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CHAP. III. The hunting, or searching out of Sciences. (Book 3)

1. The minde is not rational, if it be the Image of God. 2. The opinion of the Schooles concerning Reason. 3. A Vision in a Dream concerning Reason. 4. A Dialogue or Discourse of the minde with Reason. 5. The chief juggle of Reason. 6. The minde hath chosen understanding. 7. Reason becomes suspect∣ed by reason of her juggling deceits. 8. The weariness of the minde concerning Reason. 9. Reason began from sin. 10. What kinde of knowledge there is of the Soul, being seperated from the Body. 11. The minde hath withdrawn her Gar∣ments from Reason, in her flight. 12. Reason enters into the counsel of the minde, from an abuse. 13. Reason burdens the minde. 14. Reason being reflexed towards it self, doth produce many Errours. 15. The great Art of Lullius is sifted. 16. The manner of seperating Reason from it self. 17. An unutterable intellectual Light. 18. A feeling of the immortality of the Soul. 19. Reason is not the Lamp of which Solomon speaks. 20. In what part a Syllogisme dwells. 21. Reason generateth a dim knowledge. 22. Knowledges of the Premises are from the light of the Candle, or Lamp. 23. The minde is not deceived, but by its own reason. 24. Reason burieth the under∣standing. 25. Reason is known in its poorest nakedness. 26. The understanding refuseth the use of reason. 27. Reason and Truth, are unlike in their Roots. 28. Rea∣son doth not agree with the knowledge of the conclusion. 29. A definition of Reason. 30. The most refined Reason, is as yet deceitful. 31. What Reasoning and Discourse are. 32. What intellectual Truth is. 33. Imagination is a crooked manner of un∣derstanding. 34. Bruit Beasts are discursive. 35. A rational Creature for man, is disgraceful. 36. A true definition for a man. 37. The Schooles hearken more to Aristotle than to Paul. 38. An Animall, or living Creature, in the definition of a man, belongs to corrupted nature. 39. What kinde of Skeleton or dry Carcase, that of rea∣son is. 40. A progress to chase after Sciences. 41. Double Images, or likenesses in the Soul. 42. Where the Progress of the minde is stayed. 43. How a truer Progress may be made. 44. New understanding, or the labour of wisdom. 45. The under∣standing doth strike in, or co-agree with things understood, and how that may be done. 46. Why there is made a transmigration or passing over of the understanding. 47. The memory and will are supped up. 48. The thingliness or Essence of an intellectual thought. 49. How the Image of God lightens or shines all over. 50. How the minde beholds the understanding under an assumed form. 51. The Errour of the Rabbins concerning this State of the Soul. 52. The quality of the understanding, while it stands in that light. 53. Why, and after what manner the understanding transform∣eth it self. 54. After what manner the understanding beholds it self. 55. What intelli∣gibility or understandingness may be. 56. How the Soul understanding it self, shall understand any other things. 57. Whence that difficulty of understanding is. 58. Why accidents cannot be comprehended by the intellect. 59. The Errours of the Schooles a∣bout the dividing of the intellect. 60. In things pertaining to understanding, it is more noble to suffer than to do. 61. Aristotle knew not a true understanding. 62. The Phantasie or Imagination doth not pierce things, neither in like manner, do things en∣ter into it. 63. Eight Maxims touching the understanding, which Aristotle knew nor. 64. A dividing of the Predicament of a substance.

The hunting or searching out of Sciences, begins from [Know thy Self.]

REason is accounted to be the life of the Soul, or the life of our life. But I believe, that the Almighty is alone, the way, the truth, the life, the light, of living Crea∣tures, and of all things; but this is not reason. And therefore, that our minde ought

to be intellectual; but not rational, if it ought to shew forth the most immediate Image of God. That Paradox is to be cleared up, for the searching out of all things knowa∣ble, and especially of things Adeptical, or the attainment of great secrets. By my will, or according to my assertion, all Phylosophy begins and proceeds from the knowledge of ones self: whether it be natural, or morall.

I will therefore propose, so far as I (through my slenderness) do attain, the under∣standing, [unspec 2] and the abstruse or hid, or inward knowing of our selves. For the undoubt∣ed opinion of the Schooles, beares in hand, that God hath bestowed on man, nothing more pretious than Reason, by which alone, we are distinguished from bruit Beasts, but bear a co-resemblance with the Angels. So I being also perswaded from my tender years, believed. But after that, discretion had waxed ripe, and I had once beheld my Soul, I perceived altogether otherwise: I confess in the mean time, that I had ra∣ther be wise in secret, than to be willing to seem wise; but to be alwayes more desi∣rous to learn, than to be one that endeavoureth to teach. Notwithstanding, I ought to teach some things, least I be found to have buried my Talent received, in the Earth.

Wherefore, Reason once shewed it self to my Soul, in the form of a more thick and dark little Cloud, or mist: and proposed; that it was the Nurse, Guide, and [unspec 3] Tutouresse of the minde, so ordained of God, for the obtaining of all, even of solid good. Yea it protested, that it was the Sterne of the course of our life, the fore-deck and Sterne of the minde, and so the inventer of all Sciences. For at the first sight, my Soul entertained Reason, wished to rest in her possession, with well pleasing, in joy, and much rejoycing. Because the minde being so diligenty instructed, had once so per∣swaded it self.

Nevertheless, least it should offend through a gentleness of credulity, or rash belief, it presently assaulted Reason with its own Weapons, saying, If therefore O Reason, thou [unspec 4] art ordained for my Service, I ought not to follow thee, but thou me. Because thou art she, which af∣firmest, or demonstratest nothing by Discourse, but I have first begotten that in thee. In what sort therefore dost thou, now being a Scholar, pretend a tutorship over thy Mistress, thou being a Daughter, over thy Parent? That first Argument, arising from my arrogancy, taught me, that nothing is more nigh to the Soul than pride: which lifting up, nevertheless, arisen from disobedience, it hath covered with the Cloak of vertue: to wit, least it should be led away by credulity. But Reason answered, not indeed affirmatively; but onely, that it might breed a fear in the minde, and so, by scrupulousness, might draw it unto its desires.

