The politicks of France by Monsieur P.H. ... ; with Reflections on the 4th and 5th chapters, wherein he censures the Roman clergy and the Hugonots, by the Sr. l'Ormegreny.

CHAP. VIII.

1. Of Officers of Justice. 2. Of Parli∣ments, and other Supreme Courts. 3. Of Presidial Courts. 4. Of the King's Council. 5. Ʋseful means for the good of the State, in relation to Officers of Justice. 6. Of Sollicitations.

IF men were entirely just to one another, and each of 'em (in the phrase of one of the greatest Greek Philosophers) a Law unto him∣self; there would need neither Law nor Ma∣gistrate to keep them in perfect tranquility. But Nature being corrupted, we no longer consult that Original Righteousness, which is inseparable from reason, and which without in∣termission, inwardly presseth us to render to all their due, as exactly, as we would should be done to ourselves. Always self-love, often ne∣cessity, sometimes hatred, avarice, or one pas∣sion or other, does blind us, and induce us to violate this eminently holy and equitable Law; in such sort also, that we suffer ourselves to be transported unto excesses hard to be believed.

We equally use fraud and force to content our injustice and irregular desires. Whereupon it hath been commodiously done by wise Men, to form, as may be said, a new reason, which they called Law. But because Laws are of no use, except they be armed with Correction to pu∣nish such as despise them; and have some soul, and living principle; therefore Magistrates have been created▪ who are to pronounce the Oracles which those Laws inspire, to put the Laws in Execution, and maintain the Autho∣rity of them. These Officers are chosen of the best and most intelligent Men in a State; and if Common-wealths be duly regulated; ordi∣narily the Rich are preferred before the Poor, and Nobles before Plebeians; because 'tis sup∣posed they have a greater measure of know∣ledge and virtue; and by consequence are less capable of certain mean things, in which a ne∣cessitous condition, and a mean extraction, might engage them. Thus Ministers of Justice in France, call'd Men of the Robe, are in truth necessary in Publick Society. For if there was no evil-doer, Laws and Magistrates would be of no more use, than Joyners, and the Doors they make for the security of Houses, if there were no Thieves: whereas, should not a Man in a whole Kingdom ever swerve from right reason and pure equity; there must neverthe∣less be Priests for Religion; Soldiers for defence against Foreign Invasions that might happen; and People who may some of 'em Till the Ground; others apply themselves to Trades and Manufactures, that Men cannot be with∣out. So that these three sorts of Persons are

inseparable from a Common-wealth; and they make up the Three Estates we have spoken of, which have been receiv'd without any contest.

Yet it seems, that of late, the Parliaments have sought to infuse into some green heads, that they compos'd a Fourth Order in the Kingdom; and the same, not only distinct from the other Three, but altogether superiour to them, by reason of their Sovereignty, and of the Power they have to deliberate upon the pleasure and Edicts of the King. If they should not be brought off from this opinion, perhaps they would draw the other Sovereign Courts and Officers of Judicature into the same Error; an Union of them all not being deniable: because otherwise the affair of Justice would in France, form two bodies; which may not be. But from allowing this Fourth Body in the State, namely that of Justice, a ridiculous inconveni∣ence would follow; to wit, that a Sergeant (or Catchpole) of a Village, would be a mem∣ber of a body superior to that of the Nobility; and by consequence, in some sort, superior to a Marquis. For in matter of Hierarchy, the last of a more excellent Order, is greater than the first of a less excellent one: as the lowest of the Arch-Angels, is greater than the highest of the Angels.

