The politicks of France by Monsieur P.H. ... ; with Reflections on the 4th and 5th chapters, wherein he censures the Roman clergy and the Hugonots, by the Sr. l'Ormegreny.

THE POLITICKS OF France.

CHAP. I.

1. What the Politicks are. 2. What their Object, End, and Means. 3. The diffe∣rent sorts of Governments. 4. That Monarchy is the best.

THE Politicks are the Art of Go∣verning States. The Ancients have call'd 'em a Royal and a most Di∣vine Science, surpassing in excellency, and su∣perior to all others. They have allow'd them the same precedence in practical

Learning, which the Metaphysicks and The∣ologie, have among the Speculative.

The means which the Politicks prescribe, are comprised under the heads of an exact Observance of Religion, a doing Justice in all cases; a providing that the People be protected in the times of Peace and War; and a preserving the State in a just and lau∣dable mediocrity, by exterminating the ex∣tremes of Poverty and of Riches.

The Politicks have three principal bran∣ches: Namely, the three sorts of regular Governments, in which Men live under the Authority of Laws.

The First is Monarchy, in which one on∣ly Prince doth command for the Publick good.

The Second is Aristocracy; in which the honestest and wisest Persons, being elected out of all the Subjects, have the Direction and Administration of Publick Affairs.

The Third is Democracy, in which all Deliberations and Orders are held, and do pass by the Agency and Vote of the People.

The principal end to which a Democracy tendeth, is Liberty. That of an Aristocra∣cy, is Riches and Virtue. The end of a Mo∣narchy, is, the Glory, the Virtue, the Riches, and the Liberty of the Country.

A Tyranny, the most dangerous of all vicious and unlawful Governments, stands in direct opposition unto Monarchy.

A Tyrant commandeth meerly for his own Personal, not the Publick Profit: A King does the contrary.

Tyranny is destructive to the Glory, the Virtue, the Riches, and the Liberty of the People.

An Aristocracy often falls into an Oligar∣chy; and this happens when a determinate number of persons is no longer chosen out of the whole to Govern, and the choice is made of the Rich and Noble only; not ge∣nerally out of all the Citizens.

Sometimes there riseth up Oligarchy, even within Oligarchy; and this comes to pass, when the Magistrates are chosen of the Noblest and Richest of some preferred Fa∣milies, not of all the rich Gentry.

An Aristocracy is in some sort an Oligar∣chy, but much better than that which is sim∣ply such: Forasmuch as in an Aristocracy, Ju∣stice is administred to persons of all ranks, according to desert; which in an Oligar∣chique State is not done.

A well-temper'd Aristocracy is of long duration, and seldom comes into the dan∣ger of suffering any Change.

An Oligarchy, on the contrary, such as was the Government of the Decem-viri, or Ten, at Rome, and of the Thirty at Athens, is easily corrupted. For the persons who are in command, do frequently usurp a So∣veraign Authority. Such Usurpation is not stiled a Tyranny; (for this is of one alone) but strictly a Dynastie; that is, a Potentacy or Power, violently assumed and retained, contrary to the disposition of the Laws. The Greeks (whose the word Dynastie is,)

do take it in this case, in an ill sense.

An Aristocracy and an Oligarchy are dis∣solved, when some one among the Rich, the Noble, or the Brave, does attain to an over∣grown height. Thus Caesar became Master of Rome. The Aristocracy is also in danger, when they that Govern, come into con∣tempt with the multitude, or are hated by them, so that the inferiors grow facti∣ous, and mutiny against them, as hapned at Rome, when the Tribunes of the People were first created.

The apprehensions which the more than ordinary virtue of some excellent persons, gave the People of Greece, caused the intro∣ducing of Ostracisme among the Athenians, and of Petalisme at Syracuse: Punishments, but glorious for such as were condemn'd to them.

A Democracy likewise, sometimes, turns into an Oligarchy. And that is, when the dregs of the ignorant people, seduced by evil Orators, (whom the Greeks call Dema∣gogues, or, Leaders of the People) do dis∣pose of Affairs tumultuously, with uproar and violence, without respect to Law or Equity. Thus the Athenians seduced by their speakers, did put to death Aristogenes, and other Captains who had fought in com∣pany with Thrasibulus, and gain'd a nota∣ble Victory upon the Lacedomonians, their enemies.

Obligarchies are the means sometimes that People lose their liberty: and fall into ser∣vitude. Pisistratius became Tyrant of Athens

that way, and Dionysius of the Syracusians.

There are as various Monarchies, Aristo∣cracies, and Democracies, as there are dif∣ferent manners of men. But I have discours'd all this only cursorily; and I design not any further to engage my self in these matters, my purpose being to speak precisely of the concerns of the French Monarchy.

There are two sorts of Monarchy, unto which all Regal Governments, of whatever quality imaginable, are reduced; whether Elective, Hereditary, Barbarous, Despoti∣cal, or any other.

The first of these is entituled, The Lace∣demonian; in which the King hath but a limi∣ted Authority. The second Aeconomical; in which the King hath a Sovereign and Absolute power in his Kingdom, as the Father of a Family hath in his house.

'Tis no longer a question, Whether Mo∣narchy be the best Government, the case having been often debated by Politicians, and still decided for Regality. And indeed it is of greatest Antiquity, least susceptible of change; most conform unto the Govern∣ment of GOD himself; and not only repre∣sents the Authority which a Father exercis∣eth in his house, but it also necessarily oc∣curs in an Aristocracy, and in Democracy it self. For, both in the one and the other of these States, the Sovereignty is entirely one; so that no single person can possess any the least parcel of it. In an Aristocracy, no one of the Senators is a Sovereign; but the

whole Senate being united of one accord, is King. In a Democracy, no one of himself hath power to make the least Ordinance; the People assembled are the Monarch. Thus every where appears an indivisible Sovereign∣ty; so conform to the Laws of Nature is Monarchy.

In fine, it may be said, that there never was Aristocracy, but founded upon the cor∣ruptions and ruins of some Monarchy: moreover, that Tyranny, it's direct con∣trary, is the worst of all Governments. Now from all that I have said, it follows by a necessary consequence, That the Monar∣chique State is better than any other.

CHAP. II.

1. Of the true good and happiness of States. 2. Of the true good and happiness of a King. 3. How Feli∣city may be acquired.

THings reckon'd under the notion of Good, are of three sorts. Corporal, as Health, Beauty, Strength, Agility, and the like. External, which we commonly call Goods of Fortune; as Birth, Riches, Dignities, Reputation, Friends, and such others. The third sort are those of the Soul: these are simply and absolutely good,

that is, good of themselves; and so they can be no other but virtue alone.

Things accounted good are no further such indeed, than as they promote our Fe∣licity, and bring us to it; Corporal and External things are not instruments to effect this. But the good of the Soul is the true happiness.

Felicity is not a simple habit; otherwise a man asleep would be happy: but it consisteth in action, which is the true use of Virtue.

The Soul makes us capable of living hap∣pily: for happiness is measured by virtue▪ nor can we be counted happy, but pro∣portionably as we are counted good.

The intention of Political Science is, to bring to pass, that men lead their lives hap∣pily; as I have observ'd in the precedent Chapter. 'Tis therefore certain, that it re∣quires they be actually virtuous.

All that I have been discoursing is of con∣stant and confesseth truth. Whence clearly results, That the Politicks consider virtue in a much more noble manner than Ethicks do; for these, confining themselves to the forming of idle speculations, can produce but an imperfect felicity, which the Schools do call Theoretical. The Politicks on the contrary go further, and causing us to exer∣cise virtue, do give us a Practical, that is, solid and perfect Felicity.

In fine, it is not doubted, but the Act is preferrable to the habit. Besides, the Ethi∣cal or Moral discourses of virtue, can have

no other aim, but at most, the welfare of particular persons; which does not always produce that of the Publick: And the Po∣liticks, regarding the welfare of an whole State, provide at once for that of each particular; as a good Pilot, in endeavour∣ing the safety of his Ship, procures necessa∣rily, the safety of all that are embarqued in it. Also, the care of the welfare of parti∣cular persons, seems to be beneath the Poli∣ticks, except so far as it is necessary for the publick good. Yet sometimes particular Men must of force suffer for the Publick Good; as when a Malefactor is punished, and when some Houses are pull'd down to save a Town from Fire, and from Enemies.

The happiness of a State is of the same quality with that of particular persons. For as we say, a Man is happy when he hath Strength, Riches, and Virtue; in like man∣ner we say a Common-wealth is happy when it is potent, rich, and justly governed.

A Monarch is, in reference to His State, what the Soul is to Man. There is no doubt therefore, but that the proper Goods of a King are those of the Soul: and that he can possess no other. Fortune being beneath a true Soveraign, and extrinsick to Him, can∣not give him ought of that kind from Gold or Glory: All that He hath doth arise from His own Virtue, His Power, His Treasures, and the various effects of Beneficence which he holdeth in His Hand, do not constitute His Happiness: as GOD Himself is not

Blessed by external Blessings, but only con∣fers them as a distribution made to His Crea∣tures, and that He may cause them by sensi∣ble means to experiment His Goodness.

The Magnificence of a Man renders him considerable, if his Spirit in it be Great and Heroick.

But it is not enough to have spoken of that which constitutes Felicity, we must take some account of the means which conduce un∣to it.

Nature, Constancy and Reason, do con∣tribute to endue us with Virtue. The two former do enrich the Mind, and dispose it to receive Virtue; then Reason being cleared by the light of Precepts, makes it spring up, and cultivates it.

Of all Precepts, those of greatest effica∣cy are the Political, which being indeed Laws, do command and oblige Men to obey, in a manner, blindly: necessitating and con∣straining us to live well, whether we will or no. 'Tis upon this ground it hath been said, That there lies no servitude at all in submitting to the power of the Law; and that it's the proper act of Men truly free, to reduce their inclinations, and subject their practice to the same: Forasmuch as the conforming of Life and Manners to the impulses of Virtue, which is always right, always uncorrupt, is in truth a setting our our selves at full liberty, and an enfran∣chisement from the Empire of importunate and irregular Passions.

But of these general Theses enough. It is time at length to enter upon the subject which occasion'd my taking up the design of this present Treatise.

CHAP. III.

1. Of the French Monarchy. 2. Of the Situation and Quality of France. 3. Of the Nature of the French.

THE Monarchick Government doth not more excell other Governments, than the French Monarchy doth all other Monarchies on Earth. It is hereditary, and for Twelve whole Ages there hath been seen Reigning from Male to Male, upon the Throne of France, the August Posterity of Meroue of Charlemagne, and of Hugh Capet. For it is exactly proved, that these three Races of our Kings, are Branches issued out of the same Stock. This very Succession, so Legi∣timate as it hath been, and so long conti∣nued, makes at present the surest founda∣tion of the welfare of the State; and carries in it Splendor, Reputation and Majesty. In∣deed to how many Ills are Elective King∣doms exposed? How many Cabals? How many Complottings; and in truth, Wars, are kept on foot by so many different agita∣tions? The one and the other Roman Em∣pire, and the Kingdom of the Poles, do ad∣minister

sensible proofs of this Opinion.

If the Spartans heretofore did draw so great an advantage from the Honour they had to be commanded by Princes of the Blood of Hercules: The French have far greater cause to glory; since in the Cata∣logue of His Majesties triumphant Ancestors, there may be counted an hundred Heroes greater than Hercules himself.

Is there a Monarch in the World, whose just power is more absolute, than that of our King? and by consequent, is there a Mo∣narchy comparable to the French Monarchy? It is necessary that the power of a good King be not confin'd within other bounds than Reason and Equity do prescribe: other∣wise there will ever be division between Princes and People, to the ruin of them both. What a disorder would it be in Man, if the Eye or Hand should fail of following the impulses of the Soul? this disobeying and rebellious Member would prove dead, or seized with a Palsie. If then the whole Body should fall into an universal revolt against the Spirit of Man, all the Symme∣try, the Order and oeconomy would be ut∣terly defaced. Thus the Subjects in a Mo∣narchy, once ceasing to yield their King a full Obedience, and the King ceasing to exercise His Soveraign Authority over them, the Political Ligatures are broken, the Go∣vernment is dissolved, by little and little all is reduced to extream calamities, and oft∣times to Anarchy, and an annihilation.

Such are the inconveniencies that occur in Royalties of the Lacedemonian kind, where the Prince hath but a limited Authority; and if all that England suffer'd in the late times were pourtray'd here, it would be easie to observe of what importance it is unto the felicity of a Monarchy, that the Prince do in it command without restriction. In fine, the obedience of instrumental parts, as those of Organical Bodies, and the Sub∣jects of a State, is of so indispensible a ne∣cessity, that the common good and conser∣vation of that Whole, which they compose, depends upon it. In Democracies, even the most tumultuous and disorderly, all must bow under the Will of the multitude, though blind, ignorant and seduced: in like man∣ner, the parts of the Bodies of Brutes must act by their motions, though they be in rage and madness. And the reason of this necessity is, that the Body and the Soul, which is the form thereof, are but one indi∣visible Whole; so a King and Subjects are together but one whole, that is, one State.

In fine, the French Monarchy is accom∣panied with all the mixture that can be de∣sired for a compleat and perfect Govern∣ment. The Counsellors of State do com∣pose an excellent Oligarchy in it; The Par∣liaments, and other Officers of Judicature do form an Aristocracy; The Provosts of Merchants, the Mayors, the Consuls, and the General Estates do represent rarely well

limited Democracy; so that all the different modes of governing by Laws, being united in the Monarchy, do render it as excellent and consummate, as Reason can propose. The Regality of France is therefore of the Oeconomick kind; in which the King hath an absolute power in his State, as the Father of a Family in his House; and though he govern at His pleasure, and without con∣tradiction, it is always for the good of His Kingdom: even as the Master of an House does Rule it with an entire Authority, and incessantly provides for the accommodating of this Family. There is nothing Despo∣tical nor Barbarous in France, as in the States of the Moscovites and Turks. In short, our Laws are Holy and Equitable, to a greater degree than in any Common-wealth that ever was; and they are conceived with so much prudence and judgement, that they are apt to make the People happy in the gentle times of Peace, and enable them to triumph in the occasions of War.

The Situation and Compactness of France are known to all the World; so that it would be a needless labour, should I here expatiate, to shew the Beauty and Richness of our Grounds and of our Rivers: or de∣clare how we abound in Wine, in Corn, in Silk, in Wools, in Cloth, in Wood, in Cattle, in Salt, in Mines, and in Money; how necessary we are to our neighbours; and to what degree we may forego their Succors and their Merchandise. I might

justly be accus'd of a fondness for superflu∣ous Discourse, if I should particularly consi∣der all these great advantages; and as much, if I should speak of the pureness of the Air, and the incredible number of Inhabitants: the most ignorant having a full and an assu∣red knowledge of 'em. I shall only say, that it need not be wondred at, if Men whom Fortune brings forth, and breeds up in so excellent a Climate, be capable of hand∣somly contriving, and successfully executing the haughtiest Enterprizes. In fine, its an unspeakable satisfaction to a Man that sets himself to Treat of the Politicks of France, that he may know the French, of all the Peo∣ple upon Earth, are the most susceptible of Learning, of Policy, and of Government. For if one consider the Situation of the Country, he may be assured, that the Con∣stellations of Heaven are eminently favour∣able to it. The Experience and Skill of the Ancients do inform us, that the Situation of Regions is the prime cause of the tem∣perature of the Men in 'em; as it is of the quality of the Plants and Fruits which they produce.

The Laws of this State being so Judici∣ous as they are, do argue the Wisdom of those that enacted them; and of the People that accepted them; whereof the long du∣ration of the Monarchy is a second proof.

On the other hand, the great Acts of the French do speak their Valour. They serve in our Age, for examples to all Nations in

matter of execution; and not only so, but are as eminent likewise for their Counsels: And they have choice of the best Generals on Earth to lead Armies, as well as of the best Soldiers. That heat and impetuosity which is taken to be visible in all their at∣tempts, is an effect of their high Courage; and the confidence they shew, with some∣what less of restraint and respect than pru∣dence could wish, can be imputed to nothing but their fearlesness: In fine, the Emperor Charles the Fifth, declared with very much judgment, That the French seem'd to be Fools, but were really wise.

Now, since we know what France is, let us examine what may most conduce to the well-governing of it, to the conserving it in Plenty, and in Reputation; in what it may be augmented, and how its interests with the neighboring States ought to be secured. In a word, let us see what way may be taken to maintain the parts that compose it, in so regular an harmony, that they may all incessantly contribute to the weal of the Monarchy.

CHAP. IV.

1. Of the Clergy. 2. Ʋseful means to obstruct Frauds in Beneficiary cases. 3. Of the Monastick Religious of each Seu.

OUr Ancestors have ever been great ob∣servers of Religion. Long before the coming of JESUS CHRIST, the Druids were their Priests, and had an entire dire∣ction, not only of affairs relating to the service of their false Gods, but of those too which concern'd distributive Justice; even in the general Assemblies held by all the Gauls, whether for confirmation of Peace, or for reconciliation of disagreeing parties, who might embroil the Republiques, or whether the making of some common Na∣tional enterprises was in question, still there was no resolution formed, but by their ad∣vice. No wonder then, if since the Truth of the Gospel appeared, and made known the holiness of Christianity, the Prelates have conserv'd so many Prerogatives and Conside∣rations. They have been called to the Royal Counsels; they have assisted at the decision of the most important affairs, they have eve∣ry where hold the first rank; much hath been attributed to their Judgments, and the respect had for their Character and

Dignity, hath gotten them great and signal priviledges, which have exempted them from contributing to the burthens of the State; though at the same time wealth was heap'd upon them by Alms and Foundations. But as Church-men, after the mode of the Court of Rome, use to convert whatever is freely granted them into a point of Religion; in such manner, that by little and little, they engage the tender Consciences of the faithful in vain scruples, and possesses them with a superstitious fear of offending; they have not been wanting to assert and maintain, that these exemptions and privileges were not li∣berally given them; that Kings did but set∣tle them in possession of an advantage which was by Divine Right inseperable from their Profession: that they, while Men of War fought for the Glory and Liberty of their Country, sufficiently did their part, in lift∣ing up, as as was anciently done, their eyes and hands to GOD, to impetrate His powerful Protection: that their Arms were Prayers, Oblations, and Penitence, which they never forbore to use for the publick safety; that from the Caves and Deserts whither they retired, they sent up Meterials to the highest Heavens, which formed into Thunder there, might fall back upon, and beat down the enemies of the French name. In fine, That if Gentlemen gave their blood, and the People their sweat and labours for the welfare of the Kingdom, they Day and Night did pour out Tears at the feet of Altars

to disarm the wrath of GOD. Upon such reasonings as these the Ecclesiasticks have founded their pretences for possessing those goods, of which, publick and private Piety had made them Proprietors, without con∣cerning themselves for what success the ge∣neral affairs of the State might have.

But this is not all, they have tried by di∣vers reiterated attempts, to make themselves Masters of all the Temporal Jurisdiction, and draw Civil causes unto their Tribunal: nor have they forgotten any pretext which they thought might promote this dangerous enterprise; sometimes they have pleaded, That the Church alone having right to judge of the Validity of Marriages, as being▪ a Sacrament, all that depended on 'em ought to be handled before Ecclesiastick Judges. Sometimes again, That Christians binding themselves in their Contracts by an Oath, the cognisance appertain'd to them. Such Kings as perceived that these attempts did tend to the overthrow of their Authority, withstood them with a right Kingly vigour. But what difficulties were there not of ne∣cessity to be overcome for a full attainment of their end? and what resistance did not the Church-men make to maintain them∣selves in so unreasonable an Usurpation? Our History affords us examples of it, which I cannot call to mind without grief and wonder. Their obstinacy hath gone so very far, that they have forced our Kings to grant them Declarations upon unequitable and

disadvantageous conditions; and so capitu∣late with them both for the Tenths and Acknowledgments of the Lands which they possess; as also for the Rights of Mortmain and Indemnity. I cannot tell by what name I should call these proceedings. Our Sirs of the Clergy could not doubt, but that being born Subjects of the Crown, no∣thing could release them of this duty; and that the privileges which they have, or rather which they have invaded, being founded upon the holiness of their Chara∣cter, could not extend to these Temporal Goods, which always are the States. Yet the old error is so potent, and their ima∣gination so strongly prepossess'd for these Immunities, that they can scarce acknow∣ledge the Kings Sovereignty to this day. What clamour did they not raise about the Arrest of the last Commission of Oyer in Auvergne? with what fervour did they charge their Deputies to remonstrate to His Majesty concerning it? Yet this Arrest in∣novateth nothing; but is, in all respects, conform to the prescript, and pursuant to the use of Charles the VIII. his Pragma∣tique Sanction, Kings and Emperors, ne∣ver practis'd otherwise in such cases. Nor can it be deny'd, but that Religion coming, among others, under a Political considera∣tion; and Kings being Protectors of the Church, of its Doctrine, and of its Ca∣nons, it's a part of their Office to notifie to men the Laws of GOD. The Tables were

consigned to the hands of Moses, not to the hands of Aaron; and in the Temple of GOD, the Law of GOD was often heard by the People, from the Mouth of their Kings. 'Tis upon this account that Mel∣chisedec was both King and Priest; and 'tis from this intention that the Emperors con∣firmed the first Synods, that They some∣times gave judgments contrary to Sydonical decisions; and that other Christian Princes have had liberty to receive, or not receive Councils, though Legitimate and Universal. Nothing is more consentaneous to perfect equity, than that the Gentlemen of the Clergy be obliged to contribute to the pub∣lick charges: They receive vast sums from the State; and what they pay to the King out of 'em, amouts not to a sixth part of what they duly ought to pay.

But to reduce them gently to reason, ap∣proaches must be made by degrees; and in ways that may be to them unperceivable. First, they may be calmly told of the right of Mortmain, which being part of the an∣cient inheritance of the Crown cannot be alienated. They may ever and anon be put in mind, that Residence is of Divine Right; that it is unbecoming a Prelate, or an Ecclesiastick, to keep a great Table, to have a multitude of Pages, Horses, Dogs; intimation may be made them, that the King intends to restore the ancient Law of Fiefs; by which all sorts of persons con∣cerned, are obliged to set forth, at any time,

a certain number of Soldiers, equipped and paid at their charge. In fine, they may be required to make a new valuation of ordi∣nary Rents. For what pretext will they have to complain, or be discontented? Can they find any fault at all in it if His Majesty doth put things in their Primitive State; which is the foundation of all publick Or∣der and Discipline? Other insinuative means may be set on work, which shall make no shew at first, yet may prove in the sequel, of incredible advantage to the King's Affairs.

While I speak here of the Clergy, I pre∣tend not to speak of any but Bishops, Ca∣nons, Parish-Priests, and Chappellans. I know well, that taking the word Clerus in its ancient latitude, it may be said to com∣prehend all Christians: but I extend it not so much as to Monasticks, who in truth were, at their rise, so far from having par∣ticular and conventual Churches, as now they have, that they were reckoned Laicks, that is, of the People, and had their places separate from the Priests.

Whatever care Kings hitherto could possi∣bly take to hinder frauds in Beneficiary mat∣ters, they have not been able to find means effectual for it: Their prudence hath been still surmounted by the pravity of men, which never wanteh artifice and expedients in occasions that concern their profit. How∣ever, these frauds are of such a quality, and so important, in reference to the salvation

of all Christians, that the charitable sagaci∣ty of the Laws ought to be indefatigably ex∣ercised about them: neither Pains nor Au∣thority should be spared, in a design whose accomplishment is so necessary. And indeed, what mischief doth not follow; for example, when a wicked man, by intrusion, gets posses∣sion of some Benefice with Cure of Souls, all his Sacerdotal Functions are so many Sacri∣ledges; (for he is a suspended person, ipso facto) all the Absolutions he gives are null; the Fruits of the Benefice cannot be his, because he is not the lawful Guardian of it; and so his appropriating them to his use, is a con∣tinued Larceny; for which he is indispensi∣bly bound to make restitution. But be it a Bishop that commits this act of intrusion; and all the Consecrations of Priests which he shall solemnize are null, whence will re∣sult a nullity of all the Absolutions those pretended Priests shall give. What a con∣catenation of Crimes? what a dreadful series of Evils, Simonies, Confidences, and other bad means which are used to finger Benefices, do tend to the same Consequences. Sure, the cure of this Malady, Mortal to so many thousands of Souls, is an atchievement wor∣thy of a King.

I am of Opinion then, that to cut up the root of all these disorders, the King might create a Secretary in his Council of Con∣science; and when this Officer is in possessi∣on of his charge, a Declaration of His Ma∣jesties should come forth; by which, to ob∣viate

the great abuses that have crept int-Beneficiary matters, it should be ordained that all the Benefices in the Kingdom be Re¦gistred by the said Secretary of that Council, and no dispatch there made until the Deeds, upon which a Benefice is claimed, have been seen and signed, and placed in the Register by the same Secretary, upon pain of the nul∣lity of all that may have been petition'd for, and granted; Cognizance of all causes arising in consequence of this Declaration, must be given to the Grand Council, and this ad∣dition of Jurisdiction would facilitate the verification of it.