For it said, there is no safety to the Soul, to be attained without Reason: to wit, that Mortalls would perish under the allurements of the senses, unless vices should be re∣strained [unspec 5] by the raines of Reason. To whom, the wrothful minde, saith: Away for shame, none of these things are from thee, or by thee: whose knowledge I receive from faith, and attainment or performance, from Clemency. Yea, Faith commands, that for her, we forsake thee. For thy flexible juggling deceit hath brought forth a hundred Sections, or divisions, and clefts in faith, even in the more refined men. But every Section, hath its rational induction, or bringing in of Sophistry. Because Reason doth on every side, bring forth onely a thinking, instead of Faith; but Faith is of Grace: not of thee, subtill Reason: who dost delude, and miserably lead aside the most witty, or quick sighted men, that trust in thee, unto a Hell of miseries. Finally, my minde considered by Faith, that there was one onely Form and Essence of truth; and that all understanding was alwayes, onely of true things.

Wherefore in the choyce, my minde esteemed it meet, to magnifie understanding be∣fore [unspec 6] Reason. And therefore it began to fear, least Reason, which through a shew of Piety, Truth, and Religion, under a multiplicity of erring, did guilfully deceive so many thousands of men, as a pleasing flatteress, and crafty Seducer should seduce it. And therefore, my minde suspected, that Reason did not onely feign perswasions, for the deceiving and flattery of it self, as oft as the minde did design it for a Judge and Assistant: but also, that Reason did plainly yield it self for a Parasite, and to the ser∣vitude of the desires, even of those that are most Religious: and did bring with it, more of thinking, rashness, and blockishness, than of Knowledge and Truth. Because it was that, which would easily be bended at a beck, by Tongues, sometimes to one, but sometimes to the other extream: and would every where, finde out, feign, and pro∣strate Reasons, according to the pleasures of the desires: yea, it oft-times proceedeth in discoursing of that which falls without that which is reasonable, and it remains in∣definitely

undistinct, and uncertain in ignorances, the which notwithstanding, it did promise to untie. Also, now and then, Reason hath made Souls mad, who trusting too much to its perswasions, had enslaved themselves unto it.

In the next ••lace, in others, through foolish, importunate, undiscreet, and vain cares, it cuts off the thred of life. The minde therefore hath drawn a wearisomness [unspec 8] from the command of Reason; and the rather, for that it knew Reason to be a Hous∣hold Servant of its Family; but being a Chamber-maid, it presently did presume upon the whole government of the Soul. And the minde having remembred that divine word, that those of his own House, are his enemies: conceived a loathing over Reason. And its turning away on both sides, was not yet sufficiently founded, yet it got strength in going. From the first, therefore, after that, the Soul began no more to contemplate of Reason, as a part or power of it self; but as it were a strange guest, plain∣ly divided, and a newter from the essence of the minde. And afterwards, the Soul knew that thing by faith, that it being once separated from the Body, it stands no longer in need of Reason: and therefore that this is frail and mortal; yea, and that it hapned to us together with death, in the corruption of Nature.

Indeed, the minde knowes that it is, after death, to inhabit all its knowledge at once, [unspec 9] full, naked, not successive, not wrung out or extorted by force of premises, not con∣quered by convincement, not deceitful, disputable, or doubtful. Neither that it shall [unspec 10] make demonstrations after death, that it may conclude, draw, compel, derive, or re∣flect, whether that thing shall be to conceive, or indeed to signifie or give notice.

Therefore the minde seised on frail Reasons Coat, she being also a fugitive from the Soul, and hath spoiled her of every Garment, even unto nakedness: But then it was [unspec 11] confirmed to the minde, that Reason being left with us, came to us, as it were, a brand from a tormentor, for a remembrance of Calamities, and of our fall. And that the knowledge of good and evil, attained by eating of the Apple, was Reason its very self, which is so greatly adored by mortal men.

Afterwards therefore, my minde endeavoured to depart; not indeed against, but [unspec 12] from the use of Reason: to wit, by abstaining from all discourse, in the contemplation of a thing, as a thing is good, true, and a Being in act. But that thing I could not pre∣sently obtain, because Reason did continually accompany my Soul against its will, as a shadow doth the body, the which, without bidding, comes into the counsel of the minde, from an antient possession, and a not sufficient concealing of our councel. And by this Title, the conversation of Reason was afterwards as yet, more burdensome, sorrowful, tedious and clowdy unto me.

For truly, then I began to perceive, that reason did vex the Soul with a multiplicity, with a vain complacency of Sciences, and did tempt with it a ridiculous enquiry after [unspec 13] virtues, promising an Ornament of life, before the World, which doth adore its Starry Goddess Reason. Wherefore it did miserably draw the understanding and will into its pleasure, and did so load the memory, that even now, in my man-hood, my memory did fall as an Asse under his burden, and got a defect.

My minde therefore had often banished Reason, but it hath alwayes privily entred afresh, against the endeavours of the minde, hath discovered its learned Hypocrisie, and [unspec 14] hath placed its batteries against the most weak wall of the minde. Indeed it hath al∣wayes promised a vulgar applause, the foolish rewards of ambition, boasting, that it is nourished under it. But then it first rose up against a strictness of life, against which, as against harsh Phylosophy, and disswaded from that, as follies, and fraudulently excu∣sed many things here and there, unlawful, with the priviledges of youth, or of Custome already in many places received; and even readily serving for the flattery of the minde, it by a learned Industry, followed it as it were a Chamber-maid, feigning Reasons at the pleasure of the minde, now inclined.

At length, my minde asked, what knowledge Reason could give? Whereto she presently answered, she could effect by the great art of Lullius, that a man may be [unspec 15] able to discourse of every knowable thing, as it were an omniscient person, with the admiration of the whole World. Then my minde was wroth, and said to Reason, Be gone wicked pratler: for first of all, I detest discursive matters, therefore have I cer∣tainly known, that Reason doth alwayes forsake the Soul, with an unsweetness of dryness, stumbling in the dark with disquietness, uncertainty, and bitterness.

Last of all, as I knew, that there was no help to me in nature, nor seperation from so troublesome and tedious a guest, I hid my self within the Prayer of silence, so that [unspec 16] sometimes, I could altogether, and now and then in part, uncloath my self of Reason,

and all its appendices. It happened therefore, that without, or at leastwise, besides those things, which may be known by reason, or be any way conceived by its help, I came down as it were by a Dream, under an unutterable light.

Of which, I have nothing to say further: because that envious reason hath presently [unspec 17] withdrawn me from thence. For, as soon as Reason, being not yet putrified, wax∣ing dim under the accustomedness of the light, had entred with my minde, it raised up an admiration in me, who I was, from whence, after what manner, and why I had come down thither: and so I fell out of the light, into miserable darknesses, under the day, or in the day-time. But in my judgement, that light was delayed, scarce the space, wherein any one might drawingly pronounce four syllables.