But to clear the difficulty before us, it must be remembred, that heretofore in France, the Estates which were called Parliaments, did as∣semble twice a year for two considerations: one was, to judge of Appeals, that were made from judgments pass'd by inferior Officers. The other, to give the King Counsel when

He demanded their Opinion about Govern∣ment of the State. For alway, during the first and second Race, the King's did dispose of Publick Affairs, as of Peace and War; and this is so much a truth, that if those ancient Parli∣aments had had the disposing of the State, they would never have suffered, that the Children of Lewis, when they had divided the Kingdom among them, should have fallen to make War one upon another; which could tend to nothing but a publick desolation. They would as lit∣tle have permitted the enmities of Brize, Hau∣det, and Fredegonde. In like manner under the Second Race, they would not have endured that the Sons of Lewis the Mild, should act such outrages on their Father, that Charles the Bald should have given Neustria to the Nor∣mans. In the Third Race, that Lewis the Gross should have ruin'd so many great Lords; who made up the greatest-part of the Parlia∣ments: that Lewis the Younger should have yielded up Guienne by the Divorce of Eleanore: that the Count of Burgundy, and the Duke of Britannie, and some others, should have leagu'd together against Queen Blanche. In fine, there are thousand and a thousand examples in Histo∣ry, which▪ do evidence that these Kings always had the free and Sovereign administration of their State: nor will there one be found to prove, that the Parliaments ever contradicted them. They presented themselves at the feet of their Princes, with Petitions, and humble Remonstrances: they made no resistance, nor exercis'd Authority. So that our King's have been King's indeed, always absolute Masters▪

and for proof hereof, it will be sufficient to look into all the Statutes; there it may be seen how they spake, and what part the Estates had in them. The principal end of Parliaments therefore was, to the end the Law-suits of par∣ticular Persons; and people perceiving that Appeals brought to them were received, and sentences invalidated; many, to try Opinions in their cases once again, became Appellants: by this means affairs were multiply'd; and that contesting parties might not have the trouble to come up from the remotest parts of the Kingdom, Deputies of the General Parlia∣ment were appointed, they also stiled Parlia∣ments, and to be ambulatory. The Commis∣sion they had, was sometimes for three Months, sometimes for six, according to exigence of State; but alway by the Command and Letters of the King. These Parliaments went into the Provinces, to judge the causes that were brought them; almost in like manner as we now see done at the Extraordinary Sessions: which in∣stead of diminishing the number of Causes to be dispatch'd, as had been conceiv'd, really augmented them. Philip the Fair saw cause to make such a Parliament sedentary at Paris, another at Rouen, a third at Thoulouse; and succeeding Kings establish'd others in other Cities, as they are at present. From this faith∣ful account it resulteth, that the Parliaments are not a Fourth Body in the State; but be extracted out of the Three ancient Orders; at first they were taken out of the Clergy and Nobility only: because the Commons at that time were not considerable afterwards, These

also were received in. Other Sovereign Soci∣eties are but Images of these Parliaments. As to the Sovereignty of the Parliaments them∣selves, it neither is, nor ever was other, than an emination of the Sovereignty of the King, in whom that Quality is natural, and indivisi∣ble. The Parliaments can pretend to no more than His Majesty may please to impart to them.

The Sale of Offices of Judicature having been introduc'd, there follow'd divers creati∣ons of new Officers, both in matter of the Re∣venue, and also in that of Justice: among o∣thers, those of Presidial Courts were instituted: which perhaps was done, only out of a pecu∣niary interest; a needless degree of Jarisdicti∣on being thereby set up, and such a one as tendeth to the involving and oppression of the Kings Subjects. These Courts are so many petty Parliaments, in judging supreamly, and finally in some cases: yet by the trick of Petty∣fogging Practice, ways are found to get Ap∣peals from judgment pass'd, to be received, and new processes begun, to the vexation and undoing of the parties concern'd. There have been in all times, chief Judges in Towns; as Bailiffs and Seneschals; a thing of indispen∣sible necessity for keeping the People in or∣der: all the fault that can be found in it, is by reason of their number, which certainly is excessive.