This Declaration would produce several advantages. One is, that there could be no more fraud used, in order to demissions, or to resignations; and the Bankers of the Court of Rome would no longer have means to promote the cheats of pretenders to Be∣nefices. Another is, that the King would exactly know all that the Church does pos∣sess in France; which is a matter of extreme necessity, both for the regulating of the Tenths, and also for other considerations. A third advantage would be, that in process of time this Secretary of Conscience might make a Bank in the Roman Court, which is, to the King, of unspeakable consequence: for by this means, all the Money that goes into Italy out of France would be known; and upon such knowledge it would be more easie for him to take his measures with the Pope and Colledge of Cardinals. A fourth

advantage is, that the King, by degrees, might become Master of all the Benefices of the Kingdom, in the same manner as the Pope is Master of the Bishopricks and Abbies; which would augment the Royal Authority. That I may explain my self, I will resume the thing from its original. In the first Age of Christianity, the first Bishopricks were conferred without any Bulls from the Pope at all. Afterward He bethought Him, to send or write unto the Chapters, who then chose the Bishops, and recommended to them, to respect the merit of such or such a one, when they should proceed to the Ele∣ction. I think that Alexander the III. was the first Inventer of these kind of Letters; and they were called Bulls, because they were seal'd up with the Pope's Seal, (Bulla being Latin for a Seal.) At the beginning, these Letters which the Popes thus sent, were but simple Letters of fa∣vour and recommendation: but it hap∣ning that the Chapters reverenced them, and that here and there, at least, one, who had obtained them, was chosen; all pre∣tenders to Bishopricks came to believe, that it was necessary to obtain them. Thus, what was at first but, as hath been said, a recom∣mendation, became at length a point of right and duty. Such was its Rise. Now this being certain, there may be use made of the example: and thus, when a conside∣rable Benefice should be vacant, the King might order, that a Letter be written to the

Patron, and some Person recommended to his Nomination. There is no cause to doubt, but the Patron will Nominate whom His Majesty hath thus recommended; so that insensibly it will grow a Custom, to take the King's recommendations, as other∣while persons did those of the Popes; and as the Bulls became at length necessary for Bishopricks and Abbies, so the King's Let∣ters shall become necessary for all sorts of Benefices, and He render Himself Master of all Church-men. The King, in this, will have sufficient reason, because He being Pro∣tector of Religion, which is the prime Pil∣lar of every State, it is His interest to know whether they that shall be provided of Be∣nefices, be Orthodox, and of good Life; lest they spread some bad Doctrine among the people; for Heresies and Scandals do cause division in the Common-wealth, as well as Schisms in the Church. Besides, it concerns the tranquillity of the State, that Curates, who have the direction of Consci∣ences, be well-inclin'd for the good of the Kingdom, and ready to keep particulr Per∣sons in their duty.

To descend now unto the case of the Mo∣nastick Religious, and find out a way (for rendring them useful to the State) to take them off from that laziness and loathsome beggery in which they live, as also reduce them to such a number as may be propor∣tionate to other ranks of men in the King∣dom. It is to be noted, that there are three

sorts of Monasticks. The first is made up of the Orders of S. Augustin, S. Benedict, S. Bernard, and Premonstrey. These are they that possess the bulkie riches of the Church; I mean the Abbies and Priories. The se∣cond sort comprehends the Carthusians, the Minimes, the Coelestins, the Feuillans, and some others, who possess Goods with pro∣priety, and beg not but by Toleration. The third kind, is that of the meer Mendicants, who subsist by Alms, as do the Jacobins, the Cordeliers, the Carmelites, and their branches, that is, the Reform'd, as they term 'em, who are issued from them. These, notwith∣standing their Vow of Monastick Poverty, yet are not destitute of some foundations: but they plead for themselves, that the Pope is Proprietor of the Goods, they do but take the Profits; which certainly is a vain and frivolous subtilty. The Female Religious being comprised under these three kinds, there is no need to make of them a separate Article.

There are too to many Monks. Its an abuse so prejudicial to the Kingdom, that the King can no longer dissemble it: it is time to take it seriously and effectually in hand. For Monks live in single state, they raise no Families, get no Children, and so are barren grounds that bring forth no fruit to the Crown. Beside, the blind obedience by which they are tyed to the pleasure of the Pope, doth form a foreign Monarchy in the very bowels of France; and into it

they train along the credulous people, which is a thing of very great consequence. This Politie is founded on the abusive and perni∣cious Maxims of Rome; which too are purely Political. For, that the obedience which Monasticks give the Pope, is Religi∣ous, there is no colour to pretend: nor is there a Christian but sees what his duty binds him to in this case; and is altogether subject to his Holiness in Doctrinals, with∣out need of making particular vows to ob∣lige him. The name of Religion in the matter, is but a phantasm, and a false pretext which the Court of Rome assumeth, to aug∣ment its Temporal Power, and to have its creatures in all quarters. By consequence the abuses ought to be retrenched, as was done by Charlemagne in his time, and sun∣dry other great Kings.

But for the effecting of this I should not at all advise, that the attempt be openly made. For that would be to draw upon the under∣takers, the importune clamours of all the Monks, and their Zealots; nay, to draw Rome upon their backs, which might cost them some trouble. In fine, it would be to draw on them the People; who are ever fond of Novelties that surprise them, or are prejudicial to them, and always averse to those which they have foreseen, and are pro∣fitable for them. 'Tis therefore by-ways that must be taken. The first which seems to me fit to be pitcht upon, would be, to require of the Monastick Communities, that

they dispatch Missions unto America, and the Indies, to convert the Salvages, and ad∣minister the Holy Sacraments to Christians. The Monks, who are commonly impru∣dent, will strain to set forth the greatest number of their fraternity they possibly may, in hope to make considerable Establish∣ments; thus there will be forwardness enough to embarque. The present juncture is advantageous for this design. For they are charged with more Persons than they are able to maintain; Charity being evidently cooled toward them. A second means may be, to debar them the conversa∣tion of Women. It is scandalous to see Religious Men receive visits from them in Churches; and there, in presence of the Holy Sacrament, spend whole After∣noons with them. For remedy it might be ordained, that they should have Parlours, where Women might go to consult them. The thing is a point of deceney; and Par∣lours, the Carthusian Friars, and all Nuns, generally have. The third means might be, that the Fathers of such as enter into Religi∣on, should pay an Annual Pension to the Or∣der, by way of Alms, during their Sons life; which is the practice in Spain. This Pen∣sion, some will say, causeth in Spain an huge multiplication of Monks. But 'tis not the Pension that fills the Cloisters in that Country; 'tis the licence the Monks have to do what they please. In France they are not upon such Terms. A fourth means, is to

oblige the Monasticks to abide in their Con∣vents, and not go abroad but very rarely, and for urgent affairs: so do the Carthusians. A fifth, to embroil the Monks with the Bishops; for which they are sufficiently di∣sposed. A sixth, to prohibit that Children of Sixteen (when as yet they know not what they do) bind not themselves by Vows, which engage them for the whole remainder of their lives: but remit that Ceremony till their 22d. year of Age. The seventh means would be to suppress that Congregation, as they call it, among Mo∣nastick persons, (as for instance, there are the Congregations of S. Maur,) and com∣mand, that the Religious who make pro∣fession in an house, do there fix; not cour∣sing from Lower Britannie, for example, un∣to Paris; nor incessantly changing, as their wont is, unless some indispensible necessity does oblige to such changes. The Carthu∣sians keep in their houses, and run not from place to place: Nuns do the same. The Voyages of Monks, and all their transmigra∣tions, have no other end, but to get an universal acquaintance. Beyond all this, it may be declared to the Monks, (at least its a thing that should be done in its season) how that the King understands not their Monastick Profession does Exempt them from his Jurisdiction. Thus the Orders being purged from their impurities, will resume their ancient Iustre, and be true Se∣minaries of Doctrine and Sanctity. In fine,

no person will doubt, but the King may take cognisance of all that concerns the ex∣ternal Policy of the Church; because this is in such sort annexed to the Government of States, that not a Patriarch, nor even the Pope himself, can make any regulation of it without His Majesties consent.

That reason of State which presseth for a retrenching of the number of Monks, does also reflect upon Nuns; and that with the more Justice, because the greatest part of young Women, who become Votaries, are driven thereunto by the violence of their kindred. There will never want just means to hinder this abuse from having a longer course. As for instance, Young Women may be declared incapable of making vows be∣fore 22 years of age at the least. It may be enacted, that they never shall be Pro∣fessed, [i. e. setled of the Order] in the Convent where they have had their Educa∣tion, either as Pensionaries or Novices. This would be well enacted. For oft-times the Nuns, in hope to the gainers by their Porti∣ons, do flatter the silly Maidens, and per∣suade 'em to live with them. All kind of humane iuducements must be remov'd, and the inspirations of the Holy Ghost, left to their full operation. It may again be or∣dained, that Recluses do take no Money, as a Portion, but only simple Pensions yearly for life, and those likewise cautiously limi∣ted. A Law too may be made, that the Goods which might fall to a Daughter from

her Parents, and her collateral Kindred, should at their Decease, fall to the State, and the King by representation, be invested with the same Right to the Goods of the deceased as this Daughter had had, to re∣compence the Publick for the loss sustained by a Recluse, being incapacitated to raise a Family. Further, a general Regulation might▪ be made of all Marriages of young Women, with due respect had to the quali∣ty of each of 'em in particular; and it might be ordered, that in case any of them would take up a Religious life, they should carry as much with them into Religion, as into the Married state. For if the Order was▪ that Daughters becoming Votaries, should have less Portions than those that Married, Fa∣thers, so hugely covetous they are, would com∣pell them to the Cloister. But when they shall find no profit in taking this course, they will rather chuse to dispose of them in Marriage, and make Alliances by that means.

This subject inclines me to say summa∣rily, that the moderating of Portions is a piece of the ancient Civil Law of the French, and of divers other Nacions, in which Daughters had nothing at all. Thence it is as we see in the Customs, that a Nobleman is li∣censed to Marry his Daughter with a Nose∣gay of Roses, and she becomes disabled to pretend to any other Portion, provided the Match be suitable and fitting. This moderati∣on is necessary: Forasmuch, as the vast wealth which is given to Daughters in Marriage,

does incommode the richest Houses. More∣over, Gentlemen themselves would no more contract undue Alliances; and so the No∣bility recover their ancient esteem. Young Womens Birth, their Beauty, their Discre∣tion, their Virtue, and their Ability in the management of Domestick Affairs, would be to them instead of Wealth. They would make it their care to lay up a rich Stock of so many precious things, that perhaps it may one day come to pass, that Men will, as heretofore they did, give Money to have Wives; whereas at present, Women do so to purchase Husbands. I have spoken here of Marriages occasionally; I am well aware, that the Matter ought to be reserved for an∣other Chapter. To conclude, its a great in∣gredient of the Glory of a King, to honour the Holy See; to love and protect the Bi∣shops, to maintain the Gallican Church in its Liberties; never suffer that any propo∣sitions be advanced any way, that may wound the Authority of the Canons; and employ all the rigor of his Ordinances a gainst persons, who shall have the rashness to pub∣lish a suspected or erroneous Doctrine.

Additions to CHAP. IV.

1. That Bishops ought to be near the King. 2. Of the Pension to be paid the Order for a Monk enter'd. 3. Mo∣nasticks cannot Alienate; therefore neither sell a Rent-charge. 4. They shall not have power to purchase.

I Have affirmed Chap. 4. That Bi∣shops are obliged by Command of GOD, unto residence. This is true: yet forasmuch as they are also the Kings Subjects, and Royal Dignity requireth, that his Ma∣jesty have Bishops about him, as the Roman Emperors after Constantine had; it is fit to ordain, That each Bishop be at Court Three Months every year, attending His Majesty, to Honour Him; during which time they may negotiote their Affairs; and the rest of the year abide fix'd in their Dio∣cesses; the King assigning to each of them the Months in which their presence will be needful.

In the same Chapter, I have said, That to prevent the vast number of Monks it should be ordained, that the Parents of such as enter into an Order, should pay

an annual Pension to that Order during the persons Lives. The effect of this Law would be, that such a Pension being a Monachal Right in form of Clericature given by Act of State; they that would have Revenue enough to be Monasticks, would have e∣nough to be Secular Priests. And so per∣sons, whose Devotion should incline them to take Orders, and Consecrate themselves unto GOD, would rather chuse to remain Seculars, than shut themselves up in a Cloi∣ster all the remainder of their Lives. Now the more to fortifie this Law, it should be added, That Bishops make no more Priests upon the Title of Poverty, upon Penalty of maintaining them: The reason against it, as to Secular Priests, being as strong in reference to Regulars; because it is no less a disparagement to the Clergy, that a Priest Monk do beg, and fall into extream pover∣ty, (which may happen) than that one of the other rank do so.

It is manifest, that Monastick communi∣ties have no power to Alienate any thing; and that Monks do daily re-enter into their Estates, which they possessed heretofore. Hence it follows, that neither can they charge them with any Rents for Money taken up: Forasmuch as by these kind of Contracts, they Mortgage their Lands: but to engage an Estate in such a manner, is to make a kind of Alienation.

'Tis a fetch of the Benedictine Monks to take up Money for Rent to be paid by

them; that so they may appear always poor, and have pretexts to solicite the li∣berality of devout People: also that they may have Protectors, for the greater number of their Creditors is, the greater is the number of persons interessed in their conservation.

Yet there is nothing more unjust than this Custom: For there are Monastick Com∣munities that owe more than all their Goods, moveable and immoveable are worth. The Monks care not though their House be ruin'd, nor though they ruine some of their Creditors, provided them∣selves subsist. For by passing from one Convent to another, they are quitted of all the Debts they have created.

It greatly concerns the Publick to Prohi∣bit these kind of Contracts, that Mona∣sticks may be kept from defrauding any Man for the future; and to decree, that the Contractor shall pay the Rents Contracted for, and they bound to do it, both all in common, and each of them in particular: then, that the Notaries be Fined and De∣clared incapable of bearing any Office: Or if insolvent, condemned to the Gallies for 101 years: Moreover, that the Purchasers of such Rents shall, for their part, pay a Mulct of 3000 Livres to His Majesty, and the prin∣cipal Money be converted to His use.

Besides, it would be very fit to require all Notaries, all Creditors of Monasticks and the Monasticks themselves to make Declaration of the Sums and Rents charged

upon them, bring in the Contracts for the same before Commissioners nominated by the King to be Registred, and this within a time expresly limited: which being once pass'd, no more shall be received; and all Contracts not Registred, remain null, and as if they were cleared. This course would be very severe, but excellent to reduce the folk of the Cloister to Reason.

There is an important Observation to be made too, namely, That all the Contracts which Church men have made, are utterly null, unless their Creditors can make it appear, that the Money they lent did turn to the profit of the Church, and that there was an authentick permission to make such Contracts. This Doctrine is a point of Law; for the Church is ever a Minor, and all that it possesseth hath come from the libe∣rality of particular persons; without whose consent, or at least the Magistrates, and such as are capable of it, the Ecclesiasticks can make no alterations in the Estates they have received. So that the King may not only forbid Contracts for the future; but also Declare those to be dissolved, which have been made heretofore, and discharge the Monasteries of them. Debts have been annulled for less reasons often. It must likewise be prohibited to Monks, and to the Church, to purchase any Estate in Land, or High-rents, upon pain of such Contracts being null and void in Law; and the Sellers and Notaries incurring the fore∣mentioned penalties.

Our Lords the Prelates have lately be∣thought them, and resolved to compell such Gentlemen as have Chappels in their Houses, where the Sacrifice of the Mass hath been at any time performed, to pro∣fane the said Chappels, or endow them with Land for the maintenance of a Priest. This would be a means to gain the Church more than Two hundred thousand Livres of Rent at one blow; wherefore it will be fit to Ordain, that this enterprize of the Bi∣shops do not take effect; except in case of Chapels built hereafter, and built for other persons.

CHAP. V.

1. Of the Hugonots; and whether it be for the good of the State to put them out of France. 2. Politick means to extirpate their Heresie. 3. Of their ancient Confession of Faith.

A King cannot have a more Illustrious Object of his Cares and Applicati∣on, than the preserving of that Religion which he hath received from his Ancestors in the States he governs: because diversity of Belief of Divine Service, and of Cere∣mony, doth divide his Subjects, and breeds

Animosities among them: Whence arise Contentions, War, and in the end an uni∣versal defiance. Unity of belief, on the contrary, knits Men together; and 'tis sel∣dom seen, but that Fellow-subjects who call upon GOD in one and the same Tem∣ple, and offer at the same Altars, do also fight with the same Arms, or under the same Banners. If this Maxim be gene∣rally true in Christian Politicks, and the Religion we profess the only one, as it is, that we can savingly embrace, the Princes are obliged to maintain it with all their Might, and employ that Soveraign Power for the Glory of the true GOD, which they hold of his Goodness. The Pagans, whose particular conduct was so prudent and just, and who have left us so many Examples of wisdom and virtue, made it their principle, not to suffer in their Republicks any novel∣ty that thwarted the common and popular belief; and they adher'd so peremptorily unto it, that they would not so much as permit any man to undeceive them of their Errors. The Books of Numa Pompilius, which had been found near his Grave, and contained the ancient Religion of Rome, the Senate caused to be burnt; because the Praetor Rutilius, who had been commission'd to read them, affirmed upon Oath, That the Contents of e'm tended to subvert the Religion which the People observed at that time. They refus'd, even to open their eyes unto the light of truth, though known

to them, when they apprehended it would be novel to the people. They rather chose to stick to Fables, which length of years had consecrated among them, and the mul∣titude was through custom addicted to. Thus too the Athenians thought they did an act of necessary Justice in condemning So∣crates to death, for having taken on him to persuade the people that there was but one only GOD. They knew however, that in truth this Philosopher was the Won∣der of his time, the Honour of the City, and of all Greece: the discerning men amongst them were convinc'd of the soli∣dity of this Doctrine, and the Sect of the Stoicks made profession of it; so that it must be confess'd, the fall of Gentilism, and subversion of Idols, is an effect of the hand of GOD, who alone can work miracles of Grace and Omnipotence.

The Kings, His Majesties Predecessors, have set themselves with unwearied dili∣gence to preserve the Catholick Religion in∣violable: They have never failed to be Pro∣tectors of the Apostolick See, and the Church. They expelled the Arrians; they turned their Arms, and exposed their lives against the Al∣bigenses; they vanquish'd e'm; they destroy'd e'm; they punish'd the Poor men of Lions: In fine, they have provided that Christianity receive no harm in any places unto which their Authority extended. The last Age produced a new Monster to oppose the Church. France saw him born in her bo∣som,

and unhappily bred him up, with se∣veral complices of his Impiety and Revolt. History will tell Posterity how much Blood was shed during the course of well nigh Fourscore years to quell this dangerous Sect: and the world well know, that the Zeal there was to reduce Hereticks to their duty, did take up the Reigns of Six of our Kings; the glory of cutting off the last head of this Hydra, being reserved for his present Majesty. But it is expedient to see what weapons must be used for an execution so long expected.

There is no cause to doubt, but that upon the Principles of Christianity, and Maxims of Policy, its necessary to reduce all the Kings Subjects to one and the same Belief: And though they that make Profession of the pretended Reformed Religion, be now without Arms, without Strong-holds, with∣out Treasure, without an Head, and with∣out Allies; yet they are not out of case to be feared. They still retain a remembrance of their boldness, and by-pass'd Rebelli∣ons: they look back on the Towns they once seized, and out of which they could not be driven but by force of Arms, as if they were their proper Inheritance, and had been unjustly pluck'd out of their hands; they bear in their hearts the same aversion for Order and Discipline, that they ever had; and their minds are always inclining to revolt, and to Confusion and Anarchy▪ It disquiets them not to think who shall

head them; they have Soldiers of their own number, whom they can advance to be Captains by giving them Authority to command e'm. They persuade themselves, that if they were in Arms, they should want neither Money nor Friends. They believe, that the Glory of the King attracts as much Envy on him as Admi∣ration; and that his Virtue raiseth in his Neighbours no less Anger than Terrour. In short, there is ground to think, that he will have more than an Hundred Thousand Men of his Enemies in the heart of his State, while there are Huguenots in France; they too, per∣haps, do but wait an occasion to make their Musters. Thus they are perpetual Obstacles to the Designs that might be formed; and though weak, may nothwithstanding be dreaded. 'Tis true, the honest men of their Communion do well know, that they cannot be in a calmer repose than they now enjoy by the Grace of the King, and under the security of his Edicts▪ but in these matters the multitude carries it. These are a Torrent, that by its Rapidity, overturns Rocks which seems unmoveable.

It will be said, that the good treatment which the Huguenots receive, doth preserve the friendship of the German Princes for France; and if favourable Justice should be no longer done them, the King would lose the most potent and most considerable of his Allies. This discourse is but a found, and void of all substance of reason: for, beside that the Princes of Germany are not of the Religion of our Hereticks; They need not the Kings Protection for maintaining the Hu∣guenots

in their pretended liberty of Consci∣ence: but the French Arms securing them against the power of Austria, and principally of the Emperor, who hath divers pretensions upon them; they cannot recede from the Al∣liance they have made with his Majesty; nor will they do it, though the last man of the Hu∣guenots was brought to the Scaffold: nay, for∣asmuch as the Kings Forces are so useful to all those Protestants, it will would be their in∣terest not at all to Arm themselves for the Hu∣guenots preservation, but far otherwise, even to promote their expulsion out of France: and the reason is, because if this party were in a condition to raise stirs, the King would have his hands full of work to repress them: and so his Forces being dissipated, the Empe∣ror might take his time to enlarge his Domi∣nation: the thing that Charles the Fifth did, when Francis the First was not in a possibility to succour the Princes. It being therefore certain, that the Liberty of Germany hath its support and prop in the Arms of the King; they are not sollicitous there for the affairs of the Huguenots in France: and since the Prote∣stants▪ of the Empire are knit to his Majesty by other engagements than those of Religion, they will continue the same Deportment; and his Majesty on his part, will always have the same reasons to succour them, though the time should come that he should have no more Hu∣guenots in his Kingdom. No succour neither may they hope for from England; that's a State too weak to make any trial of strength against France: all the English there are must pass the

Sea; and the Isle be disfurnish'd of Soldiers and Provisions; yet this all would be nothing to purpose: mean time their affairs would lie expos'd to the Levity and Lunacy of the people. Holland and Swedeland are of like consideration; and they both have other In∣terests to Negotiate with the King, than those of the Huguenots. Denmark is defective in power. The Calvinists mount unto a strain of Policy above ordinary, when they would have us believe, That whatever is not of the Roman Communion is of the Opinion of Cha∣renton: the Lutherans of Germany, notwith∣standing, sympathize with them less than with us. Thus the King hath nothing to be afraid of from the pretended Allies of the Huguenots. Yet these men, as I have already said, are to be feared; and they would be seen stoutly to bestir themselves, if some extraordinary Com∣motion should happen in France, as a Civil War, or some great Invasion by Foreign Ene∣mies; in such a Juncture they would do as they did in the War of Paris: they took up Arms, and respectively protested they were for the Kings Service; but if the Peace had not been soon made, they would not have for∣born to think themselves necessary; and to make all the Propositions that they could ima∣gine advantageous to their party. They would have re-demanded their places of Se∣curity; they would have press'd for a restor∣ing of their Temples, for an augmentation of their pretended Priviledges, and for a free exercise of their Religion: and, according to their good old custom, have uttered Complaints

and Menaces. But if by ill chance a Victori∣ous Army of Strangers, whether Catholicks or Religionaries, should enter the Kingdom, the King must resolve to see the Hereticks declare against him, or else content them in all their pretensions, which would prove an engaging of his State in like Calamities, as our Fathers in their time saw.

It ought to be ordained, that they shall ex∣actly follow their ancient Confession of Faith which was permitted them in France; and that such as vary from it, shall be no longer reckon'd in the number of those of the Pro∣testant Reformed Religion, who have Liberty of Conscience given them.

These Huguenots have no ground at all to plead the Edict of Nantes so loudly and bra∣vingly as they do: they extorted it by violence, and with Sword in hand: yet was it but an Interim, an Order taken, until they should in∣form themselves of the truth; which they have had time enough to do. But did they not violate it themselves by the War of Lan∣guedock, that other of Sevennes; and again by that of Rochelle? nay, they call'd the Enemies of the State unto their Succour, and took a course to bring Fire and Sword into all parts of the Kingdom. Shortly, in matter of Go∣vernment, that which is good at one time, is frequently not so at another; all things must be accommodated to the general rule of Policy, which is, that the good of States be incessantly procured. When the Edict of Pacification was accorded, there was provision made for the welfare of France: if that welfare does

now require that the Edict be revoked, there is no remedy, revoked it must be, or neg∣lected.

From all this which I have said it follows, that the King hath most just cause to secure himself from the Professors of the Protestant Reformed Religion, and put them into such a state, as he may have nothing to apprehend from their particular. Perhaps it will be said, that 'tis expedient there be Huguenots in France, because they oblige the Church-men to study, and to live with the greater circum∣spection, and a more exact observance of the rules of their Profession. But this considera∣tion is not worth the considering. The Church of GOD will never be supported by these hu∣mane means. He is in the midst of it, and governs it Himself by His Holy Spirit, which animateth and filleth it. At whatever time there shall be no more Huguenots in France, there will be fewer bad, and a greater number of good men; which the King should particu∣larly desire; since States are always sustained by people that love Virtue, &c. It passeth there∣fore for certain, that it is fit the King do disable the Religionaties, as to their doing any harm, and as to their giving cause of suspicion.

It remaineth to examine what way may most readily and most commodiously lead unto this end. I would not advise that these People of the other Religion should be compell'd to de∣part out of France, as the Moors were out of Spain; which proved in the sequel, so preju∣dicial to the whole Country. 'Twould be a piece of inhumanity to drive the Huguenots in

that manner: they are Christians, though se∣parated from the Body of the Church: besides, this course would deprive the State of not a few good Families, and put the unhappy num∣bers of e'm out of all hope of Conversion and Salvation: so that the King, in this concern, should do well as seems to me, to imitate the Church, the common parent of all Christians; who, in the Remedies She prepareth, ever mingleth mildness and Mercy, with Justice, and Compassion with Correction.

The first means then which the King might employ, should be to provide, that the Hugue∣nots might frequent the coversation of the Catholicks with more familiarity than they do. For by this coversation they would, in time, be undeceiv'd of the Opinion with which they are pre-possess'd, that we hate them; they would put off the Aversion they have for us; they would know our Deportment; and be informed of our Doctrine in the points that offend them; because they understand not the Mysteries of them; which would induce them to confess, as St. Augustin did on the like oc∣casion, That the Church does not teach things as they once thought it did. Nothing is to my Understanding, or can be, more effectual for the Conversion of the Hereticks, than this fre∣quent Conversation; it is not possible, but that at length, the spirit of Men should yield unto impression; the plumage of the Eagle, 'tis said, consumes that of other Birds; Light dissipates Darkness, Truth triumphs over Fal∣shood.