Nevertheless, from thenceforth, I felt my self changed from that which I was be∣fore. [unspec 18] For I even tasted down the immortality of my Soul, the foundation of Faith and Religion, a knowledge that is to be preferred before all frail or mortal things. I pro∣ceeded therefore with a greater study, or endeavour, to depart from Reason: because it was that, which hath never assaulted me naked; but deceitfully covered with fight∣ing, and deceitful juggles: but it had never truly forsaken me, but with uncertainty. Salomon calls the spirit of a man, the Lamp or Candle of God. But not that God is in darkness, or that he hath need of the splendor of the spirit of a man. But altogether, because the hidden knowledges of things, are infused by the Father of Lights into us, by meanes of this Candle.

I apprehended more certainly, daily, that Reason was not that spirit of a man, and therefore neither that Candle of God. Yea neither the light of that Candle: but that [unspec 19] there was a far different light of that Candle, by the vigour or efficacy whereof, it might pierce a knowable thing, granted unto it. Indeed, I throughly beheld, that the Soul was not in need of, yea, nor the framer of a Syllogisme, because it will not use it, being once severed from the body. For truly, its native knowledge, was far more noble, and certain, than any demonstration, which is the top of reason.

Then in the next place, I knew, that neither did sense frame a Syllogisme; but that [unspec 20] Reason, the framer of demonstrations, did possess the animall understanding, or Ima∣gination, which is a meane between the senses and the intellect. Wilt thou ask, why the light shineth? why the water is moyst? yieldeth to a finger that enters it, &c. and thou shalt finde, that, by how much the more clear any thing is, by so much the reason thereof is the more stupid, remote, and dull. Then therefore, I clearly beheld, that Reason is wallowed up and down, among thick darknesses. And then, that, where∣soever there is no discourse, no premises; there also no conclusion, consequence, or reason, is found. Notwithstanding a knowledge of the premises, is more certain than of the conclusion: because, seeing it is supposed from things that are firstly or chiefly true: also that knowledge is in the Soul without Reason: because, before a demon∣stration.

Whence I concluded with my self, first, that reason doth generate nothing but [unspec 21] a dim or dark knowledge, or a thinking. Then next, that the knowledges of the truth, of things, and premises, do proceed, not indeed from Reason; but from a far different beginning, to wit, the intellectual light of the Lamp or Candle.

Wherefore I straightway observed, that the discourse of Reason, doth extenuate or [unspec 22] lessen, overshadow, hinder, and choak that noble act of understanding, whereby the knowledges of the premises, are implanted in us. And I learned more and more, that Reason was far of from, and moreover also, out of the light of truth, because like Bats, it onely cannot endure or bear the light, being content with its own borrowed Glow-worm light. Because it is that which is properly nothing else, but a wording fa∣culty of discoursing, co-bred with us as mortalls, from sin. So that I say, it more wea∣rieth the addicted or ready following Soul, by operating, and covers the Scull with Dogs hairs, than it is able to produce within us, a true knowledge of the truth.

Forasmuch as I have found, that the Soul wishing to know, by the hunting of [unspec 23] Reason, for the most part, embraceth lying meanes, and false satisfactions, in∣stead of the truth, for a reward of its labour. For thus the minde being deceived, be∣holds a lie, a false paint, deceit; and in summe, a thinking instead of truth, as long as it, as yet, doubts nothing of the juggles of Reason. For in this respect it hath happened, that there are so many juggling deceits, and false Doctrines, as well in Religion, as in the Art of Medicine, so that I cannot thorowly view any one corner of the Schooles, from whence truth is not overthrown by the aims of Reason.

Therefore, I have seen and learned, Reason to be a naked thing, because Reason, for every event, did bring forth nothing but a thinking or truth, by which meanes, it did bury the intellectual understanding. Because that the minde cannot at once em∣brace and follow two lights, which are so diverse. But the World is every where miserably misled, and deluded by thinkings. And first indeed, because every one thinks Reason to be the Image of God, and our best Treasure, &c. I pray you, let a Reason be asked about a doubtful question, of ten witty men apart: and mark, how much they differ from each other, every one is deluded by his own reason, and how stoutly every one fights for his own thought.

For truly, seeing my minde did spoil reason of its Garment, I observed, that the [unspec 25] World is chiefly deceived, by its own thinking; because it calls ••e inquisition of the knowledge of things by their causes, the seeking out, or invention of reason. But there∣in, I have first of all discovered the false paint, and most wretched condition, and most poor nakedness of Reason; because it blusheth to appear, unless under the covering of a false Etymologle, or pretended true reasoning, or derivation of words, and a beg∣ged Cloak. For truly, Reason is by no meanes, a cause, part, or essence of the thing caused, much lesse doth the rational faculty in man, reach unto things. For a thing is that in it self, which it is, without the reflexion of it on any discourse, and invention of humane reason. Therefore the outmost Garment of reason is a Mask. Indeed, the cause is the beginning, and original of the thing caused. But reason is no such thing. In the next place, I have observed, that the Schooles gave Reason place, in the middle of the essence of the minde; and that from thence, they did denominate the Soul to be rational, as it were by an essential property. As though reason should be given to it for a Lamp, or Candle, in the innermost essence thereof. When as, otherwise, in very deed, in the minde, or the most immediate Image of God, there is no room for reason. Because, the Soul being seperated from the body, doth not use the discourse of reason: Yea, when the Soul, being as yet the in mate of the body, doth intellectually understand any thing, it plainly refuseth all use of reason.

Because that when it makes use of reason, it plainly resembles the savore of a cor∣poreal Soyl. Seeing the rational power is in the lower part of the Soul, as being bound [unspec 26] with bodily Fetters. Finally, presently after the uncloathing of Reason, it offered it self as alike frivolous a covering from, the thinking of reason. To wit, that whatsoever is akin to truth, this reason judgeth rationable, and agreeable to Reason.

When as notwithstanding, Reason and Truth are unlike, or disagreeing in their Roots. For Truth is a real true Being; but reason is a mental, problematical, or [unspec 27] in∣tricate Being, onely appearing: for hence the being of reason a non-being hath arisen from its Mother, Though. For the rational faculty, and reason derived from thence, doth oft-times embrace false things, for true, and true things for falses.