'Tis not enough that the King hath Parlia∣ments and other Officers to determinate differen∣among His Subjects: there must also be a Counsel about His Majesty; by whose Advice, He may correct all ill Administration of Justice;

may reverse all Sentences given against the Mind and Intention of the Statutes; and main∣tain Order through the whole extent of His State. This Counsel is the Sacrarium of the Monarchy: and the persons admitted into it, who may justly be stiled the Eyes, the Ears and Hands of the Prince) ought to have a pro∣found Knowledge in Affairs, acquired by long and approved Experiences: They must love the Kingdom, the Kingly Power, and the King's Person. They are the Seminary, whence are taken Intendants of Provinces, Ambassa∣dors and Ministers for Negotiations with Strangers. The Counsel is compos'd at pre∣sent of Gownmen only. It would not be much amiss, nay, on the contrary, it would be very well done: if the King pleased to communi∣cate this Honour unto other Professions, when there were found Persons capable of it: Be∣cause this Preference gives the Gentlemen of the Long Robe too much Authority; whereas there is need of retrenching what they have already; much rather, than of conferring any new advantage upon them, as we shall shew hereafter. As for the Royal Privy Council, in which Secret Affairs are debated, and which ought to be of very few Persons, that Matters may be kept in silence, and not untimously divulged; I will not speak of it in this place; nor say, in what manner it ought to be com∣posed: because this depends upon the plea∣sure of the Master of it; and each King takes a different course in it. There have been Prin∣ces who committed the principal Care of all Affairs to one single person: and France hath

seen, for instance, the Cardinals of Amboise and Richlieu. Others have parted Employ∣ments, and shared them among as many per∣sons as there were different Affairs. So did King Henry the Fourth. This, in my Opini∣on, was the more wisely done; for that in matter of Government, the great Secret is to divide Authority, and hold the ballance even between a plurality of Persons. History teach∣eth us of what consequence it was to our Kings of the first Race; that they had but one Maire of the Palace; and how dear it cost their Poste∣rity. Upon a like reason of State the Roman Emperors divided the charge of the Praetorian Prefect. But Ministers, whatever for num∣ber, must for qualification, be Men of Virtue and approved sufficiency: They likewise, af∣ter the manner of the Aegyptians, ought to be reprehended and punish'd for all that the King does amiss, and contrary to Law.

The incredible number of the Ministers of Justices in France, is in truth, somewhat mon∣strous; Neither is there any disorder in the State, more pressing, or requiring a more speedy Application of the Royal Authority. The truth is, if a Man consider this multitude of Magistrates, will he not have ground to say, that the French are extream hard to be governed, seeing so many great Personages are employed in Governing them? Again, it may be said, That this Nation, so▪ Illustrious by the Glory of its Actions, and by so many Victo∣ries wherewith its Arms have been honoured, is yet incapable of virtuous Inclinations; since there is need of force to reduce them to the

rule of the Laws: though GOD never gave Men a more precious Present. On the other hand, can it be affirmed, that our Legislators wanted Wisdom, or did not sufficiently shew it in making the Laws? Yet if reflection be made upon the multitude of Law-suits, where∣of the vexation is a grievance to the Kingdom, may not a Man perswade himself, that Equity is banish'd thence, and Upright dealing utter∣ly discarded? Should it then hereupon be ta∣ken for granted, that the private sort in France are not good condition'd People; can it be imagin'd that the Publick Government is any thing reasonable and proper for its due ends? But if a Man proceed to penetrate further in∣to the Internals of the State, and there be∣hold what a desolation the corrupting of Ju∣stice hath made, loosning and breaking the most Sacred ties of Friendship; in fine, if he observe how the Monarchy hath often been in danger of subversion, will he not wonder that the Publick Fortune hath held out, and Fami∣lies been born up in the Storms that have so many times turmoild them?