The second means should be, to confer a re∣compence

of Honour upon Converts; and to make a Stock for this purpose, which might never fail. I should think it would be none of the best course to exclude the Huguenots from all Employments; they must enter into lesser Offices, though not at all into the greater. The reason is, because if they be put off from all kind of publick business, they will accustom themselves to tarry at home idle, and their ambition will be extinguish'd in such sort, as perhaps they will make it a point of Religion to do nothing; whereas being taken to ordi∣nary Offices, they will habituate themselves to a living among Catholicks, and their Ambi∣tion will awaken, when they shall compare themselves with their Superiours.

The third means I offer is, to select some particular Men, and create them such business referring to Religion, as may constrain them to attend the Council, and keep following the Court. Business of that kind may be started to Gentlemen, upon the Exercise they have in their Houses. There is not one of them but is obnoxious to a Process in that case; and the Bishops will, with joy, be the Prosecutors. Besides, the King's Procureur (or Attorney) General is concern'd to know, whether Mar∣riages, Baptisms, and Burials, be solemniz'd with due accurateness in these private houses; and whether good and faithful Registers of them be kept or no: Great defects herein being easily supposeable, the same will be just matter of complaint against the Owners, as negligent in observing the concession made them, of ha∣ving Exercise in their Castles. The like may

be done, if others, contrary to the Edict, be admitted to these Preachings beside the Do∣mesticks.

A Fourth means would be, to oblige the Re∣ligionists to put again in due state the ancient Chappels of their Houses, which they have de∣molish'd or prophan'd; the pursuance where∣of ought to be by the diligence of each Bishop in his Diocess. There must not be made a common affair of it to all the Huguenots in ge∣neral, but divers particulars only be fix'd up∣on. And the thing it self is as reasonable as any. For they had no right to destroy Tem∣ples that had been all along destin'd to Divine Service, according to the Religion of the King, receiv'd by all the Kingdom, and also profess'd by our Progenitors.

The Fifth means is, that when an Affair of such quality as I mention'd, comes before the Council, the Deputies which the Huguenots have at Court in the name of them all, be not permitted to intervene in it. There are 3 Rea∣sons for the putting by of these interventions: The First is, that the Huguenots cannot consti∣tute a Body in France, nor assemble without the Kings express permission. The Second, that Private and Particular affairs ought not to be set up in the rank of those that are general and publick. The Third, that the King will do Justice without their intervention. The De∣putation should not be all at once abrogated out-right; but no regard must be had to what the Deputies represent in the name of all the party.

The sixth means should be, that the King do

take effectual order the Huguenots may no lon∣ger have their dwellings, nor their Exercise in places not Royal; at least such as have any Lords of the Protestant Reformed Religion for Proprietors. As for Example, Vitrey in Bretan∣nie, belongs to Monsieur the Prince de Tarante, who is of that Religion; and it belongs to him by a Demise made him of it by Monsieur de la Tremouille. The Huguenots have there a Tem∣ple and a Religious Exercise: this Town they must exchange, and have another for it given them; reasons will not be wanting to colour such permutations: there is nothing that may contribute more to their Conversion. For it will be an incredible displeasure to them to live among people with whom they have no Ac∣quaintance, nor any Union, either by Interest or Blood.

A Seventh means is, to suppress by natural death, all Huguenot Counsellors. The Cham∣bers of the Edict are now of no more use.

The Eighth is, to give them for their Sy∣nods Catholick Commissaries; such as are some∣what vers'd in the Controversies, and have the skill to favour the Wranglings that are conti∣nually among them. These Commissaries were heretofore all of them Catholicks. Particular Synods, when Petition'd for, must not be de∣ny'd them; but National ones should never be granted: and at the close of all their Sy∣donal Assemblies, Money should be demanded of the Ministers for the King's Affairs, by way of Loan or of Tenths, or under some other pretexts.

The Ninth means is, to get them prosecuted

for their common Debts, and so cause them to sell, by Decree, some of their Temples, which sure cannot be judged to be in Mortmain, or Un-alienable.

A Tenth is, to Prohibit that any Subject go out of the Kingdom without the King's Per∣mission. For the Huguenots must not depart out of France; and they will be compris'd un∣der a general Prohibition.

The Eleventh is, to take order the Confes∣sors may intimate to the poorer sort of Catholicks, that it is a point of Conscience to serve Huguenots.

The Twelfth is, to oblige them on a Poli∣tical account, unto an Abstinence from Flesh, upon those days which the Catholicks do so observe, in like manner as they are already obliged to heed the Festivals, out of respect to the Publick Religion: then hereupon, se∣verely punish such as shall transgress in the one or the other of these two things.

The Thirteenth means is, to endeavour the Marrying of Catholicks to the Huguenots, and cause the Children issuing from such Marriages, to be Educated in the Roman Religion.

A Fourteenth may be, to hinder the Hugue∣nots from selling any Estate they have in Land: for this kind of possession does tye them to the Interests of the State.

The Fifteenth and last, is, to change the place of that Academy which they have at Sau∣mur, and fix it in some other Town, as Vange, or Beaufort. There is a President for such a change in the Translation of the like Academy from Montauban to Pullaurens. The pretext

for drawing them out of Saumur is, that this Town being a Pass on the Loire, and main∣taining the Communication of divers great Pro∣vinces, the King cannot be too well secured of it: beside, this planting an Academy at Sau∣mur, is an Usurpation; the Huguenots having never had a Patent for it. It would signifie nothing, should the Huguenots alledge, that they have it for a place of security: For they are now as the King's other Subjects be, who do not at all demand any. What would come of it, if all Collective Bodies should demand pla∣ces of Security? 'Tis a madness.

Further yet, it might be declared, That Pro∣ponents, who aspire to the Office of Ministers, should be obliged to teach a course of Philoso∣phy, or two years in Theology. Thus there would be fewer Ministers than there are; and at length, their number being diminished, the number of Huguenots would infallibly diminish also. The King might likewise ordain, That the Proponents should be examin'd in presence of such Commissioners as he should please to appoint; to the end they might undergo a ri∣gorous Trial. For His Majesty is concern'd, that these Ministers be perfectly well studied, left they prove promoters of Sedition, and not Pastors. At the time of their Examination, the same Proponents should be oblig'd to an∣swer all the Catholick Doctors in any contro∣versial questions they should think fit to move. The Huguenots cannot refuse this Proposition; because their Proponents ought to be prepared in all matters: and since the Huguenots affirm, that their Ministers are their Bishops, there

must no person be a Minister who hath not at∣tained to the Age of Twenty seven years at least. These are summarily the humane means that seem to me most conducible to the Con∣version of the Professors of the Protestant Re∣formed Religion.

CHAP. VI.

1. What Nobility is. 2. Of the Nobles of France, of their Degrees, and the Ranks of Gentlemen. 3. Of the Orders of Knighthood. 4. In what respects Gentlemen may be useful to the King.

HAving examined what relates to the Cler∣gy, the First of the Three Orders that compose the Body Politick of France; it is time to speak of the Second, which is that of the Nobility: Nobility is a Quality that renders the Possessors of it Generous, and secretly dis∣ly disposeth their Soul unto an affection for Honourable things. The Virtue of Ancestors does make this excellent impression of Nobili∣ty upon persons; and there is in seminal mat∣ter, I know not what spirituous and energeti∣cal Principle, that transmitteth and propaga∣teth the inclinations of Parents unto their de∣scendants: as is obvious to remark; not only in Men, and in all the Animals, which have a natural Generation; but also in Plants, and in things evidently most inanimate. This Ance∣stral Virtue, verily, gives us the first tincture in order to a right Noble Accomplishment;

and every Man issued from great and illustri∣ous Bersonages, does continually feel a kind of elastick impulse in the secret recesses of his Heart, which thrusts him on to imitate them▪ and their Memory spurs him on to Glory, and brave Actions: but if through negligence, or the degeneracy of an ill nature, it so comes to pass, that he answers not the hope which the Grandeur of his Progenitors gave ground to conceive of his Deportment; in this case, all the Lustre of their Ancient Reputation which environ'd him from the instant of his Birth, and whether he will or no, accompa∣ny'd him all along the course of his life, it does, I say, by making him be noted, for (No∣bilitas a noscendo dicitur) but promote his shame, and the more conspicuously shew his defects un∣to the augmenting and justifying a contempt of his Person. Thus an actual Virtue is neces∣sary for Gentlemen, that they may be able to bear up the weight of their condition, which otherwise presseth them quite down. The grea∣ter the Rank and Honor of their House is, the greater their Dishonor; and so much the deep∣er that Precipice into which their dissoluteness doth cast them.

There are usually noted three kinds of No∣bility. The First is a Nobleness of Blood: when the source of a great extraction is hid∣den in the obscurity of a long succession of years, and cannot now be discovered. This kind is in greatest esteem among Men: and indeed we call things that are left us of this quality, Vene∣rable, and do bear a sort of Religious Respect to them: we are generally possess'd too with

a perswasion, that whatever is unknown, is full full of Mysteries; hence Objects of such a nature are apt to surprise us; and we here∣upon are awed at them, and do admire them. Such effects, the greatness of an unsearchable high-descending Pedigree does produce. Nor need we much scruple to affirm, that this kind is the only proper and genuine Nobility; and that the Two others are only Nobilitations. What difference is made between a person No∣ble, and one Ennobled, is familiarly known. This first kind of Nobility is thought to require a possession of the Virtue of Ancestors, and withal, a possession of their wealth; this too in so essential a manner, that if each of them be not joyntly possess'd, the Nobility is ex∣tinct. We daily see proofs that evince the Ju∣stice and the Truth of this Notion. Be it in∣timated by the way, that the Virtue here men∣tion'd is the Military Art.

The Second kind of Nobility, is that which takes its rise from Offices and eminent Em∣ployments, unto which the Laws have annex∣ed this mark of Honour.

The Third is acquir'd by the Prince's Let∣ters, which are called Letters of Nobilitation. It is a right peculiar to the Kind to give such Letters; as the Roman Panegyrist once said to the Emperor Trajan. It belongs not but to Cae∣sar to create a Nobility. It is for none but the King to Honour brave aud valiant Subjects with this Quality. This Third and last kind is least considered: because the Person who ac∣quires it, hath not the Virtue of Ancestors for a foundation and caution of his own. Yet it

is sometimes more considerable than either of the two others; and Marius in Salust had great reason to tell the Gentlemen of Rome; that he had rather begin the Nobility of his Race, than faintly continue it, or unworthily lose it; and that it was more Glorious for him to transmit to his Posterity a sparkling Virtue, hard to be follow'd, than plod slowly on upon the slight, and almost effaced tracks of a common Virtue which his Ancestors had left him. In all these three kinds of Nobility, there must be the per∣sonal Virtue of the Person invested with 'em: for when all is done, it is but Virtue that con∣fers effective worth.

All Nations have had a particular esteem for Nobility, nor can any well-order'd Common∣wealth be named, which hath not invented some singular mark of Honour to make it con∣spicuous. The French in this point, have sur∣pass'd and out-done all People upon Earth; as for the first, Antiquity, Caesar observes, that the Nobles, that is, the Gentlemen, had among the Gauls, as much power over the Plebeians, as Masters at Rome had over their Slaves. After Gaul was reduced to the State of a Province, Nobility preserved its ancient Prerogatives; and the Emperors knowing, that the Nobles loved Glory, and sought it above all things, stiled them Honorati, and gave them an abso∣lute precedency in all Assemblies of the Gauls. For the Romans had thought it necessary to weaken the Authority of the Druids. In the time of Christianity the same Order was con∣tinued; and the Nobility gave their Suffrage apart in the Election of Bishops, expresly be∣fore

the People; yea, even before the Clergy themselves. Upon the declining of the Em∣pire, the Gentlemen did, in France, judge the Causes of their equals; and hence, without doubt, came into use the Parliaments, Courts and Assemblies, which our Kings held of their Peers and Barons; that is, of the qualify'd Gen∣tlemen of their Kingdom, when a Case of some Peer or Grandee of the State was to be Tried. The Nobles were distinguish'd anciently from Plebeians, by their Hair, which they wore long, for a mark of their ancient Liberty; and when any one of them committed a fault that was unbeseeming his Birth, the rest Sen∣tenc'd him to depart the Country, or cut off his Hair; This was therefore a no less punish∣ment than Exile. In Charlemagne's time, the Gentlemen of France named themselves Franks, by way of Excellence. In fine, the French No∣bility hath alwavs had such an high degree of Excellency, and so great a pre-eminence, that it was preferr'd in all Cases; as when vacant Bishopricks or Abbies were to be provided for; or when the principal Magistracy and Seats of Judicature were to be fill'd up, or the Govern∣ment of important Places, Warlike imploy∣ment, and the Leading of Armies, were to be dispoled of. To conclude this Matter, it may be affirm'd, that Kings did take the Gentle∣men into a partnership with themselves, as I may term it, in the Regality; they honour'd them with part of their Power, by conferring on them Fiefs, and by entrusting them with the charge of doing Justice, and of Commissi∣oning Officers to that end.

Hereupon it was necessary to put a gradual difference between Gentlemen themselves: nor is it indeed sufficient that they all have so ma∣ny excellent Prerogatives above the vulgar, or common sort, as we call them. For Na∣ture is alike in every Man, and all Men are Born equal. Fortune on the contrary, and Virtue, distinguish one from another. But na∣tural Reason requires there be Order in all things. 'Tis Order that makes the Beauty and Symmetry of the Universe. Now as a Musical Consort doth not make a perfect har∣mony, but by a diversity of Notes; so a Poli∣tical State can be neither comely nor compleat, unless there be a difference between the parts that compose it. I know that Nobility, be∣ing as Philosophers call it, an Inherent Quali∣ty, does lodge with its whole Essence, in each of its Subjects: As the quality of a Soldier is, for its Essence, in the person of a Corporal, as well as of a Captain or General Officer. Yet there is a great distance, and many inter∣vening degrees, between a General and the meanest Musquetier in an Army. Thus the meanest Gentleman in the Kingdom is Noble; and to speak after the common Proverb, is Noble as well as the King; but the one is se∣vered from the other by an immense gradua∣tion. So, though all Gentlemen be equal in Nobility, yet they are not so in Riches, in Lands, in Alliance, in Friends, in Offices, in Authori∣ty, in Age, and in Reputation. Again, they are not equal in Spirit, in Knowledge, in Ex∣perience, nor in Wisdom; therefore it hath been with much prudence ordered, that they

should have some external marks of these diffe∣rences; and for this end, there have been crea∣ted Princes, Dukes, Counts, Marquesses, Ba∣rons, Knights, Batchelers, Esquires; leave hath been given them to bear Helmets and Crowns upon their Armories: In short, no pains have been spared to find out things that might any way adorn their Quality; and their Valour hath been publickly rewarded, for an excite∣ment of others to a generous emulation.

Here, I cannot forbear to blame those Gen∣tlemen who give themselves the Title of Knights, of Marquesses, or of Counts, by their own private Authority. This is a shameful Usurpation; and so far from heightening the Luster of Nobility, that it injures them. For a Gentleman who takes upon him the quality of a Marquess, and well knows he is none, makes a perpetual Lye, a thing directly contra∣ry to his Honour, and to the profession he makes, of being a devoted constant defender of Truth. Beside, this huge number of Mar∣quesses, Lords and Knights, does bring those Qualities into contempt; and is a cause, that true Marquesses are not considered now, as they of right ought to be. 'Tis therefore extream∣ly important, that provision be speedily made in the case. For this confusion destroys the usefulness of those Dignities, they being such as his Majesty should keep in his own hand, and Husband them with deliberation and fru∣gality; that they might be distributed on oc∣casion, to Men of Honour, and such as have evidenced a Zeal for his Service, and for the good of his Kingdom; that the persons also

to whom they are Granted, might fully enjoy them, with all the advantages and Preroga∣tives that are by custom annexed to them. I will not omit, that it is necessary to give the No∣lity the greatest respect that may be; to the end, that Citizens may conceive the greater desire to become Gentlemen; which should be granted them, when they have rais'd them∣selves to a Worthiness of it, either by just ac∣quiring a remarkable Estate, or doing some il∣lustrious exploit in War.

The whole Constitution of the Nobility is Military: Nevertheless there have been insti∣tuted in France, particular Orders of Knight∣hood, of which, the King is Grand Master Himself; and into which He admitteth such Gentlemen as He accounts most worthy of it. Such are the Orders of the Holy Ghost, and of St. Michael. There are others, of which the King is barely Protector; The Order of S. Lazarus is of that nature. But this is of no great advantage to the State: Because all Be∣neficences, all Favours, all Honours and Em∣ployments, should come directly and immedi∣ately from the Hand and Bounty of the King. For the continuation therefore of this Order of S. Lazarus, His Majesty might unite the Grand Mastership of it to the Regality, as the King of Spain does.

CHAP. VII.

1. Of the Third Estate. 2. Of the Hus∣bandmen. 3. Of Artificers. 4. Of Merchants.

MY beginning to Treat of the Three Orders of the Body Politick of France, as the Clergy and the Nobility, leaving the Third Estate to be last spoken of, is a me∣thod like theirs, who having some Edifice to examine, do begin at the top; and settle to con∣sider the upper Stories, before they look on the Foundations. In truth, the People are the Ba∣sis upon which all Republiques have their stand∣ing. 'Tis they that manure the Ground, and cause it to bear Fruit. 'Tis they that pay the Subsidies; that breed Workmen, and fur∣nish the Merchants. Yet that which we call the Third Estate, does not consist of Peasants, or the meer rural sort; 'Tis principally the Freemen, and Communalties of Towns, and Officers of Justice, that compose it. This Third Estate was not called to the General Assemblies of the Gauls, either in the time of the Romans, or during the First and Se∣cond Race of our Kings; it was well for∣ward in the Third before they had that pri∣viledge. I believe, not until the Reign of Philip the Fair. But it is not upon this mat∣ter that I am now to insist.

However, in speaking of the Third Estate, the whole Popular body is to be consider'd; and it may be divided into three parties of men; namely, Husbandmen, Artificers, and Mer∣chants. Of the Officers of Justice we will speak in the next Chapter. The least-infected, and best party of the People, is the Husband-men that daily labour; which takes up their Heads and Hands, all the year long without intermis∣sion, keeps them in simplicity and obedience. There cannot be too great a number of 'em; especially not in France, by reason of the Fer∣tility of the Country; and our Corn being Transported into Foreign parts, we ought to make great Stores of it, and have as much as may be in a readiness. Exact care must be taken, that these Men may always be in a condition to take pains: and that they have but little con∣verse with Townsmen, whose little labour, and other manners, might corrupt their inno∣cence. And, that Ease and Plenty do not ren∣der them insolent. For there is nothing more dangerous and insufferable, than a sort of rich Peasants. No less care must be taken, that an extream penury do not reduce them to extream misery. For too great Poverty lying on them, they no longer have either Men or Cattle: they are ty'd up to ill Diet, lodge on the ground: suffer Hunger and Cold: their Children perish for want of Food; there are Epidemical Dis∣eases bred among them; they are not succour'd; they dye away: by this means the Country is dispeopled; and being void of Inhabitants, the Grounds are unhusbanded, and abandoned. When I shall come to discourse of the Finances▪

I will point out a way to preserve Country-peo∣ple in a moderately-commodious Estate: at present I will only say, that it would be to very good purpose to create a Superintendant of Husbandry; who should have his Eye on those affairs, and see, that the Grounds be cul∣tivated, Vineyards well kept, and Meadows fit∣ly ordered: in like manner as there are Masters of Waters, and Forests, who take care that the Woods be not damnifi'd; and Surveyors for the High-ways; and in fine, Jurats for every Craft.

The Second party of the Popular order, is the Handicrafts-men, or Artificers; these are no less useful to the State than any other. For, besides that Manufactures do keep men at work, and engage them; they are the cause that the Silk, the Wool, the Skins, the Flax, the Timber, and the other Commodities that grow in France, are made use of; and that Country People have the means to barter these things, and put them off; especially being wrought into Wares not made in Foreign parts, we shall grow to be further principal Manufa∣cturers, as we already are of Hats for Spain, and Stuffs for all Europe: which is a matter of exceeding great consequence: and in process of time, when the work is once on foot, things will pass from hand to hand, and oft-times go out of the Kingdom. All this quickens Trade, and makes Money pass to and fro: which pro∣moteth the Publick, and therewithall at once, every ones private welfare.

'Tis not enough to have Husband-men and Artificers in a Kingdom▪ there must of necessity

be Merchants also: for without their Industry, the Artificers Shops would be Stores never emptied; the Granaries would remain full of Corn; and the Cellars, of Wines; and no∣thing be gone. We will more largely treat of this, when we come to the Article of Com∣merce.

CHAP. VIII.

1. Of Officers of Justice. 2. Of Parli∣ments, and other Supreme Courts. 3. Of Presidial Courts. 4. Of the King's Council. 5. Ʋseful means for the good of the State, in relation to Officers of Justice. 6. Of Sollicitations.

IF men were entirely just to one another, and each of 'em (in the phrase of one of the greatest Greek Philosophers) a Law unto him∣self; there would need neither Law nor Ma∣gistrate to keep them in perfect tranquility. But Nature being corrupted, we no longer consult that Original Righteousness, which is inseparable from reason, and which without in∣termission, inwardly presseth us to render to all their due, as exactly, as we would should be done to ourselves. Always self-love, often ne∣cessity, sometimes hatred, avarice, or one pas∣sion or other, does blind us, and induce us to violate this eminently holy and equitable Law; in such sort also, that we suffer ourselves to be transported unto excesses hard to be believed.

We equally use fraud and force to content our injustice and irregular desires. Whereupon it hath been commodiously done by wise Men, to form, as may be said, a new reason, which they called Law. But because Laws are of no use, except they be armed with Correction to pu∣nish such as despise them; and have some soul, and living principle; therefore Magistrates have been created▪ who are to pronounce the Oracles which those Laws inspire, to put the Laws in Execution, and maintain the Autho∣rity of them. These Officers are chosen of the best and most intelligent Men in a State; and if Common-wealths be duly regulated; ordi∣narily the Rich are preferred before the Poor, and Nobles before Plebeians; because 'tis sup∣posed they have a greater measure of know∣ledge and virtue; and by consequence are less capable of certain mean things, in which a ne∣cessitous condition, and a mean extraction, might engage them. Thus Ministers of Justice in France, call'd Men of the Robe, are in truth necessary in Publick Society. For if there was no evil-doer, Laws and Magistrates would be of no more use, than Joyners, and the Doors they make for the security of Houses, if there were no Thieves: whereas, should not a Man in a whole Kingdom ever swerve from right reason and pure equity; there must neverthe∣less be Priests for Religion; Soldiers for defence against Foreign Invasions that might happen; and People who may some of 'em Till the Ground; others apply themselves to Trades and Manufactures, that Men cannot be with∣out. So that these three sorts of Persons are

inseparable from a Common-wealth; and they make up the Three Estates we have spoken of, which have been receiv'd without any contest.

Yet it seems, that of late, the Parliaments have sought to infuse into some green heads, that they compos'd a Fourth Order in the Kingdom; and the same, not only distinct from the other Three, but altogether superiour to them, by reason of their Sovereignty, and of the Power they have to deliberate upon the pleasure and Edicts of the King. If they should not be brought off from this opinion, perhaps they would draw the other Sovereign Courts and Officers of Judicature into the same Error; an Union of them all not being deniable: because otherwise the affair of Justice would in France, form two bodies; which may not be. But from allowing this Fourth Body in the State, namely that of Justice, a ridiculous inconveni∣ence would follow; to wit, that a Sergeant (or Catchpole) of a Village, would be a mem∣ber of a body superior to that of the Nobility; and by consequence, in some sort, superior to a Marquis. For in matter of Hierarchy, the last of a more excellent Order, is greater than the first of a less excellent one: as the lowest of the Arch-Angels, is greater than the highest of the Angels.

But to clear the difficulty before us, it must be remembred, that heretofore in France, the Estates which were called Parliaments, did as∣semble twice a year for two considerations: one was, to judge of Appeals, that were made from judgments pass'd by inferior Officers. The other, to give the King Counsel when

He demanded their Opinion about Govern∣ment of the State. For alway, during the first and second Race, the King's did dispose of Publick Affairs, as of Peace and War; and this is so much a truth, that if those ancient Parli∣aments had had the disposing of the State, they would never have suffered, that the Children of Lewis, when they had divided the Kingdom among them, should have fallen to make War one upon another; which could tend to nothing but a publick desolation. They would as lit∣tle have permitted the enmities of Brize, Hau∣det, and Fredegonde. In like manner under the Second Race, they would not have endured that the Sons of Lewis the Mild, should act such outrages on their Father, that Charles the Bald should have given Neustria to the Nor∣mans. In the Third Race, that Lewis the Gross should have ruin'd so many great Lords; who made up the greatest-part of the Parlia∣ments: that Lewis the Younger should have yielded up Guienne by the Divorce of Eleanore: that the Count of Burgundy, and the Duke of Britannie, and some others, should have leagu'd together against Queen Blanche. In fine, there are thousand and a thousand examples in Histo∣ry, which▪ do evidence that these Kings always had the free and Sovereign administration of their State: nor will there one be found to prove, that the Parliaments ever contradicted them. They presented themselves at the feet of their Princes, with Petitions, and humble Remonstrances: they made no resistance, nor exercis'd Authority. So that our King's have been King's indeed, always absolute Masters▪

and for proof hereof, it will be sufficient to look into all the Statutes; there it may be seen how they spake, and what part the Estates had in them. The principal end of Parliaments therefore was, to the end the Law-suits of par∣ticular Persons; and people perceiving that Appeals brought to them were received, and sentences invalidated; many, to try Opinions in their cases once again, became Appellants: by this means affairs were multiply'd; and that contesting parties might not have the trouble to come up from the remotest parts of the Kingdom, Deputies of the General Parlia∣ment were appointed, they also stiled Parlia∣ments, and to be ambulatory. The Commis∣sion they had, was sometimes for three Months, sometimes for six, according to exigence of State; but alway by the Command and Letters of the King. These Parliaments went into the Provinces, to judge the causes that were brought them; almost in like manner as we now see done at the Extraordinary Sessions: which in∣stead of diminishing the number of Causes to be dispatch'd, as had been conceiv'd, really augmented them. Philip the Fair saw cause to make such a Parliament sedentary at Paris, another at Rouen, a third at Thoulouse; and succeeding Kings establish'd others in other Cities, as they are at present. From this faith∣ful account it resulteth, that the Parliaments are not a Fourth Body in the State; but be extracted out of the Three ancient Orders; at first they were taken out of the Clergy and Nobility only: because the Commons at that time were not considerable afterwards, These

also were received in. Other Sovereign Soci∣eties are but Images of these Parliaments. As to the Sovereignty of the Parliaments them∣selves, it neither is, nor ever was other, than an emination of the Sovereignty of the King, in whom that Quality is natural, and indivisi∣ble. The Parliaments can pretend to no more than His Majesty may please to impart to them.