Whence at length, I seriously considered, that reason did not agree with the con∣formity of a thing proposed by discourse, and the knowledge of a conclusion found by [unspec 28] us. Because reason properly, is not the judgement of the outward man, or of his ima∣gination, whereby it rubs together, truth, appearing unto it self, according to the shapes, or figures of Sciences, which are supposed to be inbred in man: from whence it wander∣ing, the Imagination doth then first frame a knowledge agreeable to it self.

But Reason, that Steward, reputed in the minde of so great worth, is nothing else, [unspec 29] but a disposition of the aforesaid conformity, found by discourse, with the shapes or Idea's co-bred in the Imagination, which conformity in the next place, as it is in it self, confused, obscure, moveable: So of necessity, it ought to be unstable, from the nature of the Subject of its inherence. For so also, the most refined Reason may be in it self deceitful: neither must it be of necessity, that it should compel, contain, or con∣clude any certainty within it, Mathematical Science excepted because this doth plain∣ly consist in the measurings of co-measurable things.

For therefore more Heretiques are converted by the Examples of a Christian life, [unspec 30] than by the Discourses of Disputations: Next, the aptness of that Disposition unto the Species, or Shapes co-bred in the Imagination, is reckoned to be, rationality or rea∣sonableness.

But reasoning, or Logisme (from whence is a Syllogisme) is an act whereby the con∣formity of the same disposition, is made to approach unto the Species, co-begotten in [unspec 31] the Imagination, or as my opinion carries it, finally raised up, or awakened there. As soon as by putting of the shooes of reason, I found most things to be in nature,

which the understanding judgeth necessary, the which Reason refuseth as impossible: I knew from thenceforth, that reason did not dwell in the possession of a true under∣standing; but without the same. Because that in the understanding, truth is immedi∣ately, because truth being understood, is nothing else, but a suiting of the intellect to the things themselves.

Indeed, the understanding knowes things as they are; and therefore likewise, the un∣derstanding [unspec 32] is made true concerning the things themselves, by the things themselves; for as much as the Being of things from themselves, is alwayes true: and their Essence is truth it selfe. And therefore the understanding which is carried about them, or brought over them is alwayes directly true. But seeing the imagination, or the reason thereof, is a certain cr••aked manner of understanding, proceeding by Reasons and Dis∣courses; but not by a transformation of adequation or suiting: therefore that rational [unspec 33] manner, is an abusive and deceitful understanding. But good, right, one, and true, have themselves alwayes after one and the same manner, in the intellect; because they stand alwayes in one point of suicableness in the intellect: but evill, crooked, athwart, false, and manifold, are made after many manners, by reason, in the imagina∣tive part.

Therefore I have certainly known, that reason is not to be had in so high an e∣steem, as hitherto it hath been. And the rather, because Reason and Discourse, do [unspec 34] not obscurely flcurish, or grow in b••uit Beasts: for, that an aged Fox is more crafty than a younger one, by rational discourse, doth happen to be confirmed by the re∣membrance of experience: yea, Bees do number: because if there be 30 Hives placed in order, a small Bee flying out in the morning, numbers out of what Hive she went forth, and then, doth not return nor enter, unless she first re-number the rank: which is easily proved; For if the fifth or sixth Hive be removed into the seventh, or any o∣ther place, and the number being turned in and out, the Bees, which return laden with Hony and Wax, thinking to lay up their fardle within their own Common-wealth, do reck on again, upon the fifth or sixth numbred Hive: the Citizens whereof, seeing they are strangers to that little Bee, coming unto them, do kill the same. And in this man∣ner, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 do in one night, destroy all the Hives. For the Serpent was more crafty than the other living Creatures. And I will confirm by one example, instead of a thousand, a rational Discourse in Beasts. A man of a neighbouring Village, brought up a House, the chief Watchman of the night-prey. But it happened, that in full of the Moon, a Wolf, ran up and down about the Village, at whom, that Dog, straight∣way barked, and followed the fleeing Wolf. But this being impatient of hunger, re∣terted himself on the Dog, and followes him. But the Dog running away, and leap∣ing upon his Oven, retired himself in safety, and from thence continually barked; and waking his Master, discovered the presence of the Wolf. But the day following, the Wolf returned, whom the Dog, as he did the day before, assaulted by barking. For the Wolf feigning a flight, until he knew by conjecture, that his fellow Wolf, which he had brought with him, had hidden himself under the Oven. When therefore, he turned himself towards the Dog, who running away from the Wolf following him, and thinking to retire to his Oven, as it were to a most safe Castle, another hidden Wolf bewrayed himself, who laid hold on the Dog with a grinning mouth, and hindered his leaping upon his Oven. Therefore I have noted a remarkable diligence in all bruit Beasts, also in most insects.

I think it therefore a disgraceful definition, whereby a man is decyphered to be a rational or reasonable living Creature, as it were from a description of his Essence. For [unspec 35] truly, he was to be defined from his ultimate end, by the properties of appointments in creating, if the end be the first of causes, according to Aristotle. Wherefore, neither was the definition of a man, to be begged from the Fountain of Paganisme, which hath been plainly ignorant of Creation, and the ends thereof. For as my Philosophy is un∣known to the Heathen, so likewise their Philosophy is with me, of no value. Indeed, I write for the sake of Christians, for whom it is a shame, to follow Heathens, contra∣ry to Gospel-truth. Neither also am I willing to be accounted a brawler about names, as oft as I treat of the ends, Prerogatives, choiceness, and Dignity of the divine Image. I reject, first of all, the follies of Paganisme, in-definitions, especially those made concerning man. For truly, according to the Testimony of St. Anthony, descri∣bed by Blessed Jerome: Paul, the first of Anchorets, is referred among the number of the Gods. Also by relation of the same Anthony, Faunus is read to be a talking rational Creature: yea, knowing and worshipping the God of Nature, and of the Christians,

and beseeching Anthony, to pray for him and his. It is manifest in the first place, that this Faunus was not a man, from the assertion of Anthony, and his monstrous figure or shape. Next, neither that he was an evil spirit, is gathered, because this is so proud, that if he knew he might be saved by Prayer, he would not so much as ask, that any one would pray for him, neither would he prostrate himself for to beg pardon. For blessed Jerome calls Faunus, not a man, as neither an evil Spirit. Therefore Faunus is neither of these, as the same man witnesseth, by whom that Paul obtained the first place among the Anchorets, and was reckoned among the Saints. Therefore a Faunus is a li∣ving Creature, as a Being in reason, speaking his own proper Country Dialect; but not a man. So in times past, a live Satyr, and afterwards seasoned with Salt, was shewen for money, being carried thorowout Aegypt, Phrygia, and Greece. Finally, in Scotland and Zeland, and elsewhere: there are fished Monsters, using Reason, yea, ex∣ercising mechanick arts, in the half shapes of men. Indeed man alone was made after the Image of God, with an excluding of all Creatures or things. But these rational bruits, being in their own Elements, are also different among themselves: yet are they the Images, or likenesses of us, and not the Images of God.