The excessively great multitude of Officers, being the principal cause whence so many mis∣chiefs take their rise; the remedy must be first apply'd thereto. And this remedy is nothing else, but such a retrenchment as is expedient, or, to say better, necessary to be made. The fewer Officers of Justice there are, the more Soldiers and Artificers, and Merchants, and the fewer litigious Actions will be. For it is manifest that business of that kind has ever multiply'd, as the number of Officers hath been

augmented: in like manner, as the more Phy∣sicians, the more Patients. To arrive at the end propos'd, it would be convenient, that af∣ter mature deliberation upon the estate of France, the number of its Inhabitants, and the quantity of Law-business, it be advisedly stated in the King's Council, what number of Offi∣cers were fit to be reserved, and of what qua∣lity they should be; then that the rest be sup∣press'd gradually, as the persons dye away, or at once by a Declaration. What, in my opinion, might particularly be done, is as fol∣lows.

First, The Presidial Courts being compos'd of Officers that are needless to the State, a charge unto the People; having also but a no∣vel interloping Jurisdiction, the fruit of an evil Counsel given to King Henry II. and a mere invention to get Money; the extinction of them is not to be doubted of; but effected by a substraction of the Officers Annuities. By this means the King will save that Pay, which amounts unto a Sum considerable to the State; and the Royal Jurisdictions, each in its Pre∣cinct, may do what those Presidials, upon which they depend, are wont to do. The Presidial Clerks place, its being engaged, (or bound for security to one or other) as is usual, should not hinder the execution of this. Aflair: And when by decease there are no more Officers left, care shall be taken of the concern of those to whom the places were engaged, the regu∣lating whereof will by that time have no dif∣ficulty in it.

Secondly, Of Sergeants, Two Thirds whol∣ly must be suppress'd.

In the Third place, all Proctors, that are not Advocates; and a certain number of Advo∣cates should be appointed in each Parliament and Jurisdiction, who might do the Office of Proctors. This is not incompatible. For the thing is already in use many parts of France. The benefit of this regulation is manifest; in that the Proctors are very ignorant that have but a slight tincture of practice; yet out of Covetousness they often draw up Writings for their Clients, and make them pay as dear for 'em, as if the best Advocate had taken the pains. Mean time these Writings, for the most part, are nothing worth; and the poor Suitors frequently lose good Causes, through the naughtiness of their Proctors, and for want of being well defended. Again, such an order taken, another advantage would accrue, name∣ly, that Advocates being Proctors, they will be obliged to follow what the Judges shall pre∣scribe them; whereas at present they make a jest of it, and will not Plead but when they please. There cannot be a regulation made in France more profitable in matter of Justice; and if the King, in a necessity of State, would make a Money matter of it, which might at any time be done, there would be rais'd out of it, for all France, more than 20 Millions. But it had need be gone about with a great deal of Address. A Third advantage by this regu∣lation is, That all Advocates being Proctors, there would no more slip into the Court a sort of young Men, who shelter their Ignorance

and Idleness under a Lawyers Gown and a square Cap.

In the Fourth place, All the Masters of Requests belonging to the Palace, or Court (of Justice) of France, should be supprest. And the Truth is, it seems to me a contradi∣ction, that these Officers should be Counsellors of Supreme Courts, yet not impowred to judge any thing supreamly. But that the Common∣ers of the King's Houshold and other privi∣ledged persons, may not be depriv'd of the benefit of the Committimus, Power must be given them by special priviledge, to com∣mence their Actions, and prosecute them in a Chamber of Enquests. I say, by special pri∣viledge, because I know the Parliaments take no cognizance ordinarily, save of Appeals: but in the case now expres'd, this special pri∣viledge shall superadd to them this new kind of Jurisdiction. And it will be highly advan∣tageous to those Commoners and Priviledg'd persons; for by this▪ Expedient they would get a decree speedily upon one Trial, and fi∣nally end their business. It is to be noted here, that the first stating of Cases, in order to an Hearing, is not so incompetent to Parliaments, but that they do the thing for substance, upon demands incidentally made. Yet this is meant only in behalf of priviledged persons, and all such as claim the right of a Committimus.

Fifthly, The Judges Provosts of Towns are to be suppress'd, and they laid to the Sene∣schalsies and Bayliwicks. For, what are so many different Officers in one and the same Town good for?