The Sale of Offices of Judicature having been introduc'd, there follow'd divers creati∣ons of new Officers, both in matter of the Re∣venue, and also in that of Justice: among o∣thers, those of Presidial Courts were instituted: which perhaps was done, only out of a pecu∣niary interest; a needless degree of Jarisdicti∣on being thereby set up, and such a one as tendeth to the involving and oppression of the Kings Subjects. These Courts are so many petty Parliaments, in judging supreamly, and finally in some cases: yet by the trick of Petty∣fogging Practice, ways are found to get Ap∣peals from judgment pass'd, to be received, and new processes begun, to the vexation and undoing of the parties concern'd. There have been in all times, chief Judges in Towns; as Bailiffs and Seneschals; a thing of indispen∣sible necessity for keeping the People in or∣der: all the fault that can be found in it, is by reason of their number, which certainly is excessive.

'Tis not enough that the King hath Parlia∣ments and other Officers to determinate differen∣among His Subjects: there must also be a Counsel about His Majesty; by whose Advice, He may correct all ill Administration of Justice;

may reverse all Sentences given against the Mind and Intention of the Statutes; and main∣tain Order through the whole extent of His State. This Counsel is the Sacrarium of the Monarchy: and the persons admitted into it, who may justly be stiled the Eyes, the Ears and Hands of the Prince) ought to have a pro∣found Knowledge in Affairs, acquired by long and approved Experiences: They must love the Kingdom, the Kingly Power, and the King's Person. They are the Seminary, whence are taken Intendants of Provinces, Ambassa∣dors and Ministers for Negotiations with Strangers. The Counsel is compos'd at pre∣sent of Gownmen only. It would not be much amiss, nay, on the contrary, it would be very well done: if the King pleased to communi∣cate this Honour unto other Professions, when there were found Persons capable of it: Be∣cause this Preference gives the Gentlemen of the Long Robe too much Authority; whereas there is need of retrenching what they have already; much rather, than of conferring any new advantage upon them, as we shall shew hereafter. As for the Royal Privy Council, in which Secret Affairs are debated, and which ought to be of very few Persons, that Matters may be kept in silence, and not untimously divulged; I will not speak of it in this place; nor say, in what manner it ought to be com∣posed: because this depends upon the plea∣sure of the Master of it; and each King takes a different course in it. There have been Prin∣ces who committed the principal Care of all Affairs to one single person: and France hath

seen, for instance, the Cardinals of Amboise and Richlieu. Others have parted Employ∣ments, and shared them among as many per∣sons as there were different Affairs. So did King Henry the Fourth. This, in my Opini∣on, was the more wisely done; for that in matter of Government, the great Secret is to divide Authority, and hold the ballance even between a plurality of Persons. History teach∣eth us of what consequence it was to our Kings of the first Race; that they had but one Maire of the Palace; and how dear it cost their Poste∣rity. Upon a like reason of State the Roman Emperors divided the charge of the Praetorian Prefect. But Ministers, whatever for num∣ber, must for qualification, be Men of Virtue and approved sufficiency: They likewise, af∣ter the manner of the Aegyptians, ought to be reprehended and punish'd for all that the King does amiss, and contrary to Law.

The incredible number of the Ministers of Justices in France, is in truth, somewhat mon∣strous; Neither is there any disorder in the State, more pressing, or requiring a more speedy Application of the Royal Authority. The truth is, if a Man consider this multitude of Magistrates, will he not have ground to say, that the French are extream hard to be governed, seeing so many great Personages are employed in Governing them? Again, it may be said, That this Nation, so▪ Illustrious by the Glory of its Actions, and by so many Victo∣ries wherewith its Arms have been honoured, is yet incapable of virtuous Inclinations; since there is need of force to reduce them to the

rule of the Laws: though GOD never gave Men a more precious Present. On the other hand, can it be affirmed, that our Legislators wanted Wisdom, or did not sufficiently shew it in making the Laws? Yet if reflection be made upon the multitude of Law-suits, where∣of the vexation is a grievance to the Kingdom, may not a Man perswade himself, that Equity is banish'd thence, and Upright dealing utter∣ly discarded? Should it then hereupon be ta∣ken for granted, that the private sort in France are not good condition'd People; can it be imagin'd that the Publick Government is any thing reasonable and proper for its due ends? But if a Man proceed to penetrate further in∣to the Internals of the State, and there be∣hold what a desolation the corrupting of Ju∣stice hath made, loosning and breaking the most Sacred ties of Friendship; in fine, if he observe how the Monarchy hath often been in danger of subversion, will he not wonder that the Publick Fortune hath held out, and Fami∣lies been born up in the Storms that have so many times turmoild them?

The excessively great multitude of Officers, being the principal cause whence so many mis∣chiefs take their rise; the remedy must be first apply'd thereto. And this remedy is nothing else, but such a retrenchment as is expedient, or, to say better, necessary to be made. The fewer Officers of Justice there are, the more Soldiers and Artificers, and Merchants, and the fewer litigious Actions will be. For it is manifest that business of that kind has ever multiply'd, as the number of Officers hath been

augmented: in like manner, as the more Phy∣sicians, the more Patients. To arrive at the end propos'd, it would be convenient, that af∣ter mature deliberation upon the estate of France, the number of its Inhabitants, and the quantity of Law-business, it be advisedly stated in the King's Council, what number of Offi∣cers were fit to be reserved, and of what qua∣lity they should be; then that the rest be sup∣press'd gradually, as the persons dye away, or at once by a Declaration. What, in my opinion, might particularly be done, is as fol∣lows.

First, The Presidial Courts being compos'd of Officers that are needless to the State, a charge unto the People; having also but a no∣vel interloping Jurisdiction, the fruit of an evil Counsel given to King Henry II. and a mere invention to get Money; the extinction of them is not to be doubted of; but effected by a substraction of the Officers Annuities. By this means the King will save that Pay, which amounts unto a Sum considerable to the State; and the Royal Jurisdictions, each in its Pre∣cinct, may do what those Presidials, upon which they depend, are wont to do. The Presidial Clerks place, its being engaged, (or bound for security to one or other) as is usual, should not hinder the execution of this. Aflair: And when by decease there are no more Officers left, care shall be taken of the concern of those to whom the places were engaged, the regu∣lating whereof will by that time have no dif∣ficulty in it.

Secondly, Of Sergeants, Two Thirds whol∣ly must be suppress'd.

In the Third place, all Proctors, that are not Advocates; and a certain number of Advo∣cates should be appointed in each Parliament and Jurisdiction, who might do the Office of Proctors. This is not incompatible. For the thing is already in use many parts of France. The benefit of this regulation is manifest; in that the Proctors are very ignorant that have but a slight tincture of practice; yet out of Covetousness they often draw up Writings for their Clients, and make them pay as dear for 'em, as if the best Advocate had taken the pains. Mean time these Writings, for the most part, are nothing worth; and the poor Suitors frequently lose good Causes, through the naughtiness of their Proctors, and for want of being well defended. Again, such an order taken, another advantage would accrue, name∣ly, that Advocates being Proctors, they will be obliged to follow what the Judges shall pre∣scribe them; whereas at present they make a jest of it, and will not Plead but when they please. There cannot be a regulation made in France more profitable in matter of Justice; and if the King, in a necessity of State, would make a Money matter of it, which might at any time be done, there would be rais'd out of it, for all France, more than 20 Millions. But it had need be gone about with a great deal of Address. A Third advantage by this regu∣lation is, That all Advocates being Proctors, there would no more slip into the Court a sort of young Men, who shelter their Ignorance

and Idleness under a Lawyers Gown and a square Cap.

In the Fourth place, All the Masters of Requests belonging to the Palace, or Court (of Justice) of France, should be supprest. And the Truth is, it seems to me a contradi∣ction, that these Officers should be Counsellors of Supreme Courts, yet not impowred to judge any thing supreamly. But that the Common∣ers of the King's Houshold and other privi∣ledged persons, may not be depriv'd of the benefit of the Committimus, Power must be given them by special priviledge, to com∣mence their Actions, and prosecute them in a Chamber of Enquests. I say, by special pri∣viledge, because I know the Parliaments take no cognizance ordinarily, save of Appeals: but in the case now expres'd, this special pri∣viledge shall superadd to them this new kind of Jurisdiction. And it will be highly advan∣tageous to those Commoners and Priviledg'd persons; for by this▪ Expedient they would get a decree speedily upon one Trial, and fi∣nally end their business. It is to be noted here, that the first stating of Cases, in order to an Hearing, is not so incompetent to Parliaments, but that they do the thing for substance, upon demands incidentally made. Yet this is meant only in behalf of priviledged persons, and all such as claim the right of a Committimus.

Fifthly, The Judges Provosts of Towns are to be suppress'd, and they laid to the Sene∣schalsies and Bayliwicks. For, what are so many different Officers in one and the same Town good for?

In a Sixth place, All the Courts of the Aids should be united to the Parliaments; and this done, when the Officers of the Supream Court in each kind, have been reduc'd to the number which its judged meet to retain. I will say more of this in the Chapter of the Finances.

Seventhly, All the Elections are to be sup∣press'd, and the Assessing of Parishes, done by the Treasurers of France; of the Seneschalsies, by the Lieutenant of the Province. I shall speak more plainly of it in the Chapter of the Finances and Taxes. Where also the Sup∣pression of Store-houses of Salt, and of the Gabells, shall be treated of in the Article of Gabells. Besides, the Chamber of the Trea∣sury, and the Court of Moneys, should be joyn∣ed to the Chamber of Accompts; and half of all the Chambers be suppress'd likewise. For thirty Officers may do all that the Chamber of Accompts, the Treasury, and the Court of Mo∣nies now do, In fine, it is for the King's Ser∣vice, and the good of the State, that all the Presidents Places be suppress'd, as well those of Superior Courts, as of others: and the Of∣fice of Presidents be discharged by Commission. 'Tis to be consider'd▪ that this new Order would much augment the King's Authority. For what will not Counsellors do to obtain a Commission to preside? and having obtained it, what will they not further do to keep and confirm them∣selves in it? 'Tis pertinent to recall to mind here, that the Mighty Prince Philip the Fair, at his making the Parliament Sedentary, made the Count of Burgundy first President of it. And that anciently, the first President of the Cham∣ber

of Accompts was the chief Butler of France: Likewise, that at that time, and long after, the Chancellors of France were of the Church, or of the Sword; and great Dignities not gi∣ven to Men of the Robe privatively. Which being done since, without doubt gives them too much credit, and leaves the Nobility too little. It is important that the thing be not continued, but on the contrary, all restored to Primitive Order. As for Country Courts, 'tis fit they be narrowly limited, and brought to be meerly predial and dominial; that is, for Rents and the Fealties of Lordships: not capable of de∣termining an Inventory, or receiving a suit be∣tween parties, for more than three Livres. To conclude, the shortning of proceedings in Law, would much conduce to the reduction of Offi∣cers.

Let it not be objected, that this reduction of Officers, and such a multitude of Suppressions, will ruin a multitude of Families. For though it were so, yet should not the thing be stuck at; the Reformation of a State being concern'd: nor is the ill of particular persons to be put to accompt, when the Weal of the Publick is in question, GOD Himself, who is King of Kings, and Eternally Just, how many men did He destroy by that universal deluge for the Reformation of the Universe? How many Isra∣lites did He cut off in the Wilderness, to save the gross of the People? There is plenty of examples in this kind, and Soveraigns have a right to do like things with like Justice, when the general welfare of their Subjects is con∣cern'd. Kings are Eagles, to whom GOD

gives His Thunder-bolts to carry: the strokes that come from their hands do come from the hand of GOD, whose Images and Instruments they are.

To conclude, it's a thing which cannot be dissembled, that the Parliaments, constituting an Aristocratick Government in part, as they do, are quite contrary to Monarchick Govern∣ment. Aristocracy is adverse to Regality; because of all Governments it comes nearest to it. As, to use the very terms of Hesiod, a Pot∣ter envies, and is against a Potter. Be it re∣membred here briefly, that Theopompus King of Sparta having created the Ephori, at last after a great deal of time, Cleomenes was fain to put them to death; when they had slain King Agis. The Senate becoming too potent, overthrew the first Roman Monarchy, and in one word, what hath our Age seen in the trial of Chenailles? and what did a former in that of Chancellor Poyet?

A second source from which the Evils of litigious suits do arise, is the sale of Magistra∣cies. The Emperor Alexander Severus sound this mischief in his Empire; it having been introduced by Domician. S. Lewis saw cause to weed the abuse out of His Kingdom; it ha∣ving got in through the confusion and trouble of some precedent Reigns. It will be glorious for the King to do in His State what the Em∣perour Severus and S. Lewis did in theirs, with greatest glory to their Memory. But as Policy requires, that in such enterprises, way be made by degrees, and greatest events brought on by small beginnings: so it is necessary here, to

proceed leisurely, and with measured steps. The fixation of Offices hath been much ad∣vanced already: for though what hath been done seemed to signifie an authorizing the sale of them: yet in truth, there hath been ground gotten. To continue the work, and bring it to perfection, there must a Decree pass, or a Declaration be made, and publish'd at the Seal, by which the King declares, that he pur∣poseth no longer to admit any opposition in matter of Title to Offices. This is just; for the King ought to be ever Master, and have the liberty to bestow the charges of His King∣dom on whom he pleaseth, and thinks worthy of 'em. Thus no one will be alarm'd: but this Declaration will extend unto the price it self, by a consequence easily deducible; name∣ly, since the principal and essential right to Offices consisteth in the Title, and the price is but an accessory, as they term it: 'tis reason∣able, that the price alway follow the Law of the Title: as the Title to a Benefice brings in the Revenue of it; And as in Marriage, the Validity of the Sacrament makes the Validity of the Contract, and of the civil effects. Thus receiving no more opposition at the Seal for the Title; there neither will be any in reference to the price: and hence it will come to pass, in tract of time, that Offices will be no longer security for Money; which will diminish the price of them, and insensibly bring it to nothing. But it is very just too, that the Mortgaging of Offices, as hath been done hitherto, be ob∣structed for the future. For the Officer may dye before he hath paid the Paulette; whereby his

Office is extinct; or if of Grace the King re∣vives it, the value of what ariseth from the casualty, is much less than the sum for which the thing was engag'd: so that there must loss certainly accrue. But if the King make a new creation of an Officer, all engagements are gone: for 'tis then no longer the Office that formerly it was.

Let it not be said, that without the Sale of Offices, the Casualties will be worth the King nothing. For the contrary is true: and if the Casualties be worth Him Two Millions, by rea∣son of that sale of them, His Majesty will make Four Millions of 'em, if they be no longer saleable. Forasmuch as in this Case, they will be no longer Hereditary; and being no more Hereditary, they will revert to the King upon the decease of every Titulary: and so the King may dispose of 'em in favour of the Person that is most acceptable to Him, and if it please His Majesty, the new admitted Officer may fine to the Coffers of His Treasury Royal, as the Officers of Gentlemen do to the profit of the Monasticks. As to the Objection, that by such suppression of Officers and Jurisdictions, and taking away the sale of Offices, the King will lose the Revenue of many of His Clerks places, and of the Paulette; The Answer is easie; for as to the Clerks places suppress'd, the King will be recompenc'd by the greater value of those that shall remain; and as for the Paulette, the retrenchment of the wages of the Officers suppress'd, will be much more considerable.

A third cause of vexatious Law-driving is, that Offices of Judicature are gainful to those

that execute them. An evil this, the dange∣rousest of any that can affect a State; for all becomes suspected, all becomes corrupt where profit is to be made; Avarice and Ambition creep in; Justice, Uprightness, and Truth, de∣part: whereupon we may conclude with the ancient Proverb, That Money doth many things which the Devil cannot do. For an entrance up∣on a Reformation in this matter, it would be good to ordain, First, That Judges not the Kings, should take no more Spices. Secondly, That Judges in the Royal Courts should not decree Executions for their attendance against the parties that are in contest. Thirdly, That if Spices, (or Fees upon sentence obtained) be allowed, the parties shall give what they will, as the former custom was, and not be compelled. Fourthly, That there be no more transacting by Commissaries in Sovereign Courts.

Judges should be forbidden to admit any sol∣licitation from parties at Law, even though it be but to let them know the difficulties of their Affairs, and put them in a way to clear the same. For a Judge ought not to be prayed to do his Office, in favour of a man whose case is good, much less of one whose case is bad.

CHAP. IX.

1. Of some general Orders in Government. 2. Of punishment and recompence. 3. Of Royal Virtues.

IN the Chapters now dispatch'd, I have in∣serted many things which may be of use for the Kings service, for the general good of His State, and of every of His Subjects in particu∣lar. In the Chapters that are to follow, others very considerable shall be added. However, I judge it not amiss to make here a distinct Chap∣ter of some important points, which I cannot easily rank any other where.

It hath been long in dispute, whether it be good to alter Publick Laws? and upon debate of the Question to and fro, 'tis concluded, that there is oft-times so pressing a necessity, that it cannot be forborn: but withal, that such alterations must be insensible to the People, who hardly come off from old Customs; and can∣not be brought to any new observance, but by a long circumference, and ways to them unknown. Legislators are Physicians of Common-wealths, and in this case ought to imitate the ordinary Artists of that Profession, who seeing the whole habit of a body out of order, and that to pre∣serve the Patient from Perishing, 'tis necessary to change it, do prescribe remedies, which the more slowly they operate, the surer their effect.

Now the first Law, which in my Opinion might be made, or rather renewed in France, is to banish thence all Usuries, of whatever quality, except among Merchants; and those should be expresly prohibited, which arise from personal Obligations, under pretence of dama∣ges and interests; even interests adjudged by sentence not excluded; this pretence being but a means to authorize Usury, and defraud the Law, which forbids it. Usury was strictly pro∣hibited among the ancient Inhabitants of Candie: but the coveting of Riches, to elude the seve∣rity of this Statute, disposed the borrower, that he should seem to have stollen the Money he had need of, and which in reality was lent him. By this Artifice the Debtor was constrai∣ned to pay the Interests; which were not ad∣judged to the Creditor on the account of any Loan, but in hatred of Robbery, which he said had been committed upon him. This means cannot be used in France; for that Theft is there a capital Crime, both in Religion and in Policy. But the Spirit of Man being unbounded, and having more craft when bent to transgress, than the Law hath prudence to hinder evil do∣ing, the taking of damages and interests hath been introduced amongst us; which is an equi∣valent to the Cretan expedient. For the feign∣ing a detension of Money against the owners will, as is done in France, and the Debtor thereupon condemn'd to pay the Interests, can be no other thing for substance, than the feign∣ing a Robbery, as was done in Candie.

There is not any Nation of note, in which Usurious Contracts have not been prohibited

among the Subjects. 'Tis known what the Law of the Church in this behalf is, and what that of the Old Testament, so often repeated in Scripture, was. Usury sure, hath caused the greatest disorders that have hitherto troubled the tranquility of States. The Athenians, the Spartans, and the Romans, did not forbid it only; but were also forced to abolish Debts contracted; and for publick benefit, rescin'd the compacts and promises that private Men had made, though they seemed inviolable, as having been made under the Authority of the Laws, and upon the security of general custom, which they were not wont to over-rule. An act of very particular consequence All Usu∣rious Contracts should be annulled, yea the culpable and complices as to the crime of Usury, put to death; the Usurer in Plato's opinion, being worse than the Thief.

The second Law should be, to permit Con∣tracts for annual Rent out of Land: yet with charge, that they be publish'd for publick se∣curity; as I have said elsewhere, when I treated of the shortning of Law-suits. Withall, regu∣lating to a denier, the Arrearages, which are a kind of Usury, but the most tolerable of any seeing there is an Alienation of the Land; and it is a fiction prudently hit upon by the Popes Calixtus the Third, and Martin the Fifth. As for the Declaration in form of an Edict which is to be made herein; Contracts, even the for∣merly made, should be reduced to the Thirtieth denier. The Romans limited Use to the hun∣dredth, afterwards to the Two hundredth, and at length abolish'd it altogether.

A third Law should be, that no sum lent to any Son of a Family, or to others under 25 years of age, without the consent and authority of their Relations, do produce any action; no not thought the Contracts be ratified by the Debtors, after they come of age. Vespasian made a like Or∣dinance; and there is nothing more effectual to repress the greediness of Usurers, or the de∣bauch of young people: whereupon they would set themselves to labour, to exercises and study. The profit which these Laws would yield the State, beside their stopping the course of great Evils, would be, that persons who are alway concern'd, and impatient to be getting, seeing they could not put out their Money at Interest easily, and that the Interest of their Contracts would be at too low a rate, must of force ap∣ply themselves to two things, each of which is eminently advantageous to the Kingdom. For they would addict themselves to Trades and Husbandry▪ or put their Money in the hands of Merchants to make benefit of it, if not en∣ter into partnership with them, which they should be permitted to do. For Usury in mat∣ter of Commerce, was never forbidden, and is the Secret that the Hollanders have found, to make all their people Merchants. On the other hand, the Genoeses have engaged them∣selves in Traffick, upon observing the profit it yielded.

The fourth Law might be, that Gentlemen be disabled to sell their Fiefs or Inheritances, until they have made declaration of their Po∣verty in open Court. Among the Israelites, Lands engaged reverted to their ancient own∣ers

at the Jubilee. The Spartans Lands were not divided at all; I mean those 7000 por∣tions which Lycurgus had lotted out. The Lo∣crians in like manner sold not their Estates: the same is observed in Flanders. The Fiefs of the great Houses of Bretanie are never parted out. Substitution of Heirs in France doth hinder the Alienation of Lands. In Spain Gen∣tlemen cannor sell their Estates: And Lastly, the Demesne of the Crown in France, is in-ali∣enable, which may prescribe a Law for all No∣ble Families. This Ordinance would make Gentlemen good Husbands. When the Jews, the Lacedemonians, the Syracusians, the Romans, and all civilized-People, made a partition of their Lands, they consider'd the benefit that might thence redound to their States, and ve∣ry wisely provided, that all such as possess'd Inheritances should fix in the Country: having an Estate there which they could not carry away, they would love the places where they had their subsistance; and every one defending his own Possession, all would jointly defend the Common-wealth, and fight for the Publick Interests.

The Fifth Law should be, that a Gentle∣man being ruin'd, and having acknowledged his Poverty in Court, should be no longer No∣ble; there being no Estate so shameful, as that of a Man of Quality reduc'd to an extream Misery. On the contrary, that a Plebeian, when he hath rais'd himself an advantageous Fortune, which might be limited at 50000 Crowns, should be ennobled; provided always, that the profit had been made by laudable and lawful means.

A sixth Law should be, to hinder the publick begging of the Poor, by appointing the great∣est penalties upon it; and ordain, for that end, that every Parish both in Town and Country, do maintain their own Poor, not suffering them to wander; punish all that make a Trade of it; send the stoutest of them to the Gallies, and set all the rest on work according to their ability. This is a means to fetch out that idle∣ness which is among the meaner sort.

The seventh Law might be, to render Fa∣thers responsible, as to Civil Interests, for all the Faults and Crimes their Children should commit while they depend on them, and under 25 years of age; or, however, whilst they dwell in their Fathers House. The Mulct to be allow∣ed for afterwards in the Patrimony of those faulty Children; This Law is in force in Bre∣tanie, and was so at Rome. Masters, in like manner, for the faults of their Houshold-ser∣vants; and paying an Arbitrary Fine besides, because they ought to correct them. In the Third place, Provost Marshals and their Offi∣cers, for all Robberies and Murthers commit∣ted on the High-ways, Burglaries, Counterfeit Coin, and other the like Crimes within their district, if they took not up the Malefactors, and brought them to their Trial. This Law would hinder well-nigh all mischiefs of this na∣ture; it being, as may be said, of publick No∣toriety, that Provosts hold Intelligence with all persons of ill Life. Again, all Lieutenants criminal and Judges, for the Crimes commit∣ted in their Towns, by the same reason. Ma∣sters of Inns, and Houses of Entertainment, for

the Crimes committed by their Guests, while they are in their Houses. Owners of Houses, for the Crimes committed by their Tenants during their term; because they ought to know, and answer for the good abearing of such as they entertain. Captains and Officers for the Crimes of their Soldiers; the Inhabitants of an House for those committed in it. This is done in Spain. In the Turkish Towns, the Townsmen of each Street are responsible for what is done there; And if a Man be slain, the Townsman before whose door he falls, is sen∣tenced to pay for his Blood. This Order is excellent. For assoon as there is a noise in the Street, all run thither, and the Authors of the Fact, whatever it be, are seized, brought be∣fore the Judge, and forthwith punish'd accord∣ing to the quality of the Crime. In paralel to this Rule of Government in Turkie, severest penalties must be imposed upon such as trans∣gress the Laws, and especially the Laws that relate to Publick Order and Policy; those Pe∣nalties also speedily inflicted; otherwise the said Laws will be of no use. For example, 'Tis ordained in France, that no Lackey wear a Sword; that no Towns-man have Arms; or that Bakers make their Bread of a certain Weight, or other things of like nature. They that obey not, must be instantly punished, the Rich by pecuniary Fines, the Poor by Corpo∣ral Penalties. The Turks cause Offenders who have not Money to pay their Fines, to be bea∣ten with a Lath.