Man therefore, is a Creature living in a body, by an immortal minde, sealed to the honour of God, according to the light, and Image of the Word, the first example of [unspec 36] all causes. For the day, and its light were sometimes without the Sun, and the Sun shall at sometimes be without light. But the Soul of man, cannot be considered with∣out the Image of God, seeing the Kingdom of God, with all its free gifts, is more inti∣mate to the Soul, than the Soul it self is intimate to it self. Therefore, I am deserved∣ly angry, that the Schooles do badly season Youth, with Heathenish Phylosophy, and that they do even till now, delight in Acorns, the Banquets of the first, or original truth, being now found. Oh Lord, the light of thy countenance is imprinted upon us; for none hath perfectly known the Image, and whether it doth well answer to its Type, if he shall not first know or acknowledge the Type. Wherefore, as many as do badly define a man, do not know or acknowledge God, as neither themselves in essential things.

The Phylosophical Schooles therefore, have rested more in the lessons of the Hea∣thens, than of Paul. Hence I contemplate, that they have meditated of a man, onely [unspec 37] according to his dead Carcase; but not according to the intention of the Creator, or efficient, and the finall ordinations of man. For otherwise, the Almighty, had decli∣ned from his scope, if the end be the first or chief of causes, in Creation, and there be something considerable, as first, in the adorable Authour of things. Therefore the Creature was to be defined, and that from the intention of the efficient Creator. For he erreth not in his ends, who frameth the properties themselves, which flow from the very ends of their appointments. Wherefore, man, although he hath from his body, some animal or sensitive, and bodily conditions: yet, from the intent of God, he is created into the living Image of God, in an immortal substance, that he may know, love, and worship God, according to the light of the Type or figure imprinted on him. But after that man hath lived in the flesh, as an animall or sensitive living Creature, God hath said, My Spirit shall not remain, or alwayes strive with man, because he as flesh. For the proper Genus or general kinde of the thing defined, in the definition of a [unspec 38] man, which the Schooles name an Animall, or living Creature: that very thing, God nameth degeneration, a turning out of his wayes, the corruption of Nature, and de∣stroying of his intention in Creation. But, that their constitutive difference of a man, or the rational part, doth belong to bruites is without doubt: and also the penury of Logick, which is altogether destitute of all definition, and constitutive difference. But Reason being now stript even unto a nakedness, I got its every way displeasure, be∣cause it seemed to me an empty Skeleton, its Masks and Coverings being taken away.

Lastly, I beheld the narrow poverty, and unquiet foulness thereof; especially, when I was mindeful of the confusions and uncertainties, wherewith, it, according to [unspec 39] its wonted manner, had intangled me.

I began therefore afterwards to contemplate, that my intellect might more profit by figures, likenesses, & visions of the phantafie in dreams, than by the discourses [unspec 40] of Reason. Yea, that frequent Discourses did ordinarily render their man, foolish, wrathful, mad, stotmy in his judgement, and moveable, or weak, and so also of a ten∣der health. And at length, I more fully looked into the progress of figures and Idea's: and then I found those, as yet, encompassed with miseries and anguishes: because I∣mages were estranged, by reason of their adulterating from the very truth of the thing, and of its Essence, by an unexcusable disagreement of every Similitude, remote from

identity or sameliness. And then I thus judged, because the distinction between the Images of the Phantasie, and the Images of the intellect, had not yet been made known unto me: the which, after their abstractions, do remain in the very Centre of the Soul; for I was for the most part wearied all the day, about some knowable thing; [unspec 41] the which, although it was unknown to me, as to its foundation and manner, yet by likenesses, I determined it was by much labour to be known unto me. At length, when I perceived my self to be hindered from further proceeding, because astonished, I framed inwardly, that any likeness of a thing not yet perfectly known, is adorned with a possible adiacence of its essence.

Under which, I once afterwards, ere long, beholding that, in my imagination, and as it were, talking to the same, I being at length, notably wearied with study, fell asleep, [unspec 42] that at least, I might stir up a dreaming Vision, whereby I might draw out that desira∣ble thing to be known. According to that saying, Night unto night sheweth knowledge; and surely it is a wonder, how much light, those kinde of Visions unfolded unto me, espe∣cially, my Body being not well fed for a good while before. For I do not deny, but that, the essences of the thing sought for, which were for the most part, covered under the Cloak of a Riddle; or confused; and as yet, very much subject to pluralities, and interchangeable courses: I many times attained by this meanes of knocking, especial∣ly, the helps of seeking having gone before, and the ayds and wings of prayer, being adjoyned. And a holy man (to whom, I had uncovered every corner of my Consci∣ence, and the wearisomnesses of labours and years through restless nights) said unto me: Ah, I would to God, I had laboured as much, and had spent as much time in loving of God, as thou wretched man hast done, in the searching out of knowable things, whereof, the last day will not require of thee a reason or account! Truly, I then praised the Lord, that he had freely bestowed on me a certain nearer meanes of knowing and learning, than reason could be: the which did never pierce unto the former, or cause, and seldom unto the lat∣ter, or effect, and that, moreover, with much uncertainty. For then, I believed, that the original misery of corrupted nature, could not proceed further, unto the once tasted light, than by the aforesaid Images of the phantasie.

By the perswasion therefore of that man, I desisted from a more narrow wishing, seeking and searching into any thing, I stripped my self of all curiosity and appetite of [unspec 43] knowing, I betook my self unto rest or poverty of spirit, resigning my self into the most lovely will of God, as if I were not in being, not in working, in desiring meer no∣thing, in understanding nothing: most especially, because I knew manifold imper∣fections in my knowledges; I conceiving great indignation with my self, because that for a frail knowledge, I had bestowed so many and so great labours. Therefore I my self wonderfully displeased my self: therefore I begged of the Lord, that he would wholly sweep out of my minde, every knowable thing, and the profane desires thereof: the which minde, with this inscription, I wholly offered unto his good plea∣sure. In the mean time, after two moneths, in this renouncing of knowledges, and na∣ked poverty, it once again happened unto me, that I intellectually understood. I pla∣ced my Athanar, or the Instrument of my reception and operation, another way.