In a Sixth place, All the Courts of the Aids should be united to the Parliaments; and this done, when the Officers of the Supream Court in each kind, have been reduc'd to the number which its judged meet to retain. I will say more of this in the Chapter of the Finances.

Seventhly, All the Elections are to be sup∣press'd, and the Assessing of Parishes, done by the Treasurers of France; of the Seneschalsies, by the Lieutenant of the Province. I shall speak more plainly of it in the Chapter of the Finances and Taxes. Where also the Sup∣pression of Store-houses of Salt, and of the Gabells, shall be treated of in the Article of Gabells. Besides, the Chamber of the Trea∣sury, and the Court of Moneys, should be joyn∣ed to the Chamber of Accompts; and half of all the Chambers be suppress'd likewise. For thirty Officers may do all that the Chamber of Accompts, the Treasury, and the Court of Mo∣nies now do, In fine, it is for the King's Ser∣vice, and the good of the State, that all the Presidents Places be suppress'd, as well those of Superior Courts, as of others: and the Of∣fice of Presidents be discharged by Commission. 'Tis to be consider'd▪ that this new Order would much augment the King's Authority. For what will not Counsellors do to obtain a Commission to preside? and having obtained it, what will they not further do to keep and confirm them∣selves in it? 'Tis pertinent to recall to mind here, that the Mighty Prince Philip the Fair, at his making the Parliament Sedentary, made the Count of Burgundy first President of it. And that anciently, the first President of the Cham∣ber

of Accompts was the chief Butler of France: Likewise, that at that time, and long after, the Chancellors of France were of the Church, or of the Sword; and great Dignities not gi∣ven to Men of the Robe privatively. Which being done since, without doubt gives them too much credit, and leaves the Nobility too little. It is important that the thing be not continued, but on the contrary, all restored to Primitive Order. As for Country Courts, 'tis fit they be narrowly limited, and brought to be meerly predial and dominial; that is, for Rents and the Fealties of Lordships: not capable of de∣termining an Inventory, or receiving a suit be∣tween parties, for more than three Livres. To conclude, the shortning of proceedings in Law, would much conduce to the reduction of Offi∣cers.

Let it not be objected, that this reduction of Officers, and such a multitude of Suppressions, will ruin a multitude of Families. For though it were so, yet should not the thing be stuck at; the Reformation of a State being concern'd: nor is the ill of particular persons to be put to accompt, when the Weal of the Publick is in question, GOD Himself, who is King of Kings, and Eternally Just, how many men did He destroy by that universal deluge for the Reformation of the Universe? How many Isra∣lites did He cut off in the Wilderness, to save the gross of the People? There is plenty of examples in this kind, and Soveraigns have a right to do like things with like Justice, when the general welfare of their Subjects is con∣cern'd. Kings are Eagles, to whom GOD

gives His Thunder-bolts to carry: the strokes that come from their hands do come from the hand of GOD, whose Images and Instruments they are.

To conclude, it's a thing which cannot be dissembled, that the Parliaments, constituting an Aristocratick Government in part, as they do, are quite contrary to Monarchick Govern∣ment. Aristocracy is adverse to Regality; because of all Governments it comes nearest to it. As, to use the very terms of Hesiod, a Pot∣ter envies, and is against a Potter. Be it re∣membred here briefly, that Theopompus King of Sparta having created the Ephori, at last after a great deal of time, Cleomenes was fain to put them to death; when they had slain King Agis. The Senate becoming too potent, overthrew the first Roman Monarchy, and in one word, what hath our Age seen in the trial of Chenailles? and what did a former in that of Chancellor Poyet?

