec 8] the form, or to the last perfection, in the Scene or Stage of things, that, properly, di∣rectively, and executively belongeth to that Agent, or seminal chief Workman. In the next place, seeing that the efficient cause of Aristotle, is external (as he saith the Smith to be, in his view of the Iron) I easily knew that he hath set to sale his ficti∣ons, for true foundations, and all his speculation, about artificial and external things of Nature, to wander. The whole efficient cause in Nature is after another manner, it is inward and essential.
And although the Father generating be effective: yet in order to causing, or doing, [unspec 9] he is not but the cause efficient of the Seed, wholly outward, in respect to the Be∣ing which of the Seed is framed by generation. For in the Seed, which fulfills and contains the whole quiddity or thing liness of the immediate efficient, that is not the Father himself: but the Archeus or chief Workman. For that the Father in respect of the thing generated, hath the Reason of nought but an external cause, and occa∣sionally producing: for by accident alone, the effect of generation doth follow, al∣though, the Agent applies himself to generation with his whole intent. Therefore the constitutive constituter efficiently, causing inwardly, perfectively, and by it self, is the chief seminal Workman it self, really distinct from the Father, in Being, and properties. Even as in Vegetables. Herbs indeed are the productresses of Seeds, but they are but the occasional and remote causes of Herbs arising from that Seed; and therefore although they are natural causes, yet not sufficient and necessary ones: for neither of every Seed will therefore rise up a Plant. Therefore the seminal Being is in the Seed, the immediate efficient cause efficiently, the internal, as also essential, of the Herbe proceeding from thence. But the Plant that goeth before that Seed, is the remote cause, the natural occasion indeed of the Seed, which by it self, and imme∣diately [unspec 10] frameth the Plant, and effects it, with the assistance of that which stirs it up. For otherwise, if the Herbe causing, should be the efficient of the Herbe produced, the working or begetting cause could not be burnt up, but the Plant produced should also perish. Therefore the Seed is the efficient inward, immediate cause of the herbe produced. Wherefore after a diligent searching into all things, I have not found any dependance of a natural body, but onely on two causes, on the matter and the effici∣ent, to wit, inward ones, whereto for the most part, some outward exciter or stirrer up is joyned.
Because that these two are abundantly sufficient to themselves, and to other [unspec 11] things, and do contain the whole composure, order, motion, birth, sealing notions, or tokens of knowing properties: and lastly, whatsoever is required to the constitu∣ting and propagating, or increasing of a thing. For the seminal efficient cause con∣taineth the Types or Patterns of things to be done by it self, the figure, motions, houre, respects, inclinations, fitnesses, equalizings, proportions, alienation, defect, and what∣soever falls in under the succession of dayes, as well in the business of generation, as of government.
Lastly, Since the efficient containeth all ends in it self, as it were the instructions [unspec 12] of things to be done by it self, therefore the finall external cause of the Schooles, which onely hath place in artificial things, is altogether vain in Nature. At leastwise, it is not to be considered in a distinct thingliness from the efficient it self. For that which in the minde of the Artificer is the Being of Reason: can never obtain the weight of a cause real and natural: Because in the efficient natural cause, its own knowledge of ends and dispositions, is infused naturally by God. Indeed all things in Nature, do desire some generating juyce, for their matter; and lastly, a seminal, ef∣ficient, disposing, directing principle, the inward one of generation. For of these two, and not more, have all corporeal things need of.
But the three principles of bodies, so greatly boasted of by Paracelsus, although [unspec 13] they should be found in all things that are to be framed: yet it would not therefore