But I straightway returned into my self, neither knew I, how long that light had remained. That indeed I knew, that the newness, amazedness, and rejoycing of the [unspec 44] unwonted matter, then stole away that light, and made me to fall out of it, into my antient confusions of darkness; because that reason was not yet mortified. Aristotle, although he was wholly void of this light, yet he hath seemed from some other, to have described the perceivance of another, concerning the labour of wisdom, or things Adeptical. It is better for a man to be disposed or inclined, than to be knowing by description. To wit, by the deaf suggestion of another, he calls it a better thing to have men disposed, than if they were knowing: that is, by the help of demonstration. By meanes whereof alone, he elsewhere alway boasts, that all knowledge in man, doth arise. I likewise acknowledged, that we must bid farewell to Reason and Imaginati∣on, as unto brutall faculties (and that by reason of the misery of our fall) if by hope, we are drawn into the deep, for a sound knowledge of the truth.

I have known likewise, that an easie Translation of the understanding was required, and a pleasing transchanging of it self into the form of the thing intelligible; in which [unspec 45] point of time indeed, the understanding for a moment is made (as it were) the intelli∣gible thing it self. But seeing the intellect is perfected by understanding, and that nothing is perfected, but by that which hath a resemblance with it in its own na∣ture;

therefore I gathered that the understanding and things understood, as such, ought to be, or to be made of the same nature; but this ought to be done without la∣bour, and disquietness: but with rest, in the light proper to them, with the withdraw∣ing, depriving, and wanting of any other created help whatsoever. But if a forreign help doth concur, now, it shall be with the labour of a desire stirred up without the un∣derstanding. Furthermore, that passing over and transfiguration of the understanding, otherwise natural to it, they do signifie to be sometimes subordinate Poets, the name of Protheus, even as a Fable. But I have now known more clearly than that, that that transchanging of the understanding ought to be made, because the intellect is in it self, wholly pure, simple, one onely, and undivided.

Wherefore, for that cause also, some onely, simple, uniform, and single act, should belong to it, plainly undivided from the understanding it self. Otherwise, the under∣standing [unspec 46] should loose the homogeneal simplicity of its unity, by a duplicity of inter∣changeable course. Notwithstanding; I have sufficiently found, that it is not of the full and free power of our will, now thus to enjoy its own understanding. And that there is more required unto that thing, than to think, endeavour, wish, will, &c. And that not onely by reason of an accustomedness, whereby, we have been wont from a Childe, by animal or sensitive acts, to obey the Imagination: but much more, be∣cause the will it self, together with the memory, ought for that space of motion, to be wholly supt up, and as it were, annihilated in the understanding.

The which surely, is the weight of a great Mystery. For else, as soon as any one doth think of his Soul, or of any thing as of a third; with a seperated interchangeable course, [unspec 47] without the understanding, for that very cause, there is not yet the thought, or opera∣tion of a pure, and onely intellect.

But when the Soul thinks of it self, or any other thing, as it self, without an inter∣changeable course of the thinker, and of the thing thought of, without an appen∣dency, [unspec 48] out-turning, or respect to duration, place and circumstances; Then indeed, such a thought is intellectual, or of the understanding. But it is not as yet, therefore illustrated, or made lightsomely famous, although that understanding is already a far more noble thought, than that which rusheth in by things that happen: whether those do come in to it by likenesses, without a sequel, as being infused; or next, being drawn from experiences and observations, do by influence, flow to it of their own accord. Because the Soul, in that state of light, doth thus apprehend the more inward and for∣merly essence of the thing understood, because the intellect it self doth transform it self, by passing over, or thorow, into the thing understood. Hence indeed, it fol∣lowes. If intellectual knowledge be with a similitude of the thing understood in the understanding it self: that also the Kingdom of God, doth as it were come to us, and is renewed, or doth spring again, as oft as we in faith do intellectually and presentially adore the goodness, power, infiniteness, Glory, truth of God, &c. in the Spirit: And thus it is unto God a delight, to be with the Sons of men. Surely it is thus. Our un∣derstanding is as it were all to be sprinkled with a new dew of perfection, as oft as any thing that is super-celestial or heavenly above, is intellectually contemplated of: be∣cause for that moment, it passeth over into that, and tasteth down that.

Then indeed, the Image of God shines all over within, and becomes glorious. Good [unspec 49] God, whitherto dost thou bring mortalls? But surely, such an intellectual thought, is not made with a distinction of words, or properties of speech: neither with the gird∣ing of the sences or reason: neither with a certain more swift conception of a whole Discourse, abundantly drawn in; nor with a dependance and sequel of things before thought of: nor being environed with circumstances, of here, now, white, great, bitter, like, pleasing, &c. But one is not in the understanding without the other: neither with-the other under an interchangeable course: neither also, even as it may be con∣ceived by Reason, or Imagination, or be thought by Imaginations or likenesses. But in that state, now, here, sense, reason, imagination, memory, and will, are at once melt∣ed into a meer understanding, and do stand obscured, under darkness, by the light of understanding. Then, then I say, a certain light falls upon the Soul. And that in my judgement, is all of whatsoever could ever be declared by word, thought, speech, and writing. But whether that light be altogether supernatural, or that the understanding be of its own nature thus kindled, or enflamed, I had rather experience than deter∣mine. That one thing at leastwise, I know, that it doth not happen without grace. Wherefore, whether the understanding be transformed, or whether it doth transform it self into the Image of the thing understood, surely it had need of help from God,

and that indeed a singular one, because then, at leastwise, the Soul beholds its own understanding, under a form taken on it, in the said light: and in that its glasse, it [unspec 50] beholds it self intellectually, without a reflexion of interchangeable course; and so it conceiveth a knowable thing, together with all its properties. For that, this light of knowledge, is not that which issues out of the understanding, but remaineth within, re∣flexed upon the understanding, which may be perfected in all truth, and perfect certainty.