An Eighth Law, All Printers and Booksellers must be forbidden, and that upon pain of death,

to Print, Sell, Disperse, set to Sale, or keep any Book of what Quality or Subject soever, without its having been Approved, and Licence given them under Seal in due manner; after which may nothing be added to the Book.

But as it is just to punish bad Subjects, so it is reasonable to reward the good: and them that out of love to their Country, employ them∣selves in advancing its Reputation and Glory. The King ought to be the sole Master and Ar∣biter of all Rewards; and confer them himself, so as they that receive any Beneficence of His, may be convinc'd they owe it to His Bounty. This would be an infallible means to attract to Him the hope of His Subjects, and together with it, their Respect, whereupon every one would strive to please Him, in doing of his Du∣ty, and no body promise himself any Grace or Advantage, but by his Merit, his Services and Diligence. There are several kinds of Re∣wards with which His Majesty may Honour His Subjects; I say, Honour them; because a Subject, in receiving a benefit from the hand of the King, receives withal, a mark of the Esteem which is had of his Person, and of the satisfaction he hath given in his Conduct. No∣thing can be more glorious to a Man of Worth; nothing can yield him a truer Contentment. A Gift from an ordinary hand is many times somewhat shameful to him that takes it; and hence comes the adage, That it is better to Give than to Receive. But when a King is the Donor, the Dignity of the Royal Hand doth add to the Gift a new quality, which augmenteth the Worth and Excellency of it:

whence it is, in such a case no less praise to re∣ceive than to give.

This now which I have affirmed, cannot be doubted of: yet it may be taken for evident, that of these rewards, there are some purely Honourable, others only Profitable; and a last sort, both Honourable and Profitable too. The reward purely Honorary is, when the King confers upon a Subject some Dignity which he had not afore; as upon a Plebeian, the quality of Gentleman, upon a Gentleman that of Knight, or Marquess, &c. and permits him to carry Fleurdelizes in his Coat of Arms, or some other▪ Memorial of a great Action: Or grants him the privilege to wear a Crown in his Crest, or the like. This kind of reward is unlimited, because Sovereignty is a source from whence new Honours and Dignities incessantly flow; as projections of Light do every mo∣ment issue from the Sun, without exhausting its secondity; and on the contrary, the more rays that it emitteth, the more resplendent is it in it self; so the more Honours a King confers, the greater Lustre He adds to His own Royal Majesty. The Romans, of any People upon Earth, did most abound in conferring rewards of this nature: and on that account, brought into use Crowns, Triumphs, Statues, Rings, Inscriptions, Publick Praises; and stuck not to grant Deifications, Temples and Sacrifices: such a love they had for Virtue; and so ingeni∣ous were they to inhance the merit of their Fellow-Citizens: thus inciting them to worthy Persormances, and principally to an advancing the power of the Common-wealth. For any

man that hath a Noble Spirit, and is Virtuously dispos'd, does more to merit a just reward, than he would to gain the Empire of the World: because in the issue, 'tis always Virtue that tri∣umphs; and oft-times but Fortune that rules. In conformity to this example, which both An∣tiquity, and the Authors of it, and Experience, do render Illustrious, the King may Honour such as serve Him best, with Honourable Titles; but ought to punish all those, who, without His Permission, dare assume and usurp them. 'Tis necessary that there be a difference of rank between Persons; and the distinguishing of them by their merit, is to be preferr'd far be∣fore all discrimination made by their Wealth.

It would also be very commodious, that as the Honour of Knighthood is purely Personal, so the King should make the Dignity of Baron, of Marquess, of Count, &c. Personal likewise; not real, or annexed to Estates; the said Dig∣nities to become extinct by decease of the per∣sons invested with them. This Expedient, to recompence Men of worth, being well managed, would produce a marvellous effect; and an whole race, thereby become Men of Merit. For, what would not the Son of one of these personal Marquesses do, to prevent falling from that degree of Honour which his Father had? and how could he choose but press vigorously on in the Court of Honour that has been thus mark'd out to him? But in this case, there is one thing to be further done, which might much profit the State, by laying a more Express Obligation on the Nobility to serve the King: and that is, that the King do give His Letters

for personal Marquessates, in such form as they may be verified in the Parisian Chamber of Ac∣compts, and the Persons Honoured with them, do homage to His Majesty thereupon. Such kind of Homages have been done heretofore for Officers, and even for Pensions, though but of two hundred Livres. The Emperour in Germany hath, in this manner, made Gentle∣men, and Counts of the Empire, as for exam∣ple, the late Count de Guimene; who had not a foot of Land within the Emperours Jurisdicti∣on. The King of England creates a Gentleman, Baron, and Earl of a Barony, or County, in which the Gentleman possesseth Nothing.

The second kind of Gratifications and Re∣wards, is of those that are purely gainful and pecuniary; as Pensions, Tickets for Money, Acquittances by Patent, Ransoms, Confiscati∣ons of deceasing Strangers goods, and the like. These however, carry a great deal of honour with them, as I said afore. The third kind, is of those that are at once both gainful an ho∣nourable, as Great Offices, Governments, &c.

Upon this matter of Rewards, there is this further Reflection to be made; namely, that a King never be inform'd of a good Action, but He gratifie the Actor, either with Praises, or with Benefits. In fine, all these favours must be regulated by consideration of His Service, and the welfare of His State. GOD, in giving Princes a Sovereign Power, inspires into them Affection for their People. But His will is, that it be a Paternal Affection; that a King do open His Bosom to His Subjects, as His very Children; and that all His Counsels and Designs be levell'd

at their Felicity; without which, Himself cannot be happy. 'Tis principally for this great and glorious effect, that Kings are Images of GOD, and be fortified with His Spirit.

I have said, that Monarchs are in their King∣doms, what the Soul is in the Body of Man, that external Goods cannot enrich them; that Virtue alone is their proper Portion, as it is of GOD Himself. It now remaineth I should say what kind of Virtue it ought to be.

'Tis necessary that a Great Prince have Piety, to give His Subjects an Example of it; and bettering of them in this, is the security of His State. He must be just to govern them. A Government never is of long duration without Justice. This Queen of Virtues comprehends, (as Aristotle judiciously noted) all the rest. A King I say must be Just, to render unto every one, and unto Himself, what is respectively due. The third Virtue of a Prince, is Prudence, to fore∣see of Himself what may betide His States. Thus a wise Pilot hath the skill to foresee Calms and Storms: he knows by secret notices, whether the Winds will be favourable, or con∣trary to his Voyage. The fourth Virtue is Magnanimity; a weight this, that keeps the Soul always in the same position, and gives it so setled a firmness, that neither good nor bad successes can put it out of place; and a King appears unalterable: He thus bears up the hope of His Subjects; they look upon Him as an as∣sured succour against Fortune, and persuade themselves, there is somewhat of Divine Qua∣lity in His Person. Of Royal Virtues, a fifth is Clemency; It pertains to the greatness of a

King, that He be benign, and do commiserate the weaknesses of His Subjects; who are Men as He is. Mischances are pardonable, and it seems to me, 'tis too much rigor to punish a poor wretch for a Crime committed out of im∣prudence, or by necessity; and of which he is less guilty, if I may say it, than his ill destiny, 'Tis to Criminals of this kind, that Grace should not be deny'd: and when a King gives one of His Subjects his Life, who hath been condemn'd to death, he should rejoyce more at the feeling in the Secret of his Heart a Will to Pardon: than at the having in His hand the power to punish. To give a Man his Life, is in some sort to create him; and the preserving of his Being, is a giving of it. It would be, 'tis true, a great fault, to stop the course of Justice, in case of publick Crimes, and such as have disturb'd the Peoples Peace: Yet in sum it is Noble, that a King be inclin'd to compassion and Mercy. 'Tis an action appro∣priated unto GOD, to disarm His Anger: Upon this ground the Roman Poet said, That those Thunderbolts which Jupiter throws, might be diverted.

The sixth Royal Virtue is Liberality. One of the Ancients pronounced, that it was less disadvantageous for a King to be overcome by Arms, than by Liberality. A Poet intro∣duceth Mark Anthony excellently saying, That he had nothing left him but the Benefits he had conferred. And to say true, A Great Prince never enjoys His Wealth, but when He hath given it. Liberality enricheth Him, and makes Him Purchases of inestima∣ble

value. For thereby 'tis, that He wins the love of his own People, and becomes admired of all others. When I say Liberality, I mean a judicious Liberality, such as is a Virtue, not an exorbitant profuseness; a Liberality alway exercis'd with Advantage, and with Glory.

To conclude in short; when I consider other Virtues, I do not find any one of them all im∣proper for a King; but it is impossible a King should have those which I have mention'd, without having every one of the rest; since they are inseparable Companions, and must be united to make a Virtuous Man.

CHAP. X.

1. Of Finances, or a Princes Treasure. 2. Means to make the Subjects more nu∣merous. 3. Of the Officers that manage the King's Treasure. 4. Of the King's Demesnes. 5. Means to recover the Demesnes. 6. Of Taxes. 7. Means to ease the People. 8. Of the Free Ci∣ties. 9. Of the Gabells. 10. Means to augment the Receipt of the Gabells, and ease the People. 11. Of the Salt∣free Country. 12. Of the Countries of State, and Free Gifts. 13. Of the ex∣pending of Money. 14. Of the reser∣ving it.

THE Art of Finances, or the Treasury, is a principal part of the Politicks; and

so much the more necessary in a State, in that Money is the Soul of all Affairs. A Common∣wealth is no further powerful, than proporti∣onably to the richness of its publick Treasury, and the greatness of the yearly Income that maintain it. This the French Name plainly importeth; for Finance is an old Word, sig∣nifying Power, and comes from the ancient Verb Finer, which is to be able, to may or can.

Three particulars are here to be considered. First, Just and easie means to make Money. Secondly, the prudent expending it. Thirdly, the keeping it in, and laying it up for necessi∣ties that may happen; as Famine, Pestilence, War, Fire, Shipwrack, and such like.

We have in France three general means to make Money; The King's Demesnes. Impo∣sitions on the People, Merchandises, &c. Of this last I will speak in the Chapter of Com∣merce. I will say nothing here of Conquests; which may come in for a Fourth means of Get∣ting; I will treat of them elsewhere.

Before any further advance into this mat∣ter, it will be pertinent to observe, that the fundamental Wealth of a State consists in the Multitude and Plenty of Subjects. For 'tis Men that Till the Ground; that produce Ma∣nufactures; that manage Trade; that go to War; that People Colonies; and in one word, that bring in Money. To make way in France for multiplying of Men, and oblige them to Marry, the King may at once do two things, after the example of the Emperor Augustus. First, He may decree Priviledges and Advan∣tages

in favour of such as shall have divers Children; exempting them from Guardian∣ships, from being Collectors, from Commissi∣ons to look to the Fruits of Sequestred Lands, and other burthensom Offices: He may dis∣charge them from Subsidies, and even give them some Estate. Secondly, He might im∣pose penalties upon those that Marry not be∣fore a certain Age: and take part in the Suc∣cessions of all sorts of persons, who in contempt of Law and Wedlock, live single, not having impediment by any natural infirmity. 'Tis up∣on a like consideration, that I said in a former Chapter, the King, to restrain Parents from compelling their Daughters into Cloisters, might Declare, that the right of all Recluses in any Succession, was vested in Himself: And 'tis for the very same reason that the Ancient Earls of Flanders were Heirs to all the Priests that were their Subjects.

Now to that which Augustus did for the in∣ducing of his Subjects to Marry, the King might add Two particulars: One is, That the First Year a Man Taxable did Marry the first time, being under 26 years of age, he should be exempt from all Subsidies and Impositions, and publick Charges, even quartering of Sol∣diers, in case he kept House apart, and was setled in a Dwelling of his own. If the newly Married be the King's Officer, his Office should not fall into the King's hand, if he died within the year. Commanders also, and Soldiers should be dispens'd with, as to their serving for that time, unless on urgent necessity, or some important occasion. The other parti∣lar

which in France had need to be added to Augustus's Ordinances, is, to take effectual Or∣der, that persons once Married, be not so ea∣sily separated again as they are. For 'tis to no purpose to contract Marriages, if they be not stuck to, and the coupled Parties cohabit not.

A strange abuse in this matter of separati∣on hath crept in of late, nor know I how the Officials have become so favourable in it, or how the Parliaments have suffer'd it. Now-a∣days, a Woman that would have, as they say, her swing, and without controul, practice all that her giddy, witless, and oft times wanton humour prompts her to, raiseth stirs in the House, at length tires out her Husbands pati∣ence; hereupon, she complains of his Vices, hath Servants suborned for her purpose; a Di∣vorce comes to be adjudged upon their Deposi∣tions, the Husband is sentenced to yield her up her Goods, and not only do that, but also to let her have possession of her Dower, or of a good part of it; at least to allow her a great Pension. Then this Woman reties, takes an House, and lives after her own fashion, which is not alway the most commendable in the World; her Husband the while, sinking un∣der the whole weight of his Houshold Affairs. Had she counted upon nothing else, but that of necessity she must live with her Husband, and in his House, she would have formed her self to it, and not have play'd her vexatious pranks; so she had promoted the happiness of her Hus∣band, and of the Children, and together with it, her own. For application therfore

of a remedy in this case, it must be a Law That a Wife shall not sue for a Separation' as to Person or Habitation, but by the advice' of four of her nearest Kindred; Men of known Integrity: and that a Separation being order∣ed, either by Sentence in Court, or by Accom∣modation between the parties, she shall be bound to enter a Monastery, without egress again; nor suffered to admit a visit from any man there; it being contrary to Publick de∣cency, that a Woman who hath lost her Hus∣band, (for to be separated from him, is to lose him) should appear openly, and maintain commerce with other Men. On the other hand, her Sex, and all seemliness requiring, that in this estate she hide her self, and hide withal her ill fortune, and her grief for it. I would too that a very slender Pension be adjud∣ged her. And since Husbands will be found in fault on their part likewise, and discover their ill husbandry, it would be very just, that the disposal of their Estates be not left to them, nor the possession of more than a part of 'em: as is the case of Wives: and that supposing they have Children, the Money arising from the remainder, should be received, employed, and administred by a Guardian: He to ac∣compt for it to the said Children in due time. If there be none, the Revenue exceeding the Pension should be laid out on Hospitals, and other necessities of the State. This Law should extend to Separations already made. And such rigour being practis'd in matter of Divor∣ces, there would be no more of 'em. Hus∣bands and Wives would be under a recipro∣cal

Obligation, to live together, and to live together discreetly: so they would breed up a Family that might prove the contentment of their Life, the comfort of their elder years; and be beneficial to the whole Kingdom.

There is a further consideration to be made in the matter of the Finances; and it is this, namely, that it is expedient the King should declare, that for the future He will be Credi∣tor, and Donotary to His Receivers and ac∣comptable Officers, fot their Wives dotal Mo∣ney, and Marriage settlements, and for their Childrens Portions and Donatives: then ex∣plaining the late Ordinances to take away all difficulty, declare further, the crime of misem∣ploying the publick Money to be punishable by death; and ordain, that the Interests, Amends, and civil Reparations adjudged a∣gainst Criminals of that kind, should fall up∣on their Heirs or Legatees. This Law is ri∣gorous; yet it is just and necessary: foras∣much as it will strike terror on the Financiers: who having no hope to escape Justice, could not entertain a Thought of committing a fault that would ruine all that is dearest to them. Beside, the Romans punish'd even with death, the very friends of those whom they condemn'd for Crimes against the State; the History of Sejanus affords unquestionable proof of it.

That which we call the Demesne of the King, and of the Crown, cannot be Alienated, nor is it liable to any charge or encumbrance. This Law is Fundamental in all kind of Com∣mon-wealths, as well as in France. But here

things are judged to belong to the Crown three manner of ways from all Antiquity: As the Soveraignty, the power of War, Subsidies, and the like. By Declaration; when the King, by His Letters, declares some particu∣lar united to the Crown. By Confession, when for the continued space of ten years, the Re∣ceivers have accompted for it to the Chamber. There are many questions proposable in refe∣rence to the Demesne; but it is not our business to State them. Chopin may be consulted, who hath learnedly written of this Subject.

In necessities of the State, divers things have been engaged by the King to the use of pri∣vate pri∣vate persons, who have paid in Sums thereup∣on. Yet these persons cannot hinder, but that the things may be recovered. And there are two equitable ways to effect this. The First is, by making a Principal of what is due to those Creditors, and assigning them Rents up∣on the Town Hall of Paris, or some other place; of which there are examples. For when the King had Sold, or rather engaged some Rights of His unto particular Men, they have been resum'd by Contracts for a Rent∣charge. Now those Rights were Demesne, upon which, to recover the Demesne, Rents were charged. The same course then may be taken again. Nor could the Engagees have any cause to complain; for the engagements made to 'em, are but to secure their due, and give them not any propriety: their security therefore will be as great when they have Contracts for Rent. For the one and the other pertains to the Demesne still. And such

kind of Impositions in like manner, the power to impose them being Royal and Dominical, the Engagees concerned will by this means have security for security, and Rent for Rent. But that the King may reap advantage from this exchange, it is necessary to settle a Stock for the raising of these new Rents; and to that end, a new Imposition must be laid upon the Clergy, the Countries of State, Cities, Commonalties, Companies, Colledges, Merchants, and other Members of the Kingdom, the Engagees them∣selves paying their proportions. There is in this no inconvenience at all: because the De∣mesne having been engaged for the preservation and defence of all the Corporations in the King∣dom, it is natural, that they all contribute to free it again.

The second way to disengage the Demesne, would be, by giving ready Money instead of Rents, and making an Imposition for this end, which might be more easie. A reimbursement should be compleated in five or six years. Mean time, and before all things, the Engagees must be put out of Possession, and order given, that the Receivers of the Demesne do take up the profits. For if any condition be propos'd while the said Engagees are in possession, they will make a thousand difficulties at it; and on the contrary, if they no longer possess, they will readily consent. But that the matter may be transacted with less noise, it ought to be ex∣pedited in each Parliament apart: or at least the Receivers commanded, by virtue of a De∣cree of the Kings Council, to receive all the profits, and even those of the engaged De∣mesnes.

If there be not made a new imposi∣tion, in order to recover those Demesnes, the affair will not be of advantage to the King; and there may one be very justly made for the rea∣sons now alledged, and for the putting of things again in order, Let us pass unto the art of the Tallies.

The Imposition of the Tallies [or Taxes] is a kind of Subsidy or Aid laid upon the people. Under it, (in France) are comprehended the Tallion, and the Subsistance; as they term them. The Tallie is hugely equitable; it is ancient; it is necessary; and in use all the world over. For there never was People that paid not to defray the publick Expences. In France it is so moderate, and may be so easily paid, that it hath been known to be higher than now it is: because the sums that make it up are receiv'd without much trouble: Yet at present, though it be considerably diminish'd, the People are scarce able to pay it, and the Country extreamly incommodated by it. The prime cause of this is, that the ratable persons considered, the rates are not duely proportion'd; the rich Pea∣sants, the Justicers of the Villages, the Gen∣tlemens Farmers, the Eleus, and other Persons of Power, are so eased, that they pay al∣most nothing, and the poorest of all do bear all. A second cause of the mischief is, that they who are Commission'd to receive the Tallies, do so run up the charges, that they far exceed the principal, and thus draw Money out of the Peoples hands, which they can part with but once. When the Sergeants of Villages need a Cow, or Corn,

or some piece of Houshould-stuff, they go to the Peasants houses where they know the same is to be had; there they make Seizures, and then Sales at what price they please. They seize and sell whatever they find, to the very House∣hold-loaf of Bread that hath been cut, and is in use: upon this, the poor Rustick hath no∣thing left to help himself, but is utterly di∣stressed, and can no longer do his work. The greatest part of these Officers must be sup∣press'd; the more there are of them in the matter of the Finances, the more disorder and oppression there is. For all of them look for profit; and they spoil all by their avarice and ignorance.

To remedy the two Evils that have been mention'd, effectual order must be taken that the Peasants may pay equally; that is, in pro∣portion to the estate they have; and pay with∣out charges superadded. First, all the Taxes should be made real, as they are in Languedoc, that every one may pay. Secondly, The Tax should be levied in kind of the fruits that are receiv'd from the Lands and Tenements, as Wine, Sider, Beer, Corn, Cattle, and the like; the quantity that is to be taken being stinted and fix'd, for example, to a Tenth part. A Peasant that might have ten Bushels of Corn, would very willingly pay one to the King, and might do it without inconvenience. But when for payment of Forty Sous in Money, which he hath not, the Sergeants and Collectors seize upon, and sell the ten Bushels of Corn, which too are priz'd at an extream low rate, and all is spent in charges, doth he not really, instead

of Forty Sous, pay Twenty Livres? This turns not at all to the profit of the King, and tends to the undoing of his People.

Under the name of Lands and Tenements this Tenth might be extended unto Houses in Cities, Towns and Villages, and they ordered to pay a Tenth part of the Money they might be let out for; which should be very low rated. In like manner a Tenth or Twentieth part might be taken upon Contracts for a Rent∣charge. For these are stocks, and a real Estate. The Ecclesiasticks, who have sure been wary men, have taken their Rents in kind, and these sorts of Rents are now infinitely augmented. The greatest part of the Revenues of the Ro∣mans and Aegyptians themselves, was paid in Fruits. They paid their Armies and Officers with them. Many Kings have taken a Tenth of Estates, oft-times a Fifth, sometimes a Third. It is not necessary that the People have Money; but they must have Fruits for sustenance of life. The King might have Farmers of this Tenth in each Parish, or in each Election, who might let out under▪Farms of it to the Peasants, as is done in the Tyths of the Church.

If it be thought fit to take things in kind, there must be Magazines in Cities, as there are Store-houses for Salt: in them the Receivers should sell the Fruits, or reserve them, as Jo∣seph did in Aegypt. The King will need them for Armies, for Fleets, for Victualling places of strength, for Transportation into Foreign parts; especially in case of a Famine. This is practis'd in many Countries abroad, and particularly in Italy. What is done in a petty

State, may be done in a great Kingdom. It is not to be doubted, but that if the Tallie were thus rais'd, it would go further than it does, and the People suffer no incommodity by it at all. But one thing which presseth more at present, is, the putting of the Country in case again. For this end, the rich must be permitted to give Cows, Sheep, and other Cattle, upon terms, to the poor Peasants. This is done in very many places, yea, in the greatest part of the Kingdom. The too severe, and over-scrupulous Parish Priests prohibit it; but they will not any longer be able to do so, when the thing is publickly permitted.

It seems unreasonable, that some certain Cities should, upon imaginary Privileges, be for ever exempted from the charges of the State; and mean time, the Country bear the whole weight of them. The pretext of these Franchises hath induced divers of the Peasants to retire to these places. Order must be taken in the case, and all these Cities obliged to con∣tribute to the expences of the Kingdom, which they are so considerable a part of. They may then be brought to pay, under colour of Sub∣sistance or Loan. There should be Garisons sent them, or Soldiers quartered upon them▪ that all the Beams of the State may bear their part in publick affairs, and so the weight be more easie to them, whereas one alone would be over-charg'd, and break under it.

The third means the King hath to bring Him in Money, consists in the Gabells. Some have said, that the Gabells are not of the nature of the Kings Demesne: and their reason is,

because the Ordinances for the first imposition of them do import, that it was not the Kings intention they should so be. The contrary might be true. For, beside that the Salt-pits did heretofore belong to the Emperour, as goods of the Empire, the sums that are raised out of them▪ are raised by publick Authori∣ty, and turn to the profit of the whole King∣dom: as hath been done for many Ages. But however that be▪ not to enter into a dispute, which can be of no consequence here, I will consider the Gabells according to the present state of things. I will not say when this kind of Imposition did commence in France; nor upon what examples of Anti∣quity our Kings did ground themselves. Not will I explain, how, beside the Gabells of France, which are call'd The grand party, there are the Gabells of Provence, Dauphine, Languedoc, and Lionnois; because the thing is known, and makes not to our purpose.

The Gabells are paid in France by two dif∣ferent means. First by Impositions; so in pla∣ces neighbouring on the Salt-free Countries. There, for fear the Subjects would not take Salt at the Kings Garners, the Officers see how many Minots each Parish ought to take: then a rate is made in the Parishes, for it, as for the Tallie. The second means is without Impo∣sition: this is the use in places remote from the Salt-free Countries. There, because prohibi∣ted Salt cannot be brought in, every one fetcheth from the Garners at the price currant.

The King receives a great deal of Money from these Gaballs; but the People pay exces∣sively

beyond what comes into His Coffers. The infinite number of Officers belonging to a Store-house, the Receivers, the Commissioners, the Archers, the Charges, the Portage, the Fees of Officers, to whom Presents are also made, do swallow up huge sums, which the King fin∣gers not, and the People do pay. For there is not a petty Gabeller but lives handsomely by his Employment: not a Commissioner but makes him a Fortune, and grows rich upon it, making good chear, and great expences. 'Tis of very much importance that a remedy be ap∣ply'd to the malady; and in truth, the vexa∣tions which the King's Subjects do suffer under pretext of the Gabelle, are not to be compre∣hended. The Archers enter into Houses, to search (they say) for concealed Salt: in obe∣dience to Authority the doors are open'd to them; mean time themselves covertly convey in some Bags: hereupon they form a Process; and the Master of the House is excessively fin'd: nor do they depart till they have pillag'd all they can lay hands on. If entrance be deny'd them, they force the House, and act all Hosti∣lities: nor dares any one complain; all are at their Mercy; and thus they ruine the poor Per∣sons whom they single out. This is no way be∣neficial to the King's affairs, nor is it His inten∣tion, that His Subjects should be so ill treated. But it is easie to break them of this course.

First of all, it must be debated in the Kings Council of the Finances, what sum is fit to be taken for the Salt; this sum being determin'd at ten or twelve Millions; for example, two several parts of it shall be set out, to be yearly

paid: one for the Country-Parishes, another for the Cities. Each of these allotted parts shall be sent into each Generality, and thence to the places where there is a Store-house of Salt. The allotment for the Country shall be divided by the Parishes, as is now done for the Tallie, the Subjects among themselves rating every one's proportion. The Gentlemen, the Church▪ men, the Monasticks, and others, must be engaged in it, and bear their part: because they are charged by reason Salt is so dear as now it is; and by consequence, the King making a change to the profit of all, all ought to be taxed, to recompence the diminution that will follow in the Finances.