A second source from which the Evils of litigious suits do arise, is the sale of Magistra∣cies. The Emperor Alexander Severus sound this mischief in his Empire; it having been introduced by Domician. S. Lewis saw cause to weed the abuse out of His Kingdom; it ha∣ving got in through the confusion and trouble of some precedent Reigns. It will be glorious for the King to do in His State what the Em∣perour Severus and S. Lewis did in theirs, with greatest glory to their Memory. But as Policy requires, that in such enterprises, way be made by degrees, and greatest events brought on by small beginnings: so it is necessary here, to

proceed leisurely, and with measured steps. The fixation of Offices hath been much ad∣vanced already: for though what hath been done seemed to signifie an authorizing the sale of them: yet in truth, there hath been ground gotten. To continue the work, and bring it to perfection, there must a Decree pass, or a Declaration be made, and publish'd at the Seal, by which the King declares, that he pur∣poseth no longer to admit any opposition in matter of Title to Offices. This is just; for the King ought to be ever Master, and have the liberty to bestow the charges of His King∣dom on whom he pleaseth, and thinks worthy of 'em. Thus no one will be alarm'd: but this Declaration will extend unto the price it self, by a consequence easily deducible; name∣ly, since the principal and essential right to Offices consisteth in the Title, and the price is but an accessory, as they term it: 'tis reason∣able, that the price alway follow the Law of the Title: as the Title to a Benefice brings in the Revenue of it; And as in Marriage, the Validity of the Sacrament makes the Validity of the Contract, and of the civil effects. Thus receiving no more opposition at the Seal for the Title; there neither will be any in reference to the price: and hence it will come to pass, in tract of time, that Offices will be no longer security for Money; which will diminish the price of them, and insensibly bring it to nothing. But it is very just too, that the Mortgaging of Offices, as hath been done hitherto, be ob∣structed for the future. For the Officer may dye before he hath paid the Paulette; whereby his

Office is extinct; or if of Grace the King re∣vives it, the value of what ariseth from the casualty, is much less than the sum for which the thing was engag'd: so that there must loss certainly accrue. But if the King make a new creation of an Officer, all engagements are gone: for 'tis then no longer the Office that formerly it was.

Let it not be said, that without the Sale of Offices, the Casualties will be worth the King nothing. For the contrary is true: and if the Casualties be worth Him Two Millions, by rea∣son of that sale of them, His Majesty will make Four Millions of 'em, if they be no longer saleable. Forasmuch as in this Case, they will be no longer Hereditary; and being no more Hereditary, they will revert to the King upon the decease of every Titulary: and so the King may dispose of 'em in favour of the Person that is most acceptable to Him, and if it please His Majesty, the new admitted Officer may fine to the Coffers of His Treasury Royal, as the Officers of Gentlemen do to the profit of the Monasticks. As to the Objection, that by such suppression of Officers and Jurisdictions, and taking away the sale of Offices, the King will lose the Revenue of many of His Clerks places, and of the Paulette; The Answer is easie; for as to the Clerks places suppress'd, the King will be recompenc'd by the greater value of those that shall remain; and as for the Paulette, the retrenchment of the wages of the Officers suppress'd, will be much more considerable.

A third cause of vexatious Law-driving is, that Offices of Judicature are gainful to those

that execute them. An evil this, the dange∣rousest of any that can affect a State; for all becomes suspected, all becomes corrupt where profit is to be made; Avarice and Ambition creep in; Justice, Uprightness, and Truth, de∣part: whereupon we may conclude with the ancient Proverb, That Money doth many things which the Devil cannot do. For an entrance up∣on a Reformation in this matter, it would be good to ordain, First, That Judges not the Kings, should take no more Spices. Secondly, That Judges in the Royal Courts should not decree Executions for their attendance against the parties that are in contest. Thirdly, That if Spices, (or Fees upon sentence obtained) be allowed, the parties shall give what they will, as the former custom was, and not be compelled. Fourthly, That there be no more transacting by Commissaries in Sovereign Courts.

Judges should be forbidden to admit any sol∣licitation from parties at Law, even though it be but to let them know the difficulties of their Affairs, and put them in a way to clear the same. For a Judge ought not to be prayed to do his Office, in favour of a man whose case is good, much less of one whose case is bad.