Indeed, some Rabbins do fear this state of the Soul, as dangerous. The mystical School also feareth the danger of arrogancy, and spiritual adultery. But both, as they [unspec 51] do avoid or shun that which is hurtful. And the Adeptists think, if it should often in∣vade one, or long continue, undoubted death would be brought, together with a sickness, which the Rabbins call Binsica: which properly, is an unnourishment, or pi∣ning away of the Organ of the phantasie. Notwithstanding I pray, let them par∣don me, if I shall think otherwise. First of all, because the Instruments of the I∣magination do not labour in this act: but they sleep unmoved, as if they were not. Therefore likewise, they suffer nothing. Then, because that act, is not in our power: for I believe that that principal act, is of Clemency. Which Clemency, doth never give, make, cause, or admit of that which is inordinate. Therefore, although Cle∣mency should the more often, and longer abound, yet neither therefore, could it con∣tain, or argue an inordinacy. I beseech therefore, that the Father of Lights would vouch safe, to prevent, and follow me with his clearness, that he may bring me unto the calling which is pleasing to him, in his grace. The light therefore which falls from above, upon the Soul (when it is lesse tied and bound to the Organs of the Body, and the which is in it self not capable of suffering, and immortal) cannot also, hurt the life. For truly, after the receiving of a small quantity of the light, I finde a man scarce to suffer any thing by three dayes fasting. Wherefore it comes into my minde, that the friends might stand by Job, as Companions, for the full nine dayes, without meat or drink. Moreover, according to my opinion, that light, doth so dispose of the understanding, without the help, endeavour, and labour of the understanding, that it may come into its own freedom, which else, through the slavery of the body, is plainly moveable, dark, and confused. Otherwise, the understanding makes not use of Instruments, besides and without it self. And therefore, neither is it wearied, as is the Imagination: neither is it of it self, subject unto Diseases, changes, disturban∣ces, alterations, interchangeable courses, or co-mixtures.

For errour, juggling, a lie, or deceit, doth not fall on the understanding, while it stands in that light. For neither do, drowsiness, sleep, or defect, inhabit in it; neither [unspec 52] doth it receive aid from any created thing, as neither from the body, reason, or any imaginary power: but it carries its own native light, above all the circuite or ambush of Reason. Yea, which is more, the understanding is not then provoked, by any power more inferiour than it self, nor from the things themselves, even as they are known, subject to deceit, a juggle and lie: because they are those things which stand in the na∣kedness of their Being before the understanding, that they may be as it were informed by this, and in passing over, be quickned. All things therefore are in such a manner in their understanding, that all things of the Soul are their own intellect. Yet so, that although the understanding doth by an intellectual act, transform it self into the like∣ness, or kinde of the thing understood: yet it keeps its own property and essence, un∣intermixed: whereinto it again returns, as soon as it hath ceased from that act: in∣deed, the Soul possesseth this Prerogative from Clemency, that it may be the Image of God: and therefore a simple created unknown light.

So that, as oft as it conceiveth any forreign thing in it self, it ought of necessity, to desist from the Being of a most simple light, of the divine Image, or to transform it self [unspec 53] into the figure of the thing conceived. So indeed, as that the essence of the thing con∣ceived, is a naked essence, and yet essentially in the understanding, even as an Apple in the kernel of an Apple. Hence therefore, it comes to passe, that intellectual know∣ledge is void of all errour. Because Reason is absent, which doth every where, make us to stumble. For essences do stand naked, and uncloathed in an intellectual concepti∣on: the which, as such, the Soul, therein, doth now behold in the glass of its own under∣standing, as while the Eye doth behold it self in a glasse, in its own reflex beam.

Therefore it is reputed for truth, that it is no Eye, except so far as it is conceived in the intellect as such. Wherefore Aristotle was constrained to confess, that the [unspec 54] principles of understanding, are wholly the same. That is to say, that the truth of Es∣sence;

and the truth of an intellectual knowledge are one and the same. And therefore, as a Being, or to be, true, good, and one, are convertible: so essence, good∣ness and truth, ought to be co-melted with each other, into the form of a Being, in the oneness of understanding. For truly, in the understandingness of the understanding, there is not any interchangeable course of the intellect which understandeth, and of the thing understood: because that, before the act of understanding, every reciprocal or mutual relation, rebounding, and reflexion on each other, is first nullified. Seeing the very understandingness of a thing, is nothing but a coming to, and immediate [unspec 55] approach of the unity of the understanding, and of the thing understood: or a de∣stroying of interchangeable courses in a relation. The which, that it may be made more clear by an example; the understanding intellect, is no otherwise different from the thing understood, than as a beam of light which is direct, differs from it self, being reflexed. Therefore the essence of a thing understood, in the light of understanding, is made a spiritual and essential Splendor. Yea, by a co-passing unto a unity, it is af∣ter some sort made the light of the understanding it self. That which cannot happen to the Souls of bruit Beasts.

Therefore also, our Soul understanding it self, doth after a sort, understand all o∣ther things, because all other things, are in an intellectual manner in the Soul, as in [unspec 56] the Image of God. Wherefore indeed, the understanding of our selves, is most ex∣ceeding difficult, ultimate or remote, excellent, profitable, beyond other things. For a man knowing the divineness of his Soul, he cannot but preferre the same before any kinde of decaying and filthy pleasures, and those of no value.

But the difficulty of the aforesaid understandingness, doth chiefly consist in that, that it is the Image of God, which very Image also, as well in it self, as in respect of [unspec 57] the Type which it resembles, is almost impossible to the understanding. And then, the Soul not having in it any Image of it self, distinct from it self, it cannot at all understand it self by Idea's or resembling likenesses. But seeing it is simple and uni∣form, neither can it understand it self in an Image; neither also is it agreeable or con∣venient, that by reason of the highest and homogenial simplicity of the Soul, it should make use of divers manners and meanes of understandings in understanding, in respect of it self; and again, of other manners and meanes, in respect of other things under∣stood. Hence of necessity, the soul, for the preserving of its own homogeneal simplicity, due to the Image of God, hath whereby to understand all other things, without a shape distinct from the things themselves. But seeing the Soul wants a proper shape of its own divine Image, that it may transform it self intellectually into it self: Therefore it cannot properly understand it self after an intellectual manner, but in the light, and faithful witnesse of him, whose Image it is. For the knowledge which we have of God, is of Tradition, Faith, and so of merit. Although it be plainly nega∣tive, as it is not this or that, which may be conceived by the sense, or minde. And therefore, the knowledge of the Soul, as of the divine Image, hath a negative ab∣straction, or withdrawing of other things adjoyned to it, which it calls, non ens, or, a non-Being; but of a non-Being, no conception, no figure, and no understanding, doth answer. That is of a negative abstraction, seeing its companion is privation; but ne∣gative and primitive things are destitute of an Idea, or equivalent shape: therefore the light of knowledge which the Soul hath of it self, is of clemency, freely given, nor ever at the full in this world or life. But if a happy Soul shall sometimes conceive of God in it self, by the beatifical Vision, then by the same beam of light, he shall be∣hold and know God himself, and all other things inwardly. For therefore, by how much the Soul doth understand intellectually, of it self; by so much it profiteth in the most profitable knowledge which can be had of created things in this life. Be∣cause that in the light of its own light, it doth after a sort, behold the properties, es∣sences, effects, interchangeable courses, distinctions and defects of all things: whither therefore, that knowledge hath once brought, there, all the more clowdy speculation and aid of Reason languisheth; even as on the other hand, a true under∣standing is suppressed in us, under the precepts of Reason.