The second Sum allotted for the Cities, shall in like manner be sent to the Generalties, and Salt-Garners, that such Rents as the Towns are to pay the King may be divided; The houses may be measured by the Perch, and the Rents assessed accordingly; much like to what is done for cleansing the Strrets at Paris. The Cities that claim a Freedom, as Angers, Or∣leans, and Paris, shall enter into this contribu∣tion, for the same reason that the Ecclesiasticks and Gentlemen do; inasmuch as they will no∣tably profit by the suppression of the Gabells, and abatement of the price of Salt. For it is to be observed, that that measure which now costs at Paris five and forty Livres, might a∣mount not to two Crowns, and so proportio∣nably in other Cities.

Now the number of Perches in each City being known, (having been taken by Com∣missioners of the Kings, who might be Citi∣zens)

it will be very easie, on any necessity, toraise an aid from the City, upon the pro∣portion of the said Perches, by way of Loan or Subvention, or under some other title. And that the Citizens may not oppose the Kings in∣tentions in the matter, permission must be given to each City, to treat every year with what Merchants they please; and agree a price for the Salt that shall be there sold through the whole year; He to sell it, who will oblige him∣self to afford it best cheap; (except the Citi∣zens had rather leave it free for all Mer∣chants that would, to bring in,) always un∣derstood, that there be no power to compell any one to buy. The like may be done in eve∣ry Village; the Gentleman causing Salt to be Sold in a Servant's name, and making the pro∣fit of it. This course, will, without doubt, be gain to the People; and Salt being sold in such manner, it may be brought to pass, that the Commodity it self shall pay the Rents which shall be due to the King, and they the while, buy it at much a lower rate than they do. So that clearly, all sorts will receive such a proposal with applause. To augment the cheapness of Salt, it should be ordained, that it be free from paying to Lordships, and by the Load, and from Imposts.

The thing being resolved in the Council, the King shall make a Declaration in form of an Edict, by which His Majesty shall take off the Impositions upon Salt, on condi∣tion the Towns and Parishes will pay Him year∣ly the Sums He shall resolve upon in His Coun∣cil: and that until the Declaration be execu∣ted,

the Gabell shall continue its course. It would be needful to ordain, that these Sums be paid into the hands of the Receivers of the Tallies. For there would be no more need of a Receiver of a Salt-garner. What are so many Receivers good for, but to consume all? In this case, the Receivers of Salt must be otherwise dispos'd of. This Declaration would include a suppression of all the Officers of the Gabells; for when Salt should be freely Sold, the King would have no more use of 'em. As for their re-imbursement, provision might be made, either by continuing their wages during their Lives, or by assigning them Rents, which might be redeemed for little and little; or by giving them ready Money. The People too might be charged with this re-imbursement, in favour of the suppression of the Gabells. This Affair might be worth the King a great deal, and can never fail of being beneficial: the Peo∣ple will gain six Millions by it, beside the quiet it will yield them. It being put in execution, the King may purchase the Salt-pits, upon the greatest part of which, He would-previously have the Tenth part of the Salt, if He took the Tenth of all Revenues, as I said afore. Again, in doing as hath been shewed, He would have an Army ready raised: for all the Ga∣bellers must be led into the Field. There are in their Companies notable stout Men, who al∣so have been in action.

As for the Salt-free Countries which have bought out their freedom, no one durst touch them hitherto, by reason of the strength of the Huguenots, the Civil and Forraign Wars, and

other Considerations, as the Minority of Kings, &c. But now that the King is Master, and in a condition to make Himself be obeyed; 'tis reasonable, that he do oblige so many great and rich Provinces to bear a part of the bur∣thens of the State, in proportion to their abi∣lity, for the easing the rest of France. And to this end, one of the three following Proposi∣tions may be made them. First, to take a re∣imbursement of the Sums paid by them; which re-imbursement shall be made, by granting them a diminution of the Tallies, without put∣ting hand in Purse other ways. Hereto may be subjoyn'd, that the King may not wholly discharge them: because such a discharge tend∣eth to the oppressing of his other Subjects: that a King may indeed augment and diminish Subsidies, as seemeth him good, but not extin∣guish them; it not being possible, that a King∣dom should subsist without publick Incoms: that it must be remembred on this occasion, how Nero proposing to take off all the Imposts that were paid at Rome, the Senate oppos'd it, as a thing that would be the ruine of the Empire. The Second Proposition might be, that these Provinces be obliged to pay the King a yearly Rent, by way of Supplement, and in confirma∣tion of their ancient Treaty. The Third, that the Tallie, and other Impositions on them, be augmented, to even the ballance, which can∣not be done any other way.

There are certain means to maintain the Finances; among others, the Free Gifts that are presented to the King by the People of those Provinces, which are called Countries of

State. No other Order need be taken with them, but to hinder as much as may be, that the principal Members of these States be not in the Offices they bear, unjust at the Publick cost. Yet they must make their advantages in them, otherwise the States would come to nothing; which would occasion no small con∣fusion, and a retardment of the King's Affairs. His Majesty might make Himself Master of the Deputations, and gainful Commissions, which are given to the States: As for example, in Bretannie, Monsieur the late Mareschal de la Milleray, nominated alone, or rather, caus'd to be nominated whom he pleas'd, and there was no more deliberating after he had given or∣der; 'twas one way he had to gratifie his Friends. Monsieur the Duke Mazarin, does the same still; which may, in His person, suc∣ceed well: but the King may cause whom he will to be nominated, and the liberty of the States will not suffer by it any prejudice, or innovation at all: for such is the condition of things in these places. I will not speak here of the Farms of Iron, nor of others of like va∣lue. These things run in ordinary course.

But having spoken of the bringing in of Money, I must speak of a due laying out, and a like due laying up thereof. The advantage of an Exchequer doth not consist in the bare getting in of Money; but also in a meet ex∣pending of it: and there is no less profit in gi∣ving of it forth, than in receiving of it. 'Tis necessary the King should spend to maintain his Revenues. For if all the Sums that come into His Coffers should not issue thence again,

no one, in the end, would be able to pay Him any thing. The Kings of Aegypt, who took a third part of their Subjects Estates, caus'd the Labyrinth to be built, the Pyramids to be erected, the Lake of Meotis to be dug up, and other Fabricks raised, which are incredible to Posterity. Their design was to disperse among People, the Treasure they received from them; and withal, banish sloth and idleness out of their States. These two Vices, so dangerous in Kingdoms, the Aegyptian Laws did so strict∣ly provide against, that there were particular Magistrates appointed, unto whom every pri∣vate Man was obliged to give an account eve∣ry year of all that he had done throughout the year; which was executed with so much ex∣actness and rigor, that if any one had taken an ill course to live, or not preserv'd his Estate, he was severely punish'd for it. The same thing was done at Athens, and the Romans had Censors, who took the like care; they had it in charge, to make a review of all the People every fisth year, and inform the Senate of all that was amiss in the Commonwealth. I have often wondred, that there is no such Officer in France: and that each ones Estate is not precisely known, which 'tis hugely im∣portant, it should be; because in difficult times, when the Kingdom perceives it▪ self involv'd in urgent necessities, succor must be drawn from every one in proportion to his Interest in the Publick Fortune, that is, in proportion to what he possesseth in the Kingdom.

Expence must be made with good Husban∣dry; and a judicious parcimony observed in

it; that it run not out to a profusion on one hand, nor sink into a sordid avarice on the other: If Measure and Rule be not kept in the issuing out of Money, all the Gold of Asia will be but a small matter. Caligula found the way to consume in his debauches in one year, the immense Treasures which his Pre∣decessor had been heaping up all along the whole course of his Empire. Thus it is expe∣dient, that a King do cause the sums to be paid which are charged upon the Receipt of his Finances; and also that He give liberally; but always so order the matter by his Prudence, that nothing go out of, or be kept in his hand, but for the preservation and prosperity of His Subjects.

I said in a former Chapter, that there were too many Officers in France; that the wages they draw from the King were unprofitable, nay, prejudicial to the State. Since the Sale of Offices was introduced, divers new Crea∣tions have been made. All these Edicts were meerly to get Money in some pressing Occur∣rences; and nothing but the conjunctures of the time rendred them tolerable. Now that those occurrences are over, and the conjunctures pass'd, things must be reduc'd to due order, by suppressing all those new Officers.

I noted, that wherever Magistracy brought gain, disorders would creep in; the reason of which is very clear, and very natural. For it is infallibly certain, that Judges will augment the number of Suits, while those Suits will bring them in profit. Consequently, useless Officers being suppress'd, and provision made

in the case by a due reduction, sufficient Sala∣ries must be allowed them, and they forbidden to take any thing of the Plaintiff or Defen∣dant, upon the Penalties express'd in the anci∣ent Statutes. And that the King might make a stock to raise those Salaries, without char∣ging His Finances, it should be ordained, that such as go to Law shall, when they commence their Suit, deposite a certain sum into the hands of the Clerks: this, to be done in all the Roy∣al Jurisdictions. As for other Judges, they ought to take nothing at all: the proprietary Lords must defray the charge of their Courts, if they will keep up the Power to hold them: they having it of the King upon this condition, from the first Grant of the Fiefs.

In matter of the Finances, it is not sufficient to have the Secret of getting Money, and the skill of duly expending it: but there must be also a right course taken to make reserves of it. The Romans had a publick Treasury, where every year they laid up certain sums for the necessities of the Commonwealth. Other Na∣tions were no less provident. History tells us of the Stores of David, of Croesus, of Midas, and many others. The King having setled an Order in His Finances, both as to Expences and Receipt, it will be very prudently done of Him, to limit what he shall think fit to re∣serve: and this reservation should make the first Article in his Finances, and be continued until he hath in his Coffers, in some secret place, the fourth part at least of all the Coin in the Kingdom: the rest (if well us'd) may be suf∣ficent for all the People to maintain Commerce,

and pay the King's Revenues I say, this re∣serve should be in a secret place, and known only to persons of approved Fidelity. For if many had notice of it, such a store might oc∣casion Seditions, and Civil Wars. Now a fourth part of the Money being once laid up apart in the King's Coffers, some addition to it shall be made continually from year to year, in proportion to what comes in anew.

Yet liberty must be left to Persons, for some time, to have Gold and Silver Plate: yea, it would do well, to augment the use and mode of having it, if it may be; and that for three reasons. First, because the Goldsmiths per∣ceiving hope of gain, will not want inventions and industries to get into France as much Met∣tal as possibly they may, either in ingots, or barrs, or coyned pieces. Secondly, because by this means Riches will be kept in the Kingdom, and when a season for it comes, all they that are owners of such Plate, may be commanded to carry it to the Mint, and there receive the price of it. The third reason is, because the Goldsmiths having wrought up, and made Plate, contrary to the direction of the Statute, (which undoubtedly they will do) a search may be made in the case, if affairs require; a search highly just, and no less advantageous.

Two regulations must be made for the Gold∣smiths, and they enjoyned to observe them, upon pain of forfeiting Life and Goods; and so strict an hand held over them, that of all who trangress, not a Man be pardoned. The first is, to prohibit their working upon any piece of Gold, or Silver Coyn. The second,

that they do not change the form of any pro∣hibited Plate: rectifie and mend it they may. At the same time, all Persons that have any such and would put it off, must be commanded upon great penalties, to carry it to the Mint, where ready Money shall be paid them for it, at the currant price; they making proof that they are the true owners; and this to avoid Thieveries which may have been committed. These two regulations will oblige the Gold∣smiths to make use of new Silver, or Foreign Coyns, and thus they would cause a very con∣siderable quantity of either to enter into France.

The State would receive no small profit by taking a due order in matter of Coyn. It should be ordained therefore in the first place; that no more be made any where but at Paris; and all other Mints, and their Officers, suppress'd as Useless. The Romans, who had so much Money, had but one place to make it in, which was a Temple of Juno's at Rome. Charlemain forbad any Money to be made otherwhere than in His Palace. And the truth is, should all the Money of France pass through Paris, the King would much better know what quantity of it was in His Kingdom. Secondly, the Court des Monnoyes must be suppress'd, and united to the Chamber of Accompts, as I have said hereto∣fore. In the third place, the value of Brass Money must be abated; this kind of Coyn be∣ing the ruine of the State. It cannot be be∣liev'd how many Liarts and Sous the Hollanders have brought into France. It would be conve∣nient to set the Sous at two Liarts a-piece, the Liarts at a Denier, and the Doubles at an

Obole, (half a Denier:) but this should be done by little and little, and the fall made by degrees, that the people be not ruin'd: mean time, Silver pieces of six blanks, others of a Sous in value, and of twelve Deniers, are to be stamped. Brasiers, and workers in Mettal, must be forbidden to melt up any Sous, Liarts, or Doubles; or otherwise use them in work. For after the Reduction, a Sous, a Liart, and a Double, would be worth more in work than in Money; and that quantity of them which is in the Kingdom being preserv'd, would suffice for Commerce in small wares; they also be∣ing less▪ worth in Money than otherwise, Fo∣reigners would bring in no more of them. In the fourth place, 'tis fit that a Gold-coyn be made of the value of the Leuis's; this Coyn to have on the front a Sun, the face thereof representing the King, with these words about it, Nec pluribus impar, and the year it is made in: On the reverse, a Cross charged or can∣toned with Fleurdelizes; and the ordinary Motto, CHRISTƲS vincit, regnat & im∣••e••at. Of this Coyn there should be half and quarter pieces made, as there are half Crowns of Gold. This new Money should be called Suns, and all Gold Louises made in France, for∣bidden. As likewise all cravens of Or Sol, and Crowns of the Queen. New Silver-coyn also should be made; the pieces called Monarques, or Dieudonnes, or some other names; in them the Figure of the King crowned after the man∣ner of Antiquity, with the Title Ludovicus XIV. Franciae Rex: on the reverse, a Cross with Fleurdelizes, and the ordinary Inscription. Of

these pieces there must be some of twelve De∣niers, others of two Sous, six Deniers: others of five Sous, of ten Sous, of twenty, of forty. And to have matter for them, all Loueses of sixty must be forthwith prohibited: because a multitude of false ones go abroad. Afterward, the Loueses of thirty Sous, made any where but at Paris, shall be call'd in; and there must the new Coyns be also made. They will be well received by the People; for that every one hath an extream affection for the King; and because in France we account by Livres, or Franks, and have no such Money; the Quar∣decues being no longer current. This new Coyning of Money is likely to bring a great deal into the Kings Coffers.

Gold and Silver must be held in France at an higher rate than they bear among Strangers; that we may draw it hither▪ nothing hath brought us so much Gold from Spain, Italy, and other Countries, as the permission some∣time grantéd, that light pieces should pass. The same thing should be done awhile, for once again: it would cause all Foreigners to come and take off our Wines, our Linnen, and our Corn.

I should not forget to say, as I put an end to this Chapter, that the Masters of Accompts, the Correctors and Auditors, having wages of the King, ought not to take any other Salary for any thing they do, that directly refers to His Majesties service; I mean, for the Accompts of the Treasurers of the Reserve, and other Accomptable Officers: for they are paid for this by their wages: practising in the manner

they do, they take, as the saying is, two Tolls of one grist.

I said, that it was not at all just, that the Masters of Accounts, Auditors, and Correctors, take Fees for the Accounts they examine, for∣asmuch as they receive Wages and Privileges from the King: also this Custom was anciently practis'd, and this would be to reduce things to the primitive State. I well know, that the pretence of these Fees is founded upon the creation of some Chamber of Accouuts, where those payments are made that never go to the Chamber; but this pretext is frivolous; for the Chambers of Accompts in Montpellier, and else∣where, ought not in like mauner to take any Mo∣ney for examining the Accounts of the King: so these new Chambers take away no Money from that at Paris, that peradventure takes from them the homages, and the verification of gifts; but in this the Clerks only are the loosers, and the Master Auditors and Correctors are not concern'd.

Addition. Of the fine gross Farms.

I said but a word by the way of fine gross Farms, which is one of the projects to raise Money by; the fine gross Farms are let upon the Merchandise, and upon the receipt of the Kings Rights; to avoid the charge of all these, an agreement might be concluded with all the Merchants, to pay every year a certain sum to the King at Paris; and upon their doing this,

they should not be molested in their passage on the Rivers, or by Land, for any Toll or Custom.

CHAP. XI.

1. Of Peace and War. Of Sciences, of Arts, of Laws, of Publick Edifices, and Shews. 2. Of Arms, of Arsenals, Ar∣tilleries, of Fortified places and Gover∣nors. 3. Of Armies, of Conquests; how a Conquered Country should be pre∣served.

EIther Calm or Storm, if perpetual, would alike unfit the Sea for Navigation. The Waves must not rage, and swallow up the Ves∣sels they should bear: but there must be Wind enough to fill the Sails, and give convenient motion; nay some little Tempests are of use to quicken the Pilots skill; whom continual fair weather would entice into a dangerous idleness. Just so is it necessary, that there still be, in a great State, especially in Nations of the French temper, some moderate agitati∣on, and that the noise of Arms produce an ef∣fect upon them, like that of the Winds upon the Sea. Peace, by general consent, is that at which all Politicians do aim; nor can it be de∣ny'd to be preferrable to War, being natural, as Liberty is. Yet War hath its peculiar ad∣vantages; and those to such a degree, that we

may account it to be of Divine Right. To say true, what other right did GOD give His Peo∣ple against the Kings of Canaan? In short, War makes the Peace of Kingdoms the more firm, as a Storm causeth the Air to resume a more setled serenity. The prudence of Laws therefore should have provided Expedients for the preservation of States in each of these sea∣sons: and the Wisdom of Legislators hath been justly taxed, in that they have not sufficiently thought upon this provision. The Poet, upon this ground, gives his Ʋlysses all along, the company of Minerva, and disguiseth her a great many ways, that she might not be parted from him. In sum, the Mythologists repre∣senting this Goddess armed, and bearing both the Shield and Thunder-bolt of Jupiter her Father, do therein let us know, that the Wis∣dom of a good King ought to serve Him both for Peace and War. And such was the manner of teaching, in deepest and most remote Anti∣quity: Philosophy then but growing up, and bashful, durst not shew her full lustre unto de∣prav'd and ignorant men, to whom She was yet very much a Stranger. She accosted them veiled with the shadows of Fable; and went softly and secretly about the preparing of their reason to receive her illuminations and instructions. But to return to our similitude; A Storm doth not reach to the whole extent of the Ocean; and whatever Tumults be in some part of a Kingdom, yet the whole doth not so feel the shock of War, but that in others, Peace subsists; so as the Glory of Arms, and the Contentments of a full Tranquility, may

be had together. Nevertheless, since these two different times do require like different cares; each of which were enough to take up the whole application of an excellent King; it is expedient to consider them severally.

Peace is undoubtedly proper for the Cultiva∣tion of Arts and Sciences. Knowing Men there must be in a Common-wealth; it being neces∣sary that there should be good Men. For knowledge 'tis that enlightens our Soul, shews us Virtue, and inflames us with desire to pos∣sess it. I joyn Sciences here and Arts; it be∣ing impossible that Men should have the one without the other. For as they are Images of GOD, they are mov'd by a natural propen∣sion, to produce one thing or other; so that having acquired general Speculative Principles, they necessarily descend to Practical operations, which are perform'd by particular Rules, from whence Arts take their rise. This is done during a Calm; then the Soul, not interrup∣ted by any violent agitation, enjoys, and by reflections, which by its leisure and repose per∣mit it to make, views its self. 'Tis in these precious hours that it may come to know the Dignity of its Original, and be assured of its Immortality. At such a time, having and keeping its faculties united, it gathers the fruit of a solid Wisdom; which is unto the Soul, as the Sun is to the Eyes of the body; and being of all goods the greatest, communicates its self in precepts; whereof Law is the abstract and consummation, giving the same spirit to all the People.

To proceed: it is important, that Cities be enrich'd with publick Buildings, as Temples, Palaces, and other sumptuous Edifices; be∣cause People have, by that means, the more affection for their Country. The Trojans re∣gretting their defeat, were griev'd more for the ruine of Troy, than the subversion of its Empire. And the Jews in Babylon lamented the demolishing of the Temple, where they had offered their sacrifices, more than they did the loss of their Liberty. This affection of People for their Country, is likewise augmen∣ted by the contentment they receive in it; and this Maxim was a principal reason why the Greeks and Romans exhibited to their Subjects publick shews.

'Tis in a time of Peace that a Prince should prepare His Forces for War: yea, He ought to be always in Arms, they being the Orna∣ment of His Royal Majesty, and support of the Laws. A People not armed does degene∣rate; and we see, that Nations heretofore eminently redoubtable, are now bankrupt as to Valour and Reputation. Croesus after his de∣feat, counselled Cyrus His Conqueror, in re∣compence for the Favour which had been shewed him, to disarm the Lydians, and promote a∣mong them Musick, good Cheer, and Pleasures: so they would never revolt, nor fail of obeying His Command. This Counsel of Croesus was really good: For by that means the Inhabitants of Lydia lost their former love for War, and forgat their ancient virtue. Yet it is not ex∣pedient that Arms, which are the Kings, (for He hath the power of the Sword) should be

in the hands of all private Persons alike: and the difference between a Citizen and a Gentle∣man, a Soldier and a Country-Labourer, not be discern'd: Arms therefore must be in their hands whom the King intends for that employ∣ment: and He being every ones Protector, se∣curing all by His Authority, all others must be expresly forbidden to bear any, without His permission, upon pretence of Hunting, or Journey, or Enemies: and this upon pain of being Fined, and in case of reiterated Offence, sent to the Gallies. These Penalties too must not be meerly comminatory, but as they term it, Legal, and of indispensible necessity. Not that Gentlemen should all be depriv'd of the liberty to wear a Sword: on the contrary, 'tis fit to be injoyn'd them, that they never neglect to do it; because it is the mark of their Quality, and continually minds them of the Virtue of their Ancestors. It may be pro∣hibited them to carry Fire-arms; yet 'tis con∣venient to permit them to keep in their Hou∣ses Musquers, Fire-locks, Pistols, and other Arms; for that they naturally are Defenders of the State, and by consequence ought to be furnish'd for any occasion that may be offered. For the same reason 'tis meet that Gentlemen be enjoyn'd to keep their Stables stor'd with good Horses, to breed up and manage a num∣ber of them for their Service in War. But to this end, the use of German Horses for the Coach, must be forbidden, and none of them suffered to come into France: but Mares only for breed.

Lawyers, Ecclesiasticks, Citizens, Merchants, Artificers, Husbandmen, should never wear a Sword, because 'tis not their Profession; and I would as much approve a Gentleman's fan∣cying to wear a Lawyers Gown, or a Priests Cassock. But that no such person do abuse this Honourable mark, it must be ordained as a fundamental Law of Honour, that whoever strikes with a Sword, a Man, who, (not be∣ing of such profession) has none, shall be de∣clared actually fallen from all Honour, and as a very Plebeian, yea Villain, (to use the old word) deprav'd from all Gentility, and re∣duc'd to the rank of a Labourer.

Since Arms are the Kings, as I said, it is ex∣pedient that there be Magazines in divers parts of the Kingdom: they, committed to the cu∣stody of safe Hands, and persons of unquesti∣onable Fidelity: in them a store of all sorts of Arms Offensive and Defensive; ready fix'd, to Arm 40000 Men. There should be Equi∣page for Horses, Boots, Spurrs; One of these Magazines should be plac'd at Paris, to cover Picardy, Champagne and Normandy. One at Lion, for any occasion that might happen on the side of the Mediterranean of Italy, of Swis∣serland, or the Franche Comte. One at Tho∣louse, or some other City of Languedoc, for all that might be apprehended from Spain, or the Sea of Guyenne. And one at Angers, to se∣cure the Coasts of Bretagne, and Poictou. There need be beside these, two Arsenals for the Sea; which I shall speak of in their place. It will be necessary to have in the Magazines a good number of Cannon for Battery, and of Field-pieces

ready mounted with Powder, Ball, and Equipage for the Horses of the Train.

The King should have, for the security of his State, several Fortified Places in his King∣dom. 'Tis an ill piece of Policy to neglect them; and good heed had need be taken, that he that may chance to win a Battel, and be∣come Master of the Field, do not at the same time become Master of the Cities also. It is known what Revolutions England hath suffer'd by it. And on the contrary, Flanders clearly shews what a Countrey thick set with Fortres∣ses is. Yet Excess being every where vicious-I would observe a mediocrity here. But, above all, there must be left no Fortifications in Towns or Castles, which belong to parti∣cular Lords: except the King places in them other Governors than the Proprietors. These kind of Places embolden Persons of Quality that possess them, to Declare themselves, and make Parties in a time of Civil War: what pass'd at Tailebourg in the last Troubles, is an example fully authorizing what I have pro∣pos'd. I will say more of strong Places and Garisons in the Chapter of the Education of Children.

It is not sufficient to have such strong places, and them well furnished with Garisons and brave Soldiers; unless there be given them Captains fit to Command them, and to be their Governors. In each place then there must be four sorts of Officers. The Governor, the King's Lieutenant, the Governor's Lieute∣nant, and the Major. These all having their Commissions from His Majesty, it is expedient,

that, as far as is possible, their bearing Office be limited to a certain time; to the end, that the continuing of 'em longer may be in nature of a recompence for their Services. And they thus attending with the greater diligence to their Duty; I should also wish, that being continued in employment, they should change place. As for example, That a person who hath been the King's Lieutenant three years at Dunkirk, should go serve as Lieutenant-Gover∣nor at Peronne, or elsewhere. Not that such a Change were fit to pass upon all the Officers of a place at the same time. But let their Commissions last three Years, and every Year one be changed, that they may serve together one Year only. It is meet to, after the man∣ner of the Turks, that their Commissions ex∣pired, they be kept a Year without employ∣ment, to see whether there be any complaint against them. These alterations would work two effects equally advantagious to the King's Service. The First is, that every one would stick to his Duty. The Second, that the King always having such kind of Employments to give, there would be more persons to hope for them; which would much more strongly engage them to well-doing. The same usage should be introduc'd, if it be possible, in re∣ference to Governors, the King's Lieutenants. There is a concluding observation to be made; namely, that it being the Custom for Gover∣nors to have some Companies of Carabines, which they call their Guards; they give them Cassocks of their own Livery. I would have this Order changed; and that the King should

every year send each Governor a Troop of Horse to serve about him for a Guard; they having the King's Cassocks as a Badge of their Commission; and their Officers carrying the Staff in presence of their Governor during their year of service. This would be a means to augment the Authority of the King, and not diminish that of the Governors.

As to Armies, it cannot be precisely said of what number of Men they should consist; nor whether they ought to be strongest in Horse or in Foot. This wholly depends upon the en∣terprizes that are made, upon the quality of the Country, and nature of the Enemy. I should advise, that a Great King do keep Troops on foot, even during Peace, nothing is so neces∣sary to a State as old Soldiers. Augustus, after his Victories, did not cashier the Forty Roman Legions; which prov'd to be the safety of the Empire. Constantine, on the contrary, dis∣banded them; and thence came, in the issue, the dissolution of the Power of the Romans Augustus however, and the other Caesars, com∣mitted a great fault in keeping the Pretorians in a Body, for the Grandeur of their Persons; and History tells us what lamentable changes they made in the succession of the Emperors. The Turks have fallen into like disasters by following the like usage. I should therefore judge it expedient to divide the Troops into several Quarters, and keep them in far distant Garisons. The ancient Kings of Aegypt had a great many Soldiers perpetually in Pay, and were always apprehensive of their Instructions: but found a way to secure themselves from all

such Seditions of their Armies. Dividing them into Bodies, according to the diversity of Nations, they gave them different Ensigns; as for instance, to some a Crocodile; to others a Dog; to a third sort a Cat; and so the rest. Now the Aegyptians being hugely Superstitious, they were easily induced to believe, that their Tutelary Deities were included in the figure of those Beasts which were given them for En∣signs; and that they had the same Antipathies among them in Heaven, which those Beasts that represented them, had to one another up∣on Earth. Thus under a Veil of Religion, those People were possess'd with an aversion for each other, like those Animals which they had been ordered to carry in their Banners; yet all were close united, and perfectly at ac∣cord for the common defence of the State: so nothing could be executed against the inten∣tions of the Prince; because as soon as any should begin to stir, the rest would immedi∣ately have opposed them. Upon this example the King might divide all his Troops by Pro∣vinces; and though there should be no enga∣ging of Religion in the case, yet much advan∣tage would, without fail, be drawn from thence. For the Nations would strive to out-vie one an∣other, with more zeal and ardor than the Re∣giments now do. These Regiments themselves might have names given them from the Arms of their Provinces; as that of the Bretons might be called the Regiment of the Ermine; that of the Normans the Regiment of the Leo∣pards, &c. Jutius Caesar raised a new Legion among the Gauls, and gave it the name of the

Lark. But what I say in this particular, is but the giving my Opinion. For I am not of the mind, that the order of the Militia should be changed, or Regiments disbanded, which consist of the best and most War-like Troops that are in the World.

'Tis ordinarily a great question; of what Soldiers an Army should be composed. We have Subjects and Forreigners. The Subjects are Gentlemen and Plebeians. The Plebeians are Citizens and Rusticks. On the other hand, of Forreigners, some are the Auxiliary Troops of Allies, which serve at the cost of their own Princes: as when the King sent succors into Germany, and unto the Hollanders: Others are Troops that serve at the cost of the State which employs them. The Ancients termed them Mercinaries. Such at this time are the Suissers, and not a few Germans. All these dif∣ferent sorts of Soldiers may be used, as necessi∣ty and the conjuncture of Affairs requires. The Romans did so. It is true, by their Treaties of Alliance they always obliged their Allies to send them a certain number of Soldiers; but these were not incorporated with their Legi∣ons; and it is clear, that Subjects are ever best; of Subjects, Gentlemen have ordinarily more courage than others. Of Plebeians, those of the Country are to be preferred before the In∣habitants of Cities; because Peasants are more accustomed to Labour and Hardship than Townsmen are. Auxiliary Troops serve but for a time; and often, when some continuati∣on of service is demanded of them, they im∣pose hard conditions. Mercenaries will have

Money, and care not if a State be ruin'd, so themselves are paid. In fine, Strangers may on the suddain change Interests and Party; so of Friends becoming Enemies; and that in oc∣casions of greatest importance. Mercenaries above all, do serve without affection, and sel∣dom stand it out in Fight unto the utmost. They push on a Victory indeed, but scarce ever win a Battel. In short, Strangers should be as little made use of as possible: and scarce for any other cause, but that Enemies might be deprived of their Aid. When Strangers only are taken into Service, the Subjects grow less War-like, and the most considerable of them despise War, as is done in Spain; and extreamly ill done. The Carthaginians were ruined principally by the fault they committed in employing Numidian Troops and other Strangers; and not sending out their own Ci∣tizens in their Armies.

I will not here speak of the Art of War; 'tis a matter that deserves a Chapter apart. Yet I will say cursorily, that the Rules of it change as Time and Seasons do. We neither attack Places nor defend them, in the very man∣ner that the Ancients did. There is also a great deal of difference between their way of fight∣ing and ours; so that they had not the Arms which we now use. All of precept for the leading of an Army, that faileth not nor chan∣geth, is, that Discipline be exercised; where∣in Commanders should never be remiss.

The only School of War, is War it self: and twenty Years experience will better make a great Captain than an hundred Years Read∣ing.

Not but that we have examples of Ge∣neral Command given to persons, who never were in Armies afore. There are elevated Spirits, to whom nothing is impossible; but the instances are rare; and 'tis too too hazar∣dous a course to rely upon them. For a Cap∣tain must have, not only spirit and courage, but also credit with his Soldiers; which can∣not be gotten but by service. In fine, it is ne∣cessary for a great State to keep War on foot, and Men of Quality must be employed in it: to the end there may always be a stock of good Soldiers, and a breed of Generals. These two things give a Nation marvellous advantages and esteem among Foreigners.

Though France now be a most powerful Monarchy, by means of its Extent, of its Sci∣tuation, the Fruitfulness of the Soil, the Num∣ber of its Inhabitants; and though greatest States have not always most strength, as big∣gest Men are not always stoutest; yet were it to be wish'd, that the King did add unto his Kingdom, First all the Low Countrys to the Rhyne. This Conquest would re-settle Him in possession of the ancient demain of His Prede∣cessors, giving France gain its primitive limits. It would make him Master of the Northern Seas, and by consequence, Arbitrator between the Crowns of Sweden and Denmark, Poland, &c. Conquest must be aspired to out of a thirst of Empire, being an unjust thing, (if we believe Aristotle: for I would not determine, but that the right of War were a very lawful right, consonant to what I have said in the beginning of this Chapter;) but the desire of Conquest

should principally be for the doing of good to all Men; which is the end why GOD gave them Laws. The more Subjects and Power a just Prince hath, the better will it be for the World. Secondly, It were convenient that the King had Strasbourg, to keep all Germany quiet. In the third place, He need have the Franche County, to lay a restraint upon the Suisses, least dividing themselves between the Empire and France, or serving Spain in a War there, they strengthen his Enemies. In the fourth place, Milan is necessary in respect of Italy, to give the lesser Sovereigns and Republiques pro∣tection, and ballance the Power which the King of Spain hath usurp'd there. In the fifth place, Genoa and all its Territory, pertains to the King: nor would the Genoese have revolted, had it not been for the bad counsel given to Francis the First, to discontent Doria. Genoa would make the King Master of the Meditera∣nean Sea; beside, those two Acquisitions would keep the Duke of Savoy lock'd up within French Territories: So he would never depart from the King's Service, being entirely His depen∣dant. We must re-enter the Isle of Elba, and into Portolongone, and Piombino, on the conti∣nent, to drive the Spaniards out of Italy. Here our nearness would keep the Duke of Florence, the Dukes of Parma, of Modena, and of Man∣tua, and even the State of the Pope, in a sub∣mission for France. Corsica would not stand out after the reduction of Genoa; and then Sardinia would be no difficult Conquest. This would strongly favour any stirs on the account of Liberty or Discontent that might be raised

in the Kingdoms of Sicily and Naples: nor would it be an hard matter to raise them in time.

On the Coast of Bayonne there would be need of Fuentaravia; and those parts of the Kingdom of Navarr which the Spaniards have in possession, might be justly re-demanded. The King might also carry His Arms into Ca∣talonia: we have ancient pretensions there; and the Conquests of it would be no less easily atchieved than it was in the time of the last War. Majorca and Minorca would follow without trouble. Thus the King would be ab∣solute Umpire of the Mediterranean, and of all the fortune of the Spaniards. If it should hap∣pen one day that the Queen, or Her Descen∣dants, should have an Hereditary Right there, the King would be in a condition to do Him∣self reason in these matters. The means of making these Conquests severally, cannot be shewed without particular discourses.

Mean time, what I have said is not, in truth, to be done in a day: it would be an enterprise of many years. Yet there is nothing of meer fancy it it. I propose no Conquest to be made but what hath really been made, except that of the Isles of the Mediterranean, which our Kings never minded; for that before Charles the Eighth they never were in case to strengthen themselves at Sea. Bretagnie was separted from the Kingdom, the Wars of Italy took up every Reign unto Henry the Second. Then follow'd the affairs of Religion, which put a stop to all the designs that might have been formed in this behalf.

Here one thing I suggested in the precedent Chapter, is to be remembred; namely, That Conquests do afford a State one expedient to get Money. In this the Roman Captains are to be imitated; who made it a point of Glory to lay up extraordinary sums in the Publick Treasury; and their Triumphs were as illustri∣ous by the wealth they brought home with them, as by the Enemies they had defeated in their Expeditions. It would be very material therefore, that Generals should account it a Glory to them, to bring the Spoils of their Ene∣mies unto the profit of the King and Kingdom; or at least make the Conquered Countrys main∣tain and pay their Armies. But the difficulty is not to make Conquests; the Arms of the French will be Victorious wherever they appear. All the trouble is to find out the secret how to keep what hath been gotten. It is fit to say something on this particular.

The means to preserve Conquer'd Countrys which the Ancients used, and that with good success, are in a manner these. Transporta∣tions, and shiftings of the People. As when the Chaldeans led away the Jews to Babylon. The taking away of their Money, of their richest Goods, their Antiquities, their Holy Things and things of Religion; as was done with the ancient Idol-gods, and as the Ark of the Covenant, the Tables of Moses, and the Israelites holy Writings, were dealt withall. The same for substance might be done among us, by shifting of Saints Reliques and Conse∣crated Images. The leading away of the ablest Men, and such as have greatest credit with the

People. So did the Romans when they carried some of the Greeks out of their Country to Rome, and treated them there with all possible kindness and civility. In like manner as to Ar∣tificers: the Turks drew at one time 30000 Work-men out of Persia. The Romans, out of their Enemies whom they had vanquish'd and taken in War, reserved those whom they thought stoutest, and made them fight on the Theatre, the People being Spectators, de∣stroying them by that means. Christianity suffers not such inhumanity. Slavery was al∣way practis'd in the case of Prisoners of War, and the ransom we make them pay, is an Image of that old Custom. Some People to this day stay their Prisoners, or send them away to pu∣nishment, after the fashion of the Ancients.

To proceed, other means in reference to conquer'd Countrys are, the mixing of the old and new Subjects by Marriage, the Conquerors accommodating themselves to the manners of the Conquered, taking up their modes, eating with them, as Alexander demeaned himself to∣wards the Persians. Then again, the ruining the Fortifications of their Towns; the ta∣king Hostages of them: the taking away their Arms, and keeping them weak; the abstaining from their Wives; the giving them no jealousie in matter of Love. To have little converse with them, especially in their Houses; and when any is, to see it be with seriousness and decency; to honour them; to do them a pleasure on occasion; not play with them; not pick any quarrel with them: not touch their Liberty, nor the Goods that have been

left them: not disquiet them for matters of Religion. To do them Justice, maintain them in their Laws and Customs, and in their man∣ner of Government, as the Romans did; who permitted the People whom they had subdued, to have their accustomed Laws To be dif∣fedent of them, and shew a confiderde in them. To appear not desirous of their secrets: not interrupt them in their pleasures: make them pay the Tribute agreed upon with them exactly, not at all augmenting it. To keep word with them in all things, seldom meddle in their af∣fairs, except it be to accord them: to lend them no Money; but owe them some, and punctually pay the Interests of it: not let them know the true State of affairs; not give them entrance into strong holds; which must always be well furnish'd with Men and Provisions▪ That the Governor never come among them without being strongest, or having Hostages. To prevent their assembling, and hinder as much as may be their having Commerce with Neighbours that are under another Prince's Dominion: to keep off all kind Strangers from Houses, and severely punish such of 'em as shall cause the least trouble, or any motion that may tend to Sedition. If our Conquerors had practis'd in this manner, Italy and Sicily would have been French to this day.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Sea, and its usefulness. 2. Means to augment the Kings Power there. 3. Of Commerce. 4. Of Colonies.

THE Water of the Sea are wholly obnoxi∣ous to the humorousness of Fortune; and the Wind that governs them turneth and changeth with as much inconstancy as that blind Goddess. Yet it is certain, that those States whose renown is greatest in Story, did not establish their supreme Dominion, but up∣on the power they attained to at Sea: as if Virtue, stout and undaunted, had resolv'd to Combat and Conquer her Enemy in the very seat of her Empire. The Romans are one in∣stance, (whose example is ever to be follow'd with as peculiar a diligence, as their conduct of matters was with singular wisdom, and hard to be imitated:) They imposed not upon the World their Laws, till they had forced the Seas to receive and acknowledge them. Had they not set out War-like Fleets, they had ne∣ver accomplished their glorious Designs; they had never extended their Frontier beyond Italy; never brought down the Pride of Car∣thage; nor Triumphed over all the Crowns on Earth. The Aegyptians, the Persians, and the Grecians, considered the Sea as the principal support of their Domination. Xerxes having caus'd the H••li••spout to be to punish'd (as he

termed it) with Stripes, accounted his Va∣nity satisfy'd in the sight of all Asia, which he drew after him into Greece, with so much Magnificence and Pomp, that it seemed as if Jupiter Himself was come down from Heaven. The Venetians still renew every year their Alli∣ance with this Element, by an old fond super∣stitious Custom, casting into the Sea a Ring, as if they espoused it: perhaps by this use they would inform all the particular Subjects of their Common wealth, that they should be content with the inconstancy and infidelity of their Women, since the State of espousing the Sea, espouseth inconstancy and infidelity it self. The Riches of Tunis, of Algier, of Holland, and England, plainly prove the ne∣cessity there is for Princes to be Strong at Sea, and do shew the Profit which does thence ac∣crue. These are petty States, yet dare mea∣sure their Forces with those of the Greatest Monarchs. The former of them are Turkish Slaves, the others revolted Burghers; and how insolent soever the English are, they must confess, that all the Brittish Isles laid together, do not equal the half of our Continent, either in Extent, or in Fruitfulness of Ground, or for Commodiousness of Scituation, or in num∣ber of Men; in Wealth, in Valour, Industry, and Understanding; yet they fear not to af∣firm themselves Sovereigns of the Sea. Had they cast up the Wracks they have suffered, and the Battles they have lost; had they well examin'd our Ports and Havens: in fine, had they compar'd the Coasts of France with those of England, they would condemn their Vanity,

as Canutus, one of their ancient Kings, did.

'Tis true, all States are not disposed unto Navigation: either because they are too far up in Midland Countries, or because the tem∣per of the People suits not with it; or because they want Subjects: but 'tis so far, that any of these Obstacles should hinder the French from addicting themselves unto it; that on the contrary, all things conspire to raise desire of it in them; and to give them hope of ad∣vantageous success. The work however is such as must be leisurably carried on, and per∣fected by little and little; so great a design continually allarming Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, Friends and Foes. A precipitation of it would be its ruine. I say not what num∣ber of Vessels would be fit for France to put to Sea. But I affirm that the King may keep an hundred Gallies, and an hundred Ships on the Mediterranean; and a Fleet of Two hun∣dred Sail upon the Ocean. The more Vessels He shall have, the more enabled He will be to recover the expence made about 'em. As to the building of such numbers six or ten years of time may be allotted for it: and there is Tim∣ber in France, there is Cordage, there are Sails; there is Iron and Brass; there are Victuals and Workmen; so that the King's Subjects will gain the Money which is laid out in 'em. Is it not far better for the King of France to build Ships for the employing and enriching of His Subjects, than it was for the Kings of Aegypt to build their useless Pyramids? There need be no anxious enquiry whence a Stock should rise for this advance; every year will

bring in Money; and the Vessels once made, and their Guns mounted, it will not cost the King a Quardecu for other Equippings. 'Twill be but to give the Captains Places in the Ships and Gallies, on condition to fit them out; and there will more persons come to take them, than there will be Offices and Places to be be∣stowed. 'Tis true, Fleets being out, there will need vast Sums to maintain them: but the Sea will yield a maintenance for the Sea, either by Commerce or by War. Neither will it be always proper to keep so many Vessels in ser∣vice. On the other hand, it will not be necessary to have so many Troops at Land as are at pre∣sent. For Spain or Italy will not dare to dis∣furnish themselves of their Men; so there will be no need of a Land-Army but towards Germany. The number of Rowers will be made up by bringing Men from Canada, and the American Islands: or by buying Negroes at Cape Verde: or by sending all Malefactors to the Gallies. And when things have taken their course, Seamen will be had; time, and the profit that will accrue, will afford store, and bring them in from all parts of the World.

Hereupon the Corsairs of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli; will not be able to keep at Sea; and the French being continually on their Coasts, they will be constrain'd to tarry at home for the guarding of their Towns: so not in a condition to send out Troops for col∣lecting the Tribute which they exact of the Arabs, and Princes who lye further up in Afri∣ca; the Tributaries will, without fail, revolt: and the King may in the sequel, Treat with

them for their recovering their Liberty, and take them into his Protection, There is no cause to fear the Power of the Ottoman Port in this particular. For beside that the Turks are no good Seamen, the Grand Signior doth make no such account of the Pyrats of Algier, as that their fortune is considerable to Him. The Friendship of the French is more necessary for Him, both in point of Commerce, and in re∣ference to other Interests.

The Fleets which the King might keep upon the Ocean, would make Him Master of all the Powers and Trade of the North. Yea, though the English and Hollanders should unite against France, they could not avoid their ruin in the end. For how should the one and the other make good their Commerce, which is all they have to trust to, if they were forced to main∣tain great Armada's to continue it? The point of Bretannie is the Gate to enter into, and go out of the Channel. Fifty Ships of War at Brest would keep this Gate fast shut; and they should not open it but by the King's Com∣mand. Spain and Portugal would not be able to attempt any thing but by His permission, if there were kept a Fleet on the Coast of Guyenne. Thus there would need no War al∣most to be made for all these things; nor His Majesties Forces hazarded. It would be suffi∣cient to give his Order to Forreiners. Nor will it be difficult to cut them out work in their own Countries, and by this means stay their Arms at home, and make them spend their strength there. I shall something of this in its place hereafter.

There is one further excellent means to streng∣then the King at Sea: and it is the taking Or∣der that no more of His Subjects go to Malta. To do this, there must be given in Fee to the French Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, some Isle in the Mediterranean, as for Instance, the Isle du Levant, for which they should pay an acknowledgment to the King, as they do for Malta to the King of Spain. There might be given them too on the same condition, an Isle in the Ocean, as Besle-Isle, l'Isle-Dieu, or the Isle of Ree: so that the French Knights fighting not but against the Enemies of their Country, they would make War upon the Eng∣lish as upon Turks; and keep the Islands at their own charge, whereas the King is fain to keep great Garisons, and be at vast expence to do it. There is no cause to fear that they will ever give the King any trouble: for being French, they cannot fail of Affection or Obe∣dience: and their Kindred, together with the Wealth they have in France, will be perpetu∣al Hostages to the King, and caution for their Fidelity. This Project is just: for of ten parts of the Knights of Malta, no less than eight do come from the Commanderies of France; and it is easie to be put in execution; for there need be only a stopping the income of the Commanderies to effect it. The Order in ge∣neral will find its advantages in it; both in that there will be an addition made it of two considerable Islands: and that the King will receive the Knights into a more particular Protection than he hath done hitherto. The number of Commanderies may also be aug∣mented,

by giving them some Maladeries, (or Hospitals for the diseased) which are al∣ways usurped by People that have no right to them at all.

Be it observed in the last place, that it is very requisite the Office of Admiral, and Pow∣ers of the Admiralty, should be united to the Crown. It hath been an ill Policy in France, and a Diminution of the King's Authority, to communicate unto a Subject so much of His Soveraignty at Sea as hath been done. He must resume it to Himself, and be every way Su∣preme alone: Then He may appoint a select number, whose charge may be to give Him ad∣vice of the State of Maritime concerns; and hold a Council from time to time upon them in His Majesties Presence, if He please to assist. These Officers shall in this Council judge of Prizes, and other Sea-affairs; and when its neces∣sary, be Commission'd, some of them, to visit the Ships, and make report, or send their acts in Writing concerning them. Other Officers for the Marine shall be Military: they, to ex∣ecute the King's Orders, and have the conduct of Designs and Enterprizes in the usual man∣ner. It is important to the King's Service, that the Captains of Ships and Gallies, be ho∣noured with Dignities and Rewards. There may be created Mareschals of France for Ar∣mies at Sea: as there are for those at Land, with the same Honours and Prerogatives. The Romans decreed a Triumph for Captains who had been victorious at Sea, and called it a Naval Triumph. They gave also Naval Crowns, as well as Mural and Civical. These Honours

would eminently promote the King's intention as to the Marine. There must be two Arse∣nals erected: One in Provence, in some Town upon the Rhosen, for what relates to Naval Ex∣peditions on the Mediterranean: another up∣on the River Loire, for all occasions on the Ocean. By means of these two Rivers, it will be easie to bring out to Sea all the Vessels that are builded: and all necessary Provisions and Tackling whatever. Nor need it be feared that any Enemy should get up these Rivers: they too may be shut up by Bridges, or by Chains, or by Forts.

His Majesties Power thus strongly setled on each Sea, it will be easie to secure Commerce in France, and even draw the Merchants thi∣ther from all parts. I say secure Commerce: for till all this be done, it will ever be uncer∣tain and dangerous. Now 'tis unnecessary to expatiate here, in proving what profit Com∣merce brings in to most potent States; the thing is generally known, and all Men con∣vinc'd of it. Again, I know not why it hath been said, that Trading is contrary to Vir∣tue; except it be, for that Merchants are in∣cessantly busied in studying inventions to get Money, and be in a sort, Servants to the Pub∣lick. The Romans, the Thebans, and the Spar∣tans admitted not any Citizen of theirs unto the administration of Affairs, unless he had for Ten whole years sorborn Merchandizing: because they would not have their principal Magistrates accustomed to Gain, and expert in the means to do it. These kind of inclina∣tions being blameable in persons, who being

destined to great Employments, ought to be above all Considerations of private Interest.

Commerce in every Common-wealth ought to take its measure from the temper of the People, from their strength, their wealth, the fertility of their Grounds, and the situation of their Country. Therefore Order must be ta∣ken, that things traded in be useful, and in a manner, necessary. For it is a rule in Oecono∣mie, that a Man spend not his Money in what is pleasing, though he needs it, but only in what is absolutely necessary. But necessity is stated by the Birth, the Dignity, and the Estate of Persons; as for example, noble Furniture is necessary for a great Lord; not so, for eve∣ry meaner Gentleman: and thus in othes cases, proportionably still to the rank and fortune of Men. It must be studiously prevented, that Commerce introduce not into a State, Super∣fluity, Excess and Luxury; which are often fol∣lowed with Ambition, Avarice, and a dange∣rous corruption of Manners. And forasmuch as it is not sufficient to Commerce, that there be people to Sell, but Merchants must be had to buy, otherwise no Wares can go off; in which all the advantage of Trade doth con∣sist: it is meet, that Traders furnish them∣selve, with necessaries, rather than with things that meerly tend to Ease, or Magnificence. Among necessaries, those make up the first rank, which do sustain Life it self; the second is of them that are for convenience; others are also necessary to preservation from Diseases, the in∣juries of Time and violence of Enemies, as Me∣dicinals, Dwelling, Arms.

There is every where a twofold Commerce, which is visible in France, more than in any other part of the World. The First is for things ordinarily found in the Country, some of which are spent by the Inhabitants them∣selves, and others transported. The Second, for Foreign Merchandises. We have in France, Wines, Corn, Linnen and Salt, in so great a quantity, that we send them into the neigh∣bor Kingdoms; and the quality of them is so excellent, that strangers cannot forbear to come and carry them out of our Ports. We have Cattle, Skins, Wooll, Tallow, Oils, and other things necessary for Man, of which Fo∣reiners export very little, but our selves do in a manner spend them all: and this is the great wealthiness of France, that we have enough to serve our turn without Foreign Merchandises; but Forreigners cannot do well without ours. We receive from other Countries, Minerals, Pearls, Precious Stones, Silks, Spices, and what seems to be matter of Luxury. Order should be given, that in France, the Commodities we have be made use of, before any Foreign Mer∣chandises be employed: because this Order fol∣lowed would bring in the people Money, and take off their Commodities; which would in∣cline every one to fall to the work of his Cal∣ling, and the whole Kingdom be thereby huge∣ly benefited.

It hath been a question offer'd to debate, Whether Traffique in France should be mana∣ged by the Subjects, or by Forreigners? Ma∣ny Reasons might be produced in the case, upon each hand: but to make a short decision;

'tis evident, that Foreigners must be allowed to gain by our Merchandises, if we would have them take them off. For if we carry them home into their Ports, we shall make less sales, and be at greater cost, than if they came to fetch them. Yet that our Merchants may share in the profit, they may enter into Partnership with them, or be their Commissioners here, or freight them themselves, provided, they sell at somewhat cheaper rates, and so be content with moderate gain; or take in payment, and ex∣change, the Foreign Commodities.

By means of Commerce, as well as by War, there may be French Colonies planted abroad, and so the dominion of the King extended, even to far distant Countries. All the Nations of the Earth are intermix'd, and may be termed Colonies, some of one People, some of another: Of as many as are known, few can be affirmed to be originally of the places they inhabit. But to plant Colonies out of danger, they must be seated in as much nearness still as is possible: For if they be separated at too great a distance, it will be difficult to relieve them: and per∣haps they may revolt, or some one or other make himself Master of them; and so the State will be in danger to lose its Subjects. Secondly, it is necessary, that Colonies be pla∣ced in such Countrys as are able to maintain the Families, that are design'd to make them up: otherwise Provisions, and Money it self, must be carried to them, which would cause loss and damage to the Common wealths that send 'em. In the third place, the Country should bear things that may yield profit to the

State, which erects the Colony. Fourthly, the Scituation should be such, as the State may have succour, and forces from them, both for War, and for Commerce. In the fifth place, the Country should not be so Fertile, and so much profit to be there made, that the anci∣ent Subjects should be drawn thither, and the State drein'd of People, as hath happen'd to Spain, by means of the West-Indies. In fine, for prevention of the inconveniences, I have mention'd, means must be used to have always Hostages from those of the Colonies, that they may be kept in their duty, and in the greater adherence to the interest of the State.

CHAP. XIII.

1. Of the Education of Children. 2. At what age it is expedient to Marry them.

NAture gives us the first fundamental dis∣positions for Arts, and all sorts of Pro∣sessions; and we feel a certain propension leading us to one kind of life, rather than a∣nother. Some say, this impression comes from the Power of the Stars, which by secret, influ∣ences from our temper; others affirm, that we derive our inclinations from our Ancestors. However it be, 'tis certain, we have movings, the Principles whereof are in our selves; we bring them into the World with us, and can∣not quit them: 'tis true, rules may be applied to them, and they corrected, when faulty, but

to change the quality of them, is impossible This regulation, or amendment, is effected by discipline; which can only give an after per∣fection to the works of Nature, keeping to her foregoing draughts, and designs, and com∣pleating what she hath begun.

A principal point then, in reference to Chil∣dren, is to know their Genius, that they may not be put out of their natural order, but em∣ploy'd in things to which they are Originally bent. The Philosophers, to make known the difference of capacities, have told us, that as for Souls, some are of Gold, others of Sil∣ver, other of Iron; and that as a good Es∣sayor must not mistake himself, in distinguish∣ing these three Metals; so a good Politician should not fail, in the judgment he makes, of the Children that are in the State: it's a piece of his profession to discern, what each of them will be proper for, that the intentions of na∣ture may be sortify'd, and polished by precepts.

There are no Common-wealths, but have in them Priests, Judges, Counsellors of State, Soldiers, Sea men, Merchants, Artificers, Hus∣bandmen; Children must be educated for these different Professions, and timely enabled to discharge them. 'Tis fit, that in the case of the younger sort, Three Ages be distinguished. The First, from their Birth, to the end of the Seventh year. The Second, from that Seventh year to the Fourteenth. The Third, from Fourteen unto one and twenty. Childrens first Five years should be spent in their Nursing up; and they not disquieted with any higher documents. 'Tis good, to put them upon

some gentle exercise, as they are growing, and cause them to endure cold; they will have the more Vigour, by that means. There are some Nations, that plunge their Children into run∣ning Water, and give them slight Clothing in the midst of Winter: so the ancient Gauls are noted-to have done. The bodies of Children must be plyed to the acting of all kind of Postures, and Motions; this will get them a facility and dexterousness for any thing. After the age of Five years, unto Seven, 'tis conve∣nient to tell them stories, that may raise in them a desire to do well in that profession to which they shall be destinated. From Seven years, unto Fourteen, those that are intended to be given to the Church, or to the affairs of Justice, or those of the State, should learn Latin, and Greek, because in those Languages, they have the source of all the Doctrine they will be ob∣liged to profess: as likewise after Fourteen, unto One and Twenty, they shall be taught Rhetorique, Philosophy, Theology, Law, or Politicks: which must be continued also, after that Age in the usual manner. It is very ne∣cessary that Seminaries for Priests be erected in every Diocess, and our Lords the Bishops ought to take all possible care in it. The young Persons, that are intended for the Wars, may be taught Italian, Spanish, and High Dutch: they that are design'd for Trade, should know somewhat in those three Languages: but such as are thought on for Commerce, in further distant Countrys, ought to Learn the Arabic, or the Sclavonian▪ or some other of the gene∣ral Tongues that are current in Asia, or in

Africa, as the Latin is in Europe. There must be publick Professors for these Languages, as there are for Latin, and Masters places en∣dowed at the Publick charge. After fourteen or sixteen years of Age, the Youths should be dispos'd of unto places, where they may learn the Art of Traffick. As for those that are de∣stin'd to the Wars, whether Gentlemen, or Plebeians, they should be sent at fifteen or six∣teen years unto Garisons, and the skill of ser∣ving on Horseback or on Foot, there taught them; and they exercised once a weak con∣stantly; which would most conveniently be done on Sundays and Holy-days. They shall be taught to handle the Pike and the Musket, the use of the Sword, the Halbard, Partisan, Broad-sword, and other Arms; they shall be put to Run, and Leap, and Wrestle. The Lacedemonians ordinarily exercis'd their young People; which was very providently done of them. For Strength and Expertness is not at∣tained but by long and daily exercise. In the Garisons shall be taught Fortification, the Mathematicks, Dancing, Vaulting, Ridiug; and it would do well, to take away Academies and Masters of Exercise, from places not Gari∣son'd, that the Garisons may be the Academies, as I may term them, where these things are learnt. Yea, to the end, that all sorts of Per∣sons might betake themselves to the Garisons, it should be ordained, that no private Masters shall take any Apprentices, but in Garison'd places; and that no one keep a Shop, or ex∣ercise any Trade, in any City of the Kingdom,

without a Testimonial from the Governor, that he hath serv'd his Apprentiship in a Ga∣rison Town: as we see, that no Physicians, or Advocates, are admitted to practise, but such as have studied in some University.

Order must be given, that Masters cause their Lacquies to learn a Trade, and that for this, they give them, after four years service, 200 Livres, and a suit of Cloaths: or if they serve less time, a sum proportionable after that rate. Nor must it be suffered, that Lacquies have wages given them as is done; because they are ill husbands, and lay up nothing. Their Reward-money must be put in a Publick purse, or into some Merchant's hands, who will be re∣sponsible for it. The share of Lacquies that die, will serve for other Youths that shall be chosen. This would prove an excellent means, for the having of Soldiers: For the Appren∣tices would serve in their turn, on Military occasions: they would go upon the Guard, &c. nor would this take them off from perfecting their skill in the Calling they had chosen. It would too, be profitable, that poor Soldiers have skill in one handicraft or other, and be made to work at it, whenever they are not on the Guard; by this means, they would avoid idling, and get Money for a subsistance.

The Parishes both in Town, and Country, might be obliged to set forth and maintain each of them a Soldier or two in Garison, giving also a sum for their being taught a Trade at the same time. There would be Parishes able to maintain a Man and half, others half a Man,

the rest in proportion to the number of com∣municants in each of them. So the King would have 50000 Men well-nigh in Garison, and a Nursery of Soldiers, without its costing Him a Quardecu; for none must have pay, but old Soldiers: its by taking this course, that the Turks raise their Janizaries, and they become their best Men, and most Warlike.

When the young Men have been a while in Garison, that is, two or three years, they shall be sent to the Army, if there be War on foot: and all recruits shall be rais'd out of the Garisons: by this means they will be rais'd without any expence at all: for instance, if there need a recruit of 4000 Men, each of the Governors shall be ordered to send, one an hundred, another two hundred: and the Men being drawn out of the Garisons, new supplies shall be put in, taken out of the Parishes, which sent the former. Thus the Armies would be alway compos'd of none, but expert Soldiers; which is a matter of exceeding great conse∣quence. I will not prescribe, in what Towns, or in how many places, it is fit to settle Ga∣risons; because this depends on the Kings Will and Pleasure: and Towns, to be chosen for this purpose, need not be nominated; the most commodious, and best scituated are known.

As to those that should be destin'd for Sea∣service, they might be taken out of the same Garisons; and should be taught principally Navigation: but it would be better, to breed them up in the Ships themselves, that they might be accustomed to the Sea. It is fit that

they should understand all the practise of Ma∣riners; and also be Handicrafts men, as well as Soldiers: it would be very good, that some of the number were Carpenters, or at least each of them somewhat skilled in use of the Axe and Adice. If Soldiers both at Sea and on Land were Artificers, their Captains, or others might cause them to work. They should be paid for what they made, and the Person that employed them might fell their work, ei∣ther in gross or by retail: as Garments, Shooes, Cloth, Hatts, Gloves; and this would prove hugely beneficial; all the Soldiers would find con∣tent in it, & hardly one of them fall into debauch.

When the Youngsters have been some time in Garison, and are not needed for recruits, they should be sent home with their Discharge and Certificate. Hereupon they may set up the Trade they have learned, or addict themselves to Husbandry, as they should think most com∣modious for them. The Country Youth, not chosen by the King's Commissioners for the Garisons, should abide in their Parishes, to learn the Art of Husbandry, and be exercised in it.

A like course, as is to be taken with young Men, should also be taken with young Women. There must be School-Mistresses in every City, publickly pay'd, who may teach them all kind of works: the Maids giving them too, some∣thing for a reward. It would do well to use means, that Women, and even those of highest rank, might count it a shame to be unskilfull: work would notably fix their thoughts, and busy them to excellent good purpose.

Of Women I had not yet spoken; nor will I say, of them, ought more: herein I shall Imitate Lycurgus, and besides him Aristotle; who both conceiv'd it not possible, to give them any Rules, and that their temper was so im∣perious, that they could not endure to be re∣strained by Law: this is more to be excused in French Women than in others: 'tis their due to be Mistresses; since they may Glory, upon better Title than the Lacedemonian Dames, that they give birth to Men, who are capable of rendring themselves, by their Va∣lour, Conquerors of all the Earth

It seems to me a fault, that Maids should be suffer'd to Marry at Twelve, and Males at Fourteen, at which Ages the too too indul∣gent Laws have fixed the Puberty of the Sexes. For, as to Nature, it is not possible but per∣sons of those years only must extremely pre∣judice their Health by Marriage, and spend their strength before they have attain'd it. 'Tis the making of young Trees bear Fruit before the time: the Children are without doubt the less vigorous for it. How can the Parents give them, what they as yet have not themselves? Again, Morality and the Laws are concerned in the case: the truth is, when a Girl is put so young into the possession of a Husband, she hath the less of bashfulness and Modesty; nor is Virtue so well secured for her. Besides, at this age, neither Man nor Woman is of under∣standing to know their Duty: and hence it comes, that the Marriages of persons so young are ordinarily attended with no very sure Fe∣licity

and Success. Finally, how can the one or the other, take care of the Affairs of an House, being altogether unexperienced? or duly govern their Children, needing Govern∣ment themselves, and having not, by allow∣ance of the Laws, power to dispose of any thing? So that it must be ordained, they shall not be capable of making a valid contract of Marriage till they have attained, Females, the age of Eighteen years compleat, and Males of Twenty.

CHAP. XIV.

1. How France should act with Forreign Princes, and First with the King of Spain, and King of Portugal. 2. With the Pope, with Venice, with the Prin∣ces of Italy. 3. With the Swisses, with England. 4. With the Emperor and Princes of Germany. 5. With the Hollanders, the Crowns of Denmark, Sweden and Poland. 6. With the Turks, and King of Persia. 7. With the Kings of the Coast of Barbary, and the King of Morocco. 8. With all remote Princes; as the Emperor of the Negroes, Prestor John, the Great Mogul. The other Kings of the Indies, of China, and of Tartary.

HAving treated in the precedent Ceapters, of things Internal to the State: I think it reasonable to speak of Externals and what

course is to be taken in them. For to promote the happiness of People, and govern them dis∣creetly, 'tis not enough, that you regulate their Lives, and their comportment at home, but their ease and well-being must be secur'd against strangers abroad, and principally against their Neighbors. Now Interest being the prime motive unto all States, we ought to consider other Nations, either in quality of Friends, or in that of Enemies; ever accounting of them, according to the advantage we may receive from them, or the damage they may do us. As they on their part take no thought of us, but in proportion to what they fear, or to what they hope for from our Arms. Besides, to treat safely with Forreigners, it is necessary that we know their Designs, their Strength, their Alliances, their Temper, and their Coun∣try. Forasmuch then as Spain shareth with us, at this time, the Concerns of all Europe; and there is not a Power in Christendom, but hath Alliance with the one or the other of these two Crowns, it is meet we examine in the first place, what measures we are to ob∣serve with the Spaniards.

The Council of Spain proceeds with a great deal of slowness; but always with a great deal of Evenness: and since the House of Austria put it in their head to get the Dominion over all Europe: the said Council hath continually steered the same course. The end which these States-men have propos'd to themselves, has been Tyrannical and Unjust; and the means they have made use of to attain it, bad, de∣strustive,

and ill-adjusted, which the declining of their Affairs doth evidently demonstrate. Our Enemies are always Allies of theirs, either co∣vertly, or openly and declared; just in like manner, as they who chuse the King's Protecti∣on, and to be interessed with France, will be Enemies of Spain.

The Emperor is Leagu'd with the Catho∣lick King by Consanguinity, and moreover, by reasons of State. For We are cause of fear to the Empire on the North, and towards Ger∣many, as We are to Spain on the South, and towards Italy. Of all the other Princes, the Duke of Bavaria, seems fastest knit to the House of Austria; and the Pope would, perhaps, be of the Party, did not his Dignity, of being the common Father of Christians, withhold Him; and if He, as a Temporal Prince, did not also apprehend some Irruption on our part.

Spain is a Country yielding little increase; either for that the Ground is barren; or be∣cause the Inhabitants neglect to cultivate it. The discovery of the West-Indies, and the ex∣pulsion of the Moors have dispeopled it. Flan∣ders, and the places in Italy are a charge to Spain, in time of War: and what is rais'd there doth scarce suffice to maintain the Armies and Garisons.

Their Government is hard, and ill to be endured; because they are inflexibly severe; and the Monks, (whose depravation is there at the highest pitch) and Inquisitors, do un∣der pretext of Religion, exercise incredible

grievances. The Spaniards are valiant for their Persons: but Men of Quality despise the Military Profession, as heretofore the Cartha∣ginians did: and the name of Soldier is, in a manner, ignominious with them. They are Idlers, and prefer Pleasure, and a Gallantry, before any thing, be it ever so important, or of greatest consequence.

The King of Spain hath little Money, and much expense to defray. The vanity of the Viceroys and Governors of His places, doth spend Him above measure. The Spaniards are presumptuous, haughty, and provided there be Honour done them, you may treat advan∣tageously with them. Charles V. had reason to say, that the Spaniards seem to be wise; but are not. Their Forces are not at all to be feared; we ruin'd them in the late War; and the Affairs of Portugal have hindred their re∣covering them. The Minority of their King, the Discontent of Don John, and the preten∣sions of some Lords upon the particular King∣doms, which compose the Spanish Monarchy, augment its weakness. Sicily might easily make Insurrection. The Neapolitans upon a pretext of Liberty, such a darling in Italy, would set up for themselves, if they had succors; and perhaps a new Pope would favour our designs there, if he were made to see, that it would be no impossibility for him to make some per∣son of his Family King of Naples, or joyn that Kingdom to the State of the Church, of which he is possess'd already.

If ever the Spaniards be attacked, it must be done with force, and all at once, in Flan∣ders, in Italy, in Spain it self, on the Sea, and on the Coast of Portugal. This is the best method for the French. Such a general effort would produce two effects. The First is, that the Spanish Partisans would be astonish'd, ha∣ving no Forces ready to make resistance. The Second, that all their Enemies would resume Vigor, and might set on foot again their pre∣tensions against them. If a through Conquest be intended, we must not do as was done in the last War: must not make it our business to take all their fortifi'd places, one after an∣other, or to keep them when taken. But this is a matter fit to be discours'd of by it self.

As for Portugal, it's a State, yet under age, and not throughly setled: to us, a perpetual in∣strument for weakning the Spaniard. France hath nothing to fear on that side. It would do well, to convey covertly some Troops, or sums into the Country: and above all, give se∣cretly great hopes unto the French, that are in service there, if they made any important enterprises upon Spain, which would divert their Forces. It would, I say, do very well to order some Soldiers thither, and 'twere to be wish'd, there were so many French in Por∣tugal, that the Partisans might not dare to make a Peace with Spain, for fear of having those same French for Enemies. The Queen of Por∣tugal, who is French, both by Birth, and by Affection, may bear up this Interest; and She may be told, that there is a necessity of it on

Her part, and that Her Fortune depends upon it.

It must be accounted on in all Treating with the Spaniards, that they are every whit as foolish as they seem to be.

The Pope, the Venetians, and all the Prin∣ces of Italy, are of one and the same temper. The Italians are wise and circumspect: nor should we, but very seldom, enter into Ne∣gotiation with them. To reduce them to our intentions, we must work by down-right force, they are weak, and (as I have said) Wise: they are people for Pleasure; their Country is the beautifullest, and best in the World; consequently they love it, and know their In∣terest; they are able to foresee, and fear the ill that may betide them. The Pope will ever consider France, by reason of the County of Avignon, of the consequences of the Con∣cordat of 1618. and because of the Jansenists.

The Venetians are weakned by their War with the Turk; the Dukes of Mantua, of Mo∣dena, and of Florence, and the Genoese can do nothing that's considerable. The Duke of Savoy must never separate from France. We have the entrance into his Estates: and a War with us, but of 3 Months, would utterly ruin him: He may be induc'd to hope, that he shall be reinstated in the Principality of Geneva. If War be made in Italy, the Italians must not have time given them to look about them. As they are the Wisest, so when inur'd to War, they are the bravest upon Earth. In one word, they are the Masters of the Universe.

The Swisses are Mercenaries, who will alway serve the King for his Money.

As for matter of the English, they have not any Friends: themselves be a sort of People without Faith, without Religion, without Ho∣nesty, without any Justice at all, of the great∣est levity that can be, Cruel, Impatient, Glut∣tonous, Proud, Audacious, Covetous, fit for Handy strokes, and a sudden execution; but unable to carry on a War with judgment. Their Country is good enough for sustenance of Life, but not rich enough to afford them means for issuing forth and making any Conquest: accordingly, they never conquered any thing but Ireland, whose Inhabitants are weak, and ill Soldiers. On the contrary, the Romans con∣quer'd them; then the Danes, and the Nor∣mans; in such a manner too, that their pre∣sent Kings are the Heirs of a Conqueror. They hate one another, and are in continual Divisi∣on, either about Religion, or about the Go∣vernment. A War of France for three or four years upon them, would totally ruin them. So, it seems reasonable that we should make no Peace with them, but upon conditi∣ons of greatest advantage for us; unless the King think meet to defer the execution of this Project to another time; or that His Majesty, press'd with the love He hath for His own People, do incline to prefer their ease, before so fair hopes. One had need be a Mo∣narch, to know what it is to love Subjects; as be a Father, to know how Children are lo∣ved.

In fine, if we had a mind to ruin the English, we need but oblige them to keep an Army on foot: and there is no fear that they should make any invasion upon France; that would be their undoubted ruin, if they be not call'd in by some Rebels. Now if they have an Army, they will infallibly make War upon one ano∣ther, and so ruin themselves. You must put them upon making great expences; and for this end, raise a jealousie in them for the Isles of Jersey and Guernsey, of Wight and Man, for the Cinque-Ports, and Ireland: and by that means, oblige them to keep strong Garisons in all those places: this will create a belief in the people that the King formeth great Pro∣jects against their pretended Liberty; and while He is in Arms, His Subjects will hate Him.

They must be wrought to distrusts of one another, by writing Letters in Cypher to some particular persons, and causing them to be in∣tercepted. For (being suspicious and impru∣dent) they will soon be perswaded, that the Letters were seriously written. Some Forces should be landed in Ireland, and in other parts. The Irish may be induced to revolt, as having a mortal hatred for the English. The Scots al∣so will not neglect to set themselves at liber∣ty. Factions must be rais'd, and the Sects favoured against one another; especially the Catholicks, among whom, the Benedictine Monks in particular, should be secretly pro∣mis'd, on the King of England's behalf (wherein it will be easie to deceive them) that they shall be restored to all the Estates, which they once

possessed in the Island, according to the Mona∣sticon there Printed. Upon this, the Monks will move Heaven and Earth, and the Catholicks de∣clare themselves. The rumor, which hath alrea∣dy gone abroad, that the King of England is a Catholick, must be fortifi'd, and so all will fall into utter confusion, and the English Monarchy be in case to be divided.

On the other hand, our League with the Hol∣landers should be renew'd, and they put into a belief, that we will give them all the Trade still: because they have a through Knowledge of it, and are proper for it; whereas the French have no inclination that way, and Nature cannot be forced. They must be told, that now they are come to the happy time for advancing their af∣fairs, and ruining their Competitors in the So∣vereignty of the Northen Seas. Beside these par∣ticulars, if the King give Belle-Isle, or L'Isle Dieu, or the Isle of Ree, to the Knights of Malta, as I have said before, these Knights will make irreconcilable War upon the English, redemand the Commanderies of their Order, and by their courses, and Piracies, oblige them to keep great Fleets at Sea; which will ruine them, by ruin∣ing the profit of their Trade. Mean time, the King shall increase His Strength at Sea; and then finding His Enemies weakned, consum∣mate their Depression, and Subversion.

It is not difficult, to make defence against a∣ny enterprises of the Emperor; for He can∣not make War upon France, though He would: such a War would be too costly for Him; and and to make any progress in it, He must needs

bring into the Field excessive great Armies. But if He armed Him so potently, the Princes of Germany would grow jealous of Him, and make Levies to oppose Him, and to hinder His passage through their Territories: beside, His Hereditary Countrys would be disfurnish'd of Men, and so expos'd to the inroads of the Turks: so that there is no cause to apprehend any thing on the part of the Emperor. On the contrary, He hath intentions to give the King content; because He may receive great succors from Him, in Wars with the Turk, as happen'd of late Years.

The Princes of Germany, whether Catholicks or Protestants, have an equal interest to keep themselves in the King's Protection: for the reasons I noted afore in the Chapter of the Huguenots; so that they will always oppose the Emperors growing greater, on the side of France: as it may be, they would oppose the designs of the King; if He should carry His Arms too far up into Germany. 'Tis the in∣terest of lesser States, that the Kings their Neighbours be equal in Power, that the one may maintain them against the others.

To conclude: the King hath no Allies, whom He should so highly esteem, as the Ger∣mans; there is not a braver Nation, a Nation more open, more honest. Their Original is also ours; They have no Vices; are Just and Faithfull: there is among them an inexhausti∣ble Seminary of good Soldiers: their genero∣sity put Alexander the Great into admiration for 'em; and wrought affection and confidence in

'em, in the first Caesars; who by committin•• their Persons to the virtue of these People entrusted them with the quiet of the Uni¦verse.

The Hollanders will never attempt any thing against France; but keep themselves in our Alli¦ance, as much as possibly they may. They are Rich, and interessed as Merchants commonly are. If the King had relinquish'd them, the•…•… State would have sunk. (which yet by the rules of Policy, cannot last long; Democracie•• being subject to changes.) It would be expedi¦ent, that the King do interpose in their Affairs and some division be raised among them. We can hope for little from their Armies; and they would always be a charge, and expence to us.

The King of Denmark is a Prince, whose State is but of small extent; His whole Strength con∣sists in the King's Protection, who upholds Him against the Suedes his Enemies.

Sueden will never break off from the Interest of France. It's a Country unfertile except in Soldiers; but there being little Money in Sue∣den, and they far of, they can of themselves make no considerable War: they are feared and hated in Germany. So, we ought to consi∣der them, as Instruments, which for our Mo∣ney, we may make use of, to avenge our Quar∣rels, either against the Emperor, or the Ger∣man Princes; or to divert the English and the Holland Forces, when His Majesty makes any enterprise which pleaseth them not.

Poland and Muscovy are of almost no use to

〈…〉〈…〉, except it be to serve us in stopping the en∣••erprises of the Emperour. Furs may be had ••om them; and Cloth, and Silk-stuffs sent ••hem.

The Friendship of the Turks is good for ••rance, to be made use of on occasion against ••he Emperor; and that of the King of Persia, to ••e made use of against the Turks. The one and ••he other may favour our Commerce.

There must be no reliance upon the promises of the Kings of Tripoly, Tunis, and Algier; they ••re Pirates, that take a Pride in breaking their Words, and have no Faith at all. Whenever ••ccasion serves, War must be made upon them, ••nd they attacqued home to their own doors in ••heir Harbours, but with considerable Forces▪ They may be ruin'd in time, by hindring their courses at Sea, and by causing the Tributary Princes to rise against them by Land: as I have observed asore. Upon this, the King, as the Carthaginians did, might employ the Numidian Troops, so much magnified by the Ancients.

The Emperor of Fez and Morocco is a Po∣tent Prince, who's Alliance may be useful to the King against the Spaniards, and for Com∣merce. He is a Mahometan; and I would not have too much trust put in His Oaths.

In fine, when occasions for it are offered, we must not fail to compliment the African Kings, as the Emperors of the Negros, and of the Abys∣sins, then the Great Mogol, and the other Kings of the Indies, of China, of Tartary and Japan▪ letting them know by Presents, the Virtue, the Greatness and Magnificence of the King.

The Conclusion.

Such are the Political Maxims, by which I have judged, that the Subjects of this (French) Mo∣narchy might attain to the possession of a true, and stable felicity; and so, the Heroick labours of the King be Crowned with immortal Glory, and France enjoy in all its parts the highly bene∣ficial Virtue of its incomparable Monarch.

FINIS.