Wherefore, seeing the proper object of understanding, is the essence of things it [unspec 58] self, for that cause, accidents being as it were abstracted, and rent asunder from the things in which they are, ought to be conceived by the imagination, and that by shapes and likenesses: but in no wise, by the understanding. Wherein, after another man∣ner, I finde all accidents co-knit together in a point, under the essence of the things understood. Because accidents properly are not Beings: but of the Beings on whom

they depend; therefore accidents have not an essence, which doth co-pass unto the unity of the understanding, or into which essence, the understanding may transport it self. But the Schooles do divide the Intellect into the Agent and Patient. For they will have that to be conversant about the invention of meanes, and premises [unspec 59] of a demonstration; to wit, that the sealing marks of the termes, may imprint an understanding on the Patient, as it were, on wax subjected to it. Therefore they call the Agent masculine, noble, and formall. But they liken the Patient to the Wo∣man, and ignoble matter. And these their Dreams they perswade to young begin∣ners; as Nature doth every where operate toward the perfection of it self: but ope∣ration or action is alwayes more noble than passion or suffering: But I do every where pity so great dryness. First, because demonstration is not an effect or of-spring of the understanding, neither doth it any way supply meanes for Sciences or know∣ledges. I have seen an Aethiopian swiftly to roule a Reed about, in the hole of a Plank, with a Towel placed between: and not long after, the Reed with the Towel took fire. And then, I have hidden a Reed in a bright burning Fornace, and the infla∣med Reed, hath more speedily, cleerly, and perfectly shined. When as, nevertheless, the Reed did act nothing: but onely suffered an inflaming. So that, although the acting principle, may now and then be more noble than the suffering one, while the effect tends to perfection: or while the Patient ought to be perfected by the Agent: Yet while a pretious Pearl doth putrifie under the Dunghill, I may not believe the Agent to be more perfect than the Patient. I have sufficiently shewed elsewhere, that in whole nature, the Doctrine of Aristotle is vain, and meer trifles: how much lesse therefore could he subsist in the Court of understanding? whose Being and ope∣rating do depend onely on the Soul? For we Christians, are constrained to believe, that our intellect or understanding, is an immortal Spirit, Light, and Image of the Almighty, whose beginning, as it exceedes Nature, so it cannot be fitted, or squared to its Rules: Seeing it hath a most simple Being, never to be divided into the strifes of Agent and Patient, or into heterogeneals, or divers kindes. Seeing also that it de∣pendeth immediately, totally, and continually on its original Type: and so that with∣out particular or special grace, it cannot understand any thing: because the object of understanding is truth it self. Wherefore neither doth it understand with a perfect un∣derstanding, but by receiving. But that which receives onely, that suffers, but doth not act therein: for neither is that proper to the understanding, which comes to it by grace. The will also, while it suffers, is more noble, than while it wills: to wit, while it is ruled by the will of the Superiour Powers. The Imagination indeed, knowes by acting, and therefore it is wearied, and this Aristotle knew: but not the understand∣ing. Because it is that which suffers (in understanding) by way of enlightning onely. For it is a more troublesome, servile, and obscure thing, to operate in understanding, than to suffer: because, by suffering, it receives a more noble light, freely conferred on it.

Lastly, seeing that in understanding, it alwayes passeth over into the form of [unspec 60] the thing understood: therefore that which partakes of an unlimited light, is per∣fected without weariness and labour of understanding, and the light understood, shi∣neth, in understanding, in the light of the Intellect it self. So as the things themselves, seem to talk with us without words, and the understanding pierceth them being shut up, no otherwise than as if they were dissected and laid open.

Therefore the understanding is alway perfected, by suffering and receiving. But [unspec 61] the imaginative knowledge or animal understanding, which was known to Aristotle, beholdeth things onely on the outside, and frameth to it self Images or likenesses thereof, according to its own thinking; and with all wearisomness of labours, runs about them into a circle.

It sees indeed, the Rhines, and husks, but never reacheth at the kernel: because the [unspec 62] Imagination doth not enter things; as neither on the other hand, do things enter and satisfie the imaginative part. For at most, the imaginative part, satisfies it self by likenesses, if it hath long admired the outward Signate: the inward sealer whereof, notwithstanding, it least of all embraceth.

For how unjustly doth it square, that the Schooles should acknowledge the Soul [unspec 63] to be the immediate Image of God, and to divide the understanding, into two sup∣posed things, which differ in Offices and effects? For truly, a two foldedness it self in the understanding, disagreeth with the simplicity of him, whose Image it hideth in it self, throughout its whole Being. I believe in the first place, that nothing doth

pertain to the knowledge of truth, but faith and understanding. Secondly, That all truth doth issue from one onely and primitive truth. Thirdly, That all under∣standing deriveth it self, from one onely, and infinite understanding. Fourthly, Even as all Light from one onely Light. Fifthly, Therefore that the Essence of truth doth nothing differ from the Essence of the understanding. Sixthly, That our un∣derstanding is vain, empty, poor, and dark. Seventhly, That all its clearness, noble∣ness, fulness, light and truth, do come to it, by receiving and suffering. Eightly, That it is so much the more ennobled, by how much the more it suffers by the light, which is beyond all nature.

Finally, the Schooles of the Heathens have failed of the knowledge of a true un∣derstanding. And therefore, man is not a rational living Creature. But the predica∣ment [unspec 64] of a substance, is to be divided into a Spirit and a Body. A Spirit is abstract, or withdrawn, or concrete, or joyned with a Body. Man alone is a concrete Spirit, but not to be placed among Bodies. If his denomination be to be drawn from the more especial part: and essential determination, from the more famous thing sig∣nified. Therefore man was to be denominated and defined from a Spirit, and an intellectual